CRIMINAL LAW; ACCUSED'S UNDISPUTED ACT OF FIRING THE GUN, EQUIVALENT TO CRIMINAL INTENT.

— Even
assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his
undisputed act of firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is
equivalent to criminal intent.

ID.; DOCTRINES ENUNCIATED IN PEOPLE v. PAMA PEOPLE v. LAWAS AND PEOPLE v. PINEDA, NOT APPLICABLE IN
THE CASE AT BENCH. — We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion
perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court's holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence
shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun
fires, meaning continuous" does not hold water. The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said
case, there was only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two
crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more
grave or less grave felonies.

6.ID.; THE FIRING OF SEVERAL BULLETS BY THE ACCUSED ALTHOUGH RESULTING FROM ONE CONTINUOUS BURST
OF GUNFIRE CONSTITUTES SEVERAL ACTS AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A COMPLEX CRIME; CASES, OF PEOPLE
v. DESIERTO AND PEOPLE v. PARDO APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH. — What is on all fours with the case at bench
is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-
machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein: "In the
case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the five persons who
were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused
by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although it is true that several
successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into
consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and
separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting
from every single act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in
a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a
separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of
frustrated homicide were committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would
connect one of them with its companion offenses." In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single
act of pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has
only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing, the
trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them. . . . The
firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts.
Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single
missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from the
other. In People vs. Pardo we held that: "Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from
two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed." . . . Consequently, the four
murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The
accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly
to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.

||| (People v. Tabaco, G.R. Nos. 100382-100385, [March 19, 1997], 336 PHIL 771-804)

COMPLEX CRIME; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — It is clear from the evidence on record, however, that the
four crimes of murder resulted not from a single act but from several individual and distinct acts. For one thing, the
evidence indicates that there was more than one gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that
of the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single act of firing a single firearm. There were also several
empty bullet shells recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the fact that several shots were fired.
Furthermore, considering the relative positions of the gunmen and their victims, some of whom were riding the
motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible for the
four victims to have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give
rise to the complex crime of multiple murder. We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime
of multiple murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of the four victims in this case In the same manner,
accused- appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.||| (People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 127663,
[March 11, 1999], 364 PHIL 259-280)

CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; NUMBER OF BULLETS ACTUALLY PRODUCED AND NOT THE ACT OF PRESSING
THE TRIGGER CONSIDERED AS PRODUCING SEVERAL FELONIES; CASE AT BAR. — In People v. Vargas, Jr., we ruled
that several shots from a Thompson sub-machine, in view of its special mechanism causing several deaths, although
caused by a single act of pressing the trigger, are considered several acts. Although each burst of shots was caused
by one single act of pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, in view of its special mechanism the person firing it
has only to keep pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is
not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of
bullets which actually produced them. In the instant case, Malabanan testified that he heard three bursts of gunfire
from the two armalites used by accused Corcolon and Peradillas. Thus, the accused are criminally liable for as many
offenses resulting from pressing the trigger of the armalites. Therefore, accused are liable for two counts of murder
committed against the victims, Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa, instead of the complex crime of double murder.||| (People
v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 131116, [August 27, 1999], 372 PHIL 129-149)

COMPLEX CRIMES; ARTICLE 48 APPLIES ONLY WHEN TWO CRIMES ARE COMMITTED. — The language of Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code presupposes the commission of two or more crimes, and hence, does not apply when the
culprit is guilty of only one crime.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRO REO" PRINCIPLES; LESS CRIMINAL PERVERSITY IN COMPLEX CRIMES. — If one act constitutes
two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said
offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum
period, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than
the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article
48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse
than when he commits said crimes through separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption
that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.

||| (People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26 (Resolution), [July 18, 1956], 99 PHIL 515-583)

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; OBJECTIONAL PHRASING THAT WOULD COMPLEX
REBELLION WITH MURDER AND MULTIPLE MURDER, A MERE FLIGHT OF RHETORIC; CASE AT BAR. — The Court
rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense.
Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime
that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not
be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and
punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.||| (Enrile v. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, 92164, [June 5, 1990],
264 PHIL 593-637)

CRIMINAL LAW; FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE; ELEMENTS. — The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined
in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs.
The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge with the
abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED AND ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the information
sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible abduction, i.e., the taking of complainant against her will and with lewd
design. It was likewise alleged that accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired, confederated and mutually
aided one another in having carnal knowledge of complainant by means of force and intimidation and against her will.
Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly established that the carnal
knowledge was committed through force and intimidation. Moreover, the prosecution sufficiently proved beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant succeeded in forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd designs,
established by the actual rape. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.

ID.; ID.; FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WAS ONLY NECESSARY FOR THE FIRST RAPE; ONLY ONE COMPLEX CRIME WAS
COMMITTED. — [A]s correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no
longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and
considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape.

||| (People v. Garcia y Caragay, G.R. No. 141125, [February 28, 2002], 428 PHIL 312-331)

here is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, 45 it is important to ascertain whether
the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private
document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can
be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People
v. Reyes, 46 the accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario,
worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the
offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the
wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.

||| (Batulanon v. People, G.R. No. 139857, [September 15, 2006], 533 PHIL 336-359)
RULE WHERE SEVERAL ACTS OF FORGERY ARE COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A CONTINUOUS TRANSACTION ON
SAME DATE. — In respect of the defense of jeopardy, made to a prosecution for forgery, it must appear by the plea
that the offenses charged in both were the same in law and in fact. The plea will be bad if the offenses charged in the
two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in fact. As to several acts
of forgery, each generally constitutes a separate crime, even though they are committed in the course of a continuous
transaction, on the same date, or even on the same piece of paper, unless each act constitutes merely a component
part of an indivisible instrument (23 Am. Jur., p. 700-701).

ONTINUOUS CRIME OR DELITO CONTINUADO EXPLAINED. — Apart and isolated from plurality of crimes (ideal or
real) is what is known as "delito continuado" or "continuous crime". This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts
arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. Thus, it is said that when the actor, there
being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character,
merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such a concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito
continuado". In order that it may exist, there should be "plurality of acts performed separately, during a period of time;
unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated any unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or
more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the
same criminal purpose or aim".

4. ID.; ID.; TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A SINGLE ACT PRODUCING TWO OR MORE GRAVE OR LESS GRAVE
OFFENSES CONSTITUTES A COMPLEX CRIME UNDER ART. 48. — To apply the first half of Article 48, there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law. So long as the act or acts
complained of resulted in a single criminal impulse it is usually held to constitute a single offense to be punished with
the penalty corresponding to the most serious crime, imposed in its maximum period. The test is not whether one of
the two offenses is an essential element of the other. Thus, the taking of thirteen cows at the same time and in the
same place where they were found grazing, or the taking of two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the
criminal purpose on one occasion, constitutes a single crime of theft. There is no series of acts committed for the
accomplishment of different purposes, but only one which was consummated and which determines the existence of
only one crime. The act of taking the cows or roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to
two crimes having in independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriation nor two
intentions that characterize two separate crimes.||| (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41054, [November 28,
1975], 160-A PHIL 962-975)

.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR; CONTINUED CRIME, CONSTRUED. — A comparison of the
Informations filed in the two cases under consideration as well as the findings of facts of the appellate court tells us
that they refer to the same series of acts. These series of acts amount to what is known in law as a continued,
continuous or continuing offense. A continued crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from
one criminal resolution. It is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated
by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Although there are series of acts, there is only one
crime committed. Hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ONLY ONE PENALTY SHOULD BE IMPOSED. — The singularity of the offense committed by petitioner
is further demonstrated by the fact that the falsification of the two (2) public documents as a means of committing
estafa were performed on the same date, in the same place, at the same time and on the same occasion. This Court
has held in the case of People v. de Leon, that the act of taking two or more roosters in the same place and on the
same occasion is dictated by only one criminal design and therefore, there is only one crime of theft even if the roosters
are owned by different persons. ||| (Mallari v. People, G.R. No. 58886, [December 13, 1988], 250 PHIL 421-429)

