Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Pluto P Press
LONDON • STERLING, VA
TI 00 prelims 7/1/04 11:50 Page iv
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in association with
Transparency International
Otto-Suhr-Allee 97–99, D-10585 Berlin, Germany
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The right of the individual contributors to be identified as the authors of this work has been
asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any
electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photo-
copying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publishers.
Edited by Robin Hodess, Tania Inowlocki, Diana Rodriguez and Toby Wolfe
Contributing editors: Michael Griffin, Aarti Gupta and Rachel Rank
Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report,
including allegations. All information was believed to be correct as of September 2003.
Nevertheless, Transparency International cannot guarantee the accuracy and the completeness
of the contents. Nor can Transparency International accept responsibility for the consequences
of its use for other purposes or in other contexts. Contributions to the Global Corruption Report
2004 by authors external to Transparency International do not necessarily reflect the views of
Transparency International or its national chapters.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Acknowledgements xi
Executive summary 1
1 Introduction 11
Robin Hodess
Transparency International, Where did the money go? 13
Transparency International, Standards on Political Finance and Favours 16
2 Political finance 19
Political money and corruption 19
Marcin Walecki
The challenge of achieving political equality in South Africa 21
Judith February and Hennie van Vuuren
Soft money ‘reform’ in the United States: has anything changed? 25
Michael Johnston
A selection of the year’s legislation on political party governance,
funding and disclosure 28
Transparency International
Political corruption: a global comparison 30
World Economic Forum
Campaign finance reform: is Latin America on the road to transparency? 32
Bruno Wilhelm Speck
Parliamentarians join the fight against corruption 36
Musikari Kombo
Anna Hazare: TI Integrity Awards winner 2003 37
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4 Corporate money 59
The politics of corruption in the arms trade: South Africa’s arms
scandal and the Elf affair 59
Joe Roeber
Political corruption and the politics of procurement 62
Juanita Olaya
The Elf trial: political corruption and the oil industry 67
Nicholas Shaxson
Canada’s rules on lobbying: key loopholes remain 72
Duff Conacher
Following the Enron money trail 74
Larry Noble and Steven Weiss
Dora Akunyili: TI Integrity Awards winner 2003 75
5 Vote buying 76
Vote buying and its implications for democracy: evidence from
Latin America 76
Silke Pfeiffer
Vote buying in Brazil: less of a problem than believed? 78
Claudio Weber Abramo
Vote buying in East Asia 83
Frederic Charles Schaffer
Vote buying at the International Whaling Commission 87
Leslie Busby
9 Introduction 277
Pablo Zoido and Larry Chavis
12 Integrity Index for Public Institutions: measuring corruption risks in Colombia 292
Tranparencia por Colombia
21 Assessing governance in diverse and complex contexts: evidence from India 319
Julius Court
23 The power of information: evidence from public expenditure tracking surveys 326
Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson
Index 349
Acknowledgements
The editors of the Global Corruption Report 2004 (GCR 2004) would like to thank the
many individuals who were instrumental in the development of this year’s report,
above all our authors.
Many thanks are due the countless colleagues across the Transparency International
movement, from the Secretariat in Berlin to national chapters around the world, who
made our challenging task easier with their ideas and advice. TI national chapters
deserve special mention for making a tremendous contribution to our new country
reports.
Outside the TI network, thanks are also due to the many people who voluntarily
devoted their time and energy to referee contributions for the report: Boubacar Issa
Abdourahmane, David Abouem, Muzaffer Ahmed, Daniel Bach, Peter Birle, Roman
Bokeria, Emil Bolongaita, Martin Brusis, Justin Burke, Rowan Callick, Lala Camerer,
Kevin Casas-Zamora, Larry Chavis, Gwenaëlle Le Coustumer, Ian Davis, Kirsty Drew,
Nicola Ehlermann-Cache, Keith Ewing, Aleksandar Fatic, Mark Findlay, Claudio Fuentes,
Arturo Grigsby, Åse Grødeland, Gavin Hayman, Paul Heywood, Paula-Marie Hilde-
brandt, Les Holmes, Karen Hussmann, Paul Ingram, John-Mary Kauzya, Iris Kempe,
Mario Krieger, Gopakumar K. Thampi, Peter Larmour, Alena Ledeneva, Reinoud
Leenders, Jean-Marie Lequesne, Grace Livingstone, Tom Lodge, Joan Lofgren, Xiaobo
Lu, Lora Lumpe, Stephen Ma, Günther Maihold, Maureen Mancuso, Malou Mangahas,
Claudia Matthes, Dana Mesner Andolsek, Wim van Meurs, Roberto de Michele, Arnauld
Miguet, Philippe Montigny, John Mukum Mbaku, Andrew Mwenda, Naison Ngoma,
Dele Olowu, Paul Oquist, Gabriel Ortiz de Zevallos, Simon Osborne, Katarina Ott,
Pierina Pollarolo, Gavin Power, Miroslav Prokopijevic, Niels von Redecker, Roy Reeve,
Roland Rich, Pablo Rodas-Martini, Kety Rostiashvili, Fred Schaffer, Amy Schultz, John
Sfakianakis, Azmi Shuaibi, Krassen Stanchev, Helen Sutch, Aida Suyundueva, Pauline
Tamesis, Justine Thoday, Boyko Todorov, Chris Toensing, Samarth Vaidya, Shyama
Venkateswar, Marites Vitug, Hennie van Vuuren, Laurence Whitehead, Simon Wigley,
Pablo Zoido and Svetlana Zorbić.
Thank you to Barbara Meincke for her special contribution to the section on political
corruption, and to GCR interns William Quiviger and Anne Marie Brady.
We are grateful to our Editorial Advisory Committee for their ongoing commitment
to the Global Corruption Report: Claudio Weber Abramo, Merli Baroudi, Sarah Burd-
Sharps, Kurt Hoffman, Dennis de Jong, John Makumbe, Larry Noble, Devendra Raj
Panday, Elena Panfilova, Michael Pinto-Duschinsky and Augustine Ruzindana.
We thank our publisher, Pluto Press, for their enthusiasm for our publication, and
our external editor, Michael Griffin, for his good humour, patience and talent.
Particular thanks to the London-based Solicitors Pro Bono Group, who arranged for
legal work to be done on our behalf.
Special thanks to the artists whose work we feature in the GCR 2004: Julio Briceño
(‘Rac’), Alex Dimitrov, Fernando Santana, Harley Schwadron and Jonathan Shapiro
(‘Zapiro’).
The Global Corruption Report receives financial support from the Utstein Group,
comprised of the governments of Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.
Translations of the GCR 2004 into French and Spanish have been funded by grants to
Transparency International from the Canadian International Development Agency
and the Ford Foundation, respectively.
Executive summary
The Global Corruption Report 2004 provides an overview of the state of corruption around
the world. It covers national and international developments, institutional and legal
change and activities within both the private sector and civil society for the period from
July 2002 to June 2003. This year the Global Corruption Report focuses on political
corruption. It presents 34 country reports and the latest research on corruption.
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The supply side of political corruption: the role of the private sector
As the source of much of the money that funds political corruption, the corporate
sector has a vital role to play in ending the abuse of power.
Sanctioned secrecy and a lack of price transparency help perpetuate corruption in
the arms trade. The revelation that bribes were paid to secure arms deals led to the
downfall of French and German politicians in the 1990s and continues to take its toll
on officials in South Africa, where a giant defence deal was signed in defiance of the
country’s acute social and economic problems.
The energy sector is another major breeding ground for political corruption. The
flow of oil money is so vast that it can distort decision-making in poor producer countries
and the rich world alike, as the Elf scandal revealed. The larger the oil sector relative
to a country’s economy, the greater the potential for political corruption.
National developments
Public contracting is riddled with corruption, resulting in sub-standard work at inflated
prices. Bulgaria, Senegal and Serbia drafted new procurement legislation in 2002–03.
But in Algeria, where 2,300 people died after houses collapsed during the May 2003
earthquake, the government considered relaxing regulations to speed up reconstruction,
a move likely to encourage corruption – and construction that is structurally unsound.
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Corruption research
New methodologies and lines of research continue to strengthen our understanding
of corruption, and improve ways to measure it. TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2003,
which reflects perceptions of the degree of corruption among public officials and
politicians in 133 countries as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts,
shows that 70 per cent of countries score less than 5 out of a clean score of 10. Surveys
of personal experience of corruption reflect that victims lack trust in public institutions.
Recent research demonstrates that corruption leads to lower capital inflows and lower
productivity. Corruption may deter foreign investors because it is often associated with
a lack of secure property rights as well as bureaucratic red tape and mismanagement.
Surveys of many companies around the world indicate that OECD countries use
undue political pressure to win business advantage – despite legislation that aims to
level the international playing field. Moreover, these surveys point to a widespread
belief that companies from OECD countries use middlemen to circumvent anti-
corruption laws.
Assessments of anti-corruption measures suggest that publishing information is
effective. After the amount of grants awarded to school districts in Uganda was made
public, exposing leakage in educational funding, the level of leakage fell from 80 per
cent in 1995 to 20 per cent in 2001. Gender balance within organisations also affects
corruption, but two studies suggest that the reason may have more to do with organ-
isational dynamics than with gender-specific characteristics.
Surveys from West Africa, South Asia and Peru all suggest that corruption affects
the poor disproportionately. The poor spend more on bribes as a share of income and
their access to public services is severely curtailed by corruption.
Key recommendations
• Governments must enhance legislation on political funding and disclosure. Public
oversight bodies and independent courts must be endowed with adequate resources
and skills and the power to review, investigate and hold offenders accountable.
• Governments must implement adequate conflict of interest legislation, including
laws that regulate the circumstances under which an elected official may hold a
position in the private sector or a state-owned company.
• Candidates and parties should have fair access to the media. Standards for achieving
balanced media coverage of elections must be established, applied and maintained.
• Political parties, candidates and politicians should disclose assets, income and
expenditure to an independent agency. Such information should be presented in
a timely fashion, on an annual basis, as well as before and after elections.
• International financial institutions and bilateral donors must take political
corruption into account when deciding to lend or grant money to governments.
They should establish sensitive criteria to evaluate corruption levels.
• The UN Convention against Corruption must be swiftly ratified and enforced.
• The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention must be strengthened and properly monitored
and enforced. Signatory governments should launch an education campaign to
ensure that businesses know the law and the penalties for breaching it.
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Access to information and political finance reform: promising policy areas for
building transparency
Democracies can no longer tolerate bribery, fraud and dishonesty, especially as such
practices disproportionately hurt the poor. For the past 10 years, Transparency Interna-
tional has helped governments and citizens come to this realisation, in part by spearheading
efforts to inform and educate them about the corrosive effects of political corruption, but
also by developing ways to reduce it. As a member of TI’s Advisory Council, I am pleased
that The Carter Center has had the opportunity to work with many local TI national
chapters, particularly in the Americas.
Like TI, The Carter Center is committed to fostering transparency and preventing
corruption. In countries such as Jamaica, Ecuador and Costa Rica, the Center has helped
governments and civil society organisations develop plans and mechanisms to achieve
these goals. Through our work, we have recognised that corruption is concomitant with
a marked decrease in citizens’ satisfaction with democratic institutions.
In our experience there are two policy reforms that hold the most promise for reducing
corruption and promoting citizen confidence in government: development of an access
to information regime and reform of political party and campaign finance systems.
Access to government-held information allows citizens to hold their government
accountable for policy decisions and public expenditures. Informed citizens can more
fully participate in their democracy and more effectively choose their representatives.
Importantly, access to information laws can be used to ensure that basic human rights
are upheld and fundamental needs met, as individuals may request information related
to housing, education and public benefits. Such laws also help government, as they
increase the efficiency and organisation of critical records. Governance is improved, and
the private sector is assured of more transparent investment conditions. Access to information
bridges the gap between state and society as a partnership for transparency unfolds.
The Carter Center’s Americas Program has collaborated with countries in the western
hemisphere as their legislatures seek to pass and implement access to information laws
that meet emerging international standards. We have further assisted civil society organ-
isations as they prepare to use and enforce their new right to information. In Jamaica, we
helped to inform the debate regarding the now approved access to information act and
have continued to provide advice and technical assistance relating to effective imple-
mentation. In Bolivia, we have begun working with the vice-presidency’s new anti-corruption
secretariat to amend its draft access to information bill and engage civil society in the
passage and implementation of this law. We encourage every nation to ensure that citizens
have a right to access information, and The Carter Center stands ready to assist.
Transparency in campaign and party finance is needed to bolster public faith in
democratic institutions, especially political parties and legislatures. Citizens are increasingly
angry and alienated when elected representatives respond to the selfish interests of
campaign donors, instead of to the general public. This trend is evident in Latin America
and the Caribbean, where poverty and inequality persist despite democracy, but public
scepticism about the disproportionate influence of wealthy and corporate donors has
driven campaign finance reform efforts in the United States and Canada as well.
In March 2003, building on the efforts of TI, International IDEA and the Organization
of American States, The Carter Center convened a hemispheric conference to examine
campaign and party finance in the Americas and discuss possible improvements. Informed
by the deliberations of representatives from government, the private sector, the media
and civil society, 10 former presidents and prime ministers from the western hemisphere
reached consensus on principles that should guide campaign and party finance. They
backed a set of objectives and tools stemming from the premise that democratic governance
costs money, and we should be willing to invest in our democracies. Their recommen-
dations emphasised the role of public finance, equitable access to the media, the need
for full and timely disclosure and the importance of effective enforcement.
International organisations such as TI and The Carter Center play an important role in
supporting such governmental, multilateral and civil society initiatives to fight and prevent
corruption. We look forward to continuing together on this path.
Jimmy Carter
former president of the United States of America
Corruption produces human rights violations and affects many lives. When individuals
and families have to pay bribes to access food, housing, property, education, jobs and
the right to participate in the cultural life of a community, basic human rights are clearly
violated. In tackling these ills, therefore, there can be no doubt of the importance of
forging closer ties between those working for human rights and those fighting against
corruption. But it is also clear that to work most effectively together, the question ‘Just
what have human rights to do with corruption?’ is one that needs further reflection.
This link was highlighted for me when, as High Commissioner for Human Rights, I
addressed an audience of parliamentarians in Cambodia in mid-2002 on the issue of
trafficking in people. The parliament was full and many eloquent speeches were made.
I then went to a village to meet representatives of a small NGO. The women had all
escaped from a life of being trafficked as prostitutes and all were HIV positive. They spoke
to me about corruption – of the bribery of officials and the police – and it was corruption
they asked me to talk about at the press conference that was to follow.
As this example shows, corruption hits hardest at the poorest in society, those with
limited or no possibilities to defend themselves. But corruption affects the whole of society
as well. Decisions supposedly taken for the public good are in truth motivated by a desire
for private gain and result in policies and projects that impoverish rather than enrich a
country.
In order for a corrupt system to prevail, numerous other rights are likely to be restricted
in the areas of political participation and access to justice. The need for the corrupt to
protect themselves and their cronies undermines the electoral process, leads to intimidation
and manipulation of the press and compromises the independence of the judiciary in North
and South alike. Especially disturbing is the impunity that covers up so many of these acts.
If human rights are violated by corruption, respect for human rights can be a powerful
tool in fighting corruption.
The Ethical Globalization Initiative (EGI) seeks to work with those who are committed
to bringing the values of international human rights to the tables where decisions about
Executive summary 7
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the global economy are being made. The EGI is driven by the conviction that in order to
build a world in which security is underpinned by sustainable development and social
justice, and where globalisation works to the benefit of all the world’s people, multi-
lateralism and respect for international law – in particular, international human rights law
– are vital.
Essentially, my argument is that the binding human rights framework must become
part of the rules of the road of globalisation. An integral part of this value system is the
rejection of corruption and a commitment to its elimination.
Human rights and anti-corruption activists each have their own methods, actors and
challenges, but they also have much in common. From a human rights perspective, anti-
corruption activities and information can help identify and eliminate barriers to the
enjoyment of human rights. That, in turn, would enable human rights bodies to recommend
better preventive action.
From the anti-corruption perspective, analysing corruption in the light of its impact
on human rights could well strengthen public understanding of the evils of corruption
and lead to a stronger sense of public rejection. In addition, the use of the human rights
legal machinery to raise cases of corruption as human rights violations in public fora
might well bring positive results.
There are a number of ways that we could go forward together. As a starting point, a
clear statement of the interrelationship of the fight against corruption and the promotion
of human rights in a more just world could provide authoritative guidance for us all as
we embark on this joint endeavour.
Mary Robinson
executive director, the Ethical Globalization Initiative
former president of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Part one
Political corruption
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1 Introduction
Robin Hodess1
Introduction 11
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The general public around the world has taken note of political corruption. TI’s
Global Corruption Barometer (see ‘Global Corruption Barometer 2003’, Chapter 11,
page 288), a new instrument that assesses the general public’s experiences of and
attitudes towards corruption, finds that if citizens could wave a magic wand to eliminate
corruption from just one institution, more would choose to clean up political parties
than any other institution. For parties, which play a crucial role in public life in any
democracy, the message is clear: there must be absolute probity of party members and
officials, and parties themselves must clean up their internal practices.
Business people also sense the effects of political corruption. A survey by the World
Economic Forum shows that business people believe that legal donations have a high
impact on politics, that bribery does feature as a regular means of achieving policy
goals in about 20 per cent of countries surveyed, and that illegal political contributions
are standard practice in nearly half of all countries surveyed (see Box 2.4, ‘Political
corruption: a global comparison’, page 30).
Political corruption points to a lack of transparency, but also to related concerns
about equity and justice: corruption feeds the wrongs that deny human rights and
prevent human needs from being met. Former UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights Mary Robinson argues that corruption hinders participation in political life and
proper access to justice (see box ‘Corruption and human rights’, page 7).
The report also evaluates various mechanisms that can curb corruption in politics,
from citizen action to the creation of new international norms and standards, such as
Transparency International’s Standards on Political Finance and Favours (see below).
By focusing on the above topics, the Global Corruption Report addresses particular
weak spots in political life: the abuse of money in the political system by candidates
and political officials; the lack of transparency about money flows in politics; the
potential of the private sector to purchase influence, distorting both the marketplace
and the fair representation of the public interest; the corruption of the electoral process;
and the ways the legal system can affect the ability of states to pursue justice in major
corruption crimes.
12 Political corruption
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Table 1.1 illustrates the scale of the problem of alleged political corruption through
estimates of the funds allegedly embezzled by some of the most notorious leaders of the
last 20 years. To put the figures in context, the right-hand column gives the GDP per capita
of each country.
The 10 leaders in the table are not necessarily the 10 most corrupt leaders of the period
and the estimates of funds allegedly embezzled are extremely approximate. The table is
drawn from respected and widely available sources. In general, very little is known about
the amounts allegedly embezzled by many leaders.
Table 1.1
Sources:
GDP figures: UN Human Development Report 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); IMF Country Report
No. 02/269 (2002).
Suharto: Time Asia, 24 May 1999; Inter Press, 24 June 2003.
Marcos: CNN, February 1998; Time Asia, 24 May 1999; UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Anti-Corruption
Toolkit, version 5, available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption_toolkit.html
Mobutu: UN General Assembly, ‘Global Study on the Transfer of Funds of Illicit Origin, Especially Funds Derived
from Acts of Corruption’, November 2002; Time Asia, 24 May 1999.
Abacha: UNODC, Anti-Corruption Toolkit; BBC News (Britain), 4 September 2000; see also ‘Repatriation of looted
state assets’, Chapter 6, page 100.
Milosevic: Associated Press, 2 December 2000.
Duvalier: Robert Heinl, Nancy Heinl and Michael Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People 1492–1995
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1996); Time Asia, 24 May 1999; UNODC, Anti-Corruption Toolkit; L’Humanité
(France), 11 May 1999.
Fujimori: Office of the Special State Attorney for the Montesinos/Fujimori case, Peru.
Lazarenko: Financial Times (Britain), 14 May 2003; Chicago Tribune (United States), 9 June 2003.
Alemán: BBC News (Britain), 10 September 2002.
Estrada: CNN, 22 April 2001; Inter Press, 24 June 2003.
We chose these areas for a number of reasons. First, the prominence we give to
political finance (whether campaign finance or political party finance) reflects the
fact that often political corruption starts here, with financing. There is a great deal of
concern about the cost of elections in both new and established democracies as well
Introduction 13
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as about the influence of private money on political outcomes and the lack of public
information on the real sources of political funding.
In looking at corrupt forms of political finance, we demystify the topic (see Table
2.1, ‘Major types of political finance-related corruption’, page 20) and expose the legal
and systemic obstacles to cleaning up political finance. Our report presents the pros
and cons of bans, limits, disclosure rules and public funding as remedies to corruption
in political finance – and provides evidence from a number of countries where these
measures are in place.
We then feature one remedy to corrupt political finance – disclosure – that is central
to the philosophy and approach of Transparency International. Disclosure of the flow
of money in politics, whether financing parties or candidates or spent on elections or
on public contracting, is critical. Political finance needs to be accounted for and, above
all, clean. There is very little justification for anything but maximum transparency
about political funds. This emphasis on disclosure tends to be a point of consensus for
politicians and activists alike. Yet the reality of disclosure rules, and their enforcement,
tells a different story – one in which there are numerous ways to limit disclosure.
Enforcement is the linchpin of a successful political finance regime: even the best
laws are valuable only if they are enforced. In nearly every country, enforcement has
proved perhaps the most difficult element to realise in a framework designed to stop
political corruption. Effective enforcement requires appropriate powers of investigation
on the part of the agencies involved, an independent and competent judiciary as well
as the necessary political will. We include reports that look at enforcement in practice,
via various types of sanctions, providing a sense of what works and why.
In addition to evaluating rules for candidates, parties and governments, we also assess
what role the private sector plays in political corruption. We feature experts on the
arms and oil sectors who evaluate recent revelations of political corruption with an eye
to what made corruption possible. We endeavour to analyse current reforms of business
practices, particularly those pursued as a result of civil society efforts.
Political corruption is not limited to political finance. We use this special section
to consider a form of political corruption that affects the election process the world
over: vote buying. Our contributors assess why and how vote buying occurs and how
it changes not only elections and their outcomes, but also the relationship between
elected officials and voters. As a number of other institutions are dedicated to the
assessment of practices such as the rigging of ballots, we decided to focus on vote
buying, a corrupt political practice that has received less systematic analysis.4
To complete this special section, we sought to capture how justice is often difficult
to pursue. Contributors reflect on the use (and abuse) of immunity and laws on conflict
of interest, obstacles to repatriation and the cumbersome process of returning stolen
public assets. In all of the above, contributions focus on the legal hurdles faced by
prosecutors and populations in many alleged crimes of political corruption. They also
detail the way forces of change are emerging at both the international and national levels.
Throughout the section on political corruption, we feature Transparency
International’s 2003 Integrity Awards winners. Many of these individuals – some of whom
paid for their integrity with their lives – demonstrate that it is possible to fight the system,
14 Political corruption
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Introduction 15
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The TI Standards on Political Finance and Favours are based on the values of integrity, equity,
transparency and accountability. They arise out of concern about the influence of money and
favours in politics, which undermines democratic processes and the rule of law. They are
presented against the background of an international commitment to countering corruption
expressed in the UN Convention against Corruption, at this writing due to be adopted in
December 2003, and they are anchored in the global recognition of human rights endorsed
in the Universal Declaration and related conventions.
16 Political corruption
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Introduction 17
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provided the access to information and legal recourse that would enable them to play
a constructive role in the monitoring of political finance.
Political corruption is an abuse of the political system, of trust and of the principles
that make democratic society work. We hope this volume enlivens the policy debate
about political corruption, inspires action and results in positive change. Much remains
to be done to stop political corruption. Through the strength of its network of national
chapters, Transparency International intends to play an active role in constructing the
road ahead.
Notes
1. Robin Hodess edits the Global Corruption Report.
2. The difficulty of defining political corruption has occupied scholars for decades, starting
perhaps with Arnold Heidenheimer’s seminal text, Political Corruption: Readings in
Comparative Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), which offers public
office-centred, public interest-centred and market definitions. The definition above is
necessary to set a framework for this report, and necessarily reductive, so as to provide
a point of departure for the material to follow.
3. Corruption has always existed – but a recent wave of exposure has created a sense that
corruption has increased. Paul Heywood (ed.), Political Corruption (Oxford: Blackwell,
1997).
4. Several organisations (the OSCE, NDI, IFES, Electoral Reform International Services, or
ERIS, and The Carter Center) have established substantial expertise in election monitoring
around the globe, often working in conjunction with in-country partners.
5. Keith Ewing, ‘Corruption in Party Finance: The Case for Global Standards’, Global
Corruption Report 2001 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2001).
