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1. Objective. Objectives of the Galvanic operation were the at­

tack and occupation of the Japanese held islands of Tarawa, Makin, and
Apamama, in order to deny these atolls to the Japanese and provide bases
for future operations of our own forces. The major effort was directed
against the island of Tarawa where a Jap airfield was located.

2. Air Force mission.1 The primary mission of the Seventh Air

Force was to prevent use oi the airfields at Makin, Tarawa, Mili,Nauru,
Jaluit, and Maloelap by Japanese air units prior to and during the oper­
3, Task Group 57.2 formed.

a. To insure maximum coordination with other participating

units, designated air units of the Seventh Air Force were assigned to
CTF 57, under command of COMAIRCENPAC* for operational control, and
designated as Task Group 57.2. As commander, TG 57.2, the Commanding
General, Seventh Air Force, also commanded all land-based aircraft
strike units participating in Galvanic.

b. Although the land-based strike units were under operational

control of the Navy, their successful participation was largely due to
the planning, preparation, training, security precautions, and logistic
support of the Seventh Air Force and its associated agencies.

4. Unusual problems presented. The Galvanic operation was diffi­

cult in that the entire Seventh Air Force, less certain defensive units
for Oahu, was committed. Over-all plans for committment and general
operations of the campaign could not be made by the Seventh Air Force
staff. Therefore itwas necessary to be prepared to carry out all
types of missions on extremely short notice. Support of the task group
units in their forward areas required much ingenuity and specially form­
ed provisional organizations. Because of lack of adequate maintenance
and supply facilities in these forward areas, detailed plans were made
to meet all conceivable emergencies. Facilities of the Hawaiian Air
Depot, the Air Force Service Command, and mainland supply agencies were
utilized to the maximum.

B. ACTIVITIES OF A-l. The primary responsibility of A-l was to pro­

vide the staff and personnel necessary to support air units assigned to
CTF 57 for operational control.
1, Organization of provisional units.

a. The staff for CTG 57,2 was formed by selecting key person­
nel from the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons of the Seventh Air

Force and VII Air Force Service Command, The Adjutant General, A-l,
A-2, and A-3 made up the Air Force Commander's staff; the A-4 section
operated under control of the Service Commander.

b. Part of the service organization of the VII Air Force

Service Command had to be changed from a permanently based defensive
force, organized under a manning table, to a group of highly mobile
units suitable for island operations in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands,
The number of tactical organizations, ranging from one to three squad­
rons, that could be based on any given island determined the size of
these units.

(i) On 12 August 1943, the Ist Provisional Air Service

Support Squadron was formed to occupy Baker Island
in the Phoenix Island group. This composite unit,
set up on a manning table basis, consisted of 20
officers and 200 enlisted men selected from the
various Air Force arms and services.

(2) The 2d Air Service Support Squadron was formed

21 September 1943, to occupy the Makin, Betio, and
Apamama atolls in the Gilbert Island group. This
unit of 42 officers and 745 enlisted men was con­
stituted early to insure proper ground and amphibi­
ous training, as it was to follow the assault forces.

(3) The 3d Provisional Air Service Support Squadron,

formed 26 September 1943 to occupy Funafuti,
Nukufetau, and Nanomea atolls in the Ellice Island
group, had a strength of 43 officers and 747 en­
listed men*

(4) The Advance Headquarters of the Seventh Air Force

and the VII Air Force Service Command was consti­
tuted 21 October 1948, as indicated in paragraph
B 1 a, and comprised approximately 48 officers and
140 enlisted men.

(5) Provisional Signal Air Warning units were drawn

from the Fighter Command and attached to each
"ASSRCN" in numbers necessary to perform their
mission. On completion of the Galvanic operation
there were 28 Signal Air Warning officers and 319
enlisted men in the forward area.

(6) The 804th Engineer Battalion Aviation was contin­

uously employed during the Galvanic operation un­
til completion of the Makin airstrip.

(7) Signal construction personnel, 14 officers and

237 enlisted men, were furnished from the 443 d
Signal Construction Battalion.

(8) The 809-th Medical Air EvacuationTransport Squadron,

statiored at Hickam Field and Canton Island, evacu­
ated sick and wounded*

2. Total troops employed .

Officers EM

Tactical 627 3425

Service 154 2697

Total 781 6122


1• Functi ona lorganization at ADVON.

a*An advance party from A-2, Seventh Air Force, arrived at

Funafuti on 16 October 1943 wiih the responsibility of coordinating
with the VII Air Force Service Command the construction of the advanced
headquarters of the Seventh Air Force (ADVON). By 13 November 1943 all
ADVON A-2 personnel (9 officers and 13 enlisted men) had arrived and
the section was prepared to perform its functions.

b. There were also 3 officers and 5 enlisted men in the Photo

Interpretation Detachment which was controlled by A-2, and a Technical
Crash Intelligence Team, consisting of one officer and one enlisted man,
previously secured from Washington. This was the only Technical Crash
Intelligence Team from the Central Pacific present immediately after
Makin and Tarawa were occupied. Personnel from the Public Relations
Section and the Combat and Documentary Photographic Unit, operating
under A-2 control, completed the A-2 group;

2. Intelligence planning.

a. All possible intelligence of the enemy and his capabilities

was obtained and evaluated in preparation for tiie Galvanic operation.
Liaison officers were sent to the South and Southwest Pacific for a
period of three months to collect and return pertinent information.
Much information was obtained from JICPOA. Other current intelligence
was obtained from adjacent and higher commands in this and other areas.
Considerable information had been obtained from long range combat and
photographic missions flown at irregular intervals by the Seventh Air
Force from December 1942 through October 1943, A Photo Interpretation
Unit had been procured from Washington,

b. Special reports on the Gilberts were prepared. Briefing

material and target charts of enemy objectives were prepared in ad-
van oe by JICPOA, 64th Topographical Engineers, Objective Data Section
of the Seventh Air Force, the Photo Interpretation Detachment, and
A-2 of the Bomber Command, and reproduced in quantity* Terrain,
weather, flying conditions to be expected, characteristics of the
Pacific theater, distances, geological construction of its islands,
and many oilier important items of intelligence were disseminated to
combat crews. Immediately upon arrival at ADVQN a safe-hand intel­
ligence pouch service between ADVON and A-2, Rear Echelon, was es­
tablished, resulting in rapid dissemination of mission reports, photo­
graphs, and similar intelligence material.

3. Combat intelligence.

The A-2 section at ADVON maintained a War Room and fur­

nished the Commanding General with intelligence necessary for plan­
ning, and decisions as strike commander* In addition to intelligence
obtained from photographs furnished by Commander, Task Group 57.3
(Search and Reconnaissance Group), considerable photo intelligence
was obtained from strike aircraft of the Seventh Air Force of idiich
approximately one- third were equipped with cameras* Briefing and
target charts with up-to-date information of what remained to be
destroyed on each particular target were furnished participating
units for planning and executing missions.
b* All preliminary and flash radio intelligence reports
were submitted direct to COMAIRCEtJPAC (information strike commander)
by island air commanders* As the camp of the Bomber Command was
adjacent to the Air Force and the Force Flagship of COMAIRCBNPAC was
based in the harbor at Funafuti, communications between these -three
agencies were ordinarily satisfactory* Ho separate net was available
to the Bomber Command and all radio communications were handled by
joint communication centers; the flow of intelligence was often hin­
dered to a considerable degree by excessive traffic on available

Briefing and interrogation of our combat crews were

done by Army Air Force squadron intelligence officers* The weather
initially was furnished in brief reports from Navy sources to island
air commanders* These forecasts were unsatisfactory and later Seventh
Air Force personnel were procured to furnish this information*
4* Training*

Training in the use of additional navigational aids and

the use of air pilot guides over long over-water flights was an abso­
lute necessity for combat crews with little experience other than
that obtained in over- land flying in the Ttoited States* A supply of
accurate navigation maps and charts was procured from the Maps and
Charts Division, Washington, D* C*


b» Particular stress was placed on training in recognition

of aircraft and surface vessels. Although sorely handicapped by lack
of equipment, all personnel received adequate training.

c. Combat intelligence officers were given additional train­

ing during the period that units were in training in Hawaii to include
the lessons learned by the intelligence officers in the South and South­
west Pacific,

d. Intelligence personnel
of ASSRONS (Air Service Support
Squadrons) utilized in the Galvanic operations were thoroughly trained
prior to their departure from Hawaii. In addition to special lectures
given these personnel, they were furnished a guide which outlined in
detail their functions of furnishing current intelligence of the enemy
to their commanders, supervision and execution of counter-intelligence
measures, and obtaining adequate publicity for the personnel and accom*
plishments of their units.


1. Planning .
a. Planning of the Galvanic operation was done by Joint Army

and Navy Staff personnel. Intelligence information was fairly complete

on the enemy situation, showing that a number of airfields were avail­

able to the enemy in the Gilbert and Marshall groups which could cause
considerable difficulty to our forces in accomplishing their mission.
Striking units in sufficient strength to deny the use of these airfields
to the enemy was of primary importance to success of the operation. In
planning the operational role of the Seventh Air Force, based on its
assigned mission of neutralization of enemy airfields within supporting
range, two important factors entered the picture: First, the size of
force available for such an operation and its capabilities; second, the
force necessary to adequately defend Oahu during this operation. The
entire planning of Galvanic had to be aggressive, bold, thorough, and
based on the shortest possible time schedule. It was necessary to strike
the enemy with all force available, coordinating the action of all units
concerned for maximum concentration.

b. Most difficult operational problem solved was the tremendous

distance to enemy bases which required pinpoint navigation and offered
few, if any, intermediate check points. Length of flights varied from
926 to 2,408 nautical. miles.

2. Organization.

a. The task force under the command of Major General Willis H.

Hale, organized and constituted to accomplish this mission, consisted of
the following units.

Headquarters Seventh Air Force, ADVON
Headquarters VII Bomber Command, ADVON
Headquarters 11th Bomb Group
42d Bcmb Squadron (H)
431st Bomb Squadron (H)
98th Bomb Squadron (H)
26th Bomb Squadron (H)

Headquarters 30th Bomb Group

27th Bomb Squadron (H)

38th Bomb Squadron (H)

392 dBomb Squadron (H)

531st Fighter Bomber Squadron

46th Fighter Squadron
45th Fighter Squadron

b. Iftider operational control of COMAIRCSNPAC, the Command­

ing General, Seventh Air Force, was designated Commander, Task Group
57.2, with above units as a striking force.

c. C-47 and LB-30 type aircraft of the 19th Troop Carrier

Squadron were utilized for air transportation of personnel and emer­
gency supplies.

d. One heavy bomber squadron, four medium bomber squadrons,

and seven fighter squadrons were retained in the Hawaiian Area for
its defense.

3. Advanced Headquarters and operation bases.

a. Major General Willis H» Hale, Commanding General, Seventh

Air Force, and staff arrived on Funafuti Island on 6 November 1943 and
immediately set up advanced headquarters. Allunits participating in
the operation were in place and ready to operate on schedule.

b. Our operating bases were located on the following islands

1) Funafuti
Funafuti Advanced Headquarters and the 42d and
431st Heavy Bomber Squadrons,

2) Nanomea
Nanomea 27th and 38th Heavy Bomber Squadrons.

3) Canton
Canton 26th and 392 dHeavy Bomber Squadrons.

4) llukufetau
- 98th Heavy Bomber Squadron.

5) Baker
Baker 45th Fighter Squadron and staging point
for heavy bombardment aircraft based on

c. These bases, with the exception of Canton, consisted of

small runways approximately 6,000 feet in length, carved out of coco­
nut groves.

4. Training, Training of bombardment groups presented widely

varying problems.

a. The 11th Bomb Group had previously distinguished itself

in combat in the Solomons area. Upon return to Hawaii, with the ex­
ception of a few cadre personnel, it was completely reconstituted with
new personnel and airplanes. New crews had to be thoroughly trained
by the Seventh Bomber Command, their instruction including the Seventh
Air Force Gunnery School and additional training in navigation, bomb­
ing, and long over-water flights.

b. The 30th Bomb Group which arrived on Oahu 11 October 1943

had less than six weeks in which to complete its training before leav­
ing for the forward area* This group initially, however, consisted of
much more experienced crews than the rehabilitated 11th Bomb Group so
that although their training period was short the combat crews were
well trained for the operation.


1. Joint staff arrangement.

a* The Commanding General, VII Air Force Service Command was
not provided with a separate staff, but utilized the Seventh Air Force
staff jointly with the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, This
arrangement made the A-4 responsible for the preparation of supply plans,
orders to execute the plans, and supervision over the execution of orders
for both the tactical and service commands. Special staff sections of
the Seventh Air Force were utilized by both commanders in the same man­
ner as the A-4. In effect, ths special staff supply sections actually
executed that portion of the supply plan which was fixed as the respon­
sibility of the Seventh Air Force.

b» A forwarl^chelon (ADVOtf) of A-4 was established at Funa­

futi, operating as a joint A-4 for Headquarters Seventh Air Force and
Headquarters VII Air Force Service Command, The ADVON made all neces­
sary arrangements, and prepared orders to make adjustments in the supply,
evacuation, and maintenance establishments in the forward area to fur­
nish adequate air service support to meet changes in tactical disposi­
tions directed by COWAIRCENPAC. The rear echelon A-4 mounted all troops,
equipment, and supplies for the forward area and advised ADVON A-4 of
their routing, time of departure, vessel, and tire of arrival, then
disengaged from further responsibility. Upon receipt of this information
ADVON A-4 assumed responsibility for supervising the placing of troops,
equipment, and supplies on positions. Close contact was maintained be­
tween rear 3chelon A-4 and ADVON A-4 throu^i weekly summary reports.

2. Procurement of supplies and equipment.

a. Upon receipt of information concerning Galvanic, an

estimate of the situation concerning equipment and supplies was made,
and requisitions covering the required maintenance supplies for 90
days, and ASSROM organizational equipment to support the Air Force
were prepared. Upon completion of this estimate, it was ascertained
that: (1) Equipment in possession of the 17th Base Headquarters
and Air Base Squadron was of the wrong type, and inadequate to equip
the ASSRONS, and (2) USAFICPA stocks were inadequate to supply both
the Air Force and Garrison Force requirements. Certain items were
available, but the time element precluded processing the Air Force
requisitions through USAFIGPA supply depots.

b. Because of this situation, all Air Force requisitions

on requirements for the Galvanic operation were forwarded through
Headquarters Army Air Forces to Headquarters Army Service Forces and
Headquarters Air Service Command to be filled and deadlined in San
Francisco Port of Embarkation, 1 October 1943. In view of the in­
dividual characteristics of each supply arm and service, the magni­
tude and unusual nature of the requisitions, and the fact that items
requisitioned were not included in the General Schedule of Supplies,
supply representatives from the Air Depot, Ordnance, and Signal Corps
were sent to Washington to expedite shipment, make spot decisions,
and coordinate the shipment of the supplies and equipment requisi­

c. Headquarters Army Service Forces, Headquarters Air

Service Command, and the San Francisco Port of Embarkation made
special efforts to effect delivery of the supplies and equipment at
the Port of Honolulu by the deadline date. As an operational pro­
ject, Army Service Forces had assigned this shipment a project num­
ber, Honolulu port authorities expedited the movement of this
material to Hickam Field, where it was broken down, re-boxed into
organization equipment and maintenance supply packups, and marked by
Seventh Air Force supply services, in accordance with instructions
issued by the A-4.
3, Allocation of supplies and equipment.

a. Based on recommendations of observers who had been sent

to the South and Southwest Pacific Areas for the specific purpose of
observing air service operations and constant study of the type of
air service unit and supplies and equipment required for atoll war­
fare, tentative Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment had
been prepared for an ASSRON prior to assignment of Galvanic, In
planning for Galvanic, correlation of the ASSRON with the garrison
force (GARFOR), and information that adequate air transport service
would be unavailable initially made several changes in the ASSRON
organization, and consequently the ASSRON T/E, necessary. Other

minor changes necessitated continuous revision of the t/e to keep pace
with the changing orgarization of the ASSRDI.

b. On Army Service Forces information that certain supplies

and equipment would be unavailable before the deadline date, or were
not available at all, USAFICPA depots supplied such articles as were
available in their stock; these items to be returned to USAFICPA stocks
on receipt of the Air Force shipmmt from Array Service Forces, In many
cases the Navy or the Marines had equipment available which we were
short, or which was superior in design to our own. Full cooperation
was obtained from these services in exchange of equipment.

4. Location of supply, evacuation, and maintenance establishments.

Based on a recornaissance of the Ellice Islands and study

of available information on the Gilbert Islands, locations of supply,
evacuation, and maintenance establishments we re determined, consider­
ation being given to: (1) Disposition of tactical units, (2) Avail­
ability and disposition of service installations of the Navy and Marines,
(3) Anchorage and unloading facilities, (4) Size of the island and
airdrome, and availability of suitable area, and (5) Centralized loca­
tion to facilitate service to the outer area.

b. To avoid initial congestion in unloading ships at destina­

tion, supplies, troops, and construction supplies for installation of
maintenance establishments were echeloned by priority in movement to

c. A forward supply reserve of 30 days Class IV (E) supplies

for all Air Force aircraft was established in a supply barge afloat at
Funafuti, This reserve, under the control of the ADVON A-4, Head­
quarters VII Air Force Service Command, was utilized in the Ellice-
Gilbert area as emergency supply.

5. Transportation of organizations and supplies.

To expedite movement, equipment and supplies were preload-

Ed on spotted freight cars and held awaiting call of the port regulating
officer. Each car was carefully tallied to expedite checking at the
pier. Ifctit Liaison Officers were assigned to coordinate movement of
their organization to the port and supervise loading aboard ship.

b. An Air Force Cargo Booking Agency was established under the

A-4 to book all supporting supplies not moved by COMFIFTRPHIBFOR with
the GARFOR and AS3RON to Ihe destination. This agency in turn booked
its cargo with the Army Port and Service Command, which issued instruc­
tions for movements of cargo to the port when bottoms were made available
Organization movements were handled directly by tiie A-4 *

c. Tonnage requirements for water movement of organizations and

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supplies were made known to the Navy Joint Shipping Control through
TJSAFICPA. Daily conferences with the Joint Shipping Control were
held to secure allocation of bottoms for movement. Due to shortage
of bottoms, priorities had to be established to insure that the
organizations and supplies which were of the greatest importance to
guarantee the success of the operational plan were placed on posi­
tion in time to accomplish their mission. This shortage of bottoms
caused air echelons of tactical units to operate from airdromes in
the Ellice Islands without effective support from ground echelons
and air service units for a short period of time.

6. Construction of airdromes.

a. Based on information available from A-2, the Air Bagi­

neer under supervision of the A-4, prepared plans for the construc­
tion of the air strip at Makin. These plans included taxiways, re­
vetments and hardstandings. The BO4th Aviation Efagineer Battalion
was assigned to GARFOR at Makin for this construction. Upon com­
pletion of the air strip the Aviation Engineer Battalion was with­
drawn, to Oahu for rehabilitation.

b. Assembled bulk fuel systems were furnished where re­

quired. These systems consisted of the Army Air Force bulk fuel

and the Navy bulk fuel system (10


system (canvas Mareng cell, portable pipeline and dispensing system)

1,000 barrel prefabricated steel
tanks revetted above ground, portable pipeline, 4 5,000 gallon
ready banks, and dispensing system). Both systems were installed at
Makin Island and interconnected. Filling was accomplished from a
single submarine pipeline tied into a tanker anchorage 2,000 yards
offshore, or from a barrel dumping stand which was actually a suc­
tion assembly to fillthe bulk storage or gasoline trucks from the
drummed gasoline reserve in an emergency.

c. Air Force technical, administrative, supply, mess, and

latrine construction at advanced bases was planned by the Air Engi­
neer under the supervision of A-4, the work being done by ground
force engineers furnished to the Fakin CtARFOR. Construction require­
ments were set up by type unit in order to keep pace with tactical
decisions effecting changes in dispositions of tactical units. Plans
included blueprints of buildings required arid complete bills of mater­
ial for each type building. All construction was of the prefabricated
type, designed to be torn down and moved to a new base when required.
Full use was made of mainland prefabricated buildings, such as Quonset
Huts and the Army Air Forces tropical type. The requirements were
bound into book form and published as "Seventh Air Force Construction
Requirements at Advanced Bases."

d. Public utilities were planned jointly with GARFOR and

ASSRON at the bases concerned. In most cases joint use of utilities
was limited, as it was necessary for the AS3RON to remain independent

of GARFOR due to the probability -that it would be leap-frogged to
new base.

7. Mobility,, In order to effect a rapid landing and set up air

service as rapidly as possible, a major effort was extended to provide
ASSROMS with the greatest degree of mobility possible. To effect this,
motorized equipment and shops were procured or manufactured locally.

8. Bombs and ammunition.

a. Seventh Air Force requirements for bombs and ammunition at

advanced bases were planned by the Air Force Ordnance Officer under
supervision of the A-4. Types of bombs and ammunition ratios recommend­
ed by VII Bomber Command and VII Fighter Command were given high consid­
eration in computing requirements. These requirements were submitted
through channels to CCMAIRPAC to COMSERVFOR who was charged witii placing
the bombs and ammunition on position. Bombs and ammunition approved by
COMAIRPAC to accompany assault and GARFOR to positions were supplied by
the Seventh Air Force and moved to position by COMFIFTHPHIBFOR. Support
shipments were moved to position by COMSERVFOR.

b. Full cooperation was obtained with the Navy and Marines in

utilizing types of bombs and ammunition which were common to all ser­
vices. A single agency, Army, Uavy, or Marine, was designated to supply
bombs and ammunition for the base where i2ie service concerned had the
greatest concentration of tactical and service units.

9. Hospitalization, sanitation, and evacuation of casualties*

a. ASSSON dispensaries were provided with a flight surgeon in

charge, who was charged with assisting tactical unit flight surgeons in
removal of casualties from aircraft, or in case of an emergency landing,
with removal of casualties. Evacuation was direct from squadron aid
stations and ASSRON dispensary to the base hospital. Upon arrival of
Medical Air Evacuation Squadrons and assignment of 5 C-54 type aircraft
to the Air Transport Command for primary use by the Seventh Air Force,
the medical air evacuation system was placed in operation. Casualties
were evacuated from the Gilbert area by Navy PB2Y type ambulance plane
to Funafuti where the medical air evacuation collecting station was
located and from there to the Hawaiian Area by C-54 air craft ?

b. ASSRON flight surgeons were charged with sanitation of the

Air Force area on the bases. Provision was made to meet the unusual
sanitary, insect, rodent, and disease conditions encountered in Pacific
atolls by sending the necessary supplies and equipment. Extreme empha­
sis was placed on keeping latrine and refuse pits above the water line
of the extremely low islands.

10. Assignment of supply, technical and labor troops.

Troops of all supply arms and services were required to


operate the General Air Force Assembly and Intransit Depot set up to

facilitate staging and preparations for Galvanic. The Seventh Air

Force had no complement of labor troops, so supply troous were with­
drawn from the Air Base Detachments in "the Hawaiian Area, whose re­
quirements fluctuated dependent upon the rate of flow of supplies
from the intransit depot, to operate this installation. As the dead­
line loading date approached, the overload placed on the Air Force
supply services by eighteen hour a day operation of the intransit
depot caused an acute labor situation* This labor shortage was re­
lieved by disbanding the Air Base Security Battalions which were
considered as a nonessential unit, and forming aviation squadrons
to supply labor to meet the deadline date.

b. Sufficient aircraft repair personnel in the mechanical

classifications were not available to effect the desired distribution
to ASSRONS. Because this shortage might seriously effect the ASSROIT
ability to produce effective aircraft repair service, it was neces­
sary to place these troopjs in ASSRCTIS located where the major repair
effort would be required.

11. Salvage of unserviceable supplies and equipment.

a. The unavoidable probability that supplies and equipment

would continually be damaged and lost in the difficult amphibious
operations required that every man be imbued with a personal interest
in property responsibility. During the formation of ASSRCNS, supply
officers were continuously reminded of the importance of supply dis­
cipline. All supply directives repeatedly emphasized the importance
of supply discipline to the proper implementation of the supply plan.
Both ASSRON and tactical units were very conscious of wastage before
their departure from Oahu.

b. Repairable and serviceable parts were salvaged from dam­

aged aircraft and other major items of equipment. Exchange of a re­
pairable or non-serviceable part for a serviceable part was directed
as standing procedure for all supply arms except in emergencies.
Parts not repairable by A3SRONS were returned to Oahu.

