2

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POLITICAL WARF~

ty no

'yde-
BY
.tica
WANG SHANG
go thE
GENERAL, CHINESE ARMY
:-8",

it i1
ane

re
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY
PROFESSOR HSIN KW ANG-HSU
tty

In
is

tt
\.J
j l
IQ
0
I ""'),. {
 and the Command and General Staff , he has
lectured on political' warfare in recent yearf:: and has received FOREWARD (.

very comment,s. read the of his lec-

tures, I found it to be invaillable both as referenc~ in the After the debacle en the Chinese mainland, President Chiang

of warfare and as materials for instruction in this Kai-shek, layi.ng emphasis more on political actions than on

• And so, it is decided to have the military operations and more on spiritual strength than on materi-
in various
of the Ministry National Defense alforces in the war against communism, coined the term "political
General political
warfare" in 1953, and subsequently published a series of fiv~
it book form.
of the mean- articles on the study of political warfare, in which the six major'
book a brief and concise
IJV ..... ".LV<.LJ. warfare. It also provides types of operations were listed as its contents.
To President s i llstructions into practice the Political
historical lessons with concrete facts as illustrations • In ad-
Staff College, in an attempt to systematize and t~eorize the study
the author has a~e~lysed the
blocs, of political warfare, had compiled materials for instruction in
warfar6 as Communist and va.lUlI.Hi""'''

thE) communists and 1952, After two years of continuous efforts, the Political Warfare
way to IJVJlJ.I,J,,-a.J..J..Y

warfare into operation. R eSf'arch Class was optmed. Hence the courSe in political war-
dwelled in details on to IJUJ..U.L\..CClJ.

fare was extended from the military schools at various levels to

who study it with care will be able to forge ahead and march
the armed forces. Iv1eanwhile, the 'General Political Department
on the road to ..~,r'''''''''''''''
of the l\1inistry of National Defense had also ...ssued the outlines,
Chiang.Chien-jen.
the tenets, thEl chessboards and. films, all pertaining to political
Chieh Shou
warfare J as supplements for instruction and training. among.
9 1959.
servicemen of all levels. From that time, the political. work of
the armed forces has centered around political warfare, ~nd. all
servicemen have to undergo SU9h training, aside from the regular
::ourses in political science. In 1963 the President decided: that

the General Political DE:partme!1t be changed into General Politi-

cal Warfare Department , with it~ branch~s likew~se renamed,. and
that the Political Staff College be changed into the Political War-

II III
fare College, in 'Nnich a institute devoted to the study the present writer had taught the Cambodian the officers same
of warfare is set up According to the President, subject and found many parts of the book should have undergone
a special corps in warfare thorough revision because of the changing world situations.
years of oriep,a:r.:Hl.on National A V'ailing himself of .the two official visits to Kinmen, tlfe present
nn·.... ,.."{Tor! the VUI>.L.LILt;:;;:, of author had been able to finish the revision work i~ the Nien Chih
liTom the highest Hall of the off~·shore island. It is hoped that this book can con....

the whole tribute to our anti-Communist efforts, but there might sUUbe in
it much to be d~:lsired. the present writer wants to quote

The present book lectures delivered first at from the Forewiord of the Revised Edition of the book which runs

the Army Command. and General Staff College upon the in part: "Political warfare is a new sort of knowled,ge which is

ot Comrade Wang and then at the Warfare He:- to meet the demands of the National Revolution. It is also a 'war-

, but the had not been pUblic- fare of crucial importance to be waged againstthe enemy. It is

ation 1958 when Professor 11a then a student in the Re- hoped that when this book undergoes ;revision, any fruitful sug-

search Class, tock pains to it in order. sev-eral gestions or corrections from our revolutionary leaders and ad-

months of first edition came on vanced experts will be appreciated" •

13, with more than [CIOOO copies. Favorable comments

were received from many source~,. It was revised on November Wang Sheng.

17 of the same year, and third and fourth of

Nien Chih Hall, Kinmen,
this book consisted of more than 100,000 copies.' Due to pressure June 19, 1973.
of work, the present had not been able to revise it until
th~ in • Now, it has its' Chinese,
Koreoan, Vietnamese, Cambodian and
Spanish versions. the present writer received order to
visit Vietnam to ut::.l.iJ'·.~iC'l;A·IJ.LJI.;:'ll the system of IJV.i."-~.L""'G"'" w'? rfare in....
the armed forces It is conceivable the Vietnamese
servicemen have aware of the six of IJV.ll~.L""'Cl.'"

warfare in the years no less than the Chinese. Of late

VI v
 CONTENTS

Chapter II. Historical Lessons 0'" 0 • 0 ••••••••• 0 0 ••••••• 19

L II IdE~ological Conquest lt -- Tactics in

Communist Ideological Warfare .....•• 00. 0 • • • 20
2. "PE~aceful Coexistence" -- Tactics in
Communist Strategical Warfare ...••.•.. 0 • 31
3. nThree Great Weapons" -- Tactics in
Communist Organizational Warfare .• 0 0" • • • • • • 42
4. Temptation and Intimidation -- Tactics
in Communist Psychological Warfare. .. 0 0 • • • 51
5. Cloak and Dagger -- Tactic s in
Communist Intelligence Warfare ... 0 • • • • • • • • • 58
6. Thl3 Exploitation of the Masses -- Tactics
in Communist Mass Movement Warfare ..••....• 0 66

Chapter III. The Present Status of Glo'bal Political

Warfare ..... 0 ••• 0 0 ••••••• 0 ••••• 0 ...... 0 • • 77

L On the Part of Chinese Communists •. 0....... 78

2. On the Part of Democratic Countries ...•.... 84
3. On the Part of the Republic of China ... 0 , 0 0 0 0 88

--1-
Chapter IV. Communism VElrsusFreedom ••...•....••.••. 99 Warfare in Operation .•....••.. 0. 171
6. The Voice of the People Is the Voice of God
Love Hate -- Contrast
Mass Movement Warfare in Operation •.•••...• 177
• ~ " • " ••• ' •• 4' ill It • " 41 I; .. $ • ill • Ill' • ., 100
2. . VI. Conclusion 185
-- A 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••

Contrast ........... 09
3
A Contrast Ka.u..L:'!)Q.I-J.U!.l<:l..L Warfare • 116
4. Lies-- A Contrast
\;U'VJ.I.'K.L'l.'<::LJ. Warfare 24

5. Science in
.L.L.LIl(vll..... C' Warfare 131
6. .... ~ .....,... ",~ Versus .LIA.IJ .. V ....·.... Contrast
.Mass Movement Warfare 136

•••••••••• 0 143

L T he Faith in Three of the

People
• .•••• ..••.• 146
2. Calculations behind the
•• o •••• 0 ••••• 152

3. and Affection
Warfare in Operation ..•.... o. 1 59
4. Is Our Comrade"
• •••• 0 •••• 165
5. -- thl~ Price of
 the of the affairs of the mass of the subjugating the other and rendering it helpless. During the
The affairs of the mass are also those ·of course of conflict both sides employ violence and weapons to
the state lIU'lLJll_" or seek use every means at their disposal to develop
chih admlnistra tion of the s affairs, the maximum efficiency of this violence. But at times they do not

it. als 0 -involves of the state affairs need to resort to violence and are yet able to achieve
one Political warfare is this type of warfare.
The epithet !! polit1cal ll in political warfare covers many

are factors and is therefore vague as \vell as broad in implications ~

in a state; -one has s warfare is dictated by historical experience and
realities while demands of the time, President Chiang Kai-shek, the living

in symbol of anti-communism of the world, has listed under

warfare is is poiitical warfare. "six types t1 namely, strategical warfare,

or one may ideological warfare, organization"!l warfare, psychological

is the conduct of affairs; but warfa.re, intelligence warfare, and mass movement warfare.

which arises symptoms Strategy ma:rks the poticy-makj ng, ideology the cause ,

occur the administration and the is under organization the, layout, mass. movement the basis ~ psychology

threat from wIthin present conflict of the direct operation, and intelligence the covert operations of
the when the CCimmunists means as political warfare G warfare is the last resort of political

in~urrection warfare.
to create divisio'n and chaos in national and international
is forced rise 2. Political Warfare-Its Contents
or preserve freedom and As stated in the prec'eding section, political warfare
ideology versus includes warfare of strategy, ideology, organization,
versus a.nd whe!.l psychology, intelligence, and ma.ss movement. Each of these
necessary, force.
six types can be explained as follows:
War is violence each opposing
I
1. Warfare: Ideological warfare is the warfare
'Side exerts maximum the of defeating, the forms of the batLles of tongue
of ism versus ism. It

_.- 3 --
-2-
and pen. is shatter the enemy s I !JV.L......L'-'<J.... belief,
results thus achieved will be great. Strategical warfa:
break its and seek win ove:r the masses are affected
therefore the role of policy-maker in the field
by the enemy's If success in .......,~v .. vF.,............" ... warfare is l

political warfare.
the' enemy is dE!feated at its root is
the cause of .I.u.~:;v~,VI:::...L'-'C;l. ... 3. Organizational Warfare: The precise meaning
of ideas betwE!en two the organization is to closely correlate man, place, time,' ar
democracies 'want a states where physical prowess with major plans and immediate objectives e
democratic ideas and tree way of life can be preserved, the that maximum can be developed. President Chiar
Communists seek a where communism will dominate .. K al-shek has pointed out: tl No matter how well aJ
It is this marked differEmce in that leads to advanced is science, and how correct and rational is ideolog:
conflict VJl.'o;""J."'<J.... difference is the cause science and will remain a caput mortuum without tt
of .... "'Ju. .....'.... "" ... but also that of warfare" effective employment of both by a wholesome ,organizat,lon 1
Organizational 'warfare is devoted to the use of organized pow
2. Warfare: warfare is the
to crush the enemy I s organization so as to dissolve it for gOal
....""' . . . "",......"" the enemy
Just as it is necessary to have well-knit organization of U
to commit u .... ~n.<:,...,
>J".. so as to facilitate the realization wa.r'aims
armed forces in the military operation, so it is in politic;

to tactics. warfare .. Wherever the organized force has explored, that i

with from !Jv ...... " ....... c.. Jl.

the strategical point for political advancement. B

President exhorted his senior
organization itself is by no means perfunctory and must 1
officers to engage themselves the of since
guided by strategy, preceded by ideological atta,ck ar
in the last W'ar, commanders were as much concerned
supported by mass movement.
actual ..... Fi, .... " ......... of armed forces were
with .larger to allied 4. Psychological Warfare: Quite obviously, psychologic;
forces economic warfare is means other than military to subdile tht: enen

warfare its psychologically, causing its will to break and its organlzatlC
in 1-'''' " warfare because often "".L.A.,""""_"" itself in the other to collapse. It is essential to political warfare. Nevertheles~
five of warfare When strategy be pnnnlrCT'O
and the psychotogical war operation must also be guided by well

in the conduct planned strategy, carried out ideological weapons, anI

supported well-founded ~a,",-".L'-"';:; use of \Va}
-4- VarIOUS

-5-
 of tIle enemy on the one hand, and to prevent the stealing or
organizational tactics and Gropaganda leaking of secrets on the other. The loss of Chinese mainland
means
I,.;U,VJ.'Ulit..LI,.;<;~.Lwar operation can reach the masses in 1949, it should be confessed, was largely due to the failure
.... a.uoJ ... u.«O them to know the enemy Is situations on the of the National
of
This i:::. one of the most means
Goverment of the Republic of China. For this reason, President
the second World Chiang Kai;...shek has specifically directed first
in
the British and collection of information foremost...." In-the world Of ,
ormation had succE3ecled
Inlc~'mation'and tJ S Office ~or War 'all major nations have their intelligence service. In ihe United
for minds pf men. But before States, therE! are the Central Int~lligence A.gency and the
in the
S armed forces slack in the
Korean. War ill- the. Federal Bureau of Investigation, both of whi~h are
had suffered setbacks at the
esteemed intHUigence agencies. The collection and eY~luation
a~'thorities.
As soon as U. S of information today has become a highly specialized science and
J.UIIUt'U.LC::a.I.o'=' action remedy'
the mistake, an art The end and aim of intelUience warfare can be summed
and scholars to take
up as this: the less the enemy knows one IS secret and themore
1.J.1.~.""'U'V"" the center for the
cnlirg;re of th~ one knows the: enemy I s secrets, the be~ter will be. The former
DSVcn010,IlH : a1 warfare
,piannhi~of belongs to counter-intelligence,' and, the latter to offensive
as to wage the
intelligence. Be it counter-intelligence or offensive intelligence ~
the enemy These facts
it involves secrecy. Hence, intelligence warfare- is the covert
of w~rfare in the
operation in the whole fi'eld of political w'~rfare.
6. Mass Movement Warfare: Mass movement warfare is a.
Warfare:. As far back as 600 13 C., SUfr .
5 basic factor in supporting the war-effort,a·tirl in winning the. wa.r.
the. foremost world ever Victory or defeat in war hinges on the inclin<tlim! .... 1
. . VI masses
. '

sa1<1. his monumen tal War, llIf

and the development of the war' situations. The main functIon or.
welL one need not fear the,
one knows. oneself and the mass movement warfare is to stir up, to win
one kumys
In a war in
organize, and to lead the masses' behind the 'en~my line to
one can no way to
under one's banner. Thu~ one can destroy the' enemy's
'collect valuable
efficienc¥ and cripple the enemy in due cours~ of a'ction.
facts and secrets
-1-'
-6-
2 .. ua J

in Czechoslova.kia and the Russian bloakade of Berlin, both in

the battlefield of the army is that of the air force is 1948. The Southeastern Asia TreatyOrganizcHion of 1954 was'
the and that of navy is the sea, lhe battlefield of intended to prevent the expansion of Chinese Communist influence
warfare is the of of masS in this of' the world. On the Communist side, the Warsaw
movement warfare ensureS the 1.1'-'.1.... ".'-'"... warfare. Pact of 955 was signed when Russia tried to tighten its control
is on mass movement warfare. of Eastern European countries politically and • These
Therefore, ULJ.LLLJ''''''''

mentioned above are the s~m and alliances were the evidence of diplomatic warf~,re, which had

warfare. To these one- may add t:"Vl,l.UUlJ.V

been waged between the two blocs. These last two types of
should also be warfare, howev-er important, are not included because they can
warfare
type of is a that easily besubsummed under the six essentials of political

blocs have used economic power warfare. If the six types are mastered, the theories can be
democratic and
new weapons They applied and extended to economic and diplomatic fields.

because a strong It .goes without saying that political warfare and military
have stressed
a nation convince others that its system warfare are closely related, but military warfare alone cannot
economy is able
use economic aid and assistance achieve sustained power and ensure ultimate victory. The
is
ua ...... v'u;;, and win friends among integration of these six types of warfare is the decisive fac
to try to
nations. While This is reflected in the thinking of Karl Von Clauswitz of
the neutralor
other Prussia, acknowledged as the father of modern strategical
headed by the United States ases eCOn()ffiJlC
study, when he asserted that "War is a continuation of 1l
nations their defences a.",,,,,,.u.~"'~
impose its political~ If war is a body, then political warfare is thG soul of the
the UUllUli.l.lljL ,;;:)!- bloc useS economic power
or countries In modern tim€!s, wars were invariably total, total in the sense

and Economic that all natural resources and manpower of a country were used
economic
for war purposes. President Chiang Kai-shek s statement that
warfare these two blocs is still from
both sides .the p\u'lod had used diplomatic today's war ~s a total war f ideological in nature, which centers
around military power everything. By ideological total
each other The North Atlantic
Western nations war, it means but the six types of warfare. When

employment of political means has reached the highest extent

which
of the vUtUllUU1.J..l.;;:)
of power
by -9-
 Political warfare, 'as can be seen, plays the decisive role
to determine overall victory of war .. in the victory or defeat in a' war. The anc~ent Chinese saying
Political warfare and warfare hasH that "The ~lanning inside a tent determines the victory a
the same Here are the thousand Ii (each 11. is about one third of a mile) away." Herein
are
differences: the planning in:sidea tent apparently bas an overtone of political
First in term of spacEl, warfare fixed ta ttle- warfare. Another Chinese sayingruns like this, "To subdue,
front and rear; while warfare not enemy without fighting, l:which simply means the subjugation of
There are such as front and rear the hostile forces through political weapons • President Chiang
in term military warfare, Kai:-shek speaking of war efforts has re.peatedly stressed
, and demobilization have their clear demarcation "Thirty percent military a~d seventy percent political, "Thirty
can end at any
Hnes i while in I-'V.lU."·L .... ~~4 warfare percent in front of the enemy and seyenty percent in rear the

time. enemy, and lIThirty percent physical and seventy percent

in' terms of combatants, there are the requirements psychical.!l Though the ratio of thirty to seventy is not,
conditions of frontline necessarily a pure mathematical. one, it obviously indicates
for the age,· sex
and the rear area production workers Besiaes t~.e that the political factor is more important than the milita;ry. The'
c
have the required uniforms equipments, emphasis on the rear rather than the front of the enemy and on
warfare there are no such· requirements. the psychical rather -than the physical s~de is in the main
Fourth or last, terms of the nature of war, politicalinnature. The significance of political warfare, caq,not
the and bloodshed. be overstressed.
warrare has to go
is' largely 1.11',""U'E>""V"'~ war can' be Generally speaking, the ,nature of war consists of two
However,
I-'V.u. ... _L'-' ....~ ... warfare without ;:)u,:; ....., ........ J'E> a of factors in operation, the spirtnal and the materiaL The f.ormer
won
and are includes political princip tes and strategy and military discipli~es
total war. and etllics, which are essential to political warfare'. -The latter
should be
.,.t-.,"'o •.,t'l"l·n whereas includes economic resources , we'apons, and equipments,
are essentia.l to military warfare. !twill be difficuJt to achieve

close u.... ,.'-=,....""..,. . is the to victory in awar if either factor is lacking. If both ~re wanting?
the force~ will surely be destroyed.
Warfare-Its Significance
 In a conflict, the and rae tors are both conceived in political status and stimulated by political motives,'

necessary but different ways Things and that war, therefore, is " a political act. 11 He went on
and are not restricted time and further: ilWar is not merely a political act but also really a '
s
reverse is which are political a continuation of policy carried out by

other means. Il Thi,s marks the be-gin,ping of the conception of

have become CUIlJ:U.Ul";a. and the modern political warfare. Since its publication in lB27 j

has been transformed Clauswitz On War had received widespread attention and ha6
means. had a tremendous impact on the Eolshevist!L

Since World War I Gene.ral Erich Friedrich The by their origin were a group or groups or
the war disgruntl~d persons with distinctive political background. Since
should then. they have considered struggle a normal pattern and
with the themselves the vanguards of the oppressed. want to go on
and the armed fO:'~es are to fight against what they call the capitalistic, imperialistic

can there be • On the one oppressors and try to apply the Marxist theory of class
,.." i<2.LllUU.Cl battlE ield and in a world-wide scale. By adopting the basic concept d
efforts sLould made destroy ,"constant struggle" with the annihilation of the enemy as
sea j on the other
the conditions people objective, they have formulated the frantic idea of llBe my

This is say, war not the friend or enemy" and "To destroy or be destroyed. II
the enemy s lines
actions, the whole regard ir. ')st highly the theory and practice of C lauswitz.

will
of total war effort. Marx, Friedrich Engels, Nikolai Lenin, and many other Soviet
time and and l1ilitary leaders had devoted themselves to the
nation have ""","t"""'-UJLUc< do study of Clauswitz 1 treatise 011 War with extreme enthusiasm,

war itself. Engels once called Clauswitz lithe bright star in the sky. II
some in the 19th Lenin, in disregard of historical facts t anachro-
In his treatise
declared that liThe nistically considered Clauswit7 a }v1arxist and remarked that
par- C lauswltz in his writings had understood the Marxist

war betwt~en ciirilized must be cpncermng· the intim8.te relationship between :vvar and

-12 - -13-
 Quite he was -referring to the concept of
tha t IJv ..... "J• ...,.... Droa.uC'en war and war was the means .to as to realize their objectives in aggression When Lenin read
continuation of politics As matter of the passage in the treatise On. War that a conqueror was always
Communists .,UJLU1J.......,e; was not the sa.me asClauswitz I" llpeace-loving!! and hoped to march into the country subject to
to 'the realm of international invasion without bloodshed, he made special notations and
ultima te end. acclaimed it a brilliant passage, because Clauswitz, he said,
Lenin asserted that the nucleus oC war was "" ......... '.",,'" and that had expressed what was in his qUnd. Therefore, when the
a which was IJV,LLJ.>JL"''''' Boris Russians start a war, they usually have a slogan Which is II No
MikhaHovich battle will be fought without the assurance of . !l.In
expounaea thE' same idea more C:;J\o.jJ,U,"';a,'... conquering an' enemy , as a rule will first to succeed in
whilst war was a continuation of of political warfare before collecting the spoils by the military
another means f peace likewise a continuation war and power. In many places they need not resort tpmilitary force
the means than • Therefore but employ such means as . strategy, oragnization, ~gitation
of Lenin and his fCtllowers, there "vas no difference and others to annihilate their enemy. They maintain and develop
between war and peace" felt that the would on their milita.r:y strength only as a support in their conquests
was unnecessary through political means and for the purpose of attaining thei.r
Lenin held that war was the continuation the same final objective of aggression.

but that to the use of actions t It is unfortunate that the freedom-loving countries of
the a..u ... a.~{U!,U.01U between the VlJ,U~::L!.III!J would minor world were belatedly b.ware of the significance of political
difference in the extent warfare" They began to comprehend gradually the implications
actions the conflict. of the new environment which had arisen out the post-war years.
The t:HJlf,JU'a.OJl;::l on I J ' J ,. . . . . ~' ..... ...., on the part of T he revolutions in technology had changed the arts of war. To
and other Communist leaders has affected Soviot and the growing arsenal of powerful new weapons begun with the
No matter who are in power in invention of the atomic bomb was added the hydrogen bomb _ a
Soviet every will be made to bomb that could wipe out a whole city. Now development's such
front and conc,eal their war intentions. Russians would as atomic-powered air and navy craft, atomic artillery ,guided
rather use IJV,U."\,.L'-',,,, ... means 1:0 destroy their so missiles that could cross oceans· arid continents, chemical
biological, and radiological weapons, supersonic speeds, and
'- t 4-
-15 -
other communication and transpor-
tation science of war. Beyond talks .11 But peace in the eyes of !he Communists is but a con..-

the of the earthbound world arena

tinuation of war., employing m a to.her t han illl'1'Itary
.e ns

outer space, which to . The future Communists throughout the world are hoping to attain

of space be the table what they cannot attain in the battlefield. It is a lesson

reckoned with. The that that the Free World can learn from the dict.um of Lenin that

warfare would as wide as, if not there is no difference between peace and' war. The era of peace

warfare in all forms and intensities. More talks is nothing bu~an era of protracted struggle. High

attention Tn,.,,,..,·,, a,nd of so-called had been paid in peace talks with ChineseComrnunists immedi-

brush-fire wars, of ately a.fte,r the last war, in peace talks with North Koreans

wars, and and Panmunjon, and presumably in peace talks with Hanoi. Peace

more attention will be given to the of po- talks have been employed by the Communists as political

Utical Communism during the present nuclear tactics. It takes t.hose specialized and experienced in political

stalemate. warfare to talk peace with the Commllnists. The study of

Both Ludend orff were in their theory political warfare, both in theory and in practice, is therefore

and of total . It was felt that warfare should be all the more necessary and important judged from the

means. Preparednes~ on all ence of the. past, demands of the time, and. the the
-w-orld.
fronts and alertness e,very
warfare '. The
belief seemed the
. The aim of warfare
national and international without
and its the
defence and survival of
Vietnam and

of sort armistice in Middle East,

world is now entering an era of what has been called "peace

--1 6·-
-17 ~
 Chaptor ]I.

Historical··lessons .

llWhile we read history I we make history. !l

-,.... G .. WIi Curtis •.

llHistory is philosophy teaching by examples .. tl

of Halicarassus ..

The pri=vious chapter is a general description of the

meaning, the contents, and the significance of pQlitical War"~

fare. A few faets have been presented for the salte of theora;..
tical ana!lysis, but not in details. If one does not examine the
theory of political warfare wlth detailed facts, he might be
misled info believing that political warfare is a mere catchword.
Most of thE~ people of the world are still unfamiliar with the
above-mentioned six of political warfare in which
have already engaged themsebres consciously or unconsciously.
It is therefore necessary to relate more historical facts
adequate analysis of them so as to help visualize the
learned in blood, to ~ind out bases for the principles of
cal warfare, and to put into effect to the fulle st extent this
of crucial international struggle ..