6. Existing standards focus more on regulatory control and less on public monitoring. Good
examples of standards include the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers
recommendation (2003–04) on common rules against corruption in the funding of
political parties and electoral campaigns, adopted on 8 April 2003, and The Carter Center’s
‘Principles for Political Financing’, www.cartercenter.org/documents/1487.pdf
7. See www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2001/2001.03.13.nyanga_declaration.html
18 Political corruption
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2 Political finance
Corruption in political finance takes many forms, from the use of donations for personal
enrichment to the abuse of state resources. Marcin Walecki’s essay examines corruption
in political finance and the way it degrades the political process. It also evaluates the
regulations that govern political finance around the globe.
Two contributions explore how corruption in the financing of politics can lead to
differential access to the political system: Judith February and Hennie van Vuuren
consider attempts to level the political playing field in South Africa and Michael
Johnston looks at soft money reform in the United States. The World Economic Forum
presents data on the extent of political corruption around the world.
Transparency International provides a table evaluating the year’s legislative changes
in political party governance, funding and disclosure. Illustrating the breadth of new
legislation in South America, Bruno Wilhelm Speck contributes an overview of political
finance regulation in the region. Finally, Musikari Kombo, a member of the Global
Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption, or GOPAC, shares his perspective
as a politician engaged in the fight against corruption in Kenya.
Money matters for democracy because much of democratic political activity simply could
not occur without it. The misuse of money in politics, particularly when it reflects
corrupt practices, creates major problems for democracies – not least because it threatens
democratic principles of equal justice and fair representation. The public interprets
irregularities in party and campaign finance in a broader context, leading to distrust
of the political institutions and processes.
Political finance is influenced by – and influences – relations between parties,
politicians, party members and the electorate. Problems of political finance lie at the
heart of a public debate on political corruption. Political finance and corruption are
separate notions, but when their valences overlap, the zone of political corruption
emerges.
Just what constitutes corruption in political finance is often unclear. In general,
corrupt political finance involves the improper or unlawful conduct of financial
operations (often by a candidate or a party) for the profit of an individual candidate,
political party or interest group. Table 2.1 provides a typology of corrupt forms of
political finance.
Political finance 19
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Illegal expenditure Voters and A political party or candidate may directly or indirectly
including vote election officials bribe voters and election officials. They may alternatively
buying offer the electorate different kinds of incentives (gifts,
food, alcohol or even short-term employment). Besides
elections, in some parliaments there is an unofficial
market for votes – parliamentarians or councillors might
be paid for votes or for joining different caucuses.
Funding from Candidates and A political party or candidate may accept money from
infamous sources political parties organised crime (such as drug traffickers), terrorist groups
or foreign governments. These groups might even form
their own political parties.
Selling Public servants Contributors may gain rewards in the form of job
appointments, and candidates selections, appointments (ambassadorial, ministerial or
honours or access judicial), decorations or titles of nobility. Money may also
to information be used to buy a seat in parliament or a candidacy.
Abuse of state Public sector Certain state resources, such as money and infrastructure,
resources that are available to office holders may be extensively used
for electioneering. In addition, the political party or
candidate may capture state resources through the
unauthorised channelling of public funding into
companies, organisations or individuals.
Personal Candidates and Candidates may be required to contribute significant
enrichment politicians amounts to a party’s election fund and also to pay for
their individual campaign. Politics then becomes a rich
man’s game and elected representatives accumulate
necessary funds to pay for the next elections by taking a
percentage on secret commissions and accepting bribes.
Demanding contri- Public servants A political party or candidate in need of money may
butions from and public sector impose excises upon office holders, both public and
public servants elected. In some regimes a political party may also force
public servants to become party members and then extort
kickbacks from their salaries for some party expenditures.
Activities Political parties A political party or candidate may accept donations from
disobeying prohibited sources or spend more than the legal ceiling
political finance permits. Violations of disclosure requirements, such as
regulations inaccurate accounting or reporting, or lack of transparent
funding, are often the cause of political scandals.
Political contribu- Private sector One of the motives for political contributions to a political
tions for favours, party or candidate is the possibility of payoffs in the shape
contracts or policy of licences and government contracts. Donations may also
change be given for a governmental policy change or legislation
favourable to a specific interest group.
Forcing private Private sector Extortion, for instance using tax and customs inspections
sector to pay to force entrepreneurs to hand over part of their profits to
‘protection money’ a political party.
Limiting access to Opposition parties Authoritarian regimes with a patrimonial economic
funding for and candidates system and political repression may seriously constrain
opposition parties financial resources available to opposition parties.
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Narrow definitions of political corruption, such as ‘the use of public office for
unauthorised private gain’, do not include many forms of finance-related political
corruption. For example, a senior position in a political party does not in most countries
constitute a ‘public office’ holder. Extra-party actors must also be included in any
discussion of corrupt political finance since they may participate in political competition
in order to shape public policy agendas, to influence legislation or to sway electoral
debates and outcomes.
Moreover, the unfair advantage enjoyed by some parties or candidates in elective
democracies is not only a matter of corruption, since it may result from the unequal
distribution of wealth across the population. A system that prohibits corrupt practices
in the funding of parties and election campaigns does not necessarily promote political
equality (see Box 2.1, ‘The challenge of achieving political equality in South Africa’,
below).
At its heart, the regulation of party funding is a question of political equality. Perhaps the
single moment when all citizens experience equality is when they cast their vote at the
ballot box. A hard-won right in South Africa, this simple democratic act has immense value
to many and is a tangible manifestation of democracy to most. But lack of control over
the private funding of political parties may allow the wealthy to ‘buy’ influence and access
through secret donations, drowning out the citizen’s voice and undermining the equal
value of each person’s vote. Unregulated private money in politics raises the real prospect
that the wealthy will have undue influence on the government’s direction or policy options.
Corrupt payments to political parties to secure a private benefit are found the world
over, but they take on glaring dimensions in democracies plagued by huge income
disparities, such as the United States, Brazil or South Africa. Racial disparities still exist in
South Africa, but analysts are beginning to re-conceptualise what is meant by ‘the two
South African nations’. The one can be characterised as an increasingly multiracial class,
comprising one-third of the population, which owns almost all the property and is socio-
economically dominant, while the ‘other two-thirds’ is drawn from a class that often lives
a hand-to-mouth existence despite being a clear majority of the electorate. Despite the
government’s many efforts to promote development, South Africa represents a microcosm
of globalisation dilemmas – including the challenge of ensuring political equality in a
society with deep socio-economic fault lines.
After nearly 10 years of democracy, the secrecy surrounding the private funding of
political parties has not been pierced because there remains a glaring lacuna in South
African law. There is no law regulating private funding to political parties. The private funding
of political parties remains one of the last ‘legitimate’ avenues by which the private sector,
foreign governments or even criminals can exert indirect influence on public officials.
The Public Funding of Represented Parties Act provides for a certain amount of public
money to fund political parties’ activities ‘equitably’ and ‘proportionately’. But in the
country’s second democratic election in 1999 parties spent 300–500 million rand (US
$40–67 million) on the campaign, of which just 54 million rand (US $7 million) stemmed
from the public purse.
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The funding that fills the gap is raised by private means and is clearly not sourced
proportionally between the majority of the electorate – which remains impoverished –
and large corporations, foreign governments and wealthy private donors. Indeed, since
the political transformation of South Africa in 1994, income inequalities have become further
entrenched. The richest 20 per cent of South Africans receive 66.5 per cent of all income,
while the poorest 20 per cent receive just 2 per cent.1
South Africa’s parliament was recently provided with an opportune moment to reduce
the resulting political inequality: in 2002 the government submitted in parliament an
otherwise innovative piece of legislation, the Prevention of Corruption Bill (see the South
Africa country report, Chapter 8, page 258). However, the bill has so far failed to include
provisions on political party financing, and it remains to be seen whether lawmakers will
now grasp the nettle and address the omission.
Using what legislation is available – the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA)
of 2000 – the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) has requested all political
parties represented in the National Assembly to provide information on the identities of
all private donors since 1994; the amount of the donations; and the date on which they
were given. What happens next will depend on the parties’ responses. The case is
important not only for the use of PAIA but because it may give the high court (and
ultimately the constitutional court) an opportunity to pronounce on whether political
parties are public or private bodies. If it decides they are public bodies, a way to regulate
private funding may be opened. The timing of the court’s decision is crucial since 2004
is an election year.
The challenge is before the legislators and politicians. What is required now is the
political will to achieve the equality of all voters in South Africa’s democracy.
Note
1. Income inequality in South Africa is the eighth highest out of the 125 countries assessed by the
UNDP, Human Development Report 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Nor is corrupt political financing limited to illegal political finance. Illegal political
finance involves the contribution, or use, of money that contravenes existing laws. It
is often assumed that a political act is corrupt when it violates the legal standards of
behaviour, but the definition is simultaneously too narrow and too broad in scope: some
illegal acts are not necessarily corrupt (the foreign funding of democratic opposition,
such as the Polish Solidarity Trade Union in the 1980s) and some corrupt acts are not
necessarily illegal (campaign contributions from organised crime).
Indeed, the range of definitions of illegal political funding depends on country-
specific regulations, while ‘irregular’ political finance emerges in the gap that exists
between a country’s legal provisions and the reality of its practices. The irregular or
informal political finance system refers to legal contributions from disreputable sources,
or the acceptance of money in exchange for favours.
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transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the World Bank identified ‘illegal
political finance’ as one of six dimensions of the ‘state capture’ phenomenon.7 It found
that approximately one-fifth of all firms surveyed considered themselves to be signif-
icantly or very significantly affected by illegal political donations.8
The survey does not give a complete picture of corrupt political finance, since it
does not consider other forms of irregular political finance, such as misappropriation
of public funds (when a ruling party uses its power to embezzle funds from state-owned
companies, for example) or the abuse of state resources (the use of state employees,
offices and vehicles for campaign purposes).
Most democracies restrict the use of at least some sources of private donations, either
by setting limits or banning them altogether. Worldwide, half of the countries surveyed
ban certain kinds of donations, with bans most prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe
and Latin America (see Table 3.1, page 39).
The regulation of expenditure generally involves restrictions on direct vote buying,
or limitations on the expenditures of parties or individual candidates. Restrictions on
how much parties spend on their activities are based on the assumption that unregulated
political finance denies societies a level playing field in the competition for power. But
certain political environments require special caution: authoritarian regimes impose
strict limits on campaign expenditure that marginalise the opposition and aid the non-
democratic regime by allowing it to exploit resources, such as state-controlled television.
Transparent public funding, if awarded based on objective and fair criteria, is one
option for combating the abuse of state resources and the illegal funding that fuels
corruption in politics. In semi-authoritarian regimes, the absence of public funding starves
the opposition of resources, while the existence of such funding – including indirect
subsidies like state-regulated airtime – limits the opportunities for oligarchs to capture
parties and their policy-making. In all countries, direct public funding relieves parties
of the incessant pressure to raise funds. Public funding is very common in Western
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Europe, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. Yet as scandals worldwide
demonstrate, even substantial public funding is not enough to eliminate other forms
of political finance-related corruption, such as personal enrichment, illegal expenditure
or vote buying.
Box 2.2: Soft money ‘reform’ in the United States: has anything changed?
The need for campaign finance reform has been a dominant corruption issue in the United
States for many years. Opinion polls indicate that a substantial majority think the US
campaign finance system gives excessive influence to big contributors. Reduced voter
turnout and a decrease in trust are both symptoms of an electoral system in trouble.
After being introduced and debated in every Congress since 1995, the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), also known as the McCain-Feingold-Cochran Bill, was
passed in March 2002 and took effect on 6 November 2002 – the day after the mid-term
congressional elections.
Proponents consider the BCRA a significant step toward reducing corruption in politics
by putting an end to soft money and restricting issue advertising. These claims, however,
are questionable since the legislation has already been subjected to legal challenges and
other efforts to circumvent it.
The BCRA bans ‘soft money’ – unlimited contributions channelled through parties
ostensibly for get-out-the-vote and ‘party-building’ activities – as opposed to ‘hard money’
– money donated to registered campaign committees with stricter limits on amounts and
disclosure requirements. Soft money contributions grew rapidly from the late 1980s
onwards.1 While disclosed at the federal level, the soft money given to state party
committees drew much less scrutiny.
A connected concern was the use of funds for ‘issue ads’ – advertisements that escaped
regulation because they advocated points of view on issues, without mentioning candidate
names. To the viewer, however, issue ads were little better than thinly disguised attack ads.
The BCRA’s four main provisions aimed to address these problems.2 They include a total
ban on soft money in federal campaigns, and the requirement that all ‘electioneering com-
munication’ (in effect, most broadcast advertising) within 60 days of a general election
and 30 days of a primary should be paid out of hard money contributions. In effect, the
law bans issue ads during those critical periods.
Limits on individual contributions to campaigns were raised from US $1,000 to US
$2,000 per federal election campaign (one candidate running in one primary or general
election is treated as a campaign). This increase was a welcome change since inflation
had reduced the value of the previous maximum contribution of US $1,000, enacted in
1976, to US $316 in constant dollars, forcing candidates to fund ever more expensive
campaigns with smaller and smaller contributions. Limits on individuals’ total contribu-
tions across a two-year election cycle were also raised, and both the total and the
per-campaign limits were indexed for inflation. Political action committee contribution
limits, by contrast, were neither raised nor indexed.
Finally, a ‘millionaire opponent’ provision applies to House and Senate candidates
whose opponents spend large amounts of their own personal funds – spending that
remains unlimited. Ceilings on individual contributions to those facing such opponents
are raised and limits on party spending on behalf of those candidates are removed as
opponents’ expenditures from personal funds exceed various thresholds.
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The BCRA was hailed as a first and important step towards cleaner politics. Others are
more sceptical, waiting to see whether the soft money ban will be effective at the federal
level, or simply provide new incentives to route it through state and local committees.
Private foundations and think tanks closely allied to – but legally separate from – the
major parties and campaign committees have already emerged to raise and spend
campaign funds without any form of disclosure requirements.
Typical of the complexity of any reform is the concern that any all-hard-money regime,
if realised, will be slanted in favour of incumbents, who find it far easier to raise hard
money (via modest contributions directly to a campaign fund) than challengers. The
restriction on issue ads – already the subject of several first amendment challenges over
the implications for free speech – is also viewed as aiding incumbents, since issue ads are
most often targeted against them. The millionaire opponent provision, which aims to deal
with an obvious unfairness, could also be interpreted as working in favour of the incumbent
since challengers are more likely to spend large amounts from personal resources than
incumbents, who – again – find hard money easy to acquire.
The re-election of incumbents is not necessarily a bad thing. However, from 1980 to
2000, the share of incumbents whose re-election bids were successful ranged between
90.5 and 98.8 per cent, while the proportion winning with at least 60 per cent of the
vote ranged between 65.2 and 88.0 per cent.3 Re-election rates are only somewhat lower
in the Senate.4 Nearly a quarter of House incumbents running in 2000 faced only token
opposition, or none at all.5 There are many reasons for such high re-election rates, but if
the BCRA actually proves to make life more difficult for challengers, it will further tarnish
the quality of political life and make it more difficult to fight corruption at the polls.
The future of several BCRA provisions will remain in doubt until they are resolved in
court. A contradictory bundle of rulings by a special three-judge federal court in May 2003
only set the stage for the real legal battle before the US Supreme Court, which assembled
for a rare one-day special session in September 2003. Ten groups of plaintiffs squared off
against the bill’s powerful backers.
Opponents argued that the soft money and issue ad provisions of the BCRA are wholly
in violation of the Constitution. Proponents held that a compelling public interest in
limiting corruption justified the soft money restrictions, and that the issue advertising ban
would further reduce the role of money in election campaigns. The court’s eventual decision
is difficult to predict, although a group of Supreme Court justices regards political money
as a ‘form of speech’, to be protected by the Constitution like any other. No doubt they
will find it difficult to disentangle the issues raised by the BCRA, raising the possibility that
the 2004 federal election campaigns will get underway in an unsettled legal environment.
Notes
1. In the 1996 election cycle, national party committees raised and spent more than US $250 million
in soft money exempt from federal contribution limits. Committee for Economic Development
(CED), Investing in the People’s Business (New York: CED, 1999).
2. An excellent summary is available from the Campaign Finance Institute at www.cfinst.org/eguide/
update/bcra.html
3. Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann and Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress 2001–2002
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2002). Tables and commentary available online
at www.cfinst.org/studies/vital/3-3.htm
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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Disclosure
Enforcement
Political finance 27
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Mixed developments:
Kenya: The Public Officer Ethics Act of May 2003 requires all public officials, including
members of parliament, to declare their wealth. It does not provide public access to the
information, however, nor does it provide a framework for inspecting declarations.
Uganda: On the positive side, the Leadership Code 2002 requires elected politicians and
senior public officials to declare income and assets or face a penalty, and provides for their
declarations to be made public. Nevertheless, the Political Parties and Organisations Act
2002 bars political parties from campaigning for office, limits their freedom to hold public
meetings and stops them from operating outside the capital. The law’s constitutionality
is still being challenged.
Negative developments:
Azerbaijan: Adopted by referendum in August 2002, a constitutional amendment allows
ordinary courts to close down political parties; formerly, only higher level courts could
ban parties. A second amendment increases the term for official confirmation of election
results from seven to 14 post-election days, which gives incumbents a better opportunity
to falsify results.
Kazakhstan: The July 2002 law on political parties controls donations, but crucially also
increases the number of members required to set up a party from 3,000 to 50,000 people.
As a result the number of parties in existence was reduced from 19 to seven, of which
only one is an opposition party.
Zambia: In March 2003, the president refused to give his assent to the parliamentary
Political Parties Fund Bill, which would have funded political parties in proportion to their
number of members of parliament.
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One formula for greater public control of money in politics requires a comprehen-
sive system of political financing based on three main pillars: (1) full disclosure, (2) an
independent enforcement agency and (3) reasonable public funding.
Disclosure encourages transparency in fundraising and spending. Effective
enforcement requires an independent agency endowed with the necessary powers to
supervise, verify, investigate and, if required, institute legal proceedings. Assuming that
private funding will remain a constant, the regular, adequate funding of parties by the
state provides a guarantee of a diversification of parties’ financial resources and reduces
the possibilities of state capture.
Notes
1. Marcin Walecki is the adviser for political finance at the International Foundation for
Election Systems, or IFES.
2. This typology borrows from Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘Financing Politics: A Global
View’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 4, October 2002.
3. BBC News (Britain), 18 June 2001; Financial Times (Britain), 15 April 2003.
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4. Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and
Mechanisms of Political Corruption (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1999).
5. Author’s interviews with senior politicians, Warsaw and Kiev, 2001.
6. Based on Freedom House categories, which classify countries as ‘consolidated
democracies’, ‘transitional governments’ and ‘consolidated autocracies’. See www.
freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2001/index.htm
7. State capture is defined by Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann as
‘shaping the formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e. laws, rules, decrees and
regulations) through illicit and non-transparent private payments to public officials’.
See www.econ.worldbank.org/ docs/1199.pdf
8. The data comes from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey (BEEPS). See www.worldbank.org
9. Keith D. Ewing, Money, Politics and Law: A Study of Electoral Campaign Finance Reform in
Canada (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
10. Author’s interview with representatives of the Polish ministry of justice and the national
electoral commission, Warsaw, June 2002.
New data gathered by the World Economic Forum (WEF) draws attention to the extent
of political corruption around the world. In October 2003, the WEF published the results
of its 2003 Executive Opinion Survey in the Global Competitiveness Report. The survey,
which aims to obtain information about the economic environment in which firms operate,
asked business leaders in 102 countries about how their own countries compared to
global standards across a range of economic, technological and institutional dimensions.
Worldwide 7,741 firms were surveyed.
Of the more than 100 questions in the 2003 survey, three were intended to assess the
frequency of different forms of political corruption (see Table 2.2).
The first question asked businesses to estimate how commonly firms in their industry
make undocumented extra payments or bribes to influence government policy-making.
Business leaders in only 27 per cent of the countries state that such payments never or
rarely occur in their industry, while business leaders in 17 per cent say such payments are
common or fairly common.
The second question asked business leaders to assess how common illegal donations
to political parties are in their countries. Responses to this question are even more
negative; in only 18 per cent of the countries do business leaders claim that illegal donations
are rare or fairly rare, and these countries include some – such as China and Vietnam –
where the rating may reflect not so much the extent of corruption as the nature of political
parties. Business leaders in 41 per cent of the countries regard illegal donations as common
or fairly common.
The third question asked business leaders to estimate the extent of the direct influence
of legal political donations on policy outcomes in their country. In 89 per cent of the
countries, businesses regard the impact as either moderate or high. The question highlights
how businesses may remain within the law while nevertheless engaging in what may be
regarded as corrupt practices. Business leaders in the United States make a striking claim.
While irregular payments (score 5.1 on a scale from 1 to 7, where 7 indicates low political
corruption) and illegal donations (score 4.8) are perceived to be less common in the
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Table 2.2a
1. Irregular payments in 2. Prevalence of illegal 3. Policy consequences of
government policy-making political donations legal political donations
Low political 27% of the 102 countries 18% of the countries 11% of the countries
corruption (Australia, Austria, Belgium, (Australia, Austria, China, (Denmark, Finland, Hong
(score ≥5) Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, Iceland, Jordan,
Finland, France, Germany, Kong, Iceland, Jordan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore,
Jordan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Tunisia)
Malaysia, Malta, Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden,
New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Tunisia, United
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Kingdom, Vietnam)
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
Tunisia, United Kingdom,
United States)
Medium political 56% of the countries 41% of the countries 69% of the countries
corruption (score (Algeria, Brazil, Bulgaria, (Algeria, Belgium, Botswana, (Algeria, Angola, Australia,
between 3 and 5) Cameroon, Chile, China, Canada, Egypt, El Salvador, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon,
Czech Republic, Egypt, El Gambia, Germany, Greece, Canada, Chad, Chile, China,
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech
Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Republic, Dominican
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Republic, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Estonia, Ethiopia, France,
Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Morocco, Mozambique, Gambia, Germany, Ghana,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Namibia, Pakistan, Poland, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, India,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Portugal, Senegal, Serbia, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Morocco, Mozambique, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea,
Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Peru, Poland, Russian Uganda, United States, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta,
Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Uruguay) Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Mozambique, Namibia,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad Poland, Portugal, Senegal,
and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Sri Lanka, Switzerland,
Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe) Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Turkey, Uganda, United
Kingdom, Uruguay, Vietnam,
Zambia, Zimbabwe)
High political 17% of the countries 41% of the countries 21% of the countries
corruption (Angola, Argentina, (Angola, Argentina, (Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria,
(score ≤3) Bangladesh, Bolivia, Chad, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chad, Guatemala, Honduras,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Madagascar, Nicaragua,
Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Panama, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Philippines, Romania, Russian
Philippines, Romania) Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Federation, Serbia, Slovak
Honduras, India, Jamaica, Republic, Trinidad and
Kenya, Macedonia, Tobago, Ukraine, United
Madagascar, Mauritius, States, Venezuela)
Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovak Republic,
Sri Lanka, Trinidad and
Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine,
Venezuela, Zambia,
Zimbabwe)
Average (median) 4.1 3.25 3.8
score
a In each case, respondents were asked to indicate the extent or impact of a given corrupt practice on a scale from 1 to 7,
where 1 indicates the practice is common or very influential, and 7 indicates the practice is rare or not influential. The table
places countries in three groups for each question: countries with a score of 5 or better (‘low political corruption’), between
3 and 5 (‘medium political corruption’) and 3 or worse (‘high political corruption’).
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United States than the average of the 102 countries, legal donations are perceived to have
a noticeably greater impact on policy outcomes (score 3.0) than average.
While each question addresses a specific type of practice, taken together the questions
may allow a comparison of the extent of political corruption across the world. Eleven
countries are consistently in the ‘low political corruption’ category, and three have an
average score for the three questions of 6.0 or above: Denmark, Finland and Singapore.
In contrast, the ‘high political corruption’ category consistently includes 10 countries, of
which three are in Central America (Guatemala, Honduras and Panama), four in South
America (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay) and three elsewhere (Madagascar,
Philippines and Romania).
Scores cut across the divide between the developed and developing world. Two
developing countries have an average score greater than 5.0 for the three questions:
Jordan and Tunisia. On the other hand, among those countries with an average score less
than 4.0, three are members of the European Union: Greece, Ireland and Italy.
World Economic Forum (www.weforum.org/gcr)
Most Latin American countries have introduced some legislation on party or electoral
finance in the last decade (for an overview see Table 2.3, page 35).2 While some started
with higher standards, most face the task of balancing integrity and equity with the
legitimate demand for resources to finance political competition.
Severe shortfalls in public purses across the region, with their direct impact on
people’s welfare, have made Latin Americans unwilling to grant more resources for
political competition, regardless of evidence demonstrating that some public funding
tends to clean up politics. Although state resources already play a significant role in
some countries, they coexist with only moderate limits on private funding sources.
