Plato's Cave Analogy

20 Nov 2004
Plato used the analogy of the cave to illustrate his idea of forms. The analogy goes like this:
Imagine several prisoners who have been chained up in a cave for all of their lives. They have never been
outside the cave. They face a wall in the cave and they can never look at the entrance of the cave.
Sometimes animals, birds, people, or other objects pass by the entrance of the cave casting a shadow on
the wall inside the cave. The prisoners see the shadows on the wall and mistakenly view the shadows as
reality.
However, one man breaks free from his chains and runs out of the cave. For the first time, he sees the
real world and now knows that it is far beyond the shadows he had been seeing. He sees real birds and
animals, not just shadows of birds and animals.
This man is excited about what he sees and he goes back to his fellow prisoners in the cave to tell them
about the real world. But to his astonishment, they don’t believe him. In fact, they are angry with him.
They say the shadows are reality and that the escaped prisoner is crazy for saying otherwise.
POInT OF THE CAVE ANALOGY: According to Plato, the world outside the cave represents the world of
forms while the shadows on the wall represent objects in the physical world. The escape of the prisoner
represents philosophical enlightenment and the realization that forms are the true reality. Most people
are like the prisoners in the cave. They think the shadows are reality. Philosophers, though, are like the
man who escapes the cave and sees the real world. They have true knowledge.

The Allegory of the Cave

1. Plato realizes that the general run of humankind can think, and speak, etc., without (so far as they
acknowledge) any awareness of his realm of Forms.
2. The allegory of the cave is supposed to explain this.
3. In the allegory, Plato likens people untutored in the Theory of Forms to prisoners chained in a cave,
unable to turn their heads. All they can see is the wall of the cave. Behind them burns a fire.
Between the fire and the prisoners there is a parapet, along which puppeteers can walk. The
puppeteers, who are behind the prisoners, hold up puppets that cast shadows on the wall of the
cave. The prisoners are unable to see these puppets, the real objects, that pass behind them. What
the prisoners see and hear are shadows and echoes cast by objects that they do not see. Here is an
illustration of Plato’s Cave:

From Great Dialogues of Plato: Complete Texts of the Republic, Apology, Crito Phaido, Ion, and Meno, Vol.
1. (Warmington and Rouse, eds.) New York, Signet Classics: 1999. p. 316.
4. Such prisoners would mistake appearance for reality. They would think the things they see on the
wall (the shadows) were real; they would know nothing of the real causes of the shadows.
5. So when the prisoners talk, what are they talking about? If an object (a book, let us say) is carried
past behind them, and it casts a shadow on the wall, and a prisoner says “I see a book,” what is he
talking about?
He thinks he is talking about a book, but he is really talking about a shadow. But he uses the word “book.”
What does that refer to?
6. Plato gives his answer at line (515b2). The text here has puzzled many editors, and it has been
frequently emended. The translation in Grube/Reeve gets the point correctly:
“And if they could talk to one another, don’t you think they’d suppose that the names they used applied to
the things they see passing before them?”
7. Plato’s point is that the prisoners would be mistaken. For they would be taking the terms in their
language to refer to the shadows that pass before their eyes, rather than (as is correct, in Plato’s
view) to the real things that cast the shadows.
If a prisoner says “That’s a book” he thinks that the word “book” refers to the very thing he is looking at.
But he would be wrong. He’s only looking at a shadow. The real referent of the word “book” he cannot see.
To see it, he would have to turn his head around.
8. Plato’s point: the general terms of our language are not “names” of the physical objects that we
can see. They are actually names of things that we cannot see, things that we can only grasp with
the mind.
9. When the prisoners are released, they can turn their heads and see the real objects. Then they
realize their error. What can we do that is analogous to turning our heads and seeing the causes of
the shadows? We can come to grasp the Forms with our minds.
10. Plato’s aim in the Republic is to describe what is necessary for us to achieve this reflective
understanding. But even without it, it remains true that our very ability to think and to speak
 depends on the Forms. For the terms of the language we use get their meaning by “naming” the
Forms that the objects we perceive participate in.
11. The prisoners may learn what a book is by their experience with shadows of books. But they would
be mistaken if they thought that the word “book” refers to something that any of them has ever
seen.
Likewise, we may acquire concepts by our perceptual experience of physical objects. But we would be
mistaken if we thought that the concepts that we grasp were on the same level as the things we perceive.
In the cave, prisoners are forced to look only in one direction at the shadows on the walls. Behind them
and outside of the cave is a burning fire. Inbetween the prisoners and the fire is a road along which men
are carrying carved wooden figures of people and animals. Silhouettes or shadows
of these figures are reflected on the cave wall from the light of a fire. As the prisoners have never known
anything else, they mistake these images for reality and think that this is all there is to life.
One prisoner, becoming free from his shackles, is able to turn and see first the objects casting the shadows
and then the source of the light. He makes his way out of the cave, painfully blinded at first by the
brightness of the sunlight beyond the entrance to the cave. He now sees reality,
and recognises the shadows below for what they were. Later, the escaped prisoner returns to the cave.
Because he has come in out of the daylight, his eyes are temporarily blinded by the darkness. The
prisoners in the cave argue that his visit beyond the cave has ruined his eyesight and that they would kill
anyone who tried to release them and lead them out.
The analogy tell us "everything" about reality, but we need spiritual knowledge to see it.
This phenomenal universe, is a shadow of the real universe and every particle of this universe,
being creation of the Supreme Lord, reflects a bit of Himself, however pervertedly. From this
shadow of Reality we may briefly deduce the substance, and by so doing turn from the shadow
to the substance. In the analogy Socrates explain that mankind as being chained in a cave with
their backs to the blazing fire of Reality, only capable of making out shadows of one another
