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Indian nuclear forces, 2015

Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris

To cite this article: Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris (2015) Indian nuclear forces, 2015,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 71:5, 77-83, DOI: 10.1177/0096340215599788

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Nuclear notebook Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
2015, Vol. 71(5) 77–83
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Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris

Abstract
With several long-range ballistic missiles in development, the Indian nuclear posture is entering an important
new phase. After nearly two decades of focusing on nuclear competition with Pakistan, New Delhi seems to
now be paying attention to its future strategic relationship with China. India is estimated to have produced
approximately 540 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, enough for 135 to 180 nuclear warheads, though not
all of that material is being used. The authors estimate that India has produced between 110 and 120 nuclear
warheads. The countryÕs fighter-bombers still constitute the backbone of its operational nuclear strike force,
but it has made considerable progress in developing credible land-based ballistic missiles as well. They include
the Agni-4, which will be capable of delivering a single nuclear warhead more than 3,500 kilometers, and
therefore able to strike Beijing and Shanghai from northern India. In 2014, India conducted its first ever sea
trial of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

Keywords
China, defense, ICBM, India, nuclear weapon, Pakistan, SLBM, SSBN

ndiaÕs drive to develop a nuclear triad has been converted into nuclear war-

I reached an important milestone in

2014 with the first nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine deploying on
its initial, brief, sea-trial voyage. Now,
with several long-range ballistic missiles
in development, the Indian nuclear pos-
ture is entering an important and dy-
namic new phase. After nearly two
decades of concentrating on competition
with Pakistan, IndiaÕs nuclear outlook now
seems to be focused more toward its
future strategic relationship with China.
India is estimated to have produced
approximately 540 kilograms (kg) of
weapon-grade plutonium (IPFM, 2013:
21), sufficient for 135 to 180 nuclear war-
heads; however, not all of the material
heads. Based on available information
about its nuclear-capable delivery vehi-
cles, we estimate that India has produced
110 to 120 nuclear warheads. It will need
more than that to arm new missiles it is
developing. In addition to the Dhruva
plutonium production reactor near
Mumbai, India plans to construct a
second reactor near Visakhapatnam, on
the east coast. An unsafeguarded proto-
type fast breeder reactor is also under
construction 650 kilometers (km) south
at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic
Research (IGCAR) near Kalpakkam,
which will significantly increase IndiaÕs
plutonium production capacity once it
becomes operational.
78
Aircraft
Despite IndiaÕs considerable progress in
developing credible ballistic missiles, its
fighter-bombers still constitute the back-
bone of IndiaÕs operational nuclear
strike force. Two or three squadrons of
Mirage 2000H and Jaguar IS/IB aircraft
are thought to provide India with a flex-
ible capability to conduct nuclear strike
operations deep into Pakistan and China.
The Indian Air ForceÕs Mirage 2000H
fighter-bombers, which are undergoing
upgrades to extend their service life
and enhance their capabilities, are de-
ployed at Maharajpur (Gwalior) Air
Force Station with Squadrons 1 and 7 of
the 40th Wing; we estimate that one of
the squadrons has a secondary nuclear
mission. The French-supplied Mirage
has served a nuclear strike role in the
French air force for many years.
India also has four operational squad-
rons of Jaguar IS/IB aircraft; two of the
squadrons may be assigned a secondary
nuclear strike mission. The Jaguar,
designed jointly by France and Britain,
was nuclear-capable when deployed by
those countries. An upgrade of IndiaÕs
Jaguar fleet is scheduled for completion
in December 2017 (Government of India,
2012). The domestically manufactured,
Soviet-origin MiG-27 Flogger fleet,
sometimes rumored to have a nuclear
strike mission, is also undergoing an
upgrade (Government of India, 2012).
The original nuclear aircraft are aging,
and India may be searching for a modern
fighter-bomber that could potentially
take over the air-based nuclear strike
role. One potential candidate is the
Rafale, produced by France, which uses
the aircraft in such a role. After initially
announcing plans to buy 126 Rafale
fighter-bombers from France, however,
the high cost appears to have caused
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71(5)
the Indian government to consider redu-
cing the number to 36 for now (Tran and
Raghuvanshi, 2015).
Land-based missiles
India has four types of land-based nuclear-
capable missiles that appear to be oper-
ational: the short-range Prithvi-2 and Agni-
1, the medium-range Agni-2, and the inter-
mediate-range Agni-3. At least two other
longer-range Agni missiles are under devel-
opment: the Agni-4 and Agni-5 (see Table 1).
It remains unclear how many of these
missile types India plans to keep in its
arsenal. Some may serve as technology
development programs for longer-
range missiles. Although the Indian gov-
ernment has made no statements about
the future composition of its land-based
missile force, intermediate-range and
medium-range missiles could poten-
tially be discontinued, with only short-
and long-range missiles deployed in the
future to provide a mix of strike options
against near and distant targets. Other-
wise India appears to plan a very diverse
and expensive missile force.
The Indian ballistic missile force
remains dominated by the short-range
Prithvi system. Initially, the 150 km range
Prithvi-1 was thought to be nuclear, but it
appears that the system might be con-
ventional and being replaced with the
Prahaar short-range missile system. The
Indian government stated in 2013 that the
Prithvi-2 missile was the first to be devel-
oped under the countryÕs prestigious
Integrated Guided Missile Development
Program (IGMDP) for ÒIndiaÕs nuclear
deterrenceÓ (Government of India, 2013).
The Prithvi-2 can deliver a nuclear or
conventional warhead to a range of 250
kilometers (155 miles). After test launches
in 2011, 2012, and 2013, the Indian
Kristensen and Norris 79