12. Captured supplies and equipment. Captured supplies and

equipment which were of value for study were forwarded to Oahu. All
airborne equipment was turned over to the Air Depot for careful analy
sis and report. -A large quantity of enemy bombs was captured, and
are now under study to determine the possibility of their use against
the enemy. All captured bulk supplies were utilized in the forward
area. A considerable amount of enemy av^as, low in octane rating but
suitable for use as motor fuel, is available in the forward area
obviating the necessity of making motor fuel shipments from Oahu.
Captured enemy oil is utilized for road stabilization.

13. New types of equipment and modification of standard types.

Standard types of equipment were constantly studied to determine modi­
fications required to better equipment for field conditions. Modifi­
cations known to be required were made prior to departure of units from
Oahu. Other modifications were made in the field as necessity was de­
termined. New types of equipment were service tested in the field.
14, Administrative order. Administrative orders covering all ad­
ministrative instructions and the supply plan applicable to Air Force
units were prepared* Supplementary administrative instructions were
covered in the Base Development Plan for the island concerned.


1. Engineering Department. During the preparation for and

throughout the actual campaign, this department modified aircraft,
trained and supplied engineering personnel for the ASSRONS, and aug­
mented and supplied engineering personnel and equipment.

a. Aircraft were modified to meet special requirements of

the situation or better adapt -them for intended operations. Some of
these changes were standard modifications, others were original develop­
ments •

(1) Heavy bombers 50 modifications were made on

each plane, initial combat and replacement, as listed
on Inclosure No. 2. Rate of processing was 2-£ planes
per day.

(2) Medium bombers 23 modifications were made on

each plane, as listed on Inclosure No. 3, Rate of
processing was 3 planes per day.

(3) Fighters

38 P-39Q1 and P-39Q5 aircraft

were modified to facilitate launching from a carrier.
Other changes to these planes and 12 P-40's are list-
Ed on Inclosure No. 4.

(4) Fighter-bombers 13 A-24's were assembled and test-

Ed« No modifications were made.

b. The Signal Section trained and furnished 1 officer, 1 warr­

ant officer, and 20 enlisted men; assembled and packed Signal Corps
equipment and supplies for T/E plus 90-day maintenance level, totaling
over 800 packing cases; and fabricated the following special equipment:

(1) 2 Invasion type combination Early-Warning and GCI

radars (Navy' SC-2 installed in AA S/L trailer).
(2) 2 VHF sets (SCR-522 with aircraft generator) installed
in Radio Command Cars.

(3) 4 combination air-borne radio and radar test
benches •

c. 5 officers and 251 enlisted men were furnished for 3

ASSRONS, and special repair trucks were manufactured for use by the

d. 3 officers and 150 enlisted men were furnished for air­

craft maintenance and repair work at the 422 dSub-Depot which was
established at Canton. Through its operation, many airplanes of all
types were quickly returned to combat; emergency repairs were made
on others enabling them to return to the Control Depot for completion
of repairs.

c. Approximately 180 enlisted men, the majority from Air

Force squadrons, were trained in specialized work and returned to
their units, 49 Navy personnel were given training, mainly in sheet
metal fabrication pertinent to aircraft modification.

f • Civilian mechanics and supervisors were sent to advance­

ed bases on call for third and fourth echelon work.

2. Supply Department. The supply department of the Hawaiian

Air Depot took a continuous part in all phases of the Galvanic oper­
ation from the inception of the earliest preparations up to and in­
cluding re-supply and procurement in the operation of the establish­
ed bases and base detachments. The following summary highlights the
coordinating functions of the supply department in the combined
operations of the several departments of the Hawaiian Air Depot with
the Seventh Air Force and the Air Force Service Command.

a. In the initial planning stages of the ASSRDNS involved,

the supply department selected from its personnel 7 officers suffi­
ciently experienced to serve efficiently as Supply Officers in "the
First, Second, and Third Base ASSRCNS and their detachments. During
preparation of the Table of Equipment for the ASSEDNS, the entire
resources of the supply department organization were devoted to ana­
lytical and fimdamental research work for the determination of oper­
ational excellence of the t/e Equipment. As the T/E was prepared
locally and modifications were necessary as preparation of the T/S
progressed, the supply department organization and personnel were
made available day and ni^ht for complete cooperation with the Com­
manding Officer and the Supply and Engineering Officers of each
ASSRCN. All decisions with respect to changes in the T/E were coordi­
nated with A-4 of the Seventh Air Force.

b. The t/e necessary for the operational success of Galvanic

having been determined, the supply department be^an the immediate issue
and procurement planning for the many items of supply and equipment tab
ulated therein. Having been advised that the Galvanic operation would

Include a definite number or quantity of tactical squadrons of certain
types, the Depot Supply Officer coordinated the t/e v s and computed the
amount of equipment and supplies required for the operation, for both
tactical and service squadrons. All balances of Air Corps supply stock
involved were checked for availability and obligated for the Galvanic
operation* Emergency requisitions were instituted for those items not
on hand* Balances on hand and available for issue accounted for about
84% of the Air Corps items required by the final approved t/E's for the
ASSRONS and tactical squadrons. About 1,888 items, or approximately
16$ of the required items, had to be requisitioned from the mainland.
Every priority procurement means was used to carry on procurement oper­
ations in accordance with the addition or deletion of articles of equip­
ment as caused by modifications to equipment. By constant initiation
and close follow-up of emergency radios and requisitions over 500 items
of equipment and supply were secured from the mainland to fillshortages
resulting from such modifications*
(1) To maintain extreme secrecy throughout preparation for
this operation, the plans and ultimate purpose of these
involved detailed supply activities were divulged to
only -three individuals, the Depot Supply Officer, the
Property Control Officer of the Supply Department, and
the Chief Clerk of the Property Control Branch of the
Supply Department* Because it was necessary to make
a deadline of 8 days from tbe starting time of prepar­
ation of balance check and procurement requirements,
tills portion of -the supply departments work was most

The supply department organisation of the Hawaiian Air De­

pot geared itself into a day and night working program for most of its
personnel over the month of October, 1943* Deadline set for the de­
livery of requisitioned equipment and supplies at the Port of Embarka­
tion on the mainland was 15 September 1943, with arrival at Honolulu
set at 1 October 1943* As these Air Corps items arrived at the Port of
Honolulu, they were received by the Steamship Dock Section of the Ship­
ping and Receiving Branch of the Supply Department, and transportation
by trailer, truck, and railroad flat car was arranged to dear all cargo
from the docks* The deadline dates for completion of packing and crat­
ing of all T/B
items were set for eaoh ASSRQN. Coordinating the hand­
ling of this equipment and supplies received from the mainland with the
program of packing and crating of Air Corps equipment and supply on hand
as required by the t/Efor Galvanic, presented no little difficulty.
Most of these supplies from the mainland were received in one huge influx
at the Honolulu docks. Storage space was, as always, a pertinent factor,
making dispersion througiout the island of Oahu a necessity. This dis­
persion was so planned as to coordinate with requirements for packing and
crating to make deadline dates for the Galvanic operation.

d. In -the classification and preparation of equipment and sup

plies for movement, a system was magu rated and followed involving

vice and organization (ie; Signal


preparation of Shipping Tickets (AAF Form #104) for eaoh using ser­
Ist Base ASSRCN) listing all
items of it's equipment and supplies, followed by issue and packing
or crating in accordance with these shipping tickets* Preparation
of these forms required 9,844 pages of Shipping Tickets (AAF Form
#104) upon which were typed 87,031 items for issue, packing and
crating, and took 1600 man hours*

(1) Many difficulties were encountered during the

issue, packing, and crating, since these oper­
ations were being carried out while the shipping
tiokets were still in process of typing* For
example, supply for the ASSBDNS was prepared for
a period of ninety days and issue, packing, and
crating were made up in 3 30-day increments.
Considerable re-planning and much additional work
was occasioned when destination or consignee point
of one of these increments was changed after tfie
supply department had completed fully one-half of
the shipping tickets involved, both as to typing
and issue and packing* Also, the tactical squad­
rons' positions were moved from time to time
throughout the preparation so that by -the time
the supply department was ready to prepare certain
materiel for shipment the bases and their number
had actually changed, resulting in the necessity
of compiling the equipment and supplies going out
into a different collection of supplies because
of the change in tactical organization*

c* Speoial precautions were taken to insure that no time

would be wasted in segregating materiel upon arrival at destination »
Materiel was marked for each section of each ASSROT for each oper­
ation as follows j

Engineering Section
Supply Section
Transportation Section
Defense and Operations Section
Weather Section
Medical Section.

All shipping tickets were cross referenced in their marking to the

boxes in which supplies were packed, and further cross referenced
to the sections for which they were made* The boxes were each mark­
ed in code for the section to which they belonged in eaoh ASSRON.
Copies of idie shipping tickets applicable were not only affixed to
the outside of the boxes but were placed inside the boxes along with
the materiel listed thereon*

f• As part of the training program for the enlisted personnel
of the ASSBONS the complete facilities of the Supply School were made
available to the commanding officer of each ASSRCN. Many enlisted men
designated as supply personnel attended the regular classes carried on
concurrently at the Supply School. The following outline of the con­
centrated course in supply procedure for enlisted personnel illustrates
the thorough fundamental training given these men before their departure*


I* Orientation
II• Review of Organisation of Amy Air Forces
lII* Sohelons of Maintenance, Supply , and Recla­
mation (Stress laid on Echelons of Technical
IV* Army Air Force Classification of Material
(T*o* 00-36-A-l)
V. Status of Army Air Force Equipment and Supplies
VI. Army Air Force Stock List (T.O. 00-35A-6)
VII* General Provisions for Storage of AAF Equipment
and Supplies (AAF Regulation 65-19)
VIII. Regulations
IX. Army Air Force Vouchers
X. Army Air Force Supply Forms.

In addition to the Supply School classes throughout October, the supply

personnel of the ASSRCNS were given practical, demonstrations and exhi­
bits by the Hawaiian Air Depot supply organization. Property Control
Unit personnel and Warehouse Branch personnel of the supply department
worked with the ASSRON supply enlisted personnel on practical solutions
of detailed problems.

g. Ifhen the equipment and supplies required for the Galvanic

operation were boxed and crated, the shipping organization of tiie sup­
ply department was held in readiness to move equipment and supplies to
the port of embarkation upon call* Calls for delivery to piers for
vessel loading came at all hours of the day and night, necessitating
immediate organization of personnel and automotive equipment for load­
ing and transporting equipment and supplies to the port designated.
Many nights, long hours of overtime were completed to meet the vessel
sailing deadline* Inasmuch as the depot supply of automotive vehicles
for heavy transportation is barely adequate for normal transportation
requirement, a considerable strain was put upon the use of this equip­
ment* Dispersion of these vehicles, especially throughout the day when
they were dispatched on sundry routine tasks, created many problems in
securing immediate servioe for loading to meet sailing time.

h. The following pertinent statistics summarize the work done

in preparing and moving equipment and supplies into the port of embarka­
tion for Galvanic operations

(1) 10,000 boxes of supplies were moved.
(2) 6,000 drums of aviaticn gasoline were moved to

(3) Total weigit of general equipment and supplies

moved for shipment to Baker:

Vehicles and Gasoline 185,400
1,884,672 pounds

Total 2,070,072 pounds

(4) Weight for Galvanic operation in Norember 1943:

General 1,363,136 pounds

Vehicles 1,058,410 B

Total 2,421,546 pounds

(5) Weight for Galvanic operation 1 December 1943

through 15 January 1944:

Vehicles 476,300
351,900 pounds

Total 828,200 pound 8

(6) Total General

Total Vehicles
3,599,708 pound 8

Grand Total 5,319,818 pounds

(7) Summary and Grand Total Weights:

Dec 1 Jan 15
2,070,072 pounds

5,319,818 pounds (*)

(*) Approximately 9,850 measurement tons.

i. Ihe supply department gave immediate attention night

and day to the earliest possible shipment of re-supply items *hich
were ordered from the Depot Supply Officer on priority and routine
requisitions, both on standard Air Corps forma and by radio from
the several bases and base detachments in the Galvanic area of
operations. Of the total requisition items thus received, for re­
supply by the supply department, 89$ were supplied by immediate

shipment to the destination*

j. Lathes, shapera, grinders, milling machines, and similar

equipment were furnished by the supply department to provide for third
and minor fourth echelon maintenance at the advance depot* Inspection,
Property Control , and Warehouse Branch personnel of long experience in
handling such organisational and operational details were also dispatch­
ed to assist in putting the advance depot in proper shape to receive
and set up the equipment.


1. Planning for Joint Communications Centers » A committee was

formed under the direction of the Communications Office, CinCPOA, to
establish a Joint Communication System by which all communications
would operate utilizing a minimum amount of equipment, number of per­
sonnel, and number of frequencies* A representative of the Seventh
Air Force Signal Office was a member of this committee which drew up
a policy to govern communications for the Galvanic action* Although
there was not complete agreement in all matters, a compromise was made
and the policy was published by CinCPOA. Based upon this policy letter
(Inclosure No* 1) a communications plan was prepared with the assist­
ance of all the communications officers of the Seventh Air Force, VII
Fighter Command, and the VII Bomber Command* This communications plan
was published with CinCPAC operations order number 1-43, and provided
for Joint Communications Centers to be established at Canton, Baker,
Funafuti* Nukufetau, and Nanomea. These centers were to be manned by
Army* Navy, and Marine Corps personnel, utilizing equipment already
at those bases. Additional equipment was to be supplied by the Navy
for Baker, and by the Army for Canton*

2* Functional organization at ADVON.

To provide personnel and equipment to carry out the Army

Air Force job in the El]ice Islands, the Third ASSBON was formed, with
a communications section of 152 officers and men to be divided between
the bases of Nanomea* Funafuti* and Nukufetau* Baker communication
system was already organized with Army Air Force personnel of the First
ASSRCN* A section of the Seventh Air Force already at Canton operating
a Canton to Hickam circuit was combined with Army and Navy units al­
ready at that base to form a Joint Communications Center* Air circuits
were set up to handle communications between these bases for all tacti­
cal units* The major air tactical net included Funafuti* Baker, Canton,
and Tarawa. The Ellice air tactical net linked Funafuti, Nanomea, and
Nukufetau. A radar telling circuit was established between all bases
but was used very rarely* The Gilbert air tactical net was set up at
Apamama, Tarawa, and Makin after capture of -those three bases* Primary
responsibility for the establishment of the bases at Tarawa and Apamama
rested with the Navy; at Makin with the Army. Secondary responsibility
for air circuits at Apamama and for internal telephone trimking communi­

cations between the airfields at Tarawa was assumed by the Seventh
Air Force. Air Warning and Fighter Direction for Canton, Baker, and
Hakin was also the responsibility of the Seventh Air Force, The
operation of the SCR- 588 at Funafuti again was under the jurisdic­
tion of the Seventh Air Force. Bomber strike and air search and re­
connaissance stations were set up at the Joint Centers at each base.
Radio aids to navigation such as radio ranges and low frequency
homing transmitters were installed by the AACS. Radar and YG beacons
were installed by the Navy.

b. Headquarters of the Seventh Air Force and the head­

quarters of the VII Bomber Command were established adjacent to each
other at Funafuti and were served by the Funafuti Joint Communica­
tions Center and were linked to the center by teletype. A single
switchboard consisting of two TC-2O*s was installed to handle both
headquarters telephone systems, with a field wire end cable link
installed between the USS Curtis and the switchboard providing con­
tact with COMAIRC13?PAC. To coordinate the telephone system on the
island of Funafuti, the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, was
charged with the responsibility of coordinating the various services.
At Nanomea and Nukufetau, the wire sections of the ASSRON detachments
installed field cable and field wire for radio key lines and for
trunk telephone circuits between headquarters on the island. The
internal communications systems at Baker and Canton were already
established. However, additional teletype circuits were added at
Canton to expedite the delivery of messages to tactical organisations.

c. The operation of communications from November 13 to

December 6 through Joint Communications Centers was not entirely
satisfactory. This may be attributed to the fact that the idea was
new, construction of Joint Centers was continuing throughout the
action, and personnel were not accustomed to the new system of com­
munications. There were many delays in the transmission of oper­
ational messages* Aggressive corrective action was taken by communi­
cations officers of the Seventh Air Force to speed traffic in this
communications system* Through these efforts time delays decreased
continually but never reached a condition considered satisfactory*

d. A small signal section was established at Funafuti for

the supply and repair of radio and radar equipment. The Sub-Depot
at Canton provided an advance repair and supply depot for work which
could not be handled by the small section at Funafuti* The operation
of this section was hampered by delay in constructing a suitable
building for housing the repair equipment.

Radio aids to navigation were also provided. A radio

range was established at Funafuti, but operated intermittently to a
range of about 200 miles due to technical and physical difficulties.
The homer which was established at Funafuti was not satisfactory due
to transmitter and antenna difficulties. These difficulties were

remedied but not in time to be of maximum use for the Galvanic action.
A radio range was established at Nanomea on the 4th of December. A
radio homer was operating at Baker • Radio range and radio homer wore
both available at Canton. These last ranges and homers worked very
satisfactorily throughout the action. YG equipment was installed at
Nanomea. YH homing equipment was installed at Funafuti, Baker, and
Canton. The AACS established circuits between Canton, Funafuti,
Nanomea, and Baker. Ihe station at Nukufetau was not available for
this action* Ihe vital communications circuits for "ttie Gilbert group
were installed by December 6.

f• Air Warning and Fighter Direction was provided at Canton

utilizing one SCR-270, one SCR-271, and one SCR-588 with VHF communi­
cation equipment and VHF homer. At Baker an SC-2 was mounted in a
searchlight trailer to provide Fighter Direction and one SCR-270-D was
provided for Air Warning. V#F communication equipment and homer were
provided for Fighter Direction communications. These VHF communica­
tions worked admirably and operated in an excellent manner. On Novem­
ber 30 the 45th Fighter Squadron moved from Baker to Nanomea and it
was necessary for the Seventh Air Force to establish VHF homer and VHF
equipment at Nanomea for this squadron, since the Argus unit at this
base was not equipped for VHF operation. At Makin two SC-2's with
associated VHF equipment went in with the attacking troops and one was
operative 20 November. One SCR-270-D was operative 28 November and
reporting to Ihe SC-2. Ihe complete VHF SCS-3 system, the second SCR­
270-D, and the Air Defense Command Post were operative at a later date.


1. Personnel. Air Service Support Squadrons were not furnished

sufficient labor troops to perform nan-technical duties, resulting in
highly trained technical personnel being employed as laborers on docks
and barges, ration details and sanitary details during initial phase
of operations. Labor troops are being assigned to ASSRCNS, to be re-
leased when no longer required.

2. Intelligence.
a. As ADVON moves forward, the A-2 section, ADVON, with its
entire physical equipment, should be set up and ready to operate on
arrival of A-2 personnel, to eliminate difficulties of setting up camp
and carrying on intelligence operations simultaneously. Action is be­
ing taken to insure that, if at all possible, complete duplicate A-2
physical equipment is forwarded in advance to each new ADVON head­

b. It is essential that an estimate of the enemy air order

of battle be furnished to lower units for the following reasons: (1)
So that proper bcmb loading may be prescribed (if estimates indicate
strong concentration of enemy aircraft on the ground at a particular

target, specific types of bombs and fuses are required); (2) Number
and types of enemy aircraft expected at each specific target deter­
mines the size and type of formation that our commander will pres­
cribe, the altitude of attack, and the tactics utilized; (3) So that
crews will be particularly alert when, new types of enemy aircraft are
expected over a particular target; and (4) Reliable estimates of
enemy air order of battle at the specific and alternate targets build
up morale of combat crews*

(1) It was impossible at ADVON to furnish lower units

with this information on the enemy air order of
battle because of two factors: (1) Failure on the
part of COMAIRCENPAC » after repeated requests, to
furnish information necessary to make a fairly re­
liable estimate as to the enemy air order of battle;
and (2) poor facilities for rapid dissemination of
known information. Proper security measures can be
taken to permit furnishing the enemy air order of
battle by radio at least to group commanders.

c. Number of photo interpretation officers was insufficient

to adequately furnish flash photo intelligence* Action is being taken
to furnish VII Bomber Command with a team of photo interpretors in
addition to placing on detached service with each photo laboratory
unit at least one photo interpretation officer*

d* Routine air transport service is not always satisfactory

for delivery of photos and routine intelligence reports* It is plann­
ed that the Bomber Command, Fighter Command, and groups be furnished
appropriate liaison aircraft*

An urgent need existed for a radio intelligence unit in

the* ADVON area similar to (but on a smaller scale) the one at Pearl
Harbor; since the unit at Pearl Harbor, which covers land, sea, and
air, cannot furnish desired intelligence information as timely and
as completely as a unit at ADVON concentrating only on intelligence
essential for decision by the strike commander of land based aircraft*
A unit of this type has since been allocated to this theater*

3. Planning and operations .

An advance detail should precede the main unit and estab­
lish the necessary operating agencies and construct the unit camp site*
Air echelons reached their operating bases in advance of their ground
echelons which necessitated the use of combat crews to set up the camp*
Corrective action will be taken in future movements.

b* Due to the extremely long flying distances to the targets,

a definite policy regarding the total number of missions to be flown
by each combat crew is essential. Rest periods after a certain number

of missions is also necessary. Such policy has been placed in effect.

4. Service units and supply.

a. ASSRON detachments are not required at each base and are

not properly organized to provide an effective degree of air service.
One or two tactical squadrons operating from an airdrome are self suf­
ficient providing there is an ASSRON in the area to provide third eche­
lon repair &ud supply service on call or requisition. Future ASSRONS
dispatched to the forward area will be complete units, assigned an air
service area in which they will be responsible for all air service.
This method of operation introduces the following additional require­

(1) Tactical units should be provided with reefers,

mobile Air Force repair units, and additional power
and water distillation units to increase their self-

sufficiency when operating on a base away from an
Tactical units based on island airdromes
inhere there is no ASSRON will be made as self-suf­
ficient as possible by issuing each unit this Class
IV equipment. Tactical units will request supplies
and repair service direct from the ASSRON charged
with air service in the area.

