Journal of Cultural Economy

ISSN: 1753-0350 (Print) 1753-0369 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjce20

Valuation struggles over pricing – determining the

worth of wind power

Trine Pallesen

To cite this article: Trine Pallesen (2016): Valuation struggles over pricing – determining the
worth of wind power, Journal of Cultural Economy, DOI: 10.1080/17530350.2016.1212084

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2016.1212084

Published online: 02 Aug 2016.

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JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMY, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2016.1212084

Valuation struggles over pricing – determining the worth of wind

power
Trine Pallesen
Department of Organization, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Public policies such as feed-in tariffs have been widely introduced to Received 21 October 2014
stimulate the development of renewable energies, and sustain a Accepted 6 July 2016
decarbonisation of the electricity sector. Proponents argue that these
KEYWORDS
governance instruments safeguard public goods such as the climate – Wind power; feed-in tariff;
yet they are accused of creating political markets, and political prices, pricing; valuation;
here understood as market distortion. This paper studies the ‘politics’ of governance
pricing by following the adoption of the first feed-in tariff in France.
Pricing as a way of achieving non-economic ends, such as climate
mitigation, brings the values of several public goods into play, all the
while prompting a translation of these values into a single price.
Following the struggles over the pricing of wind power in the early
2000s, the study illustrates that rather than a pollution of the market
sphere by that of politics, a politics of pricing can be observed in four
distinct struggles: namely the framing of the public interest; valuation as
the articulation of the future; the possible agencies of governance; and
role of valuation methods and calculations.

Introduction
During the past decades, increasing amounts of wind power have been introduced into electricity
systems world-wide in order to decarbonize electricity production. In many countries, this introduc-
tion of wind power – and most other renewables – has been premised on public policies; without
politically backed policy instruments, wind power is not expected to substantially contribute to the
electricity generation. The arguments for supporting the introduction of wind power are many: the
most prominent stressing the ‘immaturity’ of the turbine technology (and thus the relatively high
costs of production) competing against more ‘mature’ technologies such gas or coal-burning power
plants or nuclear power centrals; or the externalities associated with conventional electricity production
(Finon & Menanteau 2003; Hvelplund 2001a). Notwithstanding the arguments, public policies for sup-
porting wind power, and renewables in general, have become a rather manifest form of governance
trough markets – or more narrowly, they are market interventions prompted by market failures.
One widespread example of such a policy instrument for accelerating the introduction of wind
power is the feed-in tariff. A feed-in tariff usually comprises three components: guaranteed grid
access, long-term contracts and a fixed price per kWh. A number of European countries (e.g. Den-
mark, Germany and Spain) have experienced high rates of wind power development following the
adoption of feed-in tariffs (Szarka 2007). Meanwhile, in the increasingly liberalized European elec-
tricity markets, the introduction of policy instruments such as the feed-in tariff has been harshly cri-
ticized for distorting markets – or for introducing ‘political prices’ and ‘political markets’ (Hvelplund
2001b; Szarka 2007), underscoring that the survival of renewables in ‘conventional’ markets is

CONTACT Trine Pallesen tp.ioa@cbs.dk

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 T. PALLESEN

achieved only through political will, articulated through public policies (Szarka 2007). To wind
power protagonist and antagonists alike, the qualification ‘political’ point to a distinction between
a market price – and a price produced by government agencies to achieve specific (non-economic)
outcomes. This study, rather than assuming any a priori distinctions between prices produced within
the realm of politics, and prices produced in markets, inquires into the production of the regulated
price. Instead, it asks: what are the politics of this price? In doing so, it builds on recent contributions
to the so-called new new economic sociology (McFall & Ossandón 2014) interrogating the
production and maintenance of market–politics distinctions (e.g. Cochoy et al. 2010; Doganova &
Laurent 2016; Muniesa 2013).
To flesh out the politics, so to speak, I will draw on the growing field of valuation studies. One of
the major accomplishments of this field has been to relax the dualist conflict between politics and
economy (Kjellberg et al. 2013) and instead draw attention to the plurality of conceptions and
metrics of value across different spheres (e.g. Antal et al. 2015; Kornberger et al. 2015; Stark
2009). Valuation studies has produced numerous empirical studies illustrating the multiplicity of
values at stake in valuation processes, or the work of qualification going into the conception and pro-
duction of goods through which value(s) are constructed and possibly assessed (e.g. Adkins & Lury
2011; Beckert & Aspers 2011; Boltanski & Thévenot 2006; Moor & Lury 2011). Many of these studies
adopt a pragmatic approach to valuation, seeing value as a practical achievement (Helgesson &
Kjellberg 2013; Helgesson & Muniesa 2013; Muniesa 2012). For the present purpose, tracing the
valuation of wind power – and its translation into a price – allows an appreciation of the ways in
which different values and interests are mobilized and used to produce a new price for wind
power – or to defy prices suggested by others.