COMPLEX CRIME

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but
awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal
Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies); 46 and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude . . .
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight . . .," 47 a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple
intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models — that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-
crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses.
The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48's
framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge,
collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of
penalties under Article 365? IDTSaC

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy)
applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences 48 unless one consequence amounts
to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or
less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting
to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts. 49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691, 50 the MeTC has now exclusive
original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correctional in its medium
period.

||| (Ivler y Aguilar v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, [November 17, 2010], 649 PHIL 478-510)

VII. PENALTIES

We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six (6) counts of rape. The sentence
of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No.
9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of the law mandates that
in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no
longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose
instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate. Since the passage of Rep. Act No.
9346, the Court has had occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent cases such as People v. Tubongbanua 52 and
People v. Cabalquinto. 53
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code. Both reclusion perpetua and death
are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime
is composed of two indivisible penalties . . . the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the
lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, in passing sentence on those convicted of
attempted felonies which warranted the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, the Court has
consistently held that penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor. In contrast, if the
penalty for the consummated crime is the single indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for several crimes under
Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalty prescribed for the felony is single
and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the
respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71". Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion
temporal.

||| (People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401 [Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67], [October 30, 2006], 536 PHIL 897-943)

CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659, PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA REMAINS INDIVISIBLE DESPITE
FIXING DURATION FROM 20 YEARS AND 1 DAY TO 40 YEARS. — After deliberating on the motion and re-examining
the legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court concludes that although Section 17 of R.A No. 7659 has fixed the
duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative
intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. [I]f reclusion perpetua was reclassified as a divisible
penalty, then Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for existence. To illustrate, the first
paragraph of Section 20 of the amended R.A. No. 6425 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever
the dangerous drugs involved are of any of the quantities stated therein. If Article 63 of the Code were no longer
applicable because reclusion perpetua is supposed to be a divisible penalty, then there would be no statutory rules for
determining when either reclusion perpetua or death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be no
occasion for imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug case, regardless of the attendant modifying
circumstances. cdasia||| (People v. Lucas y Briones, G.R. Nos. 108172-73, [January 9, 1995], 310 PHIL 77-89)

Prior to R.A. No. 7659, 36 the presence of modifying circumstances would not affect the penalty of reclusion perpetua
prescribed for the crime of rape because such a penalty was then indivisible and under Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. However, pursuant to Section 21
of R.A. No. 7659, which amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, reclusion perpetua has now a defined duration,
i.e., from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. There is, however, no corresponding amendment to
Article 76 of the same Code for the purpose of converting reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty with three specific
period — minimum, medium, and maximum — and including it in the table provided therein showing the duration and
the time included in each of the periods.

It may thus be said that although the law has now fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua, it did not make explicit its
intention to convert it into a divisible penalty. In any event, Article 65 of the Code which provides: llcd

"ART. 65. Rules in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. — In cases in which the penalty
prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles,
dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed and forming one period of each of the
three portions."

may be applied. Accordingly, the time included in the penalty of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20] years and one [1]
days to forty [40] years) can be divided into three equal portions, with each composing a period. The periods of
reclusion perpetua would then be as follows:
minimum — 20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8 months
medium — 26 years and 8 months and 1 day to 33 years and 4 months
maximum — 34 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years
Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, the
accused may finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion perpetua.
Considering again such aggravating circumstance, the accused may be sentenced in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum
as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.
||| (People v. Lucas y Briones, G.R. Nos. 108172-73, [May 25, 1994], 302 PHIL 570-587)

CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The trial court,
however, erred in convicting accused-appellant of the "complex crime of double murder" and separate offenses of
serious physical injuries. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." The instant case does not fall
under any of the two mentioned instances when a complex crime is committed. The killing of Lilia Asuncion and Jose
Asuncion and the wounding of Jaime and Leo Asuncion resulted not from a single act but from several and distinct acts
of stabbing. "When the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two
separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed." Thus, accused-appellant is liable, not for a complex crime
of double murder, but for two separate counts of murder, and separate counts of physical injuries.

