EN BANC

JOSELANO GUEVARRA,

Complainant,

versus
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL

EALA,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 7136

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA,

VELASCO, JR., and

NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:

August 1, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers
oath.

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary
Ann) Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read I love
you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall.

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts,
she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words I Love You on
its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for
you that you may find meaning in what youre about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal
pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan for
the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to
love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the
life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime.
Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]

Eternally yours,

NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also
learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent
during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted
letter was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended
social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple
attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM
Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard
issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their
picture was captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex
C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous
relationship supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as
far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.[5]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his
membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece of paper.
Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainants bride on the very day of her
wedding, vowing to continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they are.[6]
(Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his
adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to
keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents relationship with Irene was not
under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in
fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondents special friendship
with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten
letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with
respect to the formality of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).
[9]

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has
been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainants wife, he mocked the
institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainants marriage, commits adultery
with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that
under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile
special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls father. Complainant attached to the REPLY,
as Annex A, a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as
the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Lukes
Hospital.

Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainants Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case
filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery
against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-Affidavit and REPLY to ANSWER
were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.[16] Respondents counsel did not cross-examine
complainant.[17]

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently
proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.

Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala

a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule
139[22] of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-
word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published in
the Manila Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying
on an adulterous relationship with complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record
which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that]
their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the
reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . .

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a special
relationship between him and complainants wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of
Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child Samantha. In the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his
special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not
categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.[26]
(Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was
low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[27] (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of Irenes daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a
lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired
information on DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage Certificate[29] shows that they were affixed by one
and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never
denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and
a lawyer.[31]

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven
by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the
other[32] which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all
that is required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not,
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.[34]

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit
with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.

Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should
be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at
bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this
Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are
punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been
carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon
him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.[40]

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainants
petition for nullity of his (complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case, which was pending
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of
complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we
are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000,
which provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the
same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though
no appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.[43] As a
lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[44] In
carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for
an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted
to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for
Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing the City
Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on
dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent
phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a
rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married
to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual
abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only
served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent
by Mojes subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few
blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that of
Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas
Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that
Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a
coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed
all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondents love nest, to put short;
their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at
the nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the
indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was
the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of
the respondents. Complainants supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly
beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that
Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves
the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were
filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the
original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his
oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO

Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-8.

[2] Id. at 2-3; Exhibit C, p. 10.

[3] Id. at 31-35.

[4] Id. at 6.
[5] Id. at 32.

[6] Id. at 6.

[7] Id. at 32-33.

[8] Id. at 31.

[9] Id. at 7.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Id. at 33.

[12] Id. at 37-42; Exhibit E.

[13] Id. at 43; Exhibit F.

[14] Id. at 71-76.

[15] Id. at 71.

[16] Id. at 199-200; TSN, February 21, 2003, pp. 41-42.

[17] Id. at 200; TSN, February 21, 2003, p. 42.

[18] Id. at 333-344.

[19] Rollo, pp. 340-344.

[20] Id. at 332.

[21] Id. at 345-354.

[22] RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-B, Section 12 (c):

If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than
suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating
respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the
complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the Boards resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.

[23] Rollo pp. 429-445.

[24] Id. at 434-440.

[25] Id. at 342-343.

[26] REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 333.

[27] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 1059, 1107 (2003).

[28] Id. at 43; Exhibits F and F-3; TSN, December 2, 2003, pp. 226-227.

[29] Id. at 9; Exhibit B.

[30] Id. at 63.

[31] Id. at 63, 215-219; TSN, December 2, 2003, pp. 12-14, vide p. 43.

[32] Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., G.R. No. 155110, March 31, 2003, 454 SCRA
653, 664-665, citing Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184 (1912); Stronghold Insurance
Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619, May 29, 1989; Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 104408, June 21, 1993, 223 SCRA 521, 534.

[33] Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, 374 Phil. 1, 9-10 (1999).

[34] Vide rollo, p. 443.

[35] Arciga v. Maniwang, 193 Phil. 731,735-736 (1981).