Between pricing and valuation

Though the importance of prices to the study of valuation has been fleshed out occasionally (e.g.
Beunza et al. 2006; Caliskan 2007; Guyer 2009; Muniesa 2007), only limited attention has been
paid to the price in contemporary economic sociology (Beckert 2011). This paper does not attempt
to fill this void as such, but offers an empirical study of pricing. This shows, not only conflicts over
valuation criteria, but more importantly, that the introduction of a regulated price itself provokes
issues or concerns – and thus introduces new criteria for valuing wind power.
Within economics, price has traditionally been seen as the primary measure of value: ‘when asked
to ponder the subject of value, Thomas Schelling, a sophisticated and otherwise resourceful econom-
ist, can say little more than “economists respond by pondering price”’ (Klamer 2003, p. 193).
Because, Klamer continues, there are disciplinary constraints (in economics), hindering a further
elaboration of the subject matter (2003). Such a dependence on price implies that differences in
values can ‘simply’ be expressed in monetary numbers (Geiger in Kjellberg et al. 2013). And it is,
to a great extent, the blind spots of such a monolithic theorization of value which serves as a back-
drop for the growing field of valuation studies.
It is therefore not surprising that a majority of the contributions to valuation studies take an inter-
est in valuing ‘unique’ or ‘singular’ goods (Karpik 2010, 2011) for which values are not easily trans-
lated into a monetary figure. A non-exhaustive list includes cultural goods (Aspers 2001; Hutter &
Throsby 2008; Moeran & Pederson 2011; Velthuis 2005), fine wine (Allen & Germov 2011; Chauvin
2013; Hennion 2007), human life (Zelizer 1985) and incommensurable goods in the form of nature
(Espeland 1998; Fourcade 2011) for which valuation is associated with considerable uncertainty.
These studies bracket price competition by pointing to a range of empirical examples in which rad-
ical uncertainties and/or incommensurability prompts or forces competition on quality, rather than
price (Karpik 2010). They provide rich empirical studies of market exchange of non-homogenous
goods facing consumers without predefined quality measures. Whereas most of these studies explore
interesting empirical settings often neglected by standard economic theory, they also run the risk of
becoming an implicit re-enactment of the so-called Parsonian Pact (e.g. Fourcade 2011; Stark 2000,
 JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMY 3

2009), that is, a distribution of responsibilities between economists (preoccupied with value, and
standard goods) and sociologists (preoccupied with values, and goods associated with a high degree
of uncertainty regarding quality and assessment criteria). Along these lines, the valuation and pricing
of mass consumer goods appears to be deemed less interesting to those studying valuation from a
sociological vantage point; instead the study of valuation of such goods seems to be left – with
more ease – in the hands of economists. In fact, Franssen and Velthuis (2016) point out that studies
of markets for mass-produced (cultural) goods, such as CDs or Penguin books, where prices are uni-
form and rigid have stressed sales and revenues – and not taken an interest in price, per se.
A study of pricing wind power through tariffs provides a different entry point; wind power is,
once introduced into the grid, simply electricity – indistinguishable from electricity from other
energy technologies, and as such an example of a mass-produced consumer good. Meanwhile, its
pricing involves producing – or cutting – associations to a number of ‘unique’ public goods, and
these associations are difficult to quantify. Examples include wind power’s effects on CO2 mitigation
or wind power’s possible role as a future industrial success.

Towards a politics of pricing

The insights produced by valuation studies, when serving the specific purpose of studying a politics
of pricing, imply the precondition that pricing involves a translation from multiple values to a mon-
etary value. In the present study, the distinct form of the price, that is, its regulation, in itself intro-
duces a number of values that are conflated with the valuation of wind power.
The ‘politics’ of electricity pricing adhered to with the distinction ‘regulated prices’ and ‘market
prices’ has, yet under different headings, been studied before. Most important for the present pur-
pose are studies of governance through pricing. One important contribution, not least as it shares
the object to be priced, namely, electricity, is Yakubovich et al.’s (2005) account of the early elec-
tricity rate systems in the US. The authors demonstrate how the adoption of the Wright system, a
system arguably inferior to its alternative, prevailed as an effect of the political and organizational
power of its proponents (Yakubovich et al. 2005). The system best served the interests of certain
actors, such as managers of large central stations, in their struggle against smaller decentralized
stations. Another historical account provided by Yon (2014) describes the electricity rates devel-
oped by Électricité de France in postwar France. In his study, Yon illustrates how the French econ-
omic policy, usually described as Keynesian, aimed for long-term planning all the while ‘mimicking
the market’ to produce prices that orient consumers towards an ‘optimization’ of the production
capacities (2014).
Breslau (e.g. 2013), in his studies of the US electricity markets, addresses the politics–markets
dichotomy explicitly in his statement: ‘[a]t least in the electrical power industry, markets and politics
are not mutually exclusive alternatives for determining prices’ (2013, p. 18); the price of power in
wholesale markets is shaped by market forces, meanwhile the overall price level and revenues
are political outcomes (Breslau 2013). Whereas the distinction between spheres (i.e. market and
political) at play here seems unproductive to this study, Breslau does also suggest another ‘sort’ of
politics in his analysis: namely the ways in which economics formats the political agents involved
in market formation (2013).
All of the above contributions provide rich empirical studies of rate or tariff systems, in other
words, regulated prices. They all illustrate how pricing comprises a broader set of activities, including
struggles over interests that we could refer to as politics in a broad sense. But they are also more or
less implicit examples of how valuations of public goods or public concerns become associated with
specific economic goods – and the pricing of such goods. This paper draws on and extends these
contributions by paying attention to the mediation between goods and concerns, approaches to
governance and the making of concrete prices.
The paper proceeds as follows: first the feed-in tariff is briefly introduced. Second, two conflicting
valuations of wind power are described, paying attention to the public goods they put forward and
4 T. PALLESEN