ID.; ID.; PROPER IMPOSABLE PENALTY IS RECLUSION PERPETUA, NOT LIFE IMPRISONMENT. — Under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder at the time of the commission of the crime in April 1991 was reclusion
temporal maximum to death. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder and sentenced him to "life
imprisonment." The proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment. Obviously, the trial court
intended to impose reclusion perpetua.

7. ID.; PENALTIES; LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND RECLUSION PERPETUA; DIFFERENTIATED. — [T]he penalty of life
imprisonment is not the same as reclusion perpetua. They are distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties.
First, "life imprisonment" is imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is
prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, "life imprisonment" does not carry with it any accessory penalty.
Reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties. Third, "life imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes
eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.

||| (People v. Latupan y Sibal, G.R. Nos. 112453-56, [June 28, 2001], 412 PHIL 477-490)

3. Indeterminate Sentence Law

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of frustrated homicide is one degree lower than that prescribed by law for
the crime of homicide. 25 Under the indeterminate sentence law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which
could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

Considering that the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal, the penalty for the
crime of frustrated homicide would be prision mayor. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, there being the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the sentence should
be within the range of prision mayor in its minimum term which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight
(8) years, and that, on the other hand, the minimum should be within the range of prision correccional which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the imposition of imprisonment from four (4) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as maximum, is in order. ||| (People v. Lanuza
y Bagaoisan, G.R. No. 188562, [August 24, 2011], 671 PHIL 811-825)

The penalty for homicide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Under Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, 15 the court, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the offense. With the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four months. This is
pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. 16 It is such period that the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be reckoned from. Hence, limiting the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at only 14 years
and eight months contravened the express provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for such penalty was within
the minimum period of reclusion temporal. Accordingly, the Court must add one day to the maximum term fixed by
the lower courts.

The Court finds to be unnecessary the increment of one day as part of the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence.
It may be true that the increment did not constitute an error, because the minimum term thus fixed was entirely within
the parameters of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Yet, the addition of one day to the 10 years as the minimum term
of the indeterminate sentence of Talampas may occasion a degree of inconvenience when it will be time for the penal
administrators concerned to consider and determine whether Talampas is already qualified to enjoy the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, in order to simplify the computation of the minimum penalty of the indeterminate
sentence, the Court deletes the one-day increment from the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence. |||
(Talampas y Matic v. People, G.R. No. 180219, [November 23, 2011], 677 PHIL 209-219)

With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term which consists of a minimum and maximum term called the
indeterminate sentence. 25 Section 1 of the ISL provides —

SEC. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; . . . .

Thus, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
RPC. In other words, the penalty actually imposed under the pre-ISL regime became the maximum term under the ISL
regime. Upon the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty. To illustrate, if the case of Saadlucap was decided under the ISL regime, then the maximum term would be
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal and the minimum term could be anywhere within the range of
prisión mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) which is the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal. Consequently, an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prisión mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal
as maximum could have possibly been imposed.||| (People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, [December 17, 2008],
594 PHIL 680-805)

C. Execution and Service of Penalties

Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the nature of the
penalties so permit. The penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the
nature of such penalties. Where the accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be
served successively.

In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense committed.
The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the prison terms simultaneously. Applying the rule on
successive service of sentence, the Supreme Court found that petitioner has not yet completed the service of his
sentence as he commenced serving his sentence only on February 24, 1999. His prayer, therefore, for the issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus has no basis. ||| (In re Lagran, G.R. No. 147270, [August 15, 2001], 415 PHIL 506-510)

CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTIES; SUCCESSIVE SERVICE OF SENTENCES; SUCCESSIVE SERVICE OF PENALTIES ALLOWED
ONLY IF THE NATURE OF THE PENALTIES SO PERMIT; PENALTIES CONSISTING IN DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY
SHOULD BE SERVED SUCCESSIVELY. — Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two or
more penalties only if the nature of the penalties so permit. The penalties that can be simultaneously served are: (1)
perpetual absolute disqualification, (2) perpetual special disqualification, (3) temporary absolute disqualification, (4)
temporary special disqualification, (5) suspension, (6) destierro, (7) public censure, (8) fine and bond to keep the
peace, (9) civil interdiction, and (10) confiscation and payment of costs. These penalties, except destierro, can be
served simultaneously with imprisonment. The penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served
simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. Where the accused is sentenced to two or more terms of
imprisonment, the terms should be served successively. ||| (In re Lagran, G.R. No. 147270, [August 15, 2001], 415
PHIL 506-510)
VIII. Extinction of Criminal Liability

Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive notice was applied, involved therein
were land or property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of
the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed
liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof
would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as
he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He
does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married
person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is
rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agency (sic). Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution
of the violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would
encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law. To this we may also add that the
rule on constructive notice will make de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the
National Census Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or even
third marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too formidable a task to
even contemplate.||| (Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, [June 14, 1994], 303 PHIL 165-173)

Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his marriage contract with
Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and sundry for inspection. We cannot go along with
his argument because why did he indicate in the marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true
status as a married man? Or for that matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in
Marikina so that everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew that no priest or minister would
knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law.
10 Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his duplicity to his first spouse and gambled instead on the
probability that she or any third party would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the
simple expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set into motion the running
of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary and the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.||| (Sermonia
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, [June 14, 1994], 303 PHIL 165-173)

The Court ruled that R.A. No. 3019 being a special law, the commencement of the period for the prescription for any
act violating it is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326. As a rule, if the commission of the crime is known, the
prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was committed. However, in cases where the time of
commission is unknown, prescription shall only run from its discovery and institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. Ordinarily, there is no problem in determining the date when the crime consists of a
series of acts, especially when some or all of these acts are innocent in themselves. The Ombudsman should not have
dismissed the complaint on the basis of prescription which was erroneous. The Ombudsman should have given the
Solicitor General the opportunity to present his evidence and then resolve the case for purposes of preliminary
investigation. The assailed Review and Recommendation dated August 6, 1998 of Graft Investigation Officer Emora C.
Pagunuran, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto is hereby reversed and set aside.||| (Republic v. Desierto,
G.R. No. 136506, [August 23, 2001], 416 PHIL 59-80)

SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code — All violations of any provision of this Code shall
prescribe after five (5) years. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
persons and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. The term
of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) According to Mr.
Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the so-called "gap" in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326
governs the operation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
can and shall still be applied in cases where the accused is absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would
supplement Act No. 3326. This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law. While it is true that Article
10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the
ambit of "special law" as contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC.

||| (Romualdez v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33 (Resolution), [July 28, 2006], 529 PHIL 90-119)

As correctly resolved by the trial court, while only the President can commute a prison sentence, Articles 70 8 and 97
9 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) recognize partial reduction or commutation of sentences by providing that "for penal
penalties, the duration shall be computed for 30 years and the allowances of good conduct must be applied on top of
the [good conduct time allowance] accorded to an inmate with a colonist status." Accordingly, to implement the
provisions of Article 97, the law has granted the Director of Prisons the power to grant good conduct allowances. The
mandate of the Director of Prisons embodied in Article 99 of the RPC is clear and unambiguous. In fact, once granted,
such allowances shall not be revoked. Article 99 of the RPC explicitly states:

Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for
good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked. ||| (Cruz III v. Go, G.R. No. 223446 (Notice),
[November 28, 2016])

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Cdpr

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription,
in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22

||| (People v. Bayotas y Cordova, G.R. No. 102007, [September 2, 1994], 306 PHIL 266-284)||| (People v. Bayotas y
Cordova, G.R. No. 102007, [September 2, 1994], 306 PHIL 266-284)