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COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections.
Issue:
Held:
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political
power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance
to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in
the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his
or her party-list group or organization of choice.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides for the Refusal and/or Cancellation of
Registration: The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds: 1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized
for religious purposes;2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; 3) It is
a foreign party or organization; 4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; 5)
It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; 6) It
declares untruthful statements in its petition; 7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1)
year; or 8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. None of the 8
grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to nonrepresentation of the “marginalized
and underrepresented.”
The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should refer only to the sectors
in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically “marginalized and
underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must
belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party
either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. Belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does not
mean one must “wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity.” It is sufficient that one, or his
or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
“marginalized and underrepresented” are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. The recognition that national
and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and
the youth, need not be “marginalized and underrepresented” will allow small ideology-
based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies” a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers,
and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will
give the “marginalized and underrepresented” an opportunity to likewise win seats in the
House of Representatives.
The court cannot fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not
have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-
list elections, the court imposes and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned
and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court
devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's
allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT,
however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, the court declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT
in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO
ROY MONTEJO
Facts:
The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify
Marcos. It held that the animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan,
Manila, because that where she chose to live after she went back to the Philippines
after her well-publicized exile in the US. It explained that while Petitioner grew up in
Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she moved to Manila where she became a
registered voter, became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of
Manila and eventually became Governor of Manila. This, according to the COMELEC
debunks her claim that she was a resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".
Issues:
2. Whether or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with her husband
in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan.
Held:
1. The Supreme Court declared in this case that for purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile. The decision of the COMELEC
however, shows that they confused the concept of "Domicile" with "actual
residence".
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In a past case, the Court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." Thus, domicile is composed of the two elements: 1. The fact
of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and 2. Animus manendi - the intention of
returning permanently. Residence on the other hand merely refers to the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is mere physical presence. Residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his
abode ends. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to
leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. Domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A person can have different
residences in various places, but he can only have a single domicile. Note however, that
a person may abandon a domicile in favor of another.
Petitioner Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. The fact that she has a
residence in Manila does not mean that she has lost her domicile in that province. The
absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Applying this doctrine to the case of petitioner, the fact that she has
registered to vote and resided in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan do not unequivocally
point to an intention to abandon her domicile in Tacloban. Even while residing in
various places, petitioner kept close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her
province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and
close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of
origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our
country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the
majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the
fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
2. No. When petitioner Imelda Marcos was born, her domicile followed that of her
parents. Hence, her domicile of origin was Tacloban. Once acquired, domicile is
retained until a new one is gained. The domicile of origin is not easily lost. To effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence
of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue.
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt
the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to the concepts of domicile or
residence does not suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
origin in favor of the husband upon marriage. This article clearly refers to actual
residence and not domicile and merely establishes the default rule in fulfilling the
obligation of the spouses "to live together" in article immediately preceding Art. 110.