(2) ASSRCNS should be assigned transport aircraft to

effect priority deliveries of supplies and repair
personnel to airdromes within the ASSRCN service
area, to facilitate immediate temporary repairs on
economically repairable aircraft so that such planes
can be flown to the main base for completion of re­
pairs. ASSRONS are being assigned transport aircraft
for this purpose.

b. The method of marking supply shipments for the forward

area and identification at destination was excellent; the advance
copies of shipping tickets effectively facilitating the identifi­
cation of a box in which a specific item of supply was located*
Recommended that this method be continued.

c. Initial maintenance stocks should be shipped in 30-day ,

increments until ihe supply is built up to the authorized level, to
alleviate the initial congestion upon landing, reduce initial ship­
ping requirements, facilitate rapid and orderly establishment of sup­
ply dumps, and release units from loading details for the establish­
ment of camps, maintenance, and supply installations. This change
has been made.

d. The rapid and unpredictable tactical development in the

Central Pacific Area requires maximum mobility in the movement of

aircraft spares (Class IV (E)) to meet changes in dispositions of
tactioal aircraft. When these supplies are land-based, it is prac­
tically impossible to effect movement to a new position in time to
be of value to the tactical units before the next move* These main­
tenance supplies should be kept afloat in barges as much as possible,
with a working level of 10 to 30 -days supply for all aircraft based
in the ASS RON service area land based in the ASSRON supply, and a
60-day level maintained in the barges* Instructions have been issued
to maintain 10-days Class IV (£) supplies ashore and 60- days afloat
for all aircraft within the forward area. Hie barge supply will make
issues to all ASSRONS in the forward area*

(1) Although the barge supply system was not establish­

ed in sufficient time and was inadequately equipped
to be of effective value in Galvanic, it was ascer­
tained that to properly implement the barge supply
system, the following features are necessary: (1)
One barge for each type of bombardment aircraft and
one barge for all types of figiter aircraft oper­
ating in the area; (2) Barges to be equipped with
anohor and hoisting gear, ventilation, watertight
bulkhead doors, adequate hoisting gear for cargo
loading and discharge, proper bins of the wood type,
sufficient installed power for lighting and power
equipment, watertight hatches similar to a ship
hatch, and proper sanitary and office arrangements;
(3) Barges organised to effect proper storage,
shipping and receiving, issue and stock control;
(4) When barges are not tied up to piers, harbor
boats (LCMt s) must be permanently assigned to each
barge; and (5) Personnel not subject to recall by
a parent unit from which they are on detached ser­
vice must be assigned to man the barges. Necessary
action has been taken to equip and modify barges

now on procurement in accordance with these require­

If the ASSRON is too closely correlated to the 6AKFOR, it

becomes impractical to leapfrog the ASSRON to a new base without reduc
ing the service ability of either the ASSRON or GARFOR. ttie ASSRON
should be made as independent of the GARFOR as possible in order to
preserve its mobility without sacrificing its efficiency* Plans are
being made to make the ASSRON as independent of the GARFOR as possible
in order to guarantee this mobility*

f • Where a base is strictly temporary for air operations,

and is not to be extensively developed, construction for air units
should be limited to strictly essential construction only* The origi­
nal Air Foroe construction policy is being revised to eliminate non­
essential construction and revise priorities*

g. To provide proper air service upon the initial landing of
tactical aircraft on a new strip, facilities for aviation gasoline and
oil, third echelon aircraft repair, and bomb and ammunition supply
should be installed concurrently with the construction of the air strip,
The aviation engineer battalion should remain at the airdrome until all
aviation facilities have been completed. Premature removal of the 804th
Aviation Engineer Battalion from Makin Island delayed the construction
of the above facilities* Recommendation has been made that the aviation
engineer battalions not be relieved from an advanced base until released
by the Air Force Commander.

h. On islands where sufficient land mass exists, the Air Ser­

vice Center can be more effectively employed than ASSRONS. Plans are
being formulated to replace ASSRONS with Air Service Centers as the
Central Pacific offensive moves into islands where sufficient land mass
exists to facilitate their employment*

i. To supervise the execution of air service plans in the for­

ward areas an advanced echelon of the Air Service Command headquarters
should be established in a central location in the forward area. With­
out an adequate staff arrangement within the forward area, the Air Ser­
vice Commander is placed in the position of trying to execute his re­
sponsibility without the means to exercise his authority* Plans for
the organization and operation of an advanced echelon will be placed in
effect when completed.

5. Hawaiian Air Depot.

Organizations were over- equipped with heavy machinery.

Recommendations for future operations have been forwarded to the VII
Air Force Service Command.

b. Construction and engineer troops were not made available

soon enough for the preparation of facilities. Recommendations for
future operations have been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command.

c. A small number of repair troops should have been trained

and available for the commencement of operations. Recommendations for
future operations have been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command.

d. Mobile repair shops, such as the Depot manufactured sheet-

metal truck, furnish ample facilities for third echelon maintenance;
however, a greater supply of raw material, particularly sheet aluminum
and bar stock, should accompany the vehicles. Recommendation for future
operations has been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command.

c. Field repairs should be definitely limited to third echelon;

repairable items should be forwarded more quickly to the repair base.
Recommendation for corrective action to be taken in future operations has
been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command.

f • Automatic supply of Technical Data for the advanced bases
from the mainland was too slow to arrive on schedule for use in the
Galvanic operation, for which itwas intended. Requisitions were en­
tered at once by the Air Depot Supply Department for emergency handling
from the mainland to this Depot followed by immediate shipment to the
bases involved*

g. The first reports from the advance bases indicated it was

necessary to pack all AAF material with only one classification in a
box, as due to lack of storage space, material is often stored in the
original boxes; making no segregation of classes possible without un­
packing the boxes. Allfuture packing, therefore, kept AAF classifi­
cation material separate, even though such a method required additional

h. It was necessary to include many additional items of mater­

ial over and above the original estimate, because of subsequent losses
through accidents, theft, and ordinary deterioration caused by inade­
quate storage facilities at the disposal of the ASSRDNS* The automatic
supply increased to cover these abnormal supply conditions.

i. In many cases planned manufacturing operations such as the

generation of oxygen breathing gas could not be depended upon, due to
failure of equipment to function on occasion. The reserve supply of
material thus affected was increased.

j. The quantities and variety of Aircraft Spares and Supplies

listed in Prepared Combat Tables from the mainland were not sufficient
in this theater, proving short in variety as well as in quantity of
many items* New and improved tables which were built up by the supply
department based on experience reported in this theater are now being

k* Full company t/o and E's are essential for tactical combat
operations, with all teams self-sufficient in every detail possible*
All communications teams were dependent upon the ASSRON headquarters for
administration and mess* Companies are now being sent with full t/o and
E*s, the standard set-up being a Signal Headquarters (with a Major as
Signal Officer, one Lieutenant as assistant, and three clerks) and two
companies: one Aircraft Warning Company, formed under t/o and E 11-400,
and a Signal Communications Company, formed under T/o and E 11-500* The
total number of officers and men is 337 for future assignments*

1* Personnel should be trained, as nearly as possible, in all

jobs of the Joint Communication Center to provide flexibility* When­
ever possible all Seventh Air Force personnel are given diversified
training so that they may filldifferent positions if required*

m* A standardized procedure is necessary for the Joint Com­

munication Centers, to eliminate differences in procedure and terminology


and speed up the message handling process* The Joint Communication
Center personnel from all services should be trained together before
they land on an enemy beach* A suggested Standard Operating Procedure
has been prepared and included in the Advanced Base Officer's Guide as
suggested means of standardization*

n. Pre-fabricated equipment for the Joint Communications

Center, suoh as operating tables and radio receiver position^ should
be made in the rear area* Plans are being prepared for the Joint Com­
munications Center building and the furniture for it is being built*

o. Certain radio circuits which the Joint Communications

Center cannot provide are necessary for internal communications within
the Seventh Air Force. A radio circuit from ADVON Headquarters, Seventh
Air Force, to its rear echelon has been installed, and a functional VII
Bomber Command circuit was installed recently and is now being tested*

p. All radio equipment should be set up and operated prior to

shipping to an advanced base, as many radio sets are damaged in shipment
from the mainland* All radio equipment, no matter how well packed, is
now opened, set up and operated, then carefully repacked and in some
cases covered with water-proof paper and then double packed* This
double packing, in addition to better protection, also gives additional
lumber that is always needed after landing*

q* Radio equipment assigned to a net must have sufficient

frequency coverage to accommodate all frequencies which may be assigned
to that net* During Galvanic operation it was found, too late* that
equipment would not tune to assigned frequencies* Alltransmitters are
now set up and operated before leaving this area* All transmitters now
in use have extended frequency coverage*

r. AACS radio circuits, ranges, homing beacons* control tower

equipment and personnel are needed early in the operation* These fa­
cilities were not planned to be installed until D plus 15 and D plus 20,
as they were not believed necessary until then* This plan was correoted
by sending in mobile radio transmitter and radio receiving stations,
portable radio ranges and temporary radio homers* This equipment is be­
ing improved for future operations.

s. To provide for quick and dependable switchboard installa­

tion, one (1) TC-4 and one (1) TC-12 should be installed in a K-19
trailer. This was done at Funafuti, using two TC-20»s in a K-19 trail­
er, with great success. This was not done at Makin and resulted in
slow installation of telephone switchboards. Trailers are being built
for future operations*

t* Radar efficiency is greatly reduced by tall palm trees in

the vicinity, making 100 foot towers a necessity to get radar antennas
above the palm trees, as well as to inorease the range.

v. Sufficient spare parts must be readily available for
all signal equipment • including an abundance of spare parts for units
where trouble is known to occur. This applies mainly to electric
power plant equipment and to special radar installations*

v. A large bulldozer should be available to ASSRON com­

munications section upon landing to assist in full revetment of all
equipment* A bulldozer has been assigned from the Engineers to the
communications section for the initial installation of radar, radio,
and telephone equipment.

w. Deviations between Army and Navy cryptographic practices

when working on joint systems tended to give away the organisation
enciphering the message. CinCPAC in collaboration with the Seventh
Air Force, drafted a letter for submission of the differences to the
Combined Communications Committee in order that the deviations might
be overcome*

x« Both officers and enlisted men should be trained in the

operation of the ECM, and officers should be trained in all crypto­
graphic devioes* Thorough instruction is now being given to all
cryptographic personnel*

y. Navy personnel are not always familiar with the Army

systems that are available in the Joint Communication Centers, which
results in •"
many unnecessary "services The Cryptographic Security
Officer at ADVON Seventh Air Force, has sent a letter to the Joint
Communications Centers on checking Army system and Army indicators
before sending "services*" in addition, all new cryptograph officers
are instructed to keep Navy personnel conscious of the presence of
Army systems in the Joint Communications Centers*


6 Ootober 1943


From: Commander In Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean

Areas •

Sub ject s Communications Policies for Joint Operations in the Central

Pacific Areas.

References: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Uavy, 1935.
(b) CinCPOA File Pac-01-Ye Iy4lß Ser. 02258 of 21 Sept. 1943.
(c) CinCPOA File Pac-J4-Es L/tlB Ser. 02248 of 20 Sept. 1943.

The following principles shall be observed in the formulation

of communications plans for, and the conduct of communications at newly
established Central Pacific island bases, plus CANTON, BAKER, FUNAFUTI,
NUKUFETAU, NANOMEA, and others whioh may later be designated.

(a) Hie Commanding Officer of each base shall establish a

joint communication center which shall conduct all
communications for all services (Army, Navy or Marine
Corps) operating at such base. He will be assisted by
<a base communication officer from the Army, Navy or
Marine Corps, vftiose selection will be dictated by the
situation existing at the base* Selection of each base
communication officer shall be approved by CinCPOA after
consultation with the interested Services. The base
communication officer will be responsible to the com­
manding officer of the base for the operation of the
joint communication center through which all communi­
cations from the facilities necessarily separated may
be channeled to responsible commanders*
(b) The base communication officer shall have as assistants
communication officers of the various services involved
who will be responsible for advising him on the conduct
of and requirements for communications for their ser­
vices. *
(c) Normally, all operational dispatches between island
bases and external commanders or higher echelons will
be transmitted via operational or tactical circuits

Incl. No. 1 to
established or authorized by CinCPOA.

(d) In accordance with a directive from the Joint Chiefs

of Staff to avoid duplication of circuits and facili
ties, fixed circuits shall be established only as
authorized by CinCPOA. This principle applies only
to long range circuits employing frequencies below
20 mcs. Internal tactical circuits required by as­
sault or defense forces, tactical circuits required
for air-amphibious operations, and circuits employ­
ing low power on frequercies above 20 mcs, are ex­
cluded from the provision.

(1) Circuits or facilities, when authorized in ac­

cordance with (d) above, which ere peculiar to
the needs of one service usually shall be pro­
vided and operated by that service.

(2) Ttfhere circuits are employed jointly the service

having paramount interest shall provide and
operate such circuit or facility.

(c) Ihe respective services shall provide the material

necessary to meet their own internal communication
telephone, telegraph, and teletypewriter require­
ments* All wire communications at the base shall
be coordinated by the Senior Signal Officer to
avoid duplication or confusion, and will be install­
ed and maintained under his supervision*

(f) (1) Visual and harbor control communications under

the joint communication center shall be in­
stalled and operated by the Navy.

(2) The base air commander shall, upon installa­

tion of aircraft operating facilities, pres­
cribe the approach and recognition procedure
to be employed by aircraft.

(s) Communications for the Filter Director and Air

Warning Services are under the operational control
of the local air commander and shall be coordinated
with base joint communications by the base command­

00 An airways communication service way be established

by the Navy, or Army Airways Commurication Service
as required at island bases in ihe Central Pacific
Area as part of the joint communication center to
provide any or all of the following services:

(1) Point to point circuits for aircraft movements
and other messages relating to the airways

(2) Air-ground communication for itinerant, trans­

port, and combat aircraft moving between bases
on non-combat missions*

(3) Airdrome local air traffic control*

(4) Seadrome traffic control*

(5) Radio Aids to aerial navigation.