which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave. When at first confronted with the blazing
light of Reality, men, not accustomed to it, turn away, their eyes dazzled, for they are used to
the cave and require to grow accustomed to the upper world. But once their sight is accustomed
to the sight of the upper world, they would disdain returning to their prior condition. The
shadows, thrown on the wall of the cave, are analogous to the illusory energy of Krishna. The
light of the upper world is His superior energy. Our process, in the spiritualization of energy, is a
process of moving out the cave, of turning from maya(illusion) to the spiritual light of the
Imperishable.
It is easy to see that the prisoners in the cave are conditioned souls bound by material desires,
lust and anger. Originally these souls sported in the clear daylight outside, but being attracted to
the cave(the illusory material world) and the things of the cave they left the environment of light
and plunged into the darkness of the body where they sit shackled by desire. The puppet
pantomimes perceived on the wall of the cave represent other living entities and the various
objects the soul perceives while in the body. These are but flicks and specks that come and go.
They have no substantiality. Each imprisoned soul takes the shadows of these puppets to be the
real objects of the universe. Although the prisoners are seated next to one another and although
they exchange opinions about the show they are watching, they neither see themselves nor one
another, for they are bound by their passions. Indeed, their real bodies are there hidden in
darkness, just as the spiritual body is hidden to one who can perceive only through the material
senses.
the chambers of the cave correspond to the region revealed to us through the sense of sight and
other gross material senses. The fire within the cave corresponds to the sun that is perceived
within the material world. The ascent out of the cave into the upper world represents what
Socrates calls the “upward journey of the soul into the region of Absolute Intelligence.” Once in
the realms of Absolute Intelligence, Socrates says that the soul has the most difficulty perceiving
the source of light itself, which he calls “the essential Form of goodness.” “Once this form is
perceived,” he says, “the conclusion must follow that for all things this is the cause of whatever
is right and good; in the visible world, it gives birth to light and to the lord of light, while it is itself
sovereign in the world of intelligence and is the parent of intelligence and truth.” Here, Socrates
is talking about the absolute source of all light and goodness, which is Krishna. It is interesting
that he refers to the essential form of goodness. That is to say he does not accept the impersonal
light as the ultimate but indicates a source of this light which has form. He further states,
“Without having had a vision of this Form, no one can act with wisdom either in his own life or in
matters of state.”
Once a prisoner has reached the heights of the upper worlds and has become accustomed to
them, it would be very strange indeed if he wanted to return to the cave. Therefore Socrates
says that those who have attained the upper world are reluctant to become involved in the
affairs of men. Their souls simply long to spend all their time in that upper world. Those who are
in Krishna consciousness are reluctant to become politicians or fruitive laborers of any sort.
Indeed, what rewards could the cave offer them, and how could they become absorbed again in
the pantomime of puppets once they have seen the reality of the upper world? A man would
sooner return to the toys of his childhood and try to play with them. Those liberated souls who
descend out of the upper regions into the cave of the material universe are called avataras, or
“those who descend.” When an avatara does descend into the cave and mingles in the darkness
with blind , demons, literally “those opposed to light,” he may often encounter unpleasant
situations. Socrates notes this: “Nor again is it all strange that one who comes from the
contemplation of the Divine to the miseries of human life should appear awkward and ridiculous
when, with eyes still dazed and not yet accustomed to the darkness, he is compelled, in a law
court or elsewhere, to dispute about the shadows of justice or the images that cast those s