value, and the relations they create between distinct versions of governance and the regulated price.
Finally, four specific ways in which we may observe a ‘politics’ of pricing are discussed.

The feed-in tariff – between governance and market

The feed-in tariff, first designed in the US in 1978, is an instrument designed to accelerate invest-
ments in renewable energy technologies. This is achieved through long-term contracts (for on-
shore wind power, it is often 15 years) at a set price, or as a fixed premium added to the market
price (Couture et al. 2010). The distinct design of feed-in tariff varies, but it generally entails a guar-
anteed access to the grid, as well as a purchase obligation (Couture et al. 2010).
The adoption of feed-in tariffs, as well as other public policy instruments, is justified along two
lines; firstly, it is argued that the wholesale price of electricity does not reflect the costs of electricity
production, as it does not take into account the costs of pollution (and pollution control) associated
with its production, also known as externalities (Finon & Menanteau 2003; Hvelplund 2001b;
Menanteau et al. 2003). Secondly, because renewable energy technologies are still ‘immature’, they
cannot compete with conventional energy technologies. Therefore, (public) intervention may be jus-
tified, theoretically, in two ways: as internalization of environmental externalities and stimulation of
technological change (Finon & Menanteau 2003, see also Karnøe 2013).
Alternative governance systems to the feed-in tariff are tendering schemes and green certificates
(though the latter remain more popular in theory, than in practice). Whereas the feed-in tariff is best
described as a regulated or administered price, tenders and green certificate systems may be
described as instruments for administering quantities (Hvelplund 2001a). Decisions of whether to
introduce the ‘administrative’ element on the quantities or on the price have occasionally sparked
debates of the ‘market-likeness’ of the respective governance systems, often concluding that adminis-
tered prices are ‘most market-like’ (e.g. Hvelplund 2001b).
In France, the feed-in tariff for wind power was adopted in 2000 with the Electricity Act, and the
definition of the tariff at 8,38 cents/kWh followed in 2001. It replaced the so-called EOLE 2005
tendering scheme, introduced in 1996, which aimed for the realization of 250–500 MW by 2005
(Laali & Benard 1999). However, after four rounds of tenders, only 70 MW were issued. The
adoption of the feed-in tariff was a controversial decision, and the tariff remains contested, as an
instrument and its distinct level.

Two valuations
In the following, the struggles over the first French feed-in tariff are organized as two overall valua-
tions. Each valuation builds upon the heterogeneous contributions by a number of French govern-
ment agencies, each suggesting distinct valuation methods, or providing significant inputs to the
valuation of wind power. Organizing the individual contributions as two rather delineated valuations
implies disregarding certain differences, and accentuating similarities, but for the present purpose
they are organized around their clearly distinguishable conclusions on whether or not to adopt
the suggested feed-in tariff. The two valuations differ not only in the way they assemble their objects
of valuation, wind power (Pallesen 2015), but also the role they ascribe to the feed-in tariff; an instru-
ment for greening the energy production, or as ‘market distorting villain’. In the following, the valua-
tions will be organized according to (1) their framing of public and economic good and (2) the
(market-)governance they perform.
The study is based on qualitative data produced during fieldwork in France in 2008. Through a
number of interviews (22) and not least a large number of documents and articles, the controversies
surrounding the adoption and definition of the French feed-in tariff are fleshed out. The interviewees
included authors of reports produced for and by the French Parliament, members of Parliament,
government officials, government agencies, the French Syndicat for Renewable Energy, wind
power developers, Transmission System Operator (RTE) and utilities.
 JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMY 5

Valuation 1: making a feed-in tariff

The introduction of a feed-in tariff as a replacement of the EOLE 2005 tendering scheme was offi-
cially suggested in 2000 in a report ordered by the French Parliament (Cochet 2000). The working
group behind the report was headed by MP Yves Cochet (Minister of the Environment 2001–2002),
and years later, the feed-in tariff would often be referred to as the Cochet-ruling. Whereas Cochet’s
report suggested adopting a feed-in tariff system as a governance model, it did not put forth concrete
prices. Instead, the translation from governance model to price was produced by other central con-
stituents. Together, this first valuation settles for a feed-in tariff of exactly 8,38 cents/kWh – in the
following, it is described how this specific price ‘summarizes its world’, by defining and prioritizing
public goods as well as distinct forms of governance.