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Several countries prohibit funding from companies doing business with government,
but the very definition of what this means varies across the region. In Argentina and
Ecuador the law excludes suppliers of public goods and services from making donations,
while Brazil and Paraguay allow donations from these sources, but exclude companies
that depend on public licences (such as broadcasting companies). In the past, legislation
in some countries prohibited donations from any legal entity on the grounds that
democracy serves citizens, not companies. In Brazil, a ban on business donations was
abandoned in 1993 after the investigations that resulted in the impeachment of President
Fernando Collor. Reformers recognised that campaign funding by private companies
was an undeniable reality and concluded that the law must be adapted to be applicable.
Current legislation in South America also bans financing by certain organised social
groups, such as churches, unions, business associations and professional associations.
Bolivia’s law on political parties does not allow contributions from any non-governmental
organisation or religious group. Similar prohibitions are in place in Argentina, Brazil and
Paraguay. Bolivia also specifically bans money from illicit activities or criminal sources.
Argentina has the most complete model for limitations, with restrictions on the size
of individual donations and the total amount of private contributions. These are defined
in relation to the total volume of funds raised by the candidate or party. While Argentina
stipulates that individual donors can contribute up to 1 per cent of the total amount
raised by a party, Bolivia and Ecuador have 10 per cent limits – illustrating the difficulty
of defining a line that distinguishes desirable donations from problematic ones. Brazil’s
particular solution was to set donation caps for legal entities and individuals, based on
corporate or personal wealth, respectively. The caps, apparently, were imposed to protect
business owners from candidates, not candidates from donors.
Similar heterogeneity is found in the amounts defined for caps on individual
donations. While some countries set low absolute amounts, others set them at a
considerable volume. In Paraguay the absolute limit is six times the minimum monthly
salary; in Costa Rica it is 45 times the minimum monthly salary.
Argentina, Colombia and Ecuador have recently developed rules to limit expenditures.
Public subsidies
Public financing has a long tradition in Latin America. Candidates or parties in most
countries receive some direct or indirect public support. But subsidies vary widely in
form and importance. For a long time, state support was limited to free public services,
tax exemption for party activities and other benefits with only minor economic impact.
This symbolic support exists in nearly every country. Cash contributions from the state
to parties were introduced in Costa Rica as early as 1956, but significant cash subsidies
only came about elsewhere after re-democratisation at the end of the 1970s (Ecuador
1978, Argentina 1985, Colombia 1986, Brazil 1995). Public contributions range
tremendously from a few cents to several dollars per voter. Venezuela is the only Latin
American country to have revoked public financing of parties. President Hugo Chávez
withdrew funding in 1997 to cut down the privileges of what he considered a corrupt
political class.
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TI 02 chap01 7/1/04 11:39 Page 34
Brazilian parties are granted free airtime on public and private stations but are
forbidden from buying additional time. Other countries have introduced less compre-
hensive laws on media access: limiting the free time on radio and television to the
electoral campaign period (Paraguay) or providing free access to parties and candidates
only for radio (Argentina) or exclusively for state-owned media (Bolivia). Complement-
ing this effort to provide free media access for all candidates, Brazil and Chile have also
developed laws that limit paid advertising time in private media (see Box 3.2, ‘Media
discounts for politicians: examples from Latin America’, page 49).
Notes
1. Bruno Wilhelm Speck teaches political science at the State University of Campinas, Brazil,
and is director of research at Transparência Brasil.
2. This review of political finance regulation in Latin America is based on research coordinated
by the author for Transparency International – Latin America and the Caribbean. Reports
prepared by national chapters of TI have been complemented by additional research.
The core study is based on nine countries in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela). Additional examples are drawn
from Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay. For more on this research project, see
www.transparency.org/tilac/trabajo_en_red/financiamiento/diagnostico-comperativo.html
34 Political corruption
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Table 2.3: Recent reforms regarding transparency of party and candidate accounts in South
America
Argentina Since 1985, account records within 60 Legislation from 1985 Since 1985, publication
days after the fiscal year and after still provides for the of accounting records of
campaigns. possibility of mass parties and campaigns
In addition, in campaigns, complete collections and the in official gazette. Since
information 10 days prior to and 60 non-disclosure of 2002, posting on the
days after the elections. donors. Since 2002, the Internet has been
identification of required.
donations has been The law requires access
mandatory. by any citizen to the
information.
Bolivia Since 1999, parties have been required Individual identifica- Information is public.
to report on their accounts annually tion of donations.
regarding the source and purpose of
funds.
Brazil Since 1995, balance of party accounts Source and amount of Information on parties
within 120 days after the fiscal year. donations must be is published annually in
Since 1993, reporting on accounts identified individually. official journals.
within 30 days after election. Since 2002, access to
information on
campaign finance on
the Internet.
Chile Since July 2003, parties are required to Since July 2003, Since July 2003,
report monthly to the electoral donations above US information on
authority on large donations received, $500 must be campaign finance must
and must report on accounts 30 days identified. Smaller be made available to
after elections. donations need only be the public on request.
identified if they exceed
20 per cent of total
donations.
Colombia Since 1994, parties must report on Since 1994, donations Information is
accounts annually, and separately on must be identified published.
elections. individually.
Ecuador For parties, since 1978 legislation has Since 2002, complete Information is not
required accounting records, but information on accessible in practice,
oversight refers only to public funds. individual donations. although the law
For elections, since 2000, reporting on requires it to be
accounts within 90 days. available to the public.
Paraguay Since 1990, complete report on both Since 1996, inclusion of No information
party and election accounts. source of donations. published.
Political finance 35
TI 02 chap01 7/1/04 11:39 Page 36
The fight against corruption has to resound in the personal convictions of elected leaders. My
personal conviction and that of other Kenyan politicians led to the establishment in 2001 of
the Kenyan chapter of APNAC. This is an association of members of parliament who are
committed to fighting corruption from the floor of the House and to extending the fight to
all spheres of life in which they are engaged.
Of the original 21 members, 12 were re-elected in the December 2002 general elections,
and the APNAC-Kenya Chapter intends to increase its membership. Of those who were re-elected,
eight are now in the cabinet, following the change of government. As I am now a government
minister, I remain keenly aware that the National Rainbow Coalition government was elected
on an anti-corruption platform. President Kibaki himself is on record as saying that his government
intends to fight corruption ‘from the top’. I cannot agree more.
Prior to the recent election, I served as chairman of Kenya’s first parliamentary select committee
on corruption. The committee did eventually achieve its objectives, in spite of difficulties along
the way. It prepared a ‘list of shame’ that identified specific instances of official corruption and
the individuals who were culpable, but the House voted to delete the names of individuals
from the select committee’s report. The committee’s work also helped re-establish the Kenya
Anti-Corruption Authority, headed first by a politician-cum-businessman and, thereafter, by a
respected high court judge. As happens in many parts of the world, however, the Anti-Corruption
Authority was frustrated by political intrigues aimed at shielding corrupt officials.
Nevertheless, we did not relent. The original bill against corruption, which was drafted by
the select committee, took many forms before it was eventually enacted in May 2003 as the
Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, alongside the Public Officer Ethics Act. The
momentum to enact these two pieces of legislation was sustained by great personal commitment
from members of the APNAC-Kenya Chapter.
We now have a golden opportunity in Kenya to pull out corruption by the roots. It is a
challenge that we have accepted. It is a fight we have every intention of winning.
Musikari Kombo
(minister for regional development, and former chairman of the parliamentary select
committee on corruption, Kenya)
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Anna Hazare (as Kisan Babu Rao is widely known) is a renowned anti-corruption campaigner
in the Indian state of Maharashtra. He has been campaigning for more than 20 years to
end corruption in local government and the forestry industry in his home state.
As a result of Hazare’s efforts, two ministers in the ruling party in Maharashtra resigned
over corruption and the government took legal action against corrupt officials in the
forestry department. Hazare and a team of lawyers now handle corruption cases brought
to their attention by citizens and have submitted more than 700 to the government.
Hazare has suffered personally in his fight against corruption. He was sentenced to
three months in prison in 1998 for defamation in a corruption case against a former state
minister. He was released after more than 125,000 people travelled to his village in protest.
Hazare threatened to ‘fast unto death’ from 9 August 2003 unless appropriate action
was taken to investigate corrupt politicians and officials, including four ministers. Nine
days into his hunger strike, the government finally conceded most of his demands.
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TI 02 chap01 7/1/04 11:39 Page 38
Requirements to disclose the sources of party funding exist on paper in many countries,
but there is much work to be done to ensure that disclosure is practised. Gene Ward
provides an overview of disclosure, examining what it encompasses and where and to
what extent it is effectively practised. A cautionary note is sounded by Marcin Walecki,
who looks at how disclosure may be abused if the authority charged with monitoring
the process is not independent. Kevin Casas-Zamora’s contribution on media subsidies
in Latin America illustrates the complexity of the disclosure task.
Civil society groups have played an important role in achieving increased disclosure.
Transparency International provides three examples of NGO efforts that demonstrate
that disclosure is necessary not only for sources of party funding, but also for candidates’
assets and criminal records.
Besides appropriate disclosure rules, effective enforcement is an essential element
in any successful political finance regime. Yves-Marie Doublet examines how regulation
of political finance is managed in a number of countries. Alonso Lujambio relates the
experience of the leading enforcement agency in Mexico.
More is known about how to build a democracy than how to finance one. Escalating
costs and corruption in democracies should alert all nations to the need for a better
understanding of the role money plays in political processes. Secret money and corruption
hurt the economy and polity of a nation, distorting the behaviour of politicians, stunting
development and weakening citizen confidence in democracy. The perception – and,
perhaps, the reality – is that many elected officials make decisions prompted more by
the need to repay their contributors than to represent their constituents, while lawmakers
bend or break the rules to stay in power and protect their wealthy sponsors. If this is
indeed the case, what has or can be done about it?
Disclosure is one of five different types of effort to control the flows of money in
politics, as seen in Table 3.1. Most countries have some form of public financing of
political parties, yet half still rely on private funds from corporations, trade unions or
foreigners – three sources considered very influential in determining the outcome of
an election and with great potential for corruption. With regard to limits, restrictions
on spending (41 per cent) are more popular than restrictions on contributions (28 per
cent), though the majority of countries practise neither. Disclosure, or what this article
38 Political corruption
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terms ‘full disclosure’ – where the public is informed of ‘who gave how much to whom
for what purpose and when’ – appears to be the least practised of all (13 per cent).2
Public financing 79
Bans and prohibitionsa 50
Spending limits 41
Contribution limits 28
Full disclosure 13
Disclosure is the less polemical measure. This does not necessarily make it more
effective as a control mechanism than limits, bans or prohibitions on money in politics,
but it is an easier reform for which to win legislative support. Evidence for this is
suggested by the number of countries that have passed asset disclosure laws as an
indirect method of combating misuse of money in politics. Asset disclosure begins at
the ‘ethical’ or personal level (opening up to scrutiny what an elected official owns and
owes), but it can be extended to party and institutional levels. The existence of asset
disclosure laws provides a useful indication of a country’s readiness for other forms of
political finance disclosure.
Disclosure builds confidence in the democratic process. In a democracy, the
underlying principle behind disclosure is that the more transparent and open a nation’s
public and political finances, the more its citizens will trust the government. Hidden
or secret methods of funding the electoral process breed scepticism and cynicism about
democratic politics.
Two schools of thought with very different readings of the importance of disclosure
are worth mentioning. One sees a moral equivalence between the ‘secrecy of the ballot’
and the ‘secrecy of a donation’, a position espoused in Sweden and also practised in
Finland and Switzerland, where there are no disclosure requirements. The other school
is concerned about the harassment visited upon political donors when discovered to
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have backed the ‘wrong’ party or candidate, as has happened recently in Ukraine and
Egypt (see Box 3.1, ‘Ukraine: the authoritarian abuse of disclosure’, below). As democracies
mature, however, such incidences decrease and transparency more easily takes root.
Getting transparency codified into law is a critical first step.
In line with most post-communist countries, Ukraine has high disclosure requirements,
including reporting the names of donors to political parties. Yet undeclared funds used
in election campaigns account for 60–90 per cent of the total.1 While there are many
reasons why such large amounts of money go undeclared, the biggest is the fear of
politically motivated harassment. Disclosure can be abused by non-democratic regimes
to deprive the opposition of the right to participate in the electoral process. It provides
information that can be used by partisan enforcement mechanisms (including tax, fire
inspection and police) against opposition parties, their contributors and the independent
media.
There is ample evidence that the main opposition forces in Ukraine were harassed by
the regime during the 1999 presidential elections and the 2002 parliamentary elections,
and subjected to strong administrative restrictions.2 For instance, in the presidential
election, contributors to opposition candidate Oleksander Moroz’s campaign were
requested to report to local state tax inspection branches and explain the sources of their
money, according to local press reports.3 Not surprisingly, most of Moroz’s corporate
donors insisted on full privacy and broke the disclosure laws. After the election, a dozen
small retail companies, whose details had been published in Moroz’s financial report,
were subjected to harassment by different state inspectorates and several were forced into
bankruptcy. Publishing houses such as Migrodinaka and Topografic, which produced
campaign materials for opposition candidates, received similar treatment from adminis-
trative bodies after the election.4
The government of President Leonid Kuchma continued to harass opposition leaders
and their supporters in the run-up to the 2002 parliamentary elections. Opposition activists
were detained and the offices of papers that gave positive coverage to the opposition
campaign were raided on the grounds they had allegedly evaded taxes. For instance, Borys
Feldman, a business partner of former deputy prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, received
a nine-year prison sentence for tax evasion and financial mismanagement.5
The risk that disclosure of financial support to the political opposition might expose
donors to harassment in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes is compounded by
the patrimonial nature of the economic systems in such countries. Those engaged in
economic activity in autocracies are generally linked to the regime, which magnifies the
potential impact of commercial reprisals for supporting opposition parties. This influences
the environment for opposition political parties since it excludes the private sector as an
important transparent funding source for them.
In sum, where enforcement of campaign finance regulations is highly partisan, full
public disclosure may be abused rather than used as an instrument of transparency. Full
disclosure can allow an authoritarian regime to weaken opposition parties by undermining
the financial support of their sympathisers or allied interest groups. For a democracy to
function, a vibrant opposition, able to participate in free and fair elections, needs to exist.
Ukraine has not yet reached this stage of political development and still uses its disclosure
laws to prevent democracy from progressing. In such a system, opposition parties will
continue to need a high degree of privacy and freedom from harassment, while their donors
are forced to remain anonymous.
Marcin Walecki (Oxford University, Britain)
Notes
1. Centre for Forecasting of Socio-Economic and Political Processes, ‘Survey on Shadow Funding of
the Ukrainian Political Parties’, Kiev, January 1999; Anatolij Romaniuk, Parliament, nos 3–4 (Kiev:
Laboratory for Legislative Initiatives, 2003).
2. For a detailed description of physical assaults, political harassment and the administrative restrictions
imposed on opposition parties and their supporters, see OSCE, ‘Ukraine Parliamentary Elections
31 March 2002’, 27 May 2002; US Department of State, ‘Ukraine – Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices 2002’, 31 March 2002; and Razumkov Centre, ‘National Security and Defence
Report’ no. 12, Kiev, USEPS.
3. Tovarysh, no. 33 (August 1999).
4. Interview with Oleksander Moroz, leader of the Socialist Party, Kiev, March 2001.
5. International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 2002 IHF Annual Report, www.ihf-hr.
org/viewbinary/viewdocument.php?doc_id=2654
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11:39
(names of donors,
dates and amounts)
Political Internet Media/NGOs/
parties In-kind contributions Public scholars/
and loans Election Fax Media politicians
(names of donors/ commission/ NGOs empowered to
lenders, dates, Government Photocopy Politicians ‘follow the money’
types and cash agency Scholars
values of products Gazette
Candidates
or services)
More public
Expenditures confidence in
(names of vendors, parties/politicians
dates, purpose and and democracy
amounts)
which are not reported at all. ‘Full disclosure’, the maximum extent of openness in
reporting political contributions, requires information on: how much money a party
and/or a candidate received; how much free in-kind support was given to the party or
candidate (goods, services or loans); the names (and sometimes addresses) of the ‘givers’;
how much money the party or candidate spent during the campaign and on what; and
names (and sometimes addresses) of companies or persons who received the money
spent on goods and services provided to the campaign. Full disclosure also requires
candidates to file financial assets (ownership and debts) as a requirement for running
for office. Also important for full disclosure is the threshold placed on the size of
donations before they have to be reported on a campaign report.
Limited public viewing. A recent survey of 118 countries by the International
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) shows that 17 per cent of them have ‘hidden
disclosure’ and do not show party or candidate financial reports to the public (see Table
3.3).3 Such governments contend that they have disclosure, but this may simply mean
‘for the government’s eyes only’ and not for the public, watchdog NGOs or the media.
A critical question is whether such governments can be trusted not to misuse this
information against opposition parties and their donors.
Misperceptions about disclosure. The fear that legitimate revenues may dry up if
their sources are revealed through new disclosure laws is one of the steepest barriers to
political parties’ and candidates’ appreciation of the value of disclosure and it has
prevented many countries from reforming disclosure laws, or led them to institute
‘hidden disclosure’ rules instead. No research confirms that legitimate revenues to
parties decrease when disclosed. The opposite may, in fact, be true, since money in politics
flourishes in countries where it is most disclosed, as in the United States (see Box 4.3,
‘Following the Enron money trail’, page 74).
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Africa 27 44 33 11 3
The Americas:
North 3 100 100 67 67
Caribbean 12 25 0 25 0
Central 7 29 0 14 0
South 11 73 73 9 27
Europe:
Western 16 81 69 38 56
Eastern 18 89 83 39 67
Asia 15 67 47 53 27
Pacific/Oceania 9 44 33 33 33
With respect to reporting party income and/or expenses, Caribbean and Central
American nations stand out for having no disclosure requirements at all. In Africa,
Pacific/Oceania and Asia, less than half of the countries require such figures to be reported.
With respect to disclosure of candidate income and/or expenses, South America
rates lowest. The rate is also low among African, Central American and Caribbean
nations.
The differences between party and candidate reporting requirements are significant.
In some countries in Africa and the Caribbean, disclosure laws cover political party
funding but exclude any requirement for candidates to disclose. This means that
considerable amounts of money going to, and spent by, candidates remain hidden.
With respect to disclosure of the names of donors to parties, Caribbean and Central
American countries have no such laws and only a handful of countries in Africa do.
These three regions appear to be the bastions of secrecy for money in politics. While
many South American countries require disclosure of party income and/or expenses,
many do not require disclosure of party donor names, and disclosure of candidate
income and/or expenses is very rare.
46 Political corruption
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Notes
1. Gene Ward, PhD, is a senior adviser in political finance at the USAID Office of Democracy
and Governance, United States. The views expressed about the data or about disclosure
in this paper are views of the author and do not represent the views of any organisation
with which the author may be affiliated.
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Box 3.2: Media discounts for politicians: examples from Latin America
There is little question about the crucial role the mass media plays in modern election-
eering. Less clear are its implications for the funding of parties and elections. The narrow
focus on the growth of media expenses in many democracies has obscured other aspects
of the problem that are, arguably, as important from a political finance perspective. Chief
among them is the phenomenon of hefty price discounts granted to parties and candidates
during the campaign season by privately owned media outlets, particularly television
networks. This practice has in many cases given rise to severe electoral inequities, as well
as questionable exchanges between public decision-makers and media owners.
• In Uruguay, the family-controlled groups that have owned the country’s three private
television networks since the 1950s have come to operate, with the acquiescence
of public authorities, as a powerful business cartel. Examples of this were the
government’s 1994 decision to turn Montevideo’s cable television market into a closed
shop jointly controlled by the three private networks, as well as its 2000 ruling
banning the import of satellite television decoders unless done by the existing cable
operators (this decision was later reversed). In exchange, while political actors rarely
pay official advertising rates, discounts offered to factions of the long-ruling Colorado
and National parties during elections reach up to 95 per cent of the price.1 The
impact of these rebates is compounded by the networks’ frequent practice of
condoning campaign debts.2 The main left-wing competitor party, the Broad Front,
has long denounced these practices, deeming them media discrimination.
• In Costa Rica, the legal requirement that media firms publicise their advertising
rates and give equal treatment to all parties does not prevent them from making
donations in kind to specific parties. In the case of the winning party in 1998,
reported party outlays stood at less than one-quarter of the official price of purchased
advertising time, a discount amounting to a net donation of US $1.7 million,
probably the largest contribution by any economic sector in the entire election
cycle.3 The weight of government advertising, and the fact that frequencies are owned
by the state and licensed to private companies for negligible annual fees, are major
incentives for media owners to be generous towards future state authorities.
• In Guatemala, terrestrial television is monopolised by a private operator, Miami-based
Mexican entrepreneur Remigio Angel González. Since the mid-1980s this monopoly
has granted González extraordinary political influence in the country. During the
1999 presidential campaign, González put the weight of his monopoly behind the
candidacy of the eventual winner, Alfonso Portillo, reportedly donating most of his
advertisements.4 In return, according to interpretations in the local press, González’s
son-in-law and legal adviser, Luis Rabbé, was appointed minister of communica-
tions and infrastructure – entrusted with the task of regulating the operation of his
father-in-law’s channels. Rabbé was dismissed in June 2001, following a congres-
sional corruption probe. Despite President Portillo’s commitment to auction two
state-owned television frequencies, González’s monopoly remains intact.5
The evidence that the level of spending on media in some countries is much lower than
previously thought has clear policy implications. The most critical political finance issue
in these countries is not too much expenditure on television but that some parties pay too
little for their publicity and, to varying degrees, become addicted to enormous rate discounts.
This effectively turns media owners into singularly large and powerful political donors.
A number of countries have taken steps to limit the influence of media owners on
elections. Most West European countries, as well as some East Asian countries and Chile
and Brazil in Latin America, ban the purchase of campaign advertising by parties and
candidates. In some cases, the electoral authority buys the advertising from private
channels and then proceeds to distribute it between the parties. Alternatively, the
government may provide advertising slots in the state-owned network (typical of Western
Europe) or private channels may be forced by law to donate airtime, as in Chile. Yet
another route, practised in Canada, is rigorously monitoring in-kind donations, including
TV discounts. Rather than capping television expenditure, it is transparency of the dealings
between parties and media outlets that needs to be secured.
Kevin Casas-Zamora (University of Costa Rica)
Notes
1. Kevin Casas-Zamora, ‘Paying for Democracy in Latin America: Political Finance and State Funding
for Parties in Costa Rica and Uruguay’, University of Oxford, PhD thesis, 2002.
2. Ibid.
3. Figures from Servicios Publicitarios based on expenses reported by parties to the electoral authority.
4. La Prensa Libre (Guatemala), 14 February 2000 and 5 March 2000.
5. In August 2003 González continued to own all the privately owned television networks. His
monopoly has attracted criticism from the OAS and the Inter-American Press Society.
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political party financing. This was largely due to a civil-society monitoring project by TI
Latvia and the Soros Foundation, which uncovered a dramatic increase in the cost of
campaigning, especially on TV and billboard advertising.
The project began monitoring advertisements in January 2002, early enough to provide
the public with information about the cost of elections before voting took place in October.
The project revealed that spending on advertising more than tripled since the 1998
elections. In total, parties spent US $10 million, or about 4 lats (US $7) per voter. This is
10 times more per voter than in the 1997 British general election and just under four times
more per voter than in the 2002 French presidential and Swedish parliamentary elections.1
To meet the target of making information on party expenditure available ahead of the
election, work was done to tighten disclosure laws: it was clear parties would not disclose
if not legally obliged. Parliament was lobbied through a mixture of public roundtables
and media attention. Within six months, in June 2002, the Saeima approved the first
major amendments to the 1995 party finance law.
Now Latvia has one of the fullest disclosure systems in the region. Parties must post all
donations on the Internet within 10 days of receipt and provide a list of all donors’ names.
A monitoring body, the anti-corruption bureau, was given the task of verifying the
declarations. It released its first findings in September 2003, including information about
third-party donations and falsified signatures.
The Alliance of the Latvian Green Party and the Latvian Farmers’ Union were asked to
return about US $120,000 in donations from dubious sources, and criminal charges were
filed in connection with alleged falsified signatures. These donations were identified and
publicised prior to the elections by TI Latvia and Soros.
One of the project’s key objectives was to detect hidden advertising in the media. TI
Latvia and Soros had identified several cases of political advertisements masquerading as
news in the 2001 municipal elections. In 2002 they were joined by 54 NGOs and the
official media monitoring body in urging media owners to abstain from such behaviour.
The situation appeared to improve during the 2002 elections. Most news on TV, radio
and in the newspapers was genuine, though the number of articles marked ‘paid’ increased.
NGOs are now pressing for political advertisements on TV to be restricted, or banned
outright. Although the head of the parliamentary anti-corruption commission supports
the proposal, it faces opposition from stations that do not want to forfeit the lucrative
business.
This allowed PCE to pinpoint precisely when candidates exceeded the ceiling for
campaign expenditure and to request that the national electoral tribunal (TSE) issue a
prohibition against further spending. On 17 September 2002 the TSE announced a ban
on advertising by any party that had exceeded its campaign-expenditure cap and notified
media that they must not air advertisements for the PRIAN and Patriotic Society parties,
since both had exceeded their limits. A large number of media outlets complied with the
order; the TSE is debating what sanctions should be applied to those that did not.
To obtain a complete report on campaign expenditures, PCE asked the TSE for copies
of all reports filed by the presidential candidates and their parties. The TSE is obligated
to provide such reports upon request, since they are considered public information. But
the TSE ruled that the information be deemed confidential until it had finished revising
it and had issued its own report. PCE filed a lawsuit against the decision on the grounds
that it infringed the citizen’s right to information and was unconstitutional.
By mid-2003 the constitutional court had still not issued its judgment, but PCE is
confident it will finally obtain the requested information and be able to present an accurate
portrait of financing and expenditure during the 2002 presidential campaign.
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candidates’ affidavits and previous work records. Transparency International India was
involved in all these activities.
While it is too early to say how effective these efforts will prove, civil society organisa-
tions are optimistic. But the same organisations warn against the possibility of co-option
by branches of government with an interest in undermining certain parties. Monitoring
is therefore essential to ensure that disclosure requirements are uniformly enforced, and
are not used to target opponents. ‘Many of us seeking reform have great respect for the
political process’, said Jayaprakash Narayan of the NGO Lok Satta. ‘We are working hard
to improve, not undermine, democracy.’
Inese Voika (TI Latvia)
Valeria Merino Dirani (Corporación Latinoamericana para el Desarrollo, Ecuador)
Michael Schied (Transparency International)
Notes
1. Valts Kalniņš and Lolita Čiga-ne, ‘On the Road toward a More Honest Society: The Latest Trends
in Anti-Corruption Policy in Latvia’, January 2003, www.lai.lv/9on_the_road_to.doc
2. Elections will be held in Mizoram, Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. The
guidelines issued by the election commission apply in all states.
The field of political finance has witnessed numerous legal developments, but
mechanisms to ensure that legislation is enforced are rarely more than a matter of
formality. Enforcement agencies charged with supervising political party finance often
lack legitimacy and possess only limited investigative powers. They are seldom able to
provide effective checks at the national level, given the constitutional status of parties
and the variety of their sources of funding and expenditure. Despite these restrictions,
however, enforcement bodies are increasingly empowered to control political party
finance in countries around the world. This brief review illustrates what types of
regulatory bodies, investigative approaches and sanctions for violations are employed
in some European and other selected countries.
Methods of investigation
There are generally two levels of control: one by a certified accountancy firm – individually
commissioned and paid by each political party – and one by a regulatory body.
Two chartered accountants from two separate audit offices must certify party accounts
in France. While these accountants adhere to confidentiality principles, they must
inform the party managers of any irregularities they discover.
German auditors may require a party’s executive committee and its representatives
to furnish any information and proof they need to fulfil their assignment. Rather than
assessing or evaluating presented information, the auditors only control it, an approach
difficult to reconcile with the investigative nature of their work.
In Germany the second level of control involves the president of the Bundestag,
who examines statements of party accounts from the formal and legal points of view.
He may call for further information or select another accountant.
In Britain, the election commission is empowered to require an authorised person
to produce books, documents or records relating to the party. The commission may also
authorise an individual to enter the premises of a political party to inspect its books.
In Spain, however, members of the audit office have only limited powers to go beyond
the information provided by political parties, to whom they generally have strong ties.
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In Britain, parties that break the law are liable to a civil penalty; in addition, the
party treasurer also carries criminal liability. Seventy offences are on the books and the
electoral commission may pass a file to the criminal prosecuting authorities. In Italy,
the accounting office has the power to impose a fine for any violations of funding
rules.
In the United States, electoral funding violations are treated as civil infractions and
handled through the Federal Election Commission (FEC) enforcement process. Sanctions
were strengthened in 2002 to a maximum of 300 per cent of the illegal contribution
and up to US $50,000 in fines. Aggravating factors must be on hand for an infraction
to be pursued as a criminal matter: the violation must surpass a monetary threshold
of US $2,000 and have been committed knowingly and wilfully. Despite these provisions,
the FEC has developed a relatively poor reputation for effective law enforcement over
the years.
The most effective sanction is electoral, namely disqualification, or the loss of a
mandate, as is the case for the head of a political party in Québec. In France, candidates
who fail to abide by transparency regulations governing party funding will not be
disqualified unless their campaign accounts are rejected.
Closely related to the development of a sanctions regime is the problem of
determining who should be sanctioned – the politician or the party. One view holds
that activists and party members are not responsible for their leaders’ illegal behaviour.
In most countries, however, candidates are largely shielded from liability, except when
they were actively involved in a particular violation. In Germany, the executive
committee member responsible for the party’s financial affairs is the one who risks
sanctions for wrongdoing. A similar approach was adopted in the United States, where
the committee treasurer – not the candidate – shoulders the burden if illegal contribu-
tions are accepted or reports are filed inaccurately.
Note
1. Yves-Marie Doublet is senior lecturer at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration, France.
The enforcement of regulations governing political party and campaign financing has
proved challenging in Mexico in recent years, first during the democratic transition
phase and now during the period of democratic consolidation. These have been difficult
years because, given the particular problems associated with financing under the post-
revolutionary hegemonic party system, the democratic transition process strengthened
legal controls and, consequently, led to a multitude of enforcement dilemmas. Adding
a further level of complexity, Mexico has 33 party financing laws (32 state laws and
one federal), often with competing jurisdictions.
But while financing regulations may be difficult to enforce, this does not mean
they should not exist. For rules that cannot be verified directly, such as by auditing
reports, there are indirect alternatives, such as the incentives for compliance created
by disclosure and the investigation of subsequent complaints. While the hundreds of
millions of dollars in public funding for campaigns (US $300 million in 2000) is
scrupulously audited, effective enforcement of the ceiling on private donations is much
harder to verify. At the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute, our biggest headaches are
third-party donations and, in the worst cases, double accounting. It is here, where
direct verification is impossible, that disclosing the names of donors and sums involved
can serve as an indirect enforcement mechanism.
In order for disclosure to work, certain conditions must be met. Citizens must be
able to file complaints easily (even anonymously); they should be given access to
simplified regulations; and regulations and caps must be widely known. The specific
mechanism used to publicise the information is also important. It may include reference
to personal documents, for instance, and may vary as to how widely the data is
disseminated.
After analysing the Canadian experience, in late 2002 we published the names and
amounts of all donations to political parties in 2000 on the Internet. In the first few
weeks, the website was consulted hundreds of thousands of times. Afterwards, the
level of interest waned, but not before people had been prompted to file complaints
about false or imprecise information. This, without doubt, will help inhibit future
unlawful acts.
The chain of enforcement is broken, however, when the authority responsible for
compliance lacks tools to carry out an in-depth investigation of alleged illegal acts.
The electoral authority needs to be able to compare statements given by political parties
with information about bank accounts, tax declarations (where applicable) and the
cost of campaign publicity. But in Mexico we have run into difficulties: the electoral
authority’s competence to penetrate bank secrecy norms is under debate. The judicial
branch of government has established that the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute may
have access to bank data. This access currently may only be exercised on a case-by-case
basis, depending on the rulings of the electoral court. It is indispensable to create legal
instruments that acknowledge this faculty.
The lack of access to data from banks, the tax office and private companies limits
the effectiveness of disclosure as an enforcement mechanism. If cash and anonymous
donations are prohibited and all donations must be made by cheque or identifiable
bank transfer and registered in annual tax statements, and all political party income
and expenditure must go through bank accounts, then the electoral authority needs
to be able to analyse that information. Without such necessary evidence, it cannot
sanction wrongdoers and so these cases cannot serve as examples to inhibit future
infractions.
We also run into difficulties when it comes to spending limits. In Latin America,
caps on expenditure are less common than on income. In their absence, we can do little
more than monitor spending (specifically that which leaves a trace, such as spending
on radio and television airtime) and make inferences from this about income. But when
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market rates for radio and television spots vary for the different parties, it is difficult
to extract definitive conclusions from monitoring efforts. The European approach is
to control or eliminate the market completely by providing state airtime for campaign
spots. Chile and Brazil have followed this route. In Mexico, we have opted not to
control the market, but, for now, to make its motivations transparent. In the future we
will publish information on the unit value of every promotional radio or television spot
paid for by political parties so that this might lead to improved transparency and equity
in the treatment the mass media affords political parties.
An additional party financing worry in Latin America is the illegal deviation of
public resources to particular parties and candidates. Given the importance of the issue,
a specialised electoral body, with proper investigative powers, including the power to
access information, is needed to enforce the political party financing law directly. But
even then, the authority would need support. For this, it is vital that congress audit
public spending by the executive branch of government. For it to do so scrupulously,
horizontal accountability, underpinned by a true separation of powers, needs to be
achieved, which in Latin America is a long way off.
Note
1. Alonso Lujambio is electoral councillor and president of the political party finance control
committee and of the committee for international affairs of the general council of the
Mexican Federal Electoral Institute.
António Siba-Siba Macuácua was a senior auditor at the central bank of Mozambique.
He was hurled to his death from the top of the stairwell of Banco Austral on 11
August 2001, while investigating allegations of corruption there. He was just 33.
Two days later, Siba-Siba had been due to submit a report on the financial situation
of Banco Austral, the largest commercial bank in Mozambique. He had been appointed
emergency chair of the privatised bank after it collapsed in April 2001 following
fraud by highly placed people. He attempted to recover bad debts from senior members
of government and in the ruling Frelimo party. He cancelled contracts signed by the
previous board, including one with Nyimpine Chissano, son of President Joaquim
Chissano, who had been paid US $3,000 per month despite his total lack of banking
experience.
The group of prominent Mozambicans who nominated Siba-Siba for the TI award
says his murder ‘was meant to send a signal that organised crime was very much in
control’. His death has been linked to that of Mozambique’s leading journalist Carlos
Cardoso, who was gunned down in November 2000 while investigating corruption
during the privatisation of Banco Austral. His killers were convicted in early 2003.
Siba-Siba’s murder remains unresolved.
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4 Corporate money
Lessons from the South African arms scandal and the Elf affair shed light on the need
to clean up the corrupt dealings between business and politics. Joe Roeber examines
how politicians involved in the arms trade abuse a secrecy they justify on the grounds
of national defence; Nicholas Shaxson explores political corruption in the oil industry
and considers the pros and cons of initiatives such as the Publish What You Pay
campaign.
Juanita Olaya shows that because government contracting involves competing
interests and policy demands, anything less than a transparent selection process lays
the government open to claims of unfairness or even corruption. Duff Conacher homes
in on the narrow divide between legitimate and illegitimate influence in the world of
corporate lobbying. Larry Noble and Steven Weiss illustrate how civil society groups
can monitor this division by exposing the flow of corporate money into politics.
The official arms trade is among the most corrupt of all legal international trades and
one in which governments are inextricably entangled.2 Since governments make the
decision to buy and sell, it is inevitable that corruption in the trade is very often political.
Moreover, governments are often at the root of the problem. While it is difficult enough
to monitor deals in such an opaque market, the government-sanctioned secrecy
surrounding critical aspects of the business actually provides the conditions that allow
corruption to flourish.
Politicians on both sides of an arms deal may be on the take, either as individuals
or recipients of illicit party funding. While importer governments play the role of
customer and paymaster, exporter governments are more involved as promoters of
their industries. Exporter governments have been central players in scandals involving
Germany’s Thyssen, Sweden’s Bofors, France’s Thomson-CSF (now Thales) and Britain’s
BAE Systems. These companies and their supporters prefer to describe as ‘commissions’
what others call bribes. Bribe taking is almost universally proscribed but, until recently
and with the single exception of the United States, bribes were effectively legal in the
countries where the payment originated, provided they were made abroad.3
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The post-cold war arms market is still plagued with overcapacity and the negotiating
position of some manufacturers is weak. European companies, the largest of which are
in Britain and France, struggle in a market dominated by US manufacturers. Companies
of all nationalities use the inducements of bribes, which weaker players see as ‘levelling
the playing field’. They also use ‘offsets’, complex arrangements that help buyers
generate the foreign exchange needed for the transaction. Offsets are opaque, difficult
to monitor and hence an efficient route for corrupt payments.
In the main exporting countries, political corruption tends to be more complicated
and opaque because public intolerance and an independent press add to pressures for
concealment, but also because of the complexity of governments’ reasons for supporting
their arms industries. Governments see such industries as an integral part of their
defence capability, an adjunct to foreign policy, a provider of employment and a tech-
nological research base for the national economy. As a result, exporter governments
curtail public debate, invariably on grounds involving national security. The same
reasons are used to justify government-sanctioned secrecy and the involvement of
intelligence services. But no matter what the initial justification, someone will always
find a way to use it to enrich himself. Britain’s 1996 Scott Report, investigating
government complicity in an embargo-busting scandal that involved the sale of dual-
use equipment to Iraq, was as much as anything else a demonstration of how secrecy
can be abused.4
Political elites and their associates in developing countries can expect to receive life-
changing sums for approving arms purchases, together with those in the military and
civil service who are involved. The payments come in many forms and through many
routes, of which the brown envelope slipped to the man at the top (or, more likely,
payment into an offshore account) is the least likely to emerge into the open. Companies
have taken the techniques of making illegal payments to a high level of sophistication
and politicians have efficient means of self-protection, such as the ability to influence
the bodies that should be investigating them. The recent South African arms deal is
representative.
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In addition, South Africa’s deputy president Jacob Zuma came under investigation
for allegations that he attempted to solicit a bribe from Thomson’s South African head
in return for protecting the company from investigation and giving it his ‘permanent
support’.6 The case was brought to an end when the director of prosecutions, Bulelani
Ngcuka, announced in August 2003 that Zuma would not be charged because, though
there is a strong prima facie case against him, the government could not be sure to win
the case in court. The charges against Schabir Shaikh, a businessman closely involved
with Zuma, spell out in considerable detail just what the evidence is – the money and
other benefits Zuma allegedly received.7 Closely linked to Zuma’s case is that of former
chief whip of the ruling African National Congress, Tony Yengeni. In March 2003, he
was sentenced to four years in prison for fraud related to the tender process involving
an affiliate of the German shareholder in the European Aeronautic Defence and Space
Company. Yengeni appealed.8
Other questions remain unanswered. BAE Systems won a contract for jet trainers
with their venerable Hawk in competition with the cheaper Aermacchi MB339, preferred
by the South African air force, raising questions about the tender process. (Performance
parameters were modified and, when this manipulation did not produce the answer,
the ministers’ committee instructed evaluators to ignore price in the approved value
system.9) The offset arrangements, touted as the crowning triumph of the financing
process and ultimate justification for the deal, have been widely questioned. Sweetheart
deals abound as part of the offset programme, allegedly giving friends of senior politicians
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– and even President Thabo Mbeki’s brother, Moeletsi – a share of the defence pie under
the rubric of ‘black empowerment’.10
One example among many concerns the then minister of defence, the late Joe
Modise, who bought an interest in a company, Conlog, with money lent from Germany
while he was still minister. The company was expected to benefit from the defence
package through black empowerment and the loan was channelled through an account
belonging to the sister-in-law of Chippy Shaikh, the head of procurement in the defence
ministry and brother of the head of the Thomson subsidiary mentioned above. Modise’s
last act as defence minister was to sign the contract to buy submarines from German
shipbuilder HRW before the money had been approved.11
Underlying South African arms procurement are fundamental questions about the
strategic rationale for buying expensive and technically complex systems – specifically
Anglo-Swedish Gripen fighters, British Hawk trainers and state-of-the-art German
frigates for deep-sea operations – to defend South Africa against neighbours that are
no military threat.12 A thorough review process came up with four alternative defence
options costing 4–6 billion rand (US $0.7 billion) but, after many trips to Europe, a hi-
tech package costing 29 billion rand (then US $4.8 billion) finally emerged. With the
cost of financing and a weaker rand, the deal now runs to 66 billion rand (US $9.1 billion)
– and it doesn’t end there.13 The defence ministry is now seeking increased funding
from the treasury to bring the equipment up to operational status.14 In the light of South
Africa’s desperate need for social investment, this would be a major scandal even without
the garnish of corruption. At this late stage, the least we can do is ask what part
corruption played in arriving at this overgrown defence package.
The awarding of contracts after the latest Iraq war brought the interface between politics
and government contracting into sharp focus. Under a recent headline, reading ‘Iraq
deals: secrecy vs. disclosure’, the New York Times observed that ‘executives of publicly traded
companies are wary of complying with regulations to fully disclose significant business
developments for fear of alienating agencies awarding Iraqi contracts’.1
Discussions about political corruption often focus on political party finance and electoral
systems. But there is also ample scope for political corruption in public contracting,
especially when secrecy reigns. One clear case is when political parties and politicians use
government assets (among them public policy, contracts, jobs, state property and immunity)
for their own private benefit. A recent illustration was the arrest in Japan of politician
Suzuki Muneo, who allegedly took bribes from logging companies in exchange for
contracts and tried to influence Japan’s foreign and aid policy to benefit a construction
firm locked in a dispute in Russia.2 Power may also be used to pay back political supporters
or to secure future support. This was an allegation made in relation to the privatisation
auction for Slavneft, Russia’s eighth-largest oil company. One of President Vladimir Putin’s
main financiers and long-time supporters allegedly benefited in the sale.3
Government contracting is often used as a public policy tool. Around 68 per cent of a
national spending budget is given over to contracts4 and governments are usually
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concerned not only with the works on offer, but also with the impact they may have on
local industries, employment or overall expenditure. The fact that various interests are in
play need not be a problem so long as the public interest is paramount and the government
adjudicates between competing claims fairly and transparently. When the contracting
process is not transparent, governments expose themselves to accusations of corruption.
The political dimension of procurement looks starkest in the context of war and post-
war reconstruction. In relation to the first phase of post-war reconstruction in Iraq in
2003, for instance, when talk of the reconstruction preceded the war itself, can one talk
about how transparent and clean the contracting is for the reconstruction process without
referring to the political context and the use of force that created the reconstruction
need? Much has been said about the fact that contracts were awarded to companies that
had made significant contributions to the US Republican Party campaign in a bidding
process that was not open. If there had been fair and open competition for the contracts,
questions about process – and related doubts over their timing, quality and price – would
not now be raised. Good politics and good procurement go hand in hand, with transparency
underpinning both.
The above examples have clear policy implications. First, political party finance laws
must also consider the related issues of conflict of interest and statutes of limitations for
both contractors and government officials. This can help to halt the abuse of privileged
information and power that emerges from the ‘revolving door’ that allows former office
holders to pass directly into senior corporate positions and vice versa. Secondly, corruption
is not a spot market: today’s favour need not be repaid tomorrow, but often several
electoral terms in the future. Therefore, information requirements and control systems
must be fashioned so that they apply over the long term.
Juanita Olaya (Transparency International)
Notes
1. New York Times (US), 12 April 2003.
2. Asia Times (Japan), 5 August 2003; BBC News (Britain), Asia-Pacific, 16 July 2002.
3. Washington Post (US), 25 January 2003.
4. UNPAN Statistical Database, central government expenditures by type and function, as percentage
of all central government expenditure as of 1997 (calculations by author). Resulting figure excludes
expenditure on wages and interest payments from the world average. Differences according to
country development level may arise.
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allegedly paid to induce him to change government policy to permit the sale of frigates
to Taiwan for 14.6 billion francs (US $2.6 billion). Policy was indeed changed and,
according to Dumas himself, the shipbuilder, Thomson-CSF, paid US $500 million in
‘commissions’ to people known to himself and President Mitterrand. In effect, the
court appears to have judged that Dumas, a lawyer to the rich and famous, close friend
of the president, government minister and president of the highest court in France,
had simply been naive.
Investigation of the Taiwan deal has since disappeared from sight, sucked into
arbitration. Meanwhile, some of Dumas’ co-defendants went back to court along with
others, mostly Elf managers, charged with bribing African politicians and helping
themselves on the way.17 Evidence of payments to French politicians was declared a
‘defence secret’ by the government and not allowed into court.
The ramifications of the Elf case wind across the border to Germany, where they
helped to destroy the reputation of ex-chancellor Helmut Kohl. At the heart of the
matter are the ‘commissions’ allegedly paid by Elf to ‘facilitate’ the purchase of the
moribund Leuna refinery in East Germany. According to Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, Elf’s
director general, the company bought the refinery at Mitterrand’s insistence to help
his friend Helmut, whose modus operandi allegedly included buying the allegiance of
the Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) regional agents with money from a party
slush fund. The process that led to the end of Kohl’s long career began with the suggestion
that bribes may have been paid to facilitate the sale of tanks to Saudi Arabia by Thyssen.
South Africa ordered 36 tanks after the 1990 Gulf War in a non-competitive tender
at a cost of 446 million marks (US $223 million), of which half was commissions. It is
reasonable to assume that most of the commission flowed to the princely sponsors of
the deal, as is traditional. But a chunk stayed with middleman Karl-Heinz Schreiber;
some flowed back to Thyssen managers (which is when the German tax authorities
became interested); and a small piece went to the CDU, which is when journalists
perked up and Kohl’s career started to unravel.18
Under German rules, only half the tanks qualified for export licences. On 20 February
1991, Schreiber, a Bavarian fixer whose thumbprint is to be found on many deals,
contacted the CDU’s treasurer, Walther Leisler Kiep, for help.19 It seems the CDU was
paid for a change of government policy: a week later, the federal security council
overrode the foreign ministry and approved the export of the tanks. On 2 August
Thyssen paid the first instalment of Schreiber’s commissions, 11 million marks (US
$5.7 million), and just over three weeks later Schreiber gave a briefcase containing 1
million marks (US $500,000) in cash to the CDU’s accountant in the presence of Kiep.
The subsequent history of the money tells us about how slush funds are sometimes
used: 422,800 marks (US $211,400) went to the accountancy firm, 370,000 marks (US
$185,000) to a CDU trusty and the rest stayed with Kiep.
In May 1999, the Augsburg tax office arrested two Thyssen managers for tax fraud,
claiming they omitted to declare 12.5 million marks (US $6.25 million) received from
Schreiber. A warrant was also issued for the arrest of Ludwig-Holger Pfahls, the former
secretary of state in the ministry of defence and later president of the German consti-
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tutional court, on the grounds that he had not declared a 3.8 million mark (US $1.9
million) bribe. He has remained out of the country.
• The first and most important action would be to make the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention effective – starting with a rigorous and independent monitoring
system with a secure hotline for whistleblowers (see ‘Will the OECD Convention
stop foreign bribery?’, Chapter 7, page 128).
• Second, given that exporter governments have the power to issue, or withhold,
export licences within certain legal and political parameters, the approval of
export licences should be made conditional on companies having pre-qualified
themselves with annual undertakings from the companies’ top management and
lodged with export control departments. These undertakings, akin to the ‘annual
sign-off letters’ now routine in large oil companies, would certify that, to the
managers’ knowledge, no bribery was involved in getting the business.
• Borrowing from the ‘Publish What You Pay’ initiative in the extractive industries,
the third action would be to change accounting rules to require the reporting of
all payments on a national basis.
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the poorest countries in the world to buy arms they may not need with money they
probably cannot afford.
Notes
1. Joe Roeber is a freelance journalist and member of TI UK.
2. The official arms trade is the legal, open market trade that usually involves governments
as buyers or sellers. This report does not consider arms and systems traded in the black
or grey markets or smuggled to embargoed destinations.
3. The practice of bribing foreign officials is banned in countries that have ratified the 1997
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
4. Sir Richard Scott published his five-volume report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence
Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions in February 1996. See
www.ombudsman.org.uk/pca/document/hc804/a30–95.htm
5. See www.idasact.org.za/pims/arms/review.htm
6. See ‘Zuma Denies Bribery Allegations’, SABC News (South Africa), 29 November 2002;
‘Bank Record Raises New Questions on “Bribe”’, Business Day (South Africa), 7 July 2003;
and ‘Zuma Investigation Stirs Dormant Party and Empowerment Tensions’, Financial
Mail (South Africa), 8 August 2003.
7. ‘Zuma off the Hook’, Sunday Times (South Africa), 24 August 2003; ‘Shaikh Case Puts
Zuma back in the Spotlight’, Business Day (South Africa), 26 August 2003.
