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23 / SC / MRP

BLENDING CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

INTRODUCTION

1. Military doctrine is the fundamental principle by which military forces guide their actions
to attain the objective.1 The age old ‘yellow book’ has been the basis for planning and
conducting campaign, major operations and battles for a long time in the context of
Bangladesh. It basically lays down the theories to conduct conventional warfare. In the mid of
1990s the Draft Operations of War Volume One came into being to provide Bangladesh Army’s
own war fighting doctrine superseding all prevalent contentious concepts and ideas to give a
functional shape to warfare. The contents of this pamphlet are primarily based upon the
experience of the momentous Liberation War of 1971 and the knowledge and wisdom of our
present military thinkers. It projects a whole new horizon of tactical ideas, which blends both
conventional and unconventional warfare as its major concept. The Draft Pamphlet says, ‘In
future conflicts, Bangladesh Army must be prepared to blend conventional and unconventional
warfare in the implementation of national strategy’.2

2. The cumulative effects of innumerable small tactical initiatives can become a major
factor in changing the overall military posture of enemy. It can be done through unconventional
forces especially the guerrillas in conjunction with the operations of a friendly conventional
forces. The psychological effect of the real damage steaming from the sabotage activities by
the unconventional forces and the concurrent conventional military pressure may compel
enemy to turn his posture from strategic offensive to strategic defensive.

3. Guerrilla tactics against conventional forces can be compared with those of a picador,
the horseman with a lance who, in the course of a bullfight, sticks the bull repeatedly but is not
expected ever to deliver the coup de grace. Conventional pursuit forces become
correspondingly more frustrated. To shield themselves from the multiple pin-pricks and bee
stings inflicted by the guerrillas, conventional forces are forced to allocate more and more of
their effort to defence.3 The adversary of Bangladesh is likely to be politically, economically
and militarily superior. As such, the operations by only conventional force may not bring the
desired success. The blend of conventional and unconventional warfare is a need to bring

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dividend in our context. In this backdrop, this paper will examine blending conventional and
unconventional warfare in the context of Bangladesh. The paper will first focus on historical
perspective, geography and likely threats and also evaluate the present military strategy. Then,
reasons for blending conventional and unconventional warfare and the concept of blending will
be discussed. Finally a suggested force structure will also be highlighted.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to examine blending conventional and unconventional warfare
as a doctrinal novelty for Bangladesh.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

5. Due to paucity of strength and lack of adequate sophisticated armament a weaker army
needs to blend the conventional and unconventional methods of operations during the
prosecution of the national war. This blending of conventional and unconventional warfare can
bring dividend to the weaker army against a superior force.

6. World History. During Vietnam's Revolution War, America conducted massive

ROLLING THUNDER's air attack in North Vietnam, but they failed to bring Ho Chi Minh in the
negotiation table. Rather Vietminh conducted their deep operations by infiltration attacks,
ambushes etc. Vietminh resorted to both conventional and unconventional war. Afghan
followed the same technique while fighting against Russians. Russians were superior in terms
of men and materials. But Afghan compensated this overwhelming superiority by resorting to
unconventional war. They used to provoke the Russians to move out to pre-selected killing
grounds by 'hit and run' operations. When the Russians were sufficiently dispersed in pursuit
of retreating force, they were ambushed / attacked by Afghans. Afghans also disrupted
Russians lines of communication by frequent attacks / ambushes. A statistics shows that at
least 60% of total Russian Forces in Afghanistan were committed to protect lines of
communication on the face of such actions.

7. Liberation War 1971. The Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971 is the burning
example of blending conventional and unconventional warfare. The peculiarity of this war is
that the ‘Mukti Bahini’ started the Liberation War unconventionally and later, this force was

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reorganised and blended both conventional and unconventional methods of operation to
achieve decisive victory. ‘Mukti Bahini’ was a cohesive and effective force that comprised of
regular, auxiliary forces, guerrillas and local militias from all walk of life.

GEOGRAPHY AND LIKELY THREATS TO BANGLADESH

Likely Threats from Geographical Point of View

8. Bangladesh is a gentle alluvial plain and much of it is a vast delta produced by three
magnificent rivers of South Asia – the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna. The total
boundary being 4025 km, the country is almost sandwiched by Indian territories on the west,
north and east. Bangladesh also shares 283 kilometres land and river boundary with Myanmar
in the south-west. In the south Bangladesh has about 700 kilometres of sea boundary in the
Bay of Bengal, which again makes her a sea neighbour of India and Myanmar.4

9. Likely Threats. If we consider the likely threats to Bangladesh, any territorial

aggression will basically be initiated from our neighbours having common land and maritime
boundaries. Territorial aggression may be in different form than the campaign fought in the
War of Liberation.5 As such we shall consider our neighbouring countries only.
a. India. Bangladesh commands access to the Indian Ocean through the lanes of
Bay of Bengal. It increases her foreign policy bargaining capacity vis-a vis the outside
world. Bangladesh borders the seven north-east Indian states, which are witnessing
insurgency and political instability for a long period. Location wise Bangladesh almost
isolates these states from the rest of India and thus has the potential to influence the
turmoil in this part of Indian Union.6 Communication system in Bangladesh provides
easy access between two halves of India. It’s seaports, both Chittagong and Mongla,
are accessible to Indian seven north-eastern states. Northern area of Bangladesh
commands the strategic Shiliguri corridor. The exploration of natural resources in
Bangladesh may lead India to go for a wishful venture of military invention. Above all
India’s security perception takes into account her neighbours as an integral part of her
own security.7 All these make Bangladesh of special interest to India.

b. Myanmar. Before 1990s Bangladesh probably did not expect any threat from
Myanmar. But at the end of 1991 Myanmar raided one of our border outposts in

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Naikhongchari thana and the situation deteriorated. However, the situation was brought
to normalcy through diplomatic efforts. Still our country is facing the Rohinga refugee
problem. As such the potentiality of threat from this front also can not be ruled out.

10. Threat Analysis. Due to obvious geographical reality, Myanmar poses a limited
threat. Therefore, any offensive by the adversary is likely to be as follows:

a. Ground threat is likely to develop from west, north and east simultaneously. The
initial objective would be to invest along the river lines of Jamuna, Meghna – Surma and
Brahmaputra, and thereafter converge to Dhaka. They are likely to tackle the defences
en-route with simultaneous development of operations in the flank and rear areas to
reach the Dhaka bowl as soon as possible.
b. Threat may utilise long range weapons initially to cause attrition on own forces
and combat assets while remaining disengaged. At the same time they may go for air
interdiction to shape the battlefield. These would facilitate them during the conduct of
manoeuvre and close engagement. They may deploy sizeable portion of mechanised
forces and combat helicopters to rapidly secure the military objectives.

c. The threat is likely to dominate the air space throughout. Thus own forces will be
deprived of aerial reconnaissance and be subjected to detection and destruction. This
may make it extremely challenging for the formations to concentrate forces for
meaningful offensive operations. Concentration of forces by moving troops from one
sector to another will be difficult and risky for lack of own effective air cover.

d. The threat will have overwhelming superiority in terms of conventional force ratio
as well as resources including long range weapons.

Geographical Realities

11. Bangladesh is perhaps the most river-crossed terrain in the world – a land ideal for
defensive tactics.8 The major rivers have divided the country in different isolated sectors. Apart
from the rivers and soft alluvial plain, the existence of numerous marshy areas, forests, hill
features in the south-eastern part, flooding etc hinder cross-country mobility. Other than winter,
movement is basically restricted and confined to specific routes only. After the Liberation War

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in 1971, Major General D. K. Palit in his book ‘The Lightning Campaign’ said, “Every town and
village is a defender’s dream – and a nightmare for anyone planning offensive operations”.9
But the location and terrain configuration also bears significant disadvantages in relation to the
perceived threat, which are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs (Geo-political map of
Bangladesh is attached as Annex A).
12. Numerous Routes of Entry. Over the years a series of metamorphoses in its physical
features especially development of road communication along with the construction of major
bridges over the mighty rivers have altered the country’s military landscape. At present a
number of road and railway communication networks lead from the bordering areas to Dhaka,
which provide advantage to our likely adversary for tactical manoeuvre. The Dhaka bowl, the
vital ground of our defence is no more formidably protected against a superior adversary.

13. Lack of Strategic Depth. Bangladesh does not have adequate strategic depth to
sustain a protracted war through conventional operations. During Liberation War in 1971, it
was revealed that Pakistan Armed Forces encountered Allied Forces in Dhaka before their
military formations were tactically defeated. The narrow waistline of Hilli – Gaibandha of north-
western part, the depth of eastern part from the border up to the river line of Dhaka bowl are
very significant in this regard.

14. Lack of Natural Obstacle along the Border. Though Bangladesh has numerous
natural obstacles all over the main land but the borders are not demarcated along natural
obstacles excepting few areas. As such any surprise threat can not be ignored.

15. No Sanctuary Outside the Border. The geographical location of Bangladesh is as

such that she has practically only one neighbour – India. She would virtually be isolated if the
powerful Indian Navy cordons off her access to the Bay of Bengal.10 Bangladesh will be
deprived of sanctuary outside the border, a much needed support, to conduct and continue a
war against a superior enemy.

16. Difficulty in Procuring War Materials. Bangladesh will face difficulty in procuring war
materials from abroad. Potential aggressor borders Bangladesh on three sides and can
effectively block air and water routes as well. The possibility of help through Myanmar is also
remote. Because even Myanmar tends to provide support, the south-eastern part of the
country, which includes Chittagong port, is likely to be isolated at the very outset of hostility.

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MILITARY STRATEGY OF BANGLADESH

17. Present Concept of Operation. As per the present concept of operation, Bangladesh
Army plans to deploy all along the major approaches basing on a series of defensive lines
within the country to fight a limited war in the conventional mode. The overall military strategy
thereby has a framework to hold the enemy for a considerable duration and gain time so that
international pressure through diplomatic channel can be created on the enemy to withdraw
their forces. However, if the Army fails to withstand the enemy thrusts or the diplomatic efforts
turn unsuccessful, it is supposed to resort to a mode of total unconventional warfare by going
to suitable sanctuaries and organising resistance with the support of the civil population all
over the country.11

18. Evaluation of the Present Concept.

a. The present operational concept has less chances of success. It is purely

defensive and passive in nature. No specific plan to take actions to exploit enemy’s
vulnerabilities has been catered for and at the planning level defeat through
conventional warfare is accepted after a considerable period.

b. The Army formations are under strength with incomplete organisational structure.
The formations responsible for vast areas may not be able to guard all the axes
effectively only by the series of defensive battle.

c. Diplomatic aspect as envisaged is hardly guaranteed in the present day world /

regional scenario.

b. The plan does not clarify from where and how the unconventional warfare will be
fought.

e. At the end of conventional warfare resistance through general mass has been
catered for. By then maximum portion of the territory along with the population would be
under control of enemy and it would be difficult to organise the civil population.

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f. As the formations get close towards the Dhaka bowl after fighting the successive
defensive battle, it would allow enemy to find concentrated target of own Armed Forces
for piecemeal destruction.

19. Option to be Evolved in Concept of Operation. From the geographical and threat
points of view it is now evident that Bangladesh will have to fight from within the country where
only conventional war can not be conducted for a long time. As such victory is a remote
possibility for her. The popular concept of fighting unconventional war on the termination of
conventional war no longer stands valid as it deprives both the war efforts of gaining significant
advantages. But it can be achieved through blending them together. This doctrine strongly
advocates their concurrent conduct. Initially conventional war will remain as the principle
means of seeking a decision. Later, as the conventional power diminishes, unconventional war
will assume the major role. Both conventional and unconventional war must be blended
together to achieve the synergism that would produce the desired end state on conflict
termination.12

REASONS FOR BLENDING CONVENTIONAL

AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

20. Modern battles are combined arms operations that involve synchronisation of various
battlefield operating systems. When meshed together, their combined capabilities produce
the battle winning effect to achieve the decisive result. In most cases, the battlefield
operating systems which need to be co-ordinated by the both operational and tactical
commanders are: manoeuvre, fire support, air defence, engineer support, electronic
warfare, intelligence, deception, logistics, command and control, tactical air support and
unconventional warfare.13 All the battlefield operating systems mentioned here fall within
the purview of conventional methods of fighting war. The only exception to that is
unconventional warfare. As such modern concept of fighting a war envisages blending
both conventional and unconventional warfare.

21. Compensate Numerical Inferiority. Unconventional war assumes greater

importance in defensive operations as it significantly compensates the numerical disadvantage
of the defending force. It makes the theatre / battlefield cellular by allowing simultaneous
engagement of the enemy forces throughout the length and breadth of the area of operation. 14

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Therefore, the main objective of the blending of conventional and unconventional war provides
to compensate the numerical inferiority and lack of modern fighting assets of our conventional
forces against our potential adversary. It also involves the population right from the beginning
in the conduct of war. In the context of Bangladesh it is a must, where our likely adversary has
overwhelming superiority to derive advantages from maximum numbers of conventional
battlefield operating systems.

22. Operations Behind Enemy Lines. Modern concept of defensive framework

envisages synchronisation of operations in five different areas. These are: operations behind
the enemy lines, covering force operations, operations in the main defensive position, reserve
operations and rear area security. This concept makes it different from the existing one by
inclusion of ‘operation behind the enemy lines’ and ‘rear area security’. And of these two,
‘operation behind enemy lines’ assumes to be of greater importance. The objective / purpose
of this type of operation is to shape the battlefield by non-linear engagement to suit own
requirement. These operations begin before the enemy closes with the friendly forces and
continue throughout the entire battle. Surveillance assets and the unconventional forces are
initially used to locate and track the forward and follow up formations of the attacking enemy
within the area of interest. As enemy formations approach to contact with the friendly forces,
their movement is closely monitored to identify and strike selected high pay off targets and
disrupt his introduction of follow up forces either by aircraft, long range weapon system or
unconventional forces.15 Bangladesh Army has not yet attained the desired technological build
up to face the modern conventional threat of her likely adversaries. As such, the use of
unconventional forces is the likely option to operate behind the enemy lines in conjunction with
operation of the conventional forces.

23. Unorthodox Approach – A Tenet of Army Operation. An unorthodox approach to the

conduct of war implies departure from the traditional methods and adopting original and
creative tactics and operational art to achieve decisive result. It plays a key role in offsetting
enemy’s superiority of strength. Instead of engaging the attacking enemy along a traditional
defensive line, the defenders can systematically destroy them by a series of large-scale raids,
ambushes, infiltration attacks and unconventional activities. Unconventional warfare assumes
its classical role of interdicting enemy follow up formations and rear areas in defensive
operations. When well co-ordinated with conventional but unorthodox operations, it can
contribute significantly to the success of the campaign or battle.

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24. Integration of Civil Population. Bangladesh can not afford to go for offensive posture
for obvious reason and mainly will have to resort to defensive posture. To maintain sovereignty
and territorial integrity the defensive posture must be an active one that should include limited
offensive capability to defeat the enemy. We must not succumb to enemy’s will. With the
limited resources and the present force structure, attaining the objective of defeating the
enemy will be difficult. The general mass needs to be integrated in the similar way as it was
done during the Liberation War. It is no denying a fact that Bangladesh should have a cohesive
military and civil population force to deter potential adversary from aggression. The resistance
may be put concurrently and instantaneously throughout the country. This would facilitate to
fight a protracted and sustainable war. The consciousness of the people and their motivation to
defend the country plays the vital role in safeguarding the sovereignty. This civil population
may form part of the unconventional force and can enhance the capability of the conventional
forces.

25. Modern Concept of Defeating Enemy. In the modern concept, a force has to find out
the centre of gravity of enemy and own and an operational plan must aim at retaining own
centre of gravity and tilt enemy’s one. This centre of gravity may not be the same for both the
opposing forces. But now a days popular support remains as centre of gravity at strategic
level. Apart from this, the centre of gravity of likely adversary may be ‘his armed forces’ and
‘time’. On the other hand enemy may consider ‘Dhaka’ at strategic level and ‘Own Armed
Forces’ at operational level as the centre of gravity. In the context of Bangladesh, she should
create an environment so that the enemy pulls back his forces within the shortest possible
time. It can be possible by inflicting large-scale casualty to the enemy, taking the battlefield into
his ground and making him diplomatically isolated. Bangladesh can take the battlefield into the
enemy territory by employing unconventional forces. If some sabotage activity in the form of
killing, kidnapping, destruction of utility services etc can be carried out in the enemy territory,
their people are likely to go against the government and upset his design of battle. These types
of activity can be possible through employing unconventional forces. Here comes the
imperative of blending conventional and unconventional warfare. This would also facilitate to
upset enemy’s time plan and make sufficient time to develop diplomatic manoeuvre to work
against the adversary.

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26. Blending Conventional and Unconventional Warfare As a Battlefield Imperative.
The Draft Pamphlet identified ‘blending conventional and unconventional warfare’ as one of the
battlefield imperative. Because unconventional warfare behind the enemy lines produce the
same effect as manoeuvre and it must be integrated with the conventional effort to accomplish
the mission. The unconventional forces are useful in destruction and neutralisation of enemy’s
command and control centres, interdict weapon systems, air defence installations, logistic
bases, troop concentrations and lines of communication. Additionally, they can be used to
interdict the move forward of enemy follow up formations to isolate the current battle. 16 Use of
unconventional forces in conjunction with the conventional forces brings fluidity in the
battlefield, which help the user to gain advantage over the enemy.

27. Logistic Aspects. Logistic lines of communication and bases will be the first targets of
enemy interdiction operations in any future conflict. Should this support be cut off or
interrupted, intensity of operations will be drastically reduced and enemy forces will attain a
decisive initiative and freedom of action. In our case, at the outbreak of hostility the lines of
communication is likely to be disrupted. It will necessitate evolving unconventional methods of
logistic support to continue the conventional operations. These indigenous methods will
include mobilisation of civil resources. But for an unconventional force, the logistic aspect does
not pose many problems. Because this type force is designed to live off the land and they can
sustain in the situation of restricted logistic support.

28. Opinions. According to Brigadier Jiban Kanai Das, “during Liberation War in 1971,
Lieutenant General A A K Niazi had the charter that not a single piece of land to be
surrendered to Bangladesh Forces to establish government inside the country. As such he
went for strong point defence all along the border. But ultimately it was found to be unsuitable.
We really can not go for conventional type of defence”.17 Brigadier A T M Zahirul Alam said,
“our Army formations should deploy in the event of hostility as per the existing operational plan
initially. After assessing the enemy threat, surveillance elements may be kept in the less
threatened areas and main force should be deployed covering the enemy’s main effort”.18
From these two comments, we can derive that there is a need for some force, which can
enhance the operational capabilities of the conventional forces. Employment of unconventional
force in conjunction with the conventional force can bring dividend in this regard.

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CONCEPT OF BLENDING CONVENTIONAL

AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

29. The idea of blending conventional warfare with the unconventional one came into being
after having carried out an extensive research. The major concepts and doctrines related to
terrain and weather of Bangladesh, force structure, society, morale, economic condition and
above all the likely threat have been taken into due consideration. This theoretical base
combined with the practical experience, a new horizon of tactical ideas, which blends
conventional and unconventional warfare, has been evolved. The concept envisages that in
future conflicts, Bangladesh Army must be prepared to blend conventional and unconventional
warfare in the implementation of national strategy. This means unconventional warfare is not to
be regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war rather should be waged simultaneously
as an adjunct to the conventional war. For effective implementation and synchronisation with
each other, organisational set up and command and control arrangement must be worked out
in detail well before the outbreak of hostility.

30. Command and Control Arrangement. The conventional force commander should
retain the command and control of the unconventional force from the outset of hostility. He
should weigh out whether the task can be performed by unconventional force or otherwise.
Tasking of the unconventional force must conform to the overall design of battle and upset the
enemy’s one. The unconventional force should be given mission type order.

Employment of Unconventional Force

31. Right from the outbreak of hostility the battle must be taken to enemy territory to initiate
dissatisfaction amongst the people of enemy so that they go against their government’s
decision. A number of routes from Bangladesh facilitate to go inside the neighbouring country’s
territory. As per the defensive framework the unconventional force will carry out operations
behind the enemy lines. The targets for deep operation will be selected at Army, division or at
Brigade level. They will hit high value and strategic targets creating disorder in their civil and
military activities. As a result, at the very outset of war enemy will be concerned about his rear
area security and employ more troops to protect those.

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32. The unconventional force will be employed to hit the enemy high value targets like
disruption of line of communication, command and control arrangement etc, and also his flanks
by continuously laying ambushes and conducting raids. At the same time they will be
employed to provide early warning to the conventional forces. This type of warning system to
protect own rear areas against enemy air / helicopter borne troops will be of great use. These
operations would facilitate to shape the battlefield in our favour. The success of small-scale
operations will increase the morale of the conventional force as well as the population. This will
help in achieving wholehearted support from the people too.

Role of Conventional Force

33. The conventional force of respective divisions will deploy in their area of responsibility as
per the operational plan. As the battle situation develops, they should be able to identify
the main effort of the enemy and concentrate forces accordingly with strong mobile
reserve. Different layers of defence to be prepared prior to initial engagement in co-
ordination with the civil authority. While the unconventional force gradually cause attrition
to enemy war potentials the conventional force will engage the enemy major elements at
the decisive time and place to decide the fate of the battle.

34. If the conventional force fails to defend respective area of responsibility they will merge
with the civil population and resort to unconventional method of operations. This highly trained
force would be able to organise the local population to create effective resistance against the
adversary. The unconventional force, which had been operating earlier, will enhance their
operational capability.

End State of Blending Conventional and Unconventional Warfare

35. Blending of conventional and unconventional warfare will facilitate to achieve greater
degree of success in terms of neutralising enemy centre of gravity and taking high value
targets to achieve the mission. However, even after that if the enemy continues with the
aggression Bangladesh will gain maximum possible time. It will create the situation to go for
protracted war and earn the international opinion in our favour so that the adversary pulls out
his forces from our territory.

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SUGGESTED FORCE STRUCTURE

36. Blending conventional and unconventional warfare needs sound integration of regular
and unconventional forces. Here the main focus has been on the unconventional force that will
compliment the operations of the regular forces. Unconventional force must be properly led
and managed in all aspects – personnel, training, supply, material and financial. To fight the
war the forces can be divided into three tiers. At the top there would be regular forces to
conduct conventional war, then the unconventional force, which would be divided into two
groups. First group is the ‘second line force’ to perform small-scale operations and augment
regular units when required and the second group would be the local guerrillas to hit smaller
opportunity targets. The overall command and control of the unconventional force will remain
under the conventional force commander during the wartime.

Various Components

37. Regular Forces. The present force structure of Bangladesh Army should have its full
complement. Each division will have three brigades and each brigades with three infantry
battalions. Each formation should have operational reserve to meet the eventualities and
launch limited offensive.

38. Unconventional Force. It will be divided into two groups as said before i.e. second
line force and local guerrillas.

a. Second Line Force. This force would comprise the auxiliary forces and the
reservists.

(1) Auxiliary Force. Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) is a large force, which can
be trained and equipped through deliberate planning to augment our war
machine. It will entail comparatively less cost. BDR after giving the initial fight
would fall back and basically form the part of the unconventional force. However
they may be employed to strengthen the conventional forces at places.

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(2) Reservists. Reserve policy will be a key factor in the force structure. The
reservist will play the vital role in unconventional war. We suggest that soldiers
would be recruited for 5 years. At the end of the tenure only selected individuals
may be retained. Thereafter, they will follow the present system for their
promotion and retirement. Soldiers, those were not absorbed, will be in the
reserve list for next 10 years. This will create a large reserve. The contract for
recruiting will not have any retirement liability. However, these soldiers after
retirement will have handsome amount of money in their hand. This may be done
by forced saving form their pay. As they retire they will not be in the ocean of
frustration. They will be able to pursue a new career. Virtually this will be a great
incentive to the young generation to join army for such contract service. These
reservists are likely to be more agile due to their age, moreover, the size of the
reserve can be maintained as per the requirement. It will help to release well-
motivated people to the society after their retirement. They can help in the socio-
economic upliftment of the country. Government may be free of pension,
accommodation, treatment and ration liabilities. But it will need organisational
modifications and also arranging refresher training at some regular intervals to
maintain the desired standard.

b. Local Guerrillas. Local guerrillas will comprise Ansar, Village Defence Party
(VDP), Bangladesh National Cadet Corps (BNCC) and volunteer local civilians. The war
of liberation has given tremendous self-confidence to the people in their ability to deal
with external aggression. At present every union has an Ansar Platoon and each village
also has a VDP platoon. With better training and motivation they will add strength to the
unconventional force. Throughout histories, armies have employed local civilians as
scouts and saboteur. They may be employed as individuals and small groups and
integrated with the second line forces. They can be used in their own areas where their
knowledge of the ground and ability in providing warning and obtaining information is
invaluable.

Organisational Structure

39. District Armed Forces Board will maintain the organisational set up of the
unconventional force during peacetime. This organisation will have a cell to maintain district

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wise particulars of the reservists and the local guerrillas. This cell will maintain close co-
ordination with the local division headquarters during peacetime. However, during mobilisation
this organisational structure will be directly under command of respective division
headquarters. The suggested organisation of the unconventional force is as follows:

a. During peacetime all the headquarters of unconventional force will be thinly

staffed up to battalion level.

b. In each division there will be one Unconventional Force Headquarters.

c. There will be nine battalions under each Unconventional Force Headquarters.

d. Each conventional brigade will be allotted with three unconventional battalions

during the war, out of which two are second line battalions and one local guerrilla
battalion.

e. Number of companies in each battalion may vary from formation to formation

depending on the size of the formation area of responsibility.

40. A suggested organisational tree for wartime is attached as Annex B.

Training

41. Our auxiliary forces are not trained in line with regular forces and reservists will be semi-
trained. It will necessitate refresher training at some intervals for the unconventional force. The
District Armed Forces Board will organise training for the unconventional force once in two
years in co-ordination with the local division headquarters. The training team will impart
training basically on field craft, weapon handling, minor tactics, explosive handling and combat
intelligence. The duration of this training should be of one week. For this prior co-ordination
with all agencies is essential.

42. Transition from conventional to unconventional footing by the regular force would
necessitate a corresponding change in both mind and attitude of our soldiers. The soldiers will
need to overcome psychological barrier of switching over to unconventional warfare. This will

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need extensive training during peacetime so that the change over takes place as natural as
transition from one operation of war to the other. For this Standing Operating Procedures must
be worked out. Troops should be trained to operate in small groups. Junior leaders must be
trained to lead their under commands independently.

CONCLUSION
43. History of warfare particularly the follow up events of the World War II shows a sound
intermeshing of both conventional and unconventional warfare to fulfil the common objectives.
Vietminh’s bloody struggle against the mighty USA, the actions of ‘Mukti Bahini’ in the
Liberation War of Bangladesh and lastly the heroic victory of Afghan mujahidins are the
glorious chapters of military history. All the countries mentioned here have successfully
blended conventional and unconventional warfare and achieved their desired goal against the
superior adversaries (Paragraphs 5 – 7).

44. Having analysed the geo-political perspective of Bangladesh it is evident that

Bangladesh has a substantial threat from its neighbours particularly India. Few of the
geographical peculiarities like the presence of numerous routes of entry, lack of strategic
depth, lack of natural obstacle along the border, no sanctuary outside the border, difficulty in
procuring war materials etc have put Bangladesh in a disadvantageous position to fight a
conventional war against her adversary. All of the barriers mentioned here strongly suggest the
adoption of a new concept of operations that blends conventional and unconventional warfare
(paragraphs 8 -16).

45. The present concept of operations of Bangladesh outlines the adoption of defensive
posture and deploy the Army along successive lines of defence to fight a limited war in the
conventional mode. The overall theme envisages holding the enemy for a considerable
duration and gaining time to effect international pressure. If the Army fails to withstand the
enemy’s onslaught and diplomatic effort proves to be ineffective, the Army along with the
nation as a whole will resort to unconventional warfare. If we critically analyse the present
concept it would reveal certain drawbacks. The concept is inflexible and lacks dynamism. It
allows the enemy to incur substantial loss to the nation at the initial onslaught. As the
adversary is likely to enjoy overwhelming superiority in every sphere, he will retain the initiative
throughout the period of conflict. In this scenario victory is a remote possibility (paragraphs 17
–18).

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46. Bangladesh should resort to the concept of blending conventional and unconventional
warfare because it is a modern concept of fighting war against an adversary who enjoys
numerical and technological superiority. Unconventional warfare is a recognised battlefield
operating system, which needs to be synchronised with the other operating systems. Blending
conventional and unconventional warfare would enable to compensate numerical inferiority,
operate behind the enemy lines, resort to an unorthodox approach, provide workable logistic
support and above all integrate civil population. All of these attributes would add fuel to own
conventional capabilities and cause substantial damage to the potential adversary during the
conduct of war (paragraph 19 – 28).

47. The concept of blending conventional and unconventional warfare is that the
unconventional warfare is not to be regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war, rather
should be waged simultaneously as an adjunct to the conventional war. For effective
implementation and synchronisation with each other, organisational set up and command and
control arrangement must be worked out in detail well before the outbreak of hostility. The
defeat mechanism in this concept is to identify enemy’s centre of gravity at the strategic and
operational level and neutralise those to upset his design of battle and also the time plan. The
harmonious actions of both conventional and unconventional forces can bring dividend in
neutralising enemy’s centre of gravity and destroy high value targets. At the end of the conflict
enemy is expected to pull back his forces form the occupied territory (paragraphs 29 – 35).

48. In order to blend conventional and unconventional warfare and its subsequent
materialisation against the potential adversaries, the need for a cohesive and effective force
structure is of great important. The main components of this force are regular and
unconventional forces. The nucleus of this force structure is the regular force. The
unconventional force could be again subdivided into second line force and the guerrillas.
Second line force may comprise of auxiliary forces and reservists. BDR can be trained and
equipped to augment the war machine. A comprehensive policy needs to be evolved to have a
sizeable reserve force. Ansar, VDP, BNCC and volunteer civil population can form the guerrilla
organisation. The organisational and the training aspects of the unconventional force is of
utmost important for the successful blending of conventional and unconventional warfare so as
to achieve the common goal (paragraphs 36 – 42).

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Mirpur Cantonment ANWARUL MOMEN

Major
January 1999 Sub Syndicate Leader
Sub Syndicate 4B

Annexes:

A. Geo-political Map of Bangladesh.

B. Suggested Organisational Tree of Unconventional Force for Wartime.

Distribution:

Sponsor Directing Staff

Defence Services Command and Staff College
Mirpur Cantonment

End Notes:

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1
Draft Operations of War, Volume One, (Dhaka: Army Headquarters, General Staff Branch, Military
Training Directorate, 1997), p. 1-1.
2
Ibid, p. 2-6.
3
Trevor N. Dupuy, International Military and Defense Encyclopaedia, Volume 6, (Washington, New
York: Brassey’s (US) Inc. 1993) p. 2811.
4

Major Md Fayzul Haque, “Bangladesh: A Geopolitical Study”, Bangladesh Army Journal, 13th Issue
(December 1988), p.34.
5

Modus Operendi of Unconventional Warfare and Induction of its Training System in Bangladesh
Army, Army Headquarters Project Study by 33 Infantry Division, p. 4.
6

Md Nuruzzaman, “National Security in Bangladesh – Challenges and Options”, BIISS Journal,

Volume 12, No 3, 1991, p. 377.
7
“India by the year 2000: An Analytical Study of Growing Indian Hegemony”, DGFI Review, Issue No.
1 (July 1990), p. 90.
8

Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Naqueebur Rahman, “Bangladesh Inland Waterways – How to Turn
Them into Defender’s Paradise”, Bangladesh Army Journal, 13th Issue (December 1988), p. 59.
9

Major General D. K. Palit, The Lightning Campaign, (New Delhi: Thomson Press Limited, 1972), p.7.
10

Nuruzzaman, op. cit. p. 376.

11

Modus Operendi of Unconventional Warfare and Induction of its Training System in Bangladesh
Army, op. cit, p. 8.
12
Tactics A Precis, Defence Services Command and Staff College, p. 26.
13

Ibid, p. 1.
14

Draft Operations of War, op. cit. p. 9-27.

15
Ibid, p. 9-11.
16

Ibid, p. 3-22.
17

Brigadier Jiban Kanai Das, psc, Director of Supply and Transport, Army Headquarters, Dhaka
Cantonment, Interview, 15 September 1998.
18

Brigadier A T M Zahirul Alam, psc, Director of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Dhaka Cantonment,
Interview, 17 September 1998.