[36] A.C. No. 6313, September 7, 2006, 501 SCRA 166.

[37] Id. at 177-178.

[38] 376 Phil. 336 (1999).

[39] Id. at 340.

[40] Article 68.

[41] Rollo, pp. 233-246.

[42] Id. at 455-456.

[43] Id. at 1-8, 277-283.

[44] RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3 (aa); Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497
SCRA 428, 443-445.

[45] Rollo, pp. 481-482.

[46] 107 SCRA 1 (1981).

[47] Id. at 6-7.

[48] 374 Phil. 1, 9 (1999).

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EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015 ]

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez)
with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig)
and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960's
when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their
graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time
that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.[2]

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having
married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was
followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.[3] Atty. Catindig
however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that
Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have
jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.[4]

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to
dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been
decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was
lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.[5]
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.[6]

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree
that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine
laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would
legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of
the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.[7]

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a
petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the
consent of Gomez to the said petition.[8]

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter[9] in the mail informing her
of Atty. Catindig's scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter[10] written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed."
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their
affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty.
Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.[11]

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.[12]

In a Resolution[13] dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective
comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002.[14]

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,[15] admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed,
however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying
with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was
blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted
Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart
could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete
separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them.[16]

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed
to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual
consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and
Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.[17]

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by
the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she
knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty.
Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.[18]

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage
to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was
afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.
[19]

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.[20]

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr.
Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact
rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.[21]

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig
began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig's romantic
overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was
too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the
reason why she resigned from his law firm.[22]

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice.[23]

On June 2, 2003, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order[24] setting the
mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29,
2003. During the conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for
resolution based on the pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to
submit their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty.
Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 2003[25] and October 20, 2003,[26] respectively. Dr.
Perez filed her position paper[27] on October 24, 2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report
and Recommendation,[28] which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality,
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating
Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig's act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that
his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants
the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined that:

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig
established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His
conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal
conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent's bigamous marriage and his proclivity for
extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can
he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a
model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second
marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig
has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted
moral standards of the community.[29]
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support
of the alleged affair between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,[30] which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration[31] of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez's
uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the
absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez'
testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed
the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been
transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution[32] dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig's
motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant
their disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case,
the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,[33] the Court held:

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent
for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of
bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are committed
to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client's property,
reputation, his life, his all."[34] (Citation omitted)

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)

"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor."[35] Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency. The Court makes
these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral,
not simply immoral, conduct.[36]

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig's own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968,
which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when
their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig
claimed that his first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez' serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their
conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and
married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that
time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away a marriage that has at least
a semblance of legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at
that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his
previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void.
This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty.
Catindig's sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws
on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is
that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig's claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in
order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that
time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he
was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his
firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself,
cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his
propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court's finding of gross immoral
conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig's desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.

"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.'"[37] In various cases, the Court
has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.[38]

Atty. Catindig's subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in
this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to
be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig's claim that Dr. Perez's allegations against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed
married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such
admission provides ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to
prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was
presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that
the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence.[39]

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter
indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not
prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that
Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is
indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this
Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court
Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., no part respondent ca finding was collegue in faculty.

[1] Rollo, pp. 1-23.

[2] Id. at 2.

[3] Id. at 35.

[4] Id. at 2-3.

[5] Id. at 3-4.

[6] Id. at 4.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at 4-5.

[9] Id. at 43.

[10] Id. at 44.

[11] Id. at 16-18.

[12] Id. at 18.

[13] Id. at 62.

[14] Id. at 75-83; 86-99.

[15] Id. at 75-83.

[16] Id. at 76.

[17] Id. at 76-77.

[18] Id. at 77-78.

[19] Id. at 78.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at 78-79.

[22] Id. at 90.

[23] Id. at 116-117.

[24] Id. at 176-177.

[25] Id. at 454-468.

[26] Id. at 469-479.

[27] Id. at 480-500.

[28] Id. at 571-593.

[29] Id. at 587-588.

[30] Id. at 569-570.

[31] Id. at 594-610.

[32] Id. at 627.

[33] 590 Phil. 270 (2008).

[34] Id. at 276. See also Cordon v. Balicanta, 439 Phil. 95, 115-116 (2002).

[35] Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Sr., 468 Phil. 329, 335 (2004).

[36] See Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, 625 Phil. 347, 358 (2010).

[37] See Cordova v. Cordova, 259 Phil. 278 (1989).

[38] See Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, 376 Phil. 336 (1999); Narag v. Atty. Narag, 353 Phil. 643, 663 (1998); Obusan
v. Obusan, Jr., 213 Phil. 437, 440 (1984).

[39] See Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 361, 372.

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THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4369. November 28, 1997]

PIKE P. ARRIETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

Complainant Pike P. Arrieta prays for the disbarment of Atty. Joel A. Llosa for certifying under oath a
Deed of Absolute Sale.

Particularly, complainant avers that respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24,
1993[1] making it appear that some of the vendors in said Deed namely, Edelina T. Bonilla, Jesus T.
Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano were parties and signatories thereto when in truth and in fact, all three
were already dead prior to the execution of the said Deed of Absolute Sale. Jesus T. Bonilla died on
August 22, 1992[2] while Leonardo P. Toledano died on November 1, 1992.[3] Edelina T. Bonilla allegedly
died on or about June 11, 1992.

In answer, respondent admitted having notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. But before affixing his
notarial seal, he first ascertained the authenticity of the signatures, verified the identities of the
signatories, and determined the voluntariness of its execution. Satisfied with all of the above, it was only
then that he certified the document.

Curiously, on September 9, 1996, complainant had a complete turn-around and moved for the dismissal
of his complaint. He alleged that the instant case is only a product of misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of some facts and is now convinced that everything is in order.

The designated Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended the
dismissal of the instant case. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted
the above recommendation and resolved to dismiss the instant case after finding no compelling reason
to continue with the disbarment proceedings.

This Court cannot agree.

Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The
notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal,
if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

It is thus clear from the foregoing that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or
any person authorized to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents.[4] Aside from being
required to appear before the Notary Public, it is similarly incumbent upon the person acknowledging
the instrument to declare before the same Notary Public that the execution of the instrument was done
by him of his own free will.

In the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Sale, respondent certified: BEFORE ME, this 24th day of March,
1993 at Dumaguete City, Philippines, personally appeared x x x Jesus Bonilla; x x x Leonardo Toledano; x x
x.[5] Respondent claims that as a Notary Public, he asked the signatories whether the signatures
appearing above their respective names were theirs, and whether they voluntarily executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale. In order to ascertain their identities, respondent asked for their respective residence
certificates.

Except for Edelina T. Bonilla whose alleged death was not evidenced by a death certificate, respondent
certified in the acknowledgment that Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano personally appeared
before him. Respondents acts require the presence of the vendors to be able to verify the authenticity of
their signatures, the identities of the signatories and the voluntariness of the execution of the Deed. It
defies imagination and belief how these could have happened. It would have been impossible, both
physically and legally, for Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano to have personally subscribed and
sworn before respondent as to the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Sale as they had already
passed on to the Great Beyond prior to the execution of the said documents.

Yet, respondent certified to this effect. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from being a private document into a public document. By certifying the Deed,
respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world (1) that all the parties therein personally appeared before
him; (2) that they are all personally known to him; (3) that they were the same persons who executed
the instruments; (4) that he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they
acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantial
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity.[6] A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity
of this form of conveyance would be undermined.[7]

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties
which are dictated by public policy and, as such, impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and
utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. [8]

It is for the above reason that this Court is most concerned about the explanation given by complainant
for withdrawing his complaint against respondent. In his Motion to Dismiss dated September 9, 1996,
complainant declares:

xxx xxx xxx

That he is now fully convinced that everything was in order, and that nobody was ever prejudiced by the
acts of the respondent. Herein complainant has realized that he himself, or any other legal practitioner,
would have done similarly as the respondent, if confronted with such an urgent voluntary transaction in
an emergency situation; x x x.