Envisioning public goods

Cochet’s report opens with a plea for revolutionizing the energy sector (2000). This proposed revo-
lution (re)instates the values of the environment and the soon-to-be exhausted natural resources (e.g.
coal, uranium and oil), to argue for investments in the greening of the French energy sector (2000).
Concerns for the environment and the depletion of natural resources are the most common argu-
ments for developing wind power, and represent underlying so-called pure public goods,1 namely
environmental protection and energy security (Suzuki 2002). Wind power, as a renewable energy,
is valuable for securing both of these public goods. Or at least, this claim is essential to the price
suggested in this first valuation.
Meanwhile, rivalrous definitions of public goods are introduced by Cochet too: the existing
nuclear technology domination of the French electricity sector is described as a strong opponent.
What Hecht (1998) describes as a ‘technopolitical regime’ in which public interests and political
goals become intertwined with technology, in this case with nuclear technology, is described as
regime refusing the suggested qualities of wind power. Years after the adoption of the feed-in tariff,
Cochet described the political environment into which he introduced the tariff as hostile and of a
techno-ideological nature, which stressed the excess of nuclear power in France (exporting substan-
tial amounts of electricity to neighbouring countries) and the excessive price of wind power (Cochet
interview). In other words, the public best is already served by nuclear power; and the value of adding
MWs at an uncompetitive price is said to be unattractive. To encounter this so-called hostile
environment, Cochet and his fellow-protagonists emphasized the potential for developing and enfor-
cing a future French wind turbine industry, by drawing parallels to the history of the nuclear power
industry:
What we told Jospin and Pierret and the people of DGEMP was that it is normal to help a new emerging tech-
nology initially, in which France could become a champion – because we have good engineers in France’. Me
personally, I always take the example of nuclear power in France; how much did a nuclear kilowatt-hour cost in
France in 1950? It was very expensive! (Cochet interview)

In other words, the feed-in tariff is suggested as an investment in future public interests by creating
the conditions for new thriving industries, including future export and job creation. As he continues,
supporting a ‘new emerging technology in which France could be champion – because we have great
engineers in France’ (Cochet interview) is perfectly normal.
Having argued for the values of the public interests served by the introduction of wind power, the
question becomes how best to achieve this. In other words: Who has the responsibility for securing
these public goods in France?

Governing wind power

Cochet’s report uniformly suggested the replacement of EOLE 2005 by a fixed tariff system (Cochet
2000), arguing that the tendering scheme had led only to the construction of disappointing 70 MW
of wind power. In other words, if wind power was to be developed, tenders did not seem to be the
right instrument. To generalize this conclusion, experiences across Europe with different governance
6 T. PALLESEN

models (Table 1) were mobilized as an illustration of a firm relation between commitments to a guar-
anteed price, such as a feed-in tariff, and the number of MW connected to the electrical grid:
Only a support mechanism based on guaranteed purchase, at a sufficient level and duration of time, is likely to
give vigorous impetus necessary to achieve this ambitious goal. (Cochet 2000, p. 115, my translation, emphasis
in original)

Opting for a feed-in tariff as a governance model is an explicit form of governance that may be jus-
tified because of its association to the above public goods. But it remains a controversial choice, first
and foremost because it eschewed ‘market-driven valuation’, namely competition over price:
Normally, the spontaneous market device is tendering, because in principle, it doesn’t distort the market. Now
we’ve distorted the market with guaranteed tariffs – it’s a protected market in a way. (Cochet interview)

As such, Cochet’s report reproduces the dichotomous relation between market and state, yet his elab-
oration of the relationship between price and costs demonstrates an underlying concern with the
distribution of costs and responsibilities (for the realization of public goods):
The proponents of tendering usually stress the ability of lowering the price of production, thanks to compe-
tition, which is for the occasion dressed in all its virtues. And as proof they cite the contractual prices of the
EOLE 2005 as the lowest in Europe. In doing so, however, they confuse the notion of costs with the notion
of price: if the latter reflect, as everyone knows, the strength relation in a commercial negotiation between a
buyer and a seller in time T, it is not automatically related to the real costs, undertaken by one or the other
part. (Cochet 2000, p. 40, my translation)

In other words, costs are real and prices are expressions strength of relations – Cochet nearly para-
phrases Weber’s famous formulation of prices as expressions of struggles between interests and as
‘estimated quantifications of relative chances in this struggle of interests’ (1978, p. 108).
Cochet and his team did not suggest a specific price, but formed a working group managed by the
Agency for Energy and Raw Materials (DGEMP). Participating in this group, the French Environ-
ment and Energy Agency (ADEME) suggested a specific method for valuing wind power. Adopting a
Profitability Index Method (PIM), ADEME argued to be able to calculate what they called ‘fair and
efficient’ rates for wind power. The method was argued to provide due rents to the developers (i.e.
‘fair’), and at the same time maintain a sufficient level as to actually spur a ‘large scale development’
(i.e. ‘efficient’) (Chabot & Saulnier 2001). To do so, the method defines the ratio between net present
value (NPV) of the wind power project and the required initial investment (I) of the project: PI =
NPV/I (Chabot et al. 2002). It is, as such, basically a classic discounted cash flow analysis; an analysis
of future cash flows discounted into a NPV.2 Whereas methods for discounted cash flow are most
commonly used to evaluate and/or compare investment opportunities (e.g. Miller 1991), the method
developed by ADEME is said to guarantee ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’. In other words, the calculation
proves the ‘fairness’ of discounted cash flows to the developers, assuming they will attract the
wished investments from wind power developers (Chabot 2001; Chabot & Saulnier 2001; Chabot
et al. 2002, p. 1).

Table 1. Governance system, price and results.

Procedure Country Average price (cF/kWh) MW connected in 1998 MW connected in 1999
Guaranteed price Germany 57 793 1569
Guaranteed price Denmark 50 264 289
Guaranteed price Spain 49 395 346
Guaranteed price Italy 45 54 101
Tendering France 32 7 0
Tendering Great Britain 30 10 18
Tendering Ireland 29 9 4,7
Green certificates Holland Unknown 42 45
Source: Cochet (2000, p. 42, my translation).
 JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMY 7

To address one of the major critiques raised against the feed-in tariff, namely, the absence of
competition and its influence on price formation, the PIM tariff draws on profitability levels of
coal-fired plants as a reference point. ADEME demonstrates that the minimum margin on cost
for coal-fired plants is around 10%, which corresponds to a margin of PI = 0.3, which again corre-
sponds exactly to the PI of wind power projects compensated at the suggested level (Chabot et al.
2002). Fairness is thus ensured by ‘making profitability levels the same’ as those realized by compet-
ing, more mature, energy technologies.
Eventually, the translation from feed-in tariff to a specific tariff of 8,38 cents/kWh was stabilized
by the DGEMP. The calculative method of the agency was the internal rate of return (IRR). Accord-
ing to interviewees from the agency, the key concern was the elimination of undue rents; the IRR
allows assessing wind power projects against other energy technologies, and as such measure the
technologies’ relative profitability. Accordingly, the core of the calculation resonates with the so-
called fairness stressed by ADEME. However, the ultimate stress test regarding the accuracy of
the tariff, according to an employee at DGEMP, does not require any calculative methods, rather
the realized development performs such a demonstration;
… when you see the development of wind power [in France] … there are no undue rents. There is not a mass of
projects being constructed. However, the tariff has allowed a very satisfactory development of wind power in
France, as currently France is the third [fastest growing] market in Europe.

In other words, the effects of the feed-in tariff, in terms of MW constructed, justifies the tariff’s accu-
racy and efficiency, thus argued thus confirming the calculations of the past.
The collective pricing and valuation effort described above is intimately tied to the objective of
driving a transition towards renewable energy technologies, that is, ‘greening’ the energy system
without exhausting natural resources. Future targets for the share of the electricity production to
be delivered by renewable energy technologies, translated into rates of development, are mobilized
as measures of the efficiency of the price. Most importantly, valuation methods are mobilized to
demonstrate and justify the level of the tariff. As the following valuation will show, such demon-
strations remained controversial.

Valuation 2: resisting the feed-in tariff

The second valuation proposal is a clear counter-proposal to the first valuation, made up by a differ-
ent set of government agencies, rival calculations and a different repository of values. It does not
suggest a price per se – yet it recommends an alternative pricing model to the suggested tariff.
Just as the previous valuation, this contribution is the outcome of valuations produced by a number
of actors, most notably the French Commission of Energy Regulation (CRE),3 and a report written
under the direction of an MP from UMP (Union for a Popular Movement). The overall strategy of
this second valuation proposal is twofold: firstly to disqualify the feed-in tariff as an instrument
capable of fostering wind power development, and secondly, to recalculate the profitability of
wind power projects. As such, this valuation does not attempt to produce a price on wind power,
as much as contest the governance model as well as its distinct level. In doing so, it reformulates
the public good and provides counterarguments for the governance of wind power.

Reframing public goods and technologies

The outcome of the first valuation described above was subjected to an evaluation by CRE, who
issued notices on the first tariff (2001).4 In the notice, CRE’s arguments evaluation is clear: the tariff
is set too high, and the instrument should be dismissed and replaced by a ‘market-instrument’ (2001,
see also CRE 2006). The problematization of the feed-in tariff produced by CRE questions the
asserted positive relation between wind power and the mitigation of greenhouse gases. Instead,
CRE positions wind power in relation to electricity technologies broadly, to argue for the redundancy
of wind power.
8 T. PALLESEN

