PUBLIC CORPORATION COMPILED CASE DIGESTS

LEYNES V COA

FACTS: Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes , was formerly assigned to the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the
sole presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court thereof. As such, his salary and representation and transportation
allowance (RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. In addition, petitioner received a monthly allowance
of P944 from the local funds of the Municipality of Naujan. The Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved Resolution
No. 101 increasing petitioner judge’s monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656). The Provincial
Auditor sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of
the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to petitioner and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid
to the latter. She opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner in addition to the RATA the
latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court. Her directive was based on Section 36, RA No. 7645, General
Appropriations Act of 1993 and National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated January 1, 1992, of the Department of
Budget and Management that no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.

Petitioner appealed to COA Regional Director who upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor and added that Resolution No.
101, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with Section 3 of Local Budget Circular No. 53
dated September 1, 1993 outlining the conditions for the grant of allowances to judges and other national officials or
employees by the local government units (LGUs). Petitioner appealed the resolution to the Commission on Audit. In the
meantime, a disallowance of the payment of the P1, 600 monthly allowance to petitioner was issued. Thus he received
his P1, 600 monthly allowance from the Municipality of Naujan only for the period May 1993 to January 1994. COA
affirmed the resolution.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly provide RATA to its Municipal Judge, in addition to
that provided by the Supreme Court.

RULING: YES. To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges as what respondent COA would like us to
do will subvert the principle of local autonomy zealously guaranteed by the Constitution. The Local Government Code of
1991 was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local governments as mandated by the
Constitution. By upholding, in the present case, the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their
discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds, we ensure the
genuine and meaningful local autonomy of LGUs
In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special law which exclusively deals with local government units (LGUs), outlining
their powers and functions in consonance with the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy. RA 7645 (the GAA
of 1993), on the other hand, was a general law which outlined the share in the national fund of all branches of the national
government. RA 7645 therefore, being a general law, could not have, by mere implication, repealed RA 7160. Rather, RA
7160 should be taken as the exception to RA 7645 in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion.
Clearly therefore, the prohibition in NCC No. 67 is only against the dual or multiple collection of RATA by a national official
from the budgets of two or more national agencies. Since the other source referred in the controversial prohibition
is another national agency, said prohibition clearly does not apply to LGUs like the Municipality of Naujan.

REMO V SEC OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FACTS: Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring. Prior
to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her
passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her
maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. The DFA denied the request stating that Use of maiden name is
allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing
Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may
revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. The
petitioner does not meet any of these conditions. The CA affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President in denying her
appeal.

ISSUE: WON RA 8239, the law governing passport issuance operates as an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code.

RULING: NO. Article 370 of the Civil Code governs the use of surname in a case of a married woman while RA 8239 limits
the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport. These
instances are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. Once a married woman opted to adopt
her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases in R.A.
8239. This prohibition, according to petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article 370 of the
Civil Code. Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically
dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of
surnames. That a special law prevails over a general law.

IMBONG V OCHOA

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law). That it violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government
Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs
and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A. No. 9054 An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
ISSUE: WON the RH law is unconstitutional

RULING: Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority
programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law. The fact that the RH Law does not
intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and
the regional governments. Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress
cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of
general concern or common interest.

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. In this case,
a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of
skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health workers, it will be the national government that will provide
for the funding of its implementation. Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LGUs are merely encouraged
to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of
these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

PROV OF BATANGAS V ROMULO

FACTS: President Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION. The program was established to facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of
local government units (LGUs) in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government
Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code. The Oversight Committee constituted under LGC has been
tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effective implementation. Further,
to address the funding shortfalls of functions and services devolved to the LGUs and other funding requirements of the
program, the Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created. The DBM was directed to set aside an amount
to be determined by the Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the
DILG. The initial fund was to be sourced from the available savings of the national government for CY 1998. For 1999 and
the succeeding years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be incorporated in the annual
GAA. The Oversight Committee passed resolutions in which under the allocation scheme there shall be a portion to be
earmarked to support local affirmative action projects and other priority initiatives submitted by LGUs to the Oversight
Committee on Devolution for approval in accordance with its prescribed guidelines as promulgated and adopted by the
OCD.
The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed the present to declare as
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions
for the release thereof. He argued that it violates the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 that mandates that the just share
of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. The petitioner contends that to vest the Oversight Committee with
the authority to determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy.
Another infringement is the improper amendment to Section 285 of the LGC on the percentage sharing of the IRA among
the LGUs. The modifications allegedly constitute an illegal amendment by the executive branch of a substantive law. The
respondents stated that the Constitution does not specify that the just share of the LGUs shall be determined solely by
the LGC and that there exists no limitation on the power of Congress to determine what is the just share of the LGUs in
the national taxes.
ISSUE: WON the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate the constitutional
precept on local autonomy.

RULING: YES. Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. Further, a basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the constitutionally mandated automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. The
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of
the IRA. They put on hold the distribution and release of the five billion pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight Committee
from time to time. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions effectively encroach
on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck down. Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or
modifying their percentage sharing therein, which are fixed in LGC, are matters of general and substantive law. To permit
Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs, would be to give Congress the unbridled authority to unduly
infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs, and thus put the same in jeopardy every year.

LINA JR V PAÑO

FACTS: Respondent Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal
OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked petitioner Mayor Cataquiz, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This
was denied on the ground of an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995 which is a policy declaration of the Province on its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms
of gambling. Respondent filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO which the
RTC enjoined the petitioner from implementing or enforcing the said ordinance. Petitioners contend that it is a valid
exercise of the provincial government’s police power under the LGC

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid

RULING: NO.The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of
Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and
allows it to operate the lotteries. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a
provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.In our system of government, the power of local government
units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts
of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of
the statute. To conclude, respondent cannot avail of the ordinance as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For
said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Boards enactment, like spring
water, could not rise above its source of power, the national legislature.
TANO VS. SOCRATES

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted ordinances banning the shipment of all live fish and
lobster outside Puerto Princesa City and prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of
live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms.
The petitioners were criminally charged in violation of the said ordinances and now question the constitutionality of the
said ordinances.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod are constitutional.

RULING: It is settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction.
The centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution. Indispensable to
decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that "any provision on a power of a local government unit
shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution
of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall
be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned."
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the LGC regarding devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal
waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry
out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.
In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to local
government units, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

CSC VS. YU

FACTS: The national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to the Local Government Code which
affected the Department of Health (DOH) along with other government agencies.
Upon the implementation of the devolution program, Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the Provincial Health
Officer (PHO II) position.
Subsequently, a law was passed whereby the hospital positions previously devolved to the local government unit were re-
nationalized and reverted to the DOH which resulted to the reclassification of PHO II to Chief of Hospital II. However, Dr.
Yu was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being given the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II.
Then, DOH Secretary Dayrit appointed Dr. Dayrit to the position of Chief of Hospital II.
Dr. Yu filed a letter of protest before the CSC but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the item of PHO II was a devolved position or a locally created one.

RULING: PHO II was a devolved position.

Pursuant to the declared policy under the LGC to provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization, national agencies or offices, including the DOH, were mandated to devolve
to the local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities.
Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in
whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable.
Pursuant to the Executive Order issued by then President Corazon Aquino, it was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to
absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Castillo. However, with Dr. Castillo's re-absorption by the DOH,
her devolved position with the LGU was left vacant.
Thus, Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the position of PHO II and, consequently, acquired a vested right to its re-classified
designation — Chief of Hospital II.

PLAZA II VS. CASSION

FACTS: Upon the promulgation and implementation of the Local Government Code, some of the functions of the DSWD
were transferred to the local government units.
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into between Mayor Plaza II and the DSWD, the latter's
services, personnel, assets and liabilities, and technical support systems were transferred to its city counterpart.
By virtue of the same MOA, Mayor Plaza issued E.O. No. 06-92 reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office
(CSSDO) and designated Tuazon as Officer-in-Charge of the reconstituted CSSDO.
The CSSDO was originally headed by Cassion. Aggrieved by such development, respondents refused to recognize Tuazon
as the new head and to report at the DSWD building. They contended that the issuance of EO No. 06-92 and the
designation Tuazon are illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 06-92 is valid.

RULING: E.O. No. 06-92 is valid.

Section 17 of the Local Government Code authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets and liabilities, records of basic
services, and facilities of a national government agency to local government units.
As a consequence of the devolution of national agencies, Executive Order No. 503 was enacted by then President Corazon
C. Aquino to govern and ensure the efficient transfer of responsibilities to the local government unit concerned.
Thus, Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the Local
Government Code. Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to
take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head.

DISOMANGCOP VS. SEC. OF DPWH

FACTS: Sections 1 and 15, Article X mandate the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," was enacted and signed into law. The law called for the holding of a plebiscite.
However, only 4 provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu
and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In accordance with R.A.
6734, then President Corazon Aquino issued in 1990, E.O. 426, placing the control and supervision of the DPWH within
the ARMM under the Autonomous Regional Government. Nine years later, DPWH Secretary Vigilar issued D.O. 119
creating Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and
facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. Later, then President Estrada approved
and signed into law R.A. 8999 establishing an engineering district in the first district of the Province of Lanao Del Sur.
Congress later passed R.A. 9054. R.A. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi also
voted to join ARMM. R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.Petitioners
Disomangcop and Dimalotang addressed a petition to then DPWH Secretary Datumanong, seeking the revocation of D.O.
119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are constitutional.

RULING: R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are unconstitutional. The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented by E.O. 426,
devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time) to the
Regional Government. By creating an office with previously devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in essence, sought to amend
R.A. 6074. The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been
previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. Barely 2 months after R.A. 8999 was
enacted, Congress passed R.A. 9054, the second ARMM Organic Act, where it reaffirmed the devolution of the DPWH in
ARMM, including Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, to the Regional Government and effectively repealed R.A. 8999.
On the other hand, D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure
projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The office created under D.O. 119,
having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. The
department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O.
119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing
the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the
DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their
ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124. With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it
necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts. With the repeal of R.A.
8999 and the functus officio state of D.O. 119, respondents are ordered to desist from implementing R.A. 8990 and D.O.
119.

KIDA VS. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: The case involves consolidated motions assailing the decision of the Supreme Court in upholding the
constitutionality of RA 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the
regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which were scheduled to be held on the
second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President's power to appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these position ns upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local
elections.

RULING: The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local
elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the
intention can be inferred from the provisions of Article XVIII of the Constitution. The fact that the ARMM elections were
not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to
mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. The ARMM as political
units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category
of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in
autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.

BORACAY FOUNDATION VS PROVINCE OF AKLAN

FACTS: Petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (petitioner) is a duly registered, non-stock domestic corporation. Its primary
purpose is "to foster a united, concerted and environment-conscious development of Boracay Island, thereby preserving
and maintaining its culture, natural beauty... and ecological balance, marking the island as the crown jewel of Philippine
tourism, a prime tourist destination in Asia and the whole world." Respondent Province of Aklan (respondent Province) is a
political subdivision of the government created pursuant to Republic Act No. 1414, represented by Honorable Carlito S.
Marquez, the Provincial Governor (Governor Marquez). In June 2006, the President of the Philippines issued Executive
Order No. 543, delegating the power "to approve reclamation projects to PRA through its governing Board, subject to
compliance with existing laws and rules and further subject to the condition that reclamation contracts to be executed with
any person or entity (must) go through... public bidding."

ISSUES: Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing
this case

Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and regulations

RULING: Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies and even to observe the
hierarchy of courts Section 6. Appeal .Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the ECC / CNC applications may, within
15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal on the following grounds: The DENR may adopt alternative
conflict/dispute resolution procedures as a means to settle grievances between proponents and aggrieved parties to avert
unnecessary legal action. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced. We do not agree with respondents' appreciation of
the applicability of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case. Petitioner had no other plain, speedy, or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised
here that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus it was justified in coming to this Court.

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.

DOCTRINE: The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not because the local government has control
over such project, but because the local government has the duty to protect its constituents and their stake in the
implementation of the project.

FACTS: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an
IFMA. PICOP initially sought to comply with the requirement under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code to
procure prior approval of the Sanggunians concerned. However, only one of the many provinces affected approved the
issuance of an IFMA. PICOP nevertheless submitted to the DENR the purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del
Sur indorsing the approval of PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion. PICOP filed a petition for MANDAMUS against
DENR Sec Alvarez for refusing to sign and execute the IFMA contract.

ISSUE: Whether PICOP complied with the LGC requirement of obtaining prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned by
submitting a purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOP’s application for IFMA
conversion.

RULING: NO. This cannot be deemed sufficient compliance with the foregoing provision. Surigao del Sur is not the only
province affected by the area covered by the proposed IFMA. The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by
law, not because the local government has control over such project, but because the local government has the duty to
protect its constituents and their stake in the implementation of the project. Again, Section 26 states that it applies to projects
that "may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, and loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest
cover, and extinction of animal or plant species." The local government should thus represent the communities in such area,
the very people who will be affected by flooding, landslides or even climatic change if the project is not properly regulated,
and who likewise have a stake in the resources in the area, and deserve to be adequately compensated when these
resources are exploited. Indeed, it would be absurd to claim that the project must first be devolved to the local government
before the requirement of the national government seeking approval from the local government can be applied.

PROVINCE OF RIZAL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environment, parts of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a
Sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications. The petitioners opposed the implementation of said order since the
creation of dump site under the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constituents. More so, that the
dump site is to be constructed in Watershed reservation. Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of
Province of Rizal and Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of President Estrada
in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened. A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raise the
question that the project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it into
consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the
Dumpsite’s permanent closure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San
Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project.

RULING: The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."
Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No. 635, which was
passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years
earlier, on 10 October 1991. Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by
government authorities ans the prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Paño,
Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national government
projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular community
Implementing the project. Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can
be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.

Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal.

LINA JR. V. PAÑO

FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro,
Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet but was denied by the. The ground for said denial was an ordinance
passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on
September 18, 1995. As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent asked the RTC Laguna
among others an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

RULING: The Petition is denied. The Court ruled that the ordinance merely states the “objection” of the council to said game.
It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid
ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local
government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views
which may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not
mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting
the operation of lotto. In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances
and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not
contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.

ANDAYA V. RTC

FACTS: There was a vacancy in the position of chief of police in Cebu. The regional director of the Cebu police Andaya
submitted a list of 5 eligible appointees to the position to the mayor of Cebu. However, the mayor refused to appoint one
because he wanted a certain Sarmiento, who was not on the list due to being disqualified. RTC ruled in favor of the mayor,
granting the appointment of Sarmiento.

ISSUE: Whether the mayor can require the Regional Director to include the mayor’s protégé in the list?

RULING: NO. The mayor has only the power to choose from the list. It it’s the prerogative of the regional director of the
police to choose the eligible person who should be included in the list without intervention from local executives – based on
the National Police Commission (NPC) memorandum, which provides the qualifications of a chief of police. In case of
disagreement, the issue should be elevated to the regional director of the NPC who shall resolve the issue within 5 working
days. The authority of the mayor is limited, no power to appoint but basically power to choose from the list. The purpose is
to enhance professionalism and isolate police service from political domination.

CARPIO VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar assailed the constitutionality of the RA No. 6975 entitled ‘AN ACT
ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOACAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, as he averred that it only interferes with the control power
of the president. He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting
its power to “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom
the NPC and the PNP were placed and that the system of letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine
the power of the president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its power of control overt the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA NO. 6975.

RULING: No. the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control
over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will
have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly
exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices
under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

MMDA vs BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION

FACTS: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air
Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-
Air Village. On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December
22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.

ISSUES: Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?

Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of subdivision roads to
public traffic?

RULING: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative in nature.
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No.
7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess
legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal
and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan
transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the
opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general
welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CITY OF DAVAO

FACTS: Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City
Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau however, was denied on the ground that the proposed
project was within an environmentally critical area; that the City of Davao must first undergo the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a petition for
mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and the latter ruled in favor of respondent.

ISSUE: WON the LGU’s are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one which requires an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)

RULING: No.Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that “no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such
declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by
the President or his duly authorized representative." We note that LGU’s are juridical persons. HOWEVER, after
consideration of the evidence finding Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally critical area neither being a critical
project. The said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area. Consequently,
the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of
which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.

NAPOCOR VS. CITY OF CABANATUAN

FACTS: NPC, a GOCC, created under CA 120 as amended, selling electric power, was assessed by the City of Cabanatuan
for franchise tax pursuant to sec. 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92. NPC refused to pay the tax assessment on the grounds that
the City of Cabanatuan has no authority to impose tax on government entities and also that it is exempted as a non-profit
organization. For its part, the City government alleged that NPC’s exemption from local taxes has been repealed by sec.
193 of RA 7160.
ISSUE: Is the NAPOCOR excluded from the coverage of the franchise tax simply because its stocks are wholly owned by
the National Government and its charter characterized is as a ‘non-profit organization’?
Is the NAPOCOR’s exemption from all forms of taxes repealed by the provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC)?
RULING: (1) NO. To stress, a franchise tax is imposed based not on the ownership but on the exercise by the corporation
of a privilege to do business. The taxable entity is the corporation which exercises the franchise, and not the individual
stockholders. By virtue of its charter, petitioner was created as a separate and distinct entity from the National Government.
It can sue and be sued under its own name, and can exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Code.To
be sure, the ownership by the National Government of its entire capital stock does not necessarily imply that petitioner is
no engage in business.
(2) YES. One of the most significant provisions of the LGC is the removal of the blanket exclusion of instrumentalities and
agencies of the National Government from the coverage of local taxation. Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose
taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits an
exception, i.e. when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose taxes, fees, or charges on the
aforementioned entities. The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing laws or charter is clearly
manifested by the language used on Sec. 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such exemption subject only to the
exceptions enumerated. Since it would be tedious and impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing
for special tax exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such exemptions or
privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been used.

FERNANDO VS ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE

FACTS: Respondent SSC’s property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence. Marikina City enacted an ordinance
which provides that walls and fences shall not be built within a five-meter allowance between the front monument line and
the building line of an establishment. The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
demolish, replace, and move back the fence. As a response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina.
The RTC granted the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari.
ISSUE: Is Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback, a valid exercise of police power?
RULING: No. “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.” Two tests have been used by
the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites: (1) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real intent of the setback
requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the public and not for the exclusive use of respondents. This
prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and “un-neighborliness” due to the walls and fences, the parking area is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of these goals. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be
unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the exercise of police power is not valid.

GANCAYAO VS. QUEZON CITY

FACTS: The Quezon City Council issued an ordinance requiring the construction of arcades for commercial buildings to be
constructed in zones designated as business zones. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as
an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes. Gancayco sought the exemption from the application
of the ordinance which was granted by the City Council subject to the condition that upon notice, the owner shall demolish
the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands. Decades after, the MMDA conducted
operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA pursuant to Metro Manila Council's Resolution which authorizes
the MMDA and local government units to "clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public
places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions." After 15 days from the notice of demolition sent Justice
Gancayao, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall or "wing walls" of the ground floor structure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance issued by the City Council is constitutional.

RULING: The ordinance is constitutional. To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, it must first be
determined whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Police power is the power vested by the Constitution in
the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. Police power is lodged primarily
in the National Legislature. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents
can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. It is clear that Congress
expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police power by virtue of Section 12 (oo) of Republic Act
No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City.

In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned
ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of
their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades
provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon
City. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business
zone along EDSA. Hence, there was a valid exercise of police power on the part of the Quezon City Council in the issuance
of the subject ordinance which makes the said ordinance constitutional.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO.

FACTS: Pursuant to the recommendation of the MMDA of a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system,
President Arroyo issued the E.O. no. 179. The said E.O. designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.

ISSUE: Whether or not the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

RULING: The assailed E.O. constitutes an unreasonable exercise of police power. The authority of the President in
implementing the Project is derived from E.O. No. 125 which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of
legislative powers, reorganizing the then Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications. Under E.O.
No. 125, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one
subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project,
must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency
of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra
vires. Furthermore, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents' terminals not only because no authority to
implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because the elimination
of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure - that the police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.

ROMEO EDU VS. HON. VICENTE ERICTA

FACTS: Galo, on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed a case before the Court of First Instance assailing the validity
of the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause and the
Administrative Order No. 2 issued by Edu for the enforcement of the law be nullified for being contrary to the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Reflector Law and the Administrative Order are valid.

RULING: The Court sustained the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation
thereof. In reading the Reflector Law, it is obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power
to promote public safety. With regard to the Administrative Order, it is a fundamental principle owing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government,
subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated
is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them. Edu, as Land Transportation
Commissioner, clearly has the power to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality the
fundamental purpose of the Reflector Law.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR.

FACTS: Social Justice Society, et. al., sought to compel Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027. The subject ordinance reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are
the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies.

ISSUE: Whether or not the enactment of the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
RULING: Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power.
Local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites are
met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted
"for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare" of the residents of
Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in
case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined
in the ordinance from industrial to commercial. Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only
what the interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary, for the Sanggunian was in the best position
to determine the needs of its constituents.

CITY OF MANILA vs. PERFECTO LAGUIO, JR.

FACTS: Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although
duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. The City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance prohibiting the
establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in
the Ermita-Malate area. Such ordinance was approved by Mayor Lim. MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and
improperly included MTDC's Victoria Court considering that this is not an establishment for "amusement" or "entertainment"
and not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they
"disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community."

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING: The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional
limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case
at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant
to general laws. The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a
constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the
Constitution.

Ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy
two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.
That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that
the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only
by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Bantangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct,
install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to
charge its subscribers the maximum rates specied therein, "provided that any increase of rates shall be subject to the
approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner increased its subscriber rates without the Sanggunian's approval. As
a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.

ISSUE: Whether or not a local government unit can regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its
territorial jurisdiction.

RULING: A local government unit cannot. President Marcos and President Aquino, in the exercise of their legislative power,
issued presidential issuances for the reinforcement of NTC's power. It also clear that E.O. 436 mandated that the regulation
and supervision of the CATV industry shall remain vested "solely" in the NTC. Like any other enterprise, CATV operation
may be regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. This is primarily because the
CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. But, while the Court recognizes the LGUs' power under
the general welfare clause, Resolution No. 210 was not sustained. The said resolution violates the mandate of existing laws
and the State's deregulation policy over the CATV industry. Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation
of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation
of the said law. It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of
the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be
invalid. Furthermore, when the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. To rule otherwise is
to render the State's policy ineffective. Being mere creatures of the State, LGUs cannot defeat national policies through
enactments of contrary measures. Verily, in the case at bar, petitioner may increase its subscriber rates without respondents'
approval.

RURAL BANK OF MAKATI, INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI

FACTS: Atty. Valero, then the municipal attorney of the Municipality of Makati, upon request of the municipal treasurer, went
to the Rural Bank of Makati to inquire about the bank's payments of taxes and fees to the municipality. He was informed,
however, by Landicho, corporate secretary of the bank, that the bank was exempt from paying taxes under Republic Act
No. 720, as amended. The Municipality of Makati filed cases against the bank for non-payment of taxes and mayor's permit
fee. While said cases were pending with the municipal court, respondent municipality ordered the closure of the bank. This
prompted petitioners to pay, under protest, the mayor's permit fee and the annual fixed tax

ISSUE: Whether or not the closure of the bank is valid.

RULING: The Executive Order issued by then President Corazon Aquino is one proof that petitioner bank cannot claim any
exemption from payment of business taxes and permit fees. The Court finds that the bank was not engaged in any illegal
or immoral activities to warrant its outright closure. The appropriate remedies to enforce payment of delinquent taxes or
fees are provided for in Section 62 of the Local Tax Code. Said Section 62 did not provide for closure. Moreover, the order
of closure violated petitioner's right to due process, considering that the records show that the bank exercised good faith
and presented what it thought was a valid and legal justification for not paying the required taxes and fees. The violation of
a municipal ordinance does not empower a municipal mayor to avail of extrajudicial remedies. 29 It should have observed
due process before ordering the bank's closure.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. vs. JAC LINER, INC.

FACTS: JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, assailed City
Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise
of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
These ordinances grant an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to one entity
for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the subject ordinances.

RULING: The City of Lucena did not properly exercise its police power. As with the State, the local government may be
considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. The questioned
ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving trac congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public
interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.
As to the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod, bus terminals per se do not impede or help impede
the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner,
can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals
lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside
the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same
denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.

TAYABAN Y CALIPLIP vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial governor Benjamin Cappleman for the construction of the Tinoc
Public Market which was subsequently approved. Pugong won the bidding contract for the construction of the said public
market. Actual construction of the public market was commenced. However, the constructors erected structures not on the
site identified by the Sanggunian. Thus, pursuant to Resolution No. 20, Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some
men, proceeded to the construction site and demolished the structures and improvements introduced thereon. As a result,
Pugong filed an Affidavit-Complaint against herein petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the demolition is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING: The Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the subject demolition is a valid exercise of police power.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an
act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
derogation of a common right. 42 In the present case, the acts of petitioner have been established as a violation of law,
particularly of the provisions of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC. vs. E.M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC.

FACTS: At the core of the controversy are several parcels of unirrigated land originally owned by the Manila Golf and
Country Club. The property was acquired by the respondent EMRASON in 1965 for the purpose of developing the same
into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes". In May, 1972, E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for an
authority to convert and development its aforementioned property into a residential subdivision which was approved by the
Municipal Council by passing Ordinance No. 29-A. Later, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution.
Then came the Aquino government's plan to convert the tenanted neighboring property of the National Development
Company (NDC) into an industrial estate. Part of the overall conversion package called for providing the tenant-farmers,
opting to remain at the NDC property, with 3 hectares each. However, the size of the NDC property was insufficient. Thus,
to address this commitment, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was thus tasked with acquiring additional lands
from the nearby areas. The DAR earmarked for this purpose the subject property of EMRASON.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper exercise of police power on the part of the Municipal Council in converting the
property of EMRASON into a residential subdivision.

RULING: There was proper exercise of police power. The regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective
territorial jurisdiction through zoning and reclassification is an exercise of police power. The police power is a governmental
function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims,
"Sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas" and "Salus populi est suprema lex" Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations.
Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature
which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express
delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation. Under Section 7 of BP 337, "every
local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and
maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
It cannot be said that the power to reclassify agricultural land was first delegated to the city and municipal legislative bodies
under Section 26 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Said provision only articulates a power of local legislatures, which,
previously, had only been implied or inferred. Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential land by virtue
of Resolution No. 29-A, it is no longer agricultural land by the time the CARL took effect and is, therefore, exempt from the
CARP.

HEIRS OF LUNA V. AFABLE

FACTS: Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land in Oriental Mindoro wherein 100.2856 hectares of the landholding
was subjected to compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) through Notice of
Land Valuation and Acquisition. Respondents were identified by the DAR as qualified farmer-beneficiaries. Petitioners filed
before the DARAB a Petition for “Cancellation of CLOAs, Revocation of Notice and Valuation and Acquisition and Upholding
and Affirming the Classification of Subject Property and Declaring the same outside the purview of RA No. 6657.” The
petition was anchored mainly on the reclassification of the land in question into a light intensity industrial zone pursuant to
Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series of 1981, enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan, thereby excluding the same from the
coverage of the agrarian law.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of the Municipal Ordinance No. 21 was a valid exercise of police power by the local
government

RULING: YES. The regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective territorial jurisdiction through zoning and
reclassification is an exercise of police power. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses
is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of the locality. Ordinance
No. 21 was issued pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 2264 (the Local Autonomy Act of 1959) and is, consequently, a valid
exercise of police power by the local government. It is undeniable that the local governments have the power to reclassify
agricultural into non-agricultural lands. Section 3 of RA No. 2264 specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. By virtue of
a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction
into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of the needs. It may, therefore, be
reasonably presumed that when the city and municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an area or
district in their cities or municipalities as residential, commercial, or industrial zone pursuant to the power granted to them,
they were at the same time reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the
implementation of and compliance with their zoning ordinances.

PEREZ V SPS MADRONA

FACTS: Respondents are registered owners of a residential property in Marikina City and in 1989, they built their house
thereon and enclosed it with a concrete fence and steel gate. In 1999, they received a letter from petitioner, the Chief of the
Marikina Demolition Office to remove the structure allegedly protruding to the sidewalk. The petitioners replied that the letter
(1) contained an accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him and his property without due process; (2) has no
basis and authority since there is no court order authorizing him to demolish their structure; (3) cited legal bases which do
not expressly give petitioner authority to demolish; and (4) contained a false accusation since their fence did not in fact
extend to the sidewalk. Petitioner likewise contends that the clearing of the sidewalks is an infrastructure project of the
Marikina City Government and cannot be restrained by the courts as provided in PD 1818.

ISSUE: WON the demolition of the perimeter fence and steel gate is valid

RULING: NO. Respondents' fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community. It was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as
correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that respondents' fence indeed
encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but
at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.

ASILO JR V PEOPLE

FACTS: Private Respondent’s late mother and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna entered into a lease contract whereby
the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and store located at the Laguna for the period
of 20 years extendible for another 20 years. The lease contract provided that the they could build firewall on her rented
property which must be at least as high as the store; and in case of modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would
be given preferential rights. A fire razed the public market but the store of the respondent remained intact and stood strong.
The respondent received a letter from the Mayor directing her to demolish her store within five days from notice pursuant to
the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156 and a Memorandum issued by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna in
order to give way for the construction of a new municipal market building. The SB issued a Resolution No. 183 authorizing
the Mayor to demolish the store using legal means. The respondent replied alleging that there is no legal right to demolish
the store in the absence of a court order and that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only the
filing of an appropriate unlawful detainer case against her.

ISSUE: WON the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are enough to justify demolition.

RULING: NO. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals that the Mayor was only authorized to file an unlawful
detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using legal means. Clearly, the act of
demolition without legal order in this case was not among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally
impossible provision. There was a violation of the right to private property of the Spouses Bombasi. The SB Resolutions as
asserted by the defense will not, as already shown, justify demolition of the store without court order. Even if there is already
a writ of execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the court before the
officer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the contested property.

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN V MANDALUYONG CITY

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution authorizing the Mayor to institute
expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguitan. The intended purpose of the expropriation was the
expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center. The Mayor offered to buy his property but the petitioner refused prompting
the Mayor to file a complaint for expropriation. The City of Mandaluyong assumed possession of the subject property by
virtue of a writ of possession issued by RTC. Petitioners assert that the City of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated
power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of RA 7160 and not by means of resolution.

ISSUE: WON the City of Mandaluyong validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

RULING: NO. Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to
promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government
to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every
independent government without the necessity for constitutional recognition. Section 19 of the RA 7160 as the basis for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise
of the power of eminent domain.

An examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with the
proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised. Therefore, an ordinance
promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing its local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain is
necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint with the proper court, and not only after the court has determined
the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled.

MASIKIP V PASIG CITY

FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Pasig City. The City of Pasig notifies the petitioner of its
intention to expropriate a portion of her property to be used for the sports development and recreational activities of the
residents of barangay Canigoan pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for expropriation and the RTC granted on the ground that there is a genuine
necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig.

ISSUE: WON the expropriation was valid.

RULING: NO. This Court defined the power of eminent domain as "the right of a government to take and appropriate private
property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a
reasonable compensation therefor." It has also been described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take
private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. The power of eminent
domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units,
other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no
inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain
to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise.

The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be
limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. Applying this standard,
we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's
property.

Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council, the basis for the passage
of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned
that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility.
Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public.

LAGCAO V LABRA

FACTS: Pursuant to a court order, the Province of Cebu executed a final deed of sale in favor of the petitioners however,
when they tried to take possession of the lot, they discovered that it was already occupied by squatters. Petitioners instituted
an ejectment proceeding but when the demolition order was about to be implemented, the Cebu City Mayor request of a
deferment of the order and that the city was still looking for a relocation site. Unfortunately, during the suspension period,
the Sanguninang Panlungsod passed a resolution which identified the said lot as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA
7279. The SP passed an Ordinance which included the lot among the identified sites and they passed Ordinance No. 1843
authorizing the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of the land.

ISSUE: WON the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.

RULING: YES. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160. There are two legal provisions which
limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. Thus, the exercise by LGUs of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA
7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. In this
case, there was no showing at all why petitioners' property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what
necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners'
property as the site of a socialized housing project.

BARDILLON V BRGY MASILI, CALAMBA

FACTS: Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna filed for expropriation proceeding against petitioner Bardillon over Lot 4381-
D in view of providing the barangay a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of the constituents. The MTC issued an
order dismissing the case for lack of interest for failure of the respondents and its counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The
RTC ruled in favor of the expropriation holding that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding. It
issued the writ of possession over the lot. The CA affirmed the RTC, it ruled that it was not barred by res judicata since the
MTC, which dismissed the first complaint had no jurisdiction over the action.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premise.

RULING: The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and specifically
governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local government units, expropriation
is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for
authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance;
and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based
on its current tax declaration. In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had
filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with the
foregoing requisites.

SPS YUSAY V CA

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize
then City Mayor to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the spouses Yusay for the purpose of
developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. The spouses Yusay became alarmed,
and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being
unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.

ISSUE: WON certiorari and prohibition are available to the petitioners under the circumstances.

RULING: Certiorari and Prohibition does not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by the Sanggunian
Panglungsod because it was not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and
enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or
opinion. In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and providing for the expropriation, the
petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of action.

Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no
agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available. Here, however, the remedy
of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
to expropriate the petitioner’s property was issued. As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial
challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint in
the proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding
could be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power
of eminent domain.

CEBU CITY V SPS DEDAMO

FACTS: The petitioner, City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against the spouses Dedamo for the construction
of a public road. Petitioner deposited with Philippine National Bank the amount representing 15% of the fair market value of
the property to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of RA No. 7160.
The parties executed and submitted to the court an agreement wherein they declared that they have partially settled the
case. Part of the said agreement is the court will appoint three commissioners to determine the just compensation of the
lots sought to be expropriated. However, after the determination, the petitioner contends that the just compensation should
be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.

ISSUE: WON the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
RULING: In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual
taking. The petitioner has misread the ruling of the SC in the case of National Power Corp. vs. CA in which they did not
categorically ruled in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. They explicitly
stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property
as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property
as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.

Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of
the filing of the complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law.

ILOILO CITY V LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA

FACTS: The petitioner, the City of Iloilo filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondent Javellana to be
used as school site. The petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had deposited the
amount with PNB an amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation. Sixteen years later, Javella filed an Ex
Parte Motion/Manifestation, where he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the amount allegedly deposited, he
discovered that no such deposit was ever made. Javellana, filed a complaint against the City for Recovery of Possession,
Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages.

ISSUE: Does an order of expropriation become final and what is the correct reckoning point for the determination of just
compensation.

RULING: First, Javellana did not bother to file an appeal from the May 17, 1983 Order which granted petitioners Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession and which authorized petitioner to take immediate possession of the Subject Property. Thus,
it has become final, and the petitioner’s right to expropriate the property for a public use is no longer subject to review.

Second, just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement
of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation
is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.

Lastly, non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated
lot. The SC stress, however, that the City of Iloilo should be held liable for damages for taking private respondents property
without payment of just compensation. In this case, the City of Iloilo should pay with interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of filing until full payment is made plus exemplary damages.

ANTONIO VS. GERONIMO

FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) respondent, who alleged that he
was the registered owner of four (4) lands in Antipolo, Rizal. The defendants therein were the petitioners, who were
occupying the said properties. Private respondent claimed he allowed petitioners to occupy portions of his land without
requiring them to pay rent, on the condition that the latter would immediately vacate the same in the event
that the former would need the premises. However, when private respondent notified the petitioners of his need for the
property, they refused to vacate the land even after demand. Respondent filed a complaint and it was resolved in his favor.
Petitioners were ordered to vacate the area and a motion for writ of demolition was filed by the private respondent which
was later on approved. Lately, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo Rizal passed a resolution authorizing the Mayor of the
town to acquire thru expropriation or purchase the subject properties for public purposes/socialized housing. Though
the writ of demolition had not yet been fully implemented, the demolition proceeded despite said resolutions of the
Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioners filed a motion to stay invoking the Commonwealth Act No. 538 in asking respondent judge
to suspend the action for ejectment in view of the announced expropriation of the subject properties.

ISSUE: WON a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit can suspend the writ of execution and demolition in
an ejectment case.

HELD: Petition DISMISSED. The fundamental precept that underlies this case is that expropriation has no binding legal
effect unless a formal expropriation proceeding has been
instituted. The Sangguniang Bayan, being a local legislative body, may exercise the power to expropriateprivate
properties, subject to the following requisites, all of which must concur: 1).An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative
council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2).The power of eminent domain is exercised for
public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3).There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4).A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the instant case,
no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo, instead were resolutions and it was emphasized in
previous decisions that a local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere
resolution of its lawmaking body. These resolutions cannot partake of a supervening event so as to suspend the writ of
execution in the ejectment proceedings. As to the suspension of ejectment proceedings, the Commonwealth Act No. 538
applies only to cases where there exist actual expropriation proceedings.
There is no dispute that a local government unit possesses the power of eminent domain. But the taking of private
properties is not absolute. The power of
eminentdomain must not be exercised arbitrarily, even if purposed for resolving a criticalproblem such as urban squatting.
The safeguards afforded by law require strict observance.

LUZ YAMANE VS BA LEPANTO

FACTS: In 1998, BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation (Lepanto) received a tax assessment in the amount of P1.6 million
from Luz Yamane, the City Treasurer of Makati, for business taxes. Lepanto protested the assessment as it averred that
Lepanto, as a corporation, is not organized for profit; that it merely exists for the maintenance of the condominium. Yamane
denied the protest. Lepanto then appealed the denial to the RTC of Makati. RTC Makati affirmed the decision of Yamane.
Lepanto then filed a petition for review to CA and CA reversed RTC. Yamane now filed a petition for review under Rule 45
with the Supreme Court. Yamane avers that a.) Lepanto is liable for local taxation because its act of maintaining the
condominium is an activity for profit because the end result of such activity is the betterment of the market value of the
condominium which makes it easier to sell it; that Lepanto is earning profit from fees collected from condominium unit
owners.
ISSUE: Whether or not a RTC deciding an appeal from the decision of a city treasurer on tax protests is exercising original
jurisdiction. Whether or not a condominium corporation organized solely for the maintenance of a condominium is liable for
local taxation.
HELD: 1. Yes. Although the LGC (Section 195) provides that the remedy of the taxpayer whose protest is denied by the
local treasurer is “to appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction” or in this case the RTC (considering the amount of tax
liability is P1.6 million), such appeal when decided by the RTC is still in the exercise of its original jurisdiction and not its
appellate jurisdiction. This is because appellate jurisdiction is defined as the authority of a court higher in rank to re-examine
the final order or judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review. Here, the City Treasurer is
not a lower court. The Supreme Court however clarifies that this ruling is only applicable to similar cases before the passage
of Republic Act 9282 (effective April 2004). Under RA 9282, the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), not CA, exercises exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases whether originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.

2. No. Lepanto was not organized for profit. The fees it was collecting from the condominium unit owners redound to
the owners themselves because the fees collected are being used for the maintenance of the condo. Further, it appears
that the assessment issued by Yamane did not state the legal basis for the tax being imposed on Lepanto – it merely states
that Makati is authorized to collect business taxes under the Local Government Code (LGC) but no other reference specific
reference to specific laws were cited.
NAPOCOR V CITY OF CABANATUAN
PRINCIPLE: TAXATION: The most effective means to raise revenues; LGU's Power of Taxation, exception to Non-
delegation of taxing power; Tax Exemptions, construed strongly against the claimant
FACTS: NPC, a GOCC, created under CA 120 as amended, selling electric power, was assessed by the City of Cabanatuan
for franchise tax pursuant to sec. 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92. NPC refused to pay the tax assessment on the grounds that
the City of Cabanatuan has no authority to impose tax on government entities and also that it is exempted as a non-profit
organization. For its part, the
City government alleged that NPC’s exemption from local taxes has been repealed by sec. 193 of RA 7160.

ISSUE: Whether NPC is liable to pay an annual franchise tax to the City government
HELD: One of the most significant provisions of the LGC is the removal of the blanket exclusion of instrumentalities and
agencies of the national government from the coverage of local taxation. Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose
taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits an
exception, i.e., when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose taxes, fees or charges on the
aforementioned entities. As commonly used, a franchise tax is "a tax on the privilege of transacting business in the state
and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state." It is not levied on the corporation simply for existing as a
corporation, upon its property or its income, but on its exercise of the rights or privileges granted to it by the government.
Hence, a corporation need not pay franchise tax from the time it ceased to do business and exercise its franchise. It is within
this context that the phrase "tax on businesses enjoying a franchise" in section 137 of the LGC should be interpreted and
understood. Verily, to determine whether the petitioner is covered by the franchise tax in question, the following requisites
should concur: (1) that petitioner has a "franchise" in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is
exercising its rights or privileges under this franchise within the territory of the respondent city government. NPC fulfills both
requisites. To stress, a franchise tax is imposed based not on the ownership but on the exercise by the corporation of a
privilege to do business. The taxable entity is the corporation which exercises the franchise, and not the individual
stockholders.