That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged urgent situation is no
excuse at all. As an individual, and even more so as a member of the legal profession, he is required to
obey the laws of the land AT ALL TIMES, to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct AT ALL TIMES, to uphold the integrity of his profession AT ALL TIMES, to promote
respect to his profession AT ALL TIMES, and to act with justice AT ALL TIMES.
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly disregarded the requirements and solemnities of the
Notarial Law simply to accomodate his clients. Not only did he commit an illegal act but also did so
without thinking of the possible damage or prejudice that might result from non-observance of the
same.

As a lawyer, respondent breached his professional responsibility by certifying under oath an instrument
fully knowing that some of the signatories thereto were long dead. This Court cannot countenance this
practice, especially coming, as it does, from respondent who formerly served as president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Negros Oriental Chapter, President of the Dumaguete Lions Club and
City Councilor of Dumaguete. If indeed respondent had taken steps to verify the identities of the
signatories, he would have easily known that the signatures were fake as they purported to be those of
his former clients.

It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.[9] [M]embership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. There
being no lifetime guaranty, a lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior
and can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded him.[10]

Pursuant to the foregoing, it is primarily required of lawyers to obey the Constitution and laws of the
land.[11] They must refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[12]

An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counsellor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity.[13]

Respondents act of certifying under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors
were already dead, they being his former clients, constitutes misconduct. But this being his first
administrative offense, such should not warrant the supreme penalty of disbarment.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds respondent Atty. Joel A. Llosa guilty of misconduct. Consequently, he is
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning
that another infraction would be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent himself.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

[1] Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex C, Rollo, p. 11.

[2] Certificate of Death of Jesus Jose Bonilla issued by Local Civil Registrar, Cebu City, Annex A, Rollo, p. 9.

[3] Certificate of Death of Leonardo Toledano issued by Local Civil Rgistrar, City of Manila, Annex B, Rollo,
p. 10.

[4] Jamildo v. New Bilibid Prisons (NBP) Officials, 242 SCRA 87 (1995).

[5] An Act Providing for the Acknowledgment and Authentication of Instruments and Documents
Without the Philippine Islands, enacted January 26, 1912.

[6] Romana R. Maligsa, v. Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, A.C. No. 4539, May 14, 1997.

[7] Ramirez v. Ner, 21 SCRA 207 (1967).

[8] See Note 6.

[9] Bongalonta v. Castillo, 240 SCRA 313 (1995).

[10] Marcelo v. Javier, 214 SCRA 13 (1992).

[11] Canon I, Code of Professional Responsibility.

[12] Rule 1, supra.

[13] Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 (1992).

THIRD DIVISION

[AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002]

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the
client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The Case

Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement
alleging the following:

xxxxxxxxx

That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in
September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan
de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case
against certain parties for breach of contract;

That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and
some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to
secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he
subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);

That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the
amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the
instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;

That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in
court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;

That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there
seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would
repeatedly tell me just to wait;
That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my
last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my
case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at
about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building
and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within
the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;

That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk
of Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and
there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of
the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;

That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his
office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was
being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not
at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to
appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5,
1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as
Annexes D and E;

That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;

x x x x x x x x x.[1]

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,[2]
respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently denying the allegations of complainant for being totally
outrageous and baseless. The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the formers
law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill
Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business
partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this
time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without
informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the formers law office to deliver the letter
to the addressee.

Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a
complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a
compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following:

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation

3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife

All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.

Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files
pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to
draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by
complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees
amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay
on installment basis.

On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondents secretary and told her that
it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately
called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees
before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for
the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the
complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures,
Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for
two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.

Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint.
Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that
the complaint be filed first before payment of respondents acceptance and legal fees. When respondent
refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his
own personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their
office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondents checks were accepted and encashed by
complainant.

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone
had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.

The IBPs Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:

x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the
filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill
complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the
Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of
respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his
attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage
and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law
profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by
complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.
Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.[4]

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Commissions recommendation.

Main Issue:

Misappropriation of Clients Funds

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the
Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing
fee.

Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the
formers failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by
complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorneys fees and not for the filing fee.

We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense
of the clients cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests
of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect
of the community for the legal profession.[5] Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to
lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the
profession.[6]

Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only
drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.

We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. To constitute professional employment, it is
not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not
necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is established.[7]

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the
lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formers fees.[8] Hence, despite the fact that
complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice
to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he
had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect
the clients interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should
not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.[9] They
owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the
clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.[10]

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to
complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt
erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the mistake -- if indeed
it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost
no time in calling complainants attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating
the correct purpose of the payment.

The Practice of Law -- a

Profession, Not a Business

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits.[12] The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration.[13] Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest
eminence may be attained without making much money.[14]

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued
by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously
careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.[15] Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and
properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.[16] It may be true that they have a lien
upon the clients funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that
they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply
such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not
relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.[17] In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their
clients interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.[18]
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to
him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the
amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.

On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of
law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.[19]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of
the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondents file.
SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., (Chairman), abroad, on official leave.

[1] Records, pp. 2-3.

[2] Ibid., p. 15.

[3] Id., at pp. 20-28.

[4] Report and Recommendation, pp. 10-11; records, 261-262.

[5] R. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1997 ed., p. 156.

[6] Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, AC No. 4073, June 28, 2001.

[7] Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, September 21, 1949.

[8] Junio v. Grupo, AC No. 5020, December 18, 2001.

[9] Aromin v. Boncavil, 315 SCRA 1, September 22, 1999.

[10] Tan v. Lapak, 350 SCRA 74, January 23, 2001.

[11] Cantiller v. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246, December 18, 1989.

[12] Canlas v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 160, August 8, 1988.

[13] R. Agpalo, supra, p.12.

[14] Ibid., p. 13.

[15] Medina v. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, September 26, 1964.

[16] Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, supra; Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694, March 27, 2000, citing Obia v.
Catimbang, 196 SCRA 23, April 19, 1991.

[17] Tanhueco v. De Dumo, 172 SCRA 760, April 25, 1989.

[18] Aromin v. Boncavil, supra.

[19] Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Phils. et al., AC No. 4215, May 21, 2001.

EN BANC

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred
his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially
entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas
and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each
of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had
been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family
and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage
of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who
went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying
and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused
had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a
loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels
the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f
justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to
the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the
lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they
were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding
that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."[1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question
of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The
death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and
anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to
find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to
be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take
the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic
with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law.
Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when
taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer
and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on
a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal
profession.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Resolution, p. 8.Toggle navigation

Show opinions

B.M. No. 2540

EN BANC

[ B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013 ]

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979[1]
and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.[2]

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney's Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees.[3] He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13
May 1980,[4] but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys[5] given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.[6]

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.[7]
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll
of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer";[8] and "the matter of signing in
the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."[9]

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.[10] Not having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.[11]

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 2012[12] and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.
[13] The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner's gross negligence, gross
misconduct and utter lack of merit.[14] It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory
conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.[15]

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado's prayer in the instant petition, subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most
serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court's
attention to petitioner's omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse,
albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this
long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa 'yo, you don't know what's gonna happen. At the same time, it's a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what's gonna happen. And, finally it's the right thing to do. I have to come
here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.[16]

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law,
[17] which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to
the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,[18] Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.[19]

All these demonstrate Medado's worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege,[20] this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege
from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the
profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.[21] He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
"neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment."[22]

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts[23] as it negates malice or evil motive,[24] a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.[25] Ignorantia facti
excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake
of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was
already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an
attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because
of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made
him so.[26] When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the
necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one's assuming to be an attorney or officer
of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,[27] which
is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.[28] Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt[29] and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.[30] In this
case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,
because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of

law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.[31] As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend
him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him
in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to
engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael
A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution.
Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the
one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act
that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely
by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Abad, Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.

Brion, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., On leave.

Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., On official leave.

[1] Rollo, p. 1; Petition dated 6 February 2012.

[2] Id.

[3] Id. at 2.

[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 10.

[6] Id. at 2.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 3.

