Thornton vs. Thornton, G.R. No.

154598
August 16, 2004, J. Corona

Facts: Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth
to a baby girl. However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her
old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. Whenever petitioner was out of
the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7,
2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she
was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed,
presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts
of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan,
issued a certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there.

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls from different places
such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this
time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case.
It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a
writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated
in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural
expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter.

Issue: WON there is an implied repeal of RA 7902 by RA 8369.

Held: Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes,
what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation
may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction. In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word
"exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" under
the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal
technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.

Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est
optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject."
 The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369,
RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

Petition granted.

Samson vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113166

February 1, 1996, J. Regalado

Facts: Petitioner has been employed with private respondent Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., Manila, Inc. (AG & P) in the
latter's various construction projects since April, 1965, in the course of which employment he worked essentially as a rigger,
from laborer to rigger foreman. From 1977 up to 1985, he was assigned to overseas projects of AG & P, particularly in Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia.
On November 5, 1989, petitioner filed a complaint for the conversion of his employment status from project
employee to regular employee. Petitioner alleged therein that on the basis of his considerable and continuous length of service
with AG & P, he should already be considered a regular employee and, therefore, entitled to the benefits and privileges
appurtenant thereto.
Respondent AG & P then insists that petitioner is merely a project employee for several reasons. First, the factual
findings of respondent commission, which is supported by substantial evidence, is already conclusive and binding and,
therefore, entitled to respect by this Court. Second, Department Order No. 19 amended Policy Instruction No. 20 by doing away
with the required notice of termination upon completion of the project. Hence, non-compliance with the required report, which
is only one of the "indicators" for project employment, no longer affixes a prescription of regular employment, by reason of
which the doctrine laid down in the Caramol case no longer applies to the case at bar. In addition, Department Order No. 19
allows the re-hiring of employees without making them regular employees, aside from the fact that the word "rehiring"
connotes new employment. Third, on the basis of petitioner's project employment contracts, his services were engaged for a
fixed and determinable period which thus makes each employment for every project separate and distinct from one another.
Consequently, the labor arbiter supposedly erred in taking into account petitioner's various employments in the past in
determining his length of service, considering that upon completion of a project, the services of the project employee are
deemed terminated, his employment being coterminous with each project or phase of the project to which he is assigned.
The Solicitor General fully agrees with petitioner, with the observation that the evidence indubitably shows that after
a particular project has been accomplished, petitioner would be re-hired immediately the following day save for a gap of one (l)
day to one (1) week from the last project to the succeeding one; and that between 1965 to 1977, there were at least fifty (50)
occasions wherein petitioner was hired by private respondent for a continuous period of time. He hastens to add that
Department Order No. 19, which purportedly superseded Policy Instruction No. 20, cannot be given retroactive effect because
at the time petitioner's complaint was filed, the latter issuance was still in force.
Issue: WON Department Order No. 19 should be given retroactive effect in order that the notice of termination
requirement may be dispensed with in this case for a correlative ruling on the presumption of regularity of employment which
normally arises in case of non-compliance therewith.
Held: When the present action for regularization was filed on November 5, 1989 and during the entire period of
petitioner's employment with private respondent prior to said date, the rule in force then was Policy Instruction No. 20 which,
in the fourth paragraph thereof, required the employer company to report to the nearest Public Employment Office the fact of
termination of a project employee as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which he is employed.
Furthermore, contrary to private respondent's asseveration, Department Order No. 19, which was issued on April 1, 1993, did
not totally dispense with the notice requirement but, instead, made provisions therefor and considered it as one of the
"indicators" that a worker is a project employee.
This is evident in Section 2.2 thereof which provides that:
(e) The termination of his employment in the particular project/undertaking is reported to the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office having jurisdiction over the workplace within 30 days following the date of his
separation from work, using the prescribed form on employees' terminations dismissals suspensions.
 More importantly, it must be emphasized that the notice of termination requirement has been retained by express
provision of Department Order No. 19 under Section 6.1 thereof, to wit:
6.1. Requirements of labor and social legislations. (a) The construction company and the general contractor and/or
subcontractor referred to in Sec. 2.5 shall be responsible for the workers in its employ on matters of compliance with
the requirements of existing laws and regulations on hours of work, wages, wage related benefits, health, safety and
social welfare benefits, including submission to the DOLE-Regional Office of Work Accident/Illness Report, Monthly
Report on Employees' Terminations/Dismissals/Suspensions and other reports. . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Perforce, we agree with the labor arbiter that private respondent's failure to report the termination of petitioner's
services to the nearest Public Employment Office, after completion of every project or a phase thereof to which he is assigned,
is a clear indication that petitioner was not and is not a project employee.
On the bases of the foregoing, the retroactivity or prospectivity of Department Order No. 19 would normally be of no
moment. At any rate, even if the new issuance has expressly superseded Policy Instruction No. 20, the same cannot be given
retroactive effect as such an application would be prejudicial to the employees and would run counter to the constitutional
mandate on social justice and protection to labor. Furthermore, this view that we take is more in accord with the avowed
purpose of Department Order No. 19 "to ensure the protection and welfare of workers employed" in the construction industry,
and which interpretation may likewise be inferred from a reading of Section 7 thereof, applied corollarily to this case, which
provides that "nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the diminution or reduction of benefits being enjoyed by
employees at the time of issuance hereof."
It is a basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. The interpretation
herein handed down gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of
the Labor Code that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor." 7
The mandate in Article 281 of the Labor Code, which pertinently prescribes that "the provisions of written agreement
to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer" and that "any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service
is continuous or broken shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such actually exists," should apply in the case of herein petitioner.
NLRC decision is reversed and set aside.

