CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. DBM
FACTS:
The Civil Service Commission via the present petition for mandamus seeks
to compel the Department of Budget and Management to release the
balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a
determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of
fiscal autonomy. CSC claimed that the amount of P215,270,000.00 was
appropriated for its Central Office by the GAA of 2002, while the total
allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered,
amount to P285,660,790.44. It complains, however, that the total fund
releases by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was
only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance
of P5,807,392.30.
To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the
basis of its no report, no release policy whereby allocations for agencies
are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned in
Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on
Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds.
CSC contends that the application of the no report, no release policy upon
independent constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the
principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the “no report, no release” policy may be enforced against
officers vested with fiscal autonomy.
RULING:
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy. This is found in Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution which provides that “the Commission shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.” In Province of Batangas v. Romulo, this Court, in
construing the phrase automatic release in Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution reading, held that the word automatically is defined as in an
automatic manner: without thought or conscious intention. Being
automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and
perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to
receive the just share accruing to them from the national coffers. By parity
of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to
petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal
autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund
releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the above-
cited June 3, 1993 Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the
enforcement of a no report, no release policy against the Judiciary which
has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.
Respecting DBM’s justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner
as due to a shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place,
the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even
assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-
compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of
the Constitution.
If respondents theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to
automatically and regularly release approved appropriations would be
suspended every year, or even every month that there is a shortfall in
revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering
insignificant altogether, such mandate. Furthermore, the Constitution
grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the
Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or
reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent,
place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on
equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy,
thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy
should thus be given priority in the release of their approved
appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a
revenue shortfall. The Year 2002 GAA provided that Any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this Act
for the Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines, the Commission on Human
Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections shall be
automatically and regularly released. Clearly, while the retention or
reduction of appropriations for an office is generally allowed when there is
an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with
the Constitution, excepted from such rule the appropriations for entities
vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was a
revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold full release
of petitioners funds without violating not only the Constitution but also
Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.
This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also
states as a guiding principle on the Constitutional Mandate on the
Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy that:
4. After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be
automatically and regularly released subject to availability of funds.
This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict
the present ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy
should be automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in revenues
notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a
situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are not
sufficient to cover the total appropriations for all entities vested with
fiscal autonomy. In such event, it would be practically impossible to fully
release the Judiciary’s appropriations or any of the entities also vested with
fiscal autonomy for that matter, without violating the right of such other
entities to an automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under
that situation that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to
automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed.
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only
a small portion of the total national budget, only in the most extreme
circumstances will the total revenue collections fall short of the
requirements of such agencies. To illustrate, in the Year 2002 GAA the
budget for agencies vested with fiscal autonomy amounted only
to P14,548,620,000.00, which is 2.53% of the total appropriations in the
amount of P575,123,728,000.00. In Year 2003 GAA, which was re-enacted
in 2004, the budget for the same agencies was P13,807,932,000.00, which
is 2.27% of the total appropriations amounting to P609,614,730,000.00.
And in the Year 2005, the budget for the same agencies was
only P13,601,124,000.00, which is 2.28% of the total appropriations
amounting to P597,663,400,000.00.
Finally, petitioners claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress
lower than that of the previous fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary,
must be rejected.
For with respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution
explicitly provides:
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the
Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to
Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of
appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent.
Article IX (A), Section 5 merely states:
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such
reduction of appropriations below that for the previous year is that
Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of
Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for
the previous year.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing
discussions, GRANTED. Respondents act of withholding the subject funds
from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
CHR vs. CHREA
FACTS:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise
known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal
Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of
the CHR. These special provisions state:
1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding and within the limits of their respective appropriations as
authorized in this Act, the Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying
fiscal autonomy are authorized to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices, to fix and determine
the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and
whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in their personal
services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or
creation of new positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That
officers and employees whose positions are affected by such
reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and
separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable
from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their
respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof
shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits
authorized under compensation standardization laws.
2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying
fiscal autonomy are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective
appropriations for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions,
and training information materials; (b) repair, maintenance and
improvement of central and regional offices, facilities and equipment; (c)
purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d) necessary
expenses for the employment of temporary, contractual and casual
employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses,
commutable representation and transportation allowances, and fringe
benefits for their officials and employees as may be authorized by law; and
(f) other official purposes, subject to accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.
On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then
Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Reciña and Commissioners Nasser A.
Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R.
Coquia, promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998,
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission. Ten additional plantilla positions were
created, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the
Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and
five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the
Commissioners.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the
DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied
the request. In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel
modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a
memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA)
in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the
CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request in a Resolution
dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
ISSUE:
Can the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading,
reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the
Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and
Management?
RULING:
NO. CHR, unlike the other Constitutional Commissions, does not enjoy
fiscal autonomy.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the
Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall establish
and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the
Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof
encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as
erroneously held by the CA. The word to administer means to control or
regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution,
application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to
administer the government of the state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is
encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case
of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other
benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite
approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular. In
Victorina Cruz v. CA, we held that the DBM has the sole power and
discretion to administer the compensation and position classification
system of the national government. In Intia, Jr. v. COA, the Court held that
although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the compensation
and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the
rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification
Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system
established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the
imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any
reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant
to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1,
Title XVII, to wit:
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and
Management shall assist the President in the preparation of a national
resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of
the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems
essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and
efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of
compensation and position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative
proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the
upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in
the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or
approve the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three
letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped
from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from
the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal
autonomy. Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise
that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But the
Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the
appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Along the same vein, the
Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the
constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and
the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In
contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar
powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions,
which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution,
an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and
independent central monetary authority, and a national police
commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly
clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions.
As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence
excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum –
what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys
fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside
control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom
to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and
pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to
time. In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, it is understood that it is
only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy. Neither does the fact that the
CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy
is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522,
while cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR
as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and
implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage
to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy. All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation
is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal
autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share
the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding,
all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary
Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its
standpoint, thus - being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not
vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create
positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group
are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures
of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their
personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation
System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law.
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is
the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 “that the implementation hereof shall
be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits
authorized under compensation standardization laws.”
CHREA vs. CHR
RESOLUTION:
On 25 November 2004, the Court promulgated its Decision in the above-
entitled case, ruling in favor of the petitioner. The dispositive portion reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated 29 November
2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 and its Resolution
dated 11 September 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
ruling dated 29 March 1999 of the Civil Service Commission-National
Capital Region is REINSTATED. The Commission on Human Rights
Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-055
dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November
1998 without the approval of the Department of Budget and Management
are disallowed. No pronouncement as to costs.
A Motion for Reconsideration was consequently filed by the respondent to
which petitioner filed an Opposition. In its Motion, respondent prays in the
main that this Court reconsiders its ruling that respondent is not among
the constitutional bodies clothed with fiscal autonomy.
Unfazed, CHREA filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that THE
SUPREME COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CHR ALTHOUGH
ADMITTEDLY A CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION IS NONETHELESS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE GENUS OF THE OFFICES ACCORDED FISCAL AUTONOMY
BY CONSTITUTIONAL OR LEGISLATIVE FIAT.
As already settled in the assailed Decision of this Court, the creation of
respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the strict
sense, a constitutional commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution,
plainly entitled Constitutional Commissions, identifies only the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit. The mandate for the creation of the respondent is found in Section
17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on Human Rights, which reads
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

that “There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission explained that the first sentence would be a surplusage because the
on Human Rights.” autonomy actually intended is the automatic release of these
appropriations.
Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the 1987
Constitution on constitutional commissions for its benefit. It must be able On the main issue of whether or not the approval by the Department of
to present constitutional and/or statutory basis particularly pertaining to it Budget and Management (DBM) is a condition precedent to the enactment
to support its claim of fiscal autonomy. of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the CHR, this Court staunchly holds that as prescinding from
The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal
the legal and jurisprudential yardsticks discussed in length in the assailed
autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the
Decision, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to
Office of the Ombudsman.
implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in
As compared to the previously quoted Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX, Part government.
A, Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution on the
Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this
Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the
Court shares the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy
Ombudsman, respectively, Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of
notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the
Human Rights (CHR) evidently does not contain the first sentence on the
Salary Standardization Law. This Court is of the same mind with the DBM
express grant of fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the second sentence
on its standpoint, thus
on the automatic and regular release of its approved annual
appropriations. Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency
with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without
The respondent relies on the statement of then Constitutional
approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that the first sentence on the express
formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective
grant of fiscal autonomy to the respondent was deleted from Article XIII,
offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such
Section 17(4) of the 1987 Constitution because it was a
authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of
surplusage. Respondent posits that the second sentence, directing the
the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established
automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations, has
under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
the same essence as the express grant of fiscal autonomy, thus rendering
Standardization Law.
the first sentence redundant and unnecessary.
To drive home this point, in the special provision covering the Judiciary as
This Court, however, believes otherwise. The statement of then
quoted above, the Judiciary was not vested with the power to formulate
Constitutional Commissioner Davide should be read in full. Referring to the
and implement organizational structures beyond the salary rates,
deletion of the first sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy, he
allowances and other benefits under the compensation standardization

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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
laws. Stated differently, although the Judiciary is allowed to reorganize,
any such reorganization must, nevertheless, be in strict adherence to the
Salary Standardization Law. Ergo, any reorganization therein must be with
the conformity of the DBM inasmuch as it is the government arm tasked
by law to implement the Salary Standardization Law.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the General Provisions of the
General Appropriations Act (GAA), FY 1998, which the respondent heavily
relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless
provided by law or directed by the President. Here, the DBM discerned that
there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office
and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent respondents proposal to
upgrade twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-28 to Director IV, SG-28,
and three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in its
Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context
from support to substantive without actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body
to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond
cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is
tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily
controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v.
Court of Appeals, the Court echoed the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nations
coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the Presidents alter ego, knows from
where he speaks inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the adverse
effects of an unwarranted upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in
particular and in the entire government in general.
As the final thrust, given this Courts previous pronouncement in the
present Resolution that the fiscal autonomy granted to the respondent by
the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 shall be limited
only to the automatic and regular release of its approved annual
appropriations, respondent is precluded from invoking the Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal
Autonomy in the 1998 GAA.
It is unequivocal that the Special Provisions of the 1998 GAA refer to the
broad and extensive concept of fiscal autonomy. They already go beyond
ensuring the automatic and regular release of the approved annual
appropriations, but already enumerate the ways by which the named
government entities can use their appropriations to effect changes in their
organizational structure and their savings for certain official purposes.
Even assuming arguendo that the said Special Provisions are applicable to
respondent, it should be noted that the last sentence in paragraph 1
qualifies the power of a fiscally autonomous government entity to
formulate and implement changes in its organizational structure so that,
the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates,
allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws. And, as exhaustively expounded in the assailed
Decision and the herein Resolution, only the DBM has the authority and
the technical expertise to determine compliance by respondent to the
provisions of the Salary Standardization Law.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of this Court dated 25 November 2004 is
hereby MODIFIED, declaring the respondent CHR as a constitutional body
enjoying limited fiscal autonomy, in the sense that it is entitled to the
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations;
nonetheless, it is still required to conform to the Salary Standardization
Law. Accordingly, its entire reclassification scheme remains subject to the
approval of the DBM. No pronouncement as to costs.
GAMINDE vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
FACTS:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner
Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of
office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress
of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. Her term was to expire on
February 2, 1999. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought
clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her
term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,
in a letter dated April 07, 1998 opined that Gaminde’s term of office would
expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.
Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after
February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de
Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or
not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be
paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on
February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued
an opinion that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on
February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the
constitutional intent. Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident
Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101
(99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to
petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April
5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on
Audit en banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision
No. 99-090 dismissing petitioners appeal. The Commission on Audit
affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of
petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to
her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02,
1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an
extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office
of the President.
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17,
1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner,
Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993,
expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on
February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
RULING:
The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service
Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows:
Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years,
and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
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unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the
appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to
the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on
February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In
case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the
start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be
counted against the latter. In the law of public officers, there is a settled
distinction between term and tenure. [T]he term of an office must be
distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The
tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may
be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the
terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of
a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article
IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1
(2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven-year term
of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without re-
appointment, and for the first appointees terms of seven, five and three
years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to
expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to
coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification on
February 02, 1987.
However, she served as de facto Officer in good faith until February 02,
2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for
actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred
in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of
her co-terminus staff.
In order to preserve the periodic succession mandated by the Constitution,
the rotational plan requires two conditions: (1) the terms of the first
commissioners should start on a common date; and (2) any vacancy due to
death, resignation or disability before the examination of the term should
be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court REVERSED the decisions of the Commission on
Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her
tenure as de facto officer from February 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000.
ESTRELLA vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race for Baliuag,
Bulacan in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed
before Regional Trial Court of Bulacan an election protest which
consequently annulled Salvador‘s proclamation and declared Estrella as
the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While
Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for
inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was
issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and
designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division,
with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC decision and
declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for
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Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which
this time, Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante
Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while
he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the
case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Of the five Commissioners,
Commissioner Borra dissented. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the vote of those members who participated in the
deliberation of the COMELEC decision is sufficient.
RULING:
The provision of the Constitution is clear that what is required is the
majority vote of all the members, not only those who participated in the
deliberations and voted thereon in order that a valid decision may be made
by the Constitutional Commissions. Under the rules of statutory
construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
Commissioner Lantion’s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a
Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to
participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited
himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only
judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance
of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring
therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of
the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the
number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order,
as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which provides:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When sitting en banc, four (4)
Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of
transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of
the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Status Quo Ante Order
dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc is hereby
NULLIFIED. This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
ALVAREZ vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On May 12, 1997, Arsenio Alvarez was proclaimed duly elected Punong
Barangay of Doa Aurora, Quezon City. He received 590 votes while his
opponent, La Rainne Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private
respondent filed an election protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading
and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. After
petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the Metropolitan Trial
Court ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested
precincts. It subsequently rendered its decision that private respondent
won the election. She garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes
after the recount.
On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private
respondent won over petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a
Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. Both
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and private respondents Motion
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
for Execution pending appeal were submitted for resolution. The
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed
the decision of the Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution
pending appeal.
Petitioner brought before the Court this petition for Certiorari alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when:
(1) it did not preferentially dispose of the case;
(2) it prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal; and
(3) it misinterpreted the Constitutional provision that decisions, final
orders, or rulings of the Commission on Election contests involving
municipal and barangay officials shall be final, executory and not
appealable.
First, petitioner avers that the Commission violated its mandate on
preferential disposition of election contests as mandated by Section 3,
Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as Section 257, Omnibus Election
Code that the COMELEC shall decide all election cases brought before it
within ninety days from the date of submission. He points out that the case
was ordered submitted for resolution on November 15, 1999 but the
COMELEC En Banc promulgated its resolution only on April 4, 2000, four
months and four days after November 14, 1999.
RULING:
First, petitioner avers that the Commission violated its mandate on
preferential disposition of election contests as mandated by Section 3,
Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as Section 257, Omnibus Election
Code that the COMELEC shall decide all election cases brought before it
within ninety days from the date of submission. He points out that the case
was ordered submitted for resolution on November 15, 1999 but the
COMELEC En Banc promulgated its resolution only on April 4, 2000, four
months and four days after November 14, 1999.
We are not unaware of the Constitutional provision cited by petitioner. We
agree with him that election cases must be resolved justly, expeditiously
and inexpensively. We are also not unaware of the requirement of Section
257 of the Omnibus Election Code that election cases brought before the
Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the date of
submission for decision. The records show that petitioner contested the
results of 10 election precincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal,
validity, invalidity, legibility, misspelling, authenticity, and other
irregularities in these ballots. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it
where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further the tribunal’s
manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural
requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to
deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests
hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the
framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might
allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would
amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.
Petitioner avers the COMELEC abused its discretion when it failed to treat
the case preferentially. Petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258 of
the Omnibus Election Code. It will be noted that the preferential
disposition applies to cases before the courts and not those before the
COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show.
Further, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay of the COMELEC
for the first time. As private respondent pointed out, petitioner did not
raise the issue before the COMELEC when the case was pending before
it. In fact, private respondent points out that it was she who filed a Motion
for Early Resolution of the case when it was before the COMELEC. The
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active participation of a party coupled with his failure to object to the
jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending,
is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later
impugning the court or the body’s jurisdiction. On the matter of the
assailed resolution, therefore, we find no grave abuse of discretion on this
score by the COMELEC.
Second, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion
for Execution pending appeal of private respondents on April 2, 2000 when
the appeal was no longer pending. He claims that the motion had become
obsolete and unenforceable and the appeal should have been allowed to
take its normal course of finality and execution after the 30-day
period. Additionally, he avers it did not give one good reason to allow the
execution pending appeal.
We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed,
petitioner had a motion for reconsideration before the Second
Division. This pending motion for reconsideration suspended the
execution of the resolution of the Second Division. Appropriately then, the
division must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the
Second Division resolved both petitioners motion for reconsideration and
private respondents motion for execution pending appeal, it did so in the
exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The requisites for the grant
of execution pending appeal are: (a) there must be a motion by the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good
reason for the execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be
stated in a special order. In our view, these three requisites were
present. In its motion for execution, private respondent cites that their
case had been pending for almost three years and the remaining portion
of the contested term was just two more years. In a number of similar
cases and for the same good reasons, we upheld the COMELECs decision
to grant execution pending appeal in the best interest of the electorate.
Correspondingly, we do not find that the COMELEC abused its discretion
when it allowed the execution pending appeal.
Third, petitioner contends that the COMELEC misinterpreted Section 2 (2),
second paragraph, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. He insists that
factual findings of the COMELEC in election cases involving municipal and
barangay officials may still be appealed. He cites jurisprudence stating that
such decisions, final orders or rulings do not preclude a recourse to this
Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, when grave abuse of
discretion has marred such factual determination, and when there is
arbitrariness in the factual findings.
We agree with petitioner that election cases pertaining to barangay
elections may be appealed by way of a special civil action for certiorari. But
this recourse is available only when the COMELECs factual determinations
are marred by grave abuse of discretion. We find no such abuse in the
instant case. From the pleadings and the records, we observed that the
lower court and the COMELEC meticulously pored over the ballots
reviewed. Because of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived
from actual experience, the COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to evaluate, appreciate and decide on factual questions before
it. Here, we find no basis for the allegation that abuse of discretion or
arbitrariness marred the factual findings of the COMELEC. As previously
held, factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and
duly supported by evidence, are conclusive on this Court, more so in the
absence of a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law
in the questioned resolutions. Unless any of these causes are clearly
substantiated, the Court will not interfere with the COMELECs findings of
fact.
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Considering the COMELEC’s manpower and logistical limitations, it is
sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically.
Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the COMELEC to resolve
election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time.
GENERAL vs. ROCO
FACTS:
Ramon S. Roco was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos on August
26, 1996 as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in
Region V, a position equivalent to CES rank level V. He forthwith began to
assume and discharge the duties and responsibilities of the said
office. Subsequently, then President Joseph E. Estrada re-appointed him to
the same position on February 8, 1999. At the time of respondent’s
appointment in 1996 and 1999, he was not a CES eligible. However, during
his incumbency, or on August 13, 1999, he was conferred CES eligibility by
the Career Executive Service Board.
On September 7, 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who is not a CES
eligible, was appointed by President Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO
in Region V, the same position being occupied by respondent. Pursuant
thereto, DOTC Undersecretary Herminio B. Coloma, Jr., as Officer-in-
Charge of the Department, issued a Memorandum directing petitioner
General to assume the said office immediately and for respondent Roco to
report to the Office of the Secretary for further instructions. Accordingly,
petitioner General assumed office on September 16, 1999.
Aggrieved, respondent Roco filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals issued
a TRO enabling respondent Roco to re-assume the disputed office. After
the lapse of 60 days, there being no writ of preliminary injunction issued,
petitioner General again assumed the said office. On March 10, 2000, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the appointment of
respondent Roco to the Office of Regional Director of the LTO, Region V,
nullified the appointment of petitioner General and ordered him to vacate
the subject post in favor of respondent Roco. Upon motion of respondent
Roco, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of execution pending appeal.
From the Court of Appeals decision, two separate petitions for review
under Rule 45 were filed before this Court. The first one, which was filed
by General against Roco, was docketed as G.R. No. 143366; while the
second petition was filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary, Undersecretary and Assistant Secretary of the
DOTC, also against Roco, and was docketed as G.R. No. 143524. On June
26, 2000, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 143366 directing the
parties to maintain the status quo ante. Both petitions were later
consolidated.
RULING:
Two requisite must concur in order that an employee in the career
executive service may attain security of tenure: (1) career executive service
eligibility; and (2) appointment to the appropriate career executive service
rank. It must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the
Career Executive Service (except first and second level employees in civil
service) pertains only to rank, and not to the office or position to which
they may be appointed.
Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law (Subtitle A, Tittle I, Book V of E.O.
No. 292), provides:
(1) Permanent status. - A permanent appointment shall be issued to a
person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in
pursuance thereof.
In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure which
presupposes a permanent appointment is governed by the rules and
regulations promulgated by the CES Board, thus:
Career Executive Service Eligibility
Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a
CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES
eligibles. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by the Board through a
formal Board Resolution after an evaluation is done of the examinees
performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations.
Appointment to CES Rank
Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with the other
requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES position may
qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES rank is made
by the President upon the recommendation of the Board. This process
completes the officials membership in the CES and most importantly,
confers on him security of tenure in the CES.
There are six (6) ranks in the CES ranking structure. The highest rank is that
of a Career Executive Service Officer I (CESO I), while the lowest is that of
CESO VI.
The appropriate CESO rank to which a CES eligible may be appointed
depends on two major qualification criteria, namely: (1) level of managerial
responsibility; and, (2) performance.
Performance is determined by the officials performance rating obtained in
the annual CESPES. On the other hand, managerial responsibility is based
on the level of the general duties and responsibilities which an eligible is
performing.
In the Integrated Reorganization Plan, item E provides that Depending
upon their ranks, members of the Service shall be assigned to occupy
positions of undersecretary, Assistant Secretary. Bureau Director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be
identified by the Board on the basis of the members functional expertise.
As clearly set forth in the foregoing provisions, two requisites must concur
in order that an employee in the career executive service may attain
security of tenure, to wit:
a) CES eligibility; and
b) Appointment to the appropriate CES rank.
In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in
the career executive service (except first and second-level employees in
the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the
position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service
officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another
without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or
reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if assigned
to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according
to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies.
In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco,
though a CES eligible, does not possess the appropriate CES rank, which is
- CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region
V). Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his
membership in the CES, respondent cannot successfully interpose violation
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned to other
positions in the career executive service. Thus, in Achacoso v. Macaraig,
the Court held that:
It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person
who meets all the requirement for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. Achacoso did
not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as
temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing
authority and at a moments notice, conformably to established
jurisprudence.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not
possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the
nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack
of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the
position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, as an exception to
the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence
of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
Moreover, under the mobility and flexibility principles of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan, CES personnel may be reassigned or transferred from
one position to another, thus:
e. Assignments, Reassignments and Transferees…
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, members of the
Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from one
position to another and from one department, bureau or office to another;
provided that such reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public
service and involves no reduction in rank or salary; provided, further, that
no member shall be reassigned or transferred oftener than every two years;
and provided, furthermore, that if the officer concerned believes that his
reassignment or transfer is not justified, he may appeal his case to the
President.
Thus, a CES officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to
another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is
transferred or reassigned. In fact, a career executive service officer suffers
no diminution in salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary
grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank, and not on the basis
of the position or office which he occupies.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CSC
FACTS:
Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of the University of the
Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB) who went on a vacation leave of absence
without pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this
period, he served as the Philippine Government’s official representative to
the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific
(CIRDAP). When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire,
CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave of absence for
another year, but was denied by Dr. Eulogio Castillo, the then Director of
the Agricultural Credit Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLB. In the same letter,
Dr. Castillo advised Dr. De Torres to report for duty at UPLB not later than
September 15, 1989; while the then UPLB Chancellor Raul P. de Guzman
apprised him on the rules of the Civil Service on leaves and warned of the
possibility of being considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL)
if he failed to return and report for duty as directed.
On August 27, 1989, Dr. De Torres wrote UPLB that he had no alternative
but to pursue the matter in continuing his commitment to CIRDAP. In
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
response thereto, Chancellor de Guzman warned De Torres, in a Letter
dated November 20, 1989, that in case of the latter’s failure to report
within 30 days from today, UPLB would be forced to drop him from the
rolls of personnel. Despite the warning, Dr. De Torres did not report to
work. On January 3, 1994 or after almost five years of absence without
leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the incumbent Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that
he was reporting back to duty at ACCI-UPLB effective January 3,
1994. However, Chancellor Villareal notified Dr. De Torres that when an
employee reports back for duty, he should have been from an approved
leave Likewise, Director Leodegacio M. Ilag, of ACCI-UPLB, in a Letter dated
February 10, 1994, informed De Torres that in the absence of any approved
application for leave of absence, he was considered to be on AWOL. Thus,
he was advised to re-apply with UPLB.
On June 30, 1994, Dr. De Torres wrote Chancellor Villareal seeking
reconsideration of the two aforementioned decisions. On July 4, 1994,
Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that
since records at UPLB do not show that he had been officially dropped from
the rolls he may report for duty effective January 3, 1994.
Mesdames Juanita Baskinas and Winifreda Medina, members of Academic
Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission
regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres. On May 5, 1995, the
Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 deeming de Torres a
dropped from the service as of September 1, 1989.
On June 9, 1995, Dr. De Torres and the University of the Philippines at Los
Baños (UPLB) filed separate requests for reconsideration of aforesaid CSC
Resolution No. 95-3045 dated May 5, 1995. In its CSC Resolution No. 96-
1041, the commission denied the motion for reconsideration, further
stating that CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 [stood] and that since separation
from the service [was] non-disciplinary in nature, the appointing authority
may appoint Dr. De Torres to any vacant position pursuant to existing civil
service law and rules. The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
respondent commission in the issuance of the questioned Resolutions and,
thus, dismissed the Petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the
University.
RULING:
Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than
one year. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails
to return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of
such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated from the
service; Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the
expiration of his one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in
writing of the expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for
duty on said date, he will be dropped from the service.
De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained
in the University’s roll of academic personnel, even after he had been
warned of the possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to
return to work within a stated period. Indeed, as Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs Emiliana N. Bernardo explained to the CSC in her October
12, 1994 letter: UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr.
de Torres from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the
contrary, UPLB records show that his salary was increased several times
during his absence on January 1, 1988, March 16, 1988, and July 1,
1989. His appointment was also reclassified with promotion in rank from
Training Specialist II to Assistant Professor IV effective March 16, 1988. This
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promotion was approved by the UP Board of Regents during its 1015th
meeting held on August 25, 1988.
Verily, these acts are clearly inconsistent with separation or dropping from
the service. Private petitioner was not only retained in the roll of
personnel; his salary was even increased three (3) times. Moreover, he was
promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the
highest governing body of UP. Since the commencement of the Complaint
before the CSC, the University has consistently stood by his side. When
respondent ruled against him in its assailed Resolution No. 95-3045, the
University promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration favoring his
cause. Then, UP joined Dr. De Torres in his appeal before the Court of
Appeals, as well as in the Petition now before us. All these circumstances
indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to exercise its
prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ.
UPs actuations, in spite of Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service
Rules, are consistent with the exercise of its academic freedom. We have
held time and again that the University has the academic freedom to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. Clearly,
this freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and,
concomitant therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors
and other academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong: As corporate entities, educational institutions of
higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their
policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or
pressure. Similarly, Vicente G. Sinco, a former UP president and delegate
to the 1973 Constitutional Convention, stressed that the Constitution
definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the University as an
institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university
professor.”
We are not unaware that academic freedom has been traditionally
associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press. But,
as explained by Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna during the
deliberations on Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, "Since
academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers
of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the
courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."
Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even
promoting him despite his absence without leave, the University was
exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who
may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the
Revised Civil Service Law, the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate
to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have
done so without trampling upon the latter’s constitutionally enshrined
academic freedom. Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission, the
Court stressed that [t]he CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate
administrator of government offices and agencies. Its functions and
authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine
their concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law. In short,
on its own, the CSC does not have the power to terminate employment or
to drop workers from the rolls.
Needless to say, UP definitely recognizes and values petitioners academic
expertise. As the vice chancellor for academic affairs explained, dropping
him from the rolls will utterly be a waste of government funds and will not
serve the best interest of the country which is suffering from brain-drain.
Even UP President Emil Q. Javier advised Complainants Baskias and Medina
to give Dr. de Torres the opportunity to honor his service obligation to the
University, referring to petitioners required return service in view of a
fellowship abroad earlier granted him by the institution.
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Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in
favor of Dr. De Torres. His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his
tenure at CIRDAP.
DEL CASTILLO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FACTS:
On August 1, 1990, Edgar del Castillo, an employee of the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), was placed under preventive
suspension by the PRC for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. After due investigation, petitioner was found
guilty of grave misconduct and was dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits. Petitioner appealed the PRCs decision to the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which exonerated him of said
charge.
On appeal by the PRC, however, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct, and imposed upon him the penalty
of dismissal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner, thus, filed in this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court alleging that the CSC committed grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the PRCs appeal, among other grounds. This
Court granted said petition in an En Banc Decision promulgated on
February 14, 1995, reversing the decision of the CSC and reinstating that
of the MSPB.
However, it may be noted, that the decision of the MSPB referred to above
merely ordered the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position and
was silent on the award of back salaries. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the PRC Resolution dated
September 19, 1990 is hereby set aside there being no substantial evidence
adduced to support the conviction or finding of guilt. Thus, respondent-
appellant Edgar R. del Castillo is exonerated of the charge of grave
misconduct levelled (sic) against him. The Professional Regulations
Commission is thus directed to reinstate him to his former position
effective immediately.
Nevertheless petitioner, through counsel, wrote to PRC Chairman
Hermogenes Pobre requesting not only reinstatement but payment of
back salaries as well.
Petitioner was eventually reinstated on July 17, 1995. However, his claim
for backwages was in effect denied by Chairman Pobre in a Letter to
petitioner dated November 28, 1995. Attached to said letter was a
Correspondence addressed to Chairman Pobre and signed by a certain
Julieta de la Torre of the Department of Bureau and Management.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Edgar del Castillo, who is exonerated in the administrative
case and later ordered reinstated, is entitled to backwages and other
monetary benefits from the time of his preventive suspension on August
1, 1990 up to the time of his actual reinstatement on July 17, 1995.
RULING:
It is already settled in this jurisdiction that a government official or
employee is entitled to backwages not only if he is exonerated in the
administrative case but also when the suspension is unjustified.
From the foregoing, it appears that the CSC does not pose any objection to
petitioners motion. Indeed, the Commission submits to the sound
discretion of the Honorable Court the resolution of the instant motion.[8]
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
The Solicitor General, for his part, recommends that petitioners prayer for
payment of backwages be granted. In support of said recommendation,
the Solicitor General cites the following authorities:
This Honorable Court in the case of Tan, Jr. vs. Office of the President, 229
SCRA 677, stated:
Section 42 of P.D. No. 807, however, is really not in point. The provision
refers to preventive suspension[s] during the pendency of administrative
investigation[s], and it does not cover dismissed civil servants who are
ultimately exonerated and ordered reinstated to their former or equivalent
positions. The rule in the latter instance, just as we have said starting with
the case of Cristobal v. Melchor (101 SCRA 857), is that when a government
official or employee in the classified civil service had been illegally
dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal
[purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so] that he is
entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the
office that he held. Such award of backwages, however, has since been
limited to a maximum period of five (5) years.
When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement
has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having
left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that
accrue to him by virtue of the office he held (Tañada* v. Legaspi, 13 SCRA
566 [1965]).
Back salaries may be ordered paid to said officer or employee (City Mayor
of Zamboanga v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).
Having been exonerated of the charges against him, petitioner should
clearly be awarded back salaries, the silence of the MSPBs
decision notwithstanding. In Cristobal vs. Melchor, Justice Claudio
Teehankee, speaking for this Court, said:
As likewise reaffirmed by the Court in Perez vs. Evite, under Section 45 of
Rule 39, Rules of Court… a judgment is not confined to what appears upon
the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. The late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro stressed for the
Court in Padua vs. Robles, that the sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment
must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In construing a
judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow
because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern. Also,
its meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any
other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intention of the
court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which
it applies and the attendant circumstances.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GARCIA
FACTS:
Ricardo V. Garcia, Jr., a check processor and cash representative at the
Buendia Branch of petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB), was charged
by the latter with Gross Neglect of Duty in connection with the funds it had
lost on August 5, 1994 in the amount of Seven Million Pesos
(P7,000,000.00). On July 21, 1995, the PNB-Administrative Adjudication
Office (AAO) rendered its decision, duly approved by PNB Executive Vice
President Inocencio B. Deza, Jr., finding private respondent guilty as
charged and, accordingly, imposing upon him the penalty of Forced
Resignation with Benefits. . . without prejudiced to his monetary liability
arising from the case.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision,
but the same was denied by the PNB-AAO in its Resolution dated
September 21, 1995. Aggrieved, private respondent appealed to public
respondent on September 28, 1995. Meanwhile, on May 27, 1996,
petitioner was privatized pursuant to Executive Order No. 80, otherwise
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
known as the 1996 Revised Charter of the Philippine National Bank.
Thereafter, public respondent issued Resolution No. 967612 on December
3, 1996, granting private respondents appeal after finding that the
evidence on record failed to establish neglect of duty on the part of private
respondent.
In dismissing PNBs appeal, the CA cited Mendez v. Civil Service Commission,
which had ruled that only the party adversely affected by the decision --
namely, the government employee -- may appeal an administrative case.
The CA held that a decision exonerating a respondent in an administrative
case is final and unappealable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in so holding that petitioner
cannot anymore elevate on appeal the resolution of the Civil Service
Commission reversing petitioners finding of guilt for gross neglect of duty
on Garcia.
RULING:
The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but a
mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by law. Under Presidential Decree (PD) 807, the CSC has
jurisdiction over appeals of administrative disciplinary cases, in which the
penalty imposed is suspension for more than thirty days; a fine exceeding
thirty days salary; a demotion in rank or salary; or transfer, removal, or
dismissal from office. The CA stated that this provision must be read in
congruence with Section 39 of the same law. The latter provision reads
thus:
Sec. 39. Appeals. (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party
adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the
decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which
petition shall be decided within fifteen days.
Citing Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, the CA construed the phrase
party adversely affected in the above-quoted provision to refer solely to
the public officer or employee who was administratively disciplined.
Hence, an appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is
found guilty.
However, this interpretation has been overturned in Civil Service
Commission v. Dacoycoy. Speaking through Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, the
Court said that we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that the phrase party adversely affected by the decision
refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case
is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from
office.
It is a well-entrenched rule that if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. Verily, the words employed by the legislature in
a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude courts from
construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to have known the
meanings of the words, to have used those words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a
clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules
of statutory construction, and this Court has no right to look for or impose
another meaning.
Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will
be seriously undermined if we bar appeals of exoneration. After all,
administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in
21
 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
which acquittals are final and unappealable based on the constitutional
proscription of double jeopardy.
Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and
scope of judicial review. Thus, to prevent appeals of administrative
decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and
pervertedly erode this constitutional grant.
Finally, the Court in Dacoycoy ruled that the CSC had acted well within its
rights in appealing the CAs exoneration of the respondent public official
therein, because it has been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and
safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. In the same light, herein
Petitioner PNB has the standing to appeal to the CA the exoneration of
Respondent Garcia. After all, it is the aggrieved party which has complained
of his acts of dishonesty. Besides, this Court has not lost sight of the fact
that PNB was already privatized on May 27, 1996. Should respondent be
finally exonerated indeed, it might then be incumbent upon petitioner to
take him back into its fold. It should therefore be allowed to appeal a
decision that in its view hampers its right to select honest and trustworthy
employees, so that it can protect and preserve its name as a premier
banking institution in our country.
BANTAY ACT vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and
mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on
Elections respecting party-list groups which have manifested their
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and
subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007
elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal
Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify,
seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations.
Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has
yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to
the Director of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that
groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was
the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3,
2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect
denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. Comelec’s reason for
keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is
deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13,
2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that
requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party
list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman
Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the
Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al.,
to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees
possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-
List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn
Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or
publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on
the 33 private respondents named therein be "declared as unqualified to the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and
from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections. does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence.
(note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the
ISSUE:
qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the accreditation of an organization. )
the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the
ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not 2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
appear to be qualified. Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to
to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
Constitution; and afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to
disclose to the public the names of said nominees. Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
RULING: adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the transactions involving public interest.
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it
seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads:
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified
Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the
Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 the "Certified List" of the names.
and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced
in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the
determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment.
way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote,

23
 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases,
would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns
upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way
the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The
right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are
the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional
guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of
access to official records are not absolute. The people’s right to know is
limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like
concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners
for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective
petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
SANTOS vs. CA
FACTS:
On 18 January 1983, Antonio Ssntos was appointed Judge of the MeTC of
Quezon City, and he thereafter assumed office. After the military-backed
EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed to the same position. On 1 April
1992, petitioner optionally retired from the Judiciary under R.A. No. 910,
as amended, and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his
entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has
been regularly receiving a monthly pension. On 2 December 1993,
petitioner re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director
III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. His appointment was
approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7924, which reorganized the
MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA). Section 11 thereof reads:
Section 11. Transitory Provisions. To prevent disruption in the delivery of
basic urban services pending the full implementation of the MMDAs
organizational structure and staffing pattern, all officials and employees of
the interim MMA shall continue to exercise their duties and functions and
receive their salaries and allowances until they shall have been given notice
of change of duties and functions, and of being transferred to another
office or position.
The civil service laws, rules and regulations pertinent to the displacement
of personnel affected by this Act shall be strictly enforced. The national
government shall provide such amounts as may be necessary to pay the
benefits accruing to displaced employees at the rate of one and one-fourth
(1) months salary for every year of service: Provided, That, if qualified for
retirement under existing retirement laws, said employees may opt to
receive the benefits thereunder.
On 16 May 1996, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum
Order No. 372 approving the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
7924. Pursuant thereto, the MMDA issued Resolution No. 16, series of
1996, which, inter alia, authorized the payment of separation benefits to
the officials and employees of the former MMA who would be separated
as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 7924.
On 30 August 1996, the MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner
informing him that in view of his voluntary option to be separated from the
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
service his services would automatically cease effective at the close of
office hours on 15 September 1996, and that he would be entitled to
separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1) monthly salary
for every year of service as provided under Section 11 of the MMDA Law.
In view of some doubt or confusion as to the extent of his separation
benefits, petitioner submitted a Position Paper wherein he asserted that
since the retirement gratuity he received under R.A. No. 910, as amended,
is not an additional or double compensation, all the years of his
government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be
credited in the computation of his separation benefits under R.A. No.
7924. The Assistant Manager for Finance of the MMDA referred the
Position Paper to the Regional Office of the CSC-NCR.
On 7 October 1996, Director IV Nelson Acebedo of the CSC-NCR handed
down an opinion that the payment of petitioners separation pay must be
in accordance with Civil Service Resolution No. 92-063. This being so, while
an employee who was paid separation/retirement benefits is not required
to refund the same once reemployed in the government service, as
aforestated, for reasons of equity however, it would be proper and logical
that said separation/retirement benefits should nevertheless be deducted
from the retirement/[separation] pay to be received by the employee
concerned. Moreover, in this instance, the employee concerned has the
option either to refund his separation/retirement benefits and claim his
gross retirement/separation pay without any deduction corresponding to
his separation pay received, or not [to] refund his separation/retirement
pay but suffer a deduction of his retirement/separation gratuity for the
total amount representing his previous separation/retirement pay
received.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the
opinion of Director Acebedo to the CSC.
On 21 October 1997, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 97-4266
affirming the opinion of Director Acebedo and dismissing petitioners
appeal. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the CSC was correct in
dismissing petitioners appeal from the opinion of Director Acebedo,
reasoning that there is no specific rule of law which applies to petitioners
case. Nevertheless, the Court finds it equitable to deny his claim for
payment of separation pay at the rate of one and one-fourth (1) months’
salary for every year of his service in government, that is, inclusive of the
number of years he served as Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila.
RULING:
We affirm the assailed judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals and
the Civil Service Commission that for the purpose of computing or
determining petitioners separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924,
his years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and that his
separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the MMA.
In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 on the
grant of separation pay at the rate of one and one-fourth (1) months of
salary for every year of service cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination
be interpreted to refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee
in the government, i.e., to include such service in the government outside
the MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who
were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the
length of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted to an abolition
of the office or position of the displaced employees, such as that of
petitioner. The rule is settled that Congress may abolish public
offices. Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to create
public offices. However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition
that it be exercised in good faith. The separation partook of the nature of
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
a disturbance of compensation; hence, the separation pay must relate only
to the employment thus affected.
Second, petitioner himself must have realized that Section 11 does not
allow the tacking in of his previous government service. If he were
convinced that it does he could have instead applied
for retirement benefits, since by adding his years of service in the MMA to
his previous years of service in the Government he could have retired
under the third paragraph of Section 11, which pertinently reads:
Provided, that, if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws,
said employee may opt to receive the benefits thereunder.
Third, after the approval of his optional retirement on 1 April 1992,
petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under R.A. No. 910, as
amended; and five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly
pension.
The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section
8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which provides:
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or
indirect compensation.
This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can
continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another
government position to which another compensation is attached.
Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been
receiving under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not constitute double
compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if after his
retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director
III thereof. This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards for
his services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his
services as Director III of the MMA.
However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation
of his separation pay under R.A. No. 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he
had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A. No.
910, as amended, would be to countenance double compensation for
exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run
counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly
the same services. More important, it would be in violation of the first
paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which proscribes
additional, double, or indirect compensation. Said provision reads:
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized
by law.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 does not specifically authorize payment of
additional compensation for years of government service outside of the
MMA.
CAYETANO vs. MONSOD
FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat
of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed
the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he
took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, Renato Cayetano,
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed
the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception
in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer
for more than ten years. After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.)
and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod
worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-
countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank
and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant
or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of
his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by
the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for
the House of Representative.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
RULING:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the
poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the
petition is DISMISSED.
PENERA vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Rosalinda Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were
mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during the 14 May 2007 elections.
On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election
Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification
against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang
Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period. Andanar claimed that on 29
March 2007 a day before the start of the authorized campaign period
on 30 March 2007 Penera and her partymates went around the
different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and
requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the
elections. Attached to the Petition were the Affidavits of individuals who
witnessed the said incident.
Penera alone filed an Answer to the Petition on 19 April 2007, averring that
the charge of premature campaigning was not true. Although Penera
admitted that a motorcade did take place, she explained that it was simply
in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where
the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade,
which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. In fact, Penera
claimed, in the motorcade held by her political party, no person made any
speech, not even any of the candidates. Instead, there was only marching
music in the background and a grand standing for the purpose of raising
the hands of the candidates in the motorcade. Finally, Penera
cited Barroso v. Ampig in her defense, wherein the Court supposedly ruled
that a motorcade held by candidates during the filing of their COCs was not
a form of political campaigning. Also on 19 April 2007, Andanar and Penera
appeared with their counsels before the ORED-Region XIII, where they
agreed to submit their position papers and other evidence in support of
their allegations. After the parties filed their respective Position Papers, the
records of the case were transmitted to the COMELEC main office
in Manila for adjudication.
While SPA No. 07-224 was pending before the COMELEC Second Division,
the 14 May 2007 elections took place and, as a result thereof, Penera was
proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Sta. Monica. Penera soon assumed
office on 2 July 2002. On 24 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division issued
its Resolution in SPA No. 07-224, penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T.
Ferrer, which disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate
in Sta. Monica, for engaging in premature campaigning, in violation of
Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. It was the third member
of the COMELEC Second Division, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento
(Sarmiento) who put forth a Dissenting Opinion on the 24 July
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
2007 Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento believed that the pieces of
evidence submitted by Andanar did not sufficiently establish probable
cause that Penera engaged in premature campaigning, in violation of
Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The two photocopied
pictures, purporting to be those of Penera, did not clearly reveal what was
actually happening in the truck or who were the passengers
thereof. Likewise, the Affidavits seemed to have been prepared and
executed by one and the same person because they had similar sentence
construction and form, and they were sworn to before the same attesting
officer.
In the Resolution dated 30 January 2008, the COMELEC en banc denied
Peneras Motion for Reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc ruled that
Penera could no longer advance the arguments set forth in her Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, given that
she failed to first express and elucidate on the same in her Answer and
Position Paper. Penera did not specifically deny the material averments
that the motorcade went as far as Barangay Mabini, announcing their
candidacy and requesting the people to vote for them on Election Day,
despite the fact that the same were clearly propounded by Andanar in his
Petition for Disqualification and Position Paper. Therefore, these material
averments should be considered admitted. Consistent with his previous
stand, Commissioner Sarmiento again dissented from the 30 January
2008 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc. He still believed that Andanar
was not able to adduce substantial evidence that would support the claim
of violation of election laws. Particularly, Commissioner Sarmiento
accepted Peneras explanation that the motorcade conducted after the
filing by Penera and the other candidates of their COCs was merely part of
the dispersal of the spontaneous gathering of their supporters. The
incident was only in accord with normal human social experience.
Still undeterred, Penera filed the instant Petition before us, praying that
the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC
Second Division and en banc, respectively, be declared null and void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
In a Resolution dated 4 March 2008, we issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), enjoining the COMELEC from implementing the assailed
Resolutions, on the condition that Penera post a bond in the amount
of P5,000.00. We also directed COMELEC and Andanar to comment on the
instant Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Penera has engaged in an election campaign or partisan
political activity outside the campaign period.
RULING:
We find no merit in the instant Petition. Under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code, it shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter
or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an
election campaign or partisan... political activity except during the
campaign period. If the commission of the prohibited act of premature
campaigning is duly proven, the consequence of the violation is clearly
spelled out in Section 68... which reads:
“Any candidate who... violated any of Sections 80... shall be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office.”
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just by Andanar's
evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that Penera and her party
mates,... participated in a motorcade which passed through the different
barangays... of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw
candies to the onlookers. Additionally, the Joint Affidavit... gave an even
more straightforward account of the events, thus:... after actual
registration with the COMELEC... the motorcade proceeded to three (3)
barangays out of the 11 barangays while supporters were throwing sweet
candies to the crowd;... there was merriment and marching music.
For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election
campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera
must be disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.
PENERA vs. COMELEC (RESOLUTION)
FACTS:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s
decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in
Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside
the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a
candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since
under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting,
counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national
and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not
officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for engaging in premature
campaigning should be reconsidered.
RULING:
Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc
held that Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should,
thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said –
(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the assailed Decision”)
considered a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a
“candidate” even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary
to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as
amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy
will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of such campaign period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the
campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election
offenses cannot be so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no
recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law,
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended,
does not provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start
of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political
acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily
lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period.
Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal
act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for
vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning
before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision
asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful
unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does
not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus,
there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that
partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period are
lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that “any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period.” The only inescapable and logical result is that the
same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the
ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until
the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the
deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for
filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time
to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve
the existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of
candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a
candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly
incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15
of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be
considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Congress
wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the
early deadline required by the automated election system would be
disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start
of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is
unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire
Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory — reversing
Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.
QUINTO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as
unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, mainly on the ground that
they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from
overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public
appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and
functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent
COMELEC and movants-intervenors submit the following arguments:
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(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the
constitutional proscription against the participation of public appointive
officials and members of the military in partisan political activity;
(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when
they accord differential treatment to elective and appointive officials,
because such differential treatment rests on material and substantial
distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth;
and
(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public
safety and interest demand such reversal.
RULING:
We find the foregoing arguments meritorious. The assailed Decision struck
down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:
(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of
the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those
holding elective positions;
(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil
servants holding appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or
not they occupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they
limit these civil servants activity regardless of whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national, municipal
or barangay level; and
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the
fundamental right of these public appointive officials.
We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a)
of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the
present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which
reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14
of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436
insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start
of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are
running, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another
position without forfeiting his seat.
These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from
engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. The intention
to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political campaigns is unmistakable.
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Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code)
further makes intervention by civil service officers and employees in
partisan political activities an election offense, viz.:
SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee
in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer,
employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police
force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and
all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be
organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign
or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve
public order, if he is a peace officer.
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit
the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political
activities is too plain to be mistaken. But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil
servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional
ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]he
civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. This is because elected
public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan
political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign
period. Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office,
elective positions included.
The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are
allowed to vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or
mention the names of certain candidates for public office whom they
support.
MENDOZA vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
This case involves the election protest filed with the Commission on
Elections against Joselito R. Mendoza (Mendoza), who was proclaimed
elected Governor of Bulacan in the 14 May 2007 elections. Mendoza
garnered 364,566 votes while private respondent Roberto M.
Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan) got 348,834 votes, giving Mendoza a winning
margin of 15,732 votes.
After the appreciation of the contested ballots, the COMELEC Second
Division deducted a total of 20,236 votes from Mendoza and 616 votes
from Pagdanganan. As regards the claimed ballots, Mendoza was awarded
587 ballots compared to Pagdanganan's 586 ballots. Thus, the result of the
revision proceedings showed that Pagdanganan obtained 342,295 votes,
which is more than Mendoza's 337,974 votes. In its Resolution dated 1
December 2009 (Division Resolution), the COMELEC Second Division
annulled the proclamation of Mendoza and proclaimed Pagdanganan as
the duly elected Governor of Bulacan with a winning margin of 4,321 votes.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Division Resolution on 8 February
2010. On 4 March 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued an Order denying
Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration and granting Pagdanganan's
Motion for Execution of the Division Resolution
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it failed
to credit petitioner's claims.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Whether or not, the COMELEC en banc has the power to hear and decide such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
the case. motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission En Banc.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution of the
Indeed, the grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is patent in the fact
COMELEC promulgated on 8 February 2010 in EPC No. 2007-44
that despite the existence in its books of the clearly worded Section 6 of
entitled "Roberto M. Pagdanganan v. Joselito R. Mendoza," the Order
Rule 18, which incidentally has been acknowledged by this Court in the
issued on 4 March 2010, and the consequent Writ of Execution dated 5
recent case of Marcoleta v COMELEC, it completely ignored and
March 2010 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The election protest of
disregarded its very own decree and proceeded with the questioned
respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan is hereby DISMISSED.
Resolution of 8 February 2010 and Order of 4 March 2010, in all, annulling
the proclamation of petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza as the duly elected LIBERAL PARTY vs. COMELEC
governor of Bulacan, declaring respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan as the
FACTS:
duly elected governor, and ordering petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza to
cease and desist from performing the functions of the Governor of Bulacan On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646 setting
and to vacate said office in favor of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan. August 17, 2009as the last day for the filing of petitions for registration of
political parties. On January 21, 2010, the COMELEC promulgated
The grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is underscored by the fact
Resolution No. 8752, providing, among others, for the rules for the filing of
that the protest that petitioner Pagdanganan filed on 1 June 2007
petitions for accreditation for the determination of the dominant majority
overstayed with the COMELEC until the present election year when the end
party, the dominant minority party, ten major national parties, and two
of the term of the contested office is at hand and there was hardly enough
major local parties for the May 10, 2010 elections. Resolution No. 8752 also
time for the re-hearing that was conducted only on 15 February 2010. As
set the deadline for filing of petitions for accreditation on February 12,
the hearing time at the division had run out, and the re-hearing time at
2010and required that accreditation applicants be registered political
the banc was fast running out, the unwanted result came about:
parties, organizations or coalitions.
incomplete appreciation of ballots; invalidation of ballots on general and
unspecific grounds; unrebutted presumption of validity of ballots. Under
On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC, sitting en
accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same date, the
banc, does not have the authority to decide election cases in the first
Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) filed a
instance as this authority belongs to the divisions of the COMELEC
petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that it be
Specifically. Sec.3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
the May 10, 2010elections. It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 that it was an accreditation

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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
case.
On February 23, 2010, the LP filed its Opposition to the NP-NPCs petition
on the following grounds:
1) The NP-NPCs petition should be denied since it was not a duly registered
coalition of political parties at the time of filing of their petition for
accreditation as dominant minority party;
2) The COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
registration as a coalition because the petition should have been first
brought before the proper Division;
3) The petition for registration as a coalition was filed with the Clerk of the
Commission instead of the Law Department in violation of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure;
4) The petition for registration as a coalition was filed beyond the August
17, 2009deadline set by the COMELEC; and
5) The respective chapters, incumbents and candidates of the NP and the
NPC separately cannot be taken into account for purposes of accreditation
as dominant minority party because the NP-NPC as a coalition is an entirely
different entity.
On April 12, 2010, the COMELEC en banc granted the NP-NPCs petition for
registration as a coalition through the Resolution assailed in the present
case. In the same Resolution, the COMELEC en banc deferred the
resolution of the NP-NPCs application for accreditation as dominant
minority party.
On the issue of jurisdiction, the COMELEC en banc citing Baytan v. Comelec
held that the registration of coalitions involves the exercise of its
administrative powers and not its quasi-judicial powers; hence, the
COMELEC en banc can directly act on it. It further held that there is no
constitutional requirement that a petition for registration of a coalition
should be decided first by a division. On the timeliness of the filing of the
petition, the COMELEC en banc held that no rule exists setting a deadline
for the registration of coalitions. It opined that the registration of a
coalition is simply a recognition by the COMELEC of a political reality. It
held that if the NP-NPC is genuine, then the approval of its registration by
the COMELEC is a mere recognition of an operative fact.
On the merits, the COMELEC en banc found that both the NP and the NPC
have validly agreed to join forces for political or election purposes. It held
that the NP-NPC satisfactorily submitted all the documentary
requirements to prove the mergers validity. It opined, too, that if the
Constitution and By-Laws of either the NP or the NPC was violated by the
merger, the representatives or members of either party possess the legal
standing to question the coalition; the LP, a stranger to the internal
dynamics of both parties, does not have this required standing.
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented on various grounds. First, he
ruled that the COMELEC sitting en banc had no jurisdiction over NP-NPCs
petition for registration as a coalition and accreditation as dominant
minority party.
Commissioner Sarmiento secondly took the position that the relaxation of
the Rules is inappropriate in the present case.
Commissioner Sarmiento’s third point is that no valid coalition was formed
between the NP and the NPC.
Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out as his last point that the NP-NPC
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
cannot seek accreditation as the dominant minority party without the
requisite recognition by the COMELEC.
The LP now assails the April 12, 2010COMELEC Resolution for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, as follows:
1)The COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction at the first instance to
entertain petitions for registration of political coalitions;
2)The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the
registration of the purported NP-NPC coalition despite the lapse of the
deadline for registration;
3)The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the
registration of the purported NP-NPC coalition despite patent and manifest
violations of the NPC Constitution and By-Laws; and
4)The purported NP-NPC coalition is a bogus, sham and paper coalition that
makes a mockery of the electoral process.
In support of its petition, the petitioner attached the Sworn Affidavits of
two prominent members of the NPC, namely: Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes (the
current NPC Legal Counsel) and Daniel Laogan (a member of the NPCs
National Central Committee) to show that the NP-NPC was entered into
without consultations; much less, the approval of the NPCs National
Convention which was not even convened.
ISSUES:
1) Should the petition be dismissed outright for procedural and technical
infirmities?
2) Is the present petition premature since its object is to foreclose a ruling
on the unsettled NP-NPC issue?
3) Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for
registration, time-barred?
4) Is the NP-NPC an operative fact that the COMELEC simply has to note
and recognize without need of registration?
5) Does the en banc have jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain the
petition?
6) On the merits and assuming that the en banc has jurisdiction, did it
gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed the registration of the NP-
NPC?
RULING:
We find the petition meritorious.
REMEDIAL LAW: The technical and procedural questions
We have indicated many times in the past that a primary factor in
considering technical and procedural objections is the nature of the issues
involved. We have been strict when the issues are solely confined to the
parties private interests and carry no massive ripple effects directly
affecting the public, but have viewed with liberality the technical and
procedural threshold issues raised when grave public interests are
involved. Our liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical and
procedural where Court intervention has become imperative. Thus, we
have recognized exceptions to the threshold issues of ripeness and
mootness of the petitions before us, as well as questions on locus standi.
We have also brushed aside procedural technicalities where the issues
raised, because of the paramount public interest involved and their gravity,
novelty or weight as precedents deserve the Courts attention and active
intervention.
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given the weight of the counterbalancing factors we considered above.

We see every reason to be liberal in the present case in view of interests
involved which are indisputably important to the coming electoral exercise REMEDIAL LAW: failure to formally implead the NP-NPC
now fast approaching. The registration of political parties, their
accreditation as dominant parties, and the benefits these recognitions We do not likewise find the failure to formally implead the NP-NPC a
provide particularly, the on-line real time electronic transmission of sufficient reason to dismiss the petition outright. Without any finally
election results from the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) through the confirmed registration in the coalitions favor, NP-NPC does not legally exist
Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate access to as a coalition with a personality separate and distinct from the component
official election results; the per diems from the government that watchers NP and NPC parties. We find it sufficient that the NP and the NPC have
of accredited parties enjoy; and the representation at the printing, storage separately been impleaded; as of the moment, they are the real parties-in-
and distribution of ballots that the dominant-party status brings constitute interest as they are the parties truly interested in legally establishing the
distinct advantages to any party and its candidates, if only in terms of the existence of their coalition. Again, we find no resulting harm or prejudice
ready information enabling them to react faster to developing situations. in the omission to implead NP-NPC, as the component parties have voiced
The value of these advantages exponentially rises in an election under an out the concerns the coalition would have raised had it been impleaded as
automated system whose effectiveness and reliability, even at this late a separate and properly existing personality.
stage, are question marks to some. To the public, the proper registration
and the accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of equitable party REMEDIAL LAW: facial objection
representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small
measure to transparency and to the elections credibility. The respondents next argue that the petitions cited grounds are mere
errors of law and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
Thus, our focus is on the core issues that confront us and the parties, by- lack or excess of jurisdiction. This objection can be read as a facial objection
passing the technical and procedural questions raised that do not anyway to the petition or as a substantive one that goes into the merits of the
affect the integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties petition. We will discuss under the present topic the facial objection, as it
involved, and concentrating as well on the issues that would resolve the is a threshold issue that determines whether we shall proceed to consider
case soonest so that the parties involved and the COMELEC can move on the case or simply dismiss the petition outright.
to their assigned time-sensitive roles and tasks in the coming elections.
A facial objection is meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition,
We note that while the respondents placed in issue defects in the
what is evident as cited grounds are erroneous applications of the law
attachments to the petition, their objection is a formal one as they do not
rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
deny the existence and basic correctness of these attachments. We see no
jurisdiction. After due consideration, we conclude that the petition passes
resulting harm or prejudice therefore if we overrule the objection raised,
the facial objection test.

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REMEDIAL LAW: substantial distinctions between an appeal and a
petition for certiorari
In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, the Court,
through former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, gave a very succinct
exposition of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in relation to errors of law. The Court then said:
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function
is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its
power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial
distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v.
NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not
survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable through the
original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of
certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis either of the law
or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision.
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction
over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of
certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law
or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy.
The most obvious ground cited in the petition that, if properly established,
would constitute grave abuse of discretion is the alleged unwarranted
action of the COMELEC en banc in acting on the registration of the NP-NPC
when the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure provides that registration is
under the jurisdiction of the Division at the first instance. This alleged error
is more than an error of law. If this cited ground is correct, then the
COMELEC en banc acted without legal authority and thereby committed a
jurisdictional transgression; its action, being ultra vires, would be a nullity.
Another allegation of an ultra vires act is that the COMELEC, by appropriate
resolution, ordered that August 17, 2009 be the cut-off date for the
registration of parties, and yet approved the registration of NP-NPC long
after this cut-off date had passed without any valid justification or reason
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
for suspending the rule. For the COMELEC en banc to so act was not a mere
error of law. The grant of registration was an act outside mandatory legal
parameters and was therefore done when the COMELEC no longer had the
authority to act on it. In this sense, it is a proper allegation of grave abuse
of discretion under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
In our view, these jurisdictional challenges to the en banc Resolution, if
established, constitute ultra vires acts that would render the Resolution
void.
REMEDIAL LAW: OSG’s objection
This is another threshold issue, raised this time by the OSG, and we rule
that the OSGs objection has no merit.
The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the
COMELEC for registration as a coalition and accreditation as the dominant
minority party. While the COMELEC en banc claimed that it had jurisdiction
over the registration of coalitions and in fact decreed the NP-NPCs
registration, it strangely did not rule on the accreditation aspect of the
petition.
The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority
party are two separate matters that are substantively distinct from each
other. Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes
of our election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the
privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered
parties.
Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule32 of the COMELEC
Rules regulate the registration of political parties, organizations or
coalitions of political parties. Accreditation as a dominant party is governed
by COMELEC Resolution No. 8752, Section 1 of which states that the
petition for accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of the Commission
who shall docket it as an SPP (DM) case, in the manner that the NP-NPC
petition before the COMELEC was docketed. While the registration of
political parties is a special proceeding clearly assigned to a Division for
handling under the COMELEC Rules, no similar clear-cut rule is available for
a petition for accreditation as a dominant party. We thus make no
statement on this point, as it is not a matter in issue.
Under the circumstances of the present case where the registration was
handled at the COMELEC en banc, action at the COMELEC ended upon the
en banc issuance of the assailed Resolution; under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of
the COMELEC Rules, a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling is a
prohibited pleading, except in election offense cases. Any request for
accreditation that may be filed is conceptually a separate matter for the
COMELEC to handle. Thus, after the COMELEC en banc issued the assailed
Resolution resolving the NP-NPCs application for registration as a coalition,
the COMELECs part in the registration process was brought to a close,
rendering the Resolution ripe for review by this Court.
The present petition has openly stated its objective of forestalling the
accreditation of the respondent NP-NPC; the petition expressly and
frontally sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition and restraining order
to prevent the COMELEC from accrediting a coalition that is not registered
as a party. The combination of a petition for certiorari and for prohibition
under the circumstances of the present case is fully justified, as the
registration and the accreditation that the petition covers are linked with
and in fact sequentially follow one another. Accreditation can only be
granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated
otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for
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accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, be understood in its generic sense that covers political organizations and
accreditation is the next natural step to follow. political coalitions as well.

To rule otherwise is to introduce, through a COMELEC deadline-setting

Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave abuse
resolution, a meaning or intent into Section 2(5), Article IX-C, which was
of discretion, as alleged in the petition, the filing of a petition for
not clearly intended by the Constitution or by the COMELEC Rules;
prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be expected
Resolution No. 8646 would effectively differentiate between political
as a logical remedial move; otherwise, accreditation, unless restrained, will
parties, on the one hand, and political organizations and coalitions, on the
follow. Thus, from the point of view of prohibition, there is absolutely no
other.
prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event the
accreditation that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take
In fact, no substantial distinction exists among these entities germane to
place. From the point of view of the petition for certiorari questioning the
the act of registration that would justify creating distinctions among them
registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the nullification of a
in terms of deadlines. Such distinctions in the deadlines for the registration
past and accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG
of political organizations and coalitions, if allowed, may even wreak havoc
objection based on prematurity is shown to be completely groundless.
on the procedural orderliness of elections by allowing these registrations
REMEDIAL LAW: time-barred to introduce late and confusing signals to the electorate, not to mention
their possible adverse effects on election systems and procedures. This,
Our short answer to the question posed is: yes, the NP-NPCs petition for
the en banc very well knows, and their lack of unanimity on the disputed
registration as a coalition is time-barred. Thus, the COMELEC en banc was
point of timeliness shows how unusual the majority’s reading has been.
wrong in ordering the out-of-time registration of the NP-NPC coalition.
The COMELEC en banc’s failure to follow its own rules on deadlines may,
Admittedly, Resolution No. 8646 simply states that August 17, 2009 is the
at first blush, be a negligible error that does not affect its jurisdiction
Last day for filing petitions for registration of political parties, without
(assuming for the sake of argument that the COMELEC en banc as the
mentioning organizations and coalitions in the way that the three entities
authority to act at the first instance).An examination of Resolution No.
are separately mentioned under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the
8646, however, shows that the deadline for registration cannot but be a
Constitution and Rule 32, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules. Resolution No.
firm and mandatory deadline that the COMELEC has set.
8646, however, is simply a listing of electoral activities and deadlines for
the May 10, 2010elections; it is not in any way a resolution aimed at All these are related to show that the COMELEC deadline cannot but be
establishing distinctions among political parties, organizations, and mandatory; the whole electoral exercise may fail or at least suffer
coalitions. In the absence of any note, explanation or reason why the disruptions, if the deadlines are not observed. For this reason, the
deadline only mentions political parties, the term political parties should COMELEC has in the past in fact rejected applications for registration for
having been filed out of time. A case in point is the application of the

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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
political party Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc., where the COMELEC
denied the plea for registration for having been filed out of time, among
other grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood might not have been the
only political party whose application for registration was denied at the
COMELEC level for late filing. We are sure that all these other organizations
would now cry foul and rightly so because of the denial of their applications
on the ground of late filing, when the NP-NPC has been made an exception
without rhyme or reason.
Given the mandatory nature of the deadline, subject only to a systemic
change (as contrasted to an ad hoc change or a suspension of the deadline
in favor of a party in the course of application), the COMELEC en banc acted
in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted the registration of NP-NPC as a
coalition beyond the deadline the COMELEC itself had set; the authority to
register political parties under mandatory terms is only up to the deadline.
Effectively, the mandatory deadline is a jurisdictional matter that should
have been satisfied and was not. Where conditions that authorize the
exercise of a general power are wanting, fatal excess of jurisdiction results.
Separately from the above consideration, we view the COMELEC en banc’s
position that the deadline for registration is only for political parties and
not for organizations and coalitions to be preposterous, given the
importance of the participation of political parties in the election process
and the rigid schedules that have to be observed in order to implement
automated elections as efficiently and as harmoniously as possible. We
note that the COMELEC has not even bothered to explain why it imposed
a deadline applicable only to political parties, but not to political
organizations and coalitions. In our view, this kind of ruling was patently
unreasonable, made as it was without basis in law, in fact or in reason; and
was a grave abuse of discretion that fatally afflicted the assailed COMELEC
Resolution.
REMEDIAL LAW: grave abuse of discretion
Aside from the threshold and timeliness questions we have extensively
discussed, this case raises other important questions as well that, without
the time constraints the coming elections impose on us, would have been
fertile areas for discussion in exploring the limits and parameters of
COMELEC authority on the registration of coalitions. These questions,
however, are not for us to answer now, given our time constraints and the
decisive impact on the present case of our ruling on timeliness. Thus, we
reserve for another case and another time the answers to these no less
important questions.
We solely rule for now that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its
discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the registration
of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the matter of
party registration raises critical election concerns that should be handled
with discretion commensurate with the importance of elections to our
democratic system. The COMELEC should be at its most strict in
implementing and complying with the standards and procedures the
Constitution and our laws impose.
In light of the time constraints facing the COMELEC and the parties as the
election is no more than a week away, we find it compelling to declare this
Decision immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and,
accordingly, NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections dated April 12, 2010 in the application for registration of the
Nacionalista Party-Nationalist Peoples Coalition as a political coalition,
docketed as SPP-10-(DM). The Commission on Elections is DECLARED
BARRED from granting accreditation to the proposed NP-NPC Coalition in
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
the May 10, 2010 elections for lack of the requisite registration as a
political coalition. This Decision is declared immediately executory.
LOZANIDA vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Romeo Lonzanida was previously elected and served two consecutive
terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoralty
elections. In the May 1995 elections, he again ran for mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 and he was
ordered to vacate the post by reason of a COMELEC decision dated
November 13, 1997 on the election protest filed against him which
declared his opponent Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San
Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral
term. Again, on May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998, his opponent
Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify the petitioner from
running for mayor of San Antonio on the ground that he had served three
consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, the petitioner was
proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC
issued a resolution granting the petition which was also affirmed by the
COMELEC En Banc.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the two requisites for the application of the three-
term rule in this case were absent. First, the petitioner cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995
elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-
appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself
declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995
mayoralty elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared
null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It
has been repeatedly held by the Court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all while a proclaimed candidate may
assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of
Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to
the final outcome of the election protest. Second, the petitioner cannot be
deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was
ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The
respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have
served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater
portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregarded the
second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e. that he had
fully served three consecutive terms.
LADLAD vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-
list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the
latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited
certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that
since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are
considered nuisance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the
Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant
Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and
that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by
the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
RULING:
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the
ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and
RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the
law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized
and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory
perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist
in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000
persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and
4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also
represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with
affiliates around the Philippines.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed
Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to
advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held
in Estrada v. Escritor: “government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose.”
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct,
and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure
religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family,
and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and
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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has
not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these
generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted
into the realm of law. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any
specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees
that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups
members have committed or are committing immoral acts. The OSG
argues:
A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a
different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not
translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and
action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized,
COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both
the straights and the gays. Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has
the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the
state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality,
sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will
and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to
society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who,
undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of
an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of
legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of
all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an
issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal
and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to
further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications
give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal
protection clause. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its
position through normal democratic means. Freedom of expression
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and
this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also
to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any
compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose
its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not
free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. This position gains
even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in
this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones
homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that
supports LGBT individuals are protected as well. Other jurisdictions have
gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
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perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not
justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.
CABALLERO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Rogelio Caballero and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.
were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of
Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private
respondent filed a Petition to deny due course to or cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false
representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for
Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-
resident thereof.
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel,
manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and
the petition was served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay
Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition
during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a
Memorandum controverting private respondent's substantial allegations
in his petition.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and
became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on
October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. He claimed
that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite
becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to
pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to
Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally
in Canada.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding
that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he
declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within
one year prior to the election.
It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No.
9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had
validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the
other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective
office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still
comply with the one year residency requirement provided for under
Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner's naturalization as a
Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in
Uyugan, Batanes; thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is
incumbent upon him to prove that he was able to reestablish his domicile
in Uyugan for him to be eligible to run for elective office in said locality
which he failed to do.
Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns
showed that petitioner won over private respondent. Private respondent
filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.
On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the
COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC. On May 17, 2013, private
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respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation. On November 6, 2013,
the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with us the instant petition
for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the
May 3, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the
En Banc and prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the
appropriate correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes
in favor of petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's
proclamation and proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected
Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. On December 12,
2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution.
Private respondent took his Oath of Office on December 20, 2013.
RULING:
While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned
requirements, the settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the COMELEC
may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section
4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to
obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission,
these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not
square with the need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time,
provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired.
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither
fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it
is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be
immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake
of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
action.
Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held
on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC, pertains to his qualification
and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with public
interest, which justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. We
adopt the COMELEC's s ratiocination in accepting the petition, to wit:
This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with
the procedure for filing a petition to deny due course to or cancel
certificate of candidacy set forth in Section 4, Rule 23 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which
requires service of a copy of the petition to respondent prior to its filing.
But then, we should also consider the efforts exerted by petitioner in
serving a copy of his petition to respondent after being made aware that
such service is necessary. We should also take note of the impossibility for
petitioner to personally serve a copy of the petition to respondent since he
was in Canada at the time of its filing as shown in respondent's travel
records.
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The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford
the latter an opportunity to answer the allegations contained in the
petition even prior to the service of summons by the Commission to him.
In this case, respondent was given a copy of the petition during the
conference held on 10 December 2012 and was ultimately accorded the
occasion to rebut all the allegations against him. He even filed a
Memorandum containing his defenses to petitioner's allegations. For all
intents and purposes, therefore, respondent was never deprived of due
process which is the very essence of this Commission's Rules of Procedure.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to
bow to substantive considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at
promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of the law.21 The law does not provide for
residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino.
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only
logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen.24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks
for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.
Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of
1991, provides, among others, for the qualifications of an elective local
official. Section 39 thereof states:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a
resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year
immediately preceding the election day. Respondent filed the petition for
cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made
material misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident
of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of
elections.
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The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation
as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)." A
domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned
by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in
the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian
citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC we ruled that naturalization in a foreign
country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This
holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is
required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had
effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his
domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during
his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his
residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a
Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,
Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he
made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence
to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a
period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It
found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of
RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that
he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was
accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent
to reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13,
2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required
by law.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings
of fact of administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the
instant case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such
factual determinations. Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned
Resolutions, we may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor
substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.
LEGASPI vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Alfredo Germar (Germar) and Rogelio P. Santos, Jr. (Santos), along with one
Roberto C. Esquivel (Esquivel), were among the candidates fielded by the
Liberal Party (LP) to vie for local elective posts in Norzagaray, Bulacan,
during the 13 May 2013 elections. Germar ran for the position of mayor,
Santos ran for the position of councilor, and Esquivel ran for the position
of vice-mayor. Feliciano P. Legaspi, on the other hand, was the National
Unity Party’s (NUP’s) bet for mayor of Norzagaray during the 2013 polls.
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After the votes cast by the Norzagaray electorate were tallied, Germar
emerged as the highest vote getter in the mayoralty race. Santos, for his
part, also appeared to have secured enough votes to be the second
councilor of the municipality. Esquivel, though, failed in his bid to become
vice-mayor of Norzagaray. Upon learning about the results of the tally,
petitioner immediately filed before the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) of Norzagaray a motion to suspend the proclamation of Germar and
Santos as winning candidates. Such motion, however, proved to be futile.
At exactly 7:45 a.m. on 14 May 2013, despite the petitioner’s motion, the
MBC proclaimed Germar and Santos as duly elected mayor and councilor
of the municipality of Norzagaray, respectively.
A few hours after the said proclamation, petitioner filed before the
COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Germar, Santos, and
Esquivel. In it, petitioner accused Germar, Santos, and Esquivel of having
engaged in rampant vote buying during the days leading to the elections.
The Petition for Disqualification was docketed as SPA No. 13-323 (DC) and
was assigned to the COMELEC First Division, then composed of
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Al A.
Parreño. In due course, the COMELEC First Division took a vote on SPA No.
13-323 (DC). The vote of the division was an even 1-1 split, with
Commissioner Tagle voting in favor of granting the petition for
disqualification, but with Commissioner Christian Lim voting against it. The
third member of the division, i.e., Commissioner Parreño, was not able to
provide the potential tie-breaking vote as he was then absent and
attending to some other official business.
Due to the impasse created by the absence of one of its members, the
COMELEC First Division called for the constitution of a Special First Division
through which COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. sat in the First
Division as acting member vice the absent Commissioner Parreño for
purposes of SPA No. 13-323 (DC).
On 3 October 2013, the COMELEC Special First Division, by a 2 to 1 vote,
rendered a resolution: (1) disqualifying Germar and Santos for the
positions of mayor and councilor, respectively, of Norzagaray; and (2)
referring the criminal aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) to the COMELEC Law
Department for preliminary investigation.
Germar, Santos, and Esquivel filed a motion for reconsideration with the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 July 2004, the COMELEC en banc took a vote on
the motion for reconsideration. At that time, the COMELEC en banc had six
(6) incumbent members. Of the six (6), however, only five (5) members
actually participated in the deliberations and casted votes. Commissioner
Parreño opted to take no part and did not vote.
In view of the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration with respect to the criminal aspect of SPA
No. 13-323 (DC), but ordering the conduct of a rehearing insofar as the
electoral aspect of the case was concerned.
After the rehearing, the COMELEC en banc took another vote but it still
failed to muster a majority consensus on the electoral aspect of SPA No.
13-323 (DC). The final vote of the COMELEC en banc on the matter
remained at the exact 3-2 split that it was before the rehearing.
Commissioner Parreño maintained his "no part" stance, while newly
appointed Commissioner Arthur D. Lim also opted to take no part and did
not vote.
Thus, on 28 January 2015, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order directing
the dismissal of the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
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RULING:
We dismiss the present petition. Section 7 of Article IX-A of the
Constitution obliges the COMELEC, like the other constitutional
commissions, to decide all cases or matters before it by a "majority vote of
all its [m]embers." When such majority vote cannot be mustered by the
COMELEC en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules provides the
mechanism to avert a non-decision. Thus:
Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en
banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had,
the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the
action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment appealed from shall stand
affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied.
Verily, under the cited provision, the COMELEC en banc is first required to
rehear the case or matter that it cannot decide or resolve by the necessary
majority. When a majority still cannot be had after the rehearing, however,
there results a failure to decide on the part of the COMELEC en banc.
As can be gleaned above, the effects of the COMELEC en banc’s failure to
decide vary depending on the type of case or matter that is before the
commission. Thus, under the provision, the first effect (i.e., the dismissal
of the action or proceeding) only applies when the type of case before the
COMELEC is an action or proceeding "originally commenced in the
commission"; the second effect (i.e., the affirmance of a judgment or
order) only applies when the type of case before the COMELEC is an
"appealed case"; and the third effect (i.e., the denial of the petition or
motion) only applies when the case or matter before the COMELEC is an
"incidental matter."
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, et al. gives us a key illustration of an
application of the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules.
Mendoza involved an electoral protest that was originally filed before the
COMELEC and which was raffled to one of its divisions. The COMELEC
division to which the electoral protest was assigned granted that protest,
prompting the protestee to file a motion for reconsideration with the
COMELEC en banc. When the COMELEC en banc took a vote on the motion
for reconsideration, however, it failed to obtain the necessary majority
vote. Consequently, the COMELEC en banc reheard the matter and then
took another vote. However, the second vote also lacked the necessary
majority. The final vote of the COMELEC en banc was 3-1 (i.e., 3 in support
of granting the protest and 1 dissent), with 3 members taking no part. On
the basis of the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration (in effect sustaining the division’s
decision). The protestee challenged the foregoing resolution on the
strength of the argument that the failure of the COMELEC en banc to obtain
the necessary majority should have resulted in the dismissal of the election
protest case itself pursuant to the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules.
When that dispute reached this Court in Mendoza, we sustained the
protestee. We held that the first effect applied because the case before
the COMELEC en banc was an electoral protest that was "originally
commenced" in the commission. We noted that while the electoral protest
only reached the COMELEC en banc through the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of a division, the same did not change the
nature of the case before it; the motion for reconsideration not being an
appeal. Thus, we held that the failure of the COMELEC en banc to decide
the motion for reconsideration would result—not in the denial of the said
motion or the affirmance of the division’s decision—but in the dismissal of
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the electoral protest itself, pursuant to the first effect under Section 6, Rule
18 of the COMELEC Rules.
This is exactly what happened in this case. In this case, SPA No. 13- 323
(DC) was filed, at the first instance, with the COMELEC. Being a petition for
disqualification filed under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, SPA
No. 13-323 (DC) was initially raffled to and decided by a division of the
commission. From that point, however, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) found its way
to the COMELEC en banc after a motion for reconsideration from the
decision of the division was filed. Hence, when the COMELEC en banc twice
failed to reach the necessary majority to decide the electoral aspect of SPA
No. 13-323 (DC), it applied the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules. We find absolutely nothing wrong with such application.
It is, in fact, reinforced by the very provisions of the COMELEC Rules and by
Mendoza.
POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines
up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to
stay in the PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she
has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in
1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in
2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter
and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post
as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped
using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy
on the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological
parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship
and residence requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is
qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained
to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue
of qualifications of candidates.
2) Whether or not Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
3) Whether or not Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency
requirement.
4) Whether or not the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or
cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in her COC.
RULING:
1) No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers
and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications
or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them. In contrast,
the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals
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have sole jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the
President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole
jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such
positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized
proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before
elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere
rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds
for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its
rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the
Constitution. Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace as a
candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.
2) Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born
Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for
presidency. First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s
parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos.
The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos
such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born
in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her
parents’ nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it
is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd,
if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. Second, by votes of 7-
5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the
1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings
either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration
with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the
intent of the framers. Third, that foundlings are automatically
conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties
and the general principles of international law. Although the
Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres
to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the
country in which the foundling is found.
3) Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi
coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile. Grace
Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and
not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was
approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree
that an alien’s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she
acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino
citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the
circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s
actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear
that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
4) No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she
misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and residency because
such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior
authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a
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disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the
COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground
of false representations regarding her qualifications. In this case,
by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced
qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot
be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship
and residency.
Carpio Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016
Emotional pleas invoking the sad plight of foundlings conveniently forgets
the express language of the Constitution reserving those high positions,
particularly the Presidency, exclusively to natural-born Filipino
citizens. Even naturalized Filipino citizens, whose numbers are far more
than foundlings, are not qualified to run for President. The natural-born
citizenship requirement under the Constitution to qualify as a candidate for
President must be complied with strictly. To rule otherwise amounts to a
patent violation of the Constitution.
A Mockery of National Election Process
There is no majority of the Supreme Court that holds Grace Poe is a natural-
born Filipino citizen since 7 – 5 justices voted that Grace Poe is a natural-
born, while the three others withheld their opinion.
1. Allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status
to be potentially elected to the Office of the President, an office
expressly reserved by the Constitution exclusively for natural-born
Filipino citizens, will lead to absurd results.
2. This ruling implies that the majority of this Court wants to resolve
the citizenship status of petitioner after the elections, and only if
petitioner wins the elections, despite petitioner having already
presented before the COMELEC all the evidence she wanted to
present to prove her citizenship status.
3. If petitioner wins the elections but is later disqualified by this Court
(acting as PET) for not possessing a basic qualification for the Office
of the President – that of being a natural-born Filipino citizen –
those who voted for petitioner would have utterly wasted their
votes.
On Comelec’s All-Encompassing Jurisdiction
The initial determination of who are qualified to file COC with the Comelec
clearly falls within the all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the
Comelec to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election.
1. The Constitution also empower the Comelec to decide, except
those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections. The power to decide “all questions affecting
elections” necessarily includes the power to decide whether a
candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for election
to public office. This broad constitutional power and function
vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation
where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal
remedy.
– If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold
Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not
powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is
no need to wait until after the elections before such candidate may be
disqualified.
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2. In fact, the COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel COCs

of nuisance candidates.

– It cannot be disputed that a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen,

who files a certificate of candidacy for President puts the election process
in mockery and is therefore a nuisance candidate. Such person’s certificate
of candidacy can motu proprio be cancelled by the COMELEC under Section
69 of the OEC, which empowers the COMELEC to cancel motu proprio the
COC if it has been filed to put the election process in mockery. (Timbol vs
Comelec, 2015)

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