G.R. No. L-6339.

April 20, 1954

MANUEL LARA ET. AL, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, Jr. defendant-appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J

FACTS:

 Defendant Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., is the owner of Waval Taxi. He employed among others three mechanics and
49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. In September 4, 1950, del
Rosario sold his 25 cabs to La Mallorca, resulting to the unemployment of the above-mentioned chauffeurs because La
Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment.
 They brought this action against del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and
on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada) because of the failure of their former employer to give
them one month notice.
 The plaintiffs as chauffeurs received no fixed compensation based on the hours or the period or time they worked. They
were paid in the commission basis, that is, each driver received 20% of the gross return or earnings from the operation of
his taxi cab.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess of 8 hours a day, Sundays and
holidays included; and
 Whether or not there are entitled for a mesada.

RULING:

 The defendant being engaged in the taxi or transportation business which is public utility, came under the exception
provided by the Eight-hour Labor Law Commonwealth Act No. 444; and because plaintiffs did not work on a salary basis,
that is to say, they had no fixed or regular salary or remuneration other than the 20 percent of their gross earnings their
situation was therefore practically similar to piece workers and hence outside the ambit of Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce.
 Moreover, if the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week or the month, then computation of the
month’s salary (mesada) payable would be impossible. Article 302 of the Code of Commerce refers to employees receiving
a fixed salary.
 In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffs- appellee, vs. QUE PO LAY, defendant- appellants

MONTEMAYOR, J

FACTS:
 The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting
to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.
 Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or
omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
 Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in
connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators
to corresponding penalties.

Ruling:

 It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in
question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory
that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.

 Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-10666, September 24, 1958

LIM HOA TING, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant

MONTEMAYOR, J.

FACTS:

 As an importer, plaintiff-appellee Lim Hoa Ting paid the defendant Bank the amount of P650.26 and P1,526.23 on
November 11, 1954 and April 5, 1955, respectively, or a total of P2,176.49, representing the 17 percent exchange tax on the
sale of foreign exchange, for the payment of the costs and other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of
"mono-sodium glutamate". Before said dates, defendant had been refunding to the plaintiff the exchange taxes paid by
him for the importation of the same substance mono-sodium glutamate, as it had also approved the applications for
exemption from the same exchange taxes of other importers of the same commodity, in the aggregate amount of
P3,215,416.72. The refunds were made under the provisions of Republic Act No. 601, as amended, Section 2.
 However, on September 14, 1953, the officer in charge of the exchange tax administration of defendant Central Bank,
submitted a memorandum to the Monetary Board, suggesting that mono-sodium glutamate be "no longer classified as a
flavor", for the reason that if said substance is to be considered as a flavor when it is mainly used in the manufacture of the
condiment commonly known as "Vetsin", then Lea and Perrin's sauce, onions, garlic, catsup and even common salt might
also be considered flavors when they are really condiments and seasoning agents and, therefore, exchange taxes paid for
their importation should also be refunded; and that moreover, since mono-sodium glutamate was classified as a flavor, its
importation had increased considerably to the prejudice of the revenues of the state. Following said suggestion, the
Monetary Board, on September 15, 1953, passed resolution No. 756, "eliminating 'mono-sodium glutamate as flavor' under
existing Central Bank regulations on the use of foreign exchange for importation." This resolution, however, was not
published in the Official Gazette.
 It would appear, however, that the same officer in charge of the exchange tax administration in the Central Bank who had
made the suggestion about the elimination of mono-sodium glutamate from the classification as flavors, changed his mind
after he had had a conference with the Director of the Institute of Science and Technology on the meaning and scope of the
terms "condiment" and "flavor".

ISSUE:
 Whether or not mono-sodium glutamate be considered a flavor which is subject to refund

RULING:
 As already stated, Resolution No. 756 of the Monetary Board, as well as the revised classification, under which mono-
sodium glutamate was no longer considered a flavor and so not exempted from the exchange tax, was not published in the
Official Gazette. Consequently, it could not bind the plaintiff. Said this Court as regards the non effectivity of Circular No.
20 of the Central Bank for lack of publication in the Official Gazette
 The trial court imposes costs on the defendant Bank, this despite its finding that the Central Bank acted in good faith. We
believe that it is more in accord with justice to eliminate this portion of the award of the trial court, aside from the fact that
defendant Bank is and agency of the Government charged with administration of the exchange law. With this
modification, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. No costs in either instance.

G.R. No. L-64279, April 30, 1984

ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners, vs.JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES,
Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now
presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V.
ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.

AQUINO, J.

FACTS:
 Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines
Sur with Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates:
1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian,
2) permit to transfer/transport from the provincial commander; and
3) three certificates of inspections.
 In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the town’s police station
commander while passing through Camarines Norte. The confiscation was based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits the
transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported
from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14,
1982

RULING:
  No. The said order is not enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2. 1982 because it is a penal regulation published more
than two months later in the OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code
and Sec-11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
 The word “laws” in article 2 includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
 Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be
published in the Official Gazette. It provides that “every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be
deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because its confiscation
and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the
carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans.
However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither
can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the
carabaos.
 Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents to restore
carabaos, with the requisite documents, to petitioners for their own disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.

G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee, vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL, respondent-appellant.

CASTRO, J.

FACTS:

 In the year 1960, Caltex conceived a promotional scheme and called it "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest". It calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex Station will dispense during a
specified period. For the priviledge to participate, no fees or consideration, nor purchase of Caltex products were required.
 Forseeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for mailing. The acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme
falls within the purview of sections 1954, 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code and declined to grant the
requested clearance.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not Caltex’s petition for declaratory relief is proper.

 Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.

RULING:

 Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of
the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law.
 No. The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is lacking (no consideration).
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under prevailing jurisprudence and
legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries, there is no explicit definition as to what a gift enterprise
is. However, under the Postal Law, the term “gift enterprise” was used in association with the term “lottery”. As such, the
principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is only logical that
the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the
word associated therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so
also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does not include a consideration, it is
neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal service.
 The petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief and that the contest does not transgress the
provisions of the Postal Law.
 Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-28463, May 31, 1971

REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.

FERNANDO, J.

FACTS:

 From December 1963 to July 1964, Republic Flour Mills exported Pollard and/or bran which was loaded from lighters
alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the breakwater.
 The Commissioner of Customs and The Court of Tax Appeals assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said
exportations in thesum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under protest.
 In this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would want the Court to interpret the words “products of the Philippines” found in
Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as excluding bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming as
they do from wheat grain which is imported in the Philippines, they are merely waste from the production of flour.
Another mainargument of the petitioner is that no government or private wharves or government facilities were utilized in
exporting such products. In that way, it would not be liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed under such section by
Commission of Customs.
 On the other hand, the stand of Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was liable for wharfage dues “upon receipt
or discharge of the exported goods by avessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of government-owned or
private wharves.” Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs under the
appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law

RULING:

 As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles
imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of
two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage." appears to be quite precise. Section 2802 refers to what is imported
and exported .The objective of this act must be carried out. Even if there is doubt to the meaning of the language
employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. If petitioner were to prevail,
subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would
likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It was desirable then that the gates to such efforts at unjustified
restriction of the coverage of the Act are kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a
clear legislative mandate.
 The decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed with costs against petitioner.