The valuation produced by CRE builds on the categorization of energy technologies as either
guaranteed production (e.g. nuclear power, coal/fuel-fired plants) or non-guaranteed production
(e.g. solar and wind power). CRE argues that non-guaranteed energy technologies cannot substitute
the construction of new centrals with guaranteed production, because the volatility of the non-guar-
anteed production conflicts with the planning and management of the energy system (in which con-
stantly balancing supply and demand is essential). In other words, fluctuating energy technologies
cannot replace or even less decrease the number of conventional centrals (CRE 2001). As such,
non-guaranteed production such as wind power represents only a limited – if any – value vis-à-
vis CO2 neutrality, primarily because it is incompatible with the existing mode of managing the
electricity system. Furthermore, 80% of French electricity is nuclear power generated; a technology
which is qualified as CO2 neutral (CRE 2001). And it is the cheapest electricity in Europe. Accord-
ingly, CRE argues, introducing wind power into the system implies replacing a (cheap) non-emitting
technology, with an expensive (non-)emitting technology. Later, this argument would be further
extended by Poignant, arguing that increasing the number of MW of wind power in the electricity
system could potentially lead to increases in CO2-emissions – because increases in fluctuating elec-
tricity will require additional balancing resources, such as coal-fired electricity production (2003).
The public good serving as backdrop for CRE’s valuation becomes clear through the juxtaposition
of wind power and nuclear power; it reframes the ‘matter of concern’ of the environment in a broad
sense produced through the first valuation, into a more narrow concern, namely greenhouse gas
emissions, thus disregarding the exhaustion of natural resources and the quality of renewability.
CRE reinforces the value of CO2 mitigation, but rejects that wind power may add positively to
this end – at least in the French energy system. As a reply to Cochet’s claim of a relation between
feed-in tariff, successful development of wind power and thus mitigation of climate change (e.g.
Cochet 2000), CRE argues that such success stories represent energy systems with substantially
higher CO2-emissions, and therefore wind power, in these systems, may actually lead to a mitigation
of CO2. In other words, the value of wind power in terms of CO2 mitigation depends on the energy
system configuration; in a nuclear-powered system as the French, the value is unlikely to be positive.

Governance and market efficiency

Despite CRE’s pessimism regarding the positive effects of wind power in the electricity system, the
regulator nonetheless addresses the possible governance of wind power. As already mentioned, CRE
suggests the feed-in tariff to be replaced by a so-called market instrument (2001, 2006). They struc-
ture their counter-valuation by contesting the level of the suggested tariff: based on the CRE’s own
survey among developers (specifically the costs of investment and operating costs), CRE produces a
counter-calculation of the tariff, demonstrating that the suggested tariff will lead to profitability levels
well above 20% for wind power projects at ‘correctly’ winded sites, set at, 2600 hours annually –
opposed to the 10% demonstrated by ADEME’s method (CRE 2001).
Their re-calculated profitability levels serve to illustrate the contestability of the ‘political’ price,
that is, a price made in the offices of government agencies rather than by the market. The conse-
quences of such a ‘political’ price, CRE argues, indicates global surplus costs of 170 million euros
over a period of 15 years – costs that are to be paid collectively by electricity consumers (2001).
Instead, they strongly advise in favour of a return to tendering procedures; firstly, to avoid the
surplus costs, but secondly, it is argued, the feed-in tariff hinders prediction and control of the num-
ber of MW developed, the costs of the development and the location of the projects. All aspects of
wind power development which may be managed under a system of tenders (CRE 2001). Part of this
issue is the control over the numbers – and location – of turbines in the landscape. Whereas tender-
ing schemes allow a definition of location and size of future projects, feed-in tariffs grant developers
the substantial power of where to locate their projects.
According to CRE, the uncertainty introduced with the feed-in tariff is to a large extent an effect
of the ‘political’ or regulated price, as opposed to a price produced under competition (e.g. market/
tender price). The difficulty consists in getting the tariff ‘right’, by creating an accurate incentive for
 JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMY 9

developers to invest in wind power projects: if set too low, the technology will not develop – if set too
high, it will develop above the objectives (CRE 2001). This argument against a regulated price is
reinforced elsewhere, namely in Poignant’s report; the core of the problem, states the report, is get-
ting the tariff right – it is a harmfully complex challenge (Poignant 2003). As further elaborated,
years later, by a co-author of the report:
Either the tariff is too low, and it won’t work – or it is too high, and you offer undue advantages to the devel-
opers. There is no reason to believe that you strike the right level. Inevitably, it will be too high or too low.

To both CRE and Poignant, such a thing as a ‘right’ or ‘real’ price does exist, but it is an unlikely
result of ‘desk-work’. Instead, it is entirely premised on the existence of competition; either in the
market or through tendering schemes (Poignant 2003). Likewise, CRE’s valuation proposal suggests
that a ‘right’ price may be revealed; ‘CRE recommends the use of tendering procedures which reveal
real prices’ (CRE 2001, p. 1, my translation). Therefore, CRE draws a distinction between ‘market
mechanisms’, such as tenders or green certificates, and non-market mechanisms, such as the
feed-in tariff, and concludes that the adoption of market mechanisms safeguards the community,
by achieving the desired objectives at the minimum costs (2001). Accordingly, both CRE and Poign-
ant strongly opposes ADEME’s qualification of the tariff as both ‘fair’ and ‘efficient’: calculations per-
formed in the offices of economists are bound to be ‘wrong’; instead prices should be produced by
bringing supply and demand together.
The crux of the argument of this second valuation is the source of a price; even the best of valua-
tion methods cannot produce an accurate price. Thus, problematizations target the production of the
price as much as the value of wind power per se. The attempt to dissociate wind power from
reductions in CO2-emissions, and thereby ridding wind power of qualifications other than simply
(fluctuating) electrons, is but a step in making prices of different energies commensurable; as simple
electrons, wind power is commensurable to any other electricity, regardless of production technology
and, not least importantly, other pricing forms. But the valuation proposal also implies a translation
of ‘climate concerns’ into a concern of CO2-emissions: disregarding issues such as nuclear waste and
decreasing uranium resources makes the category ‘sustainable’ – rather than ‘renewable’ – the main
criteria to value.

