FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE

Trajano v. Marcos (1992)

FACTS: In August of 1977, Ferdinand Marcos was President of the Philippines, Marcos-
Manotoc was the National Chairman of the Kabataang Baranggay, and Fabian Ver was
in charge of military intelligence. Archimedes Trajano was a student at the Mapua
Institute of Technology. On the 31st of August, Trajano went to an open forum
discussion at which Marcos-Manotoc was speaking. When Trajano asked a question
about her appointment as director of an organization, he was kidnapped, interrogated,
and tortured to death by military intelligence personnel who were acting under Ver's
direction, pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos, and under the authority of Ver,
Marcos, and Marcos-Manotoc. He was tortured and murdered for his political beliefs and
activities. Marcos-Manotoc controlled the police and military intelligence personnel who
tortured and murdered Trajano, knew they were taking him to be tortured, and caused
Trajano's death.

After former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter, Imee Marcos-
Manotoc, fled to Hawaii in 1986, they were sued in federal court by Agapita Trajano, a
citizen of the Philippines who then lived in Hawaii, for the torture and wrongful death of
Trajano's son, Archimedes, in the Philippines on August 31, 1977. Marcos-Manotoc did
not appear and a default judgment was entered against her. On appeal, she contends
that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, and
that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, does not authorize a federal court to assert
jurisdiction, over actions taken by a foreign government against its own citizens.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Imee has immunity under Foreign Services Immunities Act
2. W/N the court has jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute (Sec. 1350. The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.)
3. W/N the court has subject matter jurisdiction under Art. III of US Constitution in
this case
4. W/N Trajano has a separate, substantive claim

HELD:
1. NO. A "foreign state" under the Act includes "an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).5 We have, in turn, held that an "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state" for purposes of the FSIA includes individuals
acting in their official capacity. Therefore, because Marcos- Manotoc's default
concedes that she controlled the military police, the FSIA is implicated and we
must be satisfied that it does not bar jurisdiction, even though the issue was not
raised in the district court.

In Chuidian, we held that the FSIA covers a foreign official acting in an official
capacity, but that an official is not entitled to immunity for acts which are not
committed in an official capacity (such as selling personal property), and for acts
beyond the scope of her authority (for example, doing something the sovereign
has not empowered the official to do). Marcos-Manotoc's default makes the
application of both cases easy in this case, for she has admitted acting on her
 own authority, not on the authority of the Republic of the Philippines.10 Under
these circumstances, her acts cannot have been taken within any official
mandate and therefore cannot have been acts of an agent or instrumentality of a
foreign state within the meaning of the FSIA.

2. YES. It requires a claim by an alien, a tort, and a violation of international law.

Trajano's complaint alleges that she and her son were citizens of the Philippines,
and that her claims for relief arise under wrongful death statutes and various
international declarations. There is no doubt, as the district court found, that
causing Trajano's death was wrongful, and is a tort. Nor, in view of Marcos-
Manotoc's default, is there any dispute that Trajano's death was caused by
torture. And, as we have recently held, "it would be unthinkable to conclude other
than that acts of official torture violate customary international law." We believe,
therefore, that Trajano's suit as an alien for the tort of wrongful death, committed
by military intelligence officials through torture prohibited by the law of nations, is
within the jurisdictional grant of § 1350.

Marcos-Manotoc argues, however, that the district court erred in assuming

jurisdiction of a tort committed by a foreign state's agents against its nationals
outside of the United States, and having no nexus to this country. Regardless of
the extent to which other principles may appropriately be relied upon, the
prohibition against official torture "carries with it the force of a jus cogens norm,"
which " 'enjoy[s] the highest status within international law.' " Under international
law, any state that engages in official torture violates jus cogens." We therefore
conclude that the district court did not err in founding jurisdiction on a violation of
the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture.

3. YES. We agree that a jurisdictional statute may not alone confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts, and that the rights of the parties must stand or fall on federal
substantive law to pass constitutional muster.

Because federal courts must first determine whether foreign sovereigns or

individual officials are immune before allowing suits against them to proceed, "a
suit against a foreign state under [the FSIA] necessarily raises questions of
substantive federal law at the very outset, and hence clearly 'arises under' federal
law, as that term is used in Art. III.

Although Marcos-Manotoc's default concedes that she controlled the military

intelligence personnel who tortured and murdered Trajano, and in turn that she
was acting under color of the martial law declared by then-President Marcos, we
have concluded that her actions were not those of the Republic of the Philippines
for purposes of sovereign immunity under Chuidian. Nevertheless, when
questions of sovereign immunity under the FSIA are raised, as they have been
here, Verlinden controls. Under Verlinden, subject-matter jurisdiction over this
action satisfies Article III.

Thus, in addition to resolving the defendant's immunity, for a court to determine

whether a plaintiff has a claim for a tort committed in violation of international law,
it must decide whether there is an applicable norm of international law, whether it
is recognized by the United States, what its status is, and whether it was violated
in the particular case. We therefore hold that Congress had power through the
 "Arising Under" Clause of Article III of the Constitution to enact the Alien Tort
Statute, and that exercising jurisdiction over Trajano's claims against Marcos-
Manotoc comports with Article III.

4. YES. Since Marcos-Manotoc's appeal is only to the extent the district court
founded Trajano's right to sue on treaties or the law of nations, it lacks merit
because the tort is admitted. That it was committed in violation of international
law supplies the jurisdictional key to federal court under § 1350. For these
reasons we affirm the judgment in Trajano's favor. Her suit as an alien against
Marcos-Manotoc for having caused the wrongful death of her son, by official
torture in violation of a jus cogens norm of international law, properly invokes the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under § 1350.

Hilao v. Estate Of Ferdinand Marcos 92-15526 (1994)

FACTS:
During Ferdinand Marcos' tenure as President of the Philippines, up to 10,000 people in
the Philippines were allegedly tortured, summarily executed or disappeared at the hands
of military intelligence personnel acting pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos in
1971. Military intelligence allegedly operated under the authority of Marcos, General
Fabian Ver, and Imee Marcos-Manotoc (Ferdinand Marcos' daughter).

Marcos, his family, Ver and others loyal to Marcos fled to Hawaii in February, 1986. One
month later, a number of lawsuits were filed against Marcos, Ver, and/or Imee Marcos-
Manotoc, claiming that the plaintiffs had been arrested and tortured, or were the families
of people arrested, tortured, and executed between 1971 and 1986.