There have been numerous facts and bitter lessons involYed

with political warfare that one can learn from the is
regrettable that in the decades of .hard struggle against

-18- -19-
Communists even the have not one of the most significant steps laken by the Communists in

of IJv -
is it that their is what has been called "ideological conquestll.

a comp1lel:'€ of political warfare has been The essense of "ideological conquest" is the direct attack upon
u.c/;!.u.OI.C'u ..... "'. Since President Chiang' ~he human mind as by Karl Marx and Nikolai Lenin. Since

Kai--:-shek work in Mao Tse-tung it through the publication of "New Demo-

China in is an invaluable document in ,::racy" ,the COlnmunists I attempt to .conq~er China

connection with this ""nih;.:....... ' years Hence ideology had reached its climax. 'Let us now discuss Marxism,
on J..,:v .. warfa.re based this im- Leninism and Maoism one o·ne and call the bluff of tbeil~ re-
and nature.

s indicated the the content::s of us take up Marxism first,

warfare are extensive and the historical During the between the end of the nineteenth century
facts are In ancient many stra- and the of the twentieth century, iv1arxism had been
1,.1-~.l.>:>t.i:) such as S untse, and glossed over its followers as their religious scripture tinged
others were well-known with deep mysticcolorse The youths who had not studied it
And in carefully fell into the trap of the Communist propaganda and
a.lso themselves in mistook communism for a lofty ideal. That, of course, is a
victories. is both difficult and im- fateful blunder for all credulous fanatics even now. As Presi-
"'U.'~"''-L'"'''' all such historical facts in this discussion. dent Chiang pointed out in his S01tiet Russia in
is advisable select Communist of China, 'Thoughts on Communist systems began with Karl Marx
for treatment~ One instance lead to
and Friedrich , had undergo considerable modifications
The pre sent writer that all at the hands of Lenin. Lenin claimed that the October HeYolu~
their resources in the of Hon which succeeded in overthrowing the provisional go .:XI1-
as are rww compelled to engage ourselves ment and replacing it with a Soviet regime was conversion
in whether we like it of a democratic revolution the bourgeoisie into a social re-
vOlution by the proletariat". Lenin also lauded the sa'ld re-
1• volution as Hth€3 emanciption of the proletariat", which, to
Communist Ideological him, was the same as lithe emancipation of the mas and.
studie s one can realize that tried to create the that the Bolsheviks to

-- 20- - 21-
the s most n .... '''' .....'''''
absolutely reactionary direction. When he witne SSWi. the AU "~~'.A~

that communism was the of the world in the British social relations, he deemed it necessary
to overthrow capitalism. If allowed to continue, the situation
social ideals. As a matter of Marxism was at its very
could only become more aggregating. ~uch thinking on his part
outset a which had 'made its
was largely due to the belief that capitalism was re
It
C!<::1._i"'lil""I"Oy,t in tide of democratic revolutions which for all soaial evilsex.isting at hiS time t view s as such were
fully reflected .in his work On Capital and led him toward the
mQT'II""~ at the time .. Its and aim was to
reactionary lin~ * He perceived only the pathological rather
democratic and to
than the physiological aspect of society. That was his
These invaluable remarks made
thoughts had run the J;'isk of leading the reactionary bloc to the
one encounters the of
comnlUfLism and one nn ,r'I 0'" "'1" destruction of the whole world.
the pre-
diction of Marx did not come true ~ It may be r~~called that Communist Russia at first launched
its aggre ssion of China through ideological infiltration.. A
In order to understand Marxism ideo-
"Marxism Research Institute" was set up in China prior to the
it is "".... ""\'Hl'N which
inception of Chinese Communist Party. It attempted to change
proCl.ucea such a of
the thinking of Chinese youths and intellectuals
increased
initiate item into the Communist fold. There were then some
In
naive persons who had been led by the nose. While
The elopm,ent of
on the people I s livelihood of the Three Principle-s of the Peo-
,-,a,'jJA.'~Q,,&,J.;;;:"'U had caused thE~ European countries to
pIe, Dr .. Sun Yat-senrefuted the fallacies of Marxism" It was
pr'ec~eal:mt;ea. .... u""'J.J.~<;;O in economy. rich became richer
a substantial evidence that during his lifetime Dr .. S un had al-
ahd the poor poorer as an old Chinese goes:
ready waged an ideological war against _the Communists.
own miles While the destitute own
HV"U.A.Ul\If at aU;;P Under sUlch circumstances various branches of Next, let us take up Leninism"
"U.\J''''~'!..lU.;;;) spraQ.g up. This accounted for the
Leninism we s also known as Bolshevism. Acc ording
ide~s on hand and that of socialism on the other. Be-
Joseph Stalin and his followers, Leninism was the
doubt the sa had exerted influence
phase of Marxism the_product of Marxism when
the social ills in "-'J.j'~.t""'.u.u and the
the Russian Revolution.' By analysing these words of
condition of which him r;o to an
and his follow€!rs, one can ,see that the' strate5 eal eharae -

-22- - 23--
 of Leninism even. more than those of
Marxism? The answer is that Lenin, havmg taken his cue from
Marxism. Those made of Com-
Marxism, substituted the Russian for German spirit. In adapting
theorie soften believe that Marxism is
Marxist communism to Russia, Lenin left unchanged its
of the world a matter
general philosophical and theoretical bases 1 but decisively
this is Marxism as a tool altered Marx l s concept of communism as a strategy
made its followers the human mind is of the achieving the proletarian revolution. Leninism was the system
reasons for the worldw ide cata:stI'oplhe must of Marxist communism as it had been modified and adapted by
made clear at the outs,et is that the most factor is Lenin to the requirement of revolution in Russiaand elsewhere.
the of Leninism. Take the concept of "class" for example. Marx had only rough-
Th.en what is Leninism? In brier, is ly divided the proletariat from the capitalist class, and advo-

which with dialectic cated "the dictatorship ()f the proletariat ll • .Inf1u~nced by the
On the one the Marxism, Tsarist despotism, Lenin went further to dlvide the proletariat
it inherited the Rus sian into the progressive, the awakened 1 the backward,and the un~

and all the characterIstic s . awakened, and replacedthe dictatorship of the proletariat by
and terrorism handed down Tsarist the dictatorship of the Communist Party, which finally became
Leninism is nothing but a mixture of sadistic virtually "one-man dictatorship ".
and insatiable exapnsionism. Likewise, Lenin s concept of world revolution also came
from Marxism. When discussing Leninism, Joseph Stalin stated'
_ .What are the characteristic s that Leninism
that the concept had its basis on the development of internation-
IJ .... JCO'\,cu. from Marxism? from Marxism
al realities and was not pecullarto Russia only. He went on to
the co:nc!~nt of world of the
say that since Lenin was a typical Marxist, his Weltanschauung
Marxist of class struggle, world revolution and
was beyond doubt Marxistic. As Marx thoug.ht of capitalism as a
cal conquest is the main Mar-
national phenomenon and predicted that the Communist· revolu~
xism may have
-Han would proceed fr:om one country to another, Lenin, in
been in nature~
order ~o find an excuse for world revolution and at the sa1~le
In the hands of ..... ""u... 1.1.. on which the Marx s
was based was time to cover up the pan-Slavism based lipon' the "Russian
spirito labelled capitalism as a world-wide system of
is it that Lenin s of
ll
perialism , and calle-d for the overthrow of this systein through
from from
the movements of Communist revolution in countries capitalist
-25-
 understand these does not ,understand at
So that areas
all Marxism and mordern scientific soc-
would ;:at and shed blood for the cause. For fear
ialism. It
""J.• u.,......,,"'- of Lenin's
This serves as a footnote to and explains the natur~
.Stalin ",n~'T'c.n no words
Marxism meet Lenin I s politic~l chicanery. In order to "defeat the powerful
out that Leninism was·the i:11J1J.L.I·'-'i:1 Lo,l,VU

enemy", the Coo'lfnunists would employ every means available

condition under the specific circumstances
without asking whether it is right or wrong, ethical orunethlca.l,
Russia.
If this be a "principle", is .there any grain of "truth" in it?

As Lenin's there no to
Leninism began to barge into China in 1923 when the Kuo-
e~aboTate Suffice say that it has been derived from Mar-
mintang, the ruling party, adopted the policy of alignment with
his the Problems of Leninism" Stalin ha(l,...thi5 to
Russia and taking in Chinese Communists as party members e
say:
Fully aware of Lenin I s underhand intrigues of.ideological in-
liTo defeat the enemy it
filtration,Dr. Sun Yat-sen made it clear in a joint statement
€lXert the best effort pos-
with Adolf J,offe, an envoy sent by the Russian government,
sible the use of all (DeanS
issued on January 23, 1923 that:
Meanwhile it necessary to take advan-
tage whatever be it even the "Dr~ SUll Yat-sen holds that the Com-
smallest, enemy through the most munistic order or even the Soviet system
most attentive, most care - cannot actually be introduced into China 9

ful and utilize because there do not exist here the con-
the clashes among the ditions for the successful establishment
list cla.sses different countries, and of ei~her communism or Sovietism. II

among kinds or groups of

This statement dealt a havey blow on the attempt to in-
any country and
troduce Leninism into ChLl1a.
secure the of allies
use , be it the smallest Further, let us take up the so--called "New democracy. II
even these allies'may be tem-
The so-called "New Democracy" is a stratagem rat.her than
porary,
a theory. It is a pli:.w. for the Communist insurrection on the
and conditional. does not
-1.7 -
 and Lenin. be useles~ "New Democracy!' is but a scheme to push acro~s the united
to front.

him se if in the the northern Now, why doe.s Mao cloak Marxism and Leninism
under the flNew Democracy? II The reason is quite simple: the

a seizure of power. As is well-known, China does nC't

Mao have the conditions for Marxism and Leninism; and meanwhile,

f or the sole purpo se discre- the historical tradition, cultural heritage and social order of

across his China are entirely incompatible with what Marx and Lenin have

same time, he order to predicted. Therefore, ever since Gregori Voitinsky ,chief of
the Eastern Division of the Cori1munist International under Lenin

Ame:ricans can telL entitled and Chen Tu-hsiu. the main architect of Chinese Communist

"Communism Affairs C om- Party, set up the lltvlarxism Research Institute II in China

stated: "Mao Tse- 1920, till Mao released his pamphlet, the "New Democracy" ,

is with of in 1 neither Marxism nor Leninism had in the~e tW0 de-

Marxists. It is alldifferent ll • The same ... ~,~~..... went on: cades found any support from the Chinese people .. As a matter

function is to set forth a ",~""r....... for actions more suitable of J\·larxism and Leninism as peddled by the Chinese Com-

to realities.- Thus down three different tenors: munists were rejected everywhere. In the vast territory of

tenor of orthodox communism second tenor of the Chinfl there have been places where the Communists could

st to lead the way for the Com- engage themselves in clandestine dealings and have "room to

JUU~llJ..'::>l-;:' to seize the all available turn around", but they could find no more base for movement

resources and or last the tenor to ease the anti-Com- and beaded into a blind alley after the long siege by the govern-

munist sentiments communism in the sweete st ment in 934. Had it not been for the Japanese aggres-

same time to its sion of China Mao 5e-tung and his followers would have

Such. an made the U.S. is correct. perished long ago.

The first herein exposes the tlNew but a

Mao as full aware of his critical situation's when cornered
o.f Marxism and Leninism. The second and the third
in the d <;:avern in Shen si, the north we stern province of
third reveal the
China. During war against LJapan which gave him a breathing
I S line comml.mism the so-called

- 29-
 began to realize that in an era of the· "New Democracy'! -- commUllism -- made its appearance and
Chinese and were in in favor of that the members of the "four classes" could only repent "in
way of life and that the best waywasto cloak~Aarx- dust and ashes tl • This is indeed too sad for tears~

ism and d,emocracy. Hence he advanced the

"New with view to the 2. " Peaceful Coexistence"
both at home and abroad. This is a well-known pro-
- Tactics in Communist St rategi ca I Warfare
pa~a.l.1...... a device called trant:iference. To cover communism
Mao tried to attract the Chinese adherents with
By strategy we mean here pOlitical is to
words which had a positive to win
conceal one's real intention and to pretend to meet the sire
for his programs. Thus addition to
of the opponent so as to cause him to commi.t mistakes and rea-
he crowm,ed it the word intlrder to
lize one I s political schemes.
those young students and the democratic groups and
the time. Mao 1 s 1 that In pointing out the Communists I of their ba sic
",aJLn.~.HF; about was de- strategy President Chiang said.

and that of
After meeting with reverses in war
workers and peasants was He
the Communists always turn around and
claim tha t the he advanced was
ask for peaceful coexistence • Upon re-
becuase it ",,,,mT"""; also economic
gaining strength, they break off negotia-
what he called "four clas-
tions and resort to insurrection again"
ses": work€~rs, pear-ants 1 small and national
While negotiating peace, they. rnake -secret
won the fir~Jt round
s for armed revolts. In their dialec-
tic s, this is what is tueant llunity in
Chinese contradictions!1 and 11 shifts of things ill
intellectual circles was chaoe: The "'U"V.".L\.,u.~ bulwark of oppositions H • Therefore, in combatting
VU'.~H1.U.AJll:{ was divided and then broken so-called Communists, we must understand their
The entire rhainland the hands of military thinking al1d rhythm of actions lola-
the Communists fore we can tell whether our strate-
debacle when all adherents of Mao IS gy ;3..nd tactics have been correct. From.
fell into than the our thirty years of experience in dealing

- 31-
 sulates in China, and return to China the Russian portions at
with the Co~munists we have learned
the Indemnitv Funds. What is more, the' Soviet Government
first of all their 111 .' tf

also would return to-the Chinese people, without demanding any

of dialectic s and take
full grasp kind of compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway'in Manchuria~
their
Such a gesture was indeed a tour de force the Com-
From the above it can be seen that the war- munist strategical warfare. In thG meantime, the Chinese
the Communists is based upon materialistic Communists took steps to the Kuomintang as individuals
upon the order of the Kremlin. In his memorandum 1,i Ta-:-
. The Communist warfare
chao, one of. the founders of the Chinese Communist
China dates back to 924. As in
behalf of those who joined the Kuomintang, saidin part
the first coexistence between
"Therefore, it is necessary that we join this Party Kuo
Soviet Russia from 924 to 1927 Aware the fact
'''''''''''-''"',:;1 and allow ourselves to be organizedinto one team so
that communism was for decent human and still less
that in coordinated steps we can takf~ in our National Re-
suitable to the Chinese climate this off:-:hoot Russian com-
volution under Dr e Sun Yat-sen I s leadership and the unified
munism in its formative had to to
discipline of our Party .. II Hence, their plots of
the in out in-
infiltration and 'subversion were entirely covered Upe
filtration and subversion, It then tried
masses through the UVJJJ ........ u'UF; or- Since the adopted the polley of aligning with
gans and to stir up under cover. Its Russia and admitting Chinese Communists into the , the
was to set a and to create the Communist elements immediately seized the control of the De.-,
terror in the course of China I s national revolution and partment 01 Organization and other party organs, and manipula-
war ted the Federation of Unions and its branches in
districts. They went further to label the Kuomintang mq-;mbers
this , the Russian Communist
as lithe leftists", lithe rightists" and nthe neutralists"" In or-
tried cover up their ugly face
der to drive a wedge between the various factions of the Party,
come forth with attitude its first
they shouted the slogan: !I all revolutionaries to the
declaration of J,.CJ,JU.';:lHJ• .., towards China t
left". Shortly after the ret.urn of Michael Borodin. ,ine Russian
its to renounce all financial burdens im-
emissary, to i\/Ioscow, Kissanka, head of the Russianrnilitary
on the Chine se under varlOUS
rnissjon, doggedly the defeatist thoughts among
stationed in Russian con-

- 32- -33-
the officer s arid Academy foreign aggression. Firm adherence to this policy contributed
that the then much to the success, in the strategical sense, of the fifth
the Nationalist armed forces "would certainly result in failure " .. major campaign of the government forces against the
And :when the forces advanced to Chinese Communists.
Chinese Communistsformented the
and Hankow. When encircled during the fifth campaign launched by the
subversive activities were the government forces, the Chinese Communists had come to the

Chinese the end of their tether, mI"litarily speaking.. The remnants

Communists the !!Nan- in small groups to the inland province of Shensi in the North':"
west. On seeing that their military actions could only meet ut..;,
ter failure, the Communists brewed up new plots. It happened
directed the Chinese Communists to up further up- that the Communist International's Seventh Congress was held
in Canton and urban areas .. the Kuo- in Moscow sometime between July and August of 1935, during
the Government in which, Georgi Dimitrov, in his report on the llUnited Front ll ,

undertake an allout purge of Communists from the Party. suggested that a "compl~ehensive anti-Japanese and anti-Imper:-
ialist United Front ll be formed in China.. As this Stalin l s
warfare con- p.olicy decision, it became a Cangre S8 resolution as a matter of
tinued The Chine se Eastern Inci- course and on this the Chinese Communists based their subse-
dent of lVII'''-'''''''" Incident of 1 indicated quent actions. As we can see later, this suggestion made at
fires, had the time proved to be the most treacherous and hideous
between the R ever worked out by Russian and Chinese Communists hand in
freedom could made secure .. hand.
Chinese Eastern was set- Upon Stalin I s directive, the Chinese Communists issued on
tied tenlOClya:I'l !llocal incident ll , China still herself A~gust I, 1 a declarat~on from their hide-out, Mao-erh..,.
forces. because the kai, proposing that an IIAnti-tJapanese United Front of the
their with People" be formed and demanding that a so-called s
forces Col;tlition Government" be established. On 5, 936, the
Government decided Chinese Communists again issued a circular
res1 the for cessation of internal hostilities and holding of peace nego-

-35 -
 . .
tiations After numerous talks, the Chinese Communists intrigue the Chinese Government.. On the of
aCCA!nt~Hi the four as the Russian , they sigaed a neutrality pact with
ment: and reCOilD,lzea the Japanese-manufactured in'
violation f)f the previously signed with
abide of
Furthermore, invaded Outer Mongolia and ..~u.'L\.'.J'>.'C
Generalissimo Kai-shek orders
Urianghai. , through the efforts of the In~
to abolish the "Red and to have
ternational, their utmost to defame the Chinese
the National and
ment and influence the united States I policy on China
4 soviets and have them into
the way for Chinese Communists I ac ti vitie s.
local r;:o'veJrnrnerlts
On the part of the Chinese Communists they had all
to and the Chinese CommunIsts con-
regarded the Sino-Japanese war as lithe best
the Government and their
build up their strength 1I. The policy they had laLi down
drive, with China I Russia as their
the war was devote 70 0/0 1
of their effort to their own ex-
In the October succeeded Yen
pansion, to dealing with the Nationa.l , and
to Moscow with
to .... ~:;Hl_.J.l.i~ against the Japanese" II Time and , their
ussia pro-
18th and the so-call'ed ew F our.1 R out.e
N' tl
The Marco
disobeyed orders and. acted on their own to attack "'''' . . rr., .... ''
hJ.L1.1.U-VCHJCHJ.<:: 58 on
forces, thereby undermining the war efforts
accelerated Rus::;ia. On
The funds appropriated to them for their army by t"he National
the same year China and Russia a non-
Government had been used the Communists as subsidies to
Once Soviet Hussia as a
their front and other civic and cultu'tlil\lQits un-
China under the coexlst-
der their control to undermine the national ~ty, to split the
anti-Japanese war camps and to support thgirac timie s of
the than paganda, inf.iltration and s ubv er sion 9

lissia and the Communists

used such In the of 1945, at the YaHa Conrt::rence attended
ollaboration the United States, Great B l'itain and Soviet Russia, Stalin

,ang CUlll"""Ii!. re as covers for seized China I s in Outer and up

-37-
China s administrative in the Northeastern provinces, of August 9, which was only one day before Japan I s offer to
In the June of the same year, when China and ;:;;oviat Russia surrender. Russian Red Army entered the northeastern pro-
were a friendship alliance the Peace vinces and the provinces of Jehol and Chahar only thre~ days
Shunhua in the northern of Shensi before the Japan,ese laid down their arms. However, the Allied
""'....,.... vi;n 4:lI, upon Communi:51 instigation the Headquart~rs assigned to Soviet R ussia ~he duty of accepting
...... l'lni' v seat, and attackE~d the the the surrender of Japanese troops in the northeastern provinces..
meantime Communist forces in eastern and western parts of This initiated a new phase in Russia! s aggression against China
U.~,I'I.J.Cl.U.~ and in southern. and northern of and in the Communists I subversion agajnst the Chinese Govern-
apart from each renewed th(;jir on'the ment in the post-,war period.
there., Such incidents engineered
as vp'a~,""U'u.a, materials by Upon receipt of Japan IS decl&.ration of surrender f the
the Communists their fellow-travellers the National :rvli.litary Coun~il of the Chinese Government immediately
States in ...."'''' ....,,.,'' .... i'i: the Chinese Government of II instructed all armed forces in the country to await orders per-
warn and in the United States send- taining to theacc:eptance of surrender in accordance with Allied
;:)UI.JY,J..J.~'i:) to This worldwide Communist con- agreements. In an order to the 18th Group Army of the.Com-
"'ro, ...."',,,",,,' had about tremendous difficulties China ' s munists, the Council specifically instructed all its units to re.:..
and domestic affairs in the last main where they were until further ordLrs; and fox those com-
wa'r and the initial after V -J All these may be mitted to combat operation 8 , to abide by orders of their
...." '..n<:'r1 as illustrations the Communist war- respective war area c:::>mmanders. Under no circumstances
iare. were they to make any unauthorized move 4 Bul the Communists
flatly disobeyed the Council's order, and Chu Teh, in the name
The last of strategical warfare the Com- of"Yenan Headquarters!', issued on August 10 "Seven Orders
continent was dated from 949. of the , directing Communist forces in various places to
On when Japan announced unconditional resort to all-out violence. On August 17, the Chinese Com-
the China area surren- munists, in the name of Chu Teh, presented a $et of siJt. de.-
der covered the mainland its mands to t.ne Government. The purpOSe behind Chu Teh s
and lndo-Chinal north of the 6th "Seven Ordersof the Day'l and the six demands was extrem
north should be noted that 8, ~oviet clear. Militarily, the Communists were to take free action~ to
Russia declared that a state of war with would exist as disarm the Japanese and their puppet troops, and to OCC,1.py

-38- -39 -
m~e' areas and communication as
directives for the Chinese Communists to subvert the National
areas of contrCtl and enable them with the
Government had been exposed. The atrocities committed
then into the
the Russian Red Army against the Chinese people· in the
provinces and Chahar and '_.,.u"."
northeastern provinces cannot be overstressed.. On
Ul:;;.Ult:l,llU.Ul/:f. the formation of a "coalition negative side, Stalin sought to disrupt China I s relations
their . .111........ '''''''"'''' moves with the United States; on the positive side, heattemp~~d to man-
warfare and <a.~Q.."'~O~ the Gove::rn-
IJ"' ..........."""" ........
China's foreign and domestic policies, hoping to turn
ment" the Chlllese Government from neutrality to isolation and
to make China a satellite of Russia,. As the
-""-,
this tim~~, both the Russian and Chinese Com- Communists, despite lithe" basic polky on peaceful national ::re-
.u..,'u"",......... still bc~hind the mask of coexiste- constructions" and the. "minutes conversations" with the
of and Alliance of Government delegates, they [nade use of their front
a desire to Hon, the "Democratic Alliance}' as a tool to plot internald1s-
Soviet Russia, sention and disruption. §ince the l\1ay of 1 , the Chinese
Communist forces, in response to their military operations in
Government renewed the Northeast, launched offensive in Jehol, Chahal', Hop,ei, and
talks with find a formula Shantung provinces, violating the ceasefire agreement arranged
home .. On October the the United States. By this time the Chinese Communist re--
the Government de.leQ-aU~S and the bellion erupted everyw here like bush fire s.
of which

In the December of 1946, the United States announced. the

termination of its mediation effort in China and shortly ?tfter=
cratization. All these the C,)mmunist orr,rHr"r_
wards General Marshall, the special envoy, left for home
meul Whereupon, the Chinese Communists rose in open ::rebelli.on ,.
Nevertheless in the following year both Sov'iet Russia and
A~"""""',"'CJI,. despite a of the Chinese Communists had directly and indirectly kept on
was in existence two asking the Chinese Government to talk peace. Owing to his
her longtime experience in dealing with the Russian Communists,
, Chaha-r and the and President Chiang Kai-shek had discerned the· motive behind:
--40 --
-41
 to mediate and its consequences. Had Soviet" flowering and ~arks the beginning of Communists' SUbjugation

, s mediation offer been ,...,....Ol"'\lrDn, China have of the people.. In studying the Communists t diabolism 1 o.n~has

way of a. Omtm\lmlSt-a'OmlWt:iL~~UcoaHion crn'ro .... nm"'n a to see through their organizational warff..re.

second Poland as al!i, in 1947 .. the Chinese

leader the Russia.n First of all 1 let us study the Third Inte.rnational

table that the American friends China failed realize in

The Third International is,W fact the Communist Inte.r-t t
time that had fallen into the trap of warfare
nitional, or for short, the "Gominun:"n U • Leftin (If?n!'talJUY Md
set the Russian and Chinese "'-'\..IUIJlUU'U ... """....... number of
something else in mind when he gave the name the Third Inter-
ChineS€ ........,""..... ~"" time confounded
national. Since Marx organized the First Internatioftal and
the Communists warfare,
Karl J. Kautsky the Second International 1 Lenin na"ned the
freedom and Their actions favor of the
Communist International as the Third International to show that
Communist3 hastened the which led the fall of
he followed the orthodox line of Marx.. It should ~ recalltld
the mainland in 949. In repeating these historical
that as early as April, 1927 when expelled. from Ge:rman.l t£>
the present writer wants to point out the wickedness in
Russia, under police surveillance on a train t Lenin maPt>ed Ollt
the Communist warfare against the democratic
his so-called "polotical platform" r in which he called for the.
countries on the one hand, and the of
setting up, of a new international organization to put into prac-
warfare on the other.. It is also hoped that in the anti-Como.
tise what he called the hworld-wide proletarian retrolution u s
...struggle a.head om~ has to be wary the enemv s stra-
By the time he seized the power after the October Revolution,
warfare
Lenin claimed barefacedly that the Bolsheviks had for the world
revolution established a central base. In his ambition to com-
The above are of the warfare as
munize the world, urged all the Communist "followers in
the Communists.
Western European countries to start a series ofbloddy up-
risi~gs for the purpose of grabbing political power in their
3 ree Great We~onsf1
respective countries so as to support the "Soviet Regir,e ll in
in Comnunist Organizational reo Rus~ia. However, all these urpisings ended in failure.. And
so in March 1 19, through his intensive prepartions, the Third
and c;>.u. ... ""."'"J!,vu are International was formally established in Moscow .. As a matter
and
of fact, the new only wiped out the Second lnter-
.Lu<:;;v .... Vlt'. ... '-<.~ ..... conquest, organization its
-43 ~
 been line a the idea of employing the raovement: of national salvation in the
called East to strike the western countries" Then he decided on the
to Soviet Russia use of an indirect approach to carry out his world revolution~

under the banner "Proletariat

the Communists an As a result of the change in thinking t Lenin had tried his
best to extend his tentacles to the East s At the Second
Congress" of th!3 Third International in 1928, the nCommittee
the Third International on Nationalism and Colonialism II and the lIEastern Division l!
one of its rounders had the were formed under the Third International responsible for
establishment of the Third Internationalin 19 an international 'formenting the !lanti-imperialist movements!lamong the OriE::ntal
come i n 1 . However did peoples. Besides, an Eastern University and a Labor Univer-
materialize Lenin I s intervention were established in Moscow, with the express purpose of
the time, Lenin concentrated his attention training student from Asia and the Far East so as to have the
to start the world con- branches of the Third International set up in various countries
revolution, 'and through the .ideological \<conquest of these trainees c This is a
therefore the Third International laid brief account oJ how Lenin began to wage an
the industrializE!d We,st United States warfare against the free warid through the Third International
When stablished' in he hlmeself had organized.
its comrades claimed: the
This indicated the Moscow was designated as its permanent site, the
Communists' as Com- Third International, when organized by Lenin, did, take on
failed one another, it more or less an international complexion. After the death
those highly industrialized coun- Lenin, when Stalin succeeded, the Third International was
tries too weak to its Marxist longer international, having been re~uced to be a tool of the
vvorld revolution was dissolved in the Lenin dictator with its chairman appointed or deposed at w ill~ Its
<lof'r'QrY~nf' to break he turned his eye the leaders such l;lS Zinoviev and Nikolai Bukharin were executed
National in by the order of Stalin. Those in charge of the branches of the
down or- Third International in various countries had in turn become
conceived Stalin I s and bonafide traitors to their respective

- 45
fatherlands. This was confirmed the fact that Li Li-san and others ; the Germany branch by Kao Yu-han p Chu
the Third International was dissolved Stalin in 943 f Teh and others;. the R lissia branch by Chu Chiu-pei and others
all the Communists the world had been under the "By such wide spread network, 'there could be no doubt that
direct control of their comrades in Moscow is the true Voitinsky had set the Communist organizational pattern for
characteristic of the Third International.. China on a world-wide baS1:'5. It vias indeed a Chinese
munist International in miniature 0

