Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

CHARLY HOLDINGS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CURTOM CLASSICS, LLC, CIVIL ACTION NO.

1:18-CV-2354-LMM

Defendant.

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Defendant Curtom Classics, LLC's

Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative to Stay, on the Grounds of International

Abstention Or Forum Non Conveniens [16] and Motion to Dismiss [17]. After

due consideration, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court enters the

following Order:

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Charly Holdings, Inc. ("Charly Holdings") is a Panamanian

corporation in the business of acquiring the rights to catalogs of sound recordings

and selling musical works in physical and digital formats through various

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the facts relied upon in this Order are taken from

the Complaint [1] and are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the
non-moving party.
 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 2 of 16

affiliates, business partners, and distributors. In 1995, Plaintiff entered into a

licensing agreement (the "Agreement") with Curtom Classics, Inc. ("CCI"). The

Agreement granted Plaintiff exclusive rights to use all master recordings owned

and/ or controlled by CCI (the "Master recordings") to manufacture, distribute,

sell, and lease records in Thailand, Brazil, and India. The Agreement also gave

Plaintiff non-exclusive rights to use the Master Recordings in Europe and Japan.

The Master Recordings identified in the Agreement include music from a variety

of artists, including Curtis Mayfield. By its terms, the Agreement expired on

September 30, 2002. See Dkt. No. [21-1] at 6.2

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiff alleges that it paid

substantial royalties to CCI for many years. Plaintiff now claims that it has

"discovered facts that raise serious issues" concerning the chain of title to the

Master Recordings. Plaintiff explains that, to date, multiple parties have claimed

ownership of the Master Recordings or entitlement to royalties, including the

Mayfield Family Trust, the Curtis Mayfield Estate, Curtom Records Company,

Curtom Classics, Inc., and Curtom Classics, LLC. Plaintiff alleges that CCI, with

2 The Court may consider the Agreement without converting Defendant's motions
to dismiss into motions for summary judgment because the Agreement is both
central to Plaintiffs claims and its authenticity has not been challenged. See
Atlantic Specialty Ins. Co. v. City of College Park, Ga., 319 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1292
(N.D. Ga. 2018) ("[W]here the pleadings are supplemented with documents that
are central to the plaintiffs claim and their authenticity is not challenged, the
court may consider the documents without converting the motion to one for
summary judgment.") (citing Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.
Ctrs. for Disease Ctrl. & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (nth Cir. 2010)).

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 3 of 16

whom it executed the Agreement, was dissolved in 2002. And, Plaintiff also

questions how the artist Curtis Mayfield could have assigned, in the first instance,

the rights of the other artists' whose works are included in the Master

Recordings. Due to the alleged uncertainty with regards to the ownership of the

Master Recordings, Plaintiff has suspended its payment of royalties. Plaintiff

does, however, assert that it remains ready, willing, and able to pay royalties to

the rightful owner of the Master Recordings.

Defendant, Curtom Classics, LLC ("Curtom Classics") was formed in 2003.

Defendant currently maintains that it is the true owner of the Master Recordings

and thereby entitled to all royalties payable to CCI pursuant to the Agreement.

Defendant believes that because the Agreement has expired, Plaintiffs continued

use of the Master Recordings constitutes copyright infringement. Defendant has

made its position known to Plaintiff-and threatened legal action-in various

letters and demands for payment.

In its briefing, Defendant explains that it first sent a cease and desist email

to Plaintiff on or about October 6, 2016. See Dkt. No. [16] at 6. On or about

October 19, 2016, Plaintiffs solicitor in the United Kingdom responded to the

cease and desist email with a demand that Defendant produce proof of chain of

title. See id. Defendant contends that over the course of several months,

Defendant provided Plaintiffs solicitor with both assurances of chain of title and

with an offer to indemnify Plaintiff in the event Defendant did not own chain of

title outside North America. See id. Defendant sent another cease and desist

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 4 of 16

letter on September 12, 2017 threatening litigation in

the United Kingdom but

received no response until Plaintiff filed the current suit

in this Court on May 22,

2018. See id. at 7. Defendant then issued a proceeding (the

equivalent of filing a

complaint in the United Kingdom) on June 1, 2018 in the Intellectual

Property

Enterprise Court ("IPEC"), a division of the High Court of Justice in

the United

Kingdom. See id.

Turning to the present action, Plaintiff contends that the sole basis of

Defendant's claim to ownership of the Master Recordings is an "attempted

corrective assignment" from CCI to Defendant, executed on April 25, 2017 under

Georgia law. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant-knowing that it lacked verifiable

ownership to the Master Recordings-threatened to sue Plaintiffs distributors for

infringement, causing Plaintiffs third-party distribution partner, Snapper Music

PLC ("Snapper") to stop conducting business with and seek indemnity assurances

from Plaintiff.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff (1) seeks a declaration that it has not

infringed on any copyright held by Defendant in the Master Recordings pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2201;3 and (2) brings a claim for tortious interference with

contractual relations under Georgia law.

3 Plaintiff acknowledges that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Dkt. No. [28] at 5 n.2 (citing Provident
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Transamerica-Occidental Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 1489, 1491
(nth Cir. 1988)). The Court remains concerned that Plaintiff has failed to present
a controversy that is "definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of the
parties having adverse legal interests," as required to claim relief under 28 U.S.C.

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 5 of 16

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Rule

12(b)(1) may be based on a facial or factual challenge to the

complaint.

McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cty., 501F.3d

1244, 1251

(nth Cir. 2007) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.
May

1981)). A facial attack "requires the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff

has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction," and for purposes of

the motion, Plaintiffs allegations in the complaint are taken as true.

McElmurray, 501F.3d at 1251 (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919F.2d 1525, 1529

(11th Cir. 1990)) (alterations omitted). To the contrary, a factual attack challenges

"the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings,

and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits are

considered." McElmurray, 501F.3d at 1251 (quoting Lawrence, 919F.2d at 1529).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a

"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

§ 2201. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Harford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41
(1937). Plaintiff asks the Court to declare that it has "not infringed any copyright
of Curtom Classics." Dkt. No. [1] i-I 43. But Plaintiff also repeatedly states that its
request for a declaratory judgment "has nothing to do with the U.S. Copyright
Act" or "extraterritorial infringement." Dkt. No. [28] at 6. Instead, Plaintiff insists
that its declaratory judgment action only concerns the ownership of the Master
Recordings and the terms of the Agreement. Id. Without an underlying copyright
or breach of contract dispute, the Court is hard pressed to find a non-hypothetical
controversy "appropriate for judicial determination." Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240; see
also Provident Life, 850 F.2d at 1491 ("Courts have found the case or controversy
requirement lacking when . . . no conflict exists in the case"). Nevertheless, as
Defendant has not raised this issue, the Court declines to address it further.

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 6 of 16

relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While this pleading standard does

not require

"detailed factual allegations," the Supreme Court has held that "labels and

conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face."' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint is

plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads factual content necessary for the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct

alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

At the motion to dismiss stage, "all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true,

and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff." FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (nth Cir.

2006)). However, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions set forth in

the complaint. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant first argues that this Court should refuse to exercise jurisdiction

pursuant to the doctrine of international abstention because Defendant filed suit

in the IPEC on June 1, 2018-ten days after Plaintiff filed its complaint in this

Court. See Dkt. No. [16] at 7. Because the Court finds the international abstention

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doctrine is applicable and counsels in favor of a stay, the Court will not address

Defendant's alternative arguments.

A. International Abstention

Federal courts generally have a "virtually unflagging obligation to exercise

the jurisdiction conferred upon them." Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v.

United States, 424 U.S. Boo, 817 (1976). However, "in some private international

disputes the prudent and just action for a federal court is to abstain from the

exercise of jurisdiction." Turner Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512,

1518 (11th Cir. 1994). In determining whether to abstain based on international

considerations, the Court must consider three factors (1) international comity; (2)

fairness to litigants; and, (3) judicial efficiency. See id.

1. International Comity

International comity reflects "the principle of respect for sovereign

nations." Belize Telecom, Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir.

2008). The Eleventh Circuit has identified three primary concerns in the context

of international comity (1) whether the judgment was rendered via fraud; (2)

whether the judgment was rendered by a competent court utilizing proceedings

consistent with civilized jurisprudence; and, (3) whether the foreign judgment is

prejudicial, in the sense of violating American public policy because it is

repugnant to fundamental principles of what is decent and just. Turner, 25 F.3d

at 1519.

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 8 of 16

As the IPEC has yet to render a judgment, Defendant acknowledges

that

the international comity factors do not directly bear on this case.

See Dkt. No.