(6) Instrument landing systems as required.

Tiiless absolutely essential these services shall not be

duplicated and will be utilized by both Amy and Navy
aircraft insofar as may be practicable*

(i) Permanent equipment, once provided, shall normally

remain in place regardless of changes in command
between the services* Every effort shall be made
to avoid duplication of personnel, equipments, and

2. (a) Communications plans for island bases shall be form

ulated in accordance with Chapter XI, Subsection V ?
of reference (a)*

(b) Communication facilities shall be planned in the

order of establishment as required by the operation

3* The following rules governing the expression of time of

origin, and time in message texts, shall be observed*

(a) The time of origin will be expressed as six figures,

followed by a zone suffix letter, the first pair of
digits denoting the date, the second pair hours, the
third pair minutes except that the first two digits
denoting the date may be omitted ifnot required*
Time of origin will be expressed in teims of G*C*T*
(G.M*T*) unless considerations of security and/or
expediency require otherwise.

(b) All times in the text of messages will be expressed

with a zone suffix letter except that in the text
of messages involving a large number of times, a
covering expression such as "all times zone Baker"

may be used instead of appending zone suffix
letter to each.

(c) When referenoe is made to a message by its time of

origin, the method of expression of that time of
origin will be preserved in its original form. The
month and/or year may be added if necessary.

Example t "Your 161412Z DEC 42."

(d) A major task force commander may prescribe a partic­
ular zone time to be used in message texts for his
force regardless of the fact that more than one time
zcne may be involved in the area of operations of
his force.

4* Cryptographic aids to be employed at advanced base shall

be determined by each service to meet its needs, within the limitations
to be prescribed by CinCPOA. No. E.C.M. (SIGABA) shall be landed at
any base until approved by CinCPOA* Commanders of all services shall
be kept apprised of the class (category) of cryptographic aids held by
island bases.

5. (a) All services should maintain adequate levels of

equipment and personnel initially in the Hawaiian
Area, readily available for immediate employment
wherever they may be required, as directed by para­
graph 6 of enclosure (A) to reference (c). Upon
the replacement of mobile equipment by permanent
base equipment material replaced shall be made
available for reassignment by the material pool
or depot of the appropriate service o

(b) Each, service shall be responsible for the supply

of spare parts aid replacements of its own types
of equipment regardless of the use to which it
is put.

6. All base communication services shall be directly

under the operational control of the local Officer in Tactical Command*


P, SP, MC, HTS, XI, 2, 3, 4, 5, V, Z.
C.G. Centpao
873, 3V, 11. 23, KS3, 4,
C.G. Sowespac

NAll-54, NBIB, 49, NDll-15,

C»6* Sopac

C.G. Samoan Def. For*
C.G. 7th A. F.
C.G. sth A. F.

C.G* Army Air Forcea

C.G. 11th A. F.
C.G. 4th A. F.

P. V. Mercer,
Flag Secretary.

B-24 Modifications

1. Remove lagging from winterized engines (T*o. 02-1-44, dated

8 July 43).

2. Install CO2 fire extinguishing system to engines (Mod, No. 53).

3« Comply with T.O* 01-5-65, dated 5 October 43 (gas vent line when

4. Install tail wheel (Mod. No. 13A).

5. Install waist gun crash belts.

6, Install top hatch deflector (Mod. No* 42)*

7. Relocate driftmeter next to navigator's cable (Mod* No* 42)*

8. Install scanning windows in nose.

9. Relocate navigator to flight deck (Mod. No. 42)*

10. Relocate radio compass indicator L«H. front corner of navigator's

table (Mod* No 0 42)*

11. Make one additional droppable bomb bay tank installation (as per
drawing No. 44D417).

12. Install navigator's instruments on flight deck (Mod. No. 42)*

13. Install bottom hatch deflector (Mod. No. 36).

14. Modify life raft release mechanism (Mod. No. 37A).

15. Install SCR-522 antenna mast (Mod. No. 52).

16. Install handrail alongside ball turret*

17. Install heavy duty elevation stowing cable in nose turret.

18. Install reinforcements to bomb bay door tracks (U.R. 43-249).

19, Install supports for pitot tubes (discontinued due to redesign)*
20. Install astral compass dome stowage (Mod* No. 42).
21* Install fuel transfer hand pump system (Mod. No. 17).
22. Relocation of camera vacuum valve (Mod. No. 47).

Incl. No* 2 to
23. Modify wiring in bombardier *e panel with rheostat and dimming
switoh (Mod. No. 5).

24. Install new azimuth lock on nose turret.

25. Install camera mount (Mod. No* 36).

26. Install cal. .30 guns in nose side windows and stop*

27. Install stowing containers for cal* .30 ammunition*

28. Install relief tube in nose section (Mod* No. 42).

29. Install ammunition roller guides for waist guns*

30. Bistall modified A-2 bomb releases and synchronise control box
with racks (11-5-46, dated 28 November 43 and T*o. 11-5-23,
dated 2 March 43).

31. Install upper turret Pelorus pointer and calibrate turret*

32. Install cover for ball turret.

33. Install metal cover in Astral dome (Mod* No. 42).

34. Install suspension cables for waist gun ammunition chutes.
35, Install shoulder harness for pilot and co-pilot*

36. Install sun deflector top turret sight (T.O. 11-35-14, dated

14 September 42)*

37. Safety pitot static selector in off position and check for
lines being open (Mod. No* 42).

38. Relocate oxygen bottles over bomb bay (to provide additional
stowage space).

39. Modify emergency hydraulic pump handle (U.R. AD APO 953 44-36).
40, Install SCR 521 (Mod. No. 42).
41. Install galley kit. Type C-2 aft of rie£it waist gun.

42. Remove tail turret and install twin 50*8 (Mod. No. 31A).

43. Replace Carburetor jets (Install No. 700-3 B jets as per ASC
Radio No. 1298, dated 8 Dec 43).

44* Modify Propeller Feathering Switohes (UR HAD 44-28).

45. Install blister window for Pilot and Co-pilot and widen the open­
ing and equip for emergency release (Mod. No. 69).

46. Install quick release baggage racks.

47. Relocate pilot's seat lock handle (to opposite side of seat)*

48. Install wind deflector for lower ball turret.

49. Install deflector and braces for nose turret when needed*

50. Remove relief tube near bomb bay door handle and reinstall in back
of pilot* s seat near right front leg of navigator •* table (Mod.
No. 42).

B-25 Modifications

1. 75mm gun firing switch installed an the pilots wheel.

2. Remove miscellaneous de-icer lines and equipment -throughout the


3. Remove all lines to rear fuselage heater.

4. Install twin bottle C0 2 engine fire extinguisher system (Mod,

No, 58).

5. Remove canvas cover from battery.

6. Install the N6A gunsight in front of the pilot in place of the

N3B sight (Mod. No. 59, part B).

7. Replace stocking boots that cover the nose wheel strut and elbows
with boots that cover the shock strut only (Mod. No. 60, part B).

8. Install safety wire on mounting bolts for upper turret.

9. Install turret stop for protection of tail from own fire when


10 • Comply with T.O. 01-60G-63, and install tf6A gunsight.

11. Install oil tank sump bottom self sealing, part No. 82-47083, for
left side and part No. 82-47083-1, for the right side (Shortage
of parts).

12. Cover wing openings into Navigators compartment in the airplane

that did not come so equipped (Mod* No* 60, part A).

13. Install SCR-522 and frequency crystals (T.O. 08-10-105)*

14. Comply with T*o* 01-600*45, and install buffer plates on nose
wheel door and nose as per drawings Nos. AP0953AD44D438, -443,
and -458.

15. Modify fuselage hood at hinge point (UR APO 959 43-481)*

16. Install G.S.A.P. camera gun and mount in nose.

17. Install K-21 or K-25 camera mount (Proposed Modification)*

18. Comply with NAA Modification Center Report No. A-18, Structure
Reinforcement plus additional APO 953 reinforcement (Mod. No. 65).

Incl. No. 3 to
19. Move Waist gun to middle of window, and install spoiler in front
of waist gun window. Install N6A sight (Mod. No. 64 )?

20* Beaded trailing wire antennae from reel to transmitter (UR AD

APO 43-387).

21. Install "Push to Talk11 switches on waist and tail guns (Proposed

22* Install extended blast tubes.

23. Strengthen bulkhead blast plate for package guns (Same as Item
No, 18).

Fighter Aircraft Modifications

1* Launching, tow-holdback, installation, P-39 series aircraft (NAF).

2. Supercharging of V-1710-81 engine ignition systems in P-39Q-1-BE

and P-398-5-BE series aircraft (Mod. No. 63) •

3. Supercharging of ignition systems of V-1710-73 and -85 engines

Installed in P-40K-1 and P-40N-SCU aircraft (Mod. No. 62).

Incl. No. 4 to

¦¦¦- ¦¦¦¦¦
- : -¦¦¦ :



A. PREPARATION . This command assisted the troops in the preparation

for Galvanic operation with every means at their disposal.

1« Supplies furnished. The packing and crating section furnished

all prefabricated boxes and crates, dimension lumber for palletizing and
dunnage, strapping materials, tool stencils, brushes and other equipment
for cargo crating*

2. Equipment furnished. Ihe transportation division furnished all

available low-bed and flat-bed trucks to assist in the movement of the
organizational equipment to the staging area and to the piers. The fol­
lowing equipment was also furnished for use at the Navy docks: 4 3-ton
lift trucks, 4 hi-lifts, and 4 jitneys.

3. Personnel furnished. Ihis command provided personnel for the

technical supervision of cargo crating, Port troops for loading person­
nel and equipment aboard transports, and Military Police to convoy Army
and Marine troops from staging areas to piers, direct traffic and main­
tain security guards prior to and during loading. An officer from this
command with previous task force experience also furnished advice and
assistance in loading the transports and cargo vessels.

1, Company D, 376th Port Battalion consisting of 4 officers and
220 enlisted men was assigned to the 7th Garrison Force which had th*
mission of defending the island after the assault troops left.

2* The staging and billeting section furnished the requisite bil­

lets for the entire garrison force prior to its departure from Oahu.


i i
i i i i


1. Objective. On 4 August 1943, the Commanding General, USAFICPA,

notified the Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division, that his divi­
sion was to participate in the Galvanic operation. Details were not
then available, but the general directive authorized direct contact with
the Navy, as this operation was to be an amphibious action in the Gilbert
Islands. Within 48 hours, the planning section of CinCPOA, represented
by Colonel Mandell and Colonel Ferrin, informed the Commanding General,
27th Infantry Division, that the Divisions objective was to be the
Island of Nauru, with the target date tentatively about 15 November. It
was planned to employ 9 BLT's, with an impressive number of Naval vessels
supporting the action. All information in their hands was made available
to the 27th Infantry Division* This information as to the enemy, terrain,
and logistical data, however, was inadequate for the detailed preparation
of an operational plan. Further details were to be transmitted to the
division as they became available*

2. Chain of command. During the months of August and September,

Headquarters for the Central Pacific Force, Fifth Amphibious Force, and
Fifth Amphibious Corps, were in the process of organization. Channels
of command were non-existent, and direct contact was maintained by the
27th Infantry Division with all these Naval echelons. This situation
caused considerable confusion as to the delivery of orders but did bring
about a close association between all the staffs concerned.


