CAREYSSA MAE I.

IPIL NOVEMBER 22, 2018

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Th)

Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009

DOCTRINE: Determination of Legal Heirs; Jurisprudence dictates that the determination

of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property and
this must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The
Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the
civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

FACTS:

In 1995, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced
by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis
and Catalino Acantilado.

Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land. This lot was declared for
taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that
she is the sole owner, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan
Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of
Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan
Gabatan, the lot was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for
the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but
petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to
respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took
possession of the disputed land despite respondent’s demands for them to vacate the same.

In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan
Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan
Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and
that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-
in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from
Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and
enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including
respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the
subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilos daughter while the latter is just a
caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilos
wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case
was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint
lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been
barred by laches. Both the RTC and the CA rendered in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:

Was the action in the lower court brought by the respondent proper?

HELD:

No.

The respondent’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, was owned by the deceased Juan
Gabatan, during his lifetime. Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal
heir(s) of the decedent.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made
in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action
is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here
are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
 Montaer vs. Sharia District Court
G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009

DOCTRINE: A special proceeding as “a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,

a right, or a particular fact”; In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the
decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow
them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of
the decedent.

FACTS:

In 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. in
Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora
Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children.

On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling
S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for the judicial partition of properties before the
Sharia District Court.

In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995,
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are
the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5)
Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a
list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.

Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among others, the following: (1)
the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate
of the decedent.

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the
Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because
he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees;
and (3) private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation
between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family
Code.

On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint.
The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends
only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.

ISSUE:
Did the respondent Sharia District Court fail to acquire jurisdiction over the estates and properties
of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr.

HELD:

No.
We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding.
Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules,
particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.
In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the
applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as
among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.
In the case at bar, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death
and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as
among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners’ argument that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party
defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of
the deceased, is misplaced.
Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite
adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules
illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse
parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by
which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse
party.
 Saludo vs. American Express
G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006

DOCTRINE: The term “residence” as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions
filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode whether permanent or
temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from “domicile” which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.

FACTS:

Aniceto G. Saludo Jr. filed a complaint for damages against AMEX and/or its officers with
the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Soutern, Leyte. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that
plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) “is a Filipino citizen, of legal age and a member of the House
of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Sountern, Leyte, Philippines.” The
complaint’s cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonour of petitioner Saludo’s
AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter.

Respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was
improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents
were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint,
petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof a evidenced by the fact that his community
tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint’s verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, was issued in Pasay, City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was
improperly laid because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo was a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of the complaint.

HELD:
The Court lays down the doctrinal rule that the term ‘resides’ connotes ex vi termini ‘actual
residence’ as distinguished from ‘legal residence or domicile.’ This term ‘resides’ like the term
‘residing’ and ‘residence’ is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court states that residence rather than domicile
is the significant fact in determining venue. Even where the statute uses the word ‘domicile’ still,
it is construed as a residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms ‘residence’ and ‘domicile’ but as generally used in the statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous and convey the same meaning as the term ‘inhabitant.’

In other words, ‘resides’ should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place and also an intention to make it
one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than “temporary.”