[16] at 12. But as Defendant correctly notes, "[a]lso relevant to conside

rations of

international comity are the relative strengths of the American and [United

Kingdom] interests." Turner, 25 F.3d at 1521. To illustrate, in the Eleventh's

Circuit's seminal decision in Turner, the court held that international comity

favored deference to parallel German proceedings because of the "significantly

greater German interest in the litigation." Id. at 1522. In Turner, an American

licensor of television programming sued a German distributor and broadcasters

over the terms of the contract in federal court in the Northern District of Georgia;

meanwhile the German distributor and broadcasters filed a declaratory judgment

action seeking support for their interpretation of the contract in German court.

Id. at 1514, 1516. Although the contract at issue had an American entity as a party,

was written in English, and included a choice of law and forum selection

provision designating the Northern District of Georgia as the proper court, the

Eleventh Circuit determined that the German interest in the case was much more

significant because the contract called for performance primarily in Germany. Id.

at 1521. Indeed, the court explained "the public interest in the litigation is more

conspicuous in Germany, because the German parties include the German state

broadcasters, and the salient issues in the case are of great moment to the state of

television in Germany and the rest of Europe." Id.

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 9 of 16

Moreover, because the central question in Turner required a "thoro

ugh

knowledge of European broadcasting technology and markets,

and require[d]

reference to European law" the Turner court reasoned that Germa

ny was the

"most sensible venue to determine a just result." Id. The court acknow
ledged that

the federal court "was capable of rendering a just result," but found no "clear

federal interest" in the case given the centrality of the complex international

issues surrounding the dispute. Id. Thus, based on the lack of a comparably

strong federal interest in the case, the court concluded that international comity

concerns weighed in favor of abstention. Id.

Here, Plaintiff is not an American company. See Dkt. No. [1] � 4. While the

Agreement is written in English and was executed in Illinois, it also contains a

non-exclusive choice of law and forum selection provision "corresponding to the

geographical location of [Plaintiff]"-which was, and remains, Panama. Dkt. Nos.

[1] � 4; [21-1] at 1, 11. More importantly, Plaintiff does not claim that it was ever

authorized to use the Master Recordings to manufacture, distribute, sell or lease

records in the United States. Id.�� 13-14. The Agreement only impacts music

distribution rights outside the United States; as such, this Court's ruling will have

no impact on American consumers. Akin to Turner, in which the contract called

for performance outside the United States, the United Kingdom's interest in

Plaintiffs case is "much more significant" than the American interest because the

Agreement involves distribution rights outside the United States. 25 F.3d at 1521;

see also Belize, 528 F.3d at 1306 ("In this case it is clear that the interests of

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 10 of 16

Belize far outweigh the American interests .... [T]o the extent that the litigation

might have any effect on the delivery of telecommunications services, the effect

would be on the citizens of Belize.").

Plaintiff nevertheless attempts to paint this case as a complex dispute

involving "numerous contracts, assignments, and trust and estate documents

governed by state law." Dkt. No. [27] at 5. But both of Plaintiffs claims turn on

the resolution of the complicated international copyright issue. First, as discussed

supra, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide an independent cause of

action. See Provident Life, 850 F.2d at 1491.And, Plaintiff adamantly asserts that

its declaratory judgment action does not implicate the U.S. Copyright Act.4 See

Dkt. No. [28] at 5-6.As such, to find a non-hypothetical controversy ripe for

review and grant Plaintiffs request for a declaration that it has "not infringed on

any copyright," this Court would need to-at a minimum-wade into the thicket

of international copyright law. See Dkt.No. [1] ii 43 (emphasis added).

Second, to recover for tortious interference with business relations under

Georgia law, a plaintiff must first establish that the defendant "acted improperly

and without privilege." Cook Pecan Co., Inc. v.McDaniel, 344 Ga. App.370, 374

(2018). Here, to show that Defendant lacked privilege in its correspondence with

4 At oral argument Plaintiff, for the first time, argued that the chain-of-title
dispute implicates U.S. copyright law to the extent it governs Curtis Mayfield's
ability to initially assign the rights of the other artists identified in the Master
Recordings. Plaintiff did, however, maintain its position that the U.S. Copyright
Act has nothing to do with any alleged infringement.

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 11 of 16

Snapper, Plaintiff will need to demonstrate that Defendant

is not a valid

copyright holder and, therefore, not privileged. See, e.g., Culpe

pper v. Thompson,

254 Ga. App. 569, 571-72 (2002) ("Privilege means a legitimate or

bona fide

economic interest of the defendant"). Because Plaintiff does not claim

that

Defendant holds a United States copyright to the Master Recordings, the Court

would need to consult complex international copyright and licensing law to

determine privilege. See Dkt. No. [1] ,-r 30. While, as in Turner, this Court might

be capable of rendering a just result, the IPEC-a court that exclusively handles

intellectual property disputes-appears to be "the most sensible venue to

determine a just result in this case." 25 F.3d at 1521. In light of the foregoing,

international comity concerns favor deference to the IPEC proceedings.