[11] Id. at 4.

[12] Id. at 20; TSN, 21 September 2012.

[13] Id. at 35-43; Report and Recommendation of the OBC dated 24 January 2013.

[14] Id. at 42.

[15] Id.

[16] Rollo, p. 28; Report and Recommendation of the OBC dated 24 January 2013.
[17] Id. at 3; Petition dated 6 February 2012.

[18] Id. at 22; TSN, 21 September 2012, p. 3.

[19] Id. at 34; id. at 15.

[20] Barcenas v. Alvero, A.C. No. 8159, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 1, 11.

[21] Rollo, p. 35; TSN, 21 September 2012, p. 16.

[22] Id. at 3; Petition dated 6 February 2012.

[23] Wooden v. Civil Service Commission, 508 Phil. 500, 515 (2005).

[24] Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 836 (2005).

[25] Id.

[26] Aguirre v. Rana, 451 Phil. 428, 435 (2003).

[27] RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 3(e).

[28] Tan v. Balajadia, 519 Phil. 632 (2006).

[29] Id.
[30] RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 3.

[31] See Tapay v. Bancolo, A.C. No. 9604, 20 March 2013; Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente, A.C. No. 7269, 23
November 2011, 661 SCRA 1; and Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 478 Phil. 378 (2004).

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EN BANC

[ AC. No. 11316, Jul 12, 2016 ]

PATRICK A. CARONAN v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. 'ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN +

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan
(complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan
(respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former
has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice
of law.

The Facts
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio[2] R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan.
Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born
on August 5, 1976.[3] Both of them completed their secondary education at the Makati High School
where complainant graduated in 1993[4] and respondent in 1991.[5] Upon his graduation, complainant
enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in 1997.[6]
He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator
of 7-11 Convenience Stores.[7] In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2)
daughters.[8] Through the years, complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a
Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.[9]

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) in 1992.[10] In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the
family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three
(3) children.[11] Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree.[12]

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had
enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.[13] Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant
that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records
from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.[14] Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any
adverse consequences to him.[15]

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in
Taguig City.[16] Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-
occupied with his job and had a family to support.[17]

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to
report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in
relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."[18] Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer
Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his
and respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land
Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St.
Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and his
Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St.
Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A. Caronan."[19]
Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was
one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.[20]

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities,
complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.[21] However, problems relating to respondent's use of the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha
Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's contact
details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters concerning
respondent.[22] On the other hand, a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent who,
using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.[23]
Complainant also received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how
respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when
in fact, he was not.[24] Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities,
illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.[25]

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant
developed a fear for his own safety and security.[26] He also became the subject of conversations among
his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC.[27] Hence, complainant filed
the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and
illegal practice of law.[28]

In his Answer,[29] respondent denied all the allegations against him arid invoked res judicata as a
defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed[30] the administrative
case[31] filed by Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared closed and terminated
by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.[32] Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and
her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him
because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman.
[33]
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties
failed to appear.[34] Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.[35] On such date,
however, both parties again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order[36]
directing them to file their respective position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any.[37]

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner)
issued his Report and Recommendation,[38] finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming
complainant's name, identity, and academic records.[39] He observed that respondent failed to
controvert all the allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity.[40] On the
other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan."[41]

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed
upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo;
and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.[42] However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by
the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.[43]

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that .the photograph taken of respondent
when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in
the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."[44] These, according to the Investigating
Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the
Bar Examinations.[45] Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic records of
complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the
Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll
of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.[46] He also recommended that
respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar;
and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate
actions against respondent.[47]

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,[48] adopting the
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from
being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that
he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely
assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College
of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed
upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo.[49]
Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.[50] This diverges from the
official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.[51] Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A.
Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."[52] Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous documents showing that
he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of
Makati bearing his photograph;[53] (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;[54] and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.[55]

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name,
identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be
barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for
admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a
pre-law course, viz.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of
law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major
or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases
supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in
1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating.[56]
Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education
and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name,
identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all,
is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.[57] Rather, it
is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.[58] In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar
Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the
Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,[59] the Court explained the essence of good moral
character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a
person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
[60] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar
when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into
controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had
been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers.[61] This is
imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his
client, as well as between him and the court.[62]

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary
qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his
acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to
uphold its integrity and dignity.[63]

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found
GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan
(complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to
the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a
lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such
name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards
of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a
warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the
name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno C.J. Carpio,Velasco, Jr.,Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Mendoza, and Reyes, JJ., on official leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on July 12, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by
the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on
August 19, 2016 at 2:07 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)

FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA

Clerk of Court
[1] Dated October 10, 2013. Rollo, pp. 9-18.