The inclJrsionof the Thi:rd Inte't'~a.tional into China

back to the ot 1920 when the "Marxism Research Institute" Soon after the establishment of the "Marxism Research In-
was set. up.. • chief Eastern stitute ", the "Chinese Socialist Youth Corps" was also org.an-
Division of the International the institute itself in ized in the August of the same year for the pur pose of
academic organizing the more youths as members and sending them to theEastern Uni-
various in Its sponsors and active members in- versity in Moscow to undergo further training. In the Septem-
cluded Chen Tu-hsiu Shen Hsuan-lu, Chou Fu-hai Shao Li- ber, Chen Tu-hsiu, as directed by Voitinsky, called into order
tse Li Li Ta-chao the "preparatory Committee of the Formation of the Chinese
tao Shen and It Communist Partyll 0 He also accepted Voitinsky f s invitation to
was located at No.. Yu Lane, Avenue Joffre in the visit. \<10 scow. And so the Thirdtxlternational had laid the
French Concession of Shanghai. Since its establishment, the foundation-stone in its organizational work and spread the
institute had set up branches in various both at home Comrnunist seeds in China.
and abroad, to contact with its young The
u.GUF,'''''''''' branch was headed Chen Tu-hsiu Now, let us see how the Chinese Communist Party came to
Li Han-chun and others; the branch Li Ta-chao , be established~

Liu and others; the Shansi branch

and others; the Shantung branch Hsu- Upon his arrival wHb Voitinsky in Moscow, Chen Tu-hsiu
and others; the branch was il troduced to see Leon Trotsky, the Russian leader 1 who
chiu and others the Hunan branch Mao Tse- urged him to organize the Communist Party in China and invited
tung and the him to the Third Iriternational. Chen consente@ and recei-
Pal and others; and the branch Shen Hsuart-lu ved a allowance of U. S. ,000 for activities.. In
and others. In the overSgeLS areas the branch was the of 1921 , Chen returned to China, accompanied by G"

headed -hal; f'rance branch En-lai, Maring Secretary of the "Cbnunittee Oil Nationalism

46- - 47-
 of Third to prepare for the the other it is also clear that, fully aware of the fact

the Chinese Communist After half a that communism was unsuitable to the Chinese conditions,

year National the had to upon the support of Soviet Russia. and ex-

was convened at the Po Wen Girls I ploit the conflicting interests bet ween nations in order build

School on Po Road in the Concession of Shanghai up their own strength. This explains also why the Chinese

I at which the the Communists to resort to intriguing tactics in the IJV.L.u.. l. ..... ,:t-.l

Communist The de- vvarfare o

to the included Chen
Li Han-chun Mao once said~ "Party reconstruction~
Fu-
Kuo-tao, Le Chen Shu-mei and and the united front are the three weapons of

a total of twelve Chen Tu-hsiu and Chou Communist Party. tl It is by no means improper to use his

were elected Chairman and Vice-chairman words to scan the rhythm of the Communist rebellion against

and the constitution and the National Government" From the time of its formation until

the resolutions that all the documents the 9'72, the Chinese ComI;Iunist Party, led by Chen, Tu-hsiu.

of calender Li Ta-chao, had bowed '-to the Kt::.omintang and as a para-

was evident its site for the purpose of attairiing, its fullest development" After
927 the Chines~ Communists thought they wer~ strong'VllVLl/::U
intention
to usurp power _. and contrary to, their wisht they were
led from the ruling party. Then the only way left open to them
wasarrned rebellion first building up the Red
when theY' were driven out of their hideout in the ,..,.".-,~."..,.;.~.~,~
backwardness Chinese
the activities the Chinese to of Kiangsi; the r~rnnants led by Mao Tse-tung
force northern Shensi" In desperation they courted the favor of thE
out in their name. It is as as Kuornintang ag;ain and in 1937 th~y resorted to the united
that from the tactics by pretending to fight with the Government ""~,,,".uLi::llj,.
se Communists
themselves under their comrades Japanese. aggression on the bne hand, and those
had carried out IJV.J.LL.lLcLl. warfare the credulons and ambitious in,tellectuals in order to build up their

the Chinese strength on the other. After V -J Day, made full use of
ll
salvation the "three great weapons . to start all-out rebellion till
- 49---
overran the Chine se mainland in Of course there were with the Communists.. Such tactics obviously had yielded 1'e--
than those ::stated above attributable sults r Most of the Chines~ people, cowed by -the Communist
the Communist seizure of but the atrocities or enticed by their sweet talks, were compelled to
most crucial was the em- take a fatalistic point of view and II go with the stream ", so to
force their rebellion the speak.. The Government forces fighting in the southwest am;l
Government. If w e v e can realize that t.he northwest were rendered helpless.. And the Chinese Govern-
ltthree Tse-tung were tactics ment had to abandon the mainland and move to Taiwan in 1950~

in warfare.
Organizations are largely exclusive in nature, and are
should recalled that. in the autumn of use in the political struggle. The Chinese Communist Party
Chinese Communist armed forces overran north China ana at the time of its formation was too small an organization to
Soviet Russia commanded !Via a deser"9"e mention. It was not supported by the Chinese people.
in on October I , But through its tactical maneuver8, the Party had ever reor-
and next extended its recognition This show s ganized and expanded itself.. A single sparkmaybecome a
that the Russian ChinesE~ Communists had hand in prairie fire, as the Chinese proverb says. The fall of the
in the a~~...... vQ.""'VU ~d.JLU.:t:ld.l... lVlld.l. tactic s .. that time Chinese mainland and the enslavement of the 700 million people
the Government south- were partly dueto the Communist organizational tactics ..
western and northwestern whilst
in the southeastern overrun the Reds;
which were the most and most prosperous on the 4. Temptation' and intimidation
anti-C ommunist sentiments . In order
seize the the Russian and Chinese Com- - Tactics in Communist Psychological Warfare.
munists worked hand hand in
tactics into full Both the Russian. and Chinese Communists are specialized
which claimed to have in the art of psychological warfare, a type of warfare with hu-
classes of the mentioned. aimed to de- man ~inds as its battlefield. To strike their enemy
moralize the Government forces fighting in the southwes- gically, the Comnll'mfsts have made a penetrating analysis ,-,f
tern and northwestern en the one hand and dlspell human weaknesses. By E'xpoiting these weakne~ses, they ha
the worries inthe mind those Chinese who work tried to keep the under controL. The political witchcraft
50 - 51-
 the the pf the reflexes, conditioned or otherw ise 1 to exercise their con-
their from shatter trol of human beings. The Chinese Reds learned this ~ethod
the I S morale' and- from the Russians and had gone further to practise brain
washing, a sort of indoctrination, in the mo st diabolical manner

that it was men. the

control the men Another employed the Bolsheviks in
was the human psychic response is the traditional dogma handed
human naiPPEm€!n that down by the Oriental Orthodox Church. In order to drive away
a Russian renown, from the minds of its believers the sexual desire, the mammon
Lenin, had called worship and the assertion of the will, this creed used
his such rituals as "repentence", "confession", and the lIfinal
ment". Under the supreme authority of their I.hurch leaders
the saliva and dogmatism, these religious zealots felt they were all the
but more sinful and humble that they would willingly con-
also at at the sound of the fess, and accept the final or any other judgments .. There
person of dishe s in pre- be nothing wrong with the Church in the employment of these
and at the of bell the methods, becausEl it aimed at strengthening the faith of its fol-
of the conditioned reflex, lowers and making them do good deeds. This from the
animal S would Marxist-Leninists in that the Communists tend toward doing
the cue from the theory be- evilS. To control human mind and actions; they hav~ turned
r,eflex control, human would Marxism-Leninism into a sort of religion g similar to the
Animals and beasts a circus are Oriental Orthodox Church. The Chinese Communists .have
under complete control of the trainer f s , for uu- inherited the Russian techniques in full, observed their dogmas
der the of the conditioned follow the movement of and adopted tteir methods with further elaborations.
the Q..uuv~m, in a. mechanical Likew ise , from "repentence", "confession", and "people! s trials",
human Lenin can learn to the have applied to the mainland people the theory of psychical con--
the stimuli such as This the trol in the most atrocious and terrifying manner, unprecedented
the Bolsheviks had of in Chinese history.

-- 52- - 53-
 \

Of the above-mentioned two-types of psychic one is The Chinese l(eds followed the Bolsheviks to the last letter e
temptation, the purpose of whidh is to deprive human beings of They deceived the peasants by the slogan, "land refor~ and
It soul" ; and the' other is intimidation, the
I of equal distribution of the land ownership". They dEiceived the
'which Is to deal w-ith their "body". The Communist DSlfcn,OlCI- workers by the ~logan, liThe workers should have the right
warfare largely takes; the form' of these two types. Here manag~ the factory". They deceived the businessmen the
Al'9 concrete illustrations. slogan: "Benefits to both lapor and the management .. II

dece.ived the soldiers by the Slogans: "The Chinese won I ttight

First of let us cite some the facts to show the among themselves" and lIReturn home to engage in production'l
Cdfomun1~ts had ,wavered the minds. of the people mone- , As a result, all the lands on tlle mainland. forcibly seized
temptation. the Communists 'under the name of ,the .state, became ,the "peo:",
pIe I s communes", with all the peasants turned out, to be 'mere
should-be recalled' that the Bolsheviks succeeded in the s~rfs under the Red yoke. All the factories on the mainland
001:(1)91" Revolution. of 1917 inoverthrowi~gthethen provisioqal were seized by the Communists unc.ferthe name of Itjointly owned
gcv6.rnmentand in~eizing power at one largely due to· the State and the private'lI, with workers and businessmen
;Use of monet~' temptation in psychological warfare, turned into mere slaves. Worse still, most of thesoidier,s Wl:~.·
1Ilcpns they shouted Wtere: "land to the peasants, factory del' the then Gov03rnment,. who were either lured into the Redft!
the 'workers, and peace to the ~medforces" How could "peace trap" or went home to. "engag,e in production",were
t.be.-tbreeBlogans exercise so gre'at an influence upon the persecuted or liquidated in the end. The fact that the Com-
~d the Russian people? It was only that the common munists could easily overrun themaiq.la,nd and gain "'Control
p.yohos.i:s of the people had been obsessed with selfishness. the peo.ple there was largelydue to the tactics in the psycholo-
Tbe Bolshevik bigwigs took advantage ot the common weakness gical warfare, because empty_ words a~d false promise could
th~ Russian people and baited them,with they desired. easily sway the minds of the people. Therafore temptation or;
Were' there peasants who did not want to own the they induc,ement is bne of the tactics adroitly employed by the Com-
Were there workers who dId not want to in )munists in the psyc,hological ~arfare.
the m.an.agement of the factory inwhiQh they worked? to the'
ttle~.cen&:t'y troops, did not like to fight. And so Rus- Next, let us see how the Communists had controlled the hu':"
........ ·......... 11"" and the Tsarilst troops fell as easy into the- man mind by the method of intimidation III

As a re:3ult,wha~ they
oonUscatedby the Bolsheviks• There is no. dEmying tlie fact that the Communists liS. {e ~m-

. 54-'- - 55~'
 Mao Tse-tung at the early stage of the so-calied "Hundred.
D1(>.ve~ their intimidation tactics against the to ut-
Flowers Bloom" period confessed that the Red Security Force
most ...The and invectives they use often create a
had before 1954 slaughtered only 800,000 "counter-revolutiona-
strong feeling of terror in the minds of the Such terms
ries". Of course, such figures as released through the Com-
as "altlU-r~evc)Hllti(mBlrv' II "reactionary" and others' sound ex.-
munistofficial statements are not reliable .. The,·actual number
behind the iron because
of victims behind the iron curtain must have been far greater
tho se labelled the as
A more approximate calculation might have set upon 700,000,000
"react:LOIlal:'V" have been ruthlessly and such cases
as fallen victims including those killed by the Red Public Sec-
are. too numerous cite., It is learned that the Chinese Reds
urity Department before and after 1954 and those who we're
have been practising as many as 12 varieties of Por-
driven to commit suicide or else starved and frozen to death at
haps the actual number if3 still greater.. The HBlack Paper tI
the hands of the Communists. What a massacre of historyl Be--
pUblished by the Committee of One Million the United States
sides, the Communist way of intimitating the people are not
aocused the Communists of having committed
c.onfined to mass slaughter. Such measures as IIrepentenceJ~
massacres behind the iron curtain as means intimidate the
"confessions", tlstruggles tl , ltpurges lt , and "People I s trials."
to thE~ stat1 sUe s an American
have doubtless deeper effect upon the minds of the. people tha.n
missionary~ho had worked on the mainland for many
killings.
the Peiping regime had in the first six months after the Reds
overran the mainland arre sted more than 000, people.
The Communists, whether Russian orChinese, have applied
ACQnservative estimate of December, 1 gathered the
the psychological tactics of temptation and intimation to domestic
U .. S. Federation of also confirmed that to the
as well as international affairs.. The so-called' smiling offen!"""
the same year thElre were 14,000, 000 massacred
sive is typical of the Communist applicaUon of psychological
the Commu:nists.. eatitled "The Human Cost of
warfare. Instances are too many to cite in tl;1e present book"
Commqnism in China It released sometime in the P of
One thing to be remembered is that, in waging the psychologic~l
o .,Eastland from Mississippi blamed
warfare against the Reds, the democratic world must under-
Mao· Tse-tung for the of
stand their tactics 'and analyse them ahd attack the weaknesses
from 000 63 784,000 Chinese
in the minds of their tro'ops and their people before victory: can
, the former finance minister of the
be ensured ..
one of the Communist
also "''''''''''I:'..I.Utc the glaring
000 in a nC'rln,t"1 of three years.
~ 67-
- 56-
 At its early stage, the Cheka had concentrated its activitlsa
in ,suppressmg the tlcounter-revolutionaries" at home, with its
6. Cloak and Dl1Wtr ~xpansion'abroad much delayed. By 1919 when Lenin ~sta~
.....Tactics in Corrmuflist hltelligence Warfare' bUshed the Third International, the Cheka ~egan to .set up.it!;
. branches throughout the world and Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chili-
. minh, and the Polish IIPresidentt l Boieslaw Bierut were
The COJmmmust$ seized power use
sUb$equently its agents. When the Russian clvil.warended on
espionage UUC;.L'CU•.I,VAJ:'" .And so tradition have attAched
February 11 , 1922, the' Cheka was renamed the Stat'e
mUQh more import~~ce to ...u,:.c ........ l"~'V ...., .... '" other
,Admmistration or for short, the OGP\], which worked in cp-
ordination with the Corrimimist International in the espionage
operation$ abroad. Both organizations had also set up one
WlientheBolsheviks seized in had
"International Seamen I s Alliance" with Vlko Cherl(enkov. as its
experience in ttle espllonage operations learned. and
first secretary, who later became the first "premier" ot'Gom...
prac~$ed duririg their years undergroundactlvities against
munist Bulgaria, charged with the mission of smuggling special
regime" Lenin -considered that the, Tsar
agents and firearms to various spots all, over the world" Be-
maintained his despotic rule a secret
tween 1922 and 1935, ~t should b~ recalled, agents and f·ire-·
the Bolsheviks should a much Harger one" And so he
arms had been sE~cretly smuggled into China to step up the
chase a Persian nobleman expert·' on '. this line, take
murrist rebellion. This niarksthebeginning of the intelligencl8
charge of the nobleman, F OlE"
activities in China.
was a veteran L,;OmOlillUStJ have exile in Western
1:4'",...." ...."" for many years and was well-versed intelligence as
Now, let us vite two facts as examples to testify how Soviet
JJ..Il= .......&p'~vu,'"''"' works. On December 7
Russia had employed the intelligence warfare in her aggression
an acronym for the
upon China ..
VU·UUI.lJ."'."'c to Combat Counter...revolution and
It was this organization which the
Experts on Rus'sian and Chinese Communist affairs
strikes the period
have known Vasili Blucher and .Michael Borodin .. Both of
extending frorn 1 7 The Bolsheviks had used
were none other than Russian special agents s(3nt to China
terro:r. The Cheka was in fact the first
carry out Kremlin's intelligence warfare against
h~Jlld,(]u:arl~e:r's of Russian secret agents.
Government and @ In the "Unpublished Documents

-58- - 59-
 Aggression upon China II , an Eventually Bluecher had to go to the United States again, while
name of WUlkie pointed out that as far back Borodin fled to R us~ia and later served as a new spaper editor
B.nd other card-carrying Communists in Moscow
, had already infiltrated into the Kuomintang as Dr s Sun
After Dr. Sun I in The bitter lesson that the Chinese had learned in their
in turn served as Dr. Sun s widow longtime struggle against the Communists was that the
s advisor!. or proteges. In minds of many diplomatic personnel almost invariably played the leading roJ 3
Americans_ Bluecher was a ,.,ery notorious Communist. -Borodin in the intelligence warfare.. For instance, during China I s war
was then a dealer in smuggling and was among of resistance against Japan, the Soviet Embassy in the wartime
the first batch of secret agents sent to the United States capital of Chungking was the headquarters of Communist con-
the Communist InternatioI1tal. Both Bluecher and Borodin spiracy in China. It was at once· the policy-making and
had themselves in e:spionage work in China as well as espionage organ.in the Chinese Reds I intelligence warfare
in the United States. From this one caB readily see that against the Chinese Government. A .. S. Panyushkin, the then
Russia had spared no effort waging her intelligence warfare Soviet Ambassador to China, was an outstanding special ser-
vice agent,and had since 1952 when transferred to Moscow
served as the director of the Second Bureau of the Russian
Nevertheless, the RussianCommunlsts' tactics in the intel- NKVD or Ministry of Internal Affair~. As is now known, the
.l.Jl.lIl~C.uL\.#C warfare failed Since the death of Dr. Second Bureau of NKVC is none other than the Committee of
Borodin had tried to court the favor of Generalissimo "-'U,.La..l.Jb~ State Security (KGB), under which there are several divisions
But when the Russian and Chinese Communists' con- devoted to investigation, propaganda, kidnapping, assassina-
""n11"'O,A"'l:r to subvert the Kuom:intang was exposed, the first step tion, and control of their henchmen in Russian satellites.
taken b~ was to purge those Communist in-
filtrators out of the Taking Soong In the wartime both Russian and Chinese Communists con-
s support and the vacuum created ducted their intelligence warfare under the command and the .
the Northward the National Revolutionary cover of Panyushkin. Inside the Embassy there were officers
the Chinese Reds seized power at Wuhan in charge of investigation ~nd intellig~nce in Gpina. Chou En-
a.tt:errmtlnl.! to establish a that could be controlled 1ai, then the central figure of the Chinese Communists in
the Russian Communists.. Since the purge was under Chungking, had kept constant contact with and wa.s under the
way these Russian could no have a dir~ction of Pany·ushkin. At that time the intelligence men of

- 61-
 Government kept track of the Russian envoy, time of the Sixt.h Coqg:ress of the Communist Party, held in 1'928
but he 'was rather fn 'action and often left thetu in in Moscow, the internal rift and party bickerings among the
the dark.. As he suspected that his chauffeur was in. COntclCT; Chinese Reds became even more seriou,<::.. The Central Com-
with Chinese plain-clothesmeL.,he took no action .. Butsoori mittee of the RedPartv thus moved to Shanghai and took shelter
he made a test'by tile chauffeur to 'him the out- in the foreign settlement there. HQweyer, their position was
of the wartime when be reached the destinal." still precarious.. With a ~riew to warding off the attack of their
Hon dir the car his hat, gloves, B.nd perlc~alICaJ.S hypothetical"enemyll, the Chinese Communist Party
behind.. After a few minuti~s he returned to car and secreJ service on the pattern' of the Russian OGPU ..
found these article,s had b~'en somewhat as an
excuse he fired his From t,l:11s incident one can'See At Ib,etime-,the chief' of the Chinese Red secret service
how wary the Russian intelligence had been was Ku Shun-chang. He disguised himself as a professional
even of trivial matters .. magician living somewhere on Bubbling' WellRoa.d in Snanghai
and performed on stage at the roOf garden of ·the Sincere Com-
, let us cite a few more examples show how the pany, one of the four largest department stores in the .Inter-
Chinese Communists emplo~red the intelligence warfare against national Settlement there ~ He used the profession as a coyer
the National Government .. to enlist more members for the Party and at the same time. to
align himself with local thugs and secret societies .. Things Rent
'The Chinese Reds inaugurated their ser- well for a time, with networks extended. Under him there was
vice sOll1etime in after they had been from in Shanghai' a so-called "Red Squad" specialized in assassina-
the ~uomintang and went underground engaging themselves in tion and sabotage. In 1931, the Chinese Government was able
clandestine activities armE~d uprisings, and Soviet movement .. to place an agent in the special squad o'rganized by Ku.. How-
Since then their organization had been ever ex ever, he was uncovered and the Communists decided to liquidate
the Seventh him. Arrangement .was made for him to go to a certain hoteL
ence" of the Central Committee of the Communist Not knowing this was a mousetrap, he went as scheduled, and
decided resort to violencls, started the knocked at the door usi~g a prearranged signal.. No sooner he
. . . L' . . ."" . . . - · ..... l H J .." ... Autumn Harvest Uprising, entered the room than he was shot, and the assassin fled in
Kiangsu-Chekiang and haste.. it was later ~ound out that the killer was a novice the
Canton but all of them failed. The the Red squad, and that, being too tense, he failed to kill the
was lost and many its members to tended victim.. After the shooting, the wounded was sent into a

- 63-
 emergency treatment under the of special
and evaluate it before he submitted it to the Central Committee
the then :Shanghai International
of the Pa:t'ty in Shensi and to the Soviet Bmbassy in the wartime
On these, the Chinese Red secret servicemen sneaked
capital. The intelligence report on the 18th Group Army! s
into the uv ... IJ ... ,,"'.... U.U.L'_uo:. the hours and
supply of munitions and weapons to the guerilla units of the
killed the detectlves before the wounded
New Fourth Route Army in central China during their revolt) in
The on the track
early 1942 was intercepted by the Chinese Government from the
the assassins, four numh€!r who fled in different
Liaison Office Their. intelligence activities at that time were
were able to uncover four of the Chinese Reds f secret service
directed against theKuomintang and governmental department.s.~
numbers of firearms seized.
particularly the policy-making organs of the Army, and
h"".on'"<Cll'lt ··"""'·st~.F.""""~'" revealed that those firearms had been
the Air Force .. Their main tactics were to win pnblic
unsolved casE!s assassination in the
and extend their activities among the masses under cover so as
to realize their objective of infiltration and subversion ..
In the wartime the Chinese Communist intelligence attached
more to infiltration and subversion tactics than to
Prior to their all-out rebellion against the National Govern-
assassination and had resorted to,
ment, the Chinese Reds had already waged the intelligence war-
were even more diabolical in nature.. The chief of the
.fare among the government forcese They secured military in-
Chinese Red secret service in Chungking was none other than
formation through the use of money and sex, but the emphasis
Chou En-lal, He lived Tseng-
of their major activities was lai~ on the creation of contradic-
chla-ai in the warUme "' In his overt as the
tions between officers and men, between junior and senior
director of the department of the National Mili-
officers, and between friendly forces, and the. fullest exploita-
he had chancla s to befriend such and
tion of the contradictions so created.. That Kuo Ju-kuei and
cultural workers as Yu-hsiang, Shao
Liu Fei, two Communist agents, had hidden themselves in the
and others and make them his henchmen.. In
Government I s Ministry of National Defence for years and stoleD
w government officials he also had
military intelligence for the Reds is worthy of special alertness
chances to steal and plot internal dissention and
on the part of the Government. Moreover, the Red agents every
As chief the Communist intelligence he had all,
now and then raised the doubts among the Governmen~ forces
the information supplied: the Liaison Office of the Communist
by asking "Whom are we fighting for? II to pave the way for what
8th UUj::;n..... f', and the New China News,
called "defetcion on the f1:'ontline" and "revolt in the rear,~
the Red .uv ..... &,.!"' ... ,_~ and W8~S in a position to \.,;Ul1H.Ja..I.
In an attempt to OVerrun the strategical points or to break
- 64-
- 65-
 the important defenSE! lines of the forces,
movement in the hands of the Commurii.sts is a means, not an end.
the Chinese Reds often high-ranking officers with '"
They start the mass movement not for the interests of the
money ,sex or false , causing them and their men. to
masses but to use the violence of the masses for the prom9tion
surrender en masse The case of Tal Jung.. . kuang, commander
of the Communist cause. They e:x.ploit the masses and treat the
of Kiang-yin Fort at mouth of the Yangtseriver was an
masses as their tools.
outstanding one. There were many factors that led the Com....
The witchcraf~ or the Communist mass movement warfare,
munists seizure of the mainland but the comparatively
tant onawas their waging of the intelligence w"" .... t·f:l, .... O
like that of other types of political warfare, is nothing but
intimidation and temptation.
There were two- outstanding -examples which can bf::) used to
illustrate 'he RuSsian -aggression ,upon China: one is the
encroachment upon Outer Mongolia t alii the other is tbJ1.t uppn
Tannu Tuva. As regards Outer Mong<?lia, th~ nowaProgateq.
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance said in
6. The Exploitation of the Masses
"In view of Outer Mongolia I s desire for indepe¢ence f.th~
~ Tactics in Communist Mass Movement Wa
Chinese _government has appr~ved the holding of a plebisclf\e
. The- Communists, wheth4~r Russian or Chinese are the
after the war. If. such a- desire-ls p:r.oV'ed genuin~t approval f'O:J,!'
and luan.. J.J.1<: use or the maSSes Their
its independence_ will be granted •."Base4 upon this provision,
rule has been ........JJ. 'u"',u. through the of the
Sdviet Russia need not resort toa-rms i,nher attempt to annea:
Lenin has that the pibitical attacks aim at where
Outer Monogolia·t but she had· to exert pressure upon the masseS
thifl epigram ohe can see that he has
because it was the plebiscite which would determine the status.
regLt"ded masses as. the battlefield of Communist of that region. Bence, the Russian Communist employed to
should Qe made clear: the mass fullest exttlnt their tactics: in the mass ,movement warfare. On
October 6, 1945, when the 'plebiscite took place, the Chinese.
Government sent Vice-minister of the Interior Lei Fa-eha.ng.
and Director Chu' Ming-chuan of the Mongolian Affairs Divisi,On
of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission to Ulan Balon
supervise the balloting. The total population of Outer Mongolia

66- ~ 67-
was estimated between 000 and 900 , but chairman was a pro-Russian Mongolian traitor named Uianfu
its 'Voters that means, who also acted as the secretary of Inner Mongolia Work
aside from the the disabled and sick persons, Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. A graduate of the
.UH ... U ...... "" and aLll adults had cast was Chinese :rvulitary Academy and an agent of Moscow, he was sent
which was made possible Russian to Yenan, Shensi, on a special mission to communize In'her
tactics of mass movement Under the Communist intimidation, over Mongolia. Since 't,he establishment of the puppet regime,
95 of the , as , had voted for liquidation, struggle, public trials, counter-Kuomintang-agents
Since Outer Mongolia has had a name - movements, and othe~ measures had been systematic~lly carried

s ot Mongolia ". This new name t.hat . out by Ulamu. This was how Russia,n had employed the mass
Russia. still further plots Since ancient times, bovement warfare in the region of Inner Mongolia. Meanwhile,
had been divided into the and North a.nd the shocking massacre took place in Chunli, Chahar. In June
modern times, it is into the Outer and Inner, with its 1946, there emerged an a'rmy of the so-called A utonomol1s
own adlministrati~e and systems. These well known Eastern Mongolia, numbering at first some 30, 000 compos'ed
But the of Outer HIU'H/i.::.V.U."" chiefly of cavalrymen, and later. expandihg its number from
the "".. . ~~:n ••.~v •• - •• of the word 11 and the va gue name 70,000 to 80,000. With Uredo as its commander, the army was
11 of Mongolia cast a subordinate to Chinese Communist Northeastern Democratic
dark shadow upon the minds of the people of InneT !nv'..... ~v ....."" A Hied Forces. All these were facts of Russian aggression upon
In , Ge.neral George C. S Mongolia through the employment of mass movement warfare.
envoy came to with a mission to mediate between the Then, let us see how the Russian Communists employed the
Chinese Government and the Communist He went up same type of warfare in their aggression upon Tannu Tuva
Lushan Mountian .seven times aha' the Government five Since the October Revolution in Russia, Tannu Tuva had
ceasefire orders. On January IO, 1946 the first. order was followed the major policies of Outer Mongolia. WbGn the lattBr
which gave the Chinese Reds fifteen to fulfil the declared its alleR'iance to the Repablic of China, the former
of the truce agreement. It was more than coincidence
that on the same a sio-called 11 of Eastern
also alienated itself from Russia. In 1919; when the Red
.
invaded Kiakhta and Ulan Bator, its contingent made inroads
v .............. « ' .......... its: establishment CJHJ.HL"ev, with a at the same time into Tannu Tuva in the southeastern part
of Russian brand socialism. Its Outer Mongolia. Apart from the armed aggression, the Russians
68- - 69-
 their mass movement warfare their tunity to have the small "Huruldan" convened through the
dispatched maneuver of her agents, at which a rseolution on the incorpora-
teams organized to collect of minerals tion . of Tannu Tuva into Soviet U .ion was approved. In

and for experiments in Moscow in fact appearance the Kremlin professed she would "absolutely respect
such activities were intended to provide cover for their secret the sovereignty of Tannu Tuva but in fact she had annexed it in
service agents to orientate masses and them under complete.
control. This f,or the emergence of the so-called In M:l.rch, 1948 when the Supreme Soviet was convened to
s and Y outh ..... v~ .... _ v amend the' constitution, a resolution was apuroved to
Tannu Tuva A11 these were steps taken integrate the "People! s Republic of Tapa \l as one of the six
their mass movement warfare in the target areas autonomous states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
conclusion of. the Sino-Soviet A- On learning this, the Chinese Government instructed its am-
greememt, when the of China and bassador in Moscow to lodge a strong protest but Russia made
res umed their relations, Tannu Tuva its so- no reply. Thus, Tannu Tuva was finally swallowed up by Russia.
called , which was \J.u,..... v,... ..., .. ""'....L.y one of the The principal tactics employed by the Chinese Reds in their
tactics Russians in their Etntire warfare Reso- subversive activities against the Nationa~ Government, like
the included the of those employed by Russia, were tactics of the mass mov'ement
lncle~)ellUE~nc:e.. and the V,:l.IU.l.I(a..I.J.VU of "constitutional govern- warfare. In 1924 when the Kuomintang adopted the policy of
ment the same of great and small lIHuruldans" aligning with Ii ussia and taking in Communists as its members,'
J.J.U.Ul"'U" as that in Outer Mongolia. Since Tannu the First Central Executive Committee of the ruling party had
had been renamed: the I S Republic of eight departments .in charge of organizatio~, information,
did not stop at that. When Sino- movement, workers, peasants, military affairs, and overseas
VI1IJa.uvoo war broke out 7, 1937, Rl.lssia, an attempt Chinese affairs respectivel* T. Later added to these were two
a II military Tannu more departments', those of commerce and industry. When the
she had the right to station her armed forces candidates to head each of these departments were under con-
the area. In when the war against had reached sideration, the Communists were particulariy interested in the
most critical stage and China did not have time defend departments of organization, workers, and peasants A scan
territories herself of be seen now, these three departments could provide for them
70~ - 71-
 grounds to wage the mass movement warfare Subse- as channels for keeping contacts with the peasants an9. orgam.ze,
a Communist, became the department h~ad them so as .to carry out what was called "programs Cor rural
of peasants.. in order to detract the attention of the areas If and to forment th~ upeasants' revolution", The ,objective
members he recommended Pal alsoa. was to organize a military force through peasants I riots' and thus
as the d~partment before he .to E;stablish a Soviet regime. The Chinese Reds d.id' succeed in
tendered his own Despite repeated changes .of hands stirring up riots in some ,ru:r'al areas by employing the mass
at the' had. remained 1n control of all the activities of movement tactics, but when' the Kuomintang and the National
the department. The classes set up for peasants were Government becamE~ alert and purged the Communist infiltrators·
the Reds, ~md t&e trainees admlttedwere either from the Party ,the Reds for the first time suffered a setback
CC)mlmunilsts or members of their front organizations .. the mas s movement warfare ..
the peasants unions and th,e peasants'volunteer corps in Among those employed by the Chinese Reds as tools of mass
localities were also in their handS. movement, apart from peasants and workers there were young
Shorttv
',l.'tt
when the Chinese National students. As early as August' 1920, and prior to the tormal
the Kuomintang advanced to Wuchang inception of the Chinese Communist Party, Li Ta-chao and Chen
Nanchang in Northward Expedition, the Seventh Tu-hsiu had already organized the so-called "Chinese Socialist
Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist Youth Corps" , with young students as its major constituents. It
in \. Moscow, adopted a resolution on the situation of was once dissolved but later reorganized .. By 1925, it was
China which stated in briE~r that the committee had taken notice renamed the "Chinese Communist Youth Corps". In AugustI928,
of the rapid progress in the Northward Expedition and the warm when the Chinese Communist Youth Corps held its "Fifth
response of th9'Chinese poepl~, which marked lithe third stage Congress" in Moscow, its new program was to IIturn the
revolut.iJeon mov(~ment." At this stage, the resolution students I organizations into the young workers I and peasants'
went on, Uthe national liberation movem.ent should pass on to organizations", making them complete tools of Red mass
n13w situEltions ll • This was, in Communist movement warfare. After the lv1anchurian Incident, the Chinese
semantics, another way o! saying that lithe national liberation Reds took actions to dissolve their Youth Corps and replaced it
movement and the peasants revolution should merge into one with "the Chinese Youth Ullited Front" •
• To more this was to instruct the Under the banner of t.he said "Chinese Youth United Front ll
Reds utilize the government organs and n.u.vUJ.LUI,au.~ machines the Chinese Reds set up two organizations: one was llChinese
- 73-
National and th~ other was !lNorthwest children to engag'e in such activities as propaganda, message
China Youth "''''~J.VJ,..aJ. Salvation Federation!! , both of which aimed transmission, guide, sabotage, sentry and patroL The children

recruit more In the early phase after V-J had also taken part in the "three check movement," "struggle

CLLI,CU,II.JL to save their to against three capitalist classes", "landreform", "liquidation

extend their "",.-.1,,,,,,,,,,, stepped up the ""H'~.1.-r>-H'C of the Kuomintang agents l ! and other activities. Besides, the

can and winter of 945. On 1I eavesdropping squads" and "food-smelling squads" were organ-

Communist official in ,"",UU,"I::.n..LH/::

ized to serve as Red • All these facts show that the Chinese

the New , openly called the Communists had exhausted all available resources in
firms to stage anti-war and anti-tax exploitation of the masses.
(
strikes, When these failed, the Chinese :Keds engineered.
the Incident. In May and June, 1974 incited the
students to stage anti-hunger and anti-civil-war
in with their armed rebellion The Chinese Reds
called these students I demClnstration~ "the second war front".
actions were maneuvers in the C~mmunist mass
war the Government.

In their mass war ons f even women and children were

Women had be'en forced to peddle sex to lure the
officers and leaders in the and to
the assigned to them such
as "the of women" , lithe rol~ectlam of
women" and "the of women! s
Chinese Reds incited fair sex to engage in sabotage and

subversive activities. The Communist "Young Children" formed

their mass mmrement. They were on the
pattern of Russian outh Vanguard" During their rebellion
the Government, the Chinese Reds had forced the
- 74-
 Chaptor ][.

The Present Status of Global Political Warfare

!!If one knows himself and his enemy 1
he need not fear the result of one hundred
battles" .

Suntse.

"The haft of the arrow had been

feathered. with one of the eagle I sown
plumes. We often give bur enemies the
means of our own destruction".
Aesop.
"Wise men learn much from their enemies!!.
ArJ.3tophanes.
<;::ommunism is a political creed.,It is the revolutionary 1
materialistic ideology on the basis of Marxism-Leninism used
by its adherants, whether Russian or Chinese., to justify their
s~izure of political power by all means at their disposal for the
forcible establishment of a world-wide totalitarian social
order. As communism is a creed political in nature, with world
domination as its ultimate objective, the warfare that its

advocates have waged against the free world iIi the past as well
as at present is in the main political warfare. It IS more so at
present than in the past because df th~nuclear stalemate.

Therefore, an analysis of the present status of political

- 71-
 between the CNY""'\unist and the democratic world will
of the game of the Warsaw talk and is now trying to return to the
to meet ua.LA.t;;lll~t;;l as posed by old brazen trick of seeking ceasefire and pl:etending to sur-
the foes to freedom.
render which he has been playing for the pas t thirty years II •

Ch inese Communists This message was a penetrating analysis of the Chinese strate-
gy at that time, The Peiping regime, in the face of internal
Since the debacle on the Chinese mainland
strife and Russian military pl~essure, has changed in recent
hinese Reds have come off with colors. Nevertheless,
remain as treacherous as years its stratagem in the international politics, In order to
after
Third Communist tide OYer its crisis, the regime got its seat in the United Nations
in 1956,
En-Ial expressed his d'9sire to through its 11 smiling offensive", The device of the Chinese Reds
is an attempt to sow internal dissention in the Chinese Govern-
<:'IJUU.I..I.C of China . They
resumed of Kinmen on August ment and to isolate Taiwan in the diplomatic field. Free nations
1958, but Peng
, the then Defence might be duped by such Communist intrigues for a time but
lvullle" .....
, Soon
an historical facts and grim realities prove that any nation which

Chinese Reds have been establishes whatever relations with the Chinese Communists will
the game fire
even President suffer in the long run. This will be verified in time to come.
The present Chinese Communist ideological warfare is waged

the Kinmen ......... 'UlJ'... A on tw'o major fronts, namely, the Chinese mainland and the free

we had taken areas. The so-caned "Great Cultural Revolutionl! broke out
com-
shift ;from military to largely due to the collapse of the Communist ideology and the
actions.
engaged in spread of, anti-Mao and anti-Red thoughts among the Chinese
in defenses to make a last people in general and the rank and file of the Red
"" ..,au,uc::
to save his
doom. On the forces in partiCUlar, Since the publication of Communist leader

battlefield to the Yao Wen-yuan 1 s article in the Wen WeiPao, a Shanghai daily $
battlefield
to drive a bet\veen the in 1965 1 this greatest ideological struggle of ma~nitude and
of China
and States and shake the morale government profundity, unprecedented in Chinese or perhaps world history ~
armed forces so as achiErve what he failed on the has been carried on and there is no end to it. Bloody purges
ba ttlef ie Id ,seems that the enemy has been weary and hUfian degradation have been the order of the day. The
-79'-
deification of Mao and the popularization of his thought are certain that will be more contradictions and conflicts
absurd and fanatical. In such free areas as Hongkong, inside the Party. 'There had been in this island bastion of the
Macao and the Southeast Asia, the Chinese Communists andtheir Republic of China some Communist underground cells, but due
aCrUates have done the utmost in ideologioal aUenation and to the constant vigilance of the Government and the smash-up of
the free and world with many of these by the authorities, the Chinese Reds dare not
the of and democracy. these come into the open. It is believed however that the RedS will
areas are thus rendered unable to distinguish friends from foes , never give up or stop 'their organizational activities and infil-
from wrong, and many nations have become self-contra- trations. They may tend to direct the remnant agents to change
in their official state!ments and do not what actions their tactics and preserve their strength by taking mor cautions
take. free man or every free mus t and subtler steps on the one hand, and engage themselves in
alert the tactics as employed the Chinese struggles, legitimate or iilegitimate, by setting up such anti-
Reds in their warfare. Government or traitor organizations as "Independence movement
s regards the present organizational warfare by the f or Talwan" on the other. But in either way; they w ill lie low
Chinese Reds f should be since the Great awaiting their opportune time to start rebellion the
ultural the mainlandfiv;6'years ago structure Government. The free Chinese in Taiwan are on the alert.
of the Communist has been completely u. ...., ........ ""f<,kUO after The smiling offensive is at present the principal tactic
and relentless employed by the Chinese Reds in their psychological warfare
structure on different levels has a.gainst the free world. By tactics as such, the Peiping regime
anti-Mao and tries to hook the appeasers, confuse the neutralists, f:l.nd isolate
anti-C ommunis t ever on the increase. can be the anti-Communists. With the "nuclear tests I ! , ' "a population
t::0UUl:t'U. that purges letup. of seven hundred millions", and "intensive preparations for
in an to seize has war" as weapons in their arsenal, the Chinese try to
been of women ~and youths. She makes it. a rule exert psychological pressure upon the neighboring countries
that organizations the and and the free world. In the meantime, they utilized such "''''~t';0cu",

of each unit numbers should women. seems as "identification", "return to the motherland", '''unification of
she wants her woman leaders to thes.e China" and tlpeaQe talks" as baits to lure the overseas Chinese
under things go on is toward their fold. In this island fortress of Taiwan, the Chinese

- 80- - 8'-
 to the discontent of , often areas on the borders. Meanwhile the rural work corps are
such abusive as II graft and and under order to enter the colleges and schools to persecute the
GoV"ernment and officials, intellectuals including teachers and students. Armed forces are
the ears redeployed to keep the peasants and workers under controL At
SinCe seizure of the ..."'.. . UJ'CUJU the '--'H.I..u"':i:l~ Reds have the same time, the mass movements are reorganized to deal with
the bas.tion of Taiwan as a thorn their back the military commanders who tend to set up warlord fiefdoms in
which must be 8V\"8.re of the rac the area$ under their c'ontrol. Apart from. their secret service
invasion against this island will involve too agents, the Chinese Reds in their mass operations against
resort the Taiwan, are using the indigenous segregationists, self-professed
cases
the Chinese discovered that the Reds liberals, the discontented bureaucrats, and the political never-
utilized persons of different social strata from do-wells as their tools of mass mOvements. In the past, the Reds
different directions them information or established their operation frontal base at Hongkong and Tokyo,
otherwise Very dis- but recently they open a new front in the United Stat~s,
overed that the Chinese agents, lurking in the to exert pressure on Taiwan from abroad. The Red Chinese
and cultural fields had \I\Tormed into the conL dence conspiracy is to .utilize .the "radical elements" to start students
government officials and stolen to the detriment of movement· in colleges and Jschools for the Communist cause and
of Chinese Reds have launched the exter\d such a movement to the J;ural areas. Tak1e Tiao Yu
most formidable warfare against the free world and Incident for example, which was originally an expression of
that has relations with the Peiping regime is invite Chinese students 'patriotic sentiments. However, in the hands
trouble upon as the Chinese commonplace saying gg es • of the Reds, it turned out to be the tactic of "killing three birds
The Chinese Reds ar13 relentless in their mass movelTient with one stone ll • Fortunately, a large majority of Chinese
warfare. warfare is at present waged most on youths both at home and. abroad, having seen through the
the mainland the Gu~rds they utilized the Communist cpnspiracy, nipped in the bud. But a~ free men must
Great Revolution I'v6.0 f s arch 0ppOltlellts take precaution lest the Communists should seize the discontent
These Red Guards have since. then turned be anti-Red and radicalness of the young intellectuals and abuse the frgedom
\

Thousands these school youths are now down-- of the fourth estate to organize the unsuspecting students into
and earn their own the rural anti-government movement, thus serving the Communist cause.

- 82- - 83-
 The above is of the warfare as waged at forces of Communist conspiracy had made appalling advances in
the Communists the free world the post-war years L the United States began to awaken to the
J,

and the of China in may also deadly manace. In additioh, the fall of Chinese mainland into the
serve the purpose "understanding the the hands of the Reds added to the burdens of the United States in
out of counter-measures Asia. That was why the wary Americans, fully aware of the
Communist threat,· had actually intensified their political
2. Pair! of Democratic warfare.
of international communism is as well
in the entire free world. In the fact that
have been differen.ces in the ctjJjJ.u. ... aLJ.vu theories,
the variation of tactics employed, in the
or conflicts of interests anlOng the Communist
the ultimate is in common -- to communize the free
world and to bury the democratic countries.
All nations of the free world have doubtless suffered
or from the Communist of infil-
tration and ';'=·IJV"Cl.!l::C in forms visible or invisible. Especially
the United States of America, the leading power' of the demo-
cratic is the main target of international communism.
Since the end of the Second World War, the government and the
of the States, failing to see the outer
veneer of h'tTnni"'T'nrt"lT into the inner core of deceit and terror of
the Communists, have suffered many setbacks but have also
measures counter the Red menaCe in the field of
warfare.
first counter -measures taken the United
tates was sometime and after Korean War. As the

- 85-
and other nations were taken to turn tide commu- tactics, the United States committed in the .L"''''V'~UJL''<:'''''':;

nism. Much had been attached battlefield more or less the same mistakes· in major ~JV"'''''''''''''''' a.s
warfare by the in the United States. Take the Chinese Government had committed on the mainland.
..... ""....,,'",... in North Carolina for CA''''lUi!J,1.v It indeed had its without her knowing, the United States fell into a stalemate in
we 11... laid and tacts In the field of nQ1rrn!",r. warfare f Vietnam. She was thrown irito an awkward predicament because
there was ;:'VIII1<::::1.1U,llK to be desired -- the lack of of the policy she had advocated to light without the ......... Q M...... \J'.u

among organizational and mass mf',v""me~nf oper- win the war there. Due to the Communist conspiracy, t.he
-ations but in 'intelligence and in the on the front had not been lost, but the policy-makers in
employment of. ~cieI1ltific methods, surpassed Washington were unable to come to an agreement on Vietnam on
What deserves special mention was mass account of divergence of opinion. It seemed that the
mt1,vc,m.:)nr oparations throughcivU defense Q,LJLJ.U.l,ll5 and organ- doctrine from the neutralization of Vietnam War to the 'cess-
izations, which were th!~bulwarks against ation of hostilities should ba tactically revised in certain
11 in the United StatE~s GovernmenlJo. had made remarkable aspects,. From the standpoints of military and political Cl?,... "i'-o-

success in: political warfare ,and reaped crops in turning gYt whether such a doctrine would lead to roads open
the tide of communism and after the Korean War. communism, and whether it would' make friends and foes loms-
The second is the years prior to and after the Viet- tinguishable,remains a question the seriousness of which
namese As mentioned above, duri,ng the Korean could not be minimized. It was most puzzling and shocking
had taken' several effective measures in ",VA."'''''',",,'''''' aee the Communists had in a short period been ab"le to stir, ~lP
wl,lrfare, ·but she still lagged, behind the Communist.. the tidal waves of appeasement and anti-war, the mass move-
the ten years Reds had taken more extensive and ment not against communism but against anti-communistn in
actions in strategical United States, the most. wealthy and prosperous pnIIU'It·T'1:/' of
in organizational infiltration, in world. There are reasons toworry about if bne sees how
attacks, in nfC)rrna1t!on theft and in mass ....,.... """,,...'... not in Communists have' )lVorm~d their way into the school campuses,
sia but also toward the United States. stirred up the the intellectual field, the ne'wspapers, and other mass media,
Vietnamese War 1n the Southeast Asia and created and what is more, into the various departments of the
serious chaos. in the What ,worries States Government. In more than a decaf' '3, the States
is to the Communist has made au tstanding achievements in science,
- 86- - 87-
 and in weapon.:r~r, but it is to say tha t in policy is mainland recovery and reconstruction. In the
Communist conspiracy, instead of the Chinese Government has shattered the Communist dr~am
intensive study and progress, the United States has t1bloodwashing Taiwan" by the policy of "bolstel"ing Taiwan",
gone like a bE~llt:'iOn without air. It is by no means . It has also defeated the Red plot of tldemolishing Taiwan"
incredulous that, if there emerges no statesman as great as programs of "reconstructing Taiwan" In recent years ,theChinese
and Abraham Lincoln save the Government has thwarted the Red conspiracy of "dividing Taiwan'
States and the free wortd ou t of the present crisis, .and the by measures of "consolidating Taiwan" In mor~ tpa.n two
situations remain the s~me as at present, there are indeed decades, the Chinese Communists have exhausted their means
we have belief in the to destroy Taiwan but every time they have failed. The only
national strength of the United States f in the Amexican silent way for them to do is to dupe and make fool of the free world ..
masses who are anti-Communist and sentiment. As re·gards ideological warfare waged by the Chinese:
the most critical pElriod is also the time for the United Government against the Reds, the authorities in Taiwan have
States to wake up followed the instruction of Presidint Chiang who pointed out in
his speech delivired on October 2; 1960 at theYangmingshan
3. On the of the Republic of Institute: tlIn the past years the failure in our campaign
Under the of President the agaiQ,st the Reds may be attributed at least partly to a few lines
Government and the of the Republic of China have of Communist slogans through their propaganda .mac hlne • The
the of warfare and have 1..1so Reds smeared our pUblic-spirited and law-abiding Kuomintang
seen the Communi:st politlcal stratagems from members then in the government service by calling them
prepared for ac~epting greater by reorgan- t diehards ,and those feeble-minded and. weak-kneed pJU'sons,
and modernizing the armed forces, the Government and for fear of being called die hards 1 , thus gave up their original
the are working togHther in intensifying their fJV.L.l .....l. ...... '" faith and patriotic responsibility and defected to the Communist
warfare communism. The following a brief a.ccount camps in utter disregard of national interests. Not only the
various aspects of such warfare common people but also the revolutionary cadres and intel-
As far as strategy i~ concerned, the Chinese Government lectuals . had, consciously or unconsciously, intentionally or
has aside its of,suppressing the Red rebellion and unintentionally , been deceived by Communist propaganda.
relentless Its ua!• .LVJ.J"'-.L As a result, the mainland was lost with their faith lost. H At

,...,. 89-
 Seventh of the warfare against the Reds.
In the organizational field, the Chinese Government in
ral in
Taiwan has in the past two decades spared no effort in re-
the cause of on the r.:ainland
establishment and consolidation of its organizations. In 1949 the
of thoughts
PresIdent advanced the catchword" Organization'First",
reiDC~~lll,)IP,n with administrati~e and u .... 'L,L ..........

was substantiated by his exhortation in 1951 on "The

sorry to say
and Functions of Organization". The Kuomintang, the
theoretical ""...,...v ..... u,"'"". I regret
party, underwent reorganization at first, followed by the
that such a UVc:A.J'U""lJ.L on my part had constituted
establish!J1ent of administrative organs. These two steps were
loss of the mainland to the • Since the President
imperative in waging the organizational warfare against the
Go~ernment moved
Reds, with considerable merits achieved. A s for the
(he Reds has
reorganization, though the result was not entirely .. )'CLl' .... ...," ...........

res l1 l.ted in that all the alert and Chinese citizens

past practices of membership cards without party memb(~:rs~
able the from the wrong, the friends
member s without cells f and cells without actt vities had r.>eEm
the foes AH them have learned a biUer from
corrected. In regard to the strengthening of the
the mainland in their minds t the
tablishments and the establishing of the political
and the anti·-C ommunis t re':'"
armed forces, the battles in the Formosan Straits and the
the' ,lost mainland have taken mong the
offshore islands had well testified to the :efficacy of the
armed forces it is all the more
ization~l efforts. Meanwhile, the settiRg up and the
·fruits Devoted Presi-
of organizations behind the Communist front ,
two articles: 'liThe Revolutionary and The
encountered many difficulties, had been pushed throl.1 is
both of which had aroused
believed that once the people in the enemy's rear
centiments wan.
against the Red , the foundation of mFlinland recovery
liThe
laid.
ussia In the field of the psychological warfare, the President'
Problems in
given instructions on various occasions.", He said. "We
LI~~'a,Ulu.1l with the \..dJlrmnUJJlS and Methods", have , to capture the enemy! s
remember especially the
~xerted the infbonce,in the employment ideoloQ"ical
-91-
 his walled comes next. This l! united front", the Chinese Government and the people have
in our operations the Reds but strong belieHn recovering the mainland and wiping out the Reds,
llso in all wars. We must subjugate our enemy No matter how chaotic and complicated the world situations
odds are- against him so that might be, the Chinese people in the island bastion of Taiwan
defeated even b€'fore the war breaks out Thus 9 no under the leadership of President Chiang "remain calm in the
matter numerou s soldiers he possesses face of challenge" and work hard in order "to be seH-reliant
out with a inferior force. However dignityfl .
the enemy s mind we have to strengthen our to In the field of intelligence warfare, the organization con-
the enemy s will to we have to bolster our own. cerned in Taiwan had streamlined and strengthened
In recent years, the Chineso Government has ...._ .. ,.,. .,..., structure in accordance with the President I s instruction of 1949
up its efforts in the field of ·warfare Such works It called for "revitaiizin&" the organizations, unifying the
as the of principles, command, distinguishing bet\'Veen authority and responsibility"
textbooks and other materiall; for educational purpose the 1."e- and strictly executing the reward and punishment in dealing with
and and the of merits and demerits so as to keep the personnel doing their

U"'I-JlU~;'HL as well as , all related to the psychological utmost through division of htbor and cooperation.!! In recent
warfare, have producep. substantial results. Particularly years, the security and progress of Taiwan should be attributed
c ommendableis the achievement of the frontline at least partly to the outstanding achievements of the intelligence
offensive and that of the airdropping of leaflets in the enemy IS work. All the Communist underground organizations have been
rear The Chinese Reds had confessed that the Great s mashed with their secret service agents arrested. These were
Cultural Revolution many Communist top officers and cadres the major feats accomplished by the Government intelligence

turned out to be anti-Red and anti-NRo men. Most of them having heavy responsibilities to shoulder
becaUSe had been influenced by the broadcasts and leaflets have suffered many hardships and worked under adverse

of the Government in Taiwan. It can be presumed conditions. They deserve one rS admiration. However,
on the , though under the Comn;lUnist intelligence warfare waged by the Chinese Government in

, might also have bl~en influenced to certain extent. Taiwan is largely on the defensive. How to develop the intelli-
A the defence against the Communist gence warfare in the rear of the enemy and how to turn
attacks, the tricks of talk!' and intrigue of fensive into offensive are the most pressing problems at present.

--92-
 In to the mass movement, that the and has achieved 'some results, but under careful one
had failed to realize its ;:)... ,i,J.,U, .......,Q.J.J.'--
can still find several defects and loopholes, in its operations.
Reds the last stage last war, es- The President once lamented over the fact that the strategi9a1
the whe n the war- weary warfare had not been due emphasis and that most
forces tried suppress the Communists over-all rebellion. failed to know how to fight the in the field of
realize thH importance of mass movement on the As a of fact to forgjve the enemy the President r-e:'"
of Chinese Government had resulted the of marked, is to be cruel to onese!!. Take the warfare
"' ....,:II'f.rt,.,'-'"'.:'1 from masses for instance. The Chinese in general have not established
caused the loss of mainland to the moved faith in the Three of the People on which the Chinese
Chinese Government has taken nation is built. It is doubtful where public officials in of
mass movement . The world-known Youth culture and education have a thorough understanding and absolute
achievement organization
faith in Dr. Sun Yat-sen s trilogy. In colleges and high schools,
. rv1easures taken the Government
students who can transform the thoughts contained in the
from the land rent land - t 0- the - tiller the
principles into a spiritual fOyce 'rery limited in number It
of 'and from the deeply regrettable that, under the mask of and liber-
I welfare to labor law have benefited the
alism, the devlationist and thedecadant existentialism
Similar rt, :Ll}llll I
have in recent years found their vvay into the academic circles
reaChed the Anti-Communist and Women
which are yet to be clarified and rectified. At new
Workers ssociation. movement launched armed
administration have push thro ugh many reforms and a fevy
forces Serve the 1s ever strict
radical elements who do not work with their hands and see
avail LJ'''''''",,:;'r: serve
their eyes have in a smear campaign become without their
relief and rehabilitation cultural
knowle1ge tools of the enemy. This casts a shadow on the ideo-
• The Chinese armed forces are
logical warfare waged by the Government. In
between armed forces and the differ-
warfare, the Chinese Government in Tal wan is stilt with
most
many problems The general do not fully understand
, the "lJLI.~J.'--C'L.1.
nature of the programs launched the ruling vvhich is
the Communists
Kuomintang. The organizations in the stratum

-95-
are The in the election of repre- trend eventually will further alienate the relationship of the
s entatives to levels of legislative ·UVU...ltl;:) needs to be masses of the people. Atthou gh the popular bases have for years
All these have been due to the weakness in been well laid the ruling party, yet they a,re still wanting in
relevant organizational What is more, how organize magnitude and depth. To sum up in a nutshell, the Chinese
anti-Red and anti-Mao in the rear of the enemy is the Government has to launch its drive simultaneously in the strate-
the present administration is now gical, ideological, organizational, psychological, intelligence
faced warfare the radio and mass movement ~rfare before the ultimate objective of
over the Chinese mainland are mainland recovery and national reconstruction can .be attained ..
insufficient The works in the Lt;l.l.."lHl'LJ.\)J.J.<:Ll. field need
both and in UUQ.1J.L..lL to
United States present writer that in most of
libraries , the Chinese Reds propaganda is devil s
Free China are almos none. ac-
counts the and anti-war sentiments among the
China in the States. In .... ..,':-...,,...n

warfare there is of and im-

the material of the Government ...'-',_"' ...... .1.1,:<:;1......

men. As in the past

and officers Besides, the
C ouditions for the intelligence warfare are found
not to say of such warfare a~GlU.1.1;:)L Red
on the U!<:L.l.Hjl<:L.LlU , the mass movement warfare is
the concern of the ,-,11.1.11r::.::>1:: Government

the has so far moulded the younger generation

the same pattern of marshalling toward officialdom aca-
demle The intl:3Uectuals thus up can only
an eYE:? to intE!rests and social standings Such a

96 - -91-
 Chapter IV.
Communism Versus Freedom
• A Contrast

"The sin and sor:r'0w of despotism is not

that it does not love men, but that it loves

them too much and trusts them too little."

- G. K. Chlqsterton.

"Contemporary Communism is that type

of totalitarianism whicl1 consists of three

basic factors. which contr~l people. The

first is power, the second ownership, the

third ideology. II

- Milovan DjUas.

"The history of ev erynaHon under a

communist xegime demonstrates conclusive-

ly that the com.munist version of freedom is

only a new form of total slavery. "

.... J. E. Hoover.

-'- 99 -
- 98-
 1J't::'.:11·1.J.l.J,~ of warfare, some people that the Communist and "'·.I..I.I.o ... ·- ...... "'lU1UU..LU.. ",., ideologies,.
is a mere copy from the and that mere copy
from the Communist will not necessarily enable democrat to as viewed from the power of'
us make clear at the outset that it is against hate. All and
war in the words of Clauswitz, a continuation of actions of the National Government takes their·origin from love
we mean war then war is whilst those of the Chinese Reds hate The ".ut,,,..,•. ....,«
a continuation of '"'v . . . .,.."."'.. conflicts. If that the of China is in the Three
the ...... ,.""",,"1' conflict between the democratic Communist of the ,which from love and laVA
...... ~~4'~4.' v\J'....!.L•.L\.,;,O:W'. not a tit for sixth lecture on
IJv ...... " ........ C:>..L war must be won, we have to make tiThe ancients 'of lOY8 t.o
warfare as '-""'uuauu.....H and as yqUT children t and I Be kind
the Q,u,.,... --...,'CJU'"l1"....u.... Such a the people and love all creature s I Love -N as to
study is of because from it all duties from which we can see how well
\
we can see the differences between these warfares in nature kindness and love into effect" It The essence of
and find ways to defeat the enemy. The is a com- the love of the the oppre ssed
of the six of political warfare the essence of is loye
and the F v ....".," .................< oppressed peoples of the
The essence of the y.~~ is the love of the corn.....·
love Versus Hate " " " . ".....

munity and the "'\..ovuvu.........,c"'....... , 'bf the

Contrast in ldeclogical Warfa re love "'o..·IT'a~'t' the
wh.ieh t he of the Natkm.al
the Republic China and the mentis love into effect"
In order to defeat
enemy ideologically, one has to find his weakness, The Communist. ideology, on .the other is
..
shatter his belief, and his whole Sy before hate. The Reds 9 RusSian qr Ch.inese f
destruction can be achieved. On the other hand one has to the State because they hate it
know one s strength, consolidate one s belief l and establish advocate the wiping out of class because
so that one's thought can generate unmatchew. as a the workers" And
Here is a contrast be- the obliten'1 tion the class becau.se
100 - - 101
 class .. consider the sys- natural environments through the application
tern a to the Communist the of the law ofnature~ Non-human beings do
not to love their it. be- not ,know how to solve problems they eneo'nntsr
cause they hate hate the in their struggle for survival, whilst human
resort to , liquidation, massacre J aggres- beings are seeking ways and means to solve
sion" such problems. As human beings we should
survey the l\niverse and resolve our own pro-
viewed from the humanism blems from the humanistic viewpoint" II>

Q.~'cx..uJ.';;:>" a humanistic
materialism .. i
outlook on with ·man as center .. Com- The President was of the opini'On that man should be the
munists have their solid basis on material- rnaster of ~ not vice versa. He went on to say
ism .. in IlHistory rnarks t.he of mankind; and the uniyerse is
the and matter as '-.. 5""·.u• ...,~ t.he stage of human 11 AU these can be 'summed up a
Jl~HJ"'ULU""'Ul dialectic in nutshell -- humanism ..
livelihood as the cause evolution as ~r.~~--~v the 'Communist
historical materialism; and in methodology The Communist ideology is in the d.ialectical
Q.~,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, the Communist of Marx and Lenin ... Having denied the value of
manism is the human hurnan nature, it. has tried annihilate it. The
master of the and the element of adherents consider the world as consistitued
done in the intere 5t of man.. In Section I, of his ters with their force reigning supreme. What they call
"Fundamentals of and ;;;)J.;;;:'I.xu.".,Russia is to varied interpretations. According to . LeIl.ir;,
President '-J ...... J.Q.~;.".. 'Y' ..... rn...,,"'~ir"'""" matter exists beyond the realm of perception,
subsisting, it attracts sensibility and s.o
"Human form an essentialpaxt of pears as " re fh::cted" in th,e p~rcipient$ Interpreted
universe .. non-human wa.y, the term "matter" comprises practically all
the law natural vvorld y in the hum8:n, society r including the man
whereas the life of human beings also Ac:cording to lvlarx r who proceded Lenin f
nature are, they seem
process are but the of our brains and sense Qrgans
-102 - .- 103 -
the ms,tex'!a.l.. Matter is not the Drl:l (UIC t, And
been the reason for scoeity' s
velopment, the law of social progress", it
can see that Marx and bis man
but. and his
The law of social progress is developed trom the
rel~aJ:uela as the products of it &.< ...0 ............' ' ' ' ' ' . , .... ,

mutual aid '01" harmonious relationships among men

use matter to determine human nature
method of thinking. Such a method is physiological..
SOr can
On other hand~ the Communist method of \,Ull.UJ;i..l.Ui!!!j

diametric,ally the opposite" The so-called U,~:2..I.>;;'''''''!',",''''''''

I\..

, ia1ism plays up contradictions in society and $tresses

of mutal
u ... o;:> ....,o·... as irreconcHiable ending in \'II hat is called, the
negation of negation. Such is the pathological of'
society, a view that progress takes place
person
destruction. When Communists look upon
ThIs is what
onllie basis of such pa~hological
.........,•."'" on. the
destruction~ they advocate struggle a~s

solve these problems. In fact this is the result ofinG?rrect

way of thinking. In the same section of his
the
People s livelihood, S un. had pointed out:

nClaSs waT is not the cause of social

intE~rests of . ; it is a disease developed in the
of
of social progress The cause of the Ull.'CI,C;'"",,,,,,,,,
and _""~"'''''''.' will progress. we is the inablity to subsist, and the r,esult of
make thEtse ad.1l1iStIltl611tS
the disease is war I} What Marx
From his studies of social problems W~lS a~
t.imes now man has exerted his on,OT',r1'ljp'JIl!
of disease s in the of social
maintain his existence
Therefore,
continuous
cannot say that he is
-t
 First, the ideological krmament should be
By ideological armament we mean ~he building up' of the ideolo~
gical bulwark on the one hand and th e sharpenin,g of the ide01 0"';
what the social
gical weapons' to attack the enemy.. The former is to the
was mistaken his method of
enemy I s ideological offensive at bay whilst the latter tdbe
disease the course Of social He made further
employed in penetrating and thus destroying the enemy I de~
blunder in ..""'- 0 social throug-h class
rense line.. In regard to the ideological bulwark on .the pa."tt
of the adti-Communists, It is to be built solidly on the Three
pre sent lUE301,0l:rlCl::I warfare
Principles of the People, because these doctrines not,
munists is love h,ate, humanism O'F,""'......" .....

meet the need of mankind but also ride the tide of the
..,._,~~,~_ aidllgainst strugg~,e, and in a word the Three Prill-
With our faith in the se principle s VII hich 9 based upon human~
the against communism. kindness
ism, are the orthodox cultural heritage of China, the la~~Ol.U­
as it woUld be easy to the function
gical bulwark is strong enough to hold back any attack from
and win over s~rvicemenand the on the
the enemy. As to our ideological weapons, the most
With hate as the of it
are the first and second of Dr .. Sun Yat-sen j s Prin.,~
result in anddis~;ension 'which could lead. to col.-.
ciple of People! s Livelihood in criticism of Marxism
Meanwhile with the fulle st 'development of human na-
Leninism, and President Chiang I s works'refuting the samein
ture and wisdom, olie could' make use of material forces for
the past thirty odd years, among which "The Fundamentals of
of mankind. As the Communists believe
Anti-Communist and Resisting-Russia Struggle ll ~ liThe Basic
in u.<'• • "v,'"', .......,.. determine their fate
Problems in Dealing with th'8 Comrqunist Ideology ,and Mel,n()Q:.'l;'
their with the "".....'_4•• ~ of
"Soviet Russia in China" and others are of paramount
these with mutual aid and na:rmon,lOlU5 re-
tance.. These works may well be called the hydrogen bombs
,one can unite the people an IDyincible re-
our ideological weaponry"
strike the enemy. the
Tn'"n,'\! of constant struggle the internal strife
Next the operations in ideological
will lead to their collapse. Therefore the war
Chinese Reds should be increased" It is beyond doubt that the
Q./!; ........... .., .. the Communists is sure to be won", hasten
pre sent ideol,ogical warfare ag'alnst the Peiping must
need to make the af-
be broadened and intensified. In dealing with t~e Red
in warfare ..
sonaus the Government and the people of the·

-101-
 must use various forms of
expose their 2. Reconstruction Ve rsus Destruct
nail down the
Cont rast in St rategical Wa rfare
cities of the Chinese Reds in contrast with.t.heir
and their dialectical
the Chinese Reds had cn:ampl(mE~(1 "'n.".,."·,.., ...•... should In the world
now from the Communist camp LI1 many respects~ We are for
the totalitarian craoy, and in order to map out ways to defea.t communism w
fullest extent the u'n, .... I;·o. ..... 1 S blood and must make a comparison of factors involved,.
them of their The Chinese
induced land reform In to the tenet of strategical
among have construction Communist destructlon a The program of
the national reconstruction of the Republic of China
Chinese Reds had those industrialists and business- is based upon the doctrine of Dr. un
them the honorific titleD! Father of stated that the
all strategy of national revolution was In the
similar , President of
Anti-Communist and lissia Struggle" that liThe
the elements supreme of our
to to national reconstruction ll " In his "Plans for
construction", the Founder of Chinese as
its main thre-e of reconstruction,

what the Chinese , social and economic On the basis

the servicemen the the Sun I s outline 9 Pre sident in his lecture
would realiztE tem and :?ractice of the Principle s of the
decehred and faith in COmrrmtlllSJrIl two more of reconstruction, the the ethical"
most From these one can see that the main r.h"o,...."',
led the ha IS been Fur-
thermore ~ Article Two of Dr. Sun's "Fundamentals
.- 1
-1
Reconstruction!l reads as follow
On the other hand, the basic strategy of the Chinese Recb
"The of in their, subversion and rebellion is "destruction 1I c
reconstruction liE~s in the people I "",V.LVj>;.L,,,.a.J. phase, they try to destroy the freedom of
ThereforE~ order to the through indoctrination, brainwashing and
I s basic mleds food
poliHcal regaid the state as means of
and means of
sing the people and they advocate the abolition of the
government must exert its utn::ost
because their ultimate objective the tptal destruction.
the
In the economic phase, the deprivation of the
food for them
private property is nothing but toe dest.ruction of
build
and social economy * What the Communists call
with ",;""JI,LU.U,!£.
ownership" has resulted in "collective
to
what call S Qwnershipll has resulted in
and to construct roads
owning nothing at aU" communism~ when. rendered
canals for their
into Chinese, Ha doctrine thl:!t property is shared
t10n.
all" is in the end lla doctrine that nothing can be shared
process of all !I. Thub the peo.pie are rendered destitute and be.come slaY,e~

what sort of laborers. In the social phase, the people IS COfnmune

, is dedicated lt~ building an pellQ€mt and pro- the family system. In t.he cultural field, the Chinese
sperolls natidn.. It over sts on the mainland are promoting vl'hat they call the lithe
the had h09k of op- thoroughly Red and yet highly specialized" education, a
to reConstruct .. the Chinese Reds were bination of Communist political consciousness and
dead set the reconstruction started the knowledge, which stresses the expediency rather than
because a well-·reconstructed China. meant death tradition, the practical use ra.ther than the old wisdom~

to communism. For instance, to an aim to the Chillese history f culture and ethics ..
s book liThe of finallf, the objective of th8Ghinese Reds as embodied in
_~'~""'4,", the last war f because it was rs- ~larxisln-Leninism, is world revolution, or, the communization
China .. of t~e world, w hleh is tantamount to thE:' destruction of free~~

peace and happiness of the manki.nd. What is more

tactic S 1'e sort to are "st:r uggle sl! • claim
-110 -
-111
 reconstruct socialist and at different pla9ElS use democracy and to '-''-7.'.~''''''C

, and have go on with their to attract thos~ naive and pitiable democratic and liberal
even if the is attained" as ments f but the objective of the Reds is totalitarianism e..nd
means when 'others the As a rule th.e Communist hierarchy is more
end in. itself" nical the in , for the uncontrolled
communism is destructive, and of a despot cannot reach every person and his n ....."niC::.'t"'1f'''r
can
never and despot in can control the body of his
never structive tactic s" ,~o..,r"rT '" to violence too t but not to
exploIt and control
body and soul, under the name of
matter they may the enslavement
the people under the Communist rule is a well-known
the world e

the Three the In is

in recalled that
war of the Chinese

selves to take the offensive

Government on the UGH::;;1.1.'"'''. • In a smear '-""'tUi-''';''''''X~''
to the G o'ver~ment I s
and had nr.,~''''''''Hn nnn"" .... r'Yl

strength~ By the time when Chinese ,-,,,,,,~.. u,,,,u..U"''''''''

government to open the Government was alrrioat UI.!-pre:-

"""rUYlg'!"""" reason of the fall of the mainland
hands of the CommtLTlists was that the Government
, mained passivE~ and on the now
nave Since Communists established the
-113 ~
 the thE! mainland more decaJies warfare: one is to employ .it against the Chinese Reds
tlcoalition government" had the,Jlselves, and the other is to deal wlth the the
turned out to be hundred Commu.llist mainland und~r the Communist In dealing with the
all the on the mainland rult:l Chinese Reds, she has to adhere to the tit for tat:
any· sort of freedom to of ~ pea- In his lecture on "The Basic Problems in Dealing with the
sante with the carry out "land reform" Communist Ideology and Methods " ., President
distribution out:

!lIn 'our against the Chinese Reds

busineSSmen to
matter it is in military;
the
or social field 1 regardless of whatever time
the
and space, we should never entertain any il-
lusion of coexistence and cooperation with
them. We have to know the Chinese Communists
are slave-rninded and inhuman"
has seen
We cannot ta.ke them for average
are self--evident. UndeI' the
have to their materialistic dialectic s in
Chinese Heds direc .~
striking against their organization t and th.eir
activities This its what we Chinese
say: the \1 S8 of the enemy I s spear to
his shh'31d~ Only by so doing can we make the
Reds contradict, negate r transform and thus
annihilate each other.. so can
we once and for all the materialistic
on which the Communist
are base6; And only
to maanee posed by
national communism and attain perrrlaIl6'IlJ;.
def<?at
the

114 --
 in the "'T.:I"Rr.!~D'l
As regards the Communist organization it is based upon rutn-
the
less pressure and under mechanical control.. It is constantly
in danger of disintegration if one of its links breaks off e In

fw:un-
order to defeat the enemy in the organizational aspects we
In 9.n
must use our strength to attack the enemy' is weakness before
China will adhere
we can achieve the absolute, overall victory.. A comparative
and to the
study of such a w8.-rfi:rr e is necessary ..
can

First, let us ma¥e a comparative study of the organiza-

tional theories .. It is apparent that our organization based
upon physiological principles, hence it is organic; whilst the
comrade" To defeat the Chinese and
Communist organization is based upon mechanical theo~ies,

hence it i.s inorganic. The former, being organic, is apt

As the Three of the
yield Rn inexhaustible living force through the process of
and the are
continuou3 growth and development.. In his message on
the interest China and is no
ganization: Its Principles and Functions, I President 'JAU.Q.UM
in
pointed out: IlIf we wish to strengthen our own organization. so
that 'we can surpass the enemy, it is necessary that w~

the physiological concept by the application of the

of division of labor"cooperat1on, balance and coordiriati~

among the constituent elements of our organization.. TherE~

should be no opposition, conflict, friction and laxity nor

o should there be any fissure, crack, dislocation and .n~'o....·",''''''''
tlon. II "Personal;ly", the President went on, til have been con-
vinced that the highest form of organization in the universe
none other than the organic entity of living things with that of·
camps, the the
human beings the most perfect .. In the struggle for existence f
Our
hum'an beings must perfect their physiological
order to survive.. Ther8fore the. principle of physiologica.l
~ T herein it s
-117 -
or$.!aJtl12,atJLOn is the most rational criterion rP""rrQ"~'" .allor- disihtegrate and decompose all of a sudden. II In this passage,
ganizations. It From this message we can see the of President Chiang, had exposed the weakness of the Communist
physiologipal organization. organization based upon the "pathological" theories. Its
structure will definitely end up in complete collapse beyond
The Communist o~ the other is based retrieval.
up mechanical theories. All belong to mechanism are as
rule constrained and lifeless. The theoretical basis Next, let us make a comparative study of the lines that our
Communist organizatlon is, in a sense organi?lation and the Communist organization follow respec-
In the same message on "Organization: Its and tively. Quite obviously, our organization follow s the line of
U..u'';;I.J,IJJ:A" It the President also pointed out: nlt par- the entire people whilst the CommuI!ist organization follows
emphasized that logical patterns"as embodled in the line of what has been called the proletarian class" The
Three Principles the. People entirely follow the former is shaped in the interests of the entire nation whereas
from those of the Communist or- the latter is limited to those of a part of the nation. Judged
ganization which follow the pathological from the modern democratic ideas, it is certainly erroneous
'I·i'o ....... ,..~"....."" the overall orgsl.11izational activities the Com- to follow the line of only one class of the people Besides
munist Party come from the premise s of ne- the strength ofa class of the people can never surpass that of
gatio'ns cataclysms. It Iseems that the Reds treat a ~.
&.&'V .......... the entire people. Therefore we insist that our organization
man as one who s~fers from diseases. If we go a: little deeper should follow the popular line. Our Party organ is to unite aU
the of the COIDffiUltllst organfzation 9 we can fir..d that revolutionary youths alld patriotic countrymen w'ho have faith
,;-

the constituent elements wID engage ~hemselves in in the Three Principles of the People as its constituent ele-
self-contradiction, self":'coJtlflict and self-negation. In other ments, in a common struggle fo+, the interests oCour
words, in the Communist organizatiorithe constituents have and so also of the !I\asses of the people, as strongly
engage themselves.in const;ant conflict, contradition and ne- to class struggle. The constitnentsof our Party are the en-
gatioa 0V'en if they are unwHling to so so; that is to say, from tire people~ We struggle for. the interests of our nation and of
its inception, conflict, contradition and negation are the order the mass of the pe"ople. We struggle not for the interests of
of the and then. conflicts are followed confUcts, con- a single class, or of a few persons, but fOT the interests of
·tradictions by contra4ictlons, and .negations by and the entire peolpe .. In so doing, we follow the popular line&
. J

end, the vicious ch'cle of ,innumerable conflicts., con-

tradictions and negations c.au,ses the. internal organization to As regards the Communist organization, it fol.low s the line

1 1.8 ~ 119 -
 p:b:)letariatll. follow the. proletarian class line
zaUonal methods used by the two' camps.. We organize' .onr,;,.
......,....,..,•."'... they utilize class struggle as a mea,ns
selv~s by the way of right while the Communists organize them-
cal power, wlthoutany sllncere regard for the interests of the
selves by the way of might. We are united for the same ptlr.-
p:t'bletarian, class as profess to have struggled for ll Take,
pose, while the Communists are affiliated under coercion «-
the Bolsheviks for .xampl~.. ln the first stage of the so-called
J
Our organization is characterized by unity, While the Com-
revolution, had utilized the proletarian class as basic
munist organization is marked by control. Unity forms B.
force to seize power and meanwhile rallied the peasants as
natural circle (Figure One), tight and inseparable like.
reserves man attempt to neutralize the capitalist class which
Qomprised. the liberals and the Tsarists., In the second stage,
cell in a body show ing no sign of integration 411 An organiza:tion
marked by control is formulated in' layers piled up (Figure
'With the.proletariat still as the basic force' of the revolution
Two) to the top, which is liable to collapse when one of its
and peasants and the proletariat of neighboring state s ;as
parts falls apart. The strength and weakness easily dh~"':
reserve_, they attempted. to neutl'alize what they had called
carnable ..
the bourgeois democrats from the masses .. ,And then in the
third stage, the Bolsheviks clamored for the, proletarian di-
ctatorship, :but as a matt.~r of faqt, the Russianpolitica.l power
had aJ;ready fillen into thl9 hands of the Communist hierarchy,
and slnce"thenthe proletnrian class itself had, no longer ex...
Inheriting the Bol sheviks I practise, the Chine se Reds
Fig. I Fig" II
seized power by followlnir ,practically the same line. They had
used such la-balsas "the lRed Army of Work~rs and Peasants",
In regard to unity~ Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in the sixth
nWn.... ln::t.y·!Ill in charge of thE. factory", and rule
on Nationalism, had given the following concrete
of various classes" ell em the same party line of the Bolshe-
viks.. T hey had utilized the class struggle as a mean s to lIIf we want to restore our nadonalsu'uld-
usurp the political power,. However, as 'Soon as the workers ing, we must revive OUI:" national spirit Q If 'W~
and peasants wake up and revolt against Communist dicta- want to :r:,evive our national spirit II ,'Va must Cul- '
it is certain that the Red Party as a would fill. two conditions .. First, we mU3t understand
the v~~t mass of the Chinese people .. that we occupy today a most perilous posiUon;
and second, knOWing our danger, we must
Still us ma,ko a comparative of organi- utilize China I s ancient social groups, as tl'te
-120 - - -121 -
 and the clLan and consolidate them to family system.. Theyalso promoted the struggle of tenant far-
form a national mers against landlords, labor against the management, appre-
complished and w!~ have the strength ntices against their tutors, students against their teachers,
hundred millions nnited to fight, no matter how in order to split the society into conflicting factions with the
out present position' we should be able .Cormer stability: ruined. They also conducted the st:b!JS'gle by
,
lift it up.. So, to know and to unite are pitting t~e functionaries- against the department heads, the
two essentials for reviving our nationalism" lower organ against the higher, the mobs against the govern-
ment in order to destroy the independ eht states through inter-
'!'he method of utilizing tlie traditional civic bodies China
nalstrife and dissension. HaVing destroyed' all traditional
conglomeration into a J;]ational entity is in with
systems and existing organizations, the Communists then
the natural law and human nature and feeling without the need
seized control and imposed their will upon the people 6 Such a
thus formed of kindred
control, of course, could never last long, because, as a rule,
one of volition and love, not of arbitrary force It should be
the greater the pre ssure, the stronger will be the re sistence..
recalled that Dr .. Sun had used this method to organize
It is a certainty that the Communist tyrannical regime can
Kuomintang.. he encountered many difficulties
never avoid their eventual doom. Within the Chinese Communist
and frustrations during orga'nizational , the Founding
PaTty, there have been absolute control 'and bloody suppres-
Father of the Party and the! Republic had persisted in the
sion. As a result of internal strife and purges, so, many
above-mentioned method to consolidate the organs. In the
Communist Party members and even senior Communist cadres
course of the National he had initiated several
had met their death5. In the revised edition of this book in
reforms rallying ,behind him all genuine ele-
1959 t the present writer had remarked that "Khrushchev and
ments and yet there had f,le1Ver been any blo,odshed due to
Liu Shao-chi are the masters of the Communist intramural
power struggle within the or the Government ..
struggle, but their own fate can well be imagined. II Things
have happened as predicted. It can be safeiS- presumed that no
Communist method is the use of violent suppression
C't>mmunist topnotchers can escape their doom in the constant
and, absolute control.. For, the sake of the Reds in-
party struggle s ..
imposed their will upon the after
had de strayed its volitional basis.. They what was
It suffices to say that in the organizational warfare to ,be
called the Itstruggle campaJtgns" pitting the son his
waged against the Chinese Communists, so l~ng as the National
own young bro~ber against his elder wife
Government ~nd the people of the Republic of China adher$ to
_K'a.... J.i:)i> her husband in 6rd!~r todestroy the traditional Chine se
-123 -
-122 -
the physiological rather than pathologICal organiza- discern the sincere attitude on the part of the Government
adopt the way of rather than the way of . time will In the directiv-e entitled "The Essence and
follow the popular Hne, and consolidate the structure the \1ethods of Initiative 11 President Chiang Kai-shek quoted Hu
final over the" enemy will certainly be won .. Lin·-yi, a famous general in the Ching Dynasty, as that
only bysincerit~ may we be able to defeat all hypocrisies in
thE) world and only use of truth mat we be able to rout
4 Truth Versus lies falsehoods. Thereupon he instructed . -1,.5 countrymen to
,in Psychological Warfare preciate realistically the essence of °chec1ting activeness
passiveneSS" in such fields as mHitary operation,
There is nothing similar or identical.in the campaign and personal cultivation through the practice of
psychological warfare waged by the Chinese National Govern- ?Jhonestyll and "simplicity", both of which are synonymous with
mentand its enemy, the Chinese Communists.. Whether it is tltruthfulness". In another article, HA Study of Techniques in
in the attitude during actual combat, in the techniques "and the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion II t the President
skill employed in the psychological field, or in the facts used said: "It is a matter of urgency fo.r us to make amends for the
as for the the Chinese Government is far defects in our publicity works. Naturally our information 581'-
~