The four idols distinguished by Francis Bacon are the idols of the tribe, den, market, and
theatre. Idols in this sense are eidola, the transient, and therefore to Bacon erroneous, images
of things. (i) Idols of the tribe are general tendencies to be deceived, inherent in our nature as
human beings. They include uncritical reliance on sense perception, and tendencies to over-
generalize or jump to conclusions and ignore countervailing evidence against our views. (ii)
Idols of the den are distortions arising from our particular perspectives (the metaphor is that
of Plato's myth of the cave); the corrective is to remember that whatever our mind ‘seizes and
dwells upon with peculiar satisfaction is to be held in suspicion’. (iii) Idols of the market-place
are errors that come in the course of communication with others: misunderstandings arising
through abuses of words. (iv) Idols of the theatre are the errors introduced by theories: the
abstract schemata of Aristotelianism, and the introduction of theological notions into science.
Bacon here compared philosophical and religious systems to theatrical, and therefore
fantastical, representations of the world.
Bacon distinguishes four idols, or main varieties of proneness to error. The idols of the tribe are certain
intellectual faults that are universal to mankind, or, at any rate, very common. One, for example, is a
tendency toward oversimplification, that is, toward supposing, for the sake of tidiness, that there exists
more order in a field of inquiry than there actually is. Another is a propensity to be overly influenced by
particularly sudden or exciting occurrences that are in fact unrepresentative.
The idols of the cave are the intellectual peculiarities of individuals. One person may concentrate on the
likenesses, another on the differences, between things. One may fasten on detail, another on the totality.
The idols of the marketplace are the kinds of error for which language is responsible. It has always been a
distinguishing feature of English philosophy to emphasize the unreliable nature of language, which is seen,
nominalistically, as a human improvisation. Nominalists argue that even if the power of speech is given by
God, it was Adam who named the beasts and thereby gave that power its concrete realization. But
language, like other human achievements, partakes of human imperfections. Bacon was particularly
concerned with the superficiality of distinctions drawn in everyday language, by which things
fundamentally different are classed together (whales and fishes as fish, for example) and things
fundamentally similar are distinguished (ice, water, and steam). But he was also concerned, like later
critics of language, with the capacity of words to embroil men in the discussion of the meaningless (as, for
example, in discussions of the deity Fortune). This aspect of Bacon's thought has been almost as influential
as his account of natural knowledge, inspiring a long tradition of skeptical rationalism, from the
Enlightenment to Comtian positivism of the 19th and logical positivism of the 20th centuries.
The fourth and final group of idols is that of the idols of the theatre, that is to say mistaken systems of
philosophy in the broadest, Baconian sense of the term, in which it embraces all beliefs of any degree of
generality. Bacon's critical polemic in discussing the idols of the theatre is lively but not very penetrating
philosophically. He speaks, for example, of the vain affectations of the humanists, but they were not a very
apt subject for his criticism. Humanists were really anti-philosophers who not unreasonably turned their
attention to nonphilosophical matters because of the apparent inability of philosophers to arrive at
conclusions that were either generally agreed upon or useful. Bacon does have something to say about the
skeptical philosophy to which humanists appealed when they felt the need for it. Insofar as skepticism
involves doubts about deductive reasoning, he has no quarrel with it. Insofar as it is applied not to reason
but to the ability of the senses to supply the reason with reliable premises to work from, he brushes it
aside too easily.
Bacon's attack on Scholastic orthodoxy is surprisingly rhetorical. It may be that he supposed it to be
already sufficiently discredited by its incurably contentious or disputatious character. In his view it was a
largely verbal technique for the indefinite prolongation of inconclusive argument by the drawing of
artificial distinctions. He has some awareness of the central weakness of Aristotelian science, namely its
attempt to derive substantial conclusions from premises that are intuitively evident, and argues that the
apparently obvious axioms are neither clear nor indisputable. Perhaps Bacon's most fruitful disagreement
with Scholasticism is his belief that natural knowledge is cumulative, a process of discovery, not of
conservation. Living in a time when new worlds were being found on Earth, he was able to free himself
from the view that everything men needed to know had already been revealed in the Bible or by Aristotle.
Against the fantastic learning of the occultists Bacon argued that individual reports are insufficient,
especially since men are emotionally predisposed to credit the interestingly strange. Observations worthy
to substantiate theories must be repeatable. Bacon defended the study of nature against those who
considered it as either base or dangerous. He argued for a cooperative and methodical procedure and
against individualism and intuition.
Francis Bacon opens his essay, "Idols of the Mind" by showing the reader that exploration, testing, and
reason combined is the only way to truly gain knowledge; only so much as the laws of nature are obeyed.
He proceeds
to introduce each of the four "idols of the mind": the tribe, cave, marketplace, and theatre, and why each
of these keeps humans from true understanding. Bacon asserts that idols of the tribe are in the very basis
of human nature, whereas idols of the cave are of each individual man. Idols of the Marketplace arise from
the interactions of men with one another, and idols of the theatre are ideas perceived through the theatre
of false scientific axioms as they stand now, according to Bacon.
One part of this essay that I particularly enjoyed was the anecdote of the shipwreck survivors. A man was
shown a picture in the temple of people paying vows to God after having escaped a shipwreck. The man
was asked how he could deny the power of God in light of such evidence. He responded by asking to see
the picture of the people who had drowned after praying for rescue.
I liked this piece, not because I get enjoyment from trying to find ways to deny the existence of a God, but
because it represents a great and fundamental problem with organized religion that is always quickly
blown off as not being faithful, or not truly believing. Each person is entitled to his or her own religious
believes, and I certainly feel like there are ways to justify the existence of God, however, it is that mindset,
that ridiculous, Crusade like reasoning that is still shoved down the throats of the unassuming masses that
really bothers me.
Karl Marx said "religion is the opiate of the masses" and that allegory is a perfect example of the laughable
arguments that are used by the massive organized religions to keep the people who are less apt to
question what they are told inline and awe inspire.
The New Instrument of Knowledge