On November 1, 1991, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
Estate from transferring or secreting any assets in order to preserve the possibility of
collecting a judgment. Pending this interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction, trial
on liability proceeded. On September 24, 1992, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the
class and the individually-named plaintiffs (except for plaintiff Wilson Madayag). The
preliminary injunction was modified on November 16, 1993, to set forth the jury verdict
on liability, to compel the legal representatives of the Estate to fully and completely
answer plaintiffs' interrogatories regarding the assets of the estate, to name the Swiss
banks at which the Marcoses had deposited monies as representatives of the Estate,
and to permit the plaintiffs to take discovery regarding these assets.

Defendant Estate of Ferdinand Marcos ("the Estate") appeals from the district court's
order preliminarily enjoining the Estate from transferring, secreting or dissipating the
Estate's assets pendente lite. On this interlocutory appeal, the Estate also challenges
the district court's subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
and Alien Tort Act, claims that the plaintiffs do not state a cause of action, and contends
that any cause of action abated upon Marcos' death. We have jurisdiction and affirm.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Marcos’ actions–which were, as “Acts of State”–receive immunity under
FSIA
2. W/N there is subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to “Arising Under” Clause of Art.
III of US Constitution, since Sec. 1350 of Alient Tort Act is merely a jurisdictional
 statute, and international law principles do not create substantive rights for
litigants in US courts
3. W/N there is a cause of action under Alien Tort Act
4. W/N tort claims for personal injuries or wrongful death abate upon the death of
either the plaintiff or defendant
5. W/N the court committed grave abuse of discretion in preliminarily enjoining the
Estate from transferring, secreting or dissipating the Estate's assets pendente lite

HELD:
1. NO. Like Marcos-Manotoc, the Estate argues that Marcos' acts were premised
on his official authority, and thus fall within FSIA. However, because the
allegations of the complaint are taken as true for purposes of determining
whether an action should be dismissed, Marcos' actions should be treated as
taken without official mandate pursuant to his own authority.

Further, we rejected the argument that Marcos' actions were "official" or "public"
acts when we reversed the dismissal of the actions against Ferdinand Marcos on
the "act of state doctrine."

Moreover, in Republic of the Philippines, we held that Marcos' alleged illegal acts
were not official acts pursuant to his authority as President of the Philippines. We
rejected the contention that the Republic's RICO suit against Marcos involved a
nonjusticiable political question:

Although sometimes criticized as a ruler and at times invested with extraordinary

powers, Ferdinand Marcos does not appear to have had the authority of an
absolute autocrat. He was not the state, but the head of the state, bound by the
laws that applied to him. Our courts have had no difficulty in distinguishing the
legal acts of a deposed ruler from his acts for personal profit that lack a basis in
law. As in the case of the deposed Venezuelan ruler, Marcos Perez Jimenez, the
latter acts are as adjudicable and redressable as would be a dictator's act of
rape.

In conclusion, Marcos' acts of torture, execution, and disappearance were clearly

acts outside of his authority as President. Like those of Marcos-Manotoc, Marcos'
acts were not taken within any official mandate and were therefore not the acts of
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state within the meaning of FSIA. No
exception to FSIA thus need be demonstrated.

2. YES. First, we concluded that even where FSIA was held inapplicable, there was
federal subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the required analysis of whether
immunity would be granted under FSIA. [W]e have concluded that [Marcos-
Manotoc's] actions were not those of the Republic of the Philippines for purposes
of sovereign immunity under Chuidian. Nevertheless, when questions of
sovereign immunity under the FSIA are raised, as they have been here, ...
[u]nder Verlinden, subject-matter jurisdiction over this action satisfies Article III.

[C]ompliance with international law does not determine whether the United States
may apply the Act to his conduct. Only two restrictions exist on giving
extraterritorial effect to Congress' directives. We require Congress [to] make
clear its intent to give extraterritorial effects to its statutes. And secondly, as a
 matter of constitutional law, we require that application of the statute to the acts
in question not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.

Further, we concluded that extraterritorial application would not violate

international law: "[a]lthough Congress is not bound by international law in
enacting statutes, out of respect for other nations, courts should not
unnecessarily construe a congressional statute in a way that violates
international law." Id. at 1069 (citations omitted). Thus, neither Davis nor Thomas
held that international law is not a part of federal common law if there are no
contradictory federal statutes.

3. YES. Section 1350 does not require that the action 'arise under' the law of
nations, but only mandates a 'violation of the law of nations' in order to create a
cause of action." It is unnecessary that international law provide a specific right to
sue. International law "does not require any particular reaction to violations of
law.... Whether and how the United States wished to react to such violations are
domestic questions." Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm
that is specific, universal, and obligatory. The allegations in this case satisfy the
specific, universal and obligatory standard. "Under international law, ... official
torture violates jus cogens."

4. NO. Plaintiffs' claims are most closely analogous to a claim that government
officials violated the Eighth Amendment right of freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment, which does not abate upon the death of the defendant. Alternatively,
a Sec. 1350 action is closely analogous to a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.
("Claims for tortious conduct of government officials under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1350
may be analogized to domestic lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983,
where plaintiffs must allege both deprivation of a federally protected right and
action 'under color of' state law."). A Sec. 1983 action also survives the death of
a party. In conclusion, the plaintiffs' claims survive the death of Ferdinand
Marcos.

5. NO. We join the majority of circuits in concluding that a district court has authority
to issue a preliminary injunction where the plaintiffs can establish that money
damages will be an inadequate remedy due to impending insolvency of the
defendant or that defendant has engaged in a pattern of secreting or dissipating
assets to avoid judgment. This holding is thus restricted to only extraordinary
cases in which equitable relief is not sought. In its findings supporting the
preliminary injunction, the district court found a substantial likelihood that plaintiffs
would succeed on the merits. In fact, the plaintiffs have since prevailed at trial on
liability and have been awarded substantial exemplary damages. The court
further found that plaintiffs would be irreparably injured and that the remedies at
law were not adequate if the injunction were denied, concluding that there was
substantial danger that the defendants would transfer or conceal its funds,
resulting in denying recovery to the plaintiffs.
Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos 95-15779 (1996)

FACTS: Same factual precedents.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Hilao’s claims are subjected to a two-year statute of limitations.
2. W/N Estate is liable in the case.