Discussion
Pricing wind power, or determining its worth, is evidently a politicized issue, and a great deal of
effort is put into either defend the regulation of prices or refute them. Yet, the claim made here is
that more can, and should, be said about the politics of pricing than simply pointing to the site of
production, such as state agencies or markets. More than a struggle over ‘who’ can produce the
right prices – and what a right price might be – the case illustrates continuous struggles concerning
the framing of public and economic goods, their future and how they are made calculable. In the
following, I will flesh out four ways in which we may observe such a politics of pricing. To begin,
the worth of wind power is intimately related to the formulation of public interests. Clearly, as a
major exporter of electricity, France does not need to expand the national electricity generation
capacity. Instead, the concern raised by Cochet and others is whether France needs electricity
with different qualities from those of nuclear power. And the articulation of such differences is pre-
mised on strong associations between the economic good and the public good. Whilst juxtaposing
the two valuations we see how the framing of the public goods and the economic good, namely
wind power, are articulated concurrently. Defining the public good, in the first valuation, as the
environment in a broad sense including the preservation of natural resources, reinforces the valua-
tion of wind power as a renewable energy. It envisions the greening of the energy system increasingly
powered by renewable energy technologies. The second valuation defines the public good more nar-
rowly, as the mitigation of CO2. To reach this end, it is argued, wind power’s non-guaranteed pro-
duction will not replace the reliable and manageable guaranteed-production technologies. The value
10 T. PALLESEN

of wind power is, at best, the value of a non-reliable power source. This is the first way in which we
can talk about the politics of pricing, namely the efforts of framing and delimiting both public good
and economic goods. In both valuations, significant work goes into the problematization (Callon
2009) and delimitation of the public good and suggests distinct solutions: wind power is the solution
to one set of problematizations (environment and natural resources); nuclear power to yet another
(provision of affordable energy namely cheap and non-emitting electricity for the nation).
A second way in which we may observe a politics of pricing in this case is by paying attention to
the predicted or envisioned futures of the valuation. It is the effects produced by the feed-in tariff
which are valuable, and thus the future it may bring about. As such, the study demonstrates the
articulation of the future as a central part of valuation processes (e.g. see Doganova 2011; Ehrenstein
& Muniesa 2013). The former valuation projects distinct relations between pricing, public and econ-
omic goods, and their effects: the tariff will lead to increased wind power in the energy system, reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and the exhaustion of natural resources and thus eventually contribute to a
‘greening’ of the electricity system. The opponents of the feed-in tariff produce a counter-scenario of
the future: tariffs set too low will lead to nothing – tariffs set too high will produce overinvestments;
possibly lead to increases in CO2-emissions as additional balancing power will be required to com-
pensate for fluctuations in wind power; and eventually the pollution of landscapes by turbines.
Instead, CRE and others spend substantial efforts at cutting valuable associations between wind
power and public goods and thus challenge the justifications for regulated prices.
This leads to the third way in which we may observe politics of pricing, namely the stance
towards the governance of energy markets and in particular the role attributed to the market
vis-à-vis the feed-in tariff in the respective valuations. To both valuations, markets – or market
mechanisms – play a significant role. Whereas feed-in tariffs and tenders are both widespread
approaches to stimulating development of renewable energy, they are also evaluated according
to their ‘market-likeness’; both value proposals argue that tendering is indeed ‘more of a market
instrument’ than fixed tariffs, mainly because it introduces an element of competition on the
price (driving bidders to offer the lowest possible price). Yet, the qualities ascribed to the two gov-
ernance models differ; to the latter, markets produce information through price signals or infor-
mation, similar to Breslau’s findings:
Prices that deliver ‘windfall profits’ when compared to a standard of fair return are justified when understood as
a price signal generated by a market mechanism. Prices designed to provide a fair return on investment are
reframed as price discrimination that distorts prices paid to other market participants. (2013, p. 18)