[2] "Porfirio" in some parts of the record.

[3] Rollo, pp. 9-10.

[4] Id. at 10.

[5] Id. at 11.

[6] Id. 10

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at 11.

[9] See id .at 10-12.

[10] Id. at 11.

[11] Id. at 10-11.

[12] Id. at 11.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at 12.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. at 12-13.

[20] Id. at 13.

[21] Id. at 13-14.

[22] Id. 14.

[23] Id. at 13.

[24] Id. at 14.

[25] Id. Entitled "Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds
or Credit and for Other Purposes," approved on April 3, 1979.

[26] Id. at 16.

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at 17.

[29] Dated May 5, 2015. Id at 77-80.

[30] See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XX-2012-649 dated December 29, 2012 issued by
National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 110.

[31] See complaint for disbarment dated December 18, 2008, entitled "Joseph Garcia Agtarap v. Atty.
Patrick Atillo Caronan"; id. at 81-90.

[32] See Minute Resolution dated October 23, 2013; id. at 111-112.

[33] See id. at 77-79.

[34] See Minutes of the Hearing; id. at 71.

[35] See Motion to Cancel/ Reset Mandatory Conference/ Hearing dated March 9, 2015; id. at 72-73.

[36] Dated April 20, 2015 issued by Commissioner Jose V. Cabrera. Id. at 76.
[37] Id. at 127.

[38] Id. at 117-134.

[39] Id. at 131.

[40] Id. at 130.

[41] Id. at 129.

[42] Id. at 130.

[43] Id. See also id. at 30.

[44] Id. at 129. See also id. at 50-51 and 59.

[45] Id. at 131.

[46] Id. at 133.

[47] Id.

[48] Id. at 115-116.

[49] Id. at 130. See also id. at 49.

[50] Id at 130.

[51] Id. See id. at 38.

[52] Id. at 129. See also id. at 51 and 59.

[53] Id. at 23-25.

[54] Id. at 29.

[55] Id. at 45-46.

[56] See id. at 11. See also Application for the PMA; id. at 36-37.

[57] In the Matter of the Admission to the Bar of Argosino, 316 Phil. 43, 46 (1995).

[58] Id.

[59] See B.M. No. 1154, June 8, 2004.

[60] Id.

[61] Supra note 56, at 46-50.

[62] See Lizaso v. Amante, 275 Phil. 1,11(1991).

[63] Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

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SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015 ]

SAMUEL B. ARNADO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to comply
with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.

The Antecedent Facts

In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this Court
to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his
pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the Court that he inquired from the
MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance and received the following Certification, dated
2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's Executive Director:

This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of IBP MIS
AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the following
compliance periods:

First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)

Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)

Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)

This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from the MCLE requirement
on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its January 14, 2009
meeting.[1]

In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Committee for evaluation,
report and recommendation.

In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer of the
MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing Board's
Evaluation, Report and Recommendation.[2] In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation[3] dated 14
August 2013,[4] the MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P.
Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for
the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14
April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No.
850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE
Governing Board noted that respondent neither applied for exemption nor complied with the Third
Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.

In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk of Court to furnish
respondent with complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise required respondent to file
his comment within ten days from notice.
In his Compliance and Comment[5] dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not receive a
copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why his application for
exemption could not be granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his
application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was
based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law office of
his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family controlled
Camiguin and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the
law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.

Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for
about 50 years. He stated:

xxxx

Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over government in February 1986, a seat as
Justice of the Supreme Court but I refused the intended appointment because I did not like some
members of the Cory crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my silence;

Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the results
of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally resulted to the
EDSAI revolution;

xxxx

Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the
national canvassing before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President against then
GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN CUEVAS;

Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like ABENINA
and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS,
including now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and validity of the 2010
national elections, still undecided up to this day;

Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality and
legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC only decided after the Senate decided his case and
former SC Chief Justice Corona conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and
academic;

Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the Opposition in the
regular Parliament in the Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments;

Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;

Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and orchestrated
the debate in the complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS;

Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances before the Supreme
Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and
numerous courts all over the country;

Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the MCLE;

x x x x[6]

Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo; (2)
Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles and Lost
Opportunities; and (5) Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice for him
to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be
allowed to practice law while complying with the MCLE requirements.
In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent applied
for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground of expertise in law. The MCLE
Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed respondent of the
denial of his application in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that according to the MCLE
Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant to expertise in lp.w under
Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
proof to establish his expertise in a certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent failed to
meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.

The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all their pleadings
filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption pursuant
to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no record that respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a pleading that his "MCLE Application
for Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.

The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the dismissal of
the case and the striking out of the pleadings from the records.[7] The OBC also reported that under
Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply with
the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to explain his deficiency or to show
his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also provides that a member who fails to comply
within the given period shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing
Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013.
The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be
filed against respondent in connection with the pleadings he filed without the MCLE
compliance/exemption number for the immediately preceding compliance period and that the pleadings
he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that
respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because
the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid.

The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of non-
compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's suspension from
the practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent be directed to
comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.

The Issue

The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the
MCLE requirements.

The Ruling of this Court

Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law."[8] The First Compliance Period was from
15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007;
and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered
respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also failed to
comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April
2013.

The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance
periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January
2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the First
and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance
Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009
on the ground that the application did not meet the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3,
Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for
exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its letter dated 1 October
2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and
Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's MCLE compliance.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the MCLE
Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for
reconsideration was sent to respondent in a letter[9] dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.

Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850.
His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance
periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He furnished the
Court with his letter dated 7 February 2012[10] to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on his
application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.[11] He did
not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.

In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter
denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also reported
that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of the
MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days from receipt of the notification to comply.
However, in his Compliance and Comment before this Court, respondent stated that because of his
involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could comply with Bar Matter
No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered with the MCLE Program of the
University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.

Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:

Section 12. Compliance Procedures

xxxx

(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of the
notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice
shall be written in capital letters as follows:

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF

COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE
A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE
LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit
units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior period
requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned in which case the excess may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.

A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee
of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon
the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall
apply.

Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover
his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance
Period.

The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements of
Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods,
would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but
claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider the
MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption when his motion for reconsideration was already
denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform
the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was beyond the 60-
day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and without even
indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while complying
with the MCLE requirements.

The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for
exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of his
application. The MCLE Office only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received inquiries
regarding the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent indicated
"MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the
MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption. However, after he had been informed of the
denial of his application for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion for
reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still
aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE
Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for
reconsideration before the MCLE Office.

Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE
Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing
Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing
of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the Court from using its
administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of
Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.

The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We agree. In
addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not be
permitted to practice law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of
Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement,
under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare
respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend him from the practice of law for six
months or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that require its
immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to communicate its
action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;

(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter
had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;

(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE
requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has
fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts in the land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for their
appropriate actions.

SO ORDERED.

Del Castillo, Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.

* Designated acting member per Special Order No. 2147 dated 24 August 2015.

[1] Rollo, p. 68.

[2] The MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation was not attached to the letter
and was actually forwarded to the Court only on 22 August 2013.
[3] Rollo, pp. 73-76.

[4] Not 15 August 2013 as stated in the Court's 9 December 2013 Resolution.

[5] Rollo, pp. 84-87.

[6] Id. at 85-86.

[7] This was amended in the Court's Resolution dated 14 January 2014 in Bar Matter No. 1922.

[8] Section I, Rule 1.

[9] Rollo, p. 94.

[10] Id. at 92. Not 7 February 2013 as respondent stated in his Compliance and Comment.

[11] Id. at 91.

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