2. Fairness

There are three relevant considerations with respect to the fairness factor

(1) the order in which the suits were filed; (2) the more convenient forum; (3) the

possibility of prejudice to parties resulting from abstention. Belize, 528 F.3d at

1308.

Although Plaintiff filed suit in this Court ten days before Defendant filed

suit in the IPEC, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly recognized that the location

of the first-filed suit is not dispositive. Id.; see also Turner, 25 F.3d at 1522

(noting that "none of the cases regarding concurrent international jurisdiction

give priority solely on the basis of first-filing in a case where the suits were filed

so closely together."). Moreover, while the order in which suits were filed

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 12 of 16

somewhat tilts towards the American forum, the

remaining two fairness

considerations still weigh heavily in favor of defer

ence to the IPEC proceedings.

First, with respect to the convenience of the forum

, the Court's above

determination that the United Kingdom interests outwe

igh the American

interests in this dispute leads to the logical conclusion that

the IPEC forum is

more convenient than the American forum. See Belize, 528 F.3d at 1308.
Next,

turning to the final consideration in the fairness analysis, the Court must "be

satisfied that its decision will not result in prejudice to the party opposing the

stay." Turner, 25 F.3d at 1522. In other words, the prejudice consideration

"focuses on whether the party opposing deference to the foreign forum will

receive a fair and impartial trial in the foreign forum." Belize, 528 F.3d at 1298.

Plaintiff contends that there is a "possibility of prejudice" if this Court abstains

because the IPEC lacks expertise on the Georgia state law issues surrounding the

Agreement. Dkt. No. [27] at 7. But Plaintiff has not pointed to any concrete

reason why the IPEC-a court that specializes in the resolution of international

copyright disputes-would be unable to afford Plaintiff a fair and impartial trial.

Accordingly, the three considerations under the fairness factor weigh in favor of

deference to the IPEC proceedings.

3. Judicial Efficiency

To determine whether abstention will promote the efficient use of judicial

resources, a court must consider (1) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (2)

avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (3) whether the alternative forum is likely to

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 13 of 16

render a prompt disposition; and (4) whether the action

s have common parties

and issues. Turner, 25 F.3d at 1522.

As noted above, the IPEC is the more convenient of the two forums based

on the comparable interests of America and the United Kingdom in this dispute.

Regarding the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation, as Defendant notes, its IPEC

infringement claims are arguably compulsory counterclaims to Plaintiffs

complaint in this Court. See Dkt. No. [16] at 17. However, Defendant's

counterclaims involve more foreign parties, over whom this Court may not have

personal jurisdiction. See id. at 18. These potential jurisdictional issues only

increase the likelihood of piecemeal litigation-a risk already inherent in parallel

proceedings. See, e.g., Turner, 25 F.3d at 1520 ("If both proceedings continued,

the courts' calendars would have to be synchronized and the litigation would have

to move back and forth across the Atlantic."). Deference to the IPEC proceedings

therefore minimizes the chances of inconsistent judgments. Moreover, Plaintiff

does not argue that the IPEC is unable to render a competent and efficient

judgment in a timely manner. Accordingly, the first three considerations of

judicial efficiency favor deference to the IPEC proceedings.

In arguing that judicial efficiency nevertheless counsels against a stay,

Plaintiff argues that the IPEC action does not involve "substantially the same

issues and parties" as the matter before this Court. See Dkt. No. [27] at 9.

Plaintiff contends that the IPEC action only relates to Curtis Mayfield's portion of

the Master Recordings, while the present action concerns to the entire catalog of

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 14 of 16

the Master Recordings. Id. Plaintiff also explains that the IPEC action involves

eight defendants and that any facts related to those parties reach beyond the

scope of the present litigation. Id. Finally, Plaintiff argues that its claim for

tortious interference against Defendant is not before the IPEC court. Id.