PAGCOR vs. PEJI, G.R. No. 177333

April 24, 209, J. Carpio Morales
Facts: Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February 23, 1995, created the
Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law
gives the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f), viz:
Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities,
including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities;
Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent Philippine
E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance.
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as such licensor/regulator to the
international business and gaming community, drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the
present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the
operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE. PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof,
does not give power or authority to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of
chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
PAGCOR maintains that Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
to operate, license, or authorize entities to operate games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and "amusement"
employed therein do not include "games of chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes, ZAMBOECOZONE Authority’s grant of license to
private respondent PEJI encroached on its (PAGCOR’s) authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis the above-stated
special laws to centralize and regulate all games of chance.
Issue: WON the authority of ZAMBOECOZONE to operate/license games includes “games of chance/gambling.”

Held: The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate
and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on its own, either directly or
through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and
sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention
or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non
est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly different from
"game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a
pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment. On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which
chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value against an
uncertain event in hope of gaining something of value."
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 8 Not any of these instances is present in the case at bar,
however. Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude "games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead
to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have easily
employed the words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to operate
the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922 enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903. But they did
not.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related activities
including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and
gambling casinos.
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the President, the latter’s interpretation
of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical construction. In
applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases thereof – factors leading the courts
to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors include the
respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the
statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or
improvements in the statute.
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to operate and/or license games of
chance/gambling.
Petition granted.

Compagnie Financiere Sucres Et Denrees vs. CIR

G.R. No. 133834, August 28, 2006, J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
Facts: On October 21, 1991, petitioner transferred its eight percent (8%) equity interest in the Makati Shangri-La Hotel
and Resort, Incorporated to Kerry Holdings Ltd. (formerly Sligo Holdings Ltd), as shown by a Deed of Sale and Assignment of
Subscription and Right of Subscription of the same date. Transferred were (a) 107,929 issued shares of stock valued at P100.00
per share with a total par value of P10,792,900.00; (b) 152,031 with a par value of P100.00 per share with a total par value of
P15,203,100.00; (c) deposits on stock subscriptions amounting to P43,147,630.28; and (d) petitioner’s right of subscription. On
November 29, 1991, petitioner paid the documentary stamps tax and capital gains tax on the transfer under protest.
On October 21, 1993, petitioner filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, herein respondent, a claim for
refund of overpaid capital gains tax in the amount of P107,869.00 and overpaid documentary stamps taxes in the sum of
P951,830.00 or a total of P1,059,699.00. Petitioner alleged that the transfer of deposits on stock subscriptions is not a
sale/assignment of shares of stock subject to documentary stamps tax and capital gains tax.
However, respondent did not act on petitioner’s claim for refund. Thus, on November 19, 1993, petitioner filed with
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a petition for review,