by Manly P. Hall
In the Novum Organum (the new instrumentality for the acquisition of knowledge) Francis Bacon classified
the intellectual fallacies of his time under four headings which he called idols. He distinguished them as
idols of the Tribe, idols of the Cave, idols of the Marketplace and idols of the Theater.
An idol is an image, in this case held in the mind, which receives veneration but is without substance in
itself. Bacon did not regard idols as symbols, but rather as fixations. In this respect he anticipated modern
psychology.

Idols of the Tribe are deceptive beliefs inherent in the mind of man, and therefore belonging to the
whole of the human race. They are abstractions in error arising from common tendencies to exaggeration,
distortion, and disproportion. Thus men gazing at the stars perceive the order of the world, but are not
content merely to contemplate or record that which is seen. They extend their opinions, investing the
starry heavens with innumerable imaginary qualities. In a short time these imaginings gain dignity and are
mingled with the facts until the compounds become inseparable. This may explain Bacon's epitaph which
is said to be a summary of his whole method. It reads, "Let all compounds be dissolved."

Idols of the Cave are those which arise within the mind of the individual. This mind is symbolically a
cavern. The thoughts of the individual roam about in this dark cave and are variously modified by
temperament, education, habit, environment, and accident. Thus an individual who dedicates his mind to
some particular branch of learning becomes possessed by his own peculiar interest, and interprets all
other learning according to the colors of his own devotion. The chemist sees chemistry in all things, and
the courtier ever present at the rituals of the court unduly emphasizes the significance of kings and
princes.
 (The title page of Bacon's New Atlantis (London 1626) is ornamented with a curious design or printer's
device. The winged figure of Father Time is shown lifting a female figure from a dark cave. This represents
truth resurrected from the cavern of the intellect.)

Idols of the Marketplace are errors arising from the false significance bestowed upon words, and in this
classification Bacon anticipated the modern science of semantics. According to him it is the popular belief
that men form their thoughts into words in order to communicate their opinions to others, but often words
arise as substitutes for thoughts and men think they have won an argument because they have out talked
their opponents. The constant impact of words variously used without attention to their true meaning only
in turn condition the understanding and breed fallacies. Words often betray their own purpose, obscuring
the very thoughts they are designed to express.

Idols of the Theater are those which are due to sophistry and false learning. These idols are built up in
the field of theology, philosophy, and science, and because they are defended by learned groups are
accepted without question by the masses. When false philosophies have been cultivated and have
attained a wide sphere of dominion in the world of the intellect they are no longer questioned. False
superstructures are raised on false foundations, and in the end systems barren of merit parade their
grandeur on the stage of the world.

A careful reading of the Novum Organum will show. Bacon used the theater with its curtain and its
properties as a symbol of the world stage. It might even be profitable to examine the Shakespearean plays
with this viewpoint in mind.

*************

After summarizing the faults which distinguish the learning of his time, Bacon offered his solution. To him
true knowledge was the knowledge of causes. He defined physics as the science of variable causes, and
metaphysics as the science of fixed causes. By this definition alone his position in the Platonic descent is
clearly revealed. Had he chosen Aristotle as his mentor the definition would have been reversed.

It was Bacon's intention to gather into one monumental work his program for the renewal of the sciences.
This he called Instauratio Magna (the encyclopedia of all knowledge), but unfortunately the project was
never completed. He left enough, however, so that other men could perfect the work.

The philosophy of Francis Bacon reflects not only the genius of his own mind but the experiences which
result from full and distinguished living. The very diversity of his achievements contributed to the unity of
his thinking. He realized the importance of a balanced viewpoint, and he built his patterns by combining
the idealism of Plato with the practical method of Aristotle. From Plato he derived a breadth of vision, and
from Aristotle a depth of penetration. Like Socrates, he was an exponent of utility, and like Diogenes a
sworn enemy of sophistry. Knowledge was not to be acquired merely for its own sake, which is learning,
but for its use, which is intelligence. The principal end of philosophy is to improve the state of man; the
merit of all learning is to be determined by its measure of usefulness.

Bacon believed that the first step was to make a comprehensive survey of that which is known, as
distinguished from that which is believed. This attitude he seems to have borrowed from Paracelsus and
shared with Descartes. Knowledge may be gathered from the past through tradition. It may be
accumulated and augmented by observation, but it must be proved and established by experimentation.
No theory is important until it has been proved by method. Thus Bacon set up the machinery of control
which has since become almost the fetish of science.

Upon the solid foundation of the known, trained minds can build toward universal knowing, which is the
end of the work. Knowledge alone can preserve and perfect human life. In spite of his scientific approach,
Bacon in no way discounted the spiritual content in the world. Knowledge might arise from inspiration and
the internal illumination of the consciousness, but this illumination is not knowledge until, through
experimentation, the truth is physically established.
The Four Idols of Sir Francis Bacon
by
Ben Chambers and Zeb Dahl.

Discuss how each of the following can distort what is real to the understanding: (with
EXAMPLES!)

Idols of the Tribe:

A person's education:
Education falls into the "nurture" side of the "nature-nurture" equation, and is a large
influence on an individual's perception of the world around them. Unfortunately, the false
realities of the educators, books, etc. can get passed on to the student, thus coloring their
clear understanding. For example, if a particular history teacher had a dislike of, say,
communism, the student might well get false impressions of how that system works and its
implications for society.

The books a person reads:

Books work similarly to education, and perhaps are in fact a somewhat less intense version of
education. Again, the points of view in books will tend to distort an understanding and thus a
person can be greatly influenced by their reading material. For example, if a person were to
read a book portraying a particular subject (say, religion in schools) in a negative manner, the
person's understanding and reaction to the issue could be completely clouded.

The people a person admires:

All people have their own idols and false understandings, and if a person holds another in too
high esteem, there is the potential for them to pick up their "herd's" false perceptions. (For
example, you might admire someone for some reason, but find yourself picking up a bad habit
of theirs.)

A person's experiences:

A person's experiences can also distort their understanding, especially if they attempt to draw
too many conclusions from them. For example, if you were robbed by a certain race or type of
person, you might (even subconsciously associate that type of person with the experience and
come to the conclusion that that type of person is bad.

Our need to seek more and more regularity in the world than there really is:

This is a tendency people have which may well arise from convenience of thought: we tend to
think that things ought to be simple. Science has been under this delusion for some time,
assuming there was a simple explanation for most physical phenomena (such as weather).
Relativity, QM, and Chaos theory are only recently changing this view. (It is know known that
many such phenomena cannot be predicted.)
Our tendency to seek out evidence of that which we already believe to be true:

This arises perhaps from affection we begin to give to ideas we have found and carried with us
for some time; we become attached to them and collect evidence that supports them while
throwing out that which contradicts them. Of course, this will lead us to false conclusions if we
have accidentally embraced a false "truth." Science faces this problem all the time: in the
attempts to find scientific evidence for, say, psychic phenomena, scientists often tend to find
data that fits whatever conclusions they were expecting, whether or not it was the most
accurate analysis of data. This is especially problematic in the analysis of "soft" data, such as
the results of psychological experiments.
Our tendency to see personal truths as universal:

This boils down to opinion. Clearly, your opinion (just one of your little false realities) is far
from universal, and yet most people consider them to be so and will often argue them
vehemently with little thought to their real value. For example, in the area of personal taste
around music, I
hear it said often that "musical group X sucks" or "yeah, band y has two good songs." Often,
these opinions are treated as reality without any realization of their very personal, opinion-
based nature.

Our belief in empirical data:

The problem with empirical data is it is reliant upon the senses. And the senses are inherently
unreliable, being very much a relative measure of things. This can give impressions that are
incorrect. In addition people believe that if they can't sense something, it isn't there. ("I'll
believe it when I see it.") This has slowed the discovery over time of such things as germs,
electromagnetic phenomena, etc. Clearly, initial absence of empirical data has no bearing on
its existence.

Our tendency to let emotions rule reason:

Simply put, the human's difficulty in separating emotions from observations and
understanding can give us false impressions of the truth based on our feelings at the time. For
example, the man who gets cut off by someone in traffic, loses it, chases after the offending
driver and vehicle, cuts them off, stops his vehicle and yells at the person (I'm not making this
up) clearly has let emotion cloud their better judgment and understanding.

Idols of the Cave:

People see things in light of their own special knowledge and opinions:

People tend to look at things through the eyes of their favorite science or theology, and this
can cause distortion of the truth. For example, a chemist who is asked about a certain
phenomenon (say, the nature of electromagnetic radiation) might delve into a particle-based
explanation of it while neglecting a more broad view, thus distorting the understanding of the
both the person he is talking to, and himself as well, very likely.
Some of us are governed by similarities, others by differences:

Both of these extremes are easily mired in excess, tending to miss the other half. The
tendency to classify things by their common features or their distinctions can cause the
observer to miss all other aspects of the things he is studying, even though they might be
more important. For example, an individual who meets someone they've never met before
might notice that some mannerism of the person reminds them of their mother. They might be
so distracted by this fact that they completely fail to get to know the other person.
Those who love the past and those who love the possibilities of the future obscure the
knowledge of the present:

"The past is but a memory, the future is but a dream; the only truth is now, the moment."
Philosophers who concentrate too much on the past or the future miss the importance of the
now, the present, the experience, which is the most important part. For example, those who
attempt to know the "truth" by analyzing the past may understand much of what shaped
where we are today, but they may well completely miss the thoughts of the day, the existence
of reality as it is now, or even their own thoughts on things, thus obstructing their knowledge.

Some of us see only the details and others see only the global:

Failure to examine things on more than one level of "zoom" can cause serious gaps in our
understanding of any subject of study. For instance, were mechanical physicists to ignore
particle physics, they would have a thoroughly incomplete understanding of what's going on.

Idols of the Marketplace:

Words are misused or misunderstood:

This is a large problem in the communication of ideas, which is quite important. Two people
having a conversation might be using the same word but thinking of different meanings, and
would obviously not be getting the same meaning. Or, a person might use the wrong word,
thinking one thing but saying another. For example, using the word "Sophistic" instead of
"Sophisticated" will give the listener two very different impressions of whatever is being
described.

Words have a true and a vulgar meaning:

In a word, slang. Same as above, more or less. Common meaning might differ from true
meaning, and in fact common meaning can corrupt true meaning. For example, the word "duff"
has a general meaning in common conversation, which has long obscured its true meaning,
which is "decaying matter on the floor of a forest." (Seriously.) In any case, confusion can
ultimately arise from these differences.

Words cannot be defined because we need words to define them:

Definitely a circular reasoning problem. Many people come to use words simply by hearing
them used, and fail to define them. Worse, any definitions must use more words, which in turn
must be defined causing a complete lack of exact understanding of the meaning of the words.
For example, looking up the word "intelligent," one gets the definition "having quick mental
capabilities." This requires looking up all of these words, which are in turn defined by more
words, ad infinitum; one never gets to a non-word definition.

Names of things which do not exist confuse our understanding:

Things which are supposed to be true with no evidence, simply from speculation. Such an idea
was that of ether, the medium that light was supposed to move in. However, no such medium
seems to exist, and the idea threw scientists off for some time.
Names of things which exist but which are defined or have contradictory meanings: (don't use
"humid")
Very simply, words which have more than one meaning, of which the English language is full.
Even a simple word like "clever" can mean either "smart" or "tricky," which have very different
meanings.
How do the following work well in demonstration but less well in reality separate from their
control?

Idols of the Theater:

Religion:

Religion is in a way domesticated philosophy, relying on scripture for its philosophical

teachings. The idols of much religion is the reliance on these writings (too narrow a
foundation) to the point that the philosophy is not itself examined very closely. For example,
religion is supposed to espouse virtues such as forgiveness and not murdering, but on the
other hand some of the worst atrocities of all time have been committed in
the name of religion, with little thought to the moral issues of what is being done. (Holy wars
are an especially good example of this.)
Political systems (democracy, communism, etc.):

Political systems are created on the assumption that people will act and work in certain ways
(communism especially is prone to this). In actuality, however, idols of various kinds and
limitations in the plans themselves may keep the political systems from functioning as they
had been expected to in theory. For example, democracy is supposed to have the "people"
making all the decisions, but in a large society, indirect representation is the only feasible
route to go, distancing the people from the political processes and draining much power out of
the premise of the system.

Education:

The basic idea here is that education, the transferal of knowledge, can too easily be corrupted
by stagnant ideas, or by the prejudices (idols) of the teacher.

Political parties:

Political parties also base their "philosophies" on too narrow a base of knowledge and
understanding, drawing on popular thought and opinion rather than true philosophy or
science. For example, a certain political party (think elephants) tends to base much of its
thought both on public opinion (which is a crock) and on religion (see "religion" above). Many
of its more prominent members (think bananas and lizards) seem to base most of their
viewpoints on the above stated reasons, leaving original thought out of the equation
altogether. BOTH political parties are guilty of this (in different directions), and it drains much
of the validity of the positions of both parties.