REBELLION

VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO

G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76 & 175013 June 1, 2007
Justice Carpio
FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners'
prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners' cases.

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No.

1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers arrested Crispin
Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. An inquest was held and Beltran was later charged with rebellion before the RTC.
Beltran moved for a judicial determination of probable cause. The trial court affirmed the existence of
probable cause.

ISSUE:

Is there probable cause to charge Beltran with rebellion?

HELD:

No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed —
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and That the purpose
of the uprising or movement is either —
2.(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) anybody of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(a) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in
furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest
of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents. The bulk of the documents
consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the
military and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated
20 February 2006, and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006, none of the affidavits

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mentions Beltran. In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw
Beltran and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia,
Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual. For his part,
Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP's "10th Plenum"
in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other
CPP members used were purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran,
who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an
armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was
in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during
the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting,
maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the
affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence during the 1992 CPP
Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes' affidavit, dated 25 February
2006, as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his
statement regarding meetings with Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which
plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others. However,
what the allegations in Fuentes' affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion,
punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in
meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to
commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since
the felony charged in the Information against Beltran in the criminal case is Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion and not Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired
to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found
probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.

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 DIRECT ASSUALT
LYDIA C. GELIG vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 173150, JULY 28, 2010
Justice Del Castillo

FACTS:

Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at
the Nailon Elementary School. Lydias son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to
this case.

That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, the above -named
accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, employ force and
seriously intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom teacher of Nailon Elementary School
while in the performance of official duties and functions as such which acts consequently caused the
unintentional abortion upon the person of the said Gemma S. Micarsos.

On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime
of direct assault with unintentional abortion.

The CA vacated the trial court’s judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct
assault since Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a private individual when, instead of
pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia. Likewise,
Lydia’s purpose was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of
her son. The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion since
there was no evidence that she was aware of Gemma’s pregnancy at the time of the incident. However,
it declared that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty for Direct Assault penalized under Article 148 of the
Revised Penal Code.

HELD:

Yes. The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code.

It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that
may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes

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of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents.

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault. On
the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official duties,
that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are
taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned.

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 BENJAMIN PANGAN vs. HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE ET AL
G.R. No. 141718 January 21, 2005
Justice Azcuna
FACTS:

Petitioner Benjamin Pangan was found guilty of simple seduction, when his counsel submitted
the case for a decision without offering any evidence due to his constant absence during the hearing.
Notably, at the trial of Crim. Case No. 85-816 in the Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Angeles City and
on the date set for the promulgation of the affirmed decision, the petitioner failed to appear and remained
at large.

Petitioner was then apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell at the order of the
trial court. Later, petitioner filed for a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, contending that his arrest was
illegal and unjustified on the ground that his penalty has prescribed after five years and that having been
able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has long been
totally extinguished.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may be held liable under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:
No. Pursuant to Article 157 of the Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only
by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served the penalty imposed on him in prison and that during the
service of the sentence, he escaped therefrom.
"ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. Elements of evasion of service
of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which
consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of
his sentence.
This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence"
by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take
place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157
which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false
keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees
of the penal institution. Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of
the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation
of liberty before his arrest, and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of
his service, the period of prescription never began.

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JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, vs. HON. ROSARIO TORRECAMPO, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Camarines Sur, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 139033 December 18, 2002
Justice Corona

FACTS:
On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code,
as amended, and sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as
minimum to 3 years as maximum.
During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the presiding judge to issue
an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner was never
apprehended. He remained at large.
Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to quash the warrant
issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. However, it was
denied. His motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has prescribed.

RULING:
It is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed because the circumstances of the case at
bench failed to satisfy the second element, to wit – ‘That the convict evaded the service of the
sentence by escaping during the service of his sentence.’ As a matter of fact, the petitioner never
served a single minute of his sentence.

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 ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005

Justice Garcia

FACTS:

On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information for direct
assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or about the 20th day of
March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO,
knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter
grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter was
actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime
of direct assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of direct assault.

HELD:
Yes. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment
of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties,
or on occasion of such performance. Unquestionably, petitioner’s case falls under the second mode,
which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a
weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand
upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that
it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude
while testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be
disturbed on appeal.