By virtue of its charter, petitioner was created as a separate and distinct entity from the National Government. It can sue
and be sued under its own name, and can exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Code. We also
do not find merit in the petitioner's contention that its tax exemptions under its charter subsist despite the passage of the
LGC. As a rule, tax exemptions are construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be shown to exist clearly and
categorically, and supported by clear legal provisions. In the case at bar, the petitioner's sole refuge is section 13 of Rep.
Act No. 6395 exempting from, among others, "all income taxes, franchise taxes and realty taxes to be paid to the National
Government, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities." It is worth
mentioning that section 192 of the LGC empowers the LGUs, through ordinances duly approved, to grant tax exemptions,
initiatives or reliefs.77 But in enacting section 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92 which imposes an annual franchise tax
"notwithstanding any exemption granted by law or other special law," the respondent city government clearly did not intend
to exempt the petitioner from the coverage thereof. Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise
needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services
essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people.
As this Court observed in the Mactan case, "the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to
government-owned or controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious
tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises." With the added burden of devolution,
it is even more imperative for government entities to share in the requirements of development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying
taxes or other charges due from them.

MICAA VS MARCOS

FACTS: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act 6958. Since the time of
its creation, MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its
Charter. However on 11 October 1994, the Office of the Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the payment of realty taxes on
several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and
unjustified and asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, which puts
limitations on the taxing powers of local government units. The City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax
account, insisting that the MCIAA is a government controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn
by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), and not an instrumentality of the government but
merely a government owned corporation performing proprietary functions. MCIAA paid its tax account “under protest” when
City is about to issue a warrant of levy against the MCIAA’s properties. MCIAA filed a Petition of Declaratory Relief with the
RTC contending that the taxing power of local government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees on an
instrumentality of the national government. It contends that by the nature of its powers and functions, it has the footing of
an agency or instrumentality of the national government; which claim the City rejects. The trial court dismissed the petition,
citing that close reading of the LGC provides the express cancellation and withdrawal of tax exemptions of Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations.

ISSUE: Whether the MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes.

RULING: Tax statutes are construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes
are paid for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes
granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
A claim of exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken.
Taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. However, if the grantee of the exemption is a political subdivision
or instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not apply because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to
reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by the government in the course of its operations. Further, since taxation
is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority.
The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a
mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
MCIAA is a “taxable person” under its Charter (RA 6958), and was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes.
The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person
subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Since Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) expressly
provides that “All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees [sic], executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part of parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.” With that repealing clause in the LGC, the tax exemption provided for in RA 6958 had
been expressly repealed by the provisions of the LGC. Therefore, MCIAA has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties
effective after January 1, 1992 until the present.

PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION vs THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET

FACTS: Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in Tuba, Benguet, which has facilities like
swimming pools, a spa and function halls. In 2005, the Provincial Board of Benguet approved its Revenue Code of 2005.
Section 59, the tax ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools,
bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots." Pelizloy's posits that amusement tax is an ultra vires act. Thus, it filed an
appeal/petition before the Secretary of Justice. Upon the Secretary’s failure to decide on the appeal within sixty days,
Pelizloy filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before the RTC. Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in
violation of the limitation on the taxing powers of local government units under Section 133 (i) of the Local Government
Code, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not
extend to the levy of percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods
or services except as otherwise provided.
The Province of Benguet assailed the that the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 (a) of the
LGC encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots since Article 131 (b) of the LGC
defines "amusement" as "pleasurable diversion and entertainment synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."
RTC rendered a Decision assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction for lack of merit.
Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a proper remedy. However, it gave credence to the Province of
Benguet's assertion that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are encompassed by the
phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 of the LGC.

ISSUE: W/N provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being "amusement places" under the LGC.

HELD: NO. Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. However, provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes
even if amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. The levying of percentage taxes is prohibited "except as otherwise
provided" by the LGC. Section 140 provides such exception. Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces
of amusement taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia,
and other places of amusement." However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not
among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the
determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to these places hinges on whether the phrase
‘other places of amusement’ encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots. Under the
principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of
the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."
Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition: "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the
show or performances.
As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means "a spectacle or display of something, typically an
impressive one"; while ‘performance’ means "an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form of
entertainment." As such, the ordinary definitions of the words ‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only visual engagement
(i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions are
manifested to, and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience. Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools,
bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually
engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or
performances.

CITY OF IRIGA V CAMARINES SUR.

FACTS: Petitioner required casaureco III, an electric cooperative duly registered with the national electrification
administration (NEA) which distributes electricity within City of Iriga and Ricondada area of Cam. Sur. To pay its franchise
and real property taxes for the period of 95-2003, however, refused because it is provisionally registered with the cooperative
devlp. Authority (CDA). Thus, it alleged that it is exempt from the payment of local taxes. The city then filed a collection suit
with the RTC citing its power to tax under LGC and the revenue code of Iriga City. The defense of the respondent included
that the taxes had already prescribed and that it was exempt from payment of local tax because it was then registerd with
CDA The RTC held that the 95-93’ taxes Casureco III had already prescribed under Sec.194 of LGC. But Respondent still
has to pay the franchise tax for 2000-2003 becauuse the “situs of tax is the place where the privilege is exercised”. CA,
rulled in fafvor of Casureco III. held that, respondent is a non-profit entity, not falling within the purview of “businesses
enjoying a franchise” pursuant to sec 137 of LGC, instead, it falls under sec131 of LGC, which provides for a “trade or
commercial activity regualarly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit” thus, the respondent was relieved
from paying taxes.

ISSUE: w/n casureco III is liable to pay the local franchise tax?

HELD: Yes. RA 6938 or “the cooperative code of the Ph” and RA 6939 creating the CDA was enacted, it made possible for
cooperatives to solely register under the CDA and thus reap the benefits under it. Those who choose to remain under PD269
or the NEA shall NOT be entitled to the newer laws privileges. Further developments were brought about upon the effectivity
of the LGC. Sec 193, thereof withdrew tax exemptions or incentives previously enjoyed by “all persons, whether natural or
juridical, incuding governmet owned or controlled corporation EXCEPT local water districts COOPERATIVES duly registerd
under RA 6939, non-stock and nonprofit hospitals and educational insitutions”. This exemption was elaborated on
PHILRECA vs SEC, DILG. The holding here states that only the tax privileges of those registered with the CDA subsist.
Those registered with NEA have already been validly withdrawn

With this, the Court held that Casureco III cannot use PD 269 for its alleged tax exemption. In turn, its provisional registration
with the CDA, which granted its exemption for the payment of local taxes was extended only until May 4, 1992. After this
period, it cannot claim further tax exemption including the subject franchise tax LGU derive its power of taxation from the
constitution itself. Thus, it is undeniable that petitione can impose local taxes. The specific prvisions of the LGC wich prvides
for this are Sec. 137 franchise tax and SEC 151 of Scope of taxing power. Defense of responded to be exempted of
franchise tax because of its nature as a nonprofit cooperative as contemplated in PD269, was not accepted in this court. in
NAPOCOR vs City of Cabanatuan, held “franchise tax is a tax on the privilege of transacting business in the state and
exercising corporate franchises granted by the state” thus the court explained that a business in the state and exercising
corporate franchises granted by the state” thus, Sec.137 of LGC should be interpreted as “not levied on the corporation
simply for existing as a corporation, upon its property or its income. But on its exercise of the rights or privileges granted to
it by the government”. Certainly, CASURECO III satisfies these requirements.

PROVINCE OF CAGAYAN VS LARA (SAYOP!!)

PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION vs CA

FACTS: On July 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment from the CIR for the
paymentof deficiency amusement tax in the amount of P5, 864,260.84 (including 75%surcharge and 25% interest for
2 years). The petitioner contested the assessment but it was denied by the CIR. The Court of Tax Appeals also dismissed
the subsequent petition of PBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the CTA so the petitioner filed this petition for
certiorari. Petitioner’s arguments: Jurisdiction to collect amusement taxes of PBA is vested with the local government and
not the national government. It argues that they should be included in the enumeration provided by Section 13 of the Local
Tax Code of 1973. Commissioner’s issuance of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 8-88
-- both upholding the authority of the local government to collect amusement taxes -- should bind the government or that, if
there is any revocation or modification of said rule, the same should operate prospectively. Income from the cession of
streamer and advertising spaces to VEI should not be subject to amusement taxes In case they are made liable to pay the
deficiency amusement tax, they should not be charged with the 75% surcharge.

ISSUES:

1. WON the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games a local tax –NO

2. WON BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR RMC No. 8-88 binds the government – NO

3. WON income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI is subject to amusement taxes – YES

4. WON the petitioner should be charged with amusement tax – YES

HELD: 1.Sec 13 of the Local Tax Code indicates that the province can only impose a
taxon admission from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other
places of amusement. The authority to tax professional basketball games is not therein included, **YOU MAY NOT
INCLUDE THIS** as the same is expressly embraced in PD 1959, which amended PD 1456, wherein it is clear that
the "proprietor, lessee or operator of. . . professional basketball games" is required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to
fifteen per centum (15%) of their gross receipts to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment isa national tax. While
Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other places of amusement", professional basketball games are definitely
not within its scope. Under the principle of ejusdem generis. In determining the meaning of the phrase "other places of
amusement", one must refer to the prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic
expression as their common characteristic.

Professional basketball games do not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses
as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming. Also, a historical
analysis of pertinent laws does reveal the legislative intent to place professional basketball games within the ambit of a
national tax. Previous laws (PD 871 by PD 1456 and PD 1959) shows are cognition that the amusement tax on professional
basketball games is a national, and not a local, tax.)

2. Commissioner’s issuance of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR Memorandum Circular No. 8-88, both upholding the authority
of the local government to collect amusement taxes cannot bind the government. The government cannot be never be in
estoppels, particularly in matters involving tax. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the
law by public officers do not preclude subsequent correct application of the statute, and that the Government is never
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.

3. PD 1456 provides that for the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts’ embraces all the receipts of the
proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. That definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the
cession of advertising and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of
the amusement place.

4. The issue on the payment of surcharge was never posed as an issue before the respondent court so it must necessarily
fail
SMART COMMUNICATIOSN VS MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR

FACTS: Smart constructed a telecommunications tower within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality. The construction
of the tower was for the purpose of receiving and transmitting cellular communications within the covered area. Municipality
passed Ordinance No. 18, series of 2003, entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special Projects."
Thereafter, Smart received from the Permit and Licensing Division of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality an
assessment letter with a schedule of payment for the smart telecom towers which they failed to pay Municipality caused the
posting of a closure notice to the towers. Smart protested, claims: lack of due process. And challenge ordinance no.18.
RTC held: partly grant smarts appeal/petition. the trial court declared valid the assessment starting 1 October 2003, citing
Article 4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in relation to the provisions of Ordinance No. 18 and Section 166 of Republic
Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Smart petition for review, Court of Tax Appeals HELD: denied
MR, CTA en bank: denied second MR. Ground lack of jurisdiction where the constitutionality of a law or rule is challenge.
hence this petition.

ISSUE: w/n CTA en banc decisions erred and should have exercised its jurisdiction and declared the ordinance illegal. And
respondent has no authority to impose the so called fees on the basis of the void ordinance

Held: **may not include this** (Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that “[e]ach local government unit
shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.” Consistent with this constitutional mandate, the Local
Government Code (LGC) grants the taxing powers to each local government unit. Specifically, Section 142 of the LGC
grants municipalities the power to levy taxes, fees, and charges not otherwise levied by provinces. Section 143 of the LGC
provides for the scale of taxes on business that may be imposed by municipalities while Section 147 of the same law
provides for the fees and charges that may be imposed by municipalities on business and occupation. The LGC defines the
term “charges” as referring to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property, while the term “fee” means “a
charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity.”)

In this case, the Municipality issued Ordinance No. 18, which is entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of
Special Projects,” to regulate the “placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric,
telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus, and provide for the correction, condemnation or
removal of the same when found to be dangerous, defective or otherwise hazardous to the welfare of the inhabitant[s].” It
was also envisioned to address the foreseen “environmental depredation” to be brought about by these “special projects”
to the Municipality. Pursuant to these objectives, the Municipality imposed fees on various structures, which included
telecommunications towers. As clearly stated in its whereas clauses, the primary purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to
regulate the “placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph
and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus” listed therein, which included petitioner’s
telecommunications tower. Clearly, the purpose of the assailed Ordinance is to regulate the enumerated activities
particularly related to the construction and maintenance of various structures. The fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not
impositions on the building or structure itself; rather, they are impositions on the activity subject of government
regulation, such as the installation and construction of the structures. Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is
to regulate certain construction activities of the identified special projects, which included “cell sites” or telecommunications
towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue–raising.
While the fees may contribute to the revenues of the Municipality, this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed
in Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes. Considering that the fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not in the nature of local taxes, and
petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of the same, the CTA correctly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
PLDT VS DAVAO CITY

FACTS: Petitioner PLDT applied for a Mayors Permit to operate its Davao Metro Exchange but was not granted pending
payment by petitioner of the local franchise tax in the for the first to the fourth quarter of 1999. Petitioner protested the
assessment of the local franchise tax and requested a refund of the franchise tax paid by it for the year 1997 and the first
to the third quarters of 1998, it alleged that it was exempt from the payment of franchise tax based on an opinion of the
Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF). Petitioner justifies its claim of tax exemption and cites sec 23 of R.A. No.
7925, otherwise known as the Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines.

ISSUE: WON after the withdrawal of its exemption by virtue of sec 137 of the LGC, petitioner has again become entitled to
exemption from local franchise tax.

RULING: NO. The term exemption in sec 23 of RA 7925 is too general. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that
legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not merely of a particular provision.
It does not appear that, in approving 23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts
should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we
hold that 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioners franchise so as to entitle it to exemption
from the imposition of local franchise taxes. Consequently, we hold that petitioner is liable to pay local franchise taxes for
the period covering the first to the fourth quarter of 1999 and that it is not entitled to a refund of taxes paid by it for the period
covering the first to the third quarter of 1998.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS STA ROMANA

FACTS: The Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which was undertaking a cement road, needed sufficient gravel and
sand from their source, the Municipality of Luna but its trucks sent to the latter municipality to haul said road construction
materials were allegedly charged unreasonable fees per truck load. The Municipality of San Fernando filed a complaint and
applied for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the Municipality of Luna and its officials and authorized agents, praying
that the defendants be immediately enjoined from preventing plaintiff's truck obtaining road construction materials from Luna
and from levying unreasonable fees. Defendants averred that the license fees collected from the hauling of sand and gravel
excavated are by virtue of an ordinance (Ordinance 1) duly approved by the Municipal Council of defendant municipality in
consonance with its power to tax, and that the fees collected are reasonable, fair and legal.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of Luna has the authority to pass Ordinance No. 1 and impose the license fees in question.

RULING: NO. The issue in this case is governed by Presidential Decree No. 231, enacting a Local Tax Code (for Provinces,
Cities, Municipalities and Barrios which took effect on July 1, 1973. The Section 10 of the Code (as amended) provides:

Sec. 10. Sand and gravel tax. — The province may levy and collect a tax of not exceeding seventy-five centavos per cubic
meter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel earth and other materials extracted from public and private lands of the government
or from the beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks and other public waters within the jurisdiction of the province. The
municipality where the materials are extracted shall share in the proceeds of the tax herein authorized at a rate of
not less than thirty per cent thereof as may be determined by the Provincial Board. The permit to extract the materials
shall be issued by the Director of Mines or his duly authorized representative and the extraction thereof shag be governed
by regulations issued by the Director of Mines. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 426).
Under the provisions of the Local Tax Code, there is no question that the authority to impose the license fees in dispute,
properly belongs to the province concerned and not to the Municipality of Luna which is specifically prohibited under Section
22 of the same Code "from levying taxes, fees and charges that the province or city is authorized to levy in this Code." On
the other hand, the Municipality of San Fernando cannot extract sand and gravel from the Municipality of Luna without
paying the corresponding taxes or fees that may be imposed by the province of La Union.

PALMA DEVT CORP VS MUNICIPALITY OF MALANGAS

FACTS: Petitioner Palma Development Corporation is engaged in milling and selling rice and corn to wholesalers
in Zamboanga City. It uses the municipal port of Malangas,Zamboanga del Sur as transshipment point for its goods. The
port, as well as the surrounding roads leading to it, belong to and are maintained by
the Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. The municipality then passed Municipal Revenue Code No. 09, Series
of 1993, which was subsequently approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur which imposed
service fee for the use of the municipal roads or streets leading to the wharf and to any point along the shorelines within the
jurisdiction of the municipality and for police surveillance on all goods and all equipment harbored or sheltered in the
premises of the wharf and other within the jurisdiction of the municipality. Petitioner contended that under Republic Act No.
7160, municipal governments did not have the authority to tax goods and vehicles that passed through their jurisdictions.

ISSUE: WON the imposition of a service fee for police surveillance on all goods harbored or sheltered in the premises of
the municipal port of Malangas is valid.

RULING: NO. By express language of Sections 153 and 155 of RA No. 7160, local government units, through
their Sanggunian, may prescribe the terms and conditions for the imposition of toll fees or charges for the use of any public
road, pier or wharf funded and constructed by them. A service fee imposed on vehicles using municipal roads leading to
the wharf is thus valid. However, Section 133(e) of RA No. 7160 prohibits the imposition, in the guise of wharfage, of fees -
- as well as all other taxes or charges in any form whatsoever -- on goods or merchandise. It is therefore irrelevant if the
fees imposed are actually for police surveillance on the goods, because any other form of imposition on goods passing
through the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality is clearly prohibited by Section 133(e). Under Section 131(y) of RA No.
7160, wharfage is defined as a fee assessed against the cargo of a vessel engaged in foreign or domestic trade based on
quantity, weight, or measure received and/or discharged by vessel. It is apparent that a wharfage does not lose its basic
character by being labeled as a service fee for police surveillance on all goods.

FIRST PHIL INDUSTRIAL CORP VS CA

FACTS: Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387, as amended, to contract, install and
operate oil pipelines. Petitioner applied for a mayor's permit with the Office of the Mayor of Batangas City in 1995. However,
before the mayor's permit could be issued, the respondent City Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on its
gross receipts for the fiscal year 1993 pursuant to the Local Government Code. Petitioner filed a letter-protest addressed
to the respondent City Treasurer contending that is a pipeline operator with a government concession granted under the
Petroleum Act. It is engaged in the business of transporting petroleum products and as such, is exempt from paying tax on
gross receipts under Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The respondent argued that petitioner cannot be
exempt from taxes under Section 133 (j) of the Local Government Code as said exemption applies only to "transportation
contractors and persons engaged in the transportation by hire and common carriers by air, land and water." Respondents
assert that pipelines are not included in the term "common carrier" which refers solely to ordinary carriers such as trucks,
trains, ships and the like.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is liable to pay tax on gross receipts in its transportation of petroleum business.

RULING: NO. The definition of "common carriers" in the Civil Code makes no distinction as to the means of transporting,
as long as it is by land, water or air. It does not provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be by
motor vehicle. Under the Petroleum Act of the Philippines (Republic Act 387), petitioner is considered a "common
carrier." The Bureau of Internal Revenue likewise considers the petitioner a "common carrier."

Hence, there is no doubt that petitioner is a "common carrier" and, therefore, exempt from the business tax as provided for
in Section 133 (j), of the Local Government Code, to wit:

"Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. - Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the
levy of the following:

xxxxxxxxx

(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code."

PROVINCE OF BULACAN VS CA

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan passed Provincial Ordinance No. 3, known as "An ordinance enacting
the Revenue Code of the Bulacan Province," section 21 of which provides that:

Section 21. Imposition of Tax. There is hereby levied and collected a tax of 10% of the fair market value in the
locality per cubic meter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources, such, but not limited to
 marble, granite, volcanic cinders, basalt, tuff and rock phosphate, extracted from public lands or from beds of seas,
lakes, rivers, streams, creeks and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction.

Pursuant thereto, the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan assessed private respondent Republic Cement Corporation for
extracting limestone, shale and silica from several parcels of private land in the province during the third quarter of 1992
until the second quarter of 1993.

ISSUE: WON Respondent Provincial Treasurer is correct in assessing private respondent tax for extracting limestone, shale
and silica from several parcels of private land in the province.

RULING: NO. A province has no authority to impose taxes on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources
extracted from private lands. The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code are as follows:

Sec. 134. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the province may levy only the
taxes, fees, and charges as provided in this Article.
Sec. 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources. - The province may levy and collect not more than
ten percent (10%) of fair market value in the locality per cubic meter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel, earth, and
other quarry resources, as defined under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, extracted
from public lands or from the beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks, and other public waters within its
territorial jurisdiction.

Petitioners are prohibited from imposing taxes on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted
from private lands. A province may not ordinarily impose taxes on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry
resources, as the same are already taxed under the National Internal Revenue Code. The province can, however,
impose a tax on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted from public land because it is
expressly empowered to do so under the Local Government Code. As to stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry
resources extracted from private land, however, it may not do so, because of the limitation provided by Section 133 of
the Code in relation to Section 151 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CITY OF PARANAQUE

FACTS: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government corporation created by virtue of P.D. No. 1084 to provide a
coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands, and the administration and operation of lands belonging to,
managed and/or operated by, the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development
consistent with public interest. By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas
of Manila Bay, including those located in Parañaque City. Parañaque City Treasurer issued Warrants of Levy on PRA’s
reclaimed properties based on the assessment for delinquent real property for tax years 2001 and 2002.
City of Paranaque argues that since its creation PRA consistently represented itself to be a GOCC. PRA is also a stock
corporation. Section 193 of the LGC of 1991 has withdrawn tax exemption privileges granted to or presently enjoyed by all
persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs.

ISSUE: WON PRA is an incorporated instrumentality of the national government and is, therefore, exempt from payment of
real property tax.

RULING: Yes it is a Government Instrumentality. Being an incorporated government instrumentality, it is exempt from
payment of real property tax. Clearly, respondent has no valid or legal basis in taxing the subject reclaimed lands managed
by PRA. On the other hand, Section 234(a) of the LGC, in relation to its Section 133(o), exempts PRA from paying realty
taxes and protects it from the taxing powers of local government units.

Sections 234(a) and 133(o) of the LGC provide, as follows:

SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax – The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:

(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.
xxxx
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the
levy of the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kinds on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local
government units.
It is clear from Section 234 that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) is exempt from real
property tax unless the beneficial use thereof has been granted to a taxable person. In this case, there is no proof that PRA
granted the beneficial use of the subject reclaimed lands to a taxable entity. There is no showing on record either that PRA
leased the subject reclaimed properties to a private taxable entity.

PHIL PETROLEUM CORP VS MUNICIPALITY OF PILILIA

FACTS: Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC) is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil base
stock which is a petroleum product conducting its business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Pililla. Presidential Decree No. 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code was issued by former President. Marcos
governing the exercise by provinces, cities, municipalities and barrios of their taxing and other revenue-raising powers.
Sections 19 and 19 (a) thereof, provide among others, that the municipality may impose taxes on business, except on those
for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers, importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or
nature, including brewers, distillers, rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits and/or wines in
accordance with the schedule listed therein.

Respondent Municipality of Pililla enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1. Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed
a tax on business, except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code on manufacturers, importers,
or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature.

ISSUE: WON petitioner PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay tax on
business and storage fees and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla based
on Municipal Ordinance No. 1.

RULING: YES. The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present Constitution. To allow the
continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by
mere administrative issuances. Under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only guidelines and limitations that may
be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments. As to the authority of the mayor to waive
payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees, the trial court did not err in holding that "since the power to tax
includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative, it follows that a municipal mayor who is
an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax." The waiver
partakes of the nature of an exemption. It is an ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed instrictissimi
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor. Thus,
in the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver cannot be recognized. As already
stated, it is the law-making body, and not an executive like the mayor, who can make an exemption. Under Section 36 of
the Code, a permit fee like the mayor's permit, shall be required before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any
business or occupation under the provisions of the Code.