HELD:
1. NO. The Estate argues alternatively that the appropriate statute of limitations
might be that imposed by Philippine law, which appears to require that claims for
personal injury arising out the exercise by a public officer of authority arising from
martial law be brought within one year. Philippine Civil Code, Art. 1146. The Alien
Tort Claims Act does not contain a statute of limitations. The Estate argues,
therefore, that the courts should follow the general practice of adopting an
analogous state statute of limitations if such adoption would not be inconsistent
with federal law or policy. We need not decide which statute of limitations applies
because Hilao's suit was timely under any of the proposed statutes when
equitable tolling principles are applied.

Any action against Marcos for torture, “disappearance”, or summary execution

was tolled during the time Marcos was president. A Philippine attorney who
testified as an expert witness at trial stated that in 1981 Marcos engineered the
passage of a constitutional amendment granting him, and others acting at his
direction, immunity from suit during his tenure in office. Another expert witness
testified that many victims of torture in the Philippines did not report the human-
rights abuses they suffered out of intimidation and fear of reprisals; this fear
seems particularly understandable in light of testimony on the suspension of
habeas corpus between 1972 and 1981, and on the effective dependence of the
judiciary on Marcos. Given these extraordinary conditions, any claims against
Marcos for injury from torture, “disappearance”, or summary execution were
tolled until he left office in February 1986. The Estate appears to concede that
the claims in this suit were asserted in March 1986. Thus, the filing of this action
was timely under any of the asserted statutes of limitations.

1. YES. The district court instructed the jury that it could find the Estate liable if it
found either that (1) Marcos directed, ordered, conspired with, or aided the
military in torture, summary execution, and “disappearance” or (2) if Marcos knew
of such conduct by the military and failed to use his power to prevent it. The
Estate challenges the latter basis for liability, arguing that liability is not imposed
under such conditions in analogous U.S. law claims, that “no international law
decision . has ever imposed liability upon a foreign official” on those grounds, and
that the district court essentially made the Estate liable on a respondeat superior
theory that is inapplicable in intentional torts.

The principle of “command responsibility” that holds a superior responsible for

the actions of subordinates appears to be well accepted in U.S. and international
law in wartime. [A] higher official need not have personally performed or ordered
the abuses in order to be held liable. Under international law, responsibility for
torture, summary execution, or disappearances extends beyond the person or
 persons who actually committed those acts-anyone with higher authority who
authorized, tolerated or knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them.

Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos 95-16487, 95-16145 (1996)

FACTS: Same factual precedents.

Hilao subsequently obtained a verdict of liability and an award of nearly $2 billion in

damages. The district court's final judgment of February 3, 1995 made the preliminary
injunction permanent.

In January of 1995, Hilao moved for contempt, claiming that agreements made in 1992
between the Republic of the Philippines and Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos,
on behalf of the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos and themselves as heirs, violated the
preliminary injunction by (1) agreeing to transfer artworks beneficially owned by the
Defendant Estate from the United States to the Philippines; and (2) agreeing to divide
all assets owned by the Estate between the Republic and the Appellants.

In April 1995, additional agreements between Appellants and the Republic were publicly
revealed. These agreements had been signed in 1993 and provided more specifically for
the division of the Marcos Estate: 75 percent would go to the Republic, and 25 percent
to Appellants, with Appellants receiving their share free of Philippine taxes.

ISSUES:
1. W/N there is proof as to the existence of assets belonging to Marcos’ “estate”
2. W/N mere negotiation and signing without implementation of said agreements
violates the injunction.

HELD:
1. YES.

All of those facts, however, are established either through the findings of the
district court contained in the final judgment granting the permanent injunction or
through the Rule 37 sanction imposed by the district court in the contempt
proceedings. Although the Estate has appealed from this final judgment, in that
appeal it has not challenged the findings of fact made by the district court in
granting the permanent injunction.

2. YES.

The authenticity of the agreements is an established and unchallenged fact found

by the district court. The district court has made an unchallenged finding of fact
that the Appellants entered into those agreements “on behalf of the defendant
Estate and themselves as heirs”. It is true that the injunction did not explicitly
forbid “attempts” to transfer assets of the Estate. The district court, however,
found that the Appellants made a “deal with the Republic to transfer and split the
Estate assets”. The district court was thus well within its discretion in finding that
the 1992 and 1993 agreements violated the injunction.
Hilao, Sison v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos 95-16779 (1996)

FACTS: Sison, a leading opponent of the Marcos regime, was arrested in 1977 and
interrogated personally by Marcos. He was tortured and threatened with death. After his
seven months shackled to his cot, Sison spent more than eight years in detention,
approximately five of them in solitary confinement and the rest in near-solitary
confinement.

Piopongco, a politically active owner of a radio station, had his home searched and his
radio station closed immediately after the declaration of martial law in 1972. He went into
hiding, but was arrested in November 1972. In late December 1972, he was released,
but the following day he was told that his release had been countermanded by Marcos
and he was placed under house arrest. He remained under armed surveillance at home
for over four years, until he managed to escape to the U.S. He was required to report
weekly to the military, during which reports he was threatened. He had to feed and
house his warders in his home, and as a result was shunned by his friends and
associates.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Sison is entitled to damages.
2. W/N Piopongco’s state-law claims are covered under international law, and can
be under the jurisdiction of the district court.
3. W/N plaintiff’s claims on inhuman, degrading, and cruel treatment should be
recognized

HELD:
1. YES. The district court insisted that the jury's finding in the liability phase was
relevant only to liability and not damages; it concluded, “Now, some people can
be tortured and not have any damage at all”.

Sison had testified in the liability phase of the trial as to the human-rights abuses
inflicted on him, and the jury found Marcos liable for the torture of Sison. The jury
instructions in the liability phase had defined torture, in relevant part, as “any act,
directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by
which severe pain or suffering . whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on that individual”.2 Thus, as a matter of law, evidence sufficient to
support the jury's finding of the Estate's liability for torture constitutes evidence
sufficient to support an award of damages for pain and suffering to Sison.3 In this
case, Sison was seeking only damages for pain and suffering, having waived any
claim to special damages (such as for medical costs, lost wages, etc.).

We reverse the district court's refusal to submit Sison's claim for compensatory
damages to the jury and remand for further proceedings on compensatory
damages. We therefore decline to reach Sison's arguments on the district court's
refusal to reopen the trial, its denial of Sison's motion for a new trial, and its
denial of his motion for an award of nominal damages.

2. The court appears to have rejected the claims because they were not “covered
by international law.”
 The Alien Tort Claims Act does grant a district court jurisdiction only of torts
committed in violation of international law. The district court, however, appears to
have had subject-matter jurisdiction over Piopongco's non- international-law
claims 6 on the basis of diversity. Section 1332(a)(2) provides for jurisdiction over
suits between “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state”.
Piopongco is a U.S. citizen and a California resident; Marcos was a Philippine
citizen and was resident in Hawaii at the time of the suit. Thus, to the extent that
the district court dismissed these claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the
dismissal appears to have been in error.

As to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the evidence

concerning Piopongco's four years of house arrest appears to constitute
prolonged arbitrary detention, on which the jury was also instructed. The claim for
destruction of Piopongco's radio station, however, is entirely distinct from any
claim for torture or for prolonged arbitrary detention and therefore the error in not
letting this claim go to the jury prejudiced Piopongco.

3. YES. The district court refused to instruct the jury on Sison's and Piopongco's
claims for cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment because it said that standard
for such a claim was “too vague”.

Although the district court did not instruct on a theory of “cruel, inhuman, or
degrading” treatment, it did instruct that the Estate could be found liable for
torture or arbitrary detention. Because this comprises all the conduct alleged by
Sison and Piopongco, we need not decide whether the proscription against
“cruel, inhuman, or degrading” treatment is sufficiently specific to allow a suit for
its violation under § 1350 or what, apart from torture and arbitrary detention,
which are recognized as actionable violations of international law, it might consist
of.

In the case of Sison, it seems clear that all of the abuses to which he testified-
including the eight years during which he was held in solitary or near-solitary
confinement- constituted a single course of conduct of torture. To the extent
Sison's years in solitary confinement do not constitute torture, they clearly meet
the definition of prolonged arbitrary detention as instructed by the district court.
As for Piopongco, the acts committed against him during his detention in 1972
clearly come within the definition of torture. In addition, his several years of house
arrest with no charges ever filed against him clearly come within the definition of
prolonged arbitrary detention.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Comelec (2010)

FACTS: Comelec issued two resolutions that refused to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act no. 7941, or the Party-List System Act.

Compliance with the requirements of the Constitution and RA no. 7941

 The enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
 Ang Ladlad never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Nonetheless, it is a
national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines.
  Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation.

Religion as the basis for refusal to accept Ang Ladlad’s petition for registration

 Governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with the policy of neutrality in

Art. II Sec. 5 of the Constitution. Comelec gravely violated the non-establishment clause in
utilizing the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
 If government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that
belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would
not support the policy.

Public morals as a grounds to deny Ang Ladlad’s petition for registration

 The Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.

 The assailed resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad.
 Moral disapproval without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. Denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to
further any substantial public interest.

Equal protection

 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances.
 No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual
behavior.
 Moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to
satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The Comelec’s differentiation,
and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of
legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than
disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
 The LGBT have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as
other political parties similarly situated.
 Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and other
represented sectors.

Freedom of expression and association

 Existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct.
 Public institutions must show that their actions were caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.
 Political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful
means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of
association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the
majority of the population.
 The petitioner has been precluded, because of Comelec’s action, from publicly expressing its
views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other
equally-qualified party-list candidates. There has been a transgression of petitioners’
fundamental rights.
Non-discrimination and international law

 The court recognizes the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation.
 Principle of Non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is also prohibited under various international agreements.
However, the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law in
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines.

Oposa vs. Factoran (1993) 


FACTS: Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region dismissed
Civil Case No. 90-77, which ordered defendant, DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLA) in the country and cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. Complainants argued that
non-cancellation of TLAs is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the state in Article XII
Sections 1 and 2, Article XIV Section 14, and Article II Section 16. Presiding judge, who in this
case became one of the respondents, ruled that: petitioners have no cause of action, that the
issue raised is a political question, and that relief of TLAs is an impairment of contract, prohibited
in the Constitution. Plaintiffs thus filed a civil action for certiorari that respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he dismissed the action. 


ISSUES: 


(1) Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action in their argument that granting TLAs
violated petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful ecology, as stipulated in Article II Section 16
of the Constitution 


(2) Whether or not the Court may render a valid judgment on the complaint since it is assailed as
a political question 


(3) Whether or not approval of the complaint would have contravened the non-impairment of
contracts clause in the Constitution 


HELD:

(1) YES. One’s right to a balanced and healthful ecology is as important as other civil and
political rights, and need not even be stipulated in the Constitution since they are assumed to
exist from inception of mankind. Even before the promulgation of our present Constitution, laws
such as Executive Order no. 192 (President Cory Aquino) and Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987 mandated the powers and duties of DENR. As clear as DENR’s duty
is the petitioners’ right to maintenance of a balanced and healthful ecology and therefore gives
rise to a legitimate cause of action. 

(2) YES. There is enough reason to see that there is a claimed violation of rights, since the policy
formulation or determination by the executive and legislative branches is not at issue, but the
enforcement of a right vis-à-vis policies already passed by legislation. 


(3) NO. Upholding license agreements regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare is an infidelity to the government. Moreover, a license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause but a privilege granted by the State and may be
withdrawn whenever demanded by public interest or public welfare. The State, in its exercise of
police power in promoting public welfare, may revoke such privileges. 


Province of North Cotabato vs. Government Peace Panel (2008)

FACTS: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and rebel group Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were set to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of
the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2008. The agreement–
which has three aspects, namely: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect–
stemmed from the resumption of peace talks under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s tutelage, after her
predecessor Joseph Estrada declared an all-out war with the MILF for instigating attacks amid peace
negotiations during his term in 1999. The MOA-AD, in a bid to cease armed conflicts in Mindanao, rendered
the parties committed to pursue peace negotiations and refrain from violence while talks are on-going. The
signing was discontinued after the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order.