Table 1. Indian nuclear forces, 2015

NATO NUMBER OF YEAR RANGE1 WARHEAD X YIELD NUMBER OF

TYPE
DESIGNATION LAUNCHERS DEPLOYED (KILOMETERS) (KILOTONS) WARHEADS

Aircraft
Vajra Mirage 2000H ~32 1985 1,850 1 x bomb ~32
Shamsher Jaguar IS/IB ~16 1981 1,600 1 x bomb ~16
SUBTOTAL ~48 ~48

Land-based ballistic missiles

Prithvi-2 N.A. ~24 2003 250 1 x 12 ~24
Agni-1 N.A. ~20 20072 700+ 1 x 40 ~20
Agni-2 N.A. ~8 20113 2,000+ 1 x 40 ~8
Agni-3 N.A. ~4 2014? 3,200+ 1 x 40 ~4
Agni-4 N.A. N.A. (2016) 3,500+ 1 x 40 N.A.
Agni-5 N.A. N.A. (2017) 5,200+ 1 x 40 N.A.
SUBTOTAL ~56 ~564

Sea-based ballistic missiles

Dhanush N.A. 2 (2013) 350 1 x 12 2
K-15 (Sagarika) (12) (2017) 700 1 x 12 (12)
K-4 N.A. N.A. ? ~3,000 1x? N.A.
SUBTOTAL (14) (14)

TOTAL ~106 (118)

1 Range listed is unrefueled combat range with drop tanks.

2 Agni-1 first began induction with the 334th Missile Group in 2004 but did not become operational until 2007.
3 Agni-2 first began induction with the 335th Missile Group in 2008 but did not become operational until 2011.
4 The missile and warhead inventory may be larger than the number of launchers, some of which can be reused to fire additional missiles.
5 The number in parenthesis includes 12 warheads possibly produced for the first SSBN for a total stockpile of roughly 118 warheads.

