Borlongan v.
Pena the buy-bust team to comply with the procedure in the custody of the
FACTS: In a civil case for the recovery of agent’s compensation
against the Urban Bank, the respondent filed his complaint-affidavit
with the Office of the City Prosecutor claiming that the documents
presented by the petitioners were falsified and that they introduced said
documents as evidence before RTC knowing that they are falsified.
The City Prosecutor found probable cause of the crime of Introducing
Falsified Documents under Art. 172 of RPC and the MTCC judge
issued the warrants for the arrest. The petitioners filed an Omnibus
Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrests and/or for
Reinvestigation. They insisted that they were denied due process
because of the non-observance of proper procedure on the preliminary
investigation. The MTCC upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest
and added that they could no longer question the validity of the warrant
since they already posted a bail. That by posting bail, petitioner already
waived their right to assail the validity of the warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: WON the issues raised by the petitioners had already become
moot and academic when they posted bail and were already arraigned.
RULING: NO. The principle that the accused is precluded from
questioning the legality of the arrest after the arraignment is true only
if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without
previously invoking his objections thereto. Herein petitioners filed the
Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrests and/or for
Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds
likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving
their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of their
arraignment, they refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the
issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the court. Thus,
when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was
no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same.
The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert
their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right
to assail their arrest.
People v. Frondozo
FACTS: The respondent was accused in violation of Section 5, Artcle
II of RA No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. The respondent assails the credibility of PO1 Butay (poseur-
buyer) and asserts that the prosecution not only failed to present as
evidence the dispatch book where the serial number of the buy-bust
money was supposedly entered, the prosecution also failed to present
evidence showing that the police officers previously coordinated with
the PDEA regarding the buy-bust operation launched against him.
Further, he doubts the identity of the shabu because it was marked only
after it was turned over and not immediately after seizure as a standard
procedure in anti-narcotics operation.
ISSUE: WON the respondent is guilty
RULING: NO. In this case, the arresting officers failed to strictly
comply with the procedures for the custody and disposition of
confiscated dangerous drugs as prescribed by Rep. Act No. 9165. The
arresting officers did not mark the shabu immediately after they
arrested Frondozo. Further, while there was testimony regarding the
marking of the shabu after it was turned over to the police investigator,
no evidence was presented to prove that the marking thereof was done
in the presence of Frondozo. Also, fatal in the prosecution's case is the
failure of the arresting officers to take a photograph and make an
inventory of the confiscated materials in the presence of Frondozo.
Likewise, there was no mention that any representative from the
media, DOJ or any elected public official had been present during the
inventory or that any of these persons had been required to sign the
copies of the inventory. Clearly, none of the statutory safeguards
mandated by Rep. Act No. 9165 was observed. Hence, the failure of
seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins.
Finally, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty relied upon by the lower courts cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. As a rule, the testimony of police officers who
apprehended Frondozo is accorded full faith and credit because of the
presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. However,
when the performance of their duties is tainted with irregularities, such
presumption is effectively destroyed. All told, the corpus delicti in this
case does not exist.
People v. Ong
FACTS: The two accused, who are Chinese nationals were charged
with violation of Section 15, Article III, in relation to Section 2, Article
I, of RA No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended. (980.50 grams of shabu) The RTC convicted
appellants as charged and imposed on them death penalty.
Respondents insists on their innocence and claim that their guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WON the respondents are guilty
RULING: NO. From the records, it is clear that the appellants only
know Chinese language. The arraignment of appellants violates the
above rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals. Their Certificate of
Arraignment states that they were informed of the accusations against
them. It does not, however, indicate whether the Information was read
in the language or dialect known to them neither does the order of the
RTC disclose compliance with the rule on arraignment. There was the
inability of the respondents to fully or sufficiently comprehend any
other language. Despite the inability, however, the appellants were
arraigned on an Information written in the English language. We again
emphasize that the requirement that the information should be read in
a language or dialect known to the accused is mandatory. It must be
strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The constitutional protection is part of due process.
Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the arraignment.
The prosecution evidence failed to prove that appellants willfully and
unlawfully sold or offered to sell shabu. It is abundantly clear that it
was the Confidential Informant (CI) who made the initial contact,
albeit only through the telephone, with the pusher. SPO1 Gonzales
made no reference to any further discussion of the price and the
quantity of the shabu during his meeting with respondent. When they
met, they just proceeded with the exchange of money and shabu, Since
only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the
acceptance of the offer and the consideration for the offer, we hold that
SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the "poseur-buyer" but merely the
delivery man. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of
shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of the
conviction of the appellants.
People v. Cantalejo
FACTS: The respondent was found guilty for violation of Section 5 of
RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.A buy-bust operation was conducted. Appellant and
his wife testified that the police officers had entered and searched their
house without warrant and on a hunt for shabu. Significantly, the
appellant’s wife also testified that the police officers, belying their
assertions, did not even know who the accused was and whether he
owned the house they had entered.
ISSUE: WON the respondent is guilty
RULING: NO. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence
required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and
must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution
fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may
logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case
the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be
acquitted. Moreover, when the circumstances are capable of two or
more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is consistent
with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with
guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must
acquit. It is worthy of note again that the prosecution did not present
rebuttal evidence.

In addition, the Court finds that the identity of the corpus delicti has
not been sufficiently established. Their testimonies do not definitively
state and nothing on record shows that the procedural requirements of
Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with respect to
custody and disposition of confiscated drugs were complied with.
There was no physical inventory and photograph of the items allegedly
confiscated from appellant. Neither did the police officers offer any
explanation for their failure to observe the rule. All told, the totality of
evidence presented in the instant case does not support appellant's
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, since
the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the offense. Following the constitutional mandate, when
the guilt of the appellant has not been proven with moral certainty, as
in this case, the presumption of innocence prevails and his exoneration
should be granted as a matter of right.

People v. Angus

FACTS: The accused, is a member of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines was convicted of the crime of parricide for killing his
legitimate wife. The accused argues that nobody really saw who killed
the victim or when and how she was killed. He asserts that the
prosecution witnesses merely testified to have last seen his wife alive
on the night when they heard them arguing about a woman and the
following morning his wife was found dead. In which at the appellant’s
bunker, they saw his wife’s body hanging and almost in a kneeling
position.

ISSUE: WON the respondent is guilty

RULING: NO. The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial

evidence in this case constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to the
conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty of
killing his wife. The RTC relied on the testimonies of the respondent’s
companions who heard the appellant and his wife arguing about the
latter's illicit relationship with another woman, which supposedly
proves motive for him to commit the crime. However, granting that
they had an argument on the night before her death, it would be too
much to presume that such an argument would drive appellant to kill
his wife. Clearly, the motive is not convincing.

If at all, the testimonies merely show a suspicion of appellant's

responsibility for the crime. Needless to state, however, suspicion no
matter how strong cannot sway judgment. In the absence of any other
evidence reasonably linking appellant to the crime, evidence of motive
is not sufficient to convict him. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt
will prosper even though the accused's innocence may be doubted, for
a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.