The MOA-AD constitutes the following: definition of “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao, including those from Palawan and Sulu, descendants whether mixed or full blood,
and their spouses, who are granted rights to self-governance; the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) where
authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and lands are granted (in Concepts and Principles);
delineation of the Bangsamoro homeland which includes the land mass, maritime, terrestrial, fluvial, alluvial,
and aerial domain embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan region and the present geographic area of
ARMM, that the BJE has exclusive jurisdiction on all its internal waters, and joint jurisdiction and sharing of
minerals and conducting of activities with the Central Government in its territorial waters (in Territory); that
the BJE may enter relations (economic, trade, and environmental) with foreign countries as long as it would
not include aggression against the GRP, that they may participate in international meetings and events and
Philippine delegations for border agreements, that the BJE has the right to exploit its natural resources but
should share these 75:25 with the Central Government, in favor of the BJE, that they may modify or cancel
land tenure agreements entered by the Central Government, and that the Central Government has the duty
on the external defense of the BJE (in Resources); that the BJE has the power to build, develop, and
maintain its own institutions, that the MOA-AD makes imperative the amendment of existing legal framework
which shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact, and that the BJE and the Central
Government maintain an associative relationship or shared authority and responsibility (in Governance).

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not respondent GRP exercised grave abuse of discretion in violating constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated the MOA-AD 

(2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws 


(3) Whether or not the President may order constitutional amendments to comply with the 
peace process



HELD:

(1) YES. Respondents violated Section 7 Article III (right to information) and Section 28 Article II (public
disclosure of all transactions) of the Constitution, which gives the people the right to demand information and
the government’s duty to give the information even without demand from the people. Access to information
helps people in democratic decision-making, promotes freedom of expression, and is crucial in holding
public officials accountable. Though Section 28 Article II is non-self-executing, it only provides that Congress
must enact a law to merely safeguard it, not to enable it. Executive Order no. 3, giving the GRP Peace Panel
its authority, also mandates that the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process must consult with a National
Peace Forum in both national and local levels. Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991 also requires
a consultation on policies that affect a local community especially those critical to environment and that may
call for the eviction of a particular group of people in the locality affected. Lastly, the Indigenous Peoples’
Rights Act (IPRA) states the indigenous people must be consulted in matters that may affect their rights,
lives, and destinies.

(2) YES. The present Constitution does not allow the concept of association, where the principal state
maintains its international status but an associate is delegated certain responsibilities. Moreover, the MOA-
AD grants power to the BJE exceeding those conferred to local governments and even the ARMM under
present laws. This type of relationship is usually a transitional device for a State’s arms to declare
independence. This concept already requires amendment of several constitutional provisions such as
Sections 1, 15, 18, and 20 of Article X, which stipulates standards for local governments and autonomous
regions, and Article II Section 22, which promotes the rights of indigenous people for national unity. It is also
conflicting with RA 9054 (Organic Act of the ARMM) because of its sweeping definition of the Bangsamoro
people and the IPRA because it delineates ancestral domains of the Bangsamoro. 


(3) NO. While the president, as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive, has the responsibility to promote
public peace and suppress lawless violence and thus has the power to conduct peace negotiations, she
does not possess constituent powers, therefore she may only submit proposals to legislature and the
people, but not implement constitutional changes without the approval of Congress. 


NOTES:

 The MOA-AD is ripe for judicial review for declaration of constitutionality because it has a direct adverse
effect on the persons challenging it. In this case, respondents neither consulted nor informed
affected local government units. 

 Petitioners have legal standing over the case, as they have asserted their personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy. 
 Though the government will not sign the MOA-AD, it is not considered moot and academic because of the
necessity to have it signed and the impending constitutional amendment following its approval. 

 “An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the
basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal,
while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence” (Keitner and Reisman) 

 External self-determination – The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an Independent State or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people (Declaration on Friendly Relations) 
G.R. No. 159618 : February 1, 2011

BAYAN MUNA, as represented by REP. SATUR OCAMPO, ET AL., Petitioners, v. ALBERTO ROMULO,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al., Respondents.

VELASCO, JR.,J.:

FACTS:

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes
adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d'Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute
which, by its terms,is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of
the instant petition,only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification,
approval and concurrence process.The Philippines is not among the 92.

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement
(Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.

ViaExchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP,
represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the
US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government.Inesse,
theAgreementaims to protect what it refers to and defines aspersons of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.[8]It is reflective of the
increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries.As of May 2,
2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between theUSand 33 other countries.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender
agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of
diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the
said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.

In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying
the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and
effect.

For their part, respondents question petitioners standing to maintain a suit and counter that the Agreement,
being in the nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for
reasons detailed in their comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the Agreement.

ISSUES:

1) whether or not the Agreement was contracted validly, which resolves itself into the question of whether or
not respondents gravely abused their discretion in concluding it; and

2) whether or not the Agreement,which has not been submitted to the Senate for concurrence, contravenes
and undermines the Rome Statute and other treaties.But because respondents expectedly raised it, we shall
first tackle the issue of petitioners legal standing.

HELD: This petition is bereft of merit.

POLITICAL LAW: Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-
028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners contention perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices,
and jargon is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of
the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and
international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation,
and amity with all nations.An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental
agreements,which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty
Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law
contract.The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the
possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting
State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent.The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads.The technique of exchange of notes is frequently
resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative
approval.

In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have been used
interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding
through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes
take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in
his work,The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements
whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be
difficult of ready ascertainment. It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/NBFO-028-03be it
viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as
consent to be bound is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract
among nations.

POLITICAL LAW: Senate Concurrence Not Required; treaties

Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as an international agreement
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law,whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instrumentsand whatever its particular designation.International
agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification;
or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative
concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.

Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their
binding effects on the contracting states concerned,as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
within their powers.Neither,on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the
Constitution.Authorities are, however, agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart
from the concurrence-requirement aspect. As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has
greater dignity than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty
having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people;a ratified treaty, unlike an
executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.

POLITICAL LAW: The Agreement Not in Contravention of the Rome Statute

Contrary to petitioners pretense, theAgreementdoes not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the
Rome Statute.Far from going against each other, one complements the other.As a matter of fact, the
principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.As aptly pointed out by respondents and
admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions of
the signatory states. Art. 1 of the Rome Statute pertinently provides:

Article 1

The Court

AnInternational Crimininal Court(the Court) is hereby established.It x x xshall have the power to exercise its
jurisdictionover persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute,
andshall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court
shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.

Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute declares that it is the duty of every State
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.This provision indicates
that primary jurisdiction over the so-called international crimes rests, at the first instance, with the state
where the crime was committed; secondarily, with the ICC in appropriate situations contemplated under Art.
17, par. 1of theRomeStatute.