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 REBELLION ART. 134

PEOPLE VS. SILONGAN

G.R. No. 137182 April 24, 2003
Justice Per Curiam

FACTS:

The appellants in this case, who are a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) rebel surrenderees, were convicted in the Regional Trial Court for the crime
of kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention of Alexander Saldaña and his three companions. The four
victims were taken to a mountain hideout and the appellants demanded ransom money for their release.
Alexander was detained for six months until he was finally released.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of kidnapping committed by the accused should be absorbed in
rebellion?

DECISION:

As regards the argument that the crime was politically motivated and that consequently, the
charge should have been rebellion and not kidnapping, we find the same likewise to be without merit. As
held in Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, the political motivation for
the crime must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Merely because
it is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or of the Moro National
Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that the crime of kidnapping was committed in furtherance
of a rebellion. Here, the evidence adduced is insufficient for a finding that the crime committed was
politically motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently proven their allegation that the present case
was filed against them because they are rebel surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the defense
of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.

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 OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE,
PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ATICO ABORDO, JUDY CATUBIG, PETER
MOLATO, AND FLORENCIO CANDIA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 125796, December 27, 2000
Justice Mendoza

FACTS:
That, in the morning, on or about the 1st day of May, 1988, in the municipality of Katipunan,
Zamboanga del Norte, accused armed with high caliber firearms, mutually helping one another and with
intent to kill by and attack, assault and fire several shots to one Cpl. ALFREDO DELA CRUZ PA, which
caused his instantaneous death and causing injuries to others. The information which it had filed on the
ground that the evidence presented at the preliminary investigation shows that the crime committed is
not murder with multiple frustrated murder, but rebellion. The trial court ruled that the power to
determine what crime to charge on the basis of the evidence gathered is the prerogative of the public
prosecutor. The Court of Appeals, however, agrees with the trial court and found the prosecutor to have
gravely abused his discretion in charging murder with frustrated murder on the ground that the evidence
adduced at the preliminary investigation shows that the crime committed was rebellion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime charged is rebellion.

RULING:

The charge that it is “common practice" for the military and the police to charge suspected rebels
with murder in order to prevent them from going out on bail can be laid equally at the door of the accused.
As noted in Enrile v. Salazar. It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has
lost that quintessentially quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and
punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and
have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is
allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of
seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these
days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable
to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.

What the real crime is must await the presentation of evidence at the trial or at the hearing on the
application for bail. Those accused of common crimes can then show proof that the crime with which
they were charged is really rebellion. They are thus not without any remedy.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 24, 1996, is REVERSED insofar
as it orders petitioner to file a substitute information for rebellion. In other respects, it is
AFFIRMED

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 NESTOR GUELOS, RODRIGO GUELOS, GIL CARANDANG and SP02 ALFREDO
CARANDANG y PRESCILLA, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177000, June 19, 2017
FACTS:
On December 5, 1995, two separate Informations5 were filed with the RTC against the petitioners
for Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accusatory portions
of the two Informations state:
Criminal Case No. P-204
That on or about the 4th day of June, 1995, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at Barangay
Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common
accord and mutually helping one another, [Nestor]' while armed with an Armalite Rifle, with intent to
kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with the said firearm one SP02 Estelito Andaya, a bonafide member of the Philippine
National Police assigned at Tanauan Police Station, while engaged in the performance of his official
duties as peace officer, and while the latter is being held from the back by [Gil] and other companions,
whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, thereby hitting and inflicting· upon the said SP02
Estelito Andaya gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death. Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. P-205
That on or about the 4th day of June, 1995, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at Barangay
Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common
accord and mutually helping each other, [Nestor] while armed with an Armalite Rifle, with intent to kill
and without any justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot with the said firearm, one P/Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho, a bonafide member of the
Philippine National Police and concurrently the Chief of Police of Tanauan, Batangas, while engaged in
the performance of his official duties as peace officer, and while the latter is being held at the back
including his two arms by [Alfredo] and the barrel of his armalite rifle is being held by [Rodrigo], thereby
hitting and inflicting upon the said P/Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho gunshot wounds on his head
which caused his instantaneous death.
Notably, in their Reply,31 the petitioners incorporated a motion for new trial based on alleged new
and material evidence impugning the credibility of P02 Carandang. They averred that in the case for
Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide which P02 Carandang also filed against Nestor, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 95-401 and pending before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tanauan, Batangas,
his testimony therein given from October 10, 2007 to July 30, 2008 was different from his testimony in
the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners moved for a new trial on the ground of alleged newly discovered
evidence shall be granted.
HELD: The petitioners' motion for new trial is denied