government reported the range as 350 km the Agni-1 is thought to be focused on tar-
(see, for example, Government of India, geting Pakistan, and an estimated 20
2012), but the US National Air and Space launchers are deployed in western India,
Intelligence Center (NASIC) lists the possibly with the 334th Missile Group.
range as 250 km (NASIC, 2013: 13). The The two-stage, solid-fuel, rail-mobile
350-km range version is sometimes Agni-2 is an improvement on the Agni-1,
called Prithvi-3 and has been converted and can deliver a nuclear or conventional
to the ship-launched Dhanush missile. warhead more than 2,000 km (1,243
Given its small size (9 meters long and 1 miles). The missile possibly began being
meter in diameter), the Prithvi is difficult introduced into the armed forces in 2004,
to spot in satellite images and therefore but technical issues delayed operational
little is known about where it is deployed. capability until 2011. Fewer than 10
The two-stage, solid fuel, road-mobile launchers are thought to be deployed in
Agni-1 missile became operational in 2007, northern India, possibly with the 335th
three years after its introduction into the Missile Group. Targeting is likely focused
armed forces. The short-range missile is on western, central, and southern China.
capable of delivering a nuclear or conven- The Agni-3, a two-stage, solid-fuel,
tional warhead to a distance of approxi- rail-mobile, intermediate-range ballistic
mately 700 km (435 miles). The mission of missile is capable of delivering a nuclear
80
warhead 3,200-plus km (1,988-plus
miles). The Indian Ministry of Defence
declared in 2014 that the Agni-3 is Òin
the arsenal of the armed forcesÓ (Indian
Ministry of Defence, 2014: 86), and the
Indian militaryÕs Strategic Forces Com-
mand conducted its third user trial on
April 16, 2015 from the Wheeler Island
Test Range. If the Agni-3 is operational,
there are probably fewer than 10 launch-
ers. Several years ago an army spokes-
person remarked that Òwith this missile,
India can even strike ShanghaiÓ (Indo-
Asian News Service, 2008), but this
would require launching the Agni-3
from the northeastern corner of India.
India is also developing the Agni-4 mis-
sile, a two-stage, solid fuel, rail-mobile
intermediate-range ballistic missile cap-
able of delivering a single nuclear war-
head 3,500-plus km (2,175-plus miles).
The Indian Ministry of Defence lists the
range as 4,000 km (2,486 miles) (Indian
Ministry of Defence, 2014). Following the
final development test on January 14, 2014,
the Ministry declared that Agni-4 Òserial
production will begin shortlyÓ (Indian
Ministry of Defence, 2014: 86). A second
flight test conducted on December 2, 2014
was the ArmyÕs first Agni-4 launch (Indian
Ministry of Defence, 2014). The missile
will undergo a small number of induction
tests before it becomes operational.
Although the Agni-4 will be capable of
striking targets in nearly all of China
from northern India, including Beijing
and Shanghai, India is also developing
the longer-range Agni-5, a three-stage,
solid-fuel, rail-mobile, intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of deli-
vering a warhead more than 5,000 km
(3,100-plus miles). The extra range will
allow the Indian military to establish
Agni-5 bases in central and southern
India, further away from China.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71(5)
India is modifying the Agni-5 launcher
to carry the missile in a sealed canister. The
new canister design Òwill reduce the reac-
tion time drastically . . . just a few minutes
from Ôstop-to-launch,ÕÓ according to Avi-
nash Chander (Pandit, 2013b), the Agni pro-
gram engineer who headed IndiaÕs Defence
Research and Development Organisation
from 2013 until he was sacked by the gov-
ernment of new Prime Minister Narendra
Modi in January 2015Ñthe same month the
organization launched the Agni-5 from a
canister launcher for the first time. The
missile Òwas in its deliverable configur-
ation that enables launch of the missile
within a very short time as compared to
an open launch,Ó the organization later
stated (Defence Research and Develop-
ment Organisation, 2015: 4).
Moreover, unlike previous Agni-5
flight tests that took place from rail-
mobile launchers, the January 2015 flight
test appeared to use a new road-mobile
launcher with the canister erected by
four hydraulic arms from a six- or
seven-axle trailer towed by a three-axle
truck. Although the Defence Research
and Development Organisation released
a video of the 2015 launch, the frame did
not show the new road-mobile launcher
(Defence Research and Development
Organisation, undated a), unlike videos
of the 2012 and 2013 launches that clearly
showed the rail-mobile launchers
(Defence Research and Development
Organisation, undated b, undated c).
Despite widespread speculation in
news media articles and on social media
that the Agni-5 will be equipped with mul-
tiple warheadsÑeven multiple independ-
ently targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVs)Ñthere is good reason to doubt
that India can or will add multiple war-
heads or MIRVs to its arsenal in the
near future.1 There are no reports of