Designed prices such as feed-in tariffs are, similar to Breslau’s study, seen as market distortion. To
the former valuation, the instrumentation of the market may serve the public good; and to this end,
the price is crucial to the agencement proposed with the feed-in tariff. In other words, the tariff is
basically an instrument or device for achieving a valuable public good. To the second valuation, prices
should instead be seen as representing the value of an economic good.
Rather than a struggle for or against ‘intervention’, it is a struggle about legitimate ways of
governing markets and the realization of the desired ‘public good’. As observed in the studies
by Yon (2014) and Breslau (2013), respectively, arguments for ‘mimicking’ or ‘approximating’
the market may be seen as the result of the formatting and disciplining of political agents by
economics (Breslau 2013). The arguments by actors such as CRE in favour of market mechan-
isms appear to draw on a distinct ‘world’ or regime of claims and justifications in terms of mar-
ket efficiency (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006). More importantly, however, the articulated virtues of
market efficiency rest upon the work of dissociating wind power from public goods, such as
greenhouse gas emissions.
The fourth and final way in which we may observe the politics of pricing, closely related to the
previous, are the struggles played out around the valuation methods for defining and qualifying
the price. Beyond the discussion of market efficiency which indeed addresses the ‘origin’ of prices,
these are qualified as fair, efficient, real or wrong. These qualifications are the outcome of calculations
 JOURNAL OF CULTURAL ECONOMY 11

using a number of related methods: PIM/NPV and IRR. They are used to produce prices – as well as
to refute them. The methods share that they are common valuation tools to evaluate possible invest-
ments, and one obvious strength of such methods is their widespread use (Miller 1991). They provide
estimations of the current value of specific projects (Doganova 2011). Yet, for the present purpose
they perform a prediction regarding the profits to be generated by wind power developers; they pro-
vide estimations of fairness, so to speak. They allow comparisons across technologies (Chabot et al.
2002), or industries (Miller 1991); in the present case they allow the comparison and evaluation of
profits. Noticeably, the same valuation methods are used to prove excessive rents (CRE 2001) allow-
ing the conclusion that the collective costs of the feed-in tariff will amount to 170 million euros of
additional costs. In other words, to CRE the valuation methods may document the excessiveness of
the rents – but not the definition of a (real) price. Rather, the valuation methods of the second valua-
tion are used for ‘politicizing’ the suggested tariff, questioning both level and effects of the tariff. This
struggle over the power of calculation unfolds around the question whether carefully crafted calcu-
lations can replace market forces, such as competition, and produce fairness and efficiency,
respectively.

Conclusion
The effects of industrialization on the environment, climate change being the most prominent
example hereof, are gaining increasing awareness. And the question of how to govern concerns
‘attached to markets’ (Geiger et al 2014) remains a controversial subject. One subset of questions
of this controversy has to do with the valuation of goods; as Beckert and Aspers (2011) remind
us, ‘[m]arkets fail if the problem of valuation cannot be resolved’ (p. 30). One specific challenge
in the present study is the struggles concerning the object of valuation: Is wind power safeguarding
public goods – or is it ‘simply’ electricity? Whereas the sociology of valuation discussed in the open-
ing of the paper has documented the plurality of values in the valuation of economic goods, the case
studied here demonstrates how ideas of market efficiency remains an important ideal among govern-
ment bodies as they struggle over the pricing of wind power. Yet the case also demonstrates four
examples of politics of pricing that transgress the market–politics dichotomy; firstly, the valuation
of wind power is intimately linked to the definition of the public goods – and vice versa. The defi-
nition of the public good is coproduced with the valuation of wind power as either a renewable
energy alternative or as non-guaranteed production that may eventually lead to increased emissions.
Secondly, controversies unfold around the futures which the price may bring about. Carefully crafted
prices will sustain the greening of the energy sector – or they will produce a more expensive and
polluting sector, and eventually a ‘pollution’ of landscapes by turbines. Thirdly, pricing as part of
a broader governance approach is emphasized; pricing is conceived as an instrument for achieving
valuable outcomes versus a representation of value. Fourth and finally, a series of valuation methods
are put to the test. The extent to which actors may calculate and guarantee fairness and efficiency of
prices remains a controversial topic, and each valuation produce and document calculations to prove
their claims.
This paper does not suggest that the politics of pricing unpacked in the case of feed-in tariffs are
characteristic of pricing activities more broadly conceived – be it pricing by state agencies or private
actors. Yet, the claim is that once we look beyond the state–market distinction, and see politics as
played out around issues such as the delimitation of public and private goods, their futures, govern-
ance and valuation methods, it may plausibly inform a more general politics of pricing. Just as
importantly, the case illustrates the distinct challenges encountered in situations where pricing is
used to achieve non-economic ends; not only must multiple, and often controversial, values be trans-
lated into a monetary value – something often overlooked by valuation studies – but the regulation of
the price in itself introduces a whole different repository of values that is conflated with the valuation
of the good.
12 T. PALLESEN

Notes
1. Here understood in a narrow economic sense; that is, goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous (Suzuki
2002).
2. Based on the principle of ‘time-value’ of money according to which a euro is worth more today than a euro
tomorrow.
3. An independent administrative authority, founded in 2000 (the year of the adoption of the feed-in tariff), who
regulates the French energy sector, for example, guaranteeing a transparent and equal access to transmission
and distribution grids.
4. An almost identical notice was published following the replacement of the feed-in tariff in 2006 (CRE 2006).

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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