NATIONAL TERRITORY
Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and
The Province of North Cotabato v.
The Govenment of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP)
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as
presently worded.
1. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on
TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and
paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE (eg. The relationship
between the Central Government and the
Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility)
2. Keitner and Reisman state that: [a]n association is
formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic
model, one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while
maintaining its international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground between
integration and independence
3. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other
things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it.
4. The concept of association is not recognized under
the present Constitution
5. The associative relationship envisioned between the
GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a
state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than
the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous
region recognized in the Constitution
1. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria
of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,[154] namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and acapacity to
enter into relations with other states
2. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides
that [t]he creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region
3. BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region.
But even assuming that it is covered by the term
autonomous region in the constitutional provision
just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in
relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic
area of the ARMM and, in addition, the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for
inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite
Tangkal are automatically part of the BJE without
need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas
under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the
overview. That the present components of the
ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities
voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does
not render another plebiscite unnecessary under
the Constitution, precisely because what these
areas voted for then was their inclusion in the
ARMM, not the BJE
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X,
Section 20 of the Constitution
1. Art 10, Sec 20 of the Constitution provide for
legislative powers over… (9) Such other matters as
may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
2. Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded
as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would
require an amendment that would expand the
above-quoted provision
3. The BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries: provided, however, that such
relationships and understandings do not include
aggression against the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines.
4. Under our constitutional system, it is only the
President who has that power. In our system of
government, the President, being the head of state,
is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country's sole
representative with foreign nations.
5. Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution which states
that: “The State recognizes and promotes the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development” must
also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the
MOA-AD is to be effected.
6. An associative arrangement does not uphold
national unity. The act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which, in international
practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national
unity.
MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory
law, among which are R.A. No. 9054 or the Organic Act of
the ARMM, and the IPRA
1. Paragraph 1 on CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES of MOA-
AD states: 1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all
Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. The
Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives
or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago.
2. Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act:
 As used in this Organic Act, the phrase indigenous
cultural community refers to Filipino citizens residing
in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social,
cultural and economic conditions distinguish them
from other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are
believers in Islam and who have retained some or all
of their own social, economic, cultural, and political
institutions
3. Chapter VIII of the IPRA IPRA lays down the
prevailing procedure for the delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-ADs
manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the
Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that
procedure
4. Paragraph 1 of TERRITORY of MOA-AD, the Parties
simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the
agreed Schedules, the Bangsamoro homeland and
historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains,
and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above
it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region.
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.
1. A distinction should be made between the right of
internal and external self-determination
2. RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC: right to self-
determination of a people is normally fulfilled
through internal self-determination a peoples
pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural
development within the framework of an existing
state. A right to external self-determination (which
in this case potentially takes the form of the
assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in
only the most extreme of cases and, even then,
under carefully defined circumstances
3. External self-determination can be defined as in the
following statement from the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra, as : The establishment of a
sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State
or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people
4. The right of disposing of national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every
State. Positive International Law does not recognize
the right of national groups, as such, to separate
themselves from the State of which they form part
by the simple expression of a wish
5. Indigenous peoples situated within states do not
have a general right to independence or secession
from those states under international law, but they
do have rights amounting to what was discussed
above as the right to internal self-determination
6. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP): Nothing in this
Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any
State, people, group or person any right to engage in
any activity or to perform any act contrary to the
Charter of the United Nations or construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign
and independent States.
7. While the word Constitution is not mentioned
anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term legal
framework is certainly broad enough to include the
Constitution.
Republic of the Philippines vs.
Maria P. Lee and Intermediate Appellate Court
Respondent failed to comply with the requirement of Section
48 (b) of commonwealth Act No. 141
1. At the time of the filing of the application for
registration on June 29, 1976, private respondent
had been in possession of the subject area for about
thirteen (13) years. She, however, sought to tack to
her possession that of her predecessors-in-interest
in order to comply with the requirement of Section
48 (b) of commonwealth Act No. 141
2. Section 48 (b) of commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, to wit: (b) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain. under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title," except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter.
3. The most basic rule in land registration cases is that
"no person is entitled to have land registered under
the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the
owner in fee simple. The burden is upon him to
show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee
simple."
4. Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from government. A grant is
conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has
occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively,
and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894 10 or
prior thereto.
5. It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove
that the alleged twenty year or more possession of
the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan
which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year
 period prior to the filing of the application, was
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in
concept of owners. This burden, private respondent
failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court.
Private respondent should have presented specific
facts that would have shown the nature of such
possession.
CITIZENSHIP
Maria Jeanette C. Tecson vs. The Commission On Election
In the case of FPJ
1. Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not
the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate
2. But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough
to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy
Valles v. COMELEC
As to the renunciation of citizenship
1. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows
the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth
2. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or
air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority,
a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of
war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or
amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a
foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
3. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation,
such renunciation must be express. Petitioners
contention that the application of private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration,
and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. Since
private respondent did not lose or renounce her
Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that
respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water.