In its Decision dated October 6, 1995, the CTA denied petitioner’s claim for refund. The CTA held that it is clear from
Section 176 of the Tax Code that sales "to secure the future payment of money or for the future transfer of any bond, due-bill,
certificates of obligation or stock" are taxable. Furthermore, petitioner admitted that it profited from the sale of shares of
stocks. Such profit is subject to capital gains tax.
Issue: WON assignment of deposits on stock subscriptions is subject to documentary stamps tax and capital gains tax.
Held: Along with police power and eminent domain, taxation is one of the three basic and necessary attributes of
sovereignty. Thus, the State cannot be deprived of this most essential power and attribute of sovereignty by vague implications
of law. Rather, being derogatory of sovereignty, the governing principle is that tax exemptions are to be construed in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority; and he who claims an exemption must be able to justify
his claim by the clearest grant of statute.
In the instant case, petitioner seeks a refund. Tax refunds are a derogation of the State’s taxing power. Hence, like tax
exemptions, they are construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the State. Consequently, he who claims a
refund or exemption from taxes has the burden of justifying the exemption by words too plain to be mistaken and too
categorical to be misinterpreted. Significantly, petitioner cannot point to any specific provision of the National Internal
Revenue Code authorizing its claim for an exemption or refund. Rather, Section 176 of the National Internal Revenue Code
applicable to the issue provides that the future transfer of shares of stocks is subject to documentary stamp tax, thus:
SEC. 176. Stamp tax on sales, agreements to sell, memoranda of sales, deliveries or transfer of due-bills, certificates of
obligation, or shares or certificates of stock. – On all sales, or agreements to sell, or memoranda of sales, or deliveries, or
transfer of due-bills, certificates of obligation, or shares or certificates of stock in any association, company, or corporation, or
transfer of such securities by assignment in blank, or by delivery, or by any paper or agreement, or memorandum or other
evidences of transfer or sale whether entitling the holder in any manner to the benefit of such due bills, certificates of
obligation or stock, or to secure the future payment of money, or for the future transfer of any due-bill, certificates of
obligation or stock, there shall be collected a documentary stamp tax of fifty centavos (P1.50) on each two hundred
pesos(P200.00), or fractional part thereof, of the par value of such due-bill, certificates of obligation or stock: Provided, That
only one tax shall be collected on each sale or transfer of stock or securities from one person to another, regardless of whether
or not a certificate of stock or obligation is issued, indorsed, or delivered in pursuance of such sale or transfer ; and Provided,
further, That in case of stock without par value the amount of the documentary stamp tax herein prescribed shall be equivalent
to twenty-five percentum (25%) of the documentary stamp tax paid upon the original issue of the said stock. (Emphasis
supplied).
Clearly, under the above provision, sales to secure "the future transfer of due-bills, certificates of obligation or
certificates of stock" are liable for documentary stamp tax. No exemption from such payment of documentary stamp tax is
specified therein.
Petitioner contends that the assignment of its "deposits on stock subscription" is not subject to capital gains tax
because there is no gain to speak of. In the Capital Gains Tax Return on Stock Transaction, which petitioner filed with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, the acquisition cost of the shares it sold, including the stock subscription is P69,143,630.28. The transfer
price to Kerry Holdings, Ltd. is P70,332,869.92. Obviously, petitioner has a net gain in the amount of P1,189,239.64. As the CTA
aptly ruled, " a tax on the profit of sale on net capital gain is the very essence of the net capital gains tax law. To hold otherwise
will ineluctably deprive the government of its due and unduly set free from tax liability persons who profited from said
transactions."
We reiterate the well-established doctrine that as a matter of practice and principle, this Court will not set aside the
conclusion reached by an agency, like the CTA, especially if affirmed by the Court of Appeals. By the very nature of its function, it
has dedicated itself to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject,
unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority on its part, which is not present here.
Petition denied.
 Manaya vs. Alabang Country Club, Inc
G.R. No. 168988, J. Chico-Nazario

Facts: Petitioner alleged that on 21 August 1989, he was initially hired by the respondent as a maintenance helper
receiving a salary of P198.00 per day. He was later designated as company electrician. He continued to work for the respondent
until 22 August 1998 when the latter, through its Engineering and Maintenance Department Manager, Engr. Ronnie B. de la Cruz,
informed him that his services were no longer required by the company. Petitioner alleged that he was forcibly and illegally
dismissed without cause and without due process on 22 August 1998. Hence, he filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter. He
claimed that he had not committed any infraction of company policies or rules and that he was not paid his service incentive
leave pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay. He further asserted that with his more or less nine years of service with the
respondent, he had become a regular employee. He, therefore, demanded his reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
with full backwages and all monetary benefits due him.

In its Answer, respondent denied that petitioner was its employee. It countered by saying that petitioner was
employed by First Staffing Network Corporation (FSNC), with which respondent had an existing Memorandum of Agreement
dated 21 August 1989. Thus, by virtue of a legitimate job contracting, petitioner, as an employee of FSNC, came to work with
respondent, first, as a maintenance helper, and subsequently as an electrician. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint insisting that petitioner had no cause of action against it.

The NLRC found that respondent’s counsel of record Atty. Angelina A. Mailon of Monsod, Valencia and Associates
received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on or before 11 December 2000 as shown by the postal stamp or registry return
card. Said counsel did not file a withdrawal of appearance. Instead, a Memorandum of Appeal dated 26 December 2000 was
filed by the respondent’s new counsel, Atty. Arizala of Tierra and Associates Law Office. Reckoned from 11 December 2000, the
date of receipt of the Decision by respondent’s previous counsel, the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal by its new counsel on
26 December 2000 was clearly made beyond the reglementary period. The NLRC held that the failure to perfect an appeal
within the statutory period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. The appeal having been belatedly filed, the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter had become final and executory.