To support its contention, Plaintiff relies heavily on Glock v. Glock, in

which the court found that the defendants failed to establish that American and

Austrian lawsuits involved substantially the same issues. 150 F. Supp. 3d 1297,

1302-03 (N.D. Ga. 2015). There, the Austrian lawsuits concerned the plaintiffs

divorce proceedings, her transfer of shares from Glock Ges.m.b.H. ("Parent

Company"), and an attempted forced buyout of the plaintiffs interest in the

Parent Company. Id. at 1302. By contrast, in the United States, the plaintiff

brought a federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")

action alleging a scheme to depress the value of certain assets held by the Parent

Company. Id. at 1300. The federal court refused to abstain because the Austrian

lawsuits did not involve the same central issues as the American litigation­

indeed, the Court concluded that "resolution of the Austrian litigation will not

resolve most of the material issues in this litigation." Id. at 1304-05.

Unlike in Glock, the case before this Court and the IPEC involve the same

central issues: ownership of and the ability to license the Master Recordings.

While Plaintiff argues that the present case involves less defendants and more

recordings than the IPEC litigation, abstention does not require strict

identicality. See Glock, 150 F. Supp. 3d. at 1302 ("Generally, the parties must be

14
 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 15 of 16

'litigating substantially the same issues in both actions."') (quoting Royal & Sun

Alliance, Ins. Co. of Canada v. Century Int'l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir.

2006) (emphasis added)); see also Belize, 528 F.3d at 1308 (finding actions had

common parties and issues "although the American litigation included some

additional claims as well."). Because the resolution of the IPEC litigation will

resolve most of the material issues in this litigation, the two cases necessarily

have "significantly common issues and parties." Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd.,

178 F.3d 1209, 1224 (nth Cir. 1999).

Overall, the international abstention factors favor deference to the IPEC

proceedings. However, Eleventh Circuitjurisprudence in this area does not

mandate dismissal in cases of parallel foreign proceedings. See Posner, 178 F.3d

at 1224. Accordingly, the Court will stay Plaintiffs claims pending the resolution

of the IPEC case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in the

Alternative to Stay, on the Grounds of International Abstention Or Forum Non

Conveniens [16] is GRANTED in part, as to the request for a stay, and

DENIED in part, as to dismissal. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to

State a Claim [17] is likewise DENIED without prejudice. Defendant shall be

permitted to refile its Motion to Dismiss after the conclusion of the IPEC

litigation. Accordingly, this case is ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pending

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 Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Document 39 Filed 11/14/18 Page 16 of 16

the resolution of the IPEC proceedings.s The parties are ORDERED to notify the

Court within 14 days of the resolution of the IPEC proceeding with a status report

on what remains in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of November, 2018.

s Administrative closure of a case does not prejudice the rights of the parties to
litigation in any manner. The parties may move to re-open an administratively
closed case at any time.

16
From: ganddb_efile_notice@gand.uscourts.gov
To: CourtMail@gand.uscourts.gov
Subject: Activity in Case 1:18-cv-02354-LMM Charly Holdings, Inc. v. Curtom Classics, LLC Order on Motion to Dismiss
Date: Wednesday, November 14, 2018 7:46:19 AM

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U.S. District Court

Northern District of Georgia

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was entered on 11/14/2018 at 10:45 AM EST and filed on
11/14/2018
Case Name: Charly Holdings, Inc. v. Curtom Classics, LLC
Case Number: 1:18-cv-02354-LMM
Filer:
Document Number: 39

Docket Text:
ORDER: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative to Stay, on the
Grounds of International Abstention Or Forum Non Conveniens [16] is
GRANTED in part, as to the request for a stay, and DENIED in part, as to
dismissal. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [17] is
likewise DENIED without prejudice. Defendant shall be permitted to refile its
Motion to Dismiss after the conclusion of the IPEC litigation. Accordingly, this
case is ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pending the resolution of the IPEC
proceedings. The parties are ORDERED to notify the Court within 14 days of the
resolution of the IPEC proceeding with a status report on what remains in this
case. Signed by Judge Leigh Martin May on 11/14/2018. (btql)

1:18-cv-02354-LMM Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Andrew C. Stevens     drew.stevens@agg.com, andi.gossmann@agg.com

Ira M. Steinberg     ISteinberg@ggfirm.com, calendar@greenbergglusker.com,

knicolas@greenbergglusker.com

Jeffrey D. Horst     Horst@khlawfirm.com, Jennifer@khlawfirm.com

Jonathan Tucker Barr     tucker.barr@agg.com, andrea.gossmann@agg.com,
angela.chambliss@agg.com, tammy.sims@agg.com

Michael Awni Boutros     boutros@khlawfirm.com, jennifer@khlawfirm.com

William I. Hochberg     WHochberg@ggfirm.com, calendar@greenbergglusker.com,

jnelson@greenbergglusker.com

1:18-cv-02354-LMM Notice has been delivered by other means to:

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