Of particular note is the application of the principle ofne bis in idemunder par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute,
which again underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis that of the ICC.As far as relevant,
the provision states that no person who has been tried by another court for conduct [constituting crimes
within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct.

The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, argue against the idea of jurisdictional
conflict between the Philippines, as party to the non-surrender agreement, and the ICC; or the idea of
theAgreementsubstantially impairing the value of the RPs undertaking under the Rome Statute.Ignoring for a
while the fact that the RP signed the Rome Statute ahead of the Agreement, it is abundantly clear to us that
the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes
committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only
when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.

Given the above consideration, petitioners suggestionthat the RP, by entering into theAgreement, violated its
duty required by the imperatives of good faith and breached its commitment under the Vienna Conventionto
refrain from performing any act tending to impair the value of a treaty, e.g., the Rome Statutehas to be
rejected outright.For nothing in the provisions of the Agreement,in relation to the Rome Statute, tends to
diminish the efficacy of the Statute, let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC.Lest it be overlooked, the Rome
Statute contains a proviso that enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person, should the
process require the requested state to perform an act that would violate some international agreement it has
entered into.We refer to Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which reads:

Article 98

Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender

2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending
State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.

Moreover, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory
to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty;whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is
legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith.

In the instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a
State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any
provision in the treaty would be premature.

As a result, petitioners argument that State-Parties with non-surrender agreements are prevented from
meeting their obligations under the Rome Statute, specifically Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90, must fail. These
articles are only legally binding upon State-Parties, not signatories.

Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90 would show that the Agreement is not incompatible with the
Rome Statute. Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides that if the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute
the requested State, if it is not under an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting
State, shall give priority to the request for surrender from the Court In applying the provision, certain
undisputed facts should be pointed out:first, the US is neither a State-Party nor a signatory to the Rome
Statute; and second, there is an international agreement between the US and the Philippines regarding
extradition or surrender of persons, i.e., the Agreement. Clearly, even assuming that the Philippines is a
State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between
States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.

POLITICAL LAW: Sovereignty Limited by International Agreements

Petitioner next argues that the RP has, through the Agreement, abdicated its sovereignty by bargaining
away the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute US nationals, government officials/employees or military
personnel who commit serious crimes of international concerns in the Philippines.Formulating petitioners
argument a bit differently, the RP,by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty,
abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of
the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country.

We are not persuaded.As it were, theAgreementis but a form of affirmance and confirmance of
thePhilippines national criminal jurisdiction.National criminal jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it
is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally
covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC.Thus, thePhilippinesmay decide to
try persons of theUS, as the term is understood in theAgreement, under our national criminal justice
system.Or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or overUSpersons
committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over
them.As to persons of the US whom the Philippines refuses to prosecute, the country would, in effect,
accorddiscretion to the US to exercise either its national criminal jurisdiction over the person concerned or to
give its consent to the referral of the matter to the ICC for trial.In the same breath, theUSmust extend the
same privilege to thePhilippineswith respect to persons of the RP committing high crimes withinUSterritorial
jurisdiction.

To be sure, the nullity of the subject non-surrender agreement cannot be predicated on the postulate that
some of its provisions constitute a virtual abdication of its sovereignty.Almost every time a state enters into
an international agreement, it voluntarily sheds off part of its sovereignty.The Constitution, as drafted, did not
envision a reclusivePhilippinesisolated from the rest of the world.It even adheres, as earlier stated, to the
policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise
encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty.By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or
waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and
absolute jurisdiction.The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits
derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or
immunities to the other.On the rationale that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of
international law aspart of the law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution. Such waiver does not amount to an unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.

POLITICAL LAW: Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or
being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law.The immoral aspect
proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from
responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our
country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner's earlier position, which, as already discussed,
contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement,virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process
undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly
described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes
under its national law. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country's
judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and
Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment.This is
manifestly incorrect.Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be
prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the
ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute
have been met.For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of
individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to
prosecute the crime under its existing laws.With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or
violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant
to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome
Statute.

POLITICAL LAW: Agreement Need Not Be in the Form of a Treaty

A view is advanced that the Agreement amends existing municipal laws on the States obligation in relation
to grave crimes against the law of nations,i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.Relying on
the above-quoted statutory proviso, the view posits that the Philippine is required to surrender to the proper
international tribunal those persons accused of the grave crimes defined under RA 9851, if it does not
exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute them.

The basic premise rests on the interpretation that if it does not decide to prosecute a foreign national for
violations of RA 9851, the Philippines has only two options, to wit: (1) surrender the accused to the proper
international tribunal; or (2) surrender the accused to another State if such surrender is pursuant to the
applicable extradition laws and treaties.But the Philippines may exercise these options only in cases where
another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution
of such crime; otherwise, the Philippines must prosecute the crime before its own courts pursuant to RA
9851.

Posing the situation of a US national under prosecution by an international tribunal for any crime under RA
9851, the Philippines has the option to surrender such US national to the international tribunal if it decides
not to prosecute such US national here.The view asserts that this option of the Philippines under Sec. 17 of
RA 9851 is not subject to the consent of theUS, and any derogation of Sec. 17 of RA 9851, such as
requiring the consent of the US before the Philippines can exercise such option, requires an amendatory
law.In line with this scenario, the view strongly argues that theAgreementprevents thePhilippineswithout the
consent of theUSfrom surrendering to any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes covered by
RA 9851, and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851.Consequently, the view is strongly impressed that
the Agreement cannot be embodied in a simple executive agreement in the form of an exchange of notes
but must be implemented through an extradition law or a treaty with the corresponding formalities.

Moreover, consonant with the foregoing view, citing Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution, where
thePhilippinesadopts, as a national policy, the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, the Court is further impressed to perceivethe Rome Statute as declaratory of customary
international law.In other words, the Statute embodies principles of law which constitute customary
international law or custom and for which reason it assumes the status of an enforceable domestic law in the
context of the aforecited constitutional provision.As a corollary, it is argued that any derogation from the
Rome Statute principles cannot be undertaken via a mere executive agreement, which, as an exclusive act
of the executive branch, can only implement, but cannot amend or repeal, an existing law.TheAgreement, so
the argument goes, seeks to frustrate the objects of the principles of law or alters customary rules embodied
in the Rome Statute.

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, the view thus advanced considers the Agreement inefficacious,
unless it is embodied in a treaty duly ratified with the concurrence of the Senate, the theory being that a
Senate- ratified treaty partakes of the nature of a municipal law that can amend or supersede another law, in
this instance Sec. 17 of RA 9851 and the status of the Rome Statute as constitutive of enforceable domestic
law under Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution.

We are unable to lend cogency to the view thus taken. For one, we find that the Agreement does not amend
or is repugnant to RA 9851.For another, the view does not clearly state what precise principles of law, if any,
the Agreement alters.And for a third, it does not demonstrate in the concrete how the Agreement seeks to
frustrate the objectives of the principles of law subsumed in the Rome Statute.

Nonetheless, despite the lack of actual domestic legislation, theUSnotably follows the doctrine of
incorporation.As early as 1900, the esteemed Justice Gray inThe Paquete Habana case already held
international law as part of the law of theUS, to wit:

International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for the
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.

Thus, a person can be tried in the US for an international crime despite the lack of domestic legislation.The
cited ruling in U.S. v. Coolidge,which in turn is based on the holding inU.S. v. Hudson, only applies to
common law and not to the law of nations or international law.Indeed, the Court inU.S. v. Hudson only
considered the question, whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise a common law
jurisdiction in criminal cases.Stated otherwise, there is no common law crime in the US but this is
considerably different from international law.

TheUSdoubtless recognizes international law as part of the law of the land, necessarily including
international crimes, even without any local statute.In fact, years later, US courts would apply international
law as a source of criminal liability despite the lack of a local statute criminalizing it as such. So it was that in
Ex Parte Quir in the US Supreme Court noted that from the very beginning of its history this Court has
recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the
conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals. It went on
further to explain that Congress had not undertaken the task of codifying the specific offenses covered in the
law of war, thus:

It is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of such offenses has not itself undertaken to codify
that branch of international law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the
acts which that law condemns. An Act of Congress punishing the crime of piracy as defined by the law of
nations is an appropriate exercise of its constitutional authority, Art. I, s 8, cl. 10, to define and punish the
offense since it has adopted by reference the sufficiently precise definition of international law. Similarly by
the reference in the 15th Article of War to offenders or offenses that by the law of war may be triable by such
military commissions. Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military
commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war, and which may constitutionally be
included within that jurisdiction.

This rule finds an even stronger hold in the case of crimes against humanity. It has been held that genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity have attained the status of customary international law.Some even
go so far as to state that these crimes have attained the status of jus cogens.

Customary international law or international custom is a source of international law as stated in the Statute
of the ICJ. It is defined as the general and consistent practice of states recognized and followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation.In order to establish the customary status of a particular norm, two elements
must concur: State practice, the objective element; andopinio juris sive necessitates, the subjective element.

State practice refers to the continuous repetition of the same or similar kind of acts or norms by States.It is
demonstrated upon the existence of the following elements: (1) generality; (2) uniformity and consistency;
and (3) duration. While,opinio juris, the psychological element, requires that the state practice or norm be
carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.

The term jus cogens means the compelling law.Corollary, ajus cogensnorm holds the highest hierarchical
position among all other customary norms and principles.As a result,jus cogensnorms are deemed
peremptory and non-derogable.When applied to international crimes, jus cogens crimes have been deemed
so fundamental to the existence of a just international legal order that states cannot derogate from them,
even by agreement.

These jus cogens crimes relate to the principle of universal jurisdiction, i.e., any state may exercise
jurisdiction over an individual who commits certain heinous and widely condemned offenses, even when no
other recognized basis for jurisdiction exists.The rationale behind this principle is that the crime committed is
so egregious that it is considered to be committed against all members of the international community and
thus granting every State jurisdiction over the crime. Therefore, even with the current lack of domestic
legislation on the part of the US, it still has both the doctrine of incorporation and universal jurisdiction to try
these crimes. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 Gamboa vs. Chan et al.

FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army
Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is
invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING
NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right
to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,
there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment
and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations
conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials,
they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege
of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

G.R. No. 184467 : June 19, 2012

EDGARDO NAVIA,RUBEN DIO,and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners, v. VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in
behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore. The
arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were
then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards
disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong.
Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the
security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and
lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security
department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is
available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the
aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench,
Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with
some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or
a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence
Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the
other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that
petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court
erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective
relief "to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity."

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human beings inherent
right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life
must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds
provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and
security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.

The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances
definition of enforced disappearances, as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment
of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of
the law."

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that
constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise
essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present
in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact,
none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia's amparo petition whether
as responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government
or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or
accountable persons.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo
petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy.
Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the
government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military
or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to
RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of
State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

DISMISSED

People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein.
During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and
the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every
time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by
her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing,
appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to
run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for
parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through
the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an
aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in
the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the
case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted
the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two
expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and
admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting self
defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered
woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern
for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle
at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second
time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which
has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving
(or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear
of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her
life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the
latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing
facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither
did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the
woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in
our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life;
and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised
Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack
and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was
no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor
of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion
and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-
spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her
of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the
killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said
to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to
appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense
that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The
acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she
was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and
mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of
two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed
upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-
survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) and IMELDA R.

MARCOS,Respondents.

FACTS:

On February 28, 1986, immediately after assuming power, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order 1, creating the PCGG.She empowered the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth allegedly amassed by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, and close associates during his 20-year regime.

PCGG Commissioner Raul Daza gave lawyers Jose Tan Ramirez and Ben Abella PCGG Region VIII Task
Force Head and Co-Deputy, respectively, written authority to sequester any property, documents, money,
and other assets in Leyte, belonging to former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos,Benjamin Romualdez,
Alfredo Romualdez, and their agents. On March 18, 1986, Attys. Ramirez and Abella issued a sequestration
order against the Marcoses Olot, Tolosa, Leyte property (lot Resthouse).

On August 10, 2001, Mrs. Marcos filed a motion to quash the sequestration order against
the Olot Resthouse,claiming that such order, issued only by Attys. Ramirez and Abella, was void for failing to
observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The rules required the signatures of at least two PCGG
Commissioners. Mrs. Marcos filed a Supplement to her earlier motion, claiming no prima facie evidence that
the Olot Resthouse constituted ill-gotten wealth.She pointed out that the property is the ancestral home of
her family. The Republic countered that Mrs. Marcos was already stopped from questioning the order.