to the Communists,. In the first section of t;bap1;er vice should cater around the Three Principles of the
in this book, we have amelysed the tactics employed with adequate use of new s release and educational means on
the Russian and Chinese Communists in their psychological the one hand and factual publicity in the military, social and
warfare which include and intimidation. To put political aspects on the other in order to boost the morale of
these tactics into they have to resort to various un,;"" the armed forces and the people against the enemy, an.d in
derhand methods dealitJ,g with their real or turn to enhance our fighting spirit .." "Here, the principle of
and with the mas s of people under their control.. publicity based upon facts indicates the attitude of the Chinese
" The study below show s the way to the Com- Government in its psychological warfare against the Reds.
munists wnrfare ..
The Communist attitude in psychological warfare is, on the
In the Q."'..LI<\.~\"&C such a war, Ollrs .is faith contrary, all fa.lse.. They teU sheer lies and issue rubber
based to In or information cheques .. They peddle drugs but they are
QJ.~'C!.O::''C'U to , we h~l!ve never re sorted sug~;..coated harbor pointed arrow s but they have a mouthful of sweet talks
lies·. or rubber ,."ht:>nt1IA E'ren il the public may not readily They fool the people for time, but canrrot fool them
--124 - -125 -
 still another article of similar nature of essence beauty. Where does it lie? In our thi.nking, tnith
Tactics Employed in the Suppression of the UlliiiiU,UJ.;::>~ Rebel- is beauty, virtue is beauty. In the persuit of truth and
and What. Our Senior Officers Should Understand" Pre- tue, we are true representatives of bEt~uty. Therefore t in
said: IlWhether in warfare in psychological warfare as an art, we have both the inner beauty
armed order to the as well as its outward mainfestation. The outward manifesta-
and support concrete tion is the artistic from of inner beauty. In our daily life yve
e must love our is still talk about "the art of war", ~nd lithe art of living", the same
we must pay attention to their needs. principle of artistic beauty can a1so be applied to psychological
J.U~{J.':>I,.l.~'i:I can reach, we should warfare.
s:hall never follow the Communist
of hypocrisy small favorsJ! This was pre- The Communists have no art to speak of in psycholvgical
Chine se Reds had done to the and warfare because their character is ugly t their mind pitchdar~
servicemen Now that their measures and their means treacherous. As stated in the above 1 the
it is evident that falsehood can never strength of the Communists in the psychological aspect lies in
stand the test time. duplicity, hypocrisy and sham. They have to resort to
camouflage and double talk in the employment of tactics of
warfare ours temptation and intimidation. To carry out their temptation
the of aesthetii~ s' one our tactics, the Chine'se Reds use flattery and bribery; and to
criteria. However we the out... carry out their intimidation tactics, they use struggles, pur-
ward appearance of the means and techniques ges, tortures, massacres and other atrocities. As they are'
warfare. When we a paint or print wry in face, bad in manners, uncivilized in actions and
there is no doubt that· a certain standard of vieious in schemes, they are ugly in every sense of the WOrl".
be observed in its Nevertheless, an artistic re- Despite their friendly masks and swe~t lies, they can never
should have for its basis the source aesthetic conceal their ugly attributes. As soon as their masks are
value. The source consists of the four factors ripped apart and their lie ~ uncovered, whatever achievement
~hat our mind and upright; motive is they might have made in t~e field of psychological wartare'wi~l
our objective is far-reaching and pro- be written off at one stroke.
and that our is righteous and • Par-
when we , we should upon the Speaking of the facts as basis for. waging psychological ~
-- 1 ~ 127 - ,
 all workers have turned out to beslave-laborer~.. With the

\'Ii arfare, the of China has for its h<ll,"".Ir ....... r'n"'~ a happy slo.gans of lithe election of model workers l' and Itgrabbing the
and prosperous "".. . """",t>" Taiwan as the for national Red flag , the last drop of sweat and blood of these workers
"
reconstruction has been built up ~s a model China is squeezed They are n~ better than the beasts of burden e

accordance with the Three Principles .... 0 ......... " 0 for the The little tract of lan~ the farmer was alkted to till after the

advancement of of the entire Sinoe the so-called land reform has also been taken 'away when the
H
of such IDf'aSUres as full weUare Chinese Reds set up the UAgricultural Production Cooperati'ves
labor insurance .,."'.".....,..... the worker!S in and "the People I s Communes", and all the peasants have
Taiwan have been q[uite comfortably well off" Since the turned out to be the Communists I serfs. Even iJ they the

of such policiesa.s public land redistribution, daily "working quota" ~ the peasants cannot receive the meag:re'

reduction of land to the tiller , reclamation of land food ration.. The ration system has k\pt the basic biological

mechanization all the peasants are haVing their n~eds of mainland. people under controlt> The annual ration of

farms and most of them have owned modern facilities such raw clothing materials is limited to teu feet .. Besides, they do

and T. V. sets II the not have modern transportation facilities, nor do have
en.couraU'l9ffiI9nt to and assistance
1 en- 'U'.e freedom of movement. In short, the mainland suffer
and business have been ,.,....."'"",tI..., so much froiIl the acute shor~age of food, clothing~
the growth rate of international trade rose to 48 per and means of transportation that they are now like
rate Jin 1 973 was the same II Due to the animals. Under such a circum~tance,what facts can serve

of national economy, people in all walks of life basis for the Communist propaganda or psychological warfare?
are now enjoying prosperity.. The life of the on this
island bastion of national reconstruction serves a con- To sum up, our present psychological warfare against the

trast with of mainland under Chinese Communists is truthagainst falsehood, beauty '.&<=.~~'''''¥
The se concrete when used as the matter in ugliness, virtue against evil, and abundance against dearth ..
CnID!O'Q'U::a1 warfare, constitute an unmatched <:ll.LI'U=<'..L to the 'Time is on our side: the longer the Chinese Communists rule
behind the iron curtain. the mainland, the more weaknesses will be exposed in their
psychological field. The primary ob.jeptive in our warfare is
On the other we can well apprehend how a to strike the Communists I psychical weaknesses and to shat.tErl.~

the on the mainland are leading.. Under the name their fighting spirit so as to arouse the people's anti··-Red and
S tate and , the resisting-tyranny sentiments and encourage the defection of
Reds hvve confiscated all factories, or and
-129
'-1
 The Communist J..J.AI,O.!.,1..i.l>(.... u, .... O warfare,like the Communist armed forces. As regards our psychological
fare has.its and tactics bulwark, we have to instill in the mind ortha people and ser-
the Communists are deduced materialism vicemen the Communist-baiting thoughts by pointing out to

CAI:l.l!llfJ.Lt::, their of retreat as advance them that the Chinese Reds must and will be defeated. More-
international as domestic is over, we shall use the method of psychological reconstruction
to consolidate the people and the servicemen I s will to
Thus, we can attain the goal of Il w inning the opponent I s heart
said elsewhere: !l The Communi- before overcoming him and winni~lg the support of the. op-
upremacy is based on certain ponents' people before recapturing the'land" e All these are
flexible to meGt the varied situa:tions of measures to be taken in defeating the Chinese Communists on
fil~ld of' political or wa1.'- the psychological battlefield.
backward before t"VVO

or even effect the stratagem 5. Science Ve rsusSorcery

When necessary, will themselv€ up to us 9
\
verbal attacks ""/;;:.CL.ULi:\I- their own Party and other
-A Contrast in Intelligence Warfare
tricks in order to win confidence in have
their planted in 0 ul' more , President Chiang Kal-shek, in a lecture given at the Yang-
than three five ten years ap- mingshan Institute on April 1950, had pointed out: "In
"''''·... Itl1, .... '''' moment for their' e activities. to order to defeat the Communists, we must be able to outstrip
&.ttaln their ends, these Red w~ll, them in the intelligence work. Negatively, we should tighten
suffer and any kind of hardships. As we are unaware up our own security to guard against any leakage of our
their their , we have suffered military secrets. Positively f we should develop our
Therefore anyone who is mission in the Communist- network on the mainland and then penetrate into the Chinese
areas, has to devote himself to the Reds I inner circles and other organization:.; to obtain valuable
strategy and too". information from them. Thus, we can ke~p the Red
from having access to our classified matters while keeping
From lecture we ca.n see that the Chinese Communists thelT pulse under our, thumbs. Il These short remarks UU,Ul1,~U
stress not but also tactics their kU'"vJ......l."";'C!Jl .... 'O
out'the way to defeat the Communists in intelligence warfare •
• The went on to say: liThe Chinese Com-
-131 -
 munists inherited their system from Soviet Rns~~
achieved, those individuals of high qualiti-es can undergo
sians m As early as the Tsarist days, the Russian intelligenc(i
specialized training. In a message on tlThe Mission and The
work had been well-foWlded $ Since the overthrow of the
Outlines of Intelligence Work u , President Chiang pointed out,:
Lenin had continued the practJce and the GPU
tiThe success of intelligence work depends upon not only
police) to the vast mass of the
trainings but also outstanding talents" Trainings can only
under controL. , to trace its
provide the principles, but the intelligence operatives should
arid operation I:)f Chinese has had
be able to act on their own initiative by use of their talent while
of more than one hundred years .. the time when following the principles already learned. In th!~ way 11 the in-
infiltrat,ed into our in 1924, 'VUA.J.J.O:;'';:)'C' Reds telligence service can be developed and effective. II "Genera-
inherited aU related to J.ll1,~.LU~~t:lJJ'l,;'t:f from
lly speaking, n the President went on, "the intelligence work
Soviet Russians", Since then we had been forced engage is the most difficult and ip.volves great danger, with the oper....
in warfa!:'s against
ative I slife atoStake from time to time" If the individual con-
until our defeat on the mainland in 1949
cerned is imbued with revolutionary fervor the greater the
:realize that we had far
the better will he be able to mak~ use,
IJ'Cl,ULl.!',U
difficulties f his
Reds in the field of intellIgence .. From now
natural gifts, which might be undeveloped in peace tima ll !! At
must start anew our intelligence workn"
present, in the United States and Great Britain, emphasis is
laid on the technical knowledge arid scholastic attainments of
In of the fact that the Chinese Communists both the recruits for intelligence service. Many specialists and
and tactics in their intelligence there
scholars .take pride in ioining in the combined 'War of nerves
are still ways to defeat OUlr enemy"Such measures to be
and of cloak and dagger. And so they gla<liy contribute their
taken may be stated as follow s:
knowledge and skill so as to push ahead their national security
work both in width and in depth ..
in regard to thE! intelligence recruits, We

in on the scholastic attainments

On the contrary, the Chinese Communists hs.vebeen ac-
the traditionalundergroun.d gangsterism
customed to utilizing the hoodlums in the intelligenoe opera-
have to raise the recruits for the intel-
tion.s~ Being masters of recruiting riff-raffs for such work f
U"!"jJL~~ work"
.... Particular attention should oe to those they would use any sort of, hoodlums to serve their purpose ~
, scholastic and and any Tuthless methods at their, disposal. For instanc{~~
more this be '\IV ho in 1 himself as me.gician J)D. the
132 _.
AJU,IJIJ.A._Ujl~ Well Road in was a notorious intelligence.

'VLLiI(QI\:{~U in the Chinese He

around him various of hoodlums as his dis- In regard to the methods engaged in intelligence

and seht them. out to terrorize the we are using scientific technique against the

kl(1n~lm)inIQ and frantic assassination ll the Chinese c:ery. In the past, the Chinese

Communists expanded their intelligence networks- activities had

the hoodlums in: throughou~ the n ..... \1 .....' ..... ,~ and in- doctrination, masquerade f manipulaUon and
es'p1Cma~Q'e works through series of Communist cadres were like the wicked sorcerers,

And everywhere the Chinese Reds in smart • They hypnotized the people and then

go, -will use the for infiltration and sub- sweet carrots dangling &-head and

and to control But hoodlums whips behind ~ the~e victims puzzled,

are hoodlums.. If we stress on the or frenzied. No wonder ~ many of them jumped and
and natural of the it is that we can around like mad. Therefore, the methods the '-''-/HH'U,A..U+,,, .. .,

comf;l out victorious in intelligence warfare the in their intelligence service Jlre a sort

Chinese Communists who are advocates of Yv hich seem terrifying at fir st

but a careful scrutiny w ill reveal that there is

In to the in intelligence we therein. Like the tricks of magicians 1

are momentum because of pitting our democratic against arEt not worth a straw. In the world of

the Communist force.. Ours the way of intelligence work has entered

the way of the Communists is one of might.. It is natural that vinc(~ of science. Take psychology for example,

favor the not the might" In the foreseeable merly treated as a mysterious subject of study, but

the gr~at mass people on the farmers, recognized as a branch of science, there-is nothing

bvsinessmen and age or about it any more. Many advanced nations today have IQIJlJ.l.JlCU

who have suffered from the Communists and scientific' techniques to and u'sed modern scientific

",""..:au',-.1. and recognized their true face, will in in the intelligence service. with surprising results"
us in the operations.. Our Entific techniques and apparutus, we can defeat the

UULt:'1.1LULI. will be on the inc~rease while the Communists on the Communists in the field of intelligence.
~Once the Reds lose the mainland
--~-./ ;'

will deV"ote their efforts in us sort of T o sum up, the intellif{lence warfare the

-1 /-135 -
I
KElDUlbllbC of China. the C omml.lnist on the main-
as the people are not aware of the Red conspiracy, they are
land 1s scholarship gang5terism, UVI,JU.!.itLoi a.-
often led by the Communists and becpmethe tools of subversion
alienation, and scIence against sorcery. the
and power usurpation. The loss of the Chinese mainland. to
emphasis on and the strelngthening of our .I.ll1.~J.U."':~lJL\';~ work
the Communists m~y be attr,ibuted to various factors,· but one'
we can turn into ..,."'-.i-,.." ........
of the primary causes is the alienation from the masses.. It
should be confessed that our Party and Government had for a
6. rviice Versus tXP loUation considerable period alienated themselves from the rank and
-:A Contrast in Mass Movement rUe of the people. It goes without saying that the government
and t.he people are c103ely related to each other like the water

The mass moyement warfare is waged in two N ...""' ....,!" ,

and the fish. Without the popular support, the government is

the one hand, we have to cOllsolidate the like a-fish out of water. In our pl~ to recover the mainland,

trend of our own a,nd step up our organization we must first regain the confidence of the people and take hold

so as to develop the power in the decisive war against of the psychological trend of the masses. These constitute

Communists tor securing the final On the other chief mission in our mass movement warfare against the

hand, we -also have to win over ,the heart of the under Chinese Communists. In waging such a war, we are now
assured of victory. A comparative study of strength and
the Communist to disintegrate the Red mass
~Q.U.l.4:I.::t".LUloi so as to facilitate our military counter attack. weakness betwee.1 the Republic of China an~ the Peiping re~
gime in the mass operations is'ma.de as follows:
Mancius, speaking of things other than had stated
"Natural climate is of less importance than topographical
There is a wide difference between the way we upon
and advantage is less importance
the people and the way the Chinese Communists treat thel1'b
III Here it is clearly indicated that .f'!,-

We look upon the people as the main bodyo!' the 'u.

L ....._" .......
support is to be reckoned with much more tha.n
the Communists look upon them as mere tools. We regard
climate topographical advantage. It also accounts
people as the main body of t.henation beca.use His the will of
<;>... f".u. ... AJ...._c:Ul""~ of strength of the mass of the in
the people that In one of his lectures on Ue'ffiC)C}"R.C:V

Dr. Sun Yat-sen had pointed out: "Since China has had a re-
The Chinese Communhlts are adept in deception and coer-
volution and has 9..dopted a democratic f01'111 of government 9 the
simulation of' goodness and small
people should rule i~ aU 1l13tteT The gove;rnment !lUly
favors deceive and lure the And
'be called popular goyernment; in ether words,under a 1"19-

-- 136 - ~ 137
 be no deviation from centre -- the mass of
we make the From' these handed
the people ".
dOJ/Vn
is the ..." •. n ..uL.......... and is It is quite cle.ar that here the total strength of the nation is

based upon the who are the ruler In the strength of the' people as an entity, not that of a part or a
class of the people. A s regards the task of National Revolution~
the lecture vn'~..... a.JLvU. Era To Be Proclaimed: The Scientific
it is also clear that it is a fight for the cause of the entire
Era the 'JUJ.UL;'I:!. had to say:
people with the will of the people prevailing 4

"The era differs from the in

that the are not cQmpeting the On the contrary, the term llpeople lt , as often used the
:strength but wUh total Communists in their hackneyed'slogans, means, strictly ""j.."~a.,,,,­
strength of the nation. Therefore ing, not the great mass of the people, 'but tools used to start
success or failure of a nation riots and to seize power. They incited and intimidated the
ability to build up and use the of the peasants and workers, but once they usurped .the power,
great mass of' the people, the ,meet did not care for the interests o! the peasants and workers ,
the needs and to promote the united efforts and the peasants then turned out to be serfs, the workers the
the great mass of the people. The is slave-labor-ers of the Communist hierarchy. In the years of
not an era in which knowledge or wealth can 1?47 and! 948, the Chinese Communists agitated the college
be monopolized by a few; nor is it a feudal era students throughout the country to start anti-Government cam-
in which the ambitions and caprices a few paigns, but after the ~all of the mainland, thos~ college boys
persons are bt~ fulfilled; nor is it an ,era in had become cannon-fodders and the coeds had become the re--
which a small number- of outstanding gimentedprostitut~s to "comfort" the frontline soldiers during
'alone can aC,com}:ilish the great task the Korean War. Obviously, from the start, the Chinese ",Com-
nation. It an ~~ra in which the combined wis- munists had used the youths 'and students as tools.
dom or folly, th~~ combined strength or weak- '
ness' of the mass of the people determines In the promotion of mass movement ,our objective is to
prosperity 0):' decay, the rise or faU of a serve the great mass of the people for their own good. Dr ..
nation. The revolution of 'the present era is sun Yat-sen said suc-cinctly~ liThe end and aim of life is'
the caUEie of the people, with the serve, not to rob others. II President Chiang also said
out participation of the masses. There similar vein that llRevolution is nothing but service'll. From,

---I 38 ~
these we can see that the primary pt'pose in mass
Lamplight", "Hackneyed Blast Furnace II , tlDowngrad.ing ll
movement is to serve the mass of the pre-
e t c. the'Reds also for the purpose of exploiting the
sent mass movements in Taiwan for The landre-
mainland It is doubtful t.hat the masses can tolerate
form measures to reduce farm rentals 5 perc ent of the . the Communist exploitation for long ~
total annual of the main crops and .then land to
the tillers are a movemEmt serving the farmers., The oromlOt:lOn
In regard to the manners by which the masses a.T'S- guidEld.
of the workers welfan:l and t.he labor in.surance are move-
to takeJ'part in various movements, the NationalGoveinment d
ment serve the workers.. The various movements un-
the Republic of China and cOplmunity leaders have ?1ways as-
of the Youths I National Salvation
serted the attitude of fraternal sincerity and congeniality ..
are purpose of serving the young and
treating the people of different walks of life as kinsfolk in a
women. The activities of the armed forces
family, there is no ne~d for the government or commuIll.ty
assistance to farmers, in
leaders to use sweet words to win the people! s heart or hy""
of all sorts and in' so:rei:U:U.nl:! "sweetness the
pocritical'gesturesand "small favors to deceive the people ~
comrr:lW111t1e~ aim at the people.
, Hence, our approach in guiding the masses depends
on sincerity" The ancient Chine se saying that H Sincerity in
On the of Chinese Communists
its utmost can melt the toughest minds" reflecJ;s the truth that
,
in mass movement are just the UUl.Jv.:l.I.&.c
the masses will be with us as long as we' are· sincere in at-
meant for the of people I s blood sweat ..
titutle.
Movements such "farm collectivism",
It Stockade etc. are staged the. Chinese
As reaards
o the Chinese Communist approach in leading the
in rural areas "'...............,...... the peasant~. Movements snch as
masses, it is deceptive t1u:ough and through .. Deceptiven€~ss
lithe • .aUUJLUM of the Red Banners", Increase iI}.
may for a time prove more effeptive than ~ince:rity, but in the
Production Quotas" Cut in .etc are
long run it will lose out and be rejected by the people As we
the Chinese RE:ds in f'3.ctories the purpose
did not give due emphasis to mass movement warfare, many
v.A.t-'... '-, ..... ~.~F. the workers lMovements such as "j.J'o.",.f'11~\;I::t."J.UU
people had. been duped and lured into the Communist
"Hundred Cultural 'Revolution" etc .. are
the people on the mainland" hav~ had enough ot
by the Chinese Redf) for the purpose of persecuting,the
Communist maSs line also has reached the other sndi!> So
intellectuals and studentn" Besides., there are such move-
as we regard the pE:)ople a-s the main body of the serve
ments as the
t4ern falthfully and lead iheI,n insince~ity .. o.ur mission in
-14':'-
movement warfare Q.~a."U.l.i::Il. the Chinese Reds accomplished to

Chapte.r V.
The serves a be-
tween and the Peiping in the var-
PracUce Is Eve ry thing
warfare .. The' differences as Do,wt.ed
Polit I Warfare in Operation
may well answer the ridicules of those
effort on our part copy Com-
110 Divine Art of Subtlety and . . . D.~ ....·nr>'r

munists.. indicate the ways defeat the

Through thee we learn to be invisible,
who interestedin the study of war-
through thee we learn to inaudible and
well be conv:inced We shall come out the victor
hence hold the enemy's fate in our hands II
present anti-Communist war ..
Suntse

. "The ideological war is related to poli-

tical, economic and military war, but is dif-
fe~eht from them in function, scope and
objective. ·For instance, in politics one can
compromise or compose differences; in
ideology, one cannot. In military war there
may be a stalemate; in ideology, none. The
ideological war is of paramount importance
in the next ten years ••••"•... "
Dr. Lin Yutang.

liThe times calls tor courage resolution

arid integrity, not cleverness pexped~Emcy
or 'love of soft living. No man ,has a right to
a 'time-out', 'a leave of absence' --"aU

-143-
-142 -
 must be on the lines. tl liberation of the people under the Commumst yoke as its ultimate

E Hoover. objective. Such are the opera,Hons of political warfare in the

strategical field at present.
meet the of the present in the 2. In the tactical field. Tactically, the target of our
national as well as international pictur~, the basic theories political wrrfare is the enemy I s armed forces and people within
warfare have been down. the operation zone and its vicinity. This is a direct support to
, '

should be made on how to tho military operations. In space, there are prescr~bed areas;

there are at least two ona in in in time, thereare divisions of phases. For instance, in a certain
operations, ..,V ..... "'-vLL ...
specifindarea behind the enemy lines, political warfare is to,
should be an of the six strategy be ,conducted to stage armed ~prisings against the
and maSE
Communists. Or, when the time for us to launch the countcr-'
Based upon thE! of warfare, offensive against, the enemy, political warfare will be waged in
use in the &. "certain theater with armecl strength as its certer. Such are
tactical . They are stated as follows: the operations of political warfare in the tacticrl field •
• Political warfare is a part of 3 In the field of pacification. Political warfare shou1si be
strategy carried out as, a means of pacification in are,as recovered
be coordinated the overall and must our armed forces after the ccmnter offensive. Its immediate
based upon nation; It objective is to lead the people therein into close coordination
centers the and
with and get their support to the Government. On the one hand,
at the same time should in keeping with shall consolidate what we have already $ttained in the
ations at home and abroad In the strategical field, a s well as political fie ids, .::tnd on the other, erforts can be made
is waged. for Instllnce, to evoke anti-Communist and to facilHatesubsequent military operations, For example when
moveme nts aU over Asia..and all over the we recover a certain area following the counter oH:::,ns.h'(~

and to the people behind the iron curtain to rise and pacHication and field administrs-tion should go hand in hand.
communjsm and tyrannical rule to strive for The re-estabUshment of a local government and the mohtlbm,tion
freedom' and The highest political is, of manpower and re:50urces' to meet the requirements or U'-'_.l,k'~C."""
formulation of Ii world wide united operation are two aspects in. the political
J 44- -145~
 should be made to destroy the e'nemy Y s brutal lJU"'L\.>',;:)U'UH

above thre~ are pv,,!.... " ....... ~;L.!. warfare' materialism t to disarm him ideologioally arid to shatter his will to
• As the in charge fight, which aims crush the enemy without the need to resort
Communists have suoh I-'v ...... "' ....... " ..... burea u . war.
and the united tront ..... n''' ..... 1'.,,....''',.,+, and in the there In order to achieve the objectives in ideological warf~re

have the State and t.he White lhere is the need of an overall which comprises the ""U,lL,l<:;:U"'C""'"

the warfare sections or ommittees as well as ,the objectives. In suci plan, the form
otherwise known as the II Political Section." contents, mission and methods of ideological warfare
mapped out in details and clearly defined, so that QUY"U'JLHUH,,;;}

China the agency of such and faith can be built while the enemy's destroyed.

as "'''''''UUJl''''' in the Guidelines the keynote in the whole blueprint of political warfare because it
Political Warfare on the the reservoir of moral and spiritual strength 1 the
the President sets the souls of men afire and lights the to the
sum up in of communism.
IS
The present ideological warfare waged agaln~ t the Chinese
own and the destruction of the to Gommu,nists is a. political principle against the materialistic
these detailed as follows philosophy. VIctory of trl{~ Three Principles of the People
over communism The .missions to be accomplished in
in Princip warfare are related as follows:
Ideolog Warfare in Ope L To inculcate in the minds of the freedom-loving the

like~he other spirit and thoughts as contained in Dr. Sun Yat-sen I

warfare, of warfare, has its
Principles of the People. Thou ghts engender belief and

are to be carried out in two directions.