1. Staff Amphibious School. The 27th Division had been conducting

preliminary amphibious training over a period of approximately c ight
months prior to assignment to the Galvanic operation. In December, 1942,
two officers were detailed to attend an amphibious school conducted by
the Marines at San Diego. On the return of these officers to the divi­

conducted during the period 7 April 1943


sion, a school on amphibious operations was inaugurated. This school was

12 May 1943, and was attended
by regimental and battalion commanders, their executive officers, S-2 f s, s

S-3*s, S-4's, and other officers and key non-commissioned officers of

artillery battalions and separate units. This school accomplished its
purpose in that it properly indoctrinated the organizations as to the
requirements of amphibious operations.
2 May 1943

2. BLT amphibious training Schofield Barracks. During the period

24 July 1943 each BLT was assembled at Schofield Barracks
for one weeks training. Here instruction was given in the use of ropes
for guide-lines and the tying of knots, cargo-net climbing and descending,
boat team drill, handling supplies from a platform (including the lower­
ing and stowing in mock-up boats), debarking and deployment from mock-up
boats, passage through wire entanglements and other obstacles. BLT

commanders and their staffs prepared boat assignment tables, boat
diagrams, shore party organization, landing diagrams, debarkation
and approach schedules. In addition, officer schools were ccnduct­
ed by the BLT commander to complete the indoctrination in amphibious

3. BLT amphibious training

- Waianae. During the week follow­
ing the training at Schofield Barracks each BLT received one week f s
training at the Waianae Amphibious Training Center. Here a pier was
used to simulate a transport with the necessary booms and nets and a
specially constructed barge was anchored off shore to give personnel
the experience of embarking and debarking from a listing vessel.
Winch operators were also trained with the existing equipment. Dur­
ing the training period at TiTaianae, each BLT received instruction in
the embarkation and debarkation of troops, equipment, and supplies.
Three landing exercises were conducted as follows:

a. A daylight landing "where the mechanics of debarkation,

operation of the shore party, and handling of supplies were stressed.

b. A night landing involving the same problems.

c. A dawn landing covering all phases of the landing oper­

ation, debarkation, clearing the beach, reorganization, advance to
the objective, operation of shore party, handling of supplies and
equipment. The final exercise was made as realistic as possible with
the use of simulated strafing and bombing by planes, bangalore tor­
pedos, barbed wire obstacles, smoke, and explosives.

4. Physical ccnditioning. During the period from the Ist of

January to the end of July, special attention was given to physical
conditioning. Vehicles were used only when necessary for the trans­
portation of troops* Every individual not required to participate in
strenuous training was required to run a mile a day as a step toward
proper conditioning.


1. Subjects to be stressed. It was most apparent that prior to

employment in amphibious action, the division required further train­
ing and equipment. A complete study of the equipment required to
accomplish the assigned mission was initiated. Efforts to obtain
definite information as to the personnel and cargo transports to be
assigned were continued. Training was commenced, stressing rifle
marksmanship, battle conditioning, and small unit training, vihile
efforts were being made to obtain sufficient ships for the final
phases of amphibious training in ship-to-shore movement.

2. Training camps. At the time the division was assigned to

the Galvanic operation, three RCT training camps were made available

to the division. These camps made training aids available so that the
units could complete basic training, known-distance firing, battle
courses, specialists l training and team work in the employment of oom­
bined arms. In addition, each BLT was given one week of amphibious
training at the VTaimanalo center; this training was similar to that
conducted at Waianae.
during the period 3 October
The 165th RCT conducted ship-to-shore exercises
22 October, employing the 20th Transport
Division. Shore Fire Control Parties were trained by the Division
Artillery for the purpose of directing Naval gunfire after arrival on
the beach.

3. Transport Quartermaster School. A school was conducted for

Transport Quartermasters, commencing on 17 September and continuing
until the troops embarked for the Galvanic operation. Under supervision
of Lieutenant Colonel Ferris, G-4, 27th Infantry Division, the course
stressed the following:

a. Familiarity with APA's and AKA's by visiting Pearl Harbor,

measuring the ships and observing the loading of ships.

b. Study of stowage plans used in the Attu operation.

c. Preparation of stowage plans, using the concepts prepared

by G-4 and based on tentative operational plans.

This school was of immense value. Itnot only trained transport quarter
masters for the assault troops for the Makin operation, but also made
possible the detail of officers in Vnis capacity for ships transporting
the defense battalion*

D' PIANNIFG. As previously stated, the original objective assigned the

27th Division was the Island of Nauru. On 2 October, this objective was
changed to Makin Atoll. Because of this change, the planning phase by
the 27th Division was divided into two parts.

1. Objective; Nauru.

Intelligence. In obtaining information on Nauru, every

effort was made to preserve security. All available information on
Nauru was obtained from the planning section of CinCPOA* Aerial photo­
graphs, objective reports, photo interpretation reports and studies were
obtained from the Seventh Air Force. A feigned interest in guano and
phosphate was successful in locating three information sources, namely,
National Geographic Magazine, December, 1921; Ocean and Nauru Islands
by Ellis; the Year Book of the South Pacific, 1942. A study of this
data made possible a good informational foundation of Nauru prior to the
establishment of Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps and Headquarters,
Fifth Amphibious Force.

(1) A request was made to Admiral Nimitz to obtain the aid

of an inhabitant of Nauru with the result that Mr,
Bott, an employee of the British Phosphate Company,
arrived on Oahu about 18 August. He brought with
him printed data on Nauru, pictures (both still
and moving), and a large scale company map of the
plateau on the island. This data, plus other ver­
bal information, proved extremely valuable, Mr.
Bott remained with the division for approximately
3 weeks* During this period, his time was employ­
ed as follows:

(a) Discussion of the characteristics of Nauru,

(b) Advice to PRISIC in their construction of

relief map of Nauru.

(c) Study of possible use of types of landing

craft on Nauru.

(d) Advice to G-2 during his preparation of a

terrain study of Nauru.

(c) A thorough reconnaissance of Oahu with G-2

in quest of examples of reefs, cliffs, and
vegetation with such characteristics as
those found on Nauru.

(f) Correction of Engineer topographical map

(2) By the middle of August, PRISIC had prepared a
relief model of Nauru from the information they
had at hand but the scale was too small to give
more than a general impression of the island,
A second model was requested on a scale of
5,000, exaggerated 2-g- times vertically. This
relief map, though not accurate in detail, was
declared amazingly true -when seen by Mr, Bott,
A third relief map of the same scale was Ihen
prepared under Mr, Bott*s supervision. It was
planned to make sufficient copies of this re­
lief map so that every troop ship in the oper­
ation would have one available during the

(3) The large scale map of ihe plateau area, furnish­

ed by Mr. Bott, was used in the preparation of a
1/20,000 topographical map by the 64th Engineer
Topographical Company. This map, as originally
prepared, was unsatisfactory due to the method of
over-printing grid lines. Ihe l/20,000 map was

later corrected and satisfactory maps are now

(4) About the middle of September, a submarine reconnais

sanoe of all GalTanic objectives was ordered by the
Navy* Captain Donald Neuman, an assistant G-2, 27th
Infantry Division, was designated to accompany this
reconnaissance* Since Nauru was removed from the
list of objectives for Galvanic, this reconnaissance
of the Gilbert Islands was accomplished and valuable
pictures of Makin secured.

(5) In addition to Mr. Bott, the following listed men

and officers of the Australian Forces assisted in
the preparation of information on Nauru:

Captain William Brom, Engineer, A.I.F.

Lieutenant Norman H* Cooke, Engineer, A.I.F.
Warrant Officer Frank L. Mcßae, A.I.F*
Sergeant Winston X* Tingman, R.A.A.F.

These men arrived on Oahu at about the time the

objective was changed and caused some embarrassment
as no one was available to supervise them in their
mission of producing more information on Nauru*
These men were thoroughly familiar with reef, beach,
and cliff conditions with which Mr* Bott had no
intimate knowledge* They were most conscientious
in their efforts and corrected and added to the data
which we had already obtained* They also thoroughly
analyzed and corrected the 1/20,000 engineer map
prior to its final printing* Their efforts have
made available an extremely complete data file on
the Island of Nauru*

b» Tentative plan for attack* Due to the increasing infor­

mation concerning the physical characteristics of the island, it was
possible to prepare a tentative plan of attack, employing 2 regiments
in the assault, with 1 regiment (less 1 battalion) in floating reserve*
Due to the prevailing winds, reef conditions, width of beach, cliff
conditions, and location of the phosphate pits, the plan called for an
attack on the northwest portion of the island* This plan was never
crystallised due to the ever-changing assignment of vessels and the
ultimate change in objective*
c* Logistical plans* In adapting the division for amphibious
operations, it was necessary to obtain considerable logistical support*
Additional medical assistance was needed as well as combat engineers for
shore party employment* A large amount of non-TBA equipment was also

(1) Non-TBA Engineer Equipment required.
(a) Barco hammers.

(b) Additional explosives.

(c) Water evaporators.

(d) 3 H-10 and 1 H-20 bridge and pneumatic equip­
ment (which was contemplated for jetty and
floating stage across the reef).

(c) 29 bulldozers with blades, including 2 D-7's

and 4 R-4's for each shore party company to
handle supplies ashore.

(f) 6,000 pallets for ship-to-shore movement of

supplies, and miscellaneous additional equip­

(2) Ordnance*
(a) During the period from 8 August to 30 August,
a complete physical inspection of all ordnance
in the division was made and deficiencies noted
were reported in a detailed letter to CPA with
a request for replacement of defective items.
This included:

Replacement of 60mm and 81mm mortars found

Replacement of 1918, 155mm Howitzer with new
Ml Howitzer.
585 J-ton trucks (to make up t/eshortages).
7 Athey trailers.
Replacement of lj*ton dumps for 2^-ton

(b) Permission was asked from CPA to alter Ordnance

Company T/o
ing elements:
to permit inclusion of the follow­

Ammunition men to operate a supply point.

Specialists for tank maintenance, (AA)
armament, and director equipment.
An increased small arms section, artillery
section, instrument section, and service
section, to make the organization compar­
able to a medium maintenance company,
normally a corps establishment.

(c) 50 LVT*s and as many DUKWs as could be obtained
were also requested. Late in October, infor­
mation was received that the LVT 2 f s which had
been requested, would be available for employ­
ment in the attack. This equipment actually
arrived and was delivered to the 27th Infantry
Division on 30 October. A provisional organiza­
tion, composed of members of the 193 dTank Bat­
talion had previously been organised to operate
these vehicles* This detachment, under command
of Major Inskeep, performed an outstanding piece
of work in the servicing prior to combat and
operation during combat*

(3) Signal.

(a) A request for signal/ items, including portable

radios for communication from company to platoon,
1 280 radar, 1 274 radar, K5l and K52 (truck and
trailer) and SCR 299 radios as well as radios
for tanks and ship-to-shore communication*

(b) The CPA Signal Officer offered the use of detach­

ments* 75th Signal Company, which had participat­
ed in the operation at Attu and had recently
arrived here*

(4) Filler personnel. At the time information was receiv­

ed that the 27th Infantry Division was to participate
In Galvanic, the division was under strength over
1,000 men* G-l, CPA, made plans for the reduction of
this deficiency by the assignment of troops from other
combat divisions in the area* Due to the limitations
on personnel caused by the size and number of trans­
ports available, it was at all times apparent that a
full table of organizational strength could not be
employed* The Division Commander requested that he be
allowed to remain under strength* This request was

(6) Graves registration* The attachment of quartermaster

graves registration troops was requested but not pro­
vided by higher headquarters due to their unavailability.
A graves registration section, consisting of 1 officer
and 2 enlisted men from the 27th Quartermaster Company,
augmented by 5 enlisted men from participating units was
organized for the operation* This section was trained
under the direction of the Division Quartermaster and
functioned adequately during combat in the disposition
of American dead. However it was insufficient to cope

with the problems of hostile dead. An assistant G-4
of the division was given the responsibility of the
burial of enemy dead -which he accomplished by the
employmait of the 165 th Infantry Band in conjunction
with native labor detail of approximately 50 men.

(6) A bakery unit was requested but refused.

(7) Mail* It was apparent that in the event the oper­

ation progressed as planned and the troops were with­
drawn from their objective immediately after its
capture that delivery of mail to the participating
troops would be impractical* On the other hand,
prompt delivery of mail to troops remaining on the
island was an essential morale factor© It was there­
fore necessary to determine the exact units that were
to remain on the island before definite arrangements
could be made© When the island had been captured
and air evacuation of wounded commenced, the division
G-l requested that mail be forwarded by plane at once.
Through his efforts, arrangements were made with
USAFICPA for prompt mail delivery. The operation of
the mail service when once begun was conducted in a
most superior manner. All Christmas packages were
delivered to the troops on the island prior to Christ­
mas and with the return of the remaining combat troops
to Oahu deliveries were stopped in time to prevent the
unnecessary voyage to Makin and return* The men were
outstandingly impressed by the fact that they had re­
ceived their Christmas packages and the fact that the
delivery of mail for them to Makin had been terminated
so that upon their arrival at Oahu, their current mail
was awaiting them* This matter of mail delivery can­
not be over-emphasized.