8. ‘Yengeni out on Bail Pending Appeal against Sentence’, SAPA (South Africa), 19 March
2003.
9. Report to Parliament of the Joint Investigation into Strategic Procurement Packages, 14
November 2001, Chapter 4. A series of reports in the Guardian (Britain), 13, 14 and 16
June 2003, looks at the trade, focusing on the South African deal, and suggests that the
then minister of defence, Joe Modise, was handsomely paid for his help; see ‘BAE “Paid
Millions” to Win Hawk Jet Contracts’, Guardian (Britain), 30 June 2003.
10. See ‘President’s Brother Buys into Arms Deal’, Paul Kirk, Mail and Guardian (South Africa),
27 July 2001 and ‘More Arms Deal Revelations’, Raenette Taljaard MP, Democratic
Alliance website, 26 March 2002.
11. The story of Modise’s involvement is told in ‘Soldiers of Fortune’, Peter Honey, Financial
Mail (South Africa), 26 March 2002.
12. See ‘The New Defence Equipment’ page of the South Africa Government Online website,
www.gov.za/projects/procurement/background/new_equipment.htm
13. ‘South Africa’s Multi-billion Arms Programme Revisited’, Defence Systems Daily, 19
November 2001, www.defence-data.com/features/fpage47.htm
14. See vote 22 in the Budget 2003 document, available on the National Treasury website,
www.treasury.gov.za
15. The background to the 2001 trial (sketching in the German connection) is to be found
in David Ignatius, ‘True Crime: The Scent of French Scandal’, Legal Affairs (US), June
2002.
16. ‘Court Overturns Dumas Conviction for Corruption’, Independent (Britain), 30 January
2003.
17. For background, see ‘The Elf Affair: Who’s Who’, Financial Times (Britain), 15 April 2003.
The court process finished in July 2003, with the verdict expected in November.
18. The beginning of the Thyssen story is found in ‘Schreiber muss mit Auslieferung rechnen’
(Schreiber faces extradition) Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany), 8 May 1999; and ‘BND prüft
Verstrickung in Waffengeschäfte’ (Federal Intelligence Service checks involvement in
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Less than 30 per cent of the world’s oil, according to BP, comes from OECD countries.2
Much of the rest comes from poor countries whose governance problems, according
to emerging research, are often exacerbated by oil dependence.3 Since colonial times
poor governments have taken significant control over their oil and gas industries: they
can now more easily dictate the terms on which their oil is extracted. The result, when
Western oil firms accept corrupt leaders’ demands, can be the export of corruption into
the rich world, via oil firms and banks that use tax havens in deregulated financial markets
to deal secretly with corrupt leaders. Flows of oil money are so huge they can distort
decision-making not just in poor producer countries, but in the rich world too.
Political corruption in the oil business takes many forms. One is simply the payment
of bribes to national leaders in pursuit of oil deals, often covered by the smokescreen
of intermediaries or layers of secret bank accounts in tax havens. Such bribes can run
into tens, even hundreds of millions of dollars. Companies deny bribery but weak
national laws in producing countries allow them to negotiate official contracts containing
payments that flow to elites, bypassing national treasuries. Firms can then say the
problem is not one of bribery, but of flawed national accounting, or just bad revenue
management.
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Elf used French political influence in oil-rich Gabon to sign favourable contracts
generating large super-normal profits as it built itself into General de Gaulle’s vision
of a French national champion able to rival ‘Anglo-Saxon’ competitors. Gabon and Elf
Gabon were also giant piggy banks that allowed Elf and France to conceal bribery and
wield other tools such as mercenary and arms-dealing services, either in pursuit of oil
deals or towards more overtly geopolitical ends. The Elf trials have uncovered payments
to politicians in Africa, Central Asia, China, France, Germany, Russia, Spain, Taiwan,
the United States and Venezuela. Details of Elf’s payments, the court has heard, were
even sent for approval to French budgetary authorities, the presidency and customs.
The Elf ‘system’, in place since the 1960s, had two other purposes, essential for its
survival. One was the covert financing of France’s main political parties and secret
services. The second, also essential in preserving silence, was personal enrichment.
After 1989, when the late French president François Mitterrand appointed Loïk Le
Floch-Prigent head of Elf, corruption escalated. President Mitterrand, just re-elected,
was unhappy that the Elf system mostly benefited rival right-wing or ‘Gaullist’ political
groups and said his Socialist Party should get a bigger cut.6 This was a go-ahead to
expand the Elf system.
‘Originally, everything was more or less Gaullist-controlled’, said François-Xavier
Verschave, head of Survie, a Paris-based campaigning group.7 ‘Then Le Floch-Prigent
came along. The system became less classical, more heterodox, more baroque. So it
became vulnerable.’
New rivalries in French politics and the secret services created leaks, counter-leaks
and denunciations. French laws gave the magistrates wide powers (in contrast to some
‘Anglo-Saxon’ jurisdictions where plea bargaining and other features can allow deals
to prevent dirty secrets from being aired) and the case took on a life of its own. Pulling
each thread produced others, and the complexity multiplied.
Magistrates like Eva Joly, who launched the investigations in 1994, received death
threats and needed bodyguards at times.8 Obstruction in France was worsened by poor
cooperation from Britain, Liechtenstein and Monaco, though Swiss judges have been
more helpful. French laws make it hard to prove bribery of officials, so magistrates tend
to focus on personal enrichment or kickbacks. Even so, the investigations have brought
the wider Elf system to light.
The effects of the Elf trials are ambiguous. They have exposed corruption but recent
legislation has curbed the investigating magistrates’ powers, and more restrictions are
likely to come. ‘It is as if [Eva] Joly had netted a load of fish, which are now left to rot
in the sun while the French public politely holds its nose’, wrote commentator David
Ignatius. ‘She prised open a door, at great personal risk, but the political class refused
to follow her through it into a new era of accountability … for a moment at least, the
system was weak, exposed and, perhaps, even ready to topple, but it survived because
of the code of silence of the French élite.’9 Senior French politicians like Charles Pasqua
and even President Jacques Chirac have been named, or alluded to, in the trials, but
have so far escaped legal punishment. Chirac has presidential immunity.
The trials have identified many corrupt or questionable mechanisms: overpayment
for assets generating hidden subsidies, payments through chains of offshore accounts,
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the use of Gabon as an offshore financial turntable for generating hidden payments,
and the use of secrecy and commercial intelligence as keys to financial success. There
are ‘revolving door’ problems; the use of politically networked intermediaries to win
deals; specialised trading companies that confuse revenue flows; persistent links between
oil and the covert arms trade; and the assumption by oil firms of diplomatic functions.
As revealed in the Elf trials, political corruption in oil is tied up with banking. One
example was the renegotiation of Angola’s US $5 billion debt to Russia in 1996: after
a debt reduction deal to US $1.5 billion, the debt was purchased by Russian oligarchs
who used political connections in Moscow to obtain the debt privately. Then two inter-
mediaries who featured in the Elf trials helped persuade Angola to repay the debt in
oil through a murky loan arrangement led by French banks.
A French parliamentary report in 2001 on money laundering identified London and
territories linked to Britain, including Bermuda, Gibraltar, the Channel Islands, the
British Virgin and Cayman Islands, and the Isle of Man, as a huge under-regulated
terrain ideal for money laundering; oil money often transits these zones.10 The looting
of several billion dollars in oil revenues by former Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha, with
the complicity of Britain-based banks, is well documented. An American intermediary,
James Giffen, was indicted in 2003 for violating the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
by allegedly paying US $78 million to top political officials in Kazakhstan on behalf of
Mobil (now ExxonMobil) (see the country report on Kazakhstan, Chapter 8, page 202).
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70 Political corruption
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source of much of the corruption. In The Seven Sisters, Anthony Sampson’s classic 1975
history of the oil industry, oil firms ‘appeared to be part of World Government …
financing whole nations, fuelling wars … an enduring subject of suspicion and inves-
tigation; their supranational expertise was beyond the ability of national governments’.17
The scale and endurance of political corruption in oil over so many decades suggests
it will never be eradicated, only tempered, in a permanent struggle between oil interests,
on the one hand, and political actors in the rich world or civil society and political
interests in poor countries, on the other. In general terms, the larger the oil sector
relative to a country’s economy and institutional strength, the greater the potential for
political corruption.
Within national borders, checks and balances have developed, often through
democratic processes, to curb political corruption. The problems often appear not
within countries but between them, in a global terrain where multinational firms like
the oil majors exploit the fact that the array of different national legal systems meshes
together so poorly. This provides huge opportunities for loopholes. Tackling political
corruption in the oil business is part of a wider challenge to strengthen and coordinate
global governance.
Notes
1. Nicholas Shaxson is the author of country reports on Angola and Gabon for the Economist
Intelligence Unit and a regular contributor to the Financial Times (Britain) and Financial
Times Energy (Britain).
2. BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy (London: BP, 2003).
3. For a good account of the problems, see Catholic Relief Services, Bottom of the Barrel:
Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor (Baltimore: Catholic Relief Services, 2003).
4. Guardian (Britain), 2 June 2001.
5. See Antoine Glaser and Stephen Smith, Ces messieurs Afrique (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1994)
and their later book, Ces messieurs Afrique 2: Des réseaux aux lobbies (Paris: Calmann-Lévy,
1997). Foccart died in 1997.
6. Le Floch-Prigent confirmed Mitterrand’s request during the trials.
7. Interview with author.
8. Joly describes some of the threats and intimidation in a new book, Est-ce dans ce monde-
là que nous voulons vivre? (‘Is this the world we want to live in?’) (Paris: Les Arènes, 2003).
9. David Ignatius, ‘True Crime: The Scent of French Scandal’, Legal Affairs (May–June 2002).
10. Arnaud Montebourg and Vincent Peillon, Rapport d’information, 10 October 2001.
11. See www.publishwhatyoupay.org
12. ‘Terms of Reference: Financial Diagnosis and Monitoring of State Petroleum Reserves’,
published in 2001 on the state media website www.angola.org
13. Dow Jones Business News, 18 June 2003.
14. Interview with author.
15. Interview with author.
16. ‘Investors’ Statement on Transparency in the Extractives Sector’, organised by ISIS Asset
Management, June 2003.
17. Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made
(New York: Viking Press, 1975).
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Canada’s rules on lobbying are often cited as a model for the rest of the world, but after
a series of scandals involving political donations and the misuse of public funds, Prime
Minister Jean Chrétien proposed significant changes to the federal laws on lobbying,
political finance and ethics rules in June 2002. The reforms are intended to increase the
transparency of lobbying, to set limits on political donations and to reform the institutions
that oversee the ethical behaviour of government ministers and parliamentarians. Unfor-
tunately, the changes still leave large loopholes.1 In the case of lobbying, rules on disclosure
remain too limited and weak enforcement is a particular problem.
Regulating lobbyists – and ensuring transparency – is critical in the fight against political
corruption because the line between legitimate and illegitimate lobbying is thin. Canadian
lobbyists are governed by the Lobbyists Registration Act (LRA) and a code of conduct
introduced in 1997 under the provisions of the LRA.
In principle, the LRA should ensure the registration of all lobbyists, but the law only
requires them to register if they are specifically paid for the purpose of lobbying. The law
specifies three categories of lobbyists: consultant lobbyists (hired, usually by corporations,
to work on specific efforts); in-house lobbyists working for corporations; and in-house
lobbyists working for non-profit organisations. By these definitions, a significant proportion
of corporate lobbying is not disclosed: paid employees of corporations often gather the
information needed to lobby, but don’t have to register as lobbyists, while corporate
directors and retired executives (who are not always paid, and therefore do not need to
register) actually do the lobbying.
A number of interest groups and the media have consistently called on ministers and
senior civil servants to disclose who lobbies them, since this would ensure that all lobbying
efforts aimed at these key policy-makers are transparent. However, the federal government
has refused to enact this measure and the provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, Nova
Scotia and Québec have all enacted lobbying legislation based on the weak federal example.
The LRA requires registered lobbyists to disclose basic details about themselves (or the
client, in the case of a consultant lobbyist), the departments lobbied, the aim of the
lobbying and the techniques used. The recent amendments, enacted in June 2003, include
one significant addition: a requirement that lobbyists disclose past work with the
government. This is a step forward since it will shed light on the problem of ‘revolving
doors’ through which former public officials cash in on their inside knowledge and access
by becoming lobbyists.
But disclosure of another crucial piece of information – how much is spent on a lobbying
campaign – is still not required in Canada (though it is in more than 30 US states); nor
are lobbyists asked to disclose previous work with political parties or candidates.
The real flaw in Canada’s lobbying system, however, is a lack of enforcement and
penalties for violations of ethics. The enforcement front-line consists of the Lobbyists
Registrar and the Ethics Counsellor, which both lack sufficient resources to audit the
lobbying industry and ensure compliance with the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct.
Furthermore, the Ethics Counsellor is appointed by and can be overruled by the prime
minister, which creates a risk of bias because the Ethics Counsellor’s rulings may affect
the prime minister or members of his cabinet.
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Among its other stipulations, rule 8 of the lobbyists’ code prohibits lobbyists from
placing public officials ‘in a conflict of interest by proposing, or undertaking, any activity
that would constitute an improper influence’ on the official. The interpretation of this rule
is crucial to its enforcement. The Ottawa-based citizens’ group Democracy Watch has filed
a number of complaints about lobbyists breaking rule 8 by fundraising, working for or
giving gifts to the prime minister, or to ministers they were lobbying. The Ethics Counsellor
has dismissed several of the complaints on the basis of a narrow interpretation of the rule,
and Democracy Watch is challenging the dismissals in court.2
Although the federal government refused to require lobbyists to disclose how much
they spend, recent changes to the federal political finance law closed several (but not all)
loopholes in the disclosure of donations. Bill C-24, which amends the Canada Elections
Act and comes into force in January 2004, also sets limits on political donations for the
first time. In terms of its effects on lobbying, lobbyists’ donations to parties and candidates
will now be more fully identified.
Bill C-34, due to become law by December 2003, is the final part of Prime Minister
Chrétien’s ethics package. If passed in its entirety, the bill will see the Ethics Counsellor
replaced with three new ethics watchdogs. A new Ethics Commissioner with more
independence will enforce rules for cabinet ministers and parliamentarians; an Ethics
Officer will watch over senators; and the Registrar will enforce the Lobbyists’ Code of
Conduct.3
However, key loopholes remain in the bill: the ethics watchdogs will not be fully
independent since the cabinet will still control appointments; the public will not be
allowed to file complaints with the watchdogs; and the courts will be barred from reviewing
the watchdogs’ decisions. There will continue to be no independent enforcement of ethics
rules for federal civil servants (nor effective whistleblower protection). A better system,
which Democracy Watch continues to advocate, would be a single fully independent, fully
empowered, fully accountable ethics watchdog for ministers, all parliamentarians, civil
servants and lobbyists.
Nearly 140 years after achieving nationhood, Canada’s federal government still lacks
key anti-corruption measures to ensure that secret political donations and high-powered
lobbyists cannot distort the public interest by gaining undue influence over politicians.
The changes to the lobbying, political finance and ethics laws introduced in 2003 are a
step in the right direction, but much more remains to be done.
Duff Conacher (Democracy Watch, Canada, www.dwatch.ca)
Notes
1. For details of the bills see: www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Lang=E and for details of the
laws see: www.lois.justice.gc.ca/en/index.html
2. In January 2003 the Ethics Counsellor stated that a lobbyist has violated rule 8 if he did something
to ‘interfere with the decision, judgement or action’ of a public official in a way that amounted
to ‘a wrongful constraint, whereby the will of the public office holder was overpowered’.
3. In addition, Bill C-34 provides further impetus to efforts to pass ethics rules for all members of
the House of Commons and senators. Previous attempts to pass such rules failed when federal
politicians refused to enact rules that cover themselves. In contrast, the Québec government
reacted to an ethics scandal involving lobbyists and ministers in early 2002 by enacting even stronger
measures by the end of the year and setting up a new watchdog, just for lobbyists.
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Dora Akunyili is Director General of Nigeria’s National Agency for Food and Drug Admin-
istration and Control. She has defied death threats while tackling corrupt practices in the
manufacture, import and export of drugs, cosmetics and food products.
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5 Vote buying
One of the most blatant manifestations of political corruption takes place during
elections, when politicians attempt to bribe their constituents directly. Focusing on Latin
America and East Asia, respectively, Silke Pfeiffer and Frederic Charles Schaffer show
that votes are often bought via brokers who forge long-term relationships with target
populations, frequently in poorer regions. Using surveys of vote buying in Brazil,
Claudio Weber Abramo questions assumptions about levels of bribery in both local
and national elections. Leslie Busby assesses an altogether different forum for vote
buying: international policy institutions. In her article, she examines the Japanese
government’s use of overseas development aid to further its interests in the Inter-
national Whaling Commission.
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per cent and 26 per cent,3 while a 1999 Gallup survey in Argentina found that 24 per
cent of interviewees knew someone who sold his or her vote.4
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A contrasting scenario is where vote buying takes place in the context of long-term
relations between candidates, their agents and the population of a community. In this
case, relations are cultivated throughout the entire electoral cycle.
In communities where the public service system is dysfunctional or non-accessible,
private agents – who act as intermediaries between politicians and the electorate –
establish networks of patronage (clientelismo) within the community. In Brazil such
agents have earned a distinctive soubriquet, cabos eleitorais, which can be loosely
translated as ‘precinct captain’. ‘Captains’ operate in a network of contacts and favours
and are crucial community reference points since they have the power to grant access
to public services and provide other help in solving problems. Because they guarantee
access to state services, they generate trust, commitment, but, above all, dependency.
This pays off on election day: commitments to vote generated under these conditions
result in high rates of compliance.9
The linkage between patronage and vote buying seems to indicate that low-income
sectors are more prone to be targeted by vote buyers. While 6 per cent of respondents
of an Argentine survey indicated that they received something from a candidate or
party in the October 2001 legislative elections, this share increased to 17 per cent
among low-income respondents.10 Mexican surveys confirm low-income neighbour-
hoods are more likely to be subject to vote buying.11 But the correlation may not always
hold, as suggested by the results of recent surveys carried out by Transparência Brasil
(see Box 5.1, ‘Vote buying in Brazil: less of a problem than believed?’, below).
Vote buying is a concern raised periodically in the Brazilian media, by politicians and civil
society organisations. Transparência Brasil sought to test whether this concern reflected
reality, conducting surveys after the 2000 municipal elections and the 2002 federal and
state elections (including the election of president and state governors). Both surveys
involved nationally representative samples of 2,000 voters.1
In both elections the concentration of vote buying was found to be more marked in
less-developed regions (North-Centre West and North-East) than in the richest parts of
the country (South and South-East). But its incidence did not reach levels that corroborate
the grim view commonly held by Brazilians.
In the 2000 elections, 6 per cent of voters interviewed reported that they had been
asked to sell their votes for money. In the 2002 survey, the question was rephrased to
include offers of goods or favours extended by the public administration. Although the
question was broader, the overall percentage of offers of vote buying in 2002 was lower,
at 3 per cent.
The shift from 6 per cent in 2000 to 3 per cent two years later cannot be directly
interpreted as a falling trend in vote buying.2 It is more likely due to the different nature
of the elections. Municipal elections (2000) involve only local candidates and voters, who
tend to have closer socio-political exchanges, while federal and state elections (2002) are
broader and voters tend not to know the candidates personally.
New legislation enacted in 1999, making it easier to disqualify candidates involved in
vote buying, may have played a role. The electoral justice system in 2000 was not fully
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prepared to enforce the new law. By May 2003, the federal Supreme Electoral Court had
begun reviewing nine cases against governors elected in 2002 and eight against state
legislators, all accused of ‘illicitly pursuing votes’ (more than vote buying, this charge extends
to the provision of transportation to voters on election days and other illegal practices).
Both surveys indicated that there are misconceptions about vote buying in Brazil. The
educational level of the voters had only moderate influence on offers to buy their votes.
Perhaps surprisingly, fewer voters with only primary education or below were subjected
to offers than persons with secondary or higher education. Age, however, was significant:
the younger the voters, the more frequently they were asked to sell votes.
Another common belief is that the poorer the voters, the more vulnerable they are to
offers. The surveys showed this not to be true. Offers cut equally across all income levels
and, in fact, were less frequent among lower-income voters than higher-income ones.
However, given that the poor make up the largest portion of the population, in raw
numbers, more offers were made to the poor than to people from wealthier classes.
Also contrary to common belief, the size and type of the city (capital, periphery or interior)
seems irrelevant to the frequency of the vote buying phenomenon.
Saying that vote buying is less of a problem than widely believed is not to say it is not
a problem. Projected on to the electoral demographic of 100 million voters (voting is
mandatory in Brazil), the reported cases suggest that about 6 million people were offered
money for votes in 2000. In 2002, some 3 million voters were subjected to offers to trade
votes for money, goods or favours. These are not small numbers.
The results also indicate that strategies to combat spurious electoral transactions (such
as public campaigns against vote buying) need to address the entire spectrum of voters,
not just specific segments, though special attention should be paid to more vulnerable
regions.
Claudio Weber Abramo (Transparência Brasil)
Notes
1. For more information on the survey see www.transparencia.org.br. The 2000 survey was conducted
by Ibope on behalf of Transparência Brasil and Instituto Paulo Montenegro, based on personal
interviews conducted 15–20 March 2001. The 2002 survey was conducted by Ibope on behalf
of Transparência Brasil and União Nacional dos Analistas e Técnicos de Finanças e Controle,
interviews conducted 14–17 November 2002. The surveys were conducted in four regions, with
age and income selection based on data from the Brazilian census and Supreme Electoral Court.
Margin of error: 2.2 percentage points and confidence level of 95 per cent. Auditing of interviews:
Approx. 20 per cent. The samples used in the surveys reported here allowed for conclusions
concerning only the primary question. In order to test hypotheses relating to socio-economic strata,
how many voters who sold their votes actually voted for the paying candidate, or similar ones,
much larger samples would be needed.
2. Transparência Brasil intends to repeat the surveys systematically, which will provide the data
needed to assess trends.
A further assumption that follows from the connection between patronage and vote
buying is that parties traditionally involved, or identified, with clientelistic practices are
more likely to buy votes than others. Surveys in Argentina provide clear evidence that
not only class, but also party – the Partido Justicialista in Argentina’s case – is linked to
vote buying.12 In Mexico, where 4.4 per cent of interviewees reported receiving gifts
from the opposition National Action Party (PAN) in the 2000 elections, 15.3 per cent
admitted accepting gifts from the ruling PRI.13 Interestingly, the effectiveness of the two
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parties’ vote buying strategies differed considerably; survey data reveals that, while less
than 50 per cent of voters who took inducements for the PRI voted for its presidential
candidate, the rate of effectiveness among PAN’s purchased voters was 82 per cent.14
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above. Can a dividing line be cleanly drawn between vote buying – a criminal offence
in most jurisdictions – and other legitimate forms of influencing and manipulating the
vote during election campaigns? Or are there areas where the distinction is blurred?
Indeed, we are used to election propaganda that plays with attractive promises,
very often directed at particular social sectors, which diminishes their claim to be
collective political programmes. We are equally used to campaign parties at which food
and drinks are offered for free.18 If we look closer at the problem, however, there are
criteria that can help us to position particular actions and behaviour along a continuum,
with vote buying at one extreme and the use of the vote as a fundamental instrument
of democratic control at the other.19
The manipulation of votes always carries an element of privatising and personalis-
ing the relationship between politicians and the electorate – election campaigns target
particular interest groups. Vote buying, however, drives this privatisation to an extreme.
It breaks it down to a bilateral relationship between a vote buyer and a vote seller with
the tribute for the vote mostly provided prior to the election. While this doesn’t
necessarily preclude the voter from having expectations of the politician after the
election, acceptance of the offer may well influence the incumbent’s perception of his
or her mandate. Seen from this perspective, it is irrelevant whether the vote is cast as
committed. In this, vote buying differs from election promises that raise legitimate
expectations and can arguably become the baseline for monitoring once the elected
candidate is in power.
What is traded against the vote in this bilateral relationship is cash or material
goods, not a political platform against which the candidate can be held accountable
after being elected. And finally, while the vote becomes an effective instrument for
accountability only through its collective force, a bilateral relationship between a vote
buyer and a vote seller implies a strong imbalance of power, especially in cases where
the vote is sold as a result of coercive pressure.
In sum, the more personalised, short-term, material and coercive the exchange
between politician and voter, the more clearly we can talk about the criminal offence
of vote buying – and the clearer the negative implications for accountability.
Reform efforts
Given these negative implications, what can be done to curtail vote buying? Reform
activities have tended to focus on raising awareness and changing voter attitudes, on
the one hand, and reforming the regulatory and institutional framework for elections
in order to decrease incentives for candidates to buy votes, on the other. The latter
obviously starts with criminalising vote buying by enacting the relevant laws. The law
needs to establish a clear definition of the offence and provide for adequate sanctions.
Two modifications introduced into the Brazilian legislation on vote buying in 1999 made
it more powerful: the new law debars candidates who attempt to buy votes and exempts
those who sell their votes from sanctions in order to encourage voters to denounce vote
buying candidates.20
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Apart from specific laws on vote buying, the general normative framework around
elections and political finance can help generate an environment hostile to vote buying,
provided that laws are enforced. High levels of disclosure provided by campaign finance
rules increase the incentives for candidates to channel their campaign expenses towards
legitimate areas. The capacity to reinforce and monitor the commitment made by voters
will vary with the vote-secrecy safeguards provided under the electoral system. Also,
centralised counting procedures (with maximum, as well as minimum, numbers of
voters at polling stations) can limit the possibility of monitoring election outcomes,
while party list systems depersonalise election campaigns.21 Party-neutral ballots
produced by public entities at public expense with careful control over their distribution,
and with all candidates for office listed simultaneously, help to ensure free and secret
voting. Systematic analysis of the impact of these measures remains both a challenge
and a necessity. The accompanying case study on Thailand, to cite one example, does
not paint a very encouraging picture (see ‘Vote buying in East Asia’, page 83).
Another case worth studying is Mexico, where the traditional vote buying activities
of the PRI lost their effectiveness in the 2000 elections. One reading of this is that seven
decades of authoritarian rule and dubious electoral practices had discredited the party
and, consequently, its vote buying practices had the effect of repelling voters. The jury
is still out on whether this was a product of the opposition parties’ advice, to ‘take the
gift, but vote as you please’, or indicative of a positive change in voter attitudes.
Nonetheless, what the results do seem to express is that there has been a change in
political culture with implications for how voters perceive and relate to vote buying.22
The recent Mexican experience also serves to remind us of the factors that motivate
and underpin vote buying. While a narrow focus on tackling vote buying, for instance
through regulatory and institutional reforms, is helpful, the underlying problems, such
as poverty, patronage and voter alienation, also need to be addressed.
Notes
1. Silke Pfeiffer is regional director for Latin America at Transparency International.
2. Bruno Wilhelm Speck and Claudio Weber Abramo, ‘Transparência Brasil/ Ibope Survey
– Summary Report’, www.transparencia.org.br, 2001.
3. Wayne Cornelius and Luis Estrada, ‘Mobilized Voting in the 2000 Elections: The
Changing Efficacy of Vote Buying and Coercion in Mexican Electoral Politics’, in Jorge
I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson, Mexico’s Pivotal Democratic Election (Palo Alto:
Stanford University Press, forthcoming).
4. Gallup Argentina ‘Informe’, www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/capacitybuild/
pdf/arg_report.pdf
5. El Mercado del voto, votebien.com, 25 January 2002, available at www.terra.com.co/
elecciones_2002/cubrimiento_especial/financiacion/25-01-2002/nota47324.html. The
existing empirical data on vote buying is still limited in quality and quantity. The
variation in results may relate to the different methodological approaches, scopes of
analysis and objectives of the various surveys.
6. Asociación Civil Transparencia, ‘Una historia que no debe repetirse’, www.
transparencia.org.pe/publicaciones/2000
7. El Mercado del voto, votebien.com.
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Vote buying in East Asia abounds – from the quasi-democracy of Cambodia to the
established democracy of Japan. This article focuses on three countries, Taiwan, Thailand
and the Philippines, where data on vote buying is unusually rich.
A few statistics: in the Philippines, an estimated 3 million people nationwide were
offered some form of payment in the 2002 barangay (community-level) elections –
about 7 per cent of all voting-aged adults.2 In Thailand, 30 per cent of household heads
surveyed in a national sample said that they were offered money during the 1996
general election.3 In Taiwan’s third-largest city, Taichung, and its surrounding county,
27 per cent of a random sample of eligible voters reported in 1999 that they had accepted
cash during previous electoral campaigns.4 While these numbers – all derived from
mass surveys – must be treated with caution, they provide a conservative, if rough,
gauge of just how widespread the practice has been in recent years.5
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The amount of money offered to voters varies greatly, depending on the competi-
tiveness of the election and local levels of prosperity. At the low end, voters from one
poor neighbourhood of Manila received only 30 pesos (US $0.60) during a relatively
non-competitive barangay race in 2002. By contrast, middle-class voters in the Taiwanese
county of Hualien were given up to 2,000 Taiwanese dollars (US $60) in a hotly contested
2003 magisterial by-election. In Thailand, the average offer per household in the 1996
general election was 678 baht (US $27), though Bangkok residents were likely to be
given twice as much as rural dwellers.6
The total sum of money spent by candidates on buying votes can be high. One
congressional candidate in the Southern Luzon region of the Philippines admitted to
doling out 4 million pesos (US $160,000) to voters on the eve of the 1992 election.7
Prosecutors at the Taiwanese ministry of justice reckon that a typical legislative candidate
in an urban area might easily distribute up to 100 million Taiwanese dollars (around
US $3 million).8 The Nakhon Ratchsima Rajabhat Institute, which monitors poll fraud
in Thailand, estimates that candidates gave a total of 20 billion baht (US $460 million)
to voters in the 2001 legislative elections.9
Vote buying in all three countries has institutional causes. The weakness of parties
in the Philippines and the existence of multi-member districts in Taiwan and, until
recently, Thailand have made electoral systems in each country candidate-centred. As
a result, candidates (and their factional or party backers) have strong incentives to
build personalised networks of support. Key players in the construction of these networks
are ‘vote brokers’, known as tiau-a-ka (pillars) in Taiwan, huakhanaen (voting chiefs) in
Thailand and liders (leaders) in the Philippines. Traditions of gift giving and benevolence
make the distribution of money and goods a preferred method of building personal
networks. As such, vote buying is often less an explicit contract (as ‘buying’ might
erroneously imply) than a form of gift-giving intended to demonstrate a candidate’s
compassion, good will or respect.
Even if vote buying is culturally embedded, offers of money or goods in no way
guarantee that voters will cast their ballots as candidates or vote brokers hope. Survey
data from the Philippines shows that among the poor – who tend to be the target of
vote buying – material offers decisively influenced the vote of only about 30 per cent
of the people who accepted them in the 2001 elections.10 Using a finer-tuned method,
the scholar Chin-Shou Wang compared the numbers of votes garnered by Kuomintang
(KMT) candidates in one Taiwanese town to the number of voters who received money
from KMT vote brokers, which he was able to determine by gaining access to the lists
of names used by the vote brokers themselves.11 He found that at least 45 per cent of
the people who received money did not vote for KMT candidates in the 1993 elections.
Whatever the influence of money and goods on the electoral choices of voters, vote
buying has ramifications that extend beyond the ballot box. To give but one example,
vote buying candidates are often financially backed by drug syndicates, gambling lords
and strong-arm godfathers who are happy to provide funds in exchange for protection
and influence. Vote buying thus fuels organised crime.12
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Brokers also paid inflated crop prices to farmers, distributed donations at bogus funerals
and gave ‘salaries’ to voters who joined their political parties.
Reflecting on the overall sense of these post-reform adjustments, two scholars
conclude that ‘vote buying was rampant even though the new laws forced it to become
more discreet’.16 Also noteworthy is that the amount paid out to individual voters is
thought to have been higher in the 2000 and 2001 elections than in elections past.
This increased payment may partially explain why, by one estimate, the cash flow
generated in the 2001 general election was 25 per cent higher than in the last pre-
reform election in 1996.17
Notes
1. Frederic Charles Schaffer is a member of the School of Social Science at the Institute
for Advanced Study, Princeton, United States; and a research associate at the Center
for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States.
2. Social Weather Stations, ‘National Survey’, Quezon City, Philippines, 2002.
3. Phongpaichit Pasuk, Nualnoi Treerat, Yongyuth Chaiyapong and Chris Baker, ‘Corruption
in the Public Sector in Thailand: Perception and Experience of Household’, Political
Economy Center, Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 2000.
4. Kuen-Shan Cheng, Ye-Li Wang and Yun-Tsai Chen, ‘Analysis of the Causes of Vote
Buying, and the Study of How to Prevent It’, Taipei: Ministry of Justice, 2000 [in Chinese].
5. The Philippines survey, conducted by Social Weather Stations from 24 August to 8
September 2002, gathered data through face-to-face interviews with 1,200 adult
respondents nationwide, chosen using multi-stage probability sampling for a 3 per cent
margin of error. The Thailand survey was conducted by ABAC-KSC Internet Poll Research
Centre in October–December 1999; 4,013 face-to-face interviews were conducted with
household heads across the country, chosen using multi-stage cluster sampling. The
Taiwan survey was commissioned by the Ministry of Justice; 1,168 interviewees were
randomly selected and interviewed by telephone in September 1999.
6. Pasuk et al., ‘Corruption in the Public Sector in Thailand’.
7. Philippine Daily Inquirer (Philippines), 8–9 May 1992.
8. Author’s interview at the Department of Prosecutorial Affairs, Ministry of Justice, 12
August 2003.
9. Newsweek (US), 15 January 2001.
10. Frederic Charles Schaffer, ‘Disciplinary Reactions: Alienation and the Reform of Vote
Buying in the Philippines’, prepared for the conference, ‘Trading Political Rights: The
Comparative Politics of Vote Buying’, MIT, 2002. The figure cited was calculated from
a survey conducted by Pulse Asia in June 2001, involving face-to-face interviews with
1,200 adult respondents nationwide chosen using multi-stage probability sampling for
a 3 per cent margin of error.
11. Chin-Shou Wang, ‘The Dilemmas of Clientelism: Electoral Mobilization of Clientelism
in Taiwan, 1993’, Carolina Papers: Democracy and Human Rights, no. 1, 2002, University
of North Carolina Center for International Studies.
12. See Yung-mao Chao, Change and Characteristics of Taiwan’s Local Politics (Taipei: Hanlu,
1997 [in Chinese]); Patrick I. Patiño, ‘The Color of Money: Elections and Big Business’,
Conjuncture (Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1998); James Ockey, ‘The
Rise of Local Power in Thailand: Provincial Crime, Elections and the Bureaucracy’, in
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Money and Power in Provincial Thailand, edited by Ruth McVey (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 2000); and Philippine Star (Philippines), 26 June 2003.
13. Schaffer, ‘Disciplinary Reactions’.
14. Laura Thornton, ‘Combating Corruption at the Grassroots: The Thailand Experience,
1999–2000’, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2000.
15. Allen D. Hicken, ‘The Market for Votes in Thailand’, conference paper, MIT, 2002.
16. Aurel Croissant and Jörn Dosch, ‘Parliamentary Elections in Thailand, March 2000 and
January 2001’, Electoral Studies 22, 2003.
17. Thai Farmers Research Center, ‘2001 General Election Likely to Generate over Bt 25 billion
Cash Flow’, 28 December 2000.
The Japanese government has been accused for years of using official development
assistance (ODA) to recruit developing country members into the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) in support of its whaling interests. Attention has been drawn particularly
to fisheries grant aid and related technical cooperation administered primarily by Japan’s
Fisheries Agency.
In recent years, the number of developing countries joining the IWC and systemati-
cally backing Japan’s position has increased to 16.1 Among them are six eastern Caribbean
islands, whose IWC voting records show a striking correlation between votes in support
of Japan’s interests and the flow of Japanese fisheries aid.2 With this support, Japan can
block the adoption by three-quarters majority of any binding measure not to its liking
and it is close to having a simple (51 per cent) majority with which to revise the IWC’s
rules of procedures, including the introduction of secret ballot voting on any issue – voting
is now by roll call – thus making it harder to hold individual governments accountable
for their positions.
The IWC’s US $33,000 annual membership fees for developing countries were reduced
in 2003 to US $17,000, still more than most of these states pay in contributions to the
UN and its agencies. These substantial fees continue to be paid regularly, which, when
viewed in tandem with the positions taken by these states in support of Japan’s whaling
industry, raises questions about motivations.
There is clear evidence that Japan has used promises of aid and threats of its withdrawal
to build a voting bloc that otherwise wouldn’t exist. In July 2000, Dominica’s minister for
environment, planning, agriculture and fisheries, Atherton Martin, resigned in protest at
his country’s vote against a South Pacific whale sanctuary proposal, because the negative
vote contravened a cabinet decision that Dominica should abstain. It was later revealed
that Japanese officials had visited the island and threatened to withdraw aid if Dominica
did not oppose the proposal.3
Although Japanese officials and their counterparts in recipient countries generally deny
vote buying, statements in the media support the allegations. Japan’s former vice minister
of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, Hiraoki Kameya, said in June 1999 that it was ‘essential
to increase the number of nations supportive to Japan … [and therefore] necessary to
couple effectively the ODA and the promotion of IWC membership’.4 Antigua’s prime
minister Lester Bird was even more direct: ‘I make no bones about it … if we are able to
support the Japanese and the quid pro quo is that they are going to give us some assistance
… that is part of why we do so.’5
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Since 1987 when it began, Japan’s grant aid to the eastern Caribbean IWC members
has totalled US $190 million in the fisheries sector alone, representing more than 96 per
cent of Japan’s overall grant aid to each of these six small island states; some 22 fisheries
complexes have been built or promised as a result. This aid programme was analysed by
economist Bernard Petitjean Roget in 2002. Noting that the fishing industry in these
countries amounts to 1–2 per cent of GDP, he comments that with such sizeable contri-
butions some tangible developments in the fishing sector should be expected, but he
finds no evidence ‘to suggest that this aid package is bringing any convincing results to
bear on this economic sector’.6
He also judges that the construction budgets of some complexes were greater than
could be justified by the actual facilities, raising questions about the final destination of
any excess funds. Moreover, the complexes are commonly located in the constituencies
of influential politicians. In Dominica, former minister Atherton Martin reported that ‘there
is a pattern here of aid … for projects that move around, depending on the location of
the prime minister’s constituency and not according to any reasoned plan for the
development of the fisheries sector’.7
While this is a difficult issue for the IWC to confront, it did pass a resolution in 2001
proposed by New Zealand that endorsed ‘the complete independence of sovereign
countries to decide their own policies and freely participate in the IWC (and other inter-
national forums) without undue interference or coercion from other sovereign countries’.8
The real solution will come from within the countries concerned. In Japan, NGOs and
others are placing the ODA system under increasing scrutiny; an independent inquiry into
its use to support what Bernard Petitjean Roget calls ‘institutionalised corruption’ would
be timely.
Leslie Busby (Third Millennium Foundation, Italy)
Notes
1. As of July 2003, these states are: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Commonwealth of Dominica,
Gabon, Grenada, Republic of Guinea, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, St Kitts
and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands. Cape Verde and Ivory Coast
were present as observers.
2. Aid figures compiled from Japan’s ministry of foreign affairs statistics. See ‘Briefing on Japan’s
Vote-Buying Strategy in the International Whaling Commission’, Third Millennium Foundation,
Paciano, Italy, May 2002, available from www.3mf.org
3. A full account of this episode, and an analysis of the issue and what it represents for Dominica,
can be found in Atherton Martin’s ‘Statement on IWC 2001’, published as one of a series of
discussion papers by the Dominica Academy of Arts and Sciences. See www.da-
academy.org/whaling.html
4. Suisan Keizai Shimbun, 24 June 1999 (translation), speech to the press club of Japan’s ministry of
agriculture, forestry and fisheries.
5. Interview with CANA news service, 14 July 2001.
6. Bernard Petitjean Roget, ‘Socio-Economic and Political Aspects of the Aid Provided by Japan to
the Fishing Industry in the Small Independent Islands in the East Caribbean’, October 2002.
Published by the Eastern Caribbean Coalition for Environmental Awareness, Martinique and the
Swiss Coalition for the Protection of Whales, Wadeswil, Switzerland. The full report is available
on the websites of both organisations: www.eccea.org and www.asms-swiss.org
7. Martin, ‘Statement on IWC 2001’.
8. This resolution on ‘Transparency within the IWC’ was predicated on the 1970 ‘Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
Accordance with the United Nations Charter’.
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Numerous legal obstacles lie in the way of bringing corrupt politicians to justice and
returning stolen wealth to its rightful owners. Véronique Pujas assesses the instruments
of immunity and extradition, and Transparency International provides a table that
reflects recent legal developments in immunity in a number of countries – not all for
the better. Tim Daniel looks at the provisions of the United Nations Convention against
Corruption, which offers some promise of enhancing international judicial cooperation.
Recent case material clarifies what is at stake: José Ugaz reflects on the campaign
to extradite former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori; Gherardo Colombo summarises
the legal changes that extended immunity in Italy, while Donatella della Porta reflects
on the way conflict of interest threatens media freedom in the country; and Jeremy
Carver examines efforts to return to the people of Pakistan the substantial state assets
allegedly stolen by Benazir Bhutto while she served as Pakistan’s prime minister.
The judicial fight against political corruption faces many obstacles, particularly the
legal immunity that many politicians enjoy and the difficulty of prosecuting individuals
who have fled their country to escape justice.
Immunity and extradition are two dimensions of a deeper problem: one of the main
weaknesses of the legal and institutional structures created to fight corruption is the
lack of control and accountability of politicians and civil servants at the highest level
of decision-making, in both national governments and intergovernmental organisations.
This lack of accountability is exacerbated by the increasing gap in legal protection
between normal citizens, whose rights and freedoms are being progressively undermined
by new legal tools in conventions to fight transnational crimes, and ruling elites who
fall outside any jurisdiction.
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of their duties, as a way of preventing politically motivated legal attacks. The rationale
is to protect the office that the politician holds – not the politician – as a means of
guaranteeing the continuity of the office and the separation of powers.
Even if such legal safeguards are necessary to guarantee democratic regimes, the
rationale for immunity is undermined when illegitimate practices by the political elite
are uncovered – or if the shield of immunity is used simply as a means to escape justice.
For this reason limits are generally placed on immunity – for instance, there is often
no immunity when a politician is caught in flagrante delicto – and there are typically
procedures through which immunity can be lifted for serious crimes such as high
treason, abuse of power or gross mismanagement in office. Corruption charges are a
case in point.
However, politicians – and particularly heads of state – have in some cases much
wider immunity. They are often granted immunity from all prosecution, not just in
cases relating to their work as politicians. They are sometimes granted immunity
extending back to before their term of office, and in some cases are given lifetime
immunity. Even where immunity is not so extensive, the disclosure of corruption
allegations is no guarantee that a politician will face trial. Members of parliament may
be reluctant to vote to overturn immunity, possibly because of parliamentary and
government solidarity, or in some cases because of collusion. Corrupt politicians may
be reluctant to see a fellow politician sent to court for fear of setting a precedent that
might result in their own subsequent impeachment.
Worryingly, the trend in many countries in the last few years has been for politicians
to respond to increasingly active judiciaries by changing the law, strengthening immunity
and further insulating themselves from prosecution. In June 2003 the Italian government
pushed through legislation to expand immunity for a handful of senior political figures,
including the prime minister, who was at the time facing trial for corruption (see Boxes
6.3 and 6.4 on Italy, pages 95 and 97). In Kazakhstan, a new constitutional law came
into force in July 2000 that gave lifetime immunity – except for high treason – to the
country’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbaev (though not to future presidents). In
Kyrgyzstan, a referendum in February 2003 strengthened the immunity of the president
and all members of parliament, while a law in June 2003 granted lifelong immunity
to President Askar Akayev and to two former Communist Party bosses who led the
country during the Soviet era.
The French government also initiated parliamentary proceedings in mid-2003 to
change the constitution on the political accountability of the president. In response
to the controversy over President Jacques Chirac’s immunity during his first term of
office, following a series of corruption allegations relating to the time before he became
president,2 the government took steps to clarify the law on the issue. While introducing
an impeachment procedure for ‘non-respect of duties’ (which is not clearly defined),
the new legislation will clearly affirm the president’s legal immunity while in office –
during his time in office it will not be possible to prosecute the president for offences
committed before he entered office.3 The proposal would replace the current
impeachment proceedings, which are a mixture of judicial and political provisions, by
a purely political procedure (with the two houses of parliament acting as a high court).
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At the end of his term in office, however, the president will return to being an ordinary
citizen before the law.
It is not only national politicians who enjoy a special legal status – political leaders
of intergovernmental organisations may also possess immunity. What is more, the
leaders of international bodies often do not face elections, which serve in many countries
as the final ‘fuse wire mechanism’ for corrupt politicians. In the case of the European
Commission (EC), however, the immunity of former commissioner Edith Cresson was
lifted and in March 2003 she was charged with fraud, forgery and abuse of confidence.
So far she is only facing legal procedures in Belgium, where the EC’s headquarters are
located, but the EC is also investigating the case, which could result in a trial before
the European Court of Justice. The need to strengthen political accountability, particularly
in cases of abuse of power and misuse of public funds, applies as much to international
as to national politicians.
Facilitating extradition
The anachronism of extensive immunity is reinforced by the difficulty of implementing
the appropriate legal tools for transnational prosecution of senior politicians. In some
cases the challenge of prosecuting a corrupt politician who has escaped from a country’s
jurisdiction is next to impossible. Political asylum permitted corrupt former dictators,
such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier of Haiti, to avoid justice.
Bettino Craxi, the longest-serving head of a post-war government in Italy, escaped to
Tunisia in 1994 after being convicted on multiple corruption charges. He died in 2000
in Tunisia, which has no extradition agreement with Italy. Peru’s former president,
Alberto Fujimori, left for Japan in 2000 and still lives there, in spite of an ongoing
campaign for his extradition, which Japan has rejected (see Box 6.2, ‘Campaigning for
Fujimori’s extradition’, page 94). Most recently Madagascar’s former president Didier
Ratsiraka went into exile in France, avoiding the 10 years of hard labour to which a
Madagascar court sentenced him in August 2003 for theft of public funds.4 These cases,
as well as the prominent attempt to prosecute Augusto Pinochet for human rights
abuses, have revealed current extradition arrangements to be far too cumbersome.
There have been some recent improvements in the legal tools to prosecute
transnational crime, even if their implementation remains in doubt.5 The European
Arrest Warrant (EAW), on which political agreement by EU ministers was reached in
December 2001, is the first concrete measure in criminal law that implements the
principle of mutual recognition. For 32 specific criminal offences, including corruption,
the EAW bypasses the need for bilateral extradition treaties, abolishing the role of
political approval and traditional extradition procedures. EU member states have a
deadline of December 2003 to pass the proposal into national laws, but there is likely
to be a delay.6
However, it is unclear how the EAW will operate in practice. The EAW assumes
mutual trust between countries in legal decisions, but there is no consensus on minimum
standards of civil rights protection7 – and judicial determination of these issues is not
allowed because of an EU intergovernmental rule that provides for a slow build-up of
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Notes
1. Véronique Pujas is research fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
and teaches at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, France.
2. Allegations have been made of Chirac’s involvement in several apparent cases of
corruption relating to his time as mayor of Paris (1977–95), including: vote-rigging; a
fake job scam in which activists from his former RPR party were allegedly paid by the
Paris town hall; illegal financing of the RPR through a system of illegal commissions
paid by building companies involved in municipal contracts; luxury foreign trips for
himself, his family and friends financed by used banknotes of unclear origin; and the
reimbursement of more than US $1 million of personal grocery bills during his time
as mayor.
3. According to the proposed amendment to the constitution, ‘During his mandate, the
president cannot be required to give testimony before any jurisdiction or administrative
authority, nor be the object of an inquiry, investigation or pursuit.’
4. Le Monde (France), 11 August 2003; CNN.com, 7 August 2003.
5. A number of key conventions have still not been ratified by all member countries, for
example the 1995 and 1996 European Conventions on Extradition.
6. www.euobserver.com, 9 September 2003.
7. This concern applies to the right to multinational defence teams; the right to legal aid;
the right to sufficient time and opportunity for the preparation of the defence and the
due process of law; the right to access records; and undisturbed communication and
correspondence with the defence attorney.
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8. For example, in June 2003 an EU–US agreement was signed. Supplementing bilateral
agreements, it covers mutual legal assistance, ranging from cooperation on exchange
of banking information to joint investigative teams. See www.euobserver.com
9. Several dozen countries have apparently signed such agreements. See www.hrw.org/
campaigns/icc/us.htm and www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissuesimpunityagreem.
html
10. Final round of negotiations in Vienna, 21 July–1 August 2003.
Country Developments
Positive
developments
Nepal The Impeachment Act was amended in September 2002 allowing the
commission for investigation of abuse of authority to initiate proceedings
against the prime minister and against members of parliament without
first having to consult with the speaker.
Nicaragua Former president Arnoldo Alemán’s immunity was overturned by a vote
in parliament in December 2002.
Zambia The supreme court validated a parliamentary vote that stripped former
president Frederick Chiluba of his immunity in February 2003.