necessarily translateS itself into an invincible strength.
2. .To arm the rank and file of the people with the theory and
is the need of
practice of the Three Principles of the 'People and make it
our own as our
effective weapon to strike th~ Communist ideology.
urselves in front.
3. To point out that the Three Principles of the

-147--
 Dr. Stin is the supreme on
10. To employ the ideological weapons in areas where the
the China was founded, t~e ultimate goal of our military ~ operations are conducted to' effect a clean. sweep of
national reconstruction, and the doctrine that citizens
Communist thou ghts •
should observe and put into pJractice, as '"'I.J.UU,....Q,I.v.....
The major objectives of ideological warfare thus explained,
. tution.
we can proceed ..;with the operations of such a warfare in the
To stress the fact that the Three of People strategic, tactical and pacifying fields.
is in full with the demand of the time and the requirements A. In the strategical field In planning th.~ stratagem in
of and also out that the era ideological warfare, we r..ave to take into consideration the
is an era of the Three Principles of the People extensive and goals in the war against the Communists,
To direct our concentrated attack against the of
It should be in coordination with the overall strategy of the
ideology and Mao thought by thoroughly
nation. The object of ideological warfare in the strategical
evils of Marxism and .LJ""""............. ,.u
. field is the armed forces and the people. Here are ~he objectives:
6. To expose to light the so-called "coalition is
I. To explain and hus 'to support the national policy, the
Communist tactical man€:lUver to establish the of
administrative programs and various goals in wartime.
the Party, andthe .:>U-""O'LJ'C ....' "peaceful coexistence" an employ-
2. To explain without equivocation for what and for whom we
of to camouflage the Communist <:I.",.", ... " " " "
are fighting.
:3. To thwart the infiltration and spread of the Communist
point out that .tvlarxism-Lenlnism is an that
ideology •
runs counter ttf human and the democratic way and
4. To guard against the indirect approach of the Communist
arouse the behind the iron curtain to renounce commu-
in their ..ideological warfare by using fake freedom to
lal~OJLo~rv and shatter the Communist genuine freedom', sham democracy to'destroy true democracy.
designate 'M:to as venomous 5. To seek the true understanding and moral support of the
sheer lies friendly nations in the ideological aspects.
sow the of dissens on among the schools
6. To engage in the scholastic study of the Three
of such as the "leftist" .the "rightist"
of the People, to spread its thoughts in literary articles t
the "revisionist", order to throw the enemy s ideological
popularize and to make it in keeping with the changing situ-
into chaos
ations.
-149 -
 To these , the agency in charge of laE~OlOglLCa nated . areas, to encourage theu to rise in arms against the
warfare should make use of the following media: Communist ty.I-anny J and to make sure that the people will extend
L. Academic works: Works on philosophy .... V ... ~~ ....... <.. A science, no support to the enemy 1 s military operations .
9 economics, etc. the standpoint of 30 To in the minds of the armed forces and the
the Three Principles of thf~ People and the national in the Ccmmunist-controlled areas a clear idea that the govern-
Literary articles: Poetry prose, drama and ment forces undel' the banner of the Three of the
articles other genres written to depict of People are the forces of benevolence and righteousness and
Three of the People and the of the therefore invincible.
after implements,tion. 4. To eY:tend whatever support in ideology to the officers
• News PeJriodicals, pictorials dis- and men, to the· mass of the people and ev,an to those behind the
jJUL'I,,;A,"::::<::>« etc. to be used.in the ideological VIJ~.1.,a.l,.J.VULi::l enemy's line upon the request of the field commanders.
Radio 'broadcasts l~nd TV programs: Radio 5. To.> deflect the. ideology of the enemy on the front~Hn6
and TV programs to be uSEld as means of ideological spread~ through persUas.\on.
5• Pop~lar reading materials: Folksongs, ballads, drum- To change the thoughts of the young ~ntellectuals and
songs, story-telling, local dramatic performances, articles on Communist followers, making them the motivating force of anti-
customs, etc to be used as a help in ~UU\.iI"""~,VU Communist movements behind the enemy.
B, In the tactical field. In planning the, tactical operations C. In the field of pacification. 'the ideolggical activities as
ideological warfare, we have to take into consideration the the means of pacification aim to consolidate the fruits of offensive
be to the military operations the situations in in the newly-recovered aI"eas and to support the laws promulgated
the war areas, ideologicaLrequirements of the armed by the field commanders for the people to abide by. The of
forceS and t~ people behind the enemy line speaking, ideological warfare in the field of pacification is the armed 'forces
ideological isd.irected against the servicemen and the and the people in such areas 0 Here'.are the objectives:
'people in the rearbf the enemy or in the areas. L To purge the venomous· thoughts "left behind by the e~emy
Here ~re the nt'\',o,..,·rl'l:rO"l!
in the" newly-recovered a'reas so as to prevent them from
t To shake of the enemy ' s . to de- like a phoenix from its ashes.
fighting 2. To promote the extensive educa tional work so as to make
,
faith of the people in secure the faith of the people in th~ newly-recoyered areas in
-150- -151 -
 Three of the People and in the Government g
gy, political and military, through wisdom and deliberation, tlJ
in the rehabilitation and restoration of social
carry out the national policy and strengthen national secu:rity;
order.
and on the other hand set upon· keeping the e.nemy bewildered and
• To win over wav'ering people in the
perplexed so as to commit fatal blunders in his policies,. Then
areas so that will work with the Government
in the face of our all-out offensive, the enemy will be unable to
To seek the of they young intellectuals making
defend himself. Strategical warfare is conduc~d with the dis-
them the mainstay in the society.
truction of the eIlemy 1 s will to fight as its ultimate objective.'
5 .To offer assistancEl in the resumption of
To attain these objectives in strategical warfare, there is
cultural andeduc'ational activities
the need of the formulation of separate plans for operation§ in
The above are .the principles in'the operations ot ideological
which the form and contents and th~ ways and means ~shall be
To put into , we have to, refute. the Communist
clearly defined so as to keep the thoughts and actions of the
with logical or scl~ntific arguments to give the enemyc

enemy under control. Therefore in all plans for military oper-

the expo,sing the grim realities the people have fac.edhmder
ations, the emphasis should be laid on the major strategy. As
communism, to the Communist perversion' to
the situations and responsjbil~ties in military operations vary,
the materialistic philosophy or Marx and Lenin the
the objectives strategical warfare are also different. When
cherished humanist , to root up the of class
military actions are. taken t the major stratagy should be directed
by rea:ssertion of traditional ethics, to the
to support the military operations.
dictatorship upholding democratic thoughts, ,and
Our present strategical warfare is conducted with the
to rebut Communist expropriation by the and
Chinese Communists as our main target. Here are the
n"r'n~lnl:ll'r'O"lfll life that the people are enjoying under democracy.
1. To expose the evils of "dlalettical materialism" which is
the highest tenet of the Communist strategical warfare. Based
2. Calculations Behind the Heavy rtains
upon lithe law of unity in contradictions lt the Chi.pese Communists
Wa rfare in Operation emphasi;2ie the constancy of contradictions and make -it a theore-

As in operatiol1 g .there should be '"'OJ."' .... ".. strate- tical basis for their diversionary and dividing tactics .As to }lthe

warfare. The supreme objective' in a.""'jll;,~'~<A.' warfare law of transformational" quality andquantitytr,the ChineseComrnu-

be on the one hand Set upon mapping out an overall strate- nists make the mutability in quality and quantity as the basis for
their infiltration tactics In regard to 11 the la w of
-152-
,-J53,- . 'Il
 that is, under the Red banner, and the Chinese abroad do not
the Chinese Communists use
Know that what the Sommunists call "unification" is a "front" in
doc trina t basis for the
rebeUion and make
their strategical warfare. That is why we have to make known
for what call
to the free world and overSeas Chinese communities the bitter
the free w0rld how the Govern-
lesson we had learned from our experience that they will not
of China had suffered in
ment of
fall into the Red traps again.
hands the Chinese Communists, and to
5. To make it clear. that isolation as a tactic stems from the
as nT'OOlosen by the'Communists between
Communist military stratagem, trying to drive a wedge among the
intervals Communist conspira.cy. When "UdLLJ.~JH'" are
allied countries in the free world and tJlUS undermine the
unfavorable to seek peaceful coexistence when
darity of the anti-Communist camp. This is the objective of the
fa:vorable, to aU-out rebellion. The
Communist tactic of isolation.
themselves in peace talkS is the are
6. To make it known that what the Communists call national-
• This is the of n thA unity in
ism is a mere pretext to divide the western world and the small
and "the I H''''''J.L''', ..... ' ' in their dialectics
nations; that what the Communists call democracy is a mere
make known to the free world that is one
pretext to stir up the people to rise against their legal govern-
the. tactics Communist strategy
ment; and that what the Communists- call socialism is a mere
coexistence !I , ,because
pretext to incite the working class to rise against the manage-
and ,. but a..lJ.;O .... " ........
, which is a synonym for isolation,
ment. Thes'e tactics of dissen~ion and division are steps taken by
is the tactic in their struggle. When nation is
the Reds in their subversive activities.
Communists want to be neutral; for to neutralize is to
7. To make it known to the world that the Chinese, by nature
weaken or to isolate it When is militarily weak, the Communist
a peace-loving race, hav·e consistently supported all efforts to
will never allow it to be neutral, for their eyes is
uphold international justice, have promoted the total diplomacy
OOooS11ao'l l or
maintaining cordial relations with the governments and the
4. To make it known the world that II
t h e united front" is
peoples 01' friendly nations, and had tried t through unofficial
Mfensive tactic in the whole pattern of the
channels, to offer kind advice to the non-committed countries and
The Chinese Red had' repeatedly such
those which fail to distinguish friends from foes, and to rivet
against the Government. Now Chinese Reds
cultural and economic ties with them
upo.n the ove,rseas Chinese to themselves
-155 -
-154-
 • To let it be known that, in the eyes of the vU.J.Ul::o::ll;;! peop~e Political strategy' as distinct from but in. conjunction'
the Nations has be,come the second nations ,military, is carried out in the following two aspects:
after the seating of the Peiping regime and the free is in A ~ In the strate~cal field: Political strategy, as
seriol1s that the belief of the Chinese that rule, must be planned in accordance" with the national goals and
ustice and when time comes f the policies. It should -als6 be in keeping with the changing politica.l
Chinese will extend their support situations of the worldJat large ~b.il~ dealing with the Chinea-e.
any international that the awakened countries feel there is Communist politica;l strategy ·In point of space, the implemellt-
the need to ationisnationwide, or ever global. In point of time, it is of
call upon all to be united duration. It is the chief of the state, in consultation wit1h the
differences and narrow-m:lnded so as not to be National Security Council as the advisory body, who will
utilized Chinese Communists to divide infiltrate. and direct the major strategy in the political field. The target
To unite all anti-Communist, Chines-e of our present political strategy is the Chinese Reds and
in a revelutionary to and the national Peiping c.ountries. Here are the main objectives in o'ur po1'itlcal
of mainland recovery and-national reconstruction. strategy:
II. To make a comprehensive report how the Chinese 1.. To fight against communism to the last with our own.
Communists had "hOI .~ed!l the parties efforts and with determination as the leading country in. the
the false to establish a "coalition "''"',,.''''">'," after democratic w'orld, and to accept the challenge of the Communists
mainland take-over how they had deceived the jJl::''''';:;:>'4Ul,;;;> by further unifying the freedom-loving peoples all the world over ~
false promise of implementing "land reform" and "land distri- 2. To maintain and promote the ties and 90operation through
bution II how they had duped the workers by the false all channels with those countries which, diplomatically, had eS-
Ulactories totae workers :rnd how they had fooled the business- tablished relations with the Peiping regime, b.ut domestically
men by the false promise "to benefit both the labor and the manage- adhered to their a.nti-Co~munist policies, so as to help intensify
a~d contrast them with the grim realities on the Communist- their anti-Communist aCJivities in the political and
mainland so as to uncover their and cause fields.
them to disintegrate from withiv 3. To strengthen the relationships and keep contacts in
The are major objectives in our ,strategical cultural and economic fields with the peoples of those n""",...l'"",,,,,,,,,
which can be attained. through whose' governments have leaned toward the left but citizens
-157 -
- still have unswer~'.I.11g il::uth in ~ .. ,,,.~,. ~~~- system and free wa y of
5. To carry· out .and step up the spiritual mobilization and
liCe, with issues shelved.
psychological reconstruction in Taiwan.
4. keep the world on the alert to the Chinese Communist
The warfare pertaining to political and military
VAUUAU,~",L''''''''15 the Southeast Asia Africa and
has importaht bearings on.the nati01?-alpoUcy and national defense.
IS
in Communist
It is highly comple:x; and complicated. What has been discussed
is another term for lithe li beraHan movement If
here is but a small faction. The brier description aims to enhance
remind from time to time the so-called non-co{l1mitted
the interest in the study of strategy in its relation to
Itnd neutral countries of the Chinese Communist of
warfare and to thwart the Communist chicaneries in' time.
dissensions and to expose the timeworn Communist
tricks of setting up the "coalition government ".
3. Unity of Feeliog and Affection
"'\ ~

the ChinE! se C ommunist IJv~,,~.,L'-~"L chicaneries

under such catchwords as and lithe United' front".
Organizational Warfare in Operation
call mainland people to rise
The primary objectives of organizational warfare may b(~
Communist and Mao
divided into two parts. First, on our side, the is
the .... UUA~_ _ JL rule from within
strengthen the relationship and coordination of the activities of
To for the total warfare -l". .....u • ..., .. the
organizations, tangible 'or, intangible, related to political,
r~gime •
economic, social, and military affairs. Negatively, this aims to
B. In the tactical field: mainpoints of strate-
guard them against the enemy IS -infiltration <lnd posiUvely; to
\ gy in the tactical field are alS follows:
strike the enemy in. a concerted effort. This is what Suntse said
I. To unmask the Communist vicious and break up
liTo emerge the victor with our forces intact!'. In other words,
enemy's
it is to strengthen ourselves by consolidating our own organiz~
keep a watchful eye on the of
aHons. Seeondly, in the fight against the enemy, there is the
conflicts.
primary task o£ infiltrating, di'Viding and sabotaging the enemy I 15
a watchful eye on the Communist inner strife
political f economic; social and military organizations so as to
Lin Piat,) s untimely death.
dislocate and disintegrate them. This is to destroy the enemy
pay attention and make use of of the
through the operation of organizational warfare. In conjuctioll
mainland serie~i of national calamities
with the ,military, the final goal of organizational warfare,
J 58-
- j 59-
 other type of !-,V.LJ.l.-J.l.;t:L.\ warfare, is to support the military and the civic, and forces of varyIng services, thus
in our overall and national making officers and me n one body, and the military and the civic
one family.
In our present wartare ~ 7. To step up the orge.nizational work in the rear of the
is the best weapon use against the enemy.
of affection we also best weapon to For the purpose of achieving the above-mentioned objectives
enemy's control coercion. With the the operation of organizational warfare may be divided into
center the organizational based upon the correct line following categories:
a'nd should be conducted with the A. In the strategical field: In planning the strategy
attain: organizational warfare, we have to meet the demand of the ex-
support the anti-Communist j:;a.UJ.z,a L.LVIJI:::l of tensive and longrange objectives in the conflict and keep times
every on the international level, with the implementation of overall strategy. The operational
and the targets inc1llde the· enemy and its allies and the whole system of
the enemy s military and political set-ups, covering the entire
3 of war theater" Here are the objectives:
international and economk aspects 1. To exhort the governIm nts of free countries to uphold
unofficial channels. justice and distinguish friends from foes oo:sedupon historical
To overseas Chinese united lessons and for the good of humanity, not to "open door for the

the task of mainland and national robbers", as the Chinese saying goes.
2. To give support to and maintain close ties with the friendly
re.Q~lme!n the between Government forces fighting for freedom.
and tne the and the pubUc, and the labor and the 3. To form a strong and united anti-Communist body comp-
making them an invincible composed of rising patriots at home and abroad.
IJ V 1IJUJlQ. .... C', and to consolidate the governmental structure 4. To call upon the people .q.t the low levels of the Communist
the carrying out the administrative meas ures . structqre to rise against the Red tyranny on the mainland..

........I"' ....''''U the 5. To urge the youths under the control of the Red
eUlUonships between the rank officers the ations to rise and fight the Comm.unists.

-161-
 urge the crisis of the Communist regime.
members and Red to de'fect to the 2. To foment and enlarge the anti-tyrannv organizations
urge those overseas Chinese wHo have bE'en lured behind the enemy litles at the opportune moments.
~a.U.l..u"""c... vu to wake up and turn theReds. 3. To exhort the Communist officers and men not to be de-
achieve the above objectives, the agency of ceivedanymore by the Peiping regime by citing concrete facts
the enemy should take ~"~'A~""'~ the Red treachery and chicanery, and to tell therrI to engage
actions themselves in passive resistance, awai,ting the opportune
hold conferehce::t of various types on different QCC- freethemslves from the Red orgainzatlonal control and to
asions, be attended or at home to the Government I s fold.
and to accelerate and step up uou ..... - · ' - " , J U L U ' 4. To provide all possible organizational support in res-
activities ponse to the requirements of the tactical commamders at
leaders yisit times.
official. or unofficial channels discuss how to 5. To win over th' people in war areas and take them into
coordinate in the anti-Communist work. our organizations for va.rious activities through the influ&nce of
To Elxtend activities related to the' religious bodies, clan tsysteins and, other professional. or
athl'ectics and recreation on the intern- community associations.
unofficial channels. In order to achieve the above objectives, thf!
direct our organizational work the activities should be undertaken by the unit in cha.rge of the
I1n'e-fa"· .... ',.,f'\"nn operatives on organizational operations in war zones:
la-the 'tactical organiz-. 1. To spread the anti-Red activities under the of
warfare, Wf; have into acc.::mnt the ;::'UIIJIJ\J.L be those underground organizations.

the in the war zone and to mee t the 2. To make use of those anti-Communist and anti-iv1ao elemetlts

demand the war situations in the organizational in the enemy armed forces to accomplish assigned missions

targets are the armed forces,and in the areas 3 To start activities of mass movements of various in

and u C. .l.~'.l.U'.I'" areas. Here are- the objectives war zones.

destroy the en'emy s G. In the field of pacification: The organizational

or exposing the and in this field are conducted to consolidate the fruits

~-1 62 - -163
 \I
the· reco·very the enemy-held areas and to meet the ~. "u No Enemy, He Is Our Comrade"
i.rE~m~~nt,S of the field commanders in manpower and Psychological Warfare in Operation
These operations are toward the 8.J;'med forces and the There are two major objectives involved in the operations

people in these newly-recovered areas • Here are the psychological warfare: one is the strengthening of our own beliefs

out all Communist organizations 1n- these areas to and the other is the shattering of the enemy I s faith. The former

""'vo,,,,..,.,,,nt their includes the c onsolida Hon· of tJ;1e,spiritual grace' of our orrie ers

2. the these areas in the and men, the fortification of their will to fight and the ·fostering
\ '

work and in the restoration of peace and order ~nd to of their persevering spirit during comoo.t. The latter includes

in the establishment of local :self-government after the U.IJI;..U.1U.Qoi~.1.VJ.A the attack upon the psychological weaknesseS of the enemy, the
reduction f'f combat strength, the weakening of his will to
elements
CA....."" ............

assist those who have contributed to the anti-Red figh~, and the derangement of his mental make-up. However, the

struggles in establishing civic organizations related to psychological operations should conform with the overall strate-
gy and center around the military situations.
orof~~sfno,ns, etc
To attain above objectives, the The psychological warfare we are now waging against the

should be undertaken the unit concerned: Communists is one of sincerity against falsehood, morality

To condurt the census checkup. against the immoral, and the well-being against the misery of the

those who have sworn to up mem-· people. In this respect, we are in a position much superior to
2. To
in the Comnltmist the enemy, because hypocricy, treachery and misery are
3. set the date for the. Communist undercover agents to preci:sely the weaknesses of the Communists. If we attack their

surrender to the authorities concerned and sort out the vulnerable spots, their psychological defense will surely collapse.

C.ommunist remnants and saboteurs lurking among the Here are the objectives in our psychological. warfare.

The above discussion covers only a of to 1. To convince our people at home and abroad thatthe Chinese
be attained and activities to undertaken in the organizational Communists 'lhave Spoken the best in words out done the worst in

warfare against the enemy deed$ll, and that there will be no compromise whatsoev~r with

them so that with the unshakable faith in the ultimate victory and
strong determination to fight Ull the end., the people under the

1-165-
anU-Comrmmist banner will ward off the enemy tacticsbl and the people as the targets of operations, covering the 'entire
united front and efforts. to talk peace. war areas. Here are the objectives in the·psycb.ological oper-
2.. Toenhand'e the our servic,emen and the in ations:
the final victory· Over th.e from 1. To support and explain withQut ambiguity the nationaL
history that despotic rules Cell and traitors p.olicies, objectives and go~ls during wartime.
J.. To increase valor to forge ahead with the anti- 2. To extend the use of the catchwords that "If no enemy , he
Commumst struggle e:x:posing the RedS criminal acts on the
is our comrade" as a politicfll appeal to the mainland people.
mQ,lnlandandshowing to·the,m why commu~sm must and is sure
With the exception of a few Communist leaders, no punishment'
to bed'efeaied. will be out a~d.inst anyone, instead, those who have
boost the !UV.l.a·Jl~ of the servicemen, stabilize the contriquted
... to the anti-Communist efforts will be awarded.
minds of tbepeople and to consolidate the defense
. " ( 3. To call upoh the mainland people ~.o rise up and overthrow
of the dation through psychological reconstruction as a positive. the Peiping regime so as to prevent th8 nuclear holocaust in a
methodand mentalquarantlne as a preven.tive Chinese and Russian Communis t War.
5 'T~8tir up anti-Communist uprisings capitalizing on the
4. To welcome those who have visited the mainland to Taiwan,
"
disillusil1nment and dissatisifacUon
" \
of themainalnd people with
either individually or as a group, in the hope that they will make
. realities OJflUe under the C::ammunist rule ..
a fair and just comparison between the life in Taiwan and that on
"6 .. create extreme skeptic~sm in the minds of the the mainland.
enemy'l 'orr~ersand m~ri as to the future of the Peiping regime. 5 ~ To help those countries of the Communists establish
due' incessant strifes among the topnotchers a sound system of warfare andwork with them effectively •
7.. To create' conditions favorable to our operations
6. To lay bare before the world the true nature of Chinese
winbingt~ heart of the e:nemy I s servicemen and through conununism systematica,Hy collecting materials and pUblishing
contrasting ,the lite ilfTalwan with that on ihe mainland.
documented bO~kS to show how the Chinese Reds rose in power ..
objectives as stated in the above, we \';V1.l.U.11.l\";~ our
how they had dup"ed the people and how they had .oppressed •
psychological, warfare in the following fields controlled the mainland people.
A In the field: The strategical of
T. To open the eyes of the delegates and representatives of
warfare must be in full coordination with the ex-
the Peiping- regime stationed out.side of the iron curtain.to thE
and Long-range ..,"'~.'"'~¥. of war, with armed
free world and to help them to c;iefect to the Government in Taiwan
-166- .,....167 -
 order to attain the above " h · i ........ +' ....'''''c. authorities through radio such questions: "What do your kinfolks eat? What
concerned should employ th~ following means: do they wear? What is the fate of th ose general~, commanders,
Radio network. commissars, and many other top officers who have contributed
matters induding handbills, ....a. ........ ,..... "" pictorials, their feats for the cause oCcommunism? For whom are you figh-
periodicals, etc for air' floating to the "'Wlo.LUJ,au.u. ting now?"
Important propagrctnda sheets and necessities for 6. To instill in the minds of the mainland people that the
smuggUn, into· the mainland. Governmev.t forces are fighting under the banner of benevolence
-Systematic work on the international and righteousness , trying to help them out of the Communist·yoke.
B.. In the tactical field.: The tactical of 7. Tc repeat the Government proclamation: those who have
gical warfare, when conducted to. support the operations been affliated with the Reds are not quilty and those who con-
in areas, are direeted at the enemy s armed force-sand the tribute themselves to the anti-Red efforts will' be rewarded.
people, in. such areas and vicinitles. Here are the of To attain the above objectives, the authorities concerned
ta(~UI~! operations: sho uld employ the following:
}.. Tomak~.Jrnown,to thepeople in these areas radio 1. guns, aircraft, balloons, and task force to launch,
broadcasts the economic recons1\... action and in the drop f or diss'emlnate .Leaflets and other propaganda materials.
islandm$Uonof T-man lind the happy and free life .of the people. 2. loudspeakers.
To ask the Communist cadres ,through radio such soul- 3. radio broadcas ts •
searcbi.Q:1 questions: 1I][f Liu Shao-chih Lin Piao/could not 4. small-size newspapers and pamphlets for smuggling into
presen'elbeir lives, how could you? ,I the Red-controlled. areas through all possible means.
To.keepon asking 'Mao Tse-tung the query through radio: C. In the field of pacification: The psychological operations
HIf peOJ1ls' Shao,-chih and Lin Piao "!¥erEf unreliable, how in this field are conducted to consolidate the fruit§ already
yotttrust Chou En-Lal and Yao"Wen-yuan in reaped prior to the recovery of the enemy-held areas, and' to
To .keep On asking the Chinese Red ffntricers and men the moraland material supports as required by the field commanders.
9luestionthroughradio: ,-'J+tf Pang Teh":huai, Lo Jai....chinganq Lin The targets of such operations are the servicemen and the people
po~sidered to have done wrong, then pause and in the recovered areas. Here are the objectives in this field:
is what: you are doing. now right? II To promptly take over and make use of the broadcasting
on asking the Chinese officers and men stations, newspapers, and other mass media.
-1 68 -'- -169-
 2. To over in these areas and make them 5. Vigilance.-the Price of liberty
work wi th us Intelligence Warfare in 'Operation
To stop the rumors and fabrications .. Jjike· other types of political warfSlTe, the objectives of
for cultural and educ- intelligenoe warfare are divided into two: one is self-protection j
4. To
a tional activities. to do so, we'have to employ the overt and the covert measurel;

To venomous before we can safeguard the internal securi~y; thwart th~~

pn,r.p.-SllUl.nF CLLI,.L1..1.1U.C of the people, and estahlish enemy I s infiltration, and prevent <the Jeakage of classified.
secrets. The other is to defeat. the enemy; and to attain
..... U.lU.l.\J'j:; ... ,~ ...... effects of the local on this, we have to use the highest wisdom and, most ertec~ve
areas t ormerly held the Reds methods in appraising, the enemy I s situations, in evaluating ih~
the scope of intelligence \.:U.L!.'C' ..... 1.-J'VU C onected information, in 'seeing through' the enemy· I ~i insidi()u~l

in psychological plots, and in predicating his. act.\ lsbefore we can ~ke the!
above , the authorities concerned in initiative and tinally come out the v, ctor without <any bloodshed

t he newly-recoveredarea~; employ the as means: in· our struggle against the '~nemy --...:. the Commums·ts ..

radio brbadcasts As is well known, the Chinese Communists gained power

2. ttyough :highly-or~nizedintelligence operations .. In spite of the

. loudspeakers. fact that the ,henchmen the Chinese Reds had employed as under-

4 J.AC.I-.u....... '.........L .... ' bulletins, booklets, periodicals, c~ver agents wer.e largely hoodlums, and the methods they

and other printed matters" resorted to were sorcery, they had succeeded in utilizing a-
5 motion anlf dramatic perfo:r:mances. no means small number of countrymen as tools in the e~tensive

sum up, the ope:ratlons of psychological warfare are .clandestine espior.mge network. Since the establishment of

conducted with the purpc)se of establishing in minds of the Peiping regime and the tyrannical rule on the mainland ~

mass of the faith in the Government through dUlb't::::t:LO whole situations have ,changed and the old game they played be-

and and the ultimate goal Is to defeat the enemy lore the usurpation of power have ,proved to be of no effect any
longer. Therefore in the aspect of intelUgenbe warfare, the
Government of the Republic of China has gain~d an upper hand
and turned from defensive to offensive. Now, the mi:ssitms

-110- -1 71 "'-
our warfare at present may be related as follows: connivance.
1.. To heighetn the consciousness and elevate the 7. To keep watch for the Communist methods of "human
alertness the security movement, tighten- wave" intelligence collection through tourists and foreign agents.
up the security measures and expanding the ed.u- 8. To take the counter-intelligence measures by sending
so that every considers the of national men to get close to the known Red agents and planting them in
secrets the duty of a citizen the cells.
out the Chinese Communist undercover 9. To be engaged in the large-scale and long-range re-
the highly selected and well;...trained search work on Communist affairs.
personnel and the establishment of close-knit and 10.. To develop and strengthen the intelligence net work
effective I in charge of collecting, behind the enemy I s frontlines.
and tracking down the with· Among the missions 'listed above, some are missions of
the Chine sa Communist espionage network as its counter-intelligence, others are those of offensive in the in-
telligence warfare. In order to accomplish these missions t the
3. To advocate checks and keep tracks of lJUU"'A.OJ.J,Cu. operation is conducted in the following fields:'
or which violate the national or A. In strategic:al field: The strategical operations of
interests intelligence warfare must be conducted in full conformlty with
keep watch for the enemy IS the extensive and long-range objectives of war, with the lurked
organized and infiltrations of enemy's from any Communist agents in Taiwan, the officers and men on the front-
direction means and to '"'vu.:>""",.J...... improve line and in the rear of the enemy, and their organizations,
the .. 'O,~J.U.A ... "'I ....-:;;;'" and methods of investigation. official or unofficial, as targets. The objectives in this field
To take precaution against ilie Communist are as follows:
, the Reds often assume to be liberals, I. To ensure the security of the military bases, the ,,.... J...... CL...