Kristensen and Norris
MIRV technologies being flight-tested,
and loading multiple warheads on the
Agni-5 would reduce its extra range,
which was a key reason for developing
the missile in the first place. The Agni-5
is estimated to be capable of delivering a
payload of 1.5 tons (the same as the Agni-3
and -4), and IndiaÕs first- and second-
generation warheads, even modified ver-
sions, are relatively heavy compared with
warheads developed by other nuclear
weapon states that deploy MIRVs. It
took the Soviet Union and the United
States hundreds of nuclear tests and
many years of effort to develop reentry
vehicles small enough to equip a ballistic
missile with a MIRV. Moreover, deploy-
ing missiles with multiple warheads
would invite serious questions about the
credibility of IndiaÕs minimum deterrent
doctrine; using MIRVs would reflect a
strategy aimed at quickly striking many
targets, and would also run the risk of trig-
gering a warhead race with IndiaÕs adver-
saries. It remains to be seen whether
ChinaÕs decision to equip some of its
silo-based ICBMs with MIRVs will trig-
ger a similar development in India.
Naval nuclear weapons
India is developing two naval nuclear
weapon systems: a nuclear-powered bal-
listic missile submarine (SSBN) and a
ship-launched ballistic missile.
After three decades of development,
IndiaÕs first SSBN, the Arihant, finally
sailed on sea trials in 2014.2 The reactor
on the Arihant first went critical in
August 2013 (Indian Ministry of Defence,
2014: 38). The Arihant is equipped with 12
launch tubes designed to launch the 700-
km (435-mile) range K-15 (Sagarika) sub-
marine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
A second SSBN is possibly under
81
construction (Deccan Herald, 2014), and
India might have plans to build three,
although rumors about six are probably
mistaken. A base for the SSBNs is rumored
to be under construction near Rambilli on
IndiaÕs east coast (Pandit, 2013a).
The utility of the K-15 is very limited; it
would not be able to target Islamabad,
only southern Pakistan, and would have
to sail very close to the countryÕs coast
to do so. Moreover, the K-15 would not
be able to target China at all, unless the
SSBN sailed through the Singapore Strait
deep into the South China Sea. Due to
these circumstances, the Arihant SSBN/
K-15 SLBM weapon system should be
seen as a technology development pro-
gram intended to develop a more capable
missile, rather than as a credible and
secure means of retaliation. In March
2014, India was said to have test-launched
a K-4 SLBM from a submerged launch
platform, apparently to a range of more
than 3,000 km. The Arihant would prob-
ably require modification to carry the K-4.
IndiaÕs third sea-based missile is the
Dhanush, a 400-km (249-mile) single-
stage, liquid-fuel, short-range ballistic
missile designed to launch from the
back of two specially configured Suka-
nya-class patrol vessels (Subhadra and
Suvarna). The utility of the Dhanush as
a strategic deterrence weapon, however,
is severely limited by its short range; it
would have to sail very close to the Paki-
stani or Chinese coasts to target facilities
in those countries, making it highly vul-
nerable to counterattack.
Cruise missiles
There are also unconfirmed rumors that
India is developing a nuclear-capable
cruise missile, the Nirbhay. Neither the
Indian government nor the US
82
intelligence community has yet men-
tioned the missile having any nuclear
capability.3 The Nirbhay has been
flight-tested several times, most recently
on October 17, 2014, to a range of about
1,000 kilometers (621 miles).
Notes
1. For a review of rumors and statements about
Indian MIRVs, see Kristensen (2013).
2. For more on the history of the Arihant, see
Norris and Kristensen (2010).
3. India would also need a smaller, lighter war-
head if it were to develop a nuclear-capable
cruise missile. For more on this, see Norris
and Kristensen (2010).
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Author biographies
Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the
Nuclear Information Project with the Federa-
tion of American Scientists (FAS) in Washing-
ton, DC. His work focuses on researching and
writing about the status of nuclear weapons and
the policies that direct them. Kristensen is a co-
author of the world nuclear forces overview in
the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press)
and a frequent adviser to the news media on
nuclear weapons policy and operations. Inqui-
ries should be directed to FAS, 1725 DeSales St.
NW, Sixth Floor, Washington, DC 20036, USA;
(202) 546-3300.
Kristensen and Norris
Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with the
Federation of American Scientists in Washing-
ton, DC. His principal areas of expertise include
writing and research on all aspects of the
nuclear weapons programs of the United
States, Russia, Britain, France, and China, as
83
well as India, Pakistan, and Israel. He is the
author of Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie
R. Groves, the Manhattan ProjectÕs Indispensa-
ble Man (Steerforth Press, 2002). He has co-
authored the Nuclear Notebook column since
May 1987.