On February 28, 2002 the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution, granting the motion to quash and
ordering the full restoration of the Olot Resthouse to Mrs. Marcos.The Sandiganbayan ruled that the
sequestration order was void because it was signed, not by PCGG Commissioners, but by mere PCGG
agents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the March 18, 1986 sequestration order against the Olot Resthouse, issued by
PCGG agents before the enactment of the PCGG rules, was validly issued.

HELD:

POLITICAL LAW

Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution, an order of sequestration may only issue upon a showing
"of a prima facie case" that the properties are ill-gotten wealth under Executive Orders 1 and 2. When a
court nullifies an order of sequestration for having been issued without a prima facie case, the Court does
not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG but simply applies the law.
The Republics supposed evidence does not show how the Marcoses acquired the sequestered property,
what makes it "ill-gotten wealth," and how former President Marcos intervened in its acquisition. Taking the
foregoing view, the resolution of the issue surrounding the character of the property sequestered whether or
not it could prima facie be considered ill-gotten should be necessary.

Although the two PCGG lawyers issued the sequestration order in this case on March 18, 1986, before the
passage of Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules, such consideration is immaterial following the above ruling.

Finally, Mrs Marcos is not estopped from questioning the order because a void order produces no effect and
cannot be validated under the doctrine of estoppel.

DISMISSED

Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, “An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business,” filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies
to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act
against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring
100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the
spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-
825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police
power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use
of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an
unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test
is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate
aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would
be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State
can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds
exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the
due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of
the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere;
that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not
misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and
the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws
to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus
to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to
their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content
of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general
of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine
Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military
commission was establish under Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did
not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors
cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid

HELD:

1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the
President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of
national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the
Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN,
including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of
aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a
signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the
generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US
and Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its
country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.
3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and
representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.

CASE DIGEST : Villacicencio Vs Lukban

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO
LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their
consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on
board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women
left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the
police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of
night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically
admitted by the respondents.

ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave
abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly
authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by
law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as
citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other
citizen. Thei rchoice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban,
quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from
the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao
without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to
being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished

or

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao; and
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao

HELD:
The respondents had no authority to deport the women. No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
The courts are the forum which function to safeguard liberty and to punish official transgressors. The
essential object and purpose of writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. If the mayor and the chief of police could deport
the women, they must have the means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act
with impunity in the courts. The great writ of liberty may not be easily evaded. No one of the defense offered
constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

G.R. No. 189434 March 12, 2014

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR v. REPUBLIC,

G.R. No. 189505

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos formed the Arelma S.A. entity under the laws of Panama and, opened an
account under its name at the brokerage firm of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in New York and
deposited $2 million. A class action by the Marcos' human rights victims resulted in a nearly $2 billion
judgment for the "Pimentel class," which claimed a right to enforce its judgment by attaching the Arelma
assets. The ownership in Arelma was represented by two bearer share certificates that are held in escrow by
the Philippine National Bank (PNB), after being transferred there in 1990 by an order of the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court.

The Republic of thePhilippines claimed ownership of the Arelma deposit of approximately $35 million based
on its custody of the Arelma shares, but citing claims to the funds by the Marcos' human rights victims,
Merrill Lynch filed an interpleader motion to request the courts to settle ownership of the funds. Litigation is
ongoing in the United States, as of early March 2011.

On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan
and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft court found that the totality of assets and properties
acquired by the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as
public officials, and that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth,
pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.

In June 2012, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the New York State Appellate Court decision a year
earlier which held that the case of Swezey (representing the class of human rights victims) v. Merrill Lynch,
et al, cannot proceed without the participation of the Republic of Philippines, making reference to
the Philippines' Supreme Court ruling that the Arelma assets belonged to the People of the Philippines and
should be returned to them.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the Arelma
proceeds

RULING:

We find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, despite
the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are held abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes the intent of
the forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the
reach of the courts and their recovery by the State. Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed
exhaustively in our Decision, are actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in
rem, such that:

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it
is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times
within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.

(The Republic's) national interests would be severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding because it has
asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets that rests on several bases: the Philippine
forfeiture law that predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted
public coffers to amass a personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by the Philippine Supreme Court
and Swiss Federal Supreme Court that Marcos stole related assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most
critically, the recent determination by the Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered the money that was
deposited in the Arelma brokerage account. Consequently, allowing the federal court judgment against the
estate of Marcos to be executed on property that may rightfully belong to the citizens of the Philippines could
irreparably undermine the Republic's claim to the Arelma assets.

Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court on
26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the foreign court agreed with the
dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets initiated by alleged victims of human rights
abuses during the Marcos regime. It reasoned that the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be
subject to joinder in light of its assertion of sovereign immunity:

The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to recognition because it has a
significant interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute over property that may have been stolen
from its public treasury and transferred to New York through no fault of the Republic. The high courts of the
United States, the Philippines and Switzerland have clearly explained in decisions related to this case that
wresting control over these matters from the Philippine judicial system would disrupt international comity and
reciprocal diplomatic self-interests.11

Yamashita vs Styer
G.R. No. L-129 December 19, 1945
Facts:
Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese Imperial
Army in the Philippines, after his surrender became a prisoner of war of the United States of America but
was later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused war criminal charged before
an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer, Commanding
General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.

Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that he be reinstated to his former
status as prisoner of war, and that the Military Commission be prohibited from further trying him. He
questions, among others, the jurisdiction of said Military Commission.

Issue/s:
1. Should the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this case?

2. Was the Military Commission validly constituted by respondent, therefore having jurisdiction over the war
crimes?

Ruling: 1. NO. 2. YES.

1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not sought. It seeks no discharge of
petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war, to be
interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of
military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition cannot issue
against one not made party respondent. Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen.
Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although it may
be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to
refrain from trying the petitioner.

The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if the commission be joined as
respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61, ante), “. . . an attempt of our civil courts to
exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be
considered as a violation of this country’s faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold.”

2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint and convene a military
commission. This is upon the theory that since the power to create a military commission is an aspect of
waging war, military commanders have that power unless expressly withdrawn from them.
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United States has explicitly provided,
so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses
against the laws of war in appropriate cases.