, and (~ven anti-Communists, in order e stablishments t and the mintary redeployments in order to ward
for their espionage and subversive activities off the Communist intrigue of infiltration and espienage.

• To uproot the Communist intelligence network finding 2. To insure, inpartioufar, the se'curity of national defense,
. from cases·, uncovering high-level ~aUAJU<O<.IW.VU'" from foreign affairs, scientific developments, and others .
and sorting -out Red secret servicemen through 3 To guard against the possible development of the Commu-

-17 -173-
 of intelligence warfare in the tactical field are stated as rOllov~s:
nist intelligence potential in planting into service the
""'"' ........,..LL ... ""'", .. the ...,.."'--,........ II Coreignagents who r.. To -tighten up all security measures regarding the
tary activities.
can be as CommUJrllst united front in the policy-
2. To take steps to pre"(rent the Communist ageEts
maklp.g bpdies of the Government .nd, the Party the agencies of
filtrating into our fighting and logistical Ul1.its.
mass and the department· and sections' otcommunications.
34 To gather first-hand iriformation 'wjth regaidth-e
keep.a watchful eye on the possible developments of
Communist contemplated actions a,nd intrigues.
Communist intelligence system in the overseas Chinese
4. To carefully provide the enemy 'with false intellig(~hCe§
communities a,nd in countries
causing,the enemy to commit serious tactical blunders ..
5. keep informed of the activities on
ba~les, the development of manpower To accomplish the missions listed the following are
considered neces~ary:
and , and the redeployme,nts.
To accomplish the above missIons, the authorities concerned I. The most sophisticated communication apparatus and
most advanced ti-:;chniques in comrnunication.
s.hould undertake the following:
I .. To streamHne and strHngthen the personnel and technic~l 2.. The most competant perso nnel and the highest wisdom..

sections in, the counter-intelligence organizations 3. The complet~ and weH-arranged intelligence reports ..
C.. In~,he field of pacification: Intelligence warfare in this
have selective appointees and circumspe~t

arrangements field is to ensure the security QI the newly recvoered areas

3 To prQvide radio transmitors and other equl~)ml~nt:s

to help the field administrative unit in the work of re-establi-

,4.. To keep under controlthe strategicai smng the local governments. The objectives of intelligence war.;.
fare in this field are as fallows:
'5. bridge over all cormections and contacts for possible
use I. To take OYer the Communist llpublic security" units'

In the~ tactical field: The object'i,'e'of war- sort out their regular secret servicemen and members of these

in this field ir;; to give support to themllitary operations in affiliated organs so as to keep them under contrQl.

war zenes.. It conducted in coordination with the military ,2 .. To wipe out all Communist secret party.organs and sort
situations, and the situatIons of both sides in these areas, with out thei:r cadres in an extensive drive that the Reds and their
enemy t S Intelli:gence agents"and officers and men as targets { arfiliate~ will betray their identities ..
To meet tJ1e requirements of the field comma.nders, the o'bjectives 3. To impose cenSus· checkup in order to prevent the lurking,
-174- "':-175-
 4. To keep the Communist captives under control
elements from new troubles
strict disciplinary measures.
4. To maintain aU~Uld.I.~ secrecy of the strength, the re-
, the actions of our UU".l.,,"".l. and related units~ 5. To tighten up all socurity measures.

• Tc maintain the ~ecrecy of the movements of strategical To sum up, intelligence warfare itself is a contest of wit

and the means between two parties, it is also the consummation of tactics To
materials their
achieve the. premeditated result~ from such an operation, we
ation.
fortresses have to make us~ of the e:xpe~iences and techniqup-s available,
To insure the
both ,ancient and modern, at home and abroad.
arsenals and other
into the enemy-held areas so as to
6. The Voice ,of the Pecple Is the Voice of God
spy and collect information on the Communists activities
make an extensive investigation on the materials, Mass Movement Warfare in .Operation
weapons, and behind the so as to
The people form the basis of political power .. With thenl
confiscate for our use.
there Is political; power; without them there is no political
hold of the prisoners
pOwer whatsoe"r~r. During the time of peace a governm~nt .cannot
war and to presS them our service.
last long without the support of the people. In the time.ot
Cl.LL.'.L.l..l.l,..l.C:;.:> of untoward , to
the 'allegia~ce ~d non-allegiance of the people deter~ine
sort out the come
victory and defeat.
or in
The highest p:r:incipie in the operation o! mass moveme~t L'S
attain the above tives, the authorities concerned
on the one hand to carry out t~e national policy in: accordance
these areas have to take the measures
with the theory, of total warfare by securing the support and
To utilize those reliable elements who have c::\,\,.-\.;L'll1!J'l..U:Hl'V

using the strength of the maSs of the people in the consolidation

feats in the ('tJ.1\.~-''V'''l1tHUU.'U0 or have been ",,~'''''''r,''''
of tJIe warstrllcture; and on the other. hand to defeat the enemy.
Communists up intelligence networks.
by weakening his' fighting strengththr~ugh the dovelopment and
impose the LI U';I..J. .;>.U 1'0/ and the use oC mass agitation and ~ass action against the--enemy ~
ations intenl or externP.l. Thi~ may also be called the principle
serveillance Communist
political· stratagem ..
activities
-177 -
 to attain the "I"\,;,,,,,t ....·,... the National Government of equalize the wealth after economic prosperity; to' es.~blish a new

Republic of upon the gui~ing s oclety of freedom. security ,harmony and happiness on the

strategy, has charted the ways to be <A-lJl.Jl."'O::::U thE basis of the Three Principles of the People by the increase in
nT',D!Q'i:Ilrif situations so as carry out operations on the th~per capita income of the people, under the directives of

Chinese Communists, as is are the Premier Chiang Chin-Kuo.

masters of 'the art of and controlling the 5. To fortify the anti-Communist· determinatinn of the people
Cor the. purpose of winning the over this by making them realize thoroughly that the Chinese Reds are
enemy mass mo;vement battlefiel ds, the missions public enemy, and by...exposing the facts that all the people on

are be acco'ffif>ll:shl"d: the mainland 'inc luding th~, peasants, the workers, the business-

To establish men, the youths and the women, h~ve been exploited. persecuted,
and affection the
faith wHhthe maSs 9f the in the common doom and oppressed under the Communist tyranny.

out t'he prt;lg'rams of national reconstruction in the s 6. To win the inclinations of the people In'the Commumst-

livelihood and weH-being promoted. held areas toward the National Government by the to

2s To work'with'the mass of the people for the recovery of satisfy their urgent need as a political appeaL

mainland and the defeat of communism in the self- 7. To inspire the agitation of the people in the .......,... ".\1-, ......

reliance and mutual assistance through cultural and educational areas as a prelude to the armed uprisings'against the Commu-

measures. nistsl •

To merg0 the a~rian movement with the program of 8. To publicly advocate the liberation of the people

llT.iclutll1nLI development and ihe improvement of the peasants the Communist rule and to topple the Pelping regime by or~·­

livelihood; to merge the industrial movement with ni~mig and mobilizing the anti-tyranny strength of the mass of
program
of, industrial and trade develcmmen,t a1,ld the the mass of the people on the mainland.
the
interests of the .\ndustrial and trade circles; to Among the missions listed in the above, the first five aim

movement wi th the program of the promotion in at the c'onsolidation of our own anti-Communist structure 1 while

ethics, and democracy and ment~l as well as bodily health the lastthree aim atthe defeat of the enemy. For the convenience

the ; to merge the IwomE!n' s movement the program of putting into operatIon , mass'movement warfare 1s conducted

of in the following three fields:

domestic happiness and the women' slivelihood •.
A. In the strategical field: Mass movement warfare, as
To institute social reform after reform: to

-: 178- -119 --:-

a t should be carried out in coordination·with the extensive help us in the anti-Communist effort in due time.

and long-range war and meanw~ile? with strate- In order to accomplishthe above missions, the authorities

gical deployment in overall military 1 with the concerned should undertake the following activities:

of the people . thl~ froiltand in the of the enemy as I. To put .into effect aU measures in the interest of the mass

The may be sUf111I1ed of t.he people.

I.. To lead the in the adaptation to the life 2. To strengthen the work to serve the interest of the people.

.......,.......... "..... and thrift and ill extending the 3. To promote the' education in anti-Communism .

to the national wartime 4. accelerate the tempo in fighting.a~inst the Chinese

2.. To call upon the mass of the people to support the Reds on the mainland thrQugh our underground organizations

mobilization program of manpower andresourtes in there.

the face of the Chinese Communist menace 5. To complete the preparatory work in organizing the

3 To ensure the national security by upon the people masseS against the Communists on the mainland.

to support the present program of sorting out the Communist B. In the tactical field: The objective of mass movementin

agents and traitors this field is to give direct support to the niiEtary operations in
~

4. To exhort the mass of the people to the wax: areas. It is conducted in coordination with the war de-

governmental foundation their to the velopments and the situation~ of the people on the front, with

pre~ent adminstration. the masses of the war area and their vicinities as targets. The

5 To 'alert in the enemy-held areas to true o,bjectives in the tactical field are as follows:

nature of communism and call upon them to agains t the Red 1. To exhort the people on the enemy I s front. to support our.

oppressors to the bitter end with determination military operations and convince them that the Government

6.. To in the. minds of the in the enemy- fighting for their liberation from the Commur.Jst oppression.

held areas that the. Kuomintang represents the main current of 2. To make the masses provide us with accurate informatlon

Chinese political thoughts jl that the National Government is the voluntarily.

legal and government of China; and 1. Through strict discipline and by political appeal to
l;;;.,,a.u'tan Chiang Kai-shek is the national savior. , Jhefrontline~ople in steps with our forces, not with the enemy.
To way for the people in the areas • To mobilize the manpower and resources in meeting the
in our mass movement the:rein voluntarily so will requirements in our military operations.

180 - -18t -
 .""Ii£&&tMJ&£1

To the people ·UCH... "' .... the enemy in these areas so as to ensure there wi.ll be no comeback any
for mass· movement,S so as to hamper
on Iront. 2. To re-educate those people who have "been utilized
6. To most of the enemy' ~ materials in Communists and re-orientate them toward the Government.
the hands mainland people for use our oper- :3. To stress the refugee relief work, with wages as a
ations agitatIng them for starting movements to their stitutefor relief.

4. To restore the sodal order by re-establishing the

To organize the maSses behind the enemy s so as to defense organizations, with the themselves J;'esponsible
thwart the to the Communlsts in their administr- for screening and self-fjefense.
work. 5. To exhort the people the recovered areas to give, all-
attain. of ITiass movement warfare in the out support to the political platforms based on the Three Prin-
field, the following activities should be c ip1es of the , w ltb the esta bUs hment of the government of
- . To take the masses in the target areas as the t he people. the and for the peoplg as the ultimate" goaL
1

psychologl~al operations on the enemy 's Cront 6, To utHize the positive elements among the masses as the
To coordinate the intelligence work with the anti-Commu- in the anti-Communist organizations.
o,ist people behind the enemy I s Cront. 7. To the strength of the people to the fullest extGnt
provide the anti-C ~lI\munist with weapons and to support the military operations by promptly restoring the lines
ammunition time and keep them fihgting on Commu- oft rans portatio nand prod uction.
despite setbacks • To attain the objectiv'es listed in the above, the authorities
To aH-outsupport. to the on. the mainland to concex:ned should carry out tbe following activities.
mass movements without let-up. I. To support the field civil administrative units.
In the field of pacification ~ Mass movement warfare in 2. To make all materials available for relief work.
this field is to extend the achievements in the mass J. ,- 'Ie pr.0vide the civil defense crganizations with arms.
ations so that the can-be laid in the re....e·stablishment 4. Toprivide facilities for transportation, communication
political power in the recovered areaS of such and production.
operations as The mass movement warfare in the pacification zones is the
To uproot foundation of the Communist mass operations final check-up of all the achievements of political Yvarfare It
-182 - -183 -
also' marks the '"''''6 ....,u....,u6 'of ,political reconstructIon the
Chapto r VI., Conclusion
Three In(ap,U~S of • In order to the evils of
political po'wer on it "There,is no substitute for victory"
communism and to set up
Douglas 11acArthur.
to exert our, utmost in this respect at the present

liThe fight against communism" is

the responsibility of all. The Communists
exploit our apathy f indifference and
unconcern tl •
- - ,J. E. Hoover!

"The world conflict is simply a war

between good and evil. One cannot but be
sure that f however the ebb and flow of
fortunes of war and' currents of power
politics change, man will aspire toward
the good and spurn eVil'in the long run.
Therefore it is inevitable that evil will
pass. and good must win. II

- - Lin Yutang.

In the preceding chapters, it has been made extrem,ely clear

that the Communists f Russian and Chinese 1 have long been em-
phasizing the significance of political warfare and using it as
means to further their aggressions and rebellions.
the concept and the art of political warfare are by nO'means
inventions of the Communists. The political warfare we of
differs from that of the ,Communists, both in meaning and in ob-

-184- - 185-
 &E&£&£

In way do we follow the enemy. What present by strength ll • lIThe contest by wit", in modern term, is the same

writer wants to make clear here is that has as the ,conflict of thought or ideology. The earliest examples DC

been native China for several thousand years ideological warfare in China took place in the days of Confucius

Yat-sen and President Kai-shek have bed and Menclus who flourished in the fifth and fourth century B.C

great few it.' be respectiv:ely. As in the Period of Spring and A utumn, the ortho-
dox philosophy handed down from Emperors Yao, Shun,

be cited to show how art science Tang, Wen, and Wu, and the Duke of Chou, syncretized in Con-

warfare have been stressed fucianism, had gradually diversified with conflicting schools of

has it that thought vying for supremacy. On8 of the marked trends was a

stratagem, ra ther than valor". pre- type,of "hypocrites" who in words and deeds practised pretense

in al::a,u,~"L the enemy. Suntse and and chicanery to gain their own selfish ends. Among them Shao

th8 best not also Cheng-mao was the distinguished representative-. It was said

the has said: the skillful leader subdues Confucius' detested them the most. As soon as he took the post

enemy I S troops without any fighting; he captures of Minister of Justice in his native State ofLu, he promptly put

without them he overthrows their wHh- Shao Cheng-mao to death. The stern measure taKen by Confucius

in the field!l. Suntse IS win to uproot the weeds has been admired by lat3r generations.

a war military but rather the use in the period of Warring States, schools of heterodox

is highest thoughts took concrete shapes. In the face of cultural anarchy #

genera the enemy I s plans II. In Mencius, the main architect of Confucianism, entertained the

he goes on: "With his forces he will rnastery bitter resentment against Yang Chu, who preached egoism, and

t h e , and thus will Mo-Ti, who expounded the doctrine of all- embracing love. He

This is the took upon himself the responsibity to denounce both

stratagem and enemy s saying: "The whole world is in chaos. Those who do not belong

the advocated in to the school of Yang Chu must be of the school of Mo Ti", and
fl} am not fond of disputing, but I cornpelledto do it ". Mencius I
ancient China.
times the ha'Ve denunciation of both schools of thought can be considered an

a dis tinction lithe contest by wit" and lithe contest open attack on the heterodox philosophy of his time. This is an

6- . - 18 7 -~_
 ideological warfare in ancient China this toreknowledgecannot be elicited, from spirits; it cannot be
In the first of his famous work The Art of War , obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive
had laid down the by merging his calculation. Knowledge of the ene my I s dispositions can be
ary science with his philosophy by liThe moral obtained from men." In order to detect the enemy I s situations,
113. w causes th,e' people to be in complete accord with their ruler one must resort to espionage. The use of spies an~ agents t as·
sothat will follow regardless of their lives, indicated in many cases in Chinese history ~ was the generCl':
11 In this passage, what Sunise says be nIn practice in intelligence warfare waged in ancient China.
c accord" and to shELre the same doom indicates In "the Book' of History", one of the five Confucian classics,
empmaSJ.S .on the streng- there is a passage which reads: "The people are the foundation
"AH:::UJeuJll:, of the FO.............."" ..... v .......... structure with feeling and affection. of the state; when the foundation is firm, the state is secure. t1
He also stresses of winning the of the And again, in "The Great Learning", one of the Confucian four
of belligerent showing them kindnesses soas books, it is said: "Having first the people, and then one may
the of possess land; with land secured g one may have wealth; and then
warfare ancient China. with material wealth at hand, one may use it for good purpose".
One the Chinese ancient classics has Both passages stres~ the view that the people as the foundation
the when united, will be as oIa state are more important. than land, especially in wartimes.
The word "will" deserves sp,ecial notice. The saying Menelus accordingly points out: "One who can win the empire
to the consolidatinn of the bulwark. must first win over the people". The doctrine of winning the
Art of War, another passage reads: "The best policy heart of. the people is the keynote of the mass movement warfare.
in the attack upon thH heart ot, the people of the enemy With reference to the passages quoted above, however brief
next comes the' assault upon the enemy I s "11 this they may seem, when supported by historical facts, it is evident
.......
Suntsehas' laid down the appUed in war of nerveS. that since ancient times the Chinese have emphasi24ed the impor-
China, phases of psychological warfare tance of political warfare in aspects.
defense and V\';Jl!VJ,.V~~\,;(':LJ. attask were stressed. Throughout his ..ife, Dr. Sun Yat-sen had the
to what enables the wise sov- supreme stratagem in political warfare, as can be seen in the
to strike and conquer and achieve starting of the NationalRevolution, in the overthrow of the des-
nn'<TnT,n the of men is Now potic Manchu House and in the defeat of Yuan Shih-kaL. Without.
-- 188- - 189-
 Dr. could not have succeeded in of the Republic of China had consistently stressed the necessity
these und.ert(:u{:m~~s. He wrote his magnum opus the Three of applying political warfare to the Revolution .. We can also say
.. and his lec lures on s Live- that the success in the Wuchang Uprising and the victory,over
he took Marxism to task. This is aJ.}. of how he Yuan Shhi-Kai were the fruits of political warfare in '-ILU.U.U.<>''''i

had warfare against the sinisrer force The theory practice of political ~'Varfare have been
ommunism. From the earliest days of the Hevolution when he consummated in President Chiang Kai-shek. He had not only
established the rv1eng Hui till the time of the in coined the Chinese term of II political warfare" but also
the Kuomlntang, the ruling party China Dr. Sun defined its contents as consisting of six types in his lecture on
had the tactics of organizational warfare .. In a ""~t:OC'-·ll It The Principles of Political Warfare It. It is highly
delivered in the December of 1923 before the of the that the ranking officials and military officers of ,China had

he said: for the cause failed in years before 1949 to fLIlly appreciate. the President I s
\

evolution, the on t-""-!::;a.,un, rather enlightening- instructions in the field of political warfare and had
than on He success in suffered set in the struggle against the Chinese Com-
the to the success in nists on themainla • With these ,bitter lessons in mind, we have
for the heart of the of to heighten our polit~cal c~msciousness and strengthen the work
to him of political warfa.r"e'in order to ~in the f}nal victory in the anti-
he made an extensive tour around the C ommunist war•.
lower River for the As a result· of the " smileoffensive" launcbed by the Chinese
information about the enf illy he lua, \J l-J'Ou. Commimusts .. the cross-currents of appeasement are now prev-
T his is an to show the ailing on the international leveL., Many leaders of the free world
J.UI,C:.l.J.,Cf;::.Cj.ll'-C:: collection. are bewildered andean hardly distinguish friends from foes.
Dr. Sun had '"'ULC;""...... declared that, in order to attain the S orne cast doubts on "UZ: capability of recovering the main-
the is necessary to of land and even consider it unfeasible. Others have also express-
and associ<:'te ours,elves with those ",,",'JU'''',",
ed their concern over the poss1ibiUty of our fig1)ting back. As a
who treat us as in a common struggle his matter of fact._ they'fail to understand the nature of the Commu-
members message to <,;;;U!tJ!.!u- .., .......• on mass nist regime in Peiping', nor do they understand the strength of
movement. From aU these we can say that the Father the Republic of Cllln.a in Taiwan. It is trtie that the Chinese
- 190- -·19·1~
 of tho mainland people. it'hat which we use to pierce th~ enemy's
ommunists the upper hand numerically in territorial 'areas f
weak spot is tho political weapon. So' long as we are able to con-
forces, and in addition, are in poss-
duct our political warfare against the Chinese Communists effec~ .
ession nuclear weapons. With mere' figures and stat.istics as
tively and ag~essively, we shall defeat them without difficulty 6

basis war IJJ.C;"UAU.U.~ ther'e is no denying the fact that can-

Political warfare, :is advocated by President Chiang.,. povers
sucha counteroffensive against the mainland. is also
a wide range of knowledge. what has been discussed here can .but
undeniable that once the counteroffensive is we have
serve as introductory. Further studies on the six types' of
errorts in material milltary
political warfare, both in theory and in practice, will contribute
V~JL"''';L'- support However
to the great mission in ma,inland recovery and national
is, the main force in our crusade lies not in reconstruction.
IJv ............... c.... warfare. That is alsothe reason
Finally f the present writer wants to raise three major points
'" 1-'<;;"""""""''''' of 'war efforts has stress-
in tha subject under discussion, presented here for the referen~e·
and , and
of those who are interested in the study df political warfare:
percent and seventy percent . More-
I.. ~ the strategy of political warfare, reconstruction. is
over, the battlefield of a. war is not the but
preferable to destruction. As mentioned in. the above chapters 9
the malnlano4 President Chiang has made it clear that con-
botqDr. Sun Yat-:sen and President Chiang have emphasized that
~IlJIU":l.L<'::;U. counteroffensive !lwill not
the .supreme strategy of the Party. is reconstruction. Of course 1
on ""v ..... ~ ................ doctrine II that "The L~ ... " ' "
uU;..........
ina war destr~ction is unavoidable, but one thing which is esse-
theater war and Taiwan Straits its .::>u,...... ,'-'..
ntial to the .strategical planning is this: reconstruction is
is admitted that the enemy is superior number but not in
preferable .What has to bedestroyed only paves the way for recon-
Numerical at alL
struction. At present the most important thing for the country is
Battle the Tal wan Straits Even if the
political ,cultural , economic, and national defen.ce reconstruc-
of the enemy in :streq~h is granted, one has can-
tion. Once we take the, mHitary offensive against the mainland,
sider the that in of great strength there are ah, ays
we have to resort. to extensive destruction to render the enemy
Weak • Powerful and as the Greek hero Achilles in
helpless, but such destruction can only be co'inpensateaon our part
war has he has his vulnerable which is at
by reasserting the human dignity, rebuilding the domestic happi-
heels Pierced where alone he is vulnerable is finished.
ness, restoring the social order and reconstruqting a new,
Achilles' heel af the Chinese Communists is
- 193-
- IS
 prosperous of China on ruins left Chinese wit. But unfortunately when applied to the actual operation,
Communists on weapons are often hamstrung by traditional formulas, red
the tactics of wa:rfare, personal relationships and individual shortcoming, with
, In ,operations, the most is efficiency greatly cut down. That is the reason why we had suff-
take the offensive, and is a gesture for ered defea:t in pa st, It is hoped that with the removal of all
nml"'n()~A of the In the oper- these obstacles, we can outwit the enemyin this contest' of
ation of of military, there are
warfare, ,as in that
and defensive. In ~~~Sf--swlth-ull.'",1,'''''''''
tical warfare is more or less of feminine in nature it t:HU!-'Ua.i;;),'-.LIC'i:)
tel:::hllllClIU€!S of concealment and camouflage, tours, et

retoucs, the'indirect and elusive approach, and defense and re-

treat. But the defensive 1;5 only a means for the offensive
defense in a IJVLLl,.,.l.... ':L.l. war is to take the offensive,
retreated to the island bastion of Taiwan, the
is to take ffillita:rily or IJVJ,,I,\,.LL..L,LL

fare should be and the

enemy where he is most vulnerable -- tte heart of the enemy.
3 the of warfare,
the contest of physical strength. In jJVJLL\'J.~<:L

comba.ts actions 1n-

. . . . H J V .. ,..... o< and haud-to- hand
YVALL,.LI.:<lL.l.actions embrace propaganda" organization, investigation
and se:btice. Political warfare has recourse to stratagem and wit
is no other than a in stra tagem, a of • With
a<-a'f",""1" and wit as the political warrior can defeat a
superior enemy.
warfare Ckl>:Q.,LJ,!i:)L are men
4- - 195-