(8) QM Supplies and equipment requested and obtained.

(a) 30 days maintenance from which the 27th Infantry

Division on its own initiative deleted a number
of such non-essential items as stationery and
protective clothing*

(b) Requested 2 machettes per squad (obtained 600).

(c) 12 days* combination "C", "D", and "X" ration*,

(d) 30 days' M fl ration,

B salt tablets, cigarettes p
and pipe tobacco*

(c) One additional canteen and cover per individual.

(f) Eh trenching tools for all personnel*

(g) 1 set of HBT's for each man in place of one set

of cotton khaki clothing.

(h) 2 5-gallon water containers per individual*

(9) Medical.

(a) During "the month of August, the Division Surgeon

and the G-4 visited the Surgeon CPA, CinCPAC,
and the Naval Surgeon, PH, obtaining information
regarding expected casualties in the type of
operation contemplated*

(b) Numerous conferences were held with General King,

CPA Surgeon, regarding the supporting hospital­
ization units for "the task force but General King
was unable to supply the Field Hospital inhich we
requested. However, he did furnish the following

Medical officers to fillvacancies existing in

the 27th Infantry Division.
Additional medical officers necessary for 2
portable surgical teams*
66 trained medical EM for the portable surgical
teams, to be replaced from personnel of the
division from the best of limited service
people of any branch. The division therefore
actually had to furnish its own enlisted per­
sonnel for an additional Clearing Company and
2 Surgical Teams*

(10) Regulating Point. In the last week of September, it

became evident that a regulating point would have to
be established for the assembly of supplies which were
required for loading on shipboard. The assistant G-4
made arrangements with higher authority to use certain
portions of Fort Kamehameha for such a regulating
point and operating procedure was drawn up accordingly,
ttie division special staff was instructed to ship
materiel to the regulating point for palletizing. The
division experienced considerable difficulty in obtain­
ing necessary equipment for the palletizing operation
and for handling pallets*

2. Ob jec ti
ve ; Makin .
The change in target was confirmed the first
week in October. Although the objective had been changed to Makin Atoll,
all the planning during the previous two months had not been wasted*

Valuable staff contacts had been established, the training preparations
remained unchanged* and supply requirements (including reequipping)
were changed only by reduction in the number of items required.


(1) 3y 1 October, several officers of the Australian

Forces, who had intimate knowledge of Male in, had
arrived at Fifth Amphibious Force Headquarters*
Lieutenant Commander Heyen, of the Royal Australian
Navy, remained with the Fifth Amphibious Force Head­
quarters during the entire operation and was con­
stantly available to the division for information.

(2) On 15 October, Private Fred C. Narruhn, Ist Fiji

Infantry, a native of Makin, reported to the divi­
sion for duty and was assigned to the G-2 section.
By this time. Battalion Commanding Officers of the
165 th Infantry, 105th Field Artillery, and 193 d
Tank Battalion had been informed of the mission
assigned to the division and were familiar with the
tentative ground force plans for the operation.
Since Narruhn had played as a child over all parts

of Butaritari Island, he was well informed as to
the conditions of the reefs, taro pits, swamps, and
lakes even to a greater extent than the Englishmen
who had lived there* Thus he was of greatest value
to the commanders who were to be in immediate charge
of the BLTf s.

(3) The submarine which had been dispatched to reoon­

noiter the Galvanic objectives was informed of the
change from Nauru to Makin and was able to obtain
panoramic pictures of the west and south shores of
Butaritari Island as well as some previously unknown
hydrographic information. Every effort was made to
obtain all observations made by the submarine offi­
cers as well as by Captain Neuman, Headquarters,
27th Infantry Division, iflio had accompanied the ex­

(*) Excellent air photographs were available, including

air observer's reports nhich, together with the in­
terpretations of the photographs, were invaluable
in the preparation of the plan of attack*

(6) A team of 10 Nisei (American soldiers of Japanese

ancestry) was received from the mainland approxi­
mately 4 weeks prior to departure* Due to the tacti­
cal plan, it was necessary initially to divide the

group into several teams so as to accompany each land­
ing unit* Plan 8 were made by which Ihe section was re
united in division headquarters as soon as practicable
after arrival ashore*

(6) Maps of Makin Atoll were prepared on a scale of

with sufficient sets for issue to all head­
and all officers and platoon sergeants*

(V) During the month of October, a great amount of infor­

mation data was received from the Fifth Amphibious
Corps, Fifth Amphibious Force, JICPOA, and Head­
quarters, Central Pacific Area. Regimental and Bat­
talion Commanders received single copies of all avail­
able data. The general distribution of this informa­
tion was finally made as follows:

(a) Maps, Makin Atoll, l/20,000 indicated above*

(b) Aerial mosaics, Butaritari and Kuma Islands

- to
all officers*

(c) Intelligence snnex and terrain studies all

organizations to include every squad and all

(d) Information folder, Gilbert Islands

- one per

(c) Aerial mosaics, stereo pairs

- one set per bat­
talion and higher headquarters and each separate

(f) Submarine panoramic strips

- battalion and higher
headquarters and one per LVT driver. .
(8) Due to the flatness of Butaritari Island, large hand-
drawn maps showing terrain features cf the island and
anticipated enemy installations were substituted for
relief maps* These maps were drawn to a scale of
and were distributed to each troop

b* Plan of attack*

(1) Based on enemy information and terrain study, a plan

was prepared whereby the task force (less one BLT
(reinforced) was to land on the western shore of
Butaritari Island beginning at nH"-hour, which was
to be set according to tidal conditions and time

required for preliminary naval, and air bombardment,
1 BLT, reinforced, was Initially held as a floating
reserve with the intention of landing on the lagoon
side of Butaritari Island in the center of the organ­
ised Jap positions at "If-hour, which hour was to be
determined dependent upon the success of the initial

(2) In order to insure the success of landing troops,

heavy naval gunfire bombardment and aerial bombard­
ment were employed. The naval gunfire plan was care­
fully prepared by the Division Artillery Commander
in conjunction with the appropriate staff officers
of the Fifth Amphibious Force and Fifth Amphibious
Corps* The air strikes were coordinated with the
bombardment and the approach of the initial waves of
the landing forces.

(S) An officer of the Division General Staff was given

the assignment of coordinating the preparation of
the Air Plan with Fifth Amphibious Force and Fifth
Amphibious Corps* At the time this assignment was
given, the Air Officer of Force had already prepared
a draft of a plan which had not been approved by the
Corps Commander. A plan was finally worked out
nhich proved satisfactory to all units and was issued
by tiie Fifth Amphibious Force. The principal pro­
blems which had to be solved were:

(a) Targets to be hit on "D"-l strike and MD"-day


(b) Type of bombs which would be most effective

against the Japanese installations*

(c) Safety factor*

(d) Planes to be available for direct support of the
ground forces and for reconnaissance.

The Fifth Amphibious Force had the additional problem

of lack of information as to the name and number of
aircraft carriers vhich would be available for the
operation. This so retarded the preparation of de­
tailed plans for the execution of the air support
that the final plans of the carrier task force com­
manders were not received until the day of sailing.

(4) Air-ground liaison parties, furnished by the Fifth

Amphibious Corps, were assigned to the division just

prior to the last training cruise and too late for
combined training, Ihese parties were immediately
assigned to and lived with the units with which they
were to operate, so that close personal contact might
be obtained. The greatest difficulty in the employ­
ment of these air-ground liaison groups was due to
the lack of any combined training with the carrier
groups which were eventually assigned to support the

(5) Initial information indicated that the communications

personnel for the support aircraft commander ashore
would be furnished by the Fifth Amphibious Force, It
was not until just prior to the operation "that this
decision, was changed and itbecame neces3ery to organ­
ize and train the communications group from personnel
in the division. This was finally accomplished through
the assistance of the Division Signal Officer, Force
Air Communications Officer, and the Garrison Force Sig­
nal Officer. In spite of their hasty organization, the
communications functioned very satisfactorily during
the operation.

c. Logistical, plan. TAlhen the initial logistical planning was

changed to conform to the new directives the greater part of the pallet­
izing had been completed. The assignment of Transport Division No. 20,
for employment in practice cruise, made possible the actual assignment

During the period 9 October

of troops to ships in conformity to the then tentative plans for attack.
17 October, the 27th Infantry Division
Task Force participated in a practice cruise for training in ship-to­
shore movement. Immediately following the return of the task force from
its training cruise, the ships were reloaded for the actual expedition.
By 30 October, all equipment and personnel had been loaded on Transport
Division No, 20, and during the first week of November, rehearsals for
the actual operation were conducted at Maui and Kahoolawe, The task
force returned to Pesrl Harbor and for several days devoted their time to
rehabilitating equipment and correcting faults noted in "the rehearsals.
On 10 November ths task force departed Pearl Harbor on its historic

E. .
1, In the lowest echelons (rifle companies, platoons, and squads
and tank platoons and individual tanks) there was no communication agency
available to link the components of the infantry-tank team* This dis­
crepancy is being made the subject of intensive study and test by this

2. The waterproof containers provided for communication equipment

were not entirely effective. Further experimentation is being done by

signal agencies in an effort to provide better protection for this

3. Promiscuous firing by "trigger happy" individuals is a serious

danger to our own troops. Strict discipline for offenders is necessary
but prior training should eliminate a large percentage of this.

4. Full advantage in the employment of tanks was not obtained due

to lack of training in conjunction with small infantry units* This
training is being stressed in preparation for future operations*

5. It is believed that the lightly armored LVT is the vehicle

that will insure landings being successful against the heavy opposition
that can be expected in future operations*

6. Shore Fire Control Parties and Air-Ground Liaison Parties must

train with the units which they will support in the operation*

7* Observers should be attached to the organisations of the task

force so that full use may be made of their professional qualifications
by the commanders concerned*




1* Task Force Headquarters. In support of this operation the

Canton Task Foroe Headquarters acted as an agency for coordination of
Galvanio tactical units stationed here. Assistance rendered these
units was essentially in matters of supply, maintenance, quarters and
communications •

2. Air Base facilities.

a* Two squadrons of B-24s conducted strike and search missions
from this base in preparation for Galvanic* Search missions were con­
ducted daily and a total of sixteen strikes were made*

b. One Navy reconnaissance squadron conducted photographic

missions over the Gilbert-Marshall area in order to provide the task
forces with the latest photographic intelligence* Complete facilities
were established here for reproduction and distribution of prints*

One medical air evacuation squadron brought patients to

this base for hospital isation or evacuation to Oahu depending upon the
type of casualty*


were reoeived which referred to orders which had not yet arrived.
This resulted in many questions and answers which placed an unnecessary
load upon the communication facilities* The commanders concerned have
been notified of this in an attempt to avoid a recurrence in future oper
at ions.



1. Organization, This task fore© was formed by direction of the

Commanding General, USAFICPA, on 11 August 1943 with the mission of
occupying Baker Island, establishing thereon an air base with suitable
facilities for the operation of fighter and bomber aircraft and defend­
ing the island and all of its installations against attack by land, sea
or air. The task force nhich consisted of a headquarters, an engineer
aviaticn battalion, a provisional antiaircraft artillery battalion, a
provisional ASSRON, a fighter squadron, and the necessary service de­
tachments l aided on 1 September 1943 with full equipment and supplies
sufficient to operate and maintain the base for 90 days.

2. Construction. The engineer aviation battalion assisted by

other task force units immediately cans true ted a Mars ton-mat runway
150* x 5500*, and twenty six hardstandings to accomodate fully loaded
B-24 f s with ample taxiways and turning areas. The field was ready for
fighter operations on 8 September 1943 and the entire base was ready to
support the Galvanic operation by 12 September 1943.

B. SUPPORT OF OPERATION. £uring the ninety day period following estab­

lishment of the base Army and Navy aircraft conducting heavy bombardment
strikes, and photographic, reconnaissance, search and transport missions
were serviced at this base using nearly 400,000 gallons of fuel and 4,000
gallons of lubricant. Three thousand officers and men of the air crews
were fed, quartered and in sane cases clothed. Casualties were expedi­
tiously handled by the medical section, the more seriously wounded being
kept here until definite improvement was noted.