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 LEE PUE LIONG v. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE
GR No. 181658, 2013-08-07

FACTS:

Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a
company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer
company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of... intra-corporate
disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority
stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioner's siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons took
over and barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and other
factory employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to... the filing of Criminal
Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon Lee and 972-V-99 against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee,
Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and respondent, which are now pending in different courts in Valenzuela
City. In June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretary's Certificate issued by Virginia
Lee on even date) caused the filing of a verified Petition for the Issuance of an Owner's Duplicate Copy
of Transfer Certificate... of Title (TCT) No. 232238 which covers a property owned by CHI. The case
was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner
submitted before the said court an Affidavit of Loss stating that: (1) by virtue of his position as President
of CHI, he had in his custody and possession the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238 issued by
the Register of Deeds for Manila; (2) that said owner's copy of TCT No. 232238 was inadvertently lost
or misplaced from... his files and he discovered such loss in May 1999; (3) he exerted diligent efforts in
locating the said title but it had not been found and is already beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not
been the subject of mortgage or used as collateral for the payment of any obligation... with any person,
credit or banking institution. Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing averments during an
ex-parte proceeding. In its Order dated September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and directed
the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of
the lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among others,
that the September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that respondent
was in possession of the said Owner's Duplicate Copy, the latter being the
Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner merely
needs to have another copy of the title because he planned to mortgage the same with the Planters
Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No.
232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC recalled and set aside its September 17,
1999 Order.
On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit[16] to clarify that she was accusing
petitioner of perjury allegedly committed on the following occasions: (1) by declaring in the
VERIFICATION the veracity of the contents in his petition filed... with the RTC of Manila concerning
his claim that TCT No. 232238 was in his possession but was lost; (2) by declaring under oath in his

39
affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3) by testifying under oath that the said TCT was
inadvertently lost from his files.
presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules,
stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI
and the private complainant.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed a grave error when it upheld the
resolution of the metropolitan trial court that there is a private offended party in the crime of perjury, a
crime against public interest;

RULING:

The petition has no merit. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability,
evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered there was neither a waiver nor a
reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence
should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense
committed and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors.

Principles: such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved." she submits that
pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no civil liability exists in
this case.
(1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; the
individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly
injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission the offended party may also be a private
individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same
punishable act or omission of the... accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the
delictual acts complained of.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC,
this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco.] cited by both MeTC and CA, that
whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the
intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private
prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right
reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the
civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention,
moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately,
nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private
prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action

40
 PEOPLE VS. MANGLALLA
G.R. No. L-38538

FACTS:

Ka Daniel, the leader of the New People's Army (NPA) in Sta. Ana, Cagayan directed accused
Andres Manglallan, Cesar Alvarez, Domingo Ramos, and Virgilio Ballesteros, members of the NPA to
go to Barrio Punti and kill one Apolonio Ragual who was suspected by Ka Daniel to be a Philippine
Constabulary (PC) informer. Said four went to the barrio of Ragual carrying with them their firearms.
They arrived at Punti at 9:00 A.M. and they saw Ragual at the river bank giving his carabao a bath.
Ramos went to him and after a while shot him with his gun. Manglallan also shot him followed with
another shot by Alvarez, as a result of which Ragual fell down and died. Manglallan then placed on the
dead body of Ragual a writing and drawing made by their association warning the people and the PC of
their activities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed by the accused is rebellion or murder?

DECISION:

In the case of People vs. Agarin, which was a prosecution for murder, like the present case, where
the accused Huk member with his companions killed the victim because he was a PC informer, this Court
held that the crime committed is simple rebellion and not murder, as follows:

The offense perpetrated by appellant is murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength. Considering,
however, the fact that the killing was committed as a means to or in the furtherance of the subversive
ends of the Huk balahaps (HUKS) because appellant and his companions, Commander Manaing and
Commander Vida suspected the deceased to have acted as a spy and had informed the BOT and
Government agencies regarding the presence of the Huks in that region, we find Federico Agarin alias
Commander "Smith" guilty of the crime of simple rebellion only.

The Court, therefore, sustains the contention of the appellant that the crime he committed is not murder
but the crime of rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.

41