FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency,
he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed,
petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to
issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation
of the President’s decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the
Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair
their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within
the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the
petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines?
Ruling:
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to
protect the people, promote their welfare and advance
national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as
protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no
foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and
their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the
conclusion that their return at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the
state and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded
from taking preemptive actions against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to
become serious and direct protection of the people is the
essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining
the return of the petitioners at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the
Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail.
Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion
entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country,"
stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United
States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and
after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders
dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to
travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration
Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security
Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court
of Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a
matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail
nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no
jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from
exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue:
Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been
violated.
Held:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence
of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as
a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused
were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad.
There is no indication that the business transactions cannot
be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
SILVERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the
revised securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the
passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure
order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioner’s
passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not
been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the
accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the
permission of the court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order
of the court.
Held:
The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and
warrant of arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to
appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the
right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make
himself available whenever the court requires his presence.
A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the
Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to
return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p.
138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be
re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts
to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of
the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be
interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be
impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They
can impose limits only on the basis of "national security,
public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by
law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text
(The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition,
1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international
travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a
Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party
(See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No.
53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the
Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines
must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel
so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The
offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of
the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality
without undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public
concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of
the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also
pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The
Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under
a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation
under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the
Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7
Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including
public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of
the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes
the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary provision
on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature,
subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may
be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public
concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps
and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty
of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998
Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y
Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the
death penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first
time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both
motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the
mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution
to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE
METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out
the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it
constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being
violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines'
obligations under international covenants, an undue
delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful
exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the
Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal
protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has
already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty
Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is
not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment;
execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No.
8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal
injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or
the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly
delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that
R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the
implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of
Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave
of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with
the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus
Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The
court gave due course to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its
implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a)
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our
international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue
delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
Held:
Petition denied.
Ratio:
1. NO. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection
constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the
drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage
for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in
administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177
and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of
the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix
the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the
greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the
possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in
administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently
cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty
per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then
as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court
believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing
details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left
to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain
as to which "court" will fix the time and date of execution,
and the date of execution and time of notification of the
death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court"
which designates the date of execution is the trial court
which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the
"judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its
promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are
remanded to the court below including a certified copy of
the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty
as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As
to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing
rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year
nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the
judgment imposing the death penalty became final and
executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his executive clemency powers at all times."
Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek
executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and
spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton
pain" in case of possible complications in the intravenous
injection that respondent Director is an untrained and
untested person insofar as the choice and administration of
lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. This is
unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence
that lethal injection required the expertise only of
phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs
to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner
simply cites situations in the United States wherein
execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged
and agonizing death for the convict, without any other
evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of
R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in
the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the
performance of such task. We must presume that the public
officials entrusted with the implementation of the death
penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely
incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and
does not fall within the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited
sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or
distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to
the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel.
But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for
this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which
the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent
in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."
2.NO. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights
states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions
of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This
penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be
imposed for the "most serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was
adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989.
The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.
3.NO. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which
define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically
requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under
the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of
the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as
well as during the proceedings prior to the execution."
Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take
steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered
is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict."
The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in
the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to
the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that
any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater
detail. The question raised is not the definition of what
constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out
the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense,
R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of
discretion by the administrative officials concerned is,
canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic
Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be
overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing
in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a
manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to be
confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the
implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has
practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual
on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and
approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department
of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-
making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent
abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said
paragraph invalid.
4. YES. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the
Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the
power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner
insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express
amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH
SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be
inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following
the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon
any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case,
the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for

being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise
of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner
insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express
amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the
death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while
she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor
upon any person over seventy years of age.

While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by

Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the
implementation of the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of
the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period
following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is
suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence
no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman
is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory
basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention
of the applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited

must not override, but instead remain consistent and in
harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.