Issue: WON it is right to give due course to the Appeal of respondent even if said appeal was filed beyond
reglementary period of ten (10) days for perfecting an appeal.

Held: In granting the petition, the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the case of Aguam v. Court of Appeals, where this
Court held that litigation must be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. The appellate court further justified the grant
of respondent’s petition by saying that the negligence of its counsel should not bind the respondent.

The Court of Appeals gave credence to respondent’s claim that its lawyer abandoned the case; hence, they were not
effectively represented by a competent counsel. It further held that the respondent, upon its receipt of the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter on 15 December 2000, filed its appeal on 26 December 2000 through a new lawyer. The appeal filed by
respondent through its new lawyer on 26 December 2000 was well within the reglementary period, 25 December 2000 being a
holiday.

It is axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client. In the absence of a
notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel, the Court will rightly assume that the counsel of record continues to represent
his client and receipt of notice by the former is the reckoning point of the reglementary period. As heretofore adverted, the
original counsel did not file any notice of withdrawal. Neither was there any intimation by respondent at that time that it was
terminating the services of its counsel.

For negligence not to be binding on the client, the same must constitute gross negligence as to amount to a
deprivation of property without due process. This does not exist in the case at bar. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding
upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to
appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on its face

Remarkably, in highly exceptional instances, we have allowed the relaxing of the rules on the application of the
reglementary periods of appeal.

In Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, we excused the delay of four days in the filing of a notice of appeal
because the questioned decision of the trial court was served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her
 counsel of record was already dead. Her new counsel could only file the appeal four days after the
prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453, we allowed the
perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice
since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then
been devoted for educational purposes. In Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 38, 41,
we accepted a tardy appeal considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially
settled, with finality, in another case. The dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant
being ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee.

We pronounced in those cases that technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.

In all these, the Court allowed liberal interpretation given the extraordinary circumstances that justify a deviation from
an otherwise stringent rule.

Clearly, emphasized in these cases is that the policy of liberal interpretation is qualified by the requirement that there
must be exceptional circumstances to allow the relaxation of the rules.

Absent exceptional circumstances, we adhere to the rule that certain procedural precepts must remain inviolable, like
those setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to
appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail oneself of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The rules,
particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial
business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory.
Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.

In this particular case, we adhere to the strict interpretation of the rule for the following reasons:

Firstly, in this case, entry of judgment had already been made which rendered the Decision of the Labor Arbiter as
final and executory.

Secondly, it is a basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and in interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and
its implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. The
interpretation herein made gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article
4 of the Labor Code that “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.”

In the case of Bunagan v. Sentinel we declared that:

[T]hat the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory, but
jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory and deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal. The underlying purpose of this
principle is to prevent needless delay, a circumstance which would allow the employer to wear out the efforts and
meager resources of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained to settle for less than what is due him. This
Court has declared that although the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be
liberal in the interpretation of the rules in deciding labor cases, such liberality should not be applied where it would
render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted. The liberal interpretation stems from
the mandate that the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration . We see no
reason in this case to waive the rules on the perfection of appeal.

The Court is aware that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and is allowed
to be liberal in the interpretation of rules in deciding labor cases. However, such liberality should not be
applied in the instant case as it would render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is
adopted. The liberal interpretation in favor of labor stems from the mandate that the workingman’s welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
 Indeed, there is no room for liberality in the instant case “as it would render futile the very purpose for which the
principle of liberality is adopted.” As so rightfully enunciated, “the liberal interpretation in favor of labor stems from the
mandate that the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.” This Court has repeatedly
ruled that delay in the settlement of labor cases cannot be countenanced. Not only does it involve the survival of an employee
and his loved ones who are dependent on him for food, shelter, clothing, medicine and education; it also wears down the
meager resources of the workers to the point that, not infrequently, they either give up or compromise for less than what is due
them.

Without doubt, to allow the appeal of the respondent as what the Court of Appeals had done and remand the case to
the NLRC would only result in delay to the detriment of the petitioner. In Narag v. National Labor Relations Commission, citing
Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission we held that delay in most instances gives the
employers more opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defenses, what with well-paid talented lawyers they can afford,
but even to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the workers, to the point that not infrequently the latter either give
up or compromise for less than what is due them.

Nothing is more settled in our jurisprudence than the rule that when the conflicting interest of loan and capital are
weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and
compassion the law must accord the under-privileged worker.

Petition granted.