Dual Citizenship as a disqualification
1. the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification from running for any elective local
position must refer to citizens with dual allegiance
2. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with
dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their
certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign
citizenship
3. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one
declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
Vicente D. Ching
Failure to Elect Filipino Citizenship on time
1. When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter
was the 1935 Constitution
2. The citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship
of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship
3. The age of majority then commenced upon reaching
twenty-one (21) years
4. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted
to mean that the election should be made within
three (3) years from reaching the age of majority or
over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority as held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice
5. In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11
April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years
after he had reached the age of majority
6. Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts
and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was
born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the
1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to
him.
7. Even if we consider the special circumstances in the
life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines, all
his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino.
The span Of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the
time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship
is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of
majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason
why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship
Bengzon III v. HRET
Respondent Cruz is a Natural-born after repatriation
1. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by
birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of
citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen
2. Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country”
3. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 also enumerates the
three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization,
(2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress
4. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
5. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service
in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic
necessity.
6. Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
place where the person concerned resides or last
resided
7. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. If he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
Mercado v. Manzano
Dual Citizenship As A Ground For Disqualification
1. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance
2. It is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers
and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers
country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship.
3. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is the result of an individuals volition
4. Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the
concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization
5. For candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence
of conflicting laws of different states. The filing of
such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen
Co v. HRET
On the Issue of Citizenship
1. To expect the respondent to have formally or in
writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is
obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had
been naturalized when the respondent was only
nine (9) years old. Election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a
citizen since he was nine years old.
2. The petitioners argue that the respondent's father
was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.The
Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his
death and at this very late date just so we can go
after the son.
3. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father
through a collateral approach. This can not be done.
In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship
 may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity
Moya v. Commissioner of Immigration (Based on Case
Digest)
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino
citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen:
Ruling: Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto, provided that
she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated
in CA 473. [Plaintiff-appellant does not possess all the
qualifications required for applicant for naturalization (CA
473), even she has proven that she possesses none of the
disqualifications in said law]
Republic v. dela Rosa and Frivaldo
Irregularities in Reacquiring Citizenship
1. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to
select the requirements which he believes, even
sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard
those which be believes are inconvenient or merely
of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino
citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does
not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens
2. The petition for naturalization lacks several
allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the
petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he
resided continuously in the Philippines for at least
ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write
English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that
he will reside continuously in the Philippines from
the date of the filing of the petition until his
admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he
has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused
from said filing, the justification therefor.
3. The petition is not supported by the affidavit of at
least two credible persons who vouched for the
good moral character of private respondent as
required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy
of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required
by Section 7 of the said law.
4. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the
following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the
petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of
hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition
itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months
from the last publication of the petition; (3)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance
before the finality of the judgment; and (4)
petitioner took his oath of allegiance without
observing the two-year waiting period
Limkaichong v. Comelec
On the issue of Citizenship
1. Julio Ong Sy, father of herein petitioner Jocelyn Sy-
Limkaichong, failed to acquire Filipino citizenship in
the naturalization proceedings which he underwent
for the said purpose.
2. An examination of the records of Special Case No.
1043 would reveal that the Office of the Solicitor
General was deprived of its participation in all the
stages of the proceedings therein, as required under
Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised
Naturalization Law and Republic Act No. 530, An Act
Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization: a.
OSG was not furnished copies of two material orders
of the trial court in the said proceedings. One was
theJuly 9, 1957 Order granting his petition for
naturalization and the other was theSeptember 21,
1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino
citizen; b. OSG did not receive a notice for the
hearing conducted by the trial court on July 9, 1959,
prior to its issuance of the September 12, 1959
Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen
3. This was fatal to the naturalization proceedings of
Julio Ong Sy, and prevented the same from gaining
finality
4. Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Filipino citizenship
through the naturalization proceedings in Special
Case No. 1043. Thus, he was only able to transmit to
his offspring, Chinese citizenship
Coquilla v. Comelec
In the matter of Residency
1. The term residence is to be understood not in its
common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence,
that is, the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain
2. petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by
becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965
3. Petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630,
which applies to the repatriation of those who lost
their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission
in the Armed Forces of the United States, but under
R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides
for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity
4. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on
November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his
legal residence in this country
Frivaldo v. Comelec
Frivaldo’s Repatriation
1. Petitioner Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been
effectively repealed," asserting that "then President
 Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under
the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential
Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a
serious and contentious issue of policy which the
present government, in the exercise of prudence and
sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment
of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution,"
SC Ruling: This memorandum dated March 27, 1987
cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a
repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or
implied. At best, it could be treated as an executive
policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt
the acceptance and processing of applications for
repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make.
In other words, the former President did not repeal
P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress once created
to deal with the matter.
2. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities
flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that
Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29,
1995 x x x (and) was approved in just one day or on
June 30, 1995
SC Ruling: Frivaldo counters that he filed his
application for repatriation with the Office of the
President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994.
This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However,
the Special Committee was reactivated only on June
8, 1995. Under these circumstances, it could not be
said that there was "indecent haste" in the
processing of his application. The requirements of
repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to
comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome.
Unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-
time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation
the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is
merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship
3. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed
repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be
effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas
the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local
Government Code "must exist on the date of his
election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is
filed”
SC Ruling: Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code
does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that
for residence. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his
citizenship on June 30, 1995 the very day the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) began
he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed,
to hold such office and to discharge the functions
and responsibilities thereof as of said date. Section
39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of
candidates. But to remove all doubts on this
important issue, we also hold that the repatriation
of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of
his application. It is true that under the Civil Code of
the Philippines, "laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there
are settled exceptions40 to this general rule, such as
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. A reading
and prescinding from the wording of the preamble
of P.D. 725, it immediately shows that it creates a
new right, and also provides for a new remedy,
thereby filling certain voids in our laws. it is not only
the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given
retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted
under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be
deemed to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for
this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent
of the legislative authority that the law should apply
to past events i.e., situations and transactions
existing even before the law came into being in
order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy
and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be
given the fullest effect and expression, then there is
all the more reason to have the law apply in a
retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage
of such law
Epilogue:
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find
fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant
retroactivity or it could have disputed the factual findings of
the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation.
But the real essence of justice does not emanate from
quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from
the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a
brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus,
the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic,
technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in
order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context
consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating
venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought
American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any
doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the
first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to
serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon
overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath
of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate
of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it
not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer
determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite
several legal set-backs.
Tabasa v. Court of Appeals
Repatriation under RA 8171
1. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA
8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor
children who lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity.
2. This means that if a parent who had renounced his
Philippine citizenship due to political or economic
reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171,
his repatriation will also benefit his minor children
according to the law. Repatriation under RA 8171 is
extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who
could prove that they acquired citizenship of a
foreign country due to political and economic
reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor
children at the time of repatriation. Petitioner was
no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation on
June 13, 1996. Neither can petitioner be a natural-
born Filipino who left the country due to political or
economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine
citizenship by operation of law (while he was still a
minor, his father was naturalized as an American
citizen) and not due to political or economic
exigencies. And even if petitioner now of legal age
can still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he
nevertheless failed to prove that his parents
relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity as provided for in
the law.
3. Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail
of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the
procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
He has to file his petition for repatriation with the
Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which
was designated to process petitions for repatriation
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No.
285). What petitioner simply did was that he took his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he
registered, together with the certificate of live birth,
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila
Angat v. Republic
Repatriation under RA 8171
1. R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23
October 1995, is an act providing for the
repatriation. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 725, dated 05 June 1975, amending
Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for
repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens,
as well as by natural born Filipinos who lost their
Philippine citizenship, with the Special Committee on
Naturalization.
2. Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of
President Corazon C. Aquinos Memorandum of 27
March 1987, it was not, however, abrogated. It is
obvious that no express repeal was made because
then President Aquino in her memorandum-based
on the copy furnished us by Lee-did not categorically
and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being
repealed. It could be treated as an executive policy
addressed to the Special Committee to halt the
acceptance and processing of applications for
repatriation pending whatever 'judgment the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution' might make.
It is intention of 'the present government, in the
exercise of prudence and sound discretion to leave
the matter of repeal to the new Congress.
3. Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June
1995; hence, when petitioner filed his petition on 11
March 1996, the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270
under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Angats petition
should have been filed with the Committee,
aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no
jurisdiction thereover.
Altarejos v. Comelec
Repatriation under RA 8171
1. The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. Petitioner,
therefore, completed all the requirements of
repatriation only after he filed his certificate of
candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the
elections. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the
Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be
construed as applying to the time of proclamation of
the elected official and at the start of his term.
Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute,
which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of
Frivaldo’s repatriation to the date of filing of his
application was justified by the Court. Petitioner
was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty
position in the government in the May 10, 2004
elections.
2. However, petitioner submitted the necessary
documents proving compliance with the
requirements of repatriation only during his motion
for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc
could no longer consider said evidence
Nicolas Lewis v. Comelec
Retention and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship pursuant
to R.A. 9225
1. Section 1 of Article of V of the Constitution
prescribes residency requirement as a general
eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other
hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a
system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that
 a non resident may, as an exception to the residency Calilung v. Datumanong
prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to Is RA 9225 unconstitutional?
vote. 1. In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort
2. In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to
R.A. 9189 - the OAVL. SEC 5(d) states that: An determine the intent of the legislative branch in
immigrant or a permanent resident who is drafting the assailed law.
recognized as such in the host country, unless 2. The proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. The
prepared for the purpose by the Commission problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical Philippines to the foreign country because the latest
permanent residence in the Philippines not later oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one
than three (3) years from approval of his/her of allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also States, as the case may be
state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in 3. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting
another country. Failure to return shall be the cause Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
for the removal of the name of the immigrant or Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away
permanent resident from the National Registry of Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent who become naturalized citizens of other countries.
disqualification to vote in absentia. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
3. Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have
of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225: the lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
Citizenship Retention and Re Acquisition Act of 2003. naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its
SEC. 3 states that: Any provision of law to the face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizenship
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to
have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic.
SEC. 5 states that: Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right
of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other existing laws
4. There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A.
9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first
before they can exercise their right to vote
5. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, the strategic location of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of
Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad.
The same Commission has in effect declared that
qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may
be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy
the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution.