ROSSA MARIE R.
SORTIGOSA LLB 1- D removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
Lagmanet. al. v. Medialdea et. al., GR. Nos. 231568/231771/231774, July 4, 2017
Facts:
President Rodrigo RoaDuterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days. Within
the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a
written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
This is because on the said date, Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established
several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part
of Government forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly
attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief
Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao,
constituting the crime of rebellion.
These events and the classified reports received led the President to conclude that - These activities constitute not simply a
display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a
DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.
In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police authorities conducted
briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law. After the submission of
the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 388 expressing full support to the martial law
proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law".
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for proclamation of Martial Law or Suspension of the privilege of Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
2. Whether or not the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
Ruling:
1. Petitioners acknowledge that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City.But they insist that the armed hostilities
do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable political purpose, like the removal from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or any body of
land, naval, or other armed forces; or to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers and prerogatives.
The purpose of judicial review is the determination of only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the
President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists and not the accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the
President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; . It must
also be reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the
President.
The Court is not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly
tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation. The so-called counter-evidence from the allegations
was derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have
affirmed the contents thereof. It was not even shown that efforts were made to secure such affirmation notwithstanding
the circumstances proved pointless. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice
asserted.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216,
had sufficient factual bases showing that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a
portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached
after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. After all,
what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
2. The scope of the extraordinary powers of the President is reformulated by the framers of the 1987 Constitution as
Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In specific, the President's extraordinary powers of
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the
Court and Congress.The judicial has the power to review while the congress has the power to revoke.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground
of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the
information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening
the declaration. Unlike the Court, which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis, Congress could
investigate deeper and further; it can examine into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive. It is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate
proceeding" by a citizen. Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution provides that any citizen may file the appropriate
proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. The only requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the
challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.
On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that Congress itself may activate it at any time
after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Therefore, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are totally different and are
independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Furthermore, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power
of revocation of Congress.
DISSENTING OPINION:CARPIO
1. Appropriate Proceeding
Based on this constitutional provision (section 18), this referred to a sui generis petition not falling under any of the
actions or proceedings in the Rules of Court for the following three reasons. (1) any citizen can be a petitioner. (2) the
Court is vested by the 1987 Constitution with the power to determine the "sufficiency of the factual basis". Moreover,
the standard of "sufficiency of factual basis" is a unique standard applicable only to a review of the constitutionality of
the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. (3) the Court must decide the case within 30
days from the date of filing of the petition. Contrary to the position of the OSG, the proceeding under paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution cannot possibly refer to a petition for certiorari.
2. Burden of Proof
 The proceeding under paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution places the burden of proof on the
Government. It is the Government that must justify the resort to extraordinary powers that are subject to the
extraordinary review mechanisms under the Constitution. This is only logical because it is the Government that is in
possession of facts and intelligence reports justifying the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ. Ordinary citizens are not expected to be in possession of such facts and reports.
3. Concurrence of the two elements: (1)the existence of actual rebellion or invasion; and (2) public safety requires the
declaration
In exercising his Commander-in-Chief power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ, the 1987
Constitution requires that the President establish the two elements. Thus, the absence of either element will not
authorize the President, who is sworn to defend the Constitution, from exercising his Commander-in-Chief power to
declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ.
4. Probable cause exists in Marawi City and not elsewhere
There is a probable cause that there is actual rebellion in Marawi City and that public safety requires the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ in Marawi City to suppress the rebellion. However, the same
does not apply to the rest of Mindanao.
5. Consequences of a Proclamation of a State of Martial Law
The significant additional powers that the President can exercise under a state of martial law require laws to be enacted
by Congress.
(1) a state of martial law facilitates the speedy apprehension of suspected rebels, and when the privilege of the writ is
likewise suspended, allows a longer detention of suspected rebels under arrest before they are judicially charged. (2)
With the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, the right to privacy of communication and
the freedom to travel can be legitimately restricted on the ground of public safety, provided there is a law enacted by
Congress specifically authorizing such restriction. (3) With the declaration of martial law, Congress may by law
delegate to the President emergency powers such as the takeover of privately-owned public utilities or businesses
affected with public interest. (4) Under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a state of martial law
may "authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are not
able to function.However, this also needs a law to be enacted by Congress since a state of martial law does not suspend
the operation of the 1987 Constitution and it is Congress that is empowered by law "to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of various courts."
DISSENTING OPINION: LEONEN
1. Appropriate Proceedings
The present petitions are justiciable. I concur that the petitions are the "appropriate proceedings" filed by "any citizen"
which appropriately invokes sui generis judicial review contained in the Constitution. However, in addition to the
remedy available in Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, any proper party may also file a Petition invoking
Article VIII, section 1. The remedies are not exclusive of each other. Neither does one subsume the other.
The power of judicial review is the Court's authority to strike down acts of the executive and legislative which are
contrary to the Constitution. This is inherent in all courts, being part of their power of judicial review.6 Article VIII,
Section 1 includes, but does not limit, judicial power to the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies and
determine whether or not any branch or instrumentality of the Government has committed grave abuse of discretion.
2. Congress has a broader review power than the Judiciary
The Court can only act upon an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen while Congress may, by voting jointly and
upon a majority vote, revoke such proclamation or suspension. Congress is permitted a wider latitude on how it chooses
to respond to the President's proclamation or suspension. While the Court is limited to reviewing the sufficiency of the
factual basis behind the President's proclamation or suspension, Congress does not operate under such constraints and
can strike down the President's exercise of his Commander-in-Chief powers as it pleases without running afoul of the
Constitution.
3. Many variants of Martial Law
The President, under the present Constitution, must be clear as to which variant is encompassed in Proclamation No.
216. Otherwise it would be too vague that it will violate the fundamental right to due process as well as evading review
under Article VII Section 18 of the Constitution.
4. Vagueness of the Declaration is unconstitutional
The vagueness of a declaration of martial law is unconstitutional, as it will evade review of the sufficiency of facts
required by the constitutional provision. We need to distinguish between our doctrines relating to acts being void for
vagueness and those, which are void due to overbreadth. The doctrine of void for vagueness is a ground for
invalidating a statute or a governmental regulation for being vague. The doctrine requires that a statute be sufficiently
explicit as to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.
5. Broad scope of a Declaration of Martial Law
It does not define what the President will want to actually do as a result of the proclamation. A broad declaration of
martial law thus immediately violates due process of law.
6. Burden of Proof
It is the government's burden to prove that there are sufficient facts to support the declaration of martial law. Petitioners
should not be assumed to have access to confidential or secret information possessed by the respondents.
7. Mandate of the Court to determine sufficient factual basis
The Rules on Evidence find no application in testing the credibility of intelligence information. This Court will have to
examine the information gathered by intelligence agencies. Evidently, the factual basis upon which the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is founded cannot just be asserted. The
information must undergo an analytical process that would show sound logic behind the inferences drawn.
8. Presentation of facts and arguments are wanting
There are factual allegations that find no relevance to the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. There are facts that have been contradicted by Open-Source Intelligence sources and facts
that have absolutely no basis as they are unsupported by credible evidence.
9. Factual Bases cited seem to be mere allegations
Government failed to show their sources to support the inference that the ASG Basilan, AKP, Maute Group, and BIFF
are indeed linked to the ISIS and that these groups formed alliances. Respondents' only basis is IsnilonHapilon's
"symbolic hijra." Respondent also relies heavily on the ISIS newsletter, Al Naba, which allegedly announced the
appointment of IsnilonHapilon as an emir. These allegations neither explain nor conclusively establish the nature of the
links of the four (4) groups to the ISIS.
10. Intelligence information has not been consistent.
The presentation of the facts and their interpretation changed to accommodate a version that would support martial law.
The most unreliable form of intelligence information is one that has been tweaked and changed to suit the perspective of
the policy maker.
11. Critical pieces of information have not been taken out of context
To assess the sufficiency of the factual basis for finding that rebellion exists in Mindanao, it is essential to contextualize
the acts supposedly suggestive of rebellion, in relation to the culture of the people purported to have rebelled. Ignoring
the cultural context will render this Court vulnerable to accepting any narrative, no matter how far-fetched.
12. May be Terrorism but not necessarily Rebellion
The difference between terrorists and rebels boils down to their intention. Terrorists use fear and violence to advance
their agenda or ideology, which may or may not be political in nature. In this case, it is certainly not the kind of
rebellion that warrants martial law.
13. Danger of mischaracterizing the protagonists
 The Maute Group are terrorists, pure and simple. They are not rebels within the constitutional meaning of the term, No. 4 extending the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
neither is there armed conflict as understood under International Humanitarian Law. Despite the law's benign attitude for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.
towards the local terrorist groups, by characterizing them as rebels, we risk giving the impression that what are mere
sporadic or isolated acts of violence during peacetime, which are considered law enforcement problems, have been
transformed to a non-international armed conflict covered under International Humanitarian. Issue:
14. No effect on Proclamation No. 55 1.
The calling out power of the President is in a different category from the power to proclaim martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Declaring Proclamation No. 216 as unconstitutional therefore will have no effect 2.
on the ongoing military operations in the remaining barangays in Marawi. Neither will it have any effect on military
operations ongoing in other parts of the country including Mindanao as a result of Proclamation No. 55.
15. The words we choose can have violent consequences Ruling:
The situation, as amounting to acts of terrorism, which should be addressed in a decisive but more precise manner. The
military can quell the violence. I honor the sacrifices of many by calling our enemy with their proper names: terrorists 1.
capable of committing atrocious acts. They are not rebels desirous of a viable political alternative that can be accepted
by any of our societies.
History teaches us that to rely on the iron fist of an authoritarian backed up by the police and the military to solve our
deep-seated social problems that spawn terrorism is fallacy. The ghost of Marcos' Martial Law lives within the words of
our Constitution and rightly so. That ghost must be exorcised with passion by this Court whenever its resemblance
reappears.
ROSSA MARIE R. SORTIGOSA LLB 1- D
Lagmanet. al. v. Pimentel III et. al., GR. Nos. 235935/236061/236145/236155, February 6, 2018
Facts:
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo RoaDuterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to
address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group(ASG).
Within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the
House of Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives issued House Resolution
No. 1050, both expressing full support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.
On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint
Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until
December.31, 2017.
Acting on the recommendations of AFP Chief of Staff General Guerrero and Defense Secretary Lorenzana, the President, in a
letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of 2.
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January
1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period as theCongressmaydetermine.
Defense Secretary Lorenzana wrote as recommendation, “primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired
Da’awatulIslamiyahWaliyatulMasriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed
Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to ensure
speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic
development and prosperity in Mindanao.”
On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses
Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216.
Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Yes. According to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are two factual bases for the extension of the
proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
(a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and
(b) public safety requires the extension.
The President cited reasons in his request for further extension that the rebellion, which caused him to issue
Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its “remnants” have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory
in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up,
consolidation of forces and continued attacks.
The extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, according to the Court,
shall be based principally from and are in the possession of the Executive Department. Therefore, “the Court will have
to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the Executive Department; in tum, the Executive Department will have to
open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court.”
The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the extension was based posed a significant
danger, injury or harm to the general public.
The Executive Department opened its findings to the Court when the· Armed Forced of the Philippines gave its
“briefing” or “presentation” during the oral arguments, presenting data, which had been vetted by the NICA, “based on
intelligence reports gathered on the ground,” from personalities they were able to capture and residents in affected
areas, declassified official documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. According to the AFP, the same
presentation, save for updates, was given to the Congress. As it stands, the information thus presented has not been
challenged or questionedasregardsitsreliability.
The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao
and public safety is significantly endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual basis for
the further extension sought by the President and approved by the Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.
Yes. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not specify as to the extent of the period of Martial Law and
suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. It is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the
initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus.
What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or
suspension are (1) that the extension should be upon the President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the
persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and (3) that it is subject to the Court’s review
of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.
Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and suspension. However, it
clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall
 be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.”
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was not adopted by the majority of the
Commission’s members. The framers evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to determine the
duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII and the records of the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and duration of the extension, the
determinative factor is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires” such extension.
DISSENTING OPINION: LEONEN
1. The events that leads to the consolidated cases are as follows: (a) The Proclamation of Martial Law on May 23, 2017 in
Mindanao for period not exceeding 60 days. (b) On July 18, 2017, President requested that the proclamation of martial
law be extended until December 31, 2017. From October 17, 2017 until December 2017, there was no indication that
there was any need to further extend martial law. (c) Letterdated December 8, 2017, the President asked Congress for a
second extension of the proclamation of martial law and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, for a
period of one (1) year, to last until December 31, 2018. (d) During the joint session on December 13, 2017, Congress
passed Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, Further Extending Proclamation No. 216, Series o f 2017, entitled "Declaring
a State o f Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" for a
Period of One (1) Year from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.
2. Court is required to conduct greater judicial and judicious scrutiny.The heightened scrutiny in Article VII, Section 18
already includes the power to review whether the President in his proclamation or request for extension, or the
Congress in its decision to extend, has gravely abused its discretion. The Supreme Court does not lose its powers under
Article VIII, Section 119 simply with an invocation of Article VII, Section 18. The result would be the absurd situation
of hobbling judicial review when the Constitution requires the Court to exercise its full powers.
3. Judicial review, properly invoked, is not a privilege of this Court. It is its sworn duty. Compared with the provisions in
the earlier Constitutions, more stringent conditions are needed before the President can declare martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. First, the conditions of "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent
danger thereof' found in past Constitutions are narrowed down and limited to actual "invasion or rebellion." Second,
there is an added requirement that "public safety requires" the declaration or suspension. Third, a time element is also
introduced. The President may, "for a period not exceeding sixty days," suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Apart from these stringent conditions, the 1987
Constitution grants a more active role to the other branches of government as a check on the possible excesses of the
executive.
4. Public respondents failed to address the requirement that public safety requires for the extension of martial law.The
Constitution requires that martial law may be imposed not only if there is rebellion or invasion. It also requires that it is
indispensable to public safety. The resulting damage or injuries cannot simply be the usual consequences of rebellion or
invasion. It must be of such nature that the powers to be exercised under the rubric of martial law or with the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus are indispensable to address the scope of the conflagration. The mere allegation o f the
existence of rebellion is not enough.
5. The reasonability of the specific remedy sought, in relation to the facts established.The government, in alleging that
martial law is necessary, should cite specific, measurable, attainable, reasonable, and time bound objectives. Not only
did the government fail to articulate the powers it wanted under the extension of martial law, it also failed to define the
targets it has for martial law. The powers to be exercised and its sufficiency for the targets of the extension, therefore,
could not be assessed. There are no judicial standards available to assess what does not exist.
6. Reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis means examining both the allegations and the reasonability of the
inferences.We should not content ourselves with the factum probandumor what is alleged. We should also review the
factum probansas well. A proper review of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" requires that this Court examine the
evidentiary facts that would tend to prove the ultimate facts and the premises of the inferences used to arrive at the
conclusions made by the government.
7. The allegation must be sufficient or credible. The facts can only be judicially deemed sufficient if their basis is transparent
and legible. The basis relied upon for the proclamation ofmartial law or its extension must be shown, to a certain
degree of confidence, to be factually true based upon the credibility of its intelligence sources and the viability of its
inferences.
8. The facts even only as alleged by the government, assuming them to
be true, do not adequately show that there is the
kind of rebellion that requires a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
9. Analysis of facts does not support the respondents' conclusion as to the persistence of the kind of rebellion that warrants a
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
10. There is also absolutely no basis for the extension o f martial law in the area requested, that is, the entire Mindanao
region.
Justifying law enforcement is a world apart from justifying the factual sufficiency for martial law or the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.
11. The President and his advisers failed to explain why Congress should "further extend the proclamation of Martial Law
and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1)
year" or from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. Likewise, there is no explanation why the original period of 60
days was insufficient. There was likewise no explanation why the first extension of a
few months was also not
enough.
12. The government's surreptitious insertion of incidents relating to the 50-year protracted and diminishing Marxist Leninist
Maoist insurrection communist insurrection of the Communist Party of the Philippines through its New Peoples' Army
and National Democratic Front falls short of the constitutional requirements. It appears to be an afterthought to bolster
the factual milieu in view of the military successes in relation to the alleged DAESH-related groups.
13. Terrorism must not be ignored. It is a tragic and violent reality that we must address head-on. However, military rule is
not the solution that will extinguish all acts of terrorism. This conclusion is replete in the relevant literature and
expressed by the most experienced experts.
14. The government's presentation contained no sophistication in relation to how martial law, as generally conceived, can
contribute to addressing the different types o f violence it sought to address. They were not required by Congress or by
the majority of this Court. Representing the government, the Solicitor General insisted through manifestations to even
keep the program to counter violent extremism confidential and unavailable to the petitioners and the public.
15. This was because the deliberations in Congress did not provide for any reasonable space for democratic deliberation.
Congress' deliberations, or manifest lack thereof, should be enough to encourage this Court to approach this case with
more rigor and less deference. The Congress could have been more critical and analytical in its review of the facts
presented through PowerPoint presentations.
16. The majority in this Court presents its decision in the context of a choice between terrorism and rebellion on the one hand
and martial law on the other. This is a false dichotomy. To label the law enforcement problems in Mindanao
simplistically as rebellion in order to grant a carte blanche authority for the President under the rubric of martial law is
dangerous sophistry.
DISSENTING OPINION: CARPIO
1. The Maute rebellion, which was the basis of Proclamation No. 216, already ceased.
The Constitution provides that Congress, voting jointly, may extend the period of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ "if the rebellion shall persist." Literally and without need of constitutional construction, the word
"persist" means the continued existence of the same invasion or rebellion when martial law was initially proclaimed or
the privilege of the writ was initially suspended. In the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the framers
understood that the extension could be justified "if the invasion (or rebellion) is still going on."10 The authority of
Congress to extend martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ is, therefore, limited to the same rebellion
persisting at the time of the extension. In other words, the rebellion used by Congress as justification to extend martial
 law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ must be the same rebellion identified in the initial proclamation of
the President.

The authority of Congress to extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ must
be strictly confined to the rebellion that "persists," the same rebellion cited by President Duterte in Proclamation No.
216. Hence, the end of the Maute rebellion marked the end of the validity of Proclamation No. 216. Any extension
pursuant thereto is unconstitutional since the Maute rebellion already ceased, with the death of its leader IsnilonHapilon
and the liberation of Marawi City. To uphold the extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
when the Maute rebellion no longer persists, in Marawi City or anywhere else in Mindanao, would sanction a clear
violation of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.

Moreover, the government did not present any evidence of an on- going rebellion by the Maute group in other places of
Mindanao outside of Marawi City to justify the extension of Proclamation No 216. In various media appearances,
representatives from the government and the army confessed that Marawi City was already contained and under control.

2. Threats to security posed by remnants of the defeated rebel groups do not constitute an actual rebellion.
Respondents cannot rely on the capability of the remnants of the defeated rebels to deprive duly constituted authorities
of their powers as a justification for the extension of the state of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.
To emphasize, capability to rebel, absent an actual rebellion or invasion, is not a ground to extend the declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. To allow martial law on the basis of an imminent danger or threat
would unlawfully reinstate the ground of "imminent danger" of rebellion or invasion, a ground that was intentionally
removed from the 1987 Constitution. This is a gross violation of the clear letter and intent of the Constitution.

3. Neither can the NPA rebellion justify the extension of Proclamation No. 216, considering that the NPA rebellion was
not the same rebellion that led to the initial martial law declaration and suspension of the privilege of the writ under
Proclamation No. 216. Thus, Joint Resolution No. 4 lacks sufficient factual basis, thereby making it unconstitutional.

To repeat, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the extension of the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ requires the concurrence of the following two elements: one, the invasion or
rebellion persists; and two, public safety requires the extension. Strict compliance with Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution is imperative because the provision distinguishes the initial proclamation or suspension from the
subsequent extension. The former can only last for a period not exceeding 60 days, while the duration of the latter is
subject to the discretion of Congress. By belatedly invoking the NPA rebellion as factual basis for the extension of
Proclamation No. 216, the government effectively circumvented the temporal limitation set by the Constitution that the
initial proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ can only last for 60 days. Worse, the
extension set a maximum period ofone year.