Negative
developments
Azerbaijan In December 2002 parliament gave partial approval to a legislative
amendment that would allow former parliamentarians to retain their
diplomatic passports, which guarantee immunity while the holder is
abroad. The amendments still have to pass two more voting procedures.
France The government proposed legislation on the president’s immunity in
mid-2003, setting out a procedure for impeachment in case of ‘non-
respect of duties’. However, the proposal would also affirm the president’s
immunity while in office, including for crimes committed before entering
office.
Greece Legislation approved in February 2003 stipulates that government
officials cannot be prosecuted, investigated or imprisoned without the
consent of parliament. The new law gives parliament power to halt
investigations and imposes a strict statute of limitations on prosecutions.
Guatemala Legislation approved in December 2002 gives the congressional
commissions unlimited time to decide whether to lift the immunity of
the accused, except in the cases of judges or magistrates, when a decision
must be taken within two months.
Italy June 2003 legislation grants immunity from trial to five key office-holders,
including the prime minister, while in office. The immunity applies to
all crimes, even those committed before their terms of office began.
Kyrgyz Republic A law passed in June 2003 grants lifelong immunity from prosecution
to the first (and current) president and two former Communist Party
first secretaries who are now parliamentarians.
aDevelopments from the period July 2002–June 2003, taken from the 34 country reports included in Chapter 8
of this volume.
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Sua Rimoni Ah Chong, the former controller and chief auditor of Samoa in the South Pacific,
faced serious threats when he exposed financial crime at the highest levels of government.
From 1992 to 1995 Ah Chong refused to authorise illegal payments to cabinet ministers.
When in 1994 his annual report to parliament implicated six out of 13 ministers over
improper activities and payments, the cabinet appointed a commission of inquiry, not
into the irregularities, but into the chief auditor. The committee’s members included many
of the people criticised in Ah Chong’s report.
Ah Chong paid a high price for standing up to corrupt ministers. He was suspended
in July 1995 and later, after the constitution was amended for that purpose, dismissed.
He is still fighting a legal battle against his suspension and dismissal. Receiving the award,
Chong said it would send a clear message to his government that ‘there was no place for
corruption in society’ and encourage other Samoans to stand up against graft.
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international immunity on him as well, since Japanese law does not permit the extradition
of its nationals. Fujimori had found a safe haven from the enormous charges against him.
Despite numerous requests by the Peruvian government in the past three years, the
Japanese government has shown no sign of a change of mind.
In April 2003 a campaign began to raise awareness of the need for Japan to surrender
the fugitive former president to justice. The ‘Fujimori Extraditable’ campaign was initiated
by the Peru Solidarity Network (which includes the National Coordinating Committee
for Human Rights in Peru), Amnesty International and Peace Boat, and is supported by a
number of Japanese and international organisations (including Transparency International).
The campaign’s spearhead is a website, with information in Spanish, English and Japanese:
www.fujimoriextraditable.com.pe.
As the former special state attorney in charge of the Fujimori and Montesinos
investigations, I visited Tokyo to explain in public presentations and meetings with the
Japanese authorities precisely why the ex-president is wanted in Peru. The same demand
was made in May 2003 to the general assembly of the 11th International Anti-corruption
Conference which, in its conclusions, exhorted the government of Japan to hand Fujimori
over for trial.
In July 2003 the Peruvian authorities presented the Japanese authorities with the first
formal request for Fujimori’s extradition, based on charges of human rights violations. In
response, an official of the ministry of foreign affairs stated that Japan did not intend to
overturn its policy of not extraditing Japanese citizens. Peru’s foreign affairs minister
responded with a protest note and a warning that if Japan continued to refuse its request,
Peru would either appeal to the International Court of Justice in The Hague or open a
criminal case against Fujimori in the Japanese courts.
The day the extradition request was made in Tokyo, Peruvian NGOs demonstrated in
front of the Japanese Embassy in Lima. The ‘Fujimori Extraditable’ campaign will continue
over the coming months. In the latest phase of the campaign, NGOs around the world
are sending letters to the Japanese ministers of foreign affairs and justice, demanding
Fujimori’s extradition.
José Ugaz (president of Proética, Peru)
Box 6.3: New immunity law breaks with Italy’s constitutional history
A law passed in June 2003, which prevents five of the most senior public office-holders
in Italy – including the prime minister – from being charged with common crimes, runs
counter to the principles that have underpinned immunity law since the Italian constitution
was written.
• Members of parliament were given full immunity from prosecution for votes given,
and opinions expressed, during the performance of their duties as parliamentarians.
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Until the most recent change in the law, the various modifications to the rules on
immunity all reinforced two key principles implicit in the 1948 constitution:
(a) Those who make laws (parliament), as well as those with the power to check if laws
are constitutional (the constitutional court), and those who organise the judiciary
(the superior council of magistrates), should generally not be accountable for their
votes or opinions they express connected to their functions (though there are relevant
differences between the institutions). The rationale is to ensure them substantial
freedom to perform their duties. Apart from the members of the superior council of
magistrates, parliamentary authorisation is required for the most invasive summons
or orders (for example, arrest, phone interception or search and seizure).
(b) In contrast, members of the government should not have immunity, although
parliament should be able to deny authorisation for trials if it judges that an alleged
crime was committed in performance of duties for ‘reasons of state’. The rationale
for this lack of immunity is clear: those who implement the nation’s policies must
be accountable for what they do.
The 2003 law, which expands the immunity of the highest constitutional offices to prevent
them from being charged with common crimes, runs counter to these principles. Many
doubts have been raised about the constitutionality of this new law, and recently the
Milan court appealed to the constitutional court for a decision on the issue.2
Gherardo Colombo (deputy public prosecutor in Milan, Italy)
Notes
1. The Italian constitution calls for a strict separation of powers between legislature, executive and
judiciary.
2. The constitution is paramount in Italian law, and it is the constitutional court’s role to guarantee
this. It is possible to modify the constitution, but only by constitutional bills submitted to parliament
and to referendum.
On 14 September 2002, approximately half a million Italians took to the streets in Rome
in the name of freedom of information and the independence of the judiciary. The target
of their protest was Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, whom they accused of jeopardising
the basic principles of liberal democracy. The protesters expressed their opposition to
laws proposed, or passed, by the government on justice issues, which they believed were
intended to save the prime minister in the ongoing proceedings against him on corruption
charges. These laws depenalised some economic crimes and were expected to reduce
the independence of the judiciary.
The protesters also claimed that freedom of information was under attack. The lack of
an effective law on conflict of interest in Italy (and the failure of the previous centre-left
government to pass one) had allowed Berlusconi to maintain control of his own media
empire after he was elected prime minister. Not only did he continue to own the three
main private television channels, controlled by Mediaset, but as head of government he
also controlled the three public television channels. This situation would be deemed
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Notes
1. Federazione Nazionale della Stampa, Press release 8 May 2003.
2. Usigrai, Press release 8 May 2003.
3. Federazione Nazionale della Stampa, Press release 21 May 2003.
4. See www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/committees/cult/cult20030707/501707en.pdf and www.
socialrights.org/en/news51.html
5. Giacomo Sani, Mass media e elezioni (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001).
6. www.osservatorio.it/cares_visual1.php?pub=archives
Abdelhaï Beliardouh was local correspondent for the daily El Watan at Tébessa, 600
kilometres southeast of Algiers. On 20 July 2002, he was kidnapped by a gang of armed
men. After beating him for several hours, the group finally released Beliardouh. El Watan
had run an article that day in which the journalist reported the alleged arrest of the
president of the local chamber of commerce and industry, an importer, ‘for having links
with terrorist networks’. The importer was immediately suspected of heading the gang
that attacked Beliardouh.
The incident enraged public opinion and drew condemnation from human rights
organisations, political parties and the media at home and abroad. Though Beliardouh
launched a legal action, the gang’s alleged ringleader was released. The only action taken
by the authorities was to strip the importer of his functions as president of the chamber
of commerce and industry.
Traumatised and discouraged, Beliardouh tried to take his life on 19 October by
swallowing acid. He spent a month in agony before dying on 20 November 2002.
In the last few years before his death, Beliardouh had become famous for his investigative
articles on the local criminal underworld, grand corruption practices in the import trade
and links with terrorism. The Tébessa region, on the Tunisian border, is notorious for
smuggling and persistent terrorism.
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States and businesses have become increasingly aware of the damage corruption causes
populations around the world. The dangerous combination of immunity from
prosecution and unlimited personal power allows corrupt leaders to devastate their
countries by systematic looting of their wealth. The drafting of the United Nations
Convention against Corruption is therefore timely (see ‘The UN Convention against
Corruption’, Chapter 7, page 111).2 Of particular interest is the convention’s chapter
on asset recovery.
Before turning to the convention’s salient provisions, it is worthwhile to examine
three of the most notorious cases of looting by heads of state in the past decade – and
the efforts made to repatriate the funds (see Box 1.1, ‘Where did the money go?’,
page 13). All three share a common feature in that they concern assets deposited in
Swiss banks. Strict banking secrecy once earned Switzerland notoriety as a safe haven
for illicit funds: one-third of the world’s illegal wealth was estimated, at one point, to
have been secreted with Swiss banks. The watershed legal action taken on behalf of
Holocaust victims in the late 1990s played a major role in opening up the Swiss banking
sector. With the appointment of uncompromising examining judges such as Carla del
Ponte and Bernard Bertossa, armed with powers to force disclosure and freeze assets,
Switzerland quickly developed a legal climate that now leads the global fight against
money laundering. While the transformation did not happen without complication
or criticism, Switzerland’s experience points the way forward for states that subscribe
to the new UN convention. In this regard, Switzerland’s admission to the UN in
September 2002 was another positive step.
Ferdinand Marcos
Repatriation was a major issue in the case of former president Ferdinand Marcos of the
Philippines, and his family. Only after protracted litigation did the Swiss authorities
finally agree to assist the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), a
non-judicial authority investigating the Marcos family. The decision was taken though
no charges had been brought against the Marcoses in the Philippines, where the
authorities were awaiting evidence from the Swiss. After considering whether assets held
in Swiss accounts would be returned to the Philippines, the Swiss supreme court ruled
that the assets should indeed be returned, but subject to the following requirements:
• The government of the Philippines must file a criminal charge and/or bring
forfeiture proceedings against the Marcoses within one year, failing which the assets
would be unfrozen.
• A Philippine court with appropriate criminal jurisdiction must hand down final
judgment confirming that the assets were stolen or illicit property to be confiscated
and returned to their rightful owner, the government of the Philippines.
• Any criminal prosecution and forfeiture proceedings must comply with the
procedural requirements of due process and rights of the accused under the Swiss
constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.
These stipulations prompted the PCGG’s chairman to criticise the Swiss law on
international legal assistance in criminal matters (EIMP) and to accuse the Swiss
authorities of attempting to thwart countries’ efforts to repatriate stolen funds. In the
end, the PCGG signed an agreement with the Swiss under which the ‘anticipatory
restitution’ provision of the EIMP was used to allow repatriation before final judgment
was obtained in the Philippines.4 The UN Convention would permit a similar step if
the requested state waives the requirement of a final judgment in the requesting state.5
There was, however, a further sting in the tail of the supreme court decision: the transfer
of assets, which amounted to some US $657 million, had to be made to an account in
the Philippine National Bank, over which the Zurich district attorney retained control,
including the choice of investments made. In this way, the Swiss authorities ensured
that the funds remained under their control until they were satisfied with the conduct
of the government of the Philippines. In August 2003, the Zurich attorney finally
announced the release of Marcos’ frozen assets to the government, five years after they
were deposited and 14 years after his death in Hawaii in 1989. The announcement
followed a ruling by the Philippine supreme court in July 2003 that the Marcos family
had ‘failed to justify the lawful nature of their acquisition’ of the Swiss funds.6 This is a
helpful ruling, the principle of which is incorporated in the UN Convention (see below).7
Sani Abacha
General Sani Abacha was military dictator of Nigeria from 1993 to 10 June 1998, when
he died suddenly of a heart attack. Estimates of the amount he looted during five years
in office vary from US $2 billion to US $5 billion. The upper limit represents about 10
per cent of Nigeria’s annual income from oil over five years.8 Abacha was replaced by
another military ruler, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who returned Nigeria to
democratic rule. Elections were held in early 1999 and Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn
in as president at the end of May of the same year.
Before Obasanjo took office, Abubakar’s interim government delivered a clear
message to the Abacha clan: Abacha had looted huge sums, and they had to be restored.
The government recovered some US $825 million and paid it into a special account at
the Bank of International Settlements in Basle, Switzerland. Most of this sum was later
spent on housing projects, education and allocations to Nigeria’s 36 states.
While a large amount was ‘voluntarily’ returned, more remained frozen in other
jurisdictions, including US $1.3 billion in Switzerland, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein.
Five years after Abacha’s death, none of this money has been returned and the Obasanjo
government is still trying to reach a settlement.
In April 2003, the Swiss supreme court handed down a judgment that rejected
numerous appeals by the Abachas’ lawyers, who had sought to prevent the transmission
of incriminating documents and, ultimately, the repatriation of the remaining funds.
The judgment stopped short of ordering their repatriation. As in the Marcos case, it
was preoccupied with ensuring that the defendants receive a fair trial and that their
human rights be observed. Following a meeting with the Swiss president in October
2003, however, Obasanjo announced that a mutual agreement had been reached
whereby the Swiss would soon repatriate the US $618 million frozen in Switzerland
against assurances from Nigeria that the returned funds would be devoted to improving
education, health, agriculture and infrastructure.
Box 6.6: The hunt for looted state assets: the case of Benazir Bhutto
Benazir Bhutto served twice as prime minister of Pakistan, and was twice removed for
widespread abuse of public office. Pakistani authorities were fortunate to obtain early
hard evidence implicating Bhutto and her family.
Key documents copied from the files of her lawyer in Switzerland revealed that significant
commissions were paid by contractors in a series of deals between shell offshore companies
and foreign corporations contracted by the government of Pakistan. In all cases, the
beneficial owners of the various companies were Bhutto family members, usually Asif Ali
Zardari, Bhutto’s husband, commonly known as ‘Mr Ten Per Cent’ during his wife’s first
term – and ‘Mr Forty Per Cent’ after he assumed the post of minister of investment during
her second.
In late 1997, Pakistan’s attorney general promptly sent requests for assistance to his
opposite numbers in Switzerland, Britain and the United States, three of the many countries
identified as having some connection with these commission contracts. Only Switzerland
provided swift and effective responses. The then Swiss attorney general, Carla del Ponte,
instructed the federal police in Berne to cooperate with the Pakistani authorities and
appointed judge Daniel Devaud in Geneva to take charge of judicial aspects of the
investigation.
There were several strands to the initial evidence, implicating different companies in
public contracts with Pakistan, each with a subset of offshore companies controlled by
Jens Schlegelmilch, the Bhutto family lawyer in Geneva. One of the earliest steps taken
was to identify Swiss bank accounts in the names of the Bhutto family, their front companies
and known associates, and to freeze any balances in them. The order resulted in the
freezing of no fewer than 500 separate accounts containing in excess of US $80 million,
funds that remain frozen to this day.
The gap between freezing funds and repatriating them to another country is formidable,
as Pakistan was just starting to discover.
For Switzerland to transfer the blocked funds to Pakistan required a conviction in
Pakistan against Bhutto, her husband and possibly others for an offence that would allow
judge Devaud to order the transfer. Alternatively, Bhutto would have had to be convicted
in Switzerland for an offence giving rise to similar powers.
In July 2003, after more than five years, Devaud convicted Bhutto and her husband of
money laundering, sentencing them to six months’ imprisonment suspended for three
years, and ordered the transfer to Pakistan of some US $12 million.1 His decisions are now
under appeal, and may take another year to resolve.
Examining why it took so long to arrive at this still-not-final result sheds light on what
obstacles could be encountered in similar situations.
From the half a dozen offences disclosed by the initial documents, Devaud deliberately
selected one in which those paying the commissions were Swiss companies. This tactic
enabled him to investigate and seize within Switzerland documents covering all aspects
of the offence, whether from the companies or from Bhutto’s lawyer. In this way, he did
not need to rely on assistance from other countries.
Corruption was not a criminal offence in Switzerland until 2001, long after the frozen
accounts had been filled with cash. But money laundering was an offence. Provided that
Bhutto and Zardari could be prosecuted in Pakistan, anyone dealing with the corrupt
proceeds could be indicted in Switzerland. Accordingly, Devaud issued indictments against
five parties: Bhutto and Zardari outside Switzerland, and Schlegelmilch and the responsible
executives of two Swiss companies within his own jurisdiction. Backed with the indictments,
he ordered the seizure of documents and sought to interrogate the accused as investigating
magistrate.
At an early date, he ordered that Pakistan be a ‘civil party’ to the proceedings, as the
victim of the alleged criminal activity. The commissions paid as bribes for the benefit of
Bhutto, her husband and mother should have been accounted to the Republic of Pakistan,
whose interests Bhutto had been bound to protect. As a civil party, the Pakistani authorities
would have access to the entire file of the proceedings, and could be compensated for
any losses established.
Devaud’s judgments on what became known as the SGS-Cotecna case disclose that,
during Bhutto’s first term of office, the Swiss company Cotecna was awarded a contract
by Pakistan’s ministry of finance to take over pre-shipment inspection of goods entering
Karachi port. Cotecna had agreed to pay a commission of 6 per cent of the contract
receipts to Mariston Securities Inc., an offshore company formed by Schlegelmilch and
beneficially owned by Bhutto’s mother. Mariston received US $1.2 million before the
contract was terminated after Bhutto was first ejected from office.2
On her return in 1993, Bhutto appointed herself minister of finance. A contract with
similar terms was awarded to SGS, a Swiss inspection company that owned much of
Cotecna and had agreed to share both the revenue – and the obligation to pay bribes.
Schlegelmilch created a new offshore company, Bomer Finance Inc., whose beneficial
owner was Zardari, though Bhutto controlled its assets. Two other companies were
involved: Mariston and Nassam Overseas Inc., a company beneficially owned by Bhutto’s
then brother-in-law. The commission between them rose to 9 per cent. Additionally,
Schlegelmilch himself was to receive a commission of 1.25 per cent of contract receipts.
The SGS–Cotecna contract took effect from 1 January 1995, and large sums were paid
to both companies over the next two years. Schlegelmilch made sure that the commissions
were duly paid to the various Bhutto front companies, aggregating US $12 million. All
the payments – including date, amount, payer and payee – are set out in Devaud’s decisions.
More than US $5 million was transferred to another front company, Hospital of the
Middle East Inc. With access to bank records, Devaud was able to freeze the accounts
and trap nearly all the money paid by the Swiss companies. But the final nail in the Bhutto
coffin was the purchase of a diamond necklace worth £117,000 (US $195,000) from
David Morris, a leading London jeweller. To pay for it, Bhutto had drawn £90,000 (US
$150,000) from Bomer Finance’s bank account.3
The six-month suspended sentence against Bhutto and her husband may seem light
for such serious offences, but they were the maximum Devaud could exact. With the
appeals now filed, the superior court can impose much tougher sanctions.
Devaud also ordered Bhutto and her husband to pay Pakistan the aggregate of the bribes
they had received. He further ordered forfeiture of all the remaining funds of the companies
and the transfer of the diamond necklace to Pakistan. By his calculation, this left Pakistan
short by US $250,000, which the two were ordered to pay forthwith. When these funds
reach Pakistan, they will constitute a first in terms of a state recovering directly sums paid
by way of bribes to responsible politicians.
The bribes paid in the SGS–Cotecna case are large, but they pale into insignificance
against the harm suffered by Pakistan as a direct result of these corrupt contracts. Pakistan
is estimated to have lost more than US $2 billion in tariff revenues as a consequence of
the greed of Bhutto and her family.
Jeremy Carver (Clifford Chance law firm, Britain)
Notes
1. Devaud similarly convicted Schlegelmilch with a four-month term of imprisonment, but he was
unable to forfeit the proceeds from the corrupt contracts because corruption was not then a
criminal offence in Switzerland, as it was in Pakistan. An unofficial translation of Devaud’s three
decisions can be found on the website of Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau: www.nab.gov.pk
2. The Cotecna contract with Pakistan created a public scandal because of appalling performance
by Cotecna. Tariff receipts by the ministry of finance dropped alarmingly. A public investigation
blamed Cotecna for the loss of more than US $1 billion of revenue.
3. Through her spokespeople, Bhutto has denied involvement in the purchased necklace, indeed
in all the facts uncovered by Devaud. But she steadfastly refuses to participate in the proceedings,
save through the press, claiming that Devaud is politically motivated.
One set of provisions aims to get states to require domestic financial institutions
to adopt stringent ‘know your customer’ procedures, particularly in regard to those
‘entrusted with prominent public functions and their family members and close
associates’ to whom ‘enhanced scrutiny’ provisions should apply. The package addresses
many of the core issues associated with abuse of office, lax banking controls and the
use of offshore banks. If every country were to pass legislation giving effect to these
measures – and ensure their proper enforcement – opportunities for looting would be
radically reduced.10
The chapter also addresses the recovery of property under individual states’ domestic
laws and through international cooperation on confiscation. Again, the aim is to
encourage states to ensure that domestic law permits courts to order those who have
committed offences established under the convention to pay compensation or damages
to states that have been harmed by those offences.11
Further measures concern the freezing or seizure of property in a requested state,
once competent authorities in a requesting state have issued orders.12 These measures
contain the important provision, referred to above, that such orders should enable the
requested state to take action on the basis of ‘reasonable belief’ that there are sufficient
grounds for the requesting state to take such actions and that the property will eventually
be subject to an order of confiscation.13 In addition, the requested state can take action
simply on the grounds of reasonable belief – without the competent authority in the
requesting state having to issue a freezing or seizure order.14 This provision envisages
a situation that approximates the procedure in Switzerland, where prosecuting magistrates
can take action to freeze assets on the basis of reasonable belief, without court orders
from requesting states. This situation contrasts sharply with the position in Britain, where
the Home Office will not take action unless it is satisfied that criminal charges have
been brought in the requesting country, and that those criminal charges are properly
filed. Subsequent delays tend to favour the malefactor, who may use the time to move
funds elsewhere.
The UN Convention also focuses on international cooperation for the purposes of
confiscation. A number of its provisions deal with the submission of requests, but they
place a positive obligation on the requested state to take measures to identify, trace and
freeze or seize the proceeds of crime. Each signatory must furnish copies of all laws and
regulations giving effect to this set of provisions and any subsequent changes to the
UN secretary-general.15
Furthermore, each signatory of the convention is to take measures to permit it to
forward information on illicitly acquired assets to another signatory without prior
request, as long as it considers the disclosure of such information helpful to the initiation
or carrying out of investigations that might lead to a request.16 The convention also
tracks the setting up of financial intelligence units (FIUs) in countries belonging to the
Egmont Group, whose members exchange information on money laundering.17 States
that have not already done so are encouraged to set up FIUs.18
With respect to the return and disposition of assets, the convention sets out the
requirement for requested signatories to return embezzled public funds to requesting
signatories. The concept of repatriation has led to considerable difficulties, as highlighted
in the three cases cited above. A requested signatory can waive the requirement of a
final judgment being given in the requesting signatory’s courts and return property when
the requesting signatory ‘reasonably establishes its prior ownership of … confiscated
property to the requested state party; or when the requested state party recognises
damage to the requesting state party as a basis for returning the confiscated property’.19
This provision resembles existing procedures in Switzerland that enable the criminal
courts to confer ‘damaged’ status on a civil party (including countries) and order
confiscation of assets and repatriation to the ‘damaged’ country.20
Some of the provisions described above have undergone significant changes since
they appeared in the earlier draft of the convention, and further changes may be
adopted after this writing.
Regardless of these changes, however, the chapter on asset recovery clearly sets out
to encourage countries to establish comprehensive regimes of mutual legal assistance
that are designed to be as helpful as possible to requesting countries. It is only hoped
that requested countries will take heed and observe the spirit as well as the letter of the
aims of the chapter, making it increasingly difficult for rogue heads of state to pillage
their citizens and get away with it.
Notes
1. Tim Daniel founded the public international law group at the law firm Kendall Freeman
in London and has represented the government of Nigeria in major litigation for 25
years.
2. During the latter half of 2003, the precise formulation of the draft UN Convention against
Corruption was debated in Vienna. At this writing, the final document was to be open
for signature in Mexico in December 2003.
3. See Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s
Congo (New York: HarperCollins, 2002).
4. Article 74 of the EIMP.
5. Article 61.3 (a) and (b).
6. Sunday Mail (Australia), 6 August 2003. The article states that Imelda Marcos has appealed
this decision, claiming that she and her three children were deprived of due process:
this appeal does not appear to be delaying the handover of funds.
7. Article 67 bis, paragraph 2 (a).
8. This information is based on evidence presented to the International Development
Committee, a British parliamentary select committee, which published its fourth report
(on corruption) on 22 March 2001.
9. Articles of the chapter on asset recovery (chapter V) are discussed in the order in which
they appear in the draft convention. The numbering is not sequential: 64, 65, 67, 67
bis, 60, 60 bis, 68, 61 and 66.
10. Article 65.
11. Article 67.
12. Article 67 bis.
13. Article 67 bis, paragraph 2 (a).
14. Article 67 bis, paragraph 2 (b).
15. Article 60.
16. Article 68.
Part two
Global, regional and country reports
TI 03 chap05 6/1/04 16:15 Page 110
TI 03 chap05 6/1/04 16:15 Page 111
The major global issue to take shape in the period from July 2002 to June 2003 was the
negotiation of the UN Convention against Corruption. Regionally, the African Union
adopted a convention that promises to reduce bribery and the EU prepared for the
accession of 10 Central and East European countries, with important implications for
the ongoing fight against corruption. Debate continues on the possible amendment
of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, even as it is being implemented. Finally, the
US government presented proposals for the Millennium Challenge Account, which
will place a country’s corruption record centre stage in the decision-making on aid.
Two years of negotiations were coming to an end as this report went to press, with
indications that a text would be agreed for the proposed UN Convention against
Corruption in time for it to be signed in Mexico in December 2003.
Successful negotiation of the convention will create the first global instrument
embracing a comprehensive range of anti-corruption measures to be taken at the
national level. It will also enhance international cooperation regarding corruption
prevention and enforcement.
In 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Declaration against Corruption
and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions. It later negotiated the UN
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, which came into force in September
2003. Though both address corruption in a specific context, it was recognised that a
comprehensive international instrument against corruption was still needed. In
December 2000, the UN General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc committee
to negotiate a more general anti-corruption convention.
Delegates at the first negotiating session in January 2002 expressed the view that
the convention should be binding, effective, efficient and universal, and that it should
be a flexible and balanced instrument taking into account the legal, social, cultural,
economic and political differences between countries, as well as their different levels
of development. Whether the new UN convention will live up to these expectations
remains to be seen – it is expected to enter into force at the end of 2005 at the earliest.
not adequately deal with cases involving officials of international public organisations,
however, as there is no ‘home government’ to take responsibility. The General Assembly’s
draft resolution to adopt the convention text drew attention to this point and it seems
likely that a protocol will be proposed to deal with it after consultations with interna-
tional organisations, which some delegations perceived as too eager to claim immunity
for their officials.
Mandatory criminal sanctions in the convention include embezzlement by public
officials, liability of legal persons and laundering of proceeds of crime, as well as certain
ancillary offences and remedies; the latter include obstruction of justice, participation
and attempt, freezing, seizure and confiscation, waiver of bank secrecy and protection
of witnesses and victims. Optional offences include trading in influence, concealment,
abuse of functions, illicit enrichment and bribery, and embezzlement in the private sector.
Unfortunately, the protection of reporting persons (or whistleblowers) is not mandatory.
Final provisions
The most important of the final provisions is the threshold for entry into force of the
convention. Opposing camps advocated 20 ratifications on the one hand, and 40 on
the other. There are precedents for each in UN instruments, but the UN Convention
on Transnational Organized Crime, which has influenced the new convention’s wording
in a number of respects, had a threshold of 40, which took more than two years to
achieve. Delegations finally reached a compromise of 30 for the UN Convention on
Corruption.
An overview
Throughout two years of negotiations, TI has stressed the importance of making adequate
provisions in relation to the private sector, where the Enron scandal, and others that
followed, seriously eroded confidence in financial markets; and in the political sphere,
where confidence has been dissipated by the impunity of leaders such as former Peruvian
president Alberto Fujimori and Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, and by suspicions
of influence-buying in the energy and arms sectors.
For the first time a convention provides a framework – albeit not mandatory – for
criminalising bribery in the private sector and for measures to improve business integrity.
But as mentioned earlier, the convention fails to adequately address the issue of political
corruption. It also relies too heavily on non-mandatory wording and, in relation to
international cooperation, has tended to replicate the corresponding provisions in the
UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, rather than to improve on them.
Of most concern, however, is that the new convention gives too little guidance to the
Conference of States Parties on what forms of monitoring should be adopted.
More positively, the decision of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime – under whose
auspices the convention was negotiated – to promote a global campaign of public
service announcements on television to raise awareness of corruption, is most welcome.
If the convention spurs national governments to do more in this direction, public
support for greater efforts to curb corruption will be enhanced, improving the chances
for the convention’s implementation.
Note
1. Peter Rooke is a member of the board of directors for Transparency International and
director of projects at Transparency International Australia.
The UN Global Compact, which challenges business leaders to uphold nine universally
agreed principles on human rights, labour rights and respect for the environment, has
an increasingly important role to play in a world where globalisation blurs borders in
international relations and commerce. From its foundation in January 1999, the compact
is supported by more than 1,000 companies worldwide, representing a powerful force
for improving corporate responsibility.
The compact has highlighted the influence business can have in bringing about a more
sustainable and inclusive global economy where the rule of law is paramount. To ensure
that this important objective is realised, the issue of transparency in the way business is
conducted is crucial.
The Global Compact pursues transparency by asking participating companies to
publish annual reports on their activities in support of the nine principles. This is important
given the lack of robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the principles,
which are not legally enforceable standards. Many NGOs are critical of the Global
Compact for this reason; they argue that it allows companies to appear committed to
sound corporate governance, but does nothing to ensure there are real improvements
in business behaviour.
In the absence of an explicit principle on corruption, however, companies do not have
to report on how they are working to eliminate the scourge of corruption from their
business practices. This major loophole is why the biggest possibilities within the compact
still lie ahead. The UN Convention against Corruption, at this writing due for completion
in December 2003, gives the issue of corruption more prominence within the UN system
and raises the possibility of an explicit principle on corruption and transparency being
incorporated within the Global Compact. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has indicated
that the signing of the convention in Mexico in late 2003 provides an opportunity for a
10th principle to be incorporated into the compact.
The Global Compact office has already started to prepare the ground for a 10th principle
on transparency and against corruption, making it the subject of discussion with stakeholders
in December 2002, and of its advisory council in July 2003. An evaluation of the possibility
of a 10th principle was conducted at the Global Compact Learning Forum meeting in
December 2002 in Berlin. Reactions from businesses, unions and governments were
mixed: some argued that realisation of all of the principles involved an element of
transparency and that a 10th principle was therefore not necessary.
But the fact that corruption hinders the realisation of the rights enshrined in all of the
other principles lends more, not less, weight to the claim that an explicit principle on
transparency is needed.
The Global Compact is already working on substantive projects related to corruption
and transparency. The working group on transparency and corruption has been tackling
bribery, antitrust, publishing data and related public policies, issues that are all addressed
in the UN Convention against Corruption.
A policy dialogue in 2001 on the ‘The role of the private sector in zones of conflict’,
for instance, produced a set of guidelines with detailed recommendations for civil society,
governments, businesses and multilateral institutions, aimed at eliminating corruption in
the arms trade.
By centring the issue of transparency and corruption as the focus of a 10th principle,
these and similar important efforts can only be strengthened.
Jermyn Brooks (Transparency International)
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was born out of the struggle for independence
of the 1950s and the early 1960s. Its short-term goals included abolishing apartheid
and assisting African countries in gaining full independence from their colonial rulers.
Under the spur of the pan-Africanists, the OAU also sought to realise the dream of a
united Africa.
In the post-World War II atmosphere of ideological bipolarisation between East and
West, some African leaders took sides while others opted for non-alignment. As African
countries were wooed by the superpowers, issues such as human rights, the rule of law
and public participation in decision-making were downgraded on the political agenda.
The leaders who had been a strong force in the struggle for independence (Kwame
Nkrumah in Ghana and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere), the powerful trade unions and the
successful multiparty systems were gradually replaced with one-party states and dicta-
torships. These regimes were mostly tolerated by cold war superpowers that regularly
fought wars by proxy throughout the continent, and in southern Africa in particular.
Mobutu Sese Seko was one such dictator who plundered the resource-rich Zaire (now
Democratic Republic of Congo) for more than 30 years with the tacit approval of some
of his backers in Western capitals. Anti-corruption initiatives were on no one’s agenda.
Moreover, the word ‘corruption’ was taboo, even within the international financial
institutions (IFIs).
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the leadership vacuum in many countries
became exposed to populations that increasingly demanded democracy, human rights
and public participation. Corrupt leaders could no longer hide behind the coat-tails of
their foreign sponsors, for whom most of the African continent had become less stra-
tegically important. As IFIs and bilateral donors began applying pressure for good
governance and democratisation, African states recognised the need to strike a balance
between the state, private sector, civil society and the media.
Together with local pressure groups, international organisations like Amnesty Inter-
national mounted a continuous campaign against human right violations, but the
OAU only reacted in the early 1980s. Indeed, the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights came into force in 1986.
The 1990s saw a return to the multiparty system. Pressure from civil society, the
media and political parties quickly pushed corruption and governance issues to the fore.
The IFIs adopted a good governance agenda as part of structural adjustment programmes
(SAPs). This trend produced ambiguous results, since it not only entrenched calls for
more accountable governance, but also created mistrust of the good governance agenda
among those critical of the ravaging effects of SAPs. It was against this backdrop that
the OAU, predecessor of the new African Union (AU), was to seek a continental approach
to a problem that had taken on a magnitude similar to that of the human rights issue
in the 1980s.
to show beyond a reasonable doubt that wealth exceeds income. Nor does the prosecution
necessarily have to show that unjustified earnings are the result of corruption, as it is
automatically presumed that unjustified earnings derive from a corrupt source. If
implemented, such provisions are likely to face legal challenges, particularly in countries
where the presumption of innocence is constitutionally enshrined.
The convention also addresses the confiscation and forfeiture of corrupt proceeds,
bank secrecy, cooperation and mutual legal assistance. It calls on signatories to introduce
legislation on money laundering and commits them to require designated public
officials to declare their assets at the time of assumption of office, as well as during
and after their term.7 A last-minute inclusion in the convention, the provision on
political party funding states that each signatory is to ‘adopt legislative and other
measures to proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices
to finance political parties’ and to ‘incorporate the principle of transparency into
funding of political parties’.8
With respect to enforcement, the convention shall operate like an extradition treaty
among countries not already bound by them. Until it enters into force, however,
extradition is only possible between states that have bilateral or multilateral treaty
arrangements.
The convention also lays the groundwork for recognition by signatories of civil
society and the media, committing signatories to ‘fully engage in the fight against
corruption and related offences and the popularisation of this convention with the full
participation of the media and civil society at large’. States are to draw up individual
legal frameworks that would permit civil society and the media to be integrated into
this process. These statutes should take into consideration the role defined for civil
society in article 12, namely that civil society and the media should be encouraged to
hold governments to the highest levels of transparency and accountability; to participate
in the monitoring process and be consulted in the implementation of the AU convention;
and to be given access to information in cases of corruption and related offences on
condition that the dissemination of such information does not adversely affect the
investigation process and the right to a fair trial. Despite these guidelines, and in view
of the fact that the present climate tends to brand civil society and the media as
opposition groups in many countries, it may be some time before their role becomes
entrenched in the statute books. Similar provisions in the sub-regional Southern African
Development Community Protocol against Corruption have also proven too ‘loose’ to
provide for a clearly defined oversight function for civil society.
Whistleblowers are also addressed in the convention, which requires signatories to
‘adopt legislative and other measures to protect informants and witnesses in corruption
and related offences, including protection of their identities’ and to ‘adopt measures
that ensure citizens report instances of corruption without fear of consequent reprisals’.
Nonetheless, these efforts to ensure whistleblower protection may be undermined by
a provision calling on signatories to ‘adopt national legislative measures in order to
punish those who make false and malicious reports against innocent persons in
corruption and related offences’. Other forms of redress, such as civil action, normally
suffice in such situations.
It should be noted that the convention’s procedure permits any signatory to opt
out of some or all issues. Under article 24, states may announce reservations (based on
article 15) on one or more provisions deemed incompatible with the object and purposes
of the convention. A state may maintain this reservation until circumstances permit
its withdrawal. Under article 26, states are also entitled to denounce the convention
in its entirety, by notifying the chairperson of the commission with six months’ notice.
Regardless of its apparent imperfections, the convention represents the first universal
framework for the fight against corruption for member states of the AU. The challenge
now is for African governments to show political will to implement – and enforce –
the AU convention against corruption. Active lobbying by African media and civil
society organisations can positively influence this process. Additional pressure from
international actors could contribute to the impact of what amounts to Africa’s first
continental structure for combating corruption within each state’s sovereign borders.
Notes
1. Akere Muna is chairman of TI Cameroon.
2. Other sources of inspiration for the drafting of the AU convention are the 1990 Declaration
on the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World and Their Implications for
Africa; the 1994 Cairo Agenda for Action Re-launching Africa’s Socio-economic Trans-
formation; and the Plan of Action against Impunity adopted by the 19th ordinary session
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1996 and subsequently
endorsed by the 64th ordinary session of the Council of Ministers held in Yaoundé,
Cameroon. The most recent impetus for the convention came from the 37th ordinary
session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Lusaka,
Zambia, in July 2001, as well as the declaration adopted by the first session of the Assembly
of the Union held in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, relating to the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development, or NEPAD, which calls for the setting up of a coordinated
mechanism to combat corruption effectively.
3. The convention was initially approved by the AU’s ministerial conference in Addis Ababa
on 18–19 September 2002. It was later approved by the executive council in N’djamena,
Chad, on 5–6 March 2003.
4. Article 2.
5. Article 11.
6. Article 4 (d).
7. Articles 6 and 7.
8. Article 10 (a) and (b).
9. The procedure for amending the convention is a three-stage process: (1) a signatory must
submit a written request to the chairperson of AU commission; (2) the chairperson must
circulate the proposed amendment to signatories, granting reviewers a period of at least
six months from the circulation date; (3) a two-thirds majority is required for the
amendment to enter into force.
As the day approaches when 10 East European states join the European Union (EU),
the question that continues to be asked – by existing members as well as the candidate
states themselves – is: ‘Are they ready?’2
The question is no longer so concerned with technical details of harmonisation
with the acquis communautaire. From the candidates’ point of view, doubts over their
ability to compete in a single market are coming to the fore. For the European
Commission, corruption represents one of the most urgent items on the agenda. Yet a
closer look reveals that, with respect to corruption, the question of preparedness involves
an urgent need for reform within the EU itself.
The Commission has repeatedly identified corruption as a serious problem in at least
half of the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In a speech marking
the release of the 2002 Regular Reports on candidates’ preparedness for accession,
Commission President Romano Prodi labelled corruption an ‘extremely serious’ problem
that must be tackled before accession.3
The Commission’s unease about corruption in prospective new member states can
be traced to two main sources. First, corruption undermines fulfilment by candidate
states of the Copenhagen criteria, which were laid down in 1993 by the European
Council as the basic conditions for EU membership. The Copenhagen criteria comprise
three main categories: political criteria (stable, functioning democratic institutions),
economic criteria (a functioning market economy) and the ability of the candidate
state to fulfil the obligations of membership (in other words, the capacity to implement
the acquis).
Second, the Commission is influenced by the perception that corruption is more
widespread in candidate countries than in existing member states. This perception is
underpinned by arguments explaining why countries in post-communist transition
suffer from high levels of corruption; it is also supported by data such as Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which indicates that these countries do
indeed experience higher levels of corruption. Nonetheless, the amount of incontro-
vertible research that might substantiate these fears is very small.
Irrespective of how post-communist countries compare to Western Europe, a recent
report by the EU Accession Monitoring Program of the Open Society Institute (OSI)
underlines the serious extent of corruption in most candidate states.4 According to
OSI, corruption flourishes in the majority of the future member states of Central and
Eastern Europe. Moreover, in addition to sharing the European Commission’s worries
about corruption in areas such as public administration, the OSI report emphasises the
critical problem of corruption in areas on which the Commission has not often focused.
In particular, OSI finds that corruption in the creation of laws and rules – or ‘state
capture’ – is widespread; the European Commission has paid more attention to the speed
of legislative processes than to the quality of such processes. OSI points to public
procurement, political party financing, patronage networks and conflicts of interest as
areas where problems are more serious than the Commission acknowledges.
Further complications stem from a public culture that – although it often condemns
corruption and exhibits strong perceptions of corruption – regularly tolerates corrupt
behaviour in the pursuit of political or individual interests. A lack of media independence
in most countries of the region – and the failure of regulators to regulate TV broadcasting
properly – combined with a lack of professionalism and resources in investigative
journalism across the region have led the dominant media to provide citizens with
inadequate information on the subject of corruption.
Although informed by the above considerations, the Commission has not adopted
a clear approach to corruption in candidate countries or formulated a set of assumptions
about the roots of corruption or the policies needed to deal with it. Nor has the
instruments for tackling corruption among public officials – has been an EU priority
in candidate countries, as has reform of systems of financial control and audit.
For several reasons, however, the real impact of the EU on anti-corruption policy
in the future member states has been less convincing.
First, the Commission has tended to focus on issues of criminal law and enforcement,
which elicits the criticism that bribery provisions and post hoc solutions to corruption
are only marginally effective and that priority should be given to prevention rather
than punishment. This is especially the case in countries with a recent history of one-
party control, where establishing the independence of enforcement institutions (the
police, investigation offices and courts) is a long-term and difficult process vulnerable
to abuse for political ends.
Second, although the Commission has made national anti-corruption strategies a
condition for accession, it has provided little guidance as to their contents. In recognition
of this shortfall, Brussels recently produced an unofficial list of principles to serve as a
model for countries seeking EU assistance in developing anti-corruption strategies,
which formed the basis for a recent ‘Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee
on a Comprehensive EU Policy against Corruption’.5
Third, even in areas where EU regulations and requirements appear to have a clear
anti-corruption component, the impact of these instruments is doubtful. For example,
though the requirements of EU public procurement directives clearly have anti-corruption
implications, their primary objective is to ensure a single market – not to fight corruption.
In the area of financial control and audit, the experience of EU member states clearly
demonstrates that EU instruments cannot be relied on to ensure an effective system of
control in member countries. A recent report by the British National Audit Office noted
a 75 per cent rise in detected fraud involving EU funds from 1999 to 2000.6 More
worrying, most of the increase was accounted for by better detection in the UK, and
in a number of countries no cases of fraud were detected at all. The EU’s own anti-fraud
convention, approved in 1995, was only ratified by the 15 member states in time to
come into effect in late 2002. While it provides the EU’s first common definition of
fraud, the convention imposes minimal requirements.
What these comments reflect is the fact that the EU itself lacks any clear framework
for dealing with corruption. Individual member states do not even provide information
on corruption in any systematic way. Recent reports by the Council of Europe’s Group
of States against Corruption (GRECO) – the only organisation monitoring the majority
of European states according to broad principles of anti-corruption policy – noted that
no overall statistics are available on corruption in Greece or Spain.7
The EU has been unable to persuade member states to adopt existing instruments.
For example, only three member states had ratified the Council of Europe’s Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption by the time it came into effect in July 2002.8 By contrast,
all but two of the CEE candidate states had done so by the same date.
There are several reasons why the EU lacks an anti-corruption framework. One is
that corruption has not been perceived as a phenomenon that significantly undermines
implementation of the acquis in existing member states. Even if it were, Brussels would
be unlikely to take the initiative in confronting corruption, which generally falls under
the purview of sovereign ministries such as justice and home affairs. As elsewhere, anti-
corruption developments in the EU do not come to fruition as speedily as hoped, mostly
due to the sensitivity of corruption as an issue, the interest political elites often have
in sustaining elements of corruption and the national resistance to external efforts to
introduce any legislation or reform. Importantly, unlike the accession candidates, EU
members lack incentives for adopting such frameworks.
The interest of political elites should not be regarded as hypothetical. There is
substantial evidence that numerous EU members are troubled by entrenched levels of
corruption, including the Elf Aquitaine affair and an alleged tradition of corruption in
public procurement in France; a spate of party financing scandals in Germany; and recent
revelations in Ireland and the Netherlands. Neither Italy, whose corruption problems
are well known, nor Austria is a member of GRECO, though all candidate states are. In
perception surveys, Greece and Italy are ranked as slightly more corrupt than the least
corrupt candidate states, Estonia and Slovenia.9 The GRECO report on Greece indicates
that the most corruption-plagued area is the allocation of EU funds.
The situation so far described involves important risks for the process of EU
enlargement. If the findings on post-communist countries cited earlier are reliable,
then 2004 will see a large number of countries with serious corruption problems join
a Union that lacks any real framework for tackling the problem. Since the Copenhagen
mandate ceases to apply to countries once they are admitted into the EU, the Commission
will no longer be able to require of the 10 accession states what it could never demand
of existing members.
Under these circumstances, the Commission is likely to cease applying the double
standards that have required anti-corruption policies of new members that were never
required of older members. The result will be an inability to pursue effective anti-
corruption policy across the entire enlarged Union. This is a serious cause for concern,
especially given the large increase in EU funds that new member states will be required
to distribute after 2004.
Policy implications
These worrying developments raise two major policy issues. One applies to the content
of anti-corruption policies in candidate countries; the other concerns the EU as a whole
and the need to establish a Union-wide approach to corruption.
To ensure effective anti-corruption policy in the CEE future member states, a degree
of cross-party consensus needs to be achieved. This process would be facilitated by
steps aimed at depoliticising anti-corruption policy as much as possible, for example
by restricting the application of the phrase ‘anti-corruption policy’ to policies whose
primary aim is to reduce corruption.
A second and absolutely vital precondition for creating more effective policies is the
conduct of more detailed research on corruption. One of the main lessons of the rush
of anti-corruption activity over the past 10 years is that anti-corruption policy needs
to be based on fact, rather than assumption or imported solutions. Effective anti-
corruption policies are unlikely to emerge without a detailed analysis of what the real
roots of corruption are in specific areas: for example, whether corruption is initiated
by officials or citizens, and whether it reflects an overall corrupt organisation culture
or individual actions of opportunism. Such research needs to go beyond standard surveys
to more detailed focus-group studies that incorporate various analytical approaches.
In designing anti-corruption policy, countries should concentrate on making standard
institutions and mechanisms work rather than creating new ones, unless there is a
very specific rationale for doing so. For instance, a decent internal audit may be far
more effective in preventing corruption in public administration than a special anti-
corruption body.
Regarding specific policy areas, future member states should pay particular attention
to the reform of legislative processes to make them less vulnerable to corruption. Such
reform can range from proper transparent consultation to parliamentary procedures
that ensure that each proposed amendment is adequately evaluated, and that voting
patterns are subject to public scrutiny.
In addition, public administration reform should be buttressed by two important
aspects that have not received sufficient attention in CEE countries. First, it is vital to
create a functioning system of redress in public administration, both to facilitate whistle-
blowing and to allow citizens a means of appealing effectively against administrative
decisions and actions. Second, reform of public administration should be based on
consensus rather than top-down imposition; for example, a number of countries have
imposed codes of ethics on the civil service (one of the criteria by which the Commission
assesses anti-corruption policy), though such codes will be ineffective unless they are
prepared through an extensive consultation process that allows officials to feel ownership
of them.
One area in which CEE countries have often pursued ineffective policies is conflict
of interest regulation. Their approach is often based only, or primarily, on declaring
certain combinations of functions illegal; however, an equally (if not more) important
aspect of such regulation is the duty to disclose potential conflicts of interest and
exclude oneself from decision-making in such cases. Such disclosure processes have been
developed only to a very limited extent, while enforcement of disclosure requirements
is poor across the entire region.
If corruption is to be tackled effectively in the area of public procurement, the
region must develop a more holistic approach to reform, one that goes beyond the
technical rules for running tenders and allocating bids. Such an approach needs to
include much more professional budget planning to ensure that needs are well defined;
integrity training for procurement officers on specific codes of conduct; and wider par-
ticipation in tender proceedings by external professional observers. Moreover, regulatory
bodies must be better equipped – with sufficient powers and sanctions – to supervise
not only the activities of public administration in procurement, but also the thorny
issue of private sector collusion.
Greater attention needs to be paid to creating systems of political party funding that
are less vulnerable to corruption. State funding to mitigate reliance of parties on business
for finance should be combined with maximum transparency of party funding and
regulation by an independent institution such as an electoral commission.
Last but not least, there is a clear need in many countries of the region to reform
the system of broadcasting regulation to increase the objectivity and independence of
television news and editorial activities. Such reforms need to be directed at completing
the transition from state-controlled to public service broadcasting, with regulators
designed to ensure minimum political influence on broadcasting and the maximum
enforcement of transparent broadcasting rules.
Notes
