SUBMITTED BY: CLOYD CLEVENSE VIGO LLB 1A

DIGESTED CASES
(FORCIBLE ENTRY AND ILLEGAL DETENTION)
Facts:
Peralta-Labrador purchased a parcel of land from the spouses Pronto in 1976. In 1990, the
Department of Public Works and Highways constructed a road traversing the parcel of land,
separating 108 sq. m. Sometime in 1994, Bulagarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m.
lot and refused to vacate despite the please of Peralta-Labrador.

In 1996, Peralta-Labrador instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership with
the Metropolitan Trial Court against Bulgarin. Bulagrin pleaded the defense of lack of cause of
action and prescription.

The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of Bulgarin. The Regional Trial Court affirmed the
decision. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the declaration of the Metropolitan Trial
Court that Bulgarin was the owner of the land.

Issue:
Whether or not the action to file for a forcible entry case had already prescribed.

Held:
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. a person deprived of the possession of
any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, may at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with the damages and costs.

It was clear that Peralta-Labrador's averment was a case for forcible entry because she alleged
prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by
Bulgarin. Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred 2
years prior to the filing of the complaint in 1996, the cause of action for forcible entry had
prescribed and the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

The complaint therefore should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court via an accion
publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess, or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an
action to recover ownership as well as possession.
Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424 (May 2, 2006)

Facts:
Valdez was the owner of a parcel of land where Fabella consructed a house without any color of
title whatsoever. Valdez orally asked Fabella several times to vacate the property but the latter
stubbornly refused.

The parties were not able to settle the dispute amicably, which lead to the filing of a complaint
for unlawful detainer by Valdez against Fabella.

The MTC ruled in favor of Valdez, which was affirmed by the RTC. The CA, on the other hand,
reversed the decision. It held that Valdez failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because
they failed to show that they had given Fabella the right to occupy the premises or that they
had tolerated the possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases.

Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a case for unlawful detainer.

Held:
No, the allegations of the complaint did not clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer.

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the tolerance must be present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper
remedy.

The allegations in the complaint did not contain any fact that would substantiate the claim of
Valdez that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Fabella. The
complaint contained only bare allegations that Fabella without any color of title whatsoever
occupied the land by building their house in the said land thereby depriving Valdez the
possession thereof. Nothing had been said on how Fabella's entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties.

The evidence revealed that the possession of Fabella was illegal from the start and not merely
tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that Fabella started to occupy the lot and
then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of Valdez and before them,
their mother.
Clearly, Fabella's entry into the land was without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it
is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. Tolerance must be present right
from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
unlawful detainer not of forcible entry.
There was nothing said on how Fabella's entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started. There was also no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of Valdez
to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer was fatal. Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer,
the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008
(FORCIBLE ENTRY)

Facts:
The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected of
being members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in
various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, the
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces
led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in place for their
brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met
other desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the Philippines students Karen
Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being communist insurgents and
members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other
dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.

Issue:
Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws.

Held:
Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s person against government intrusion. The
right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian sword
of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is directed
against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights
and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning “to protect,” is
borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights abuses—often
perpetrated by the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist insurgents,
anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced
disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their
rights, liberties, and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in
positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
People vs. Larrañaga ( ILLEGAL DETENTION)
G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004

FACTS:
On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on
the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. The
woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced
and admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified
appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel
Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime.

Rusia discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was
never found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2)
reclusiones perpetua.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct penalty.
HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated. The appellants’ actions showed that they had the same objective to kidnap and
detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the appellants indeed
conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.
2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or
is raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.
3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable
penalty to the offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was
only 16 years old when the crimes were committed. As penalty for the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to
be imposed should be reclusion perpetua. There being no aggravating and mitigating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion temporal in its medium
period.. With regard to the rest of the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above
should be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely imposing “two (2) reclusiones
perpetua”.

SEMIRA v. CA- Forcible Entry

FACTS :
Ms. Gutierez sold to Respondent Buenaventura An an 822sqm lot specifically designated by
boundaries. Respondent then proceeded to occupy said lot within the boundaries.
Mr. Buenaventura got lucky with money and expanded. He subsequently purchased an
adjacent lot with the size of 8,606 and another of 11,000 sqm. Not much later on, he then sold
the original 822sqm lot to his nephew, Mr. Ramirez.
Seven years passed and Mr. Ramirez sold the 822 sqm lot to Mr. Semira according to the stated
boundaries for a lump sum of P20,000. At this point, Mr Semira discovered that the actual size
delimited by the boundaries was not 822sqm, but rather, 2200sqm. What a bonanza! Mr.
Semira gleefully entered the lot according to its stated boundaries and built a rice mill.
Someone wasn’t pleased. He filed forcible entry, claiming that Mr. Semira forcibly occupied an
additional 1,377 sqm. He asserts that Mr. Semira purchased an 822sqm lot, not a 2200sqm lot.
The case went to court and during the pendancy of proceedings.
The MTC dismissed the forcible entry case against Mr Semira, stating that it had no jurisdiction
to try cases on the issue of ownership. The RTC reversed and ruled for Buenaventura. CA
affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Semira rightfully owned 2200sqm of land designated by boundaries and
not the 822sqm erroneously stated on the Deed. (this is a boundary vs area quandary)

HELD:
Mr. Semira is entitled to 2200sqm designated by the boundary.

It is clear that the original “822sqm” lot was once owned by respondent Buenaventura; and
that he sold same to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez for the lump sum of P2,500.00. The
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" incorporated both the estimated area and the definite
boundaries of the land; and, that private respondent's nephew in turn sold the lot to petitioner
with the very same boundaries mentioned in the deed of sale executed in his favor by his uncle
Buenaventura An.
Petitioner Semira claims that owns the entire 2,200 square meters since it is the size of the lot
he purchased as established boundaries. On the other hand, respondent Buenaventura insists
that he only sold 822.5 square meters, therefore, his nephew Ramirez could not
havetransferred a bigger area to petitioner.

The SC sustained Mr. Semira as well as the MCTC’s decision. When land is sold for a lump sum
and not on a per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract
determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the area thereof. Hence, the Vendor Ramirez is
obligated to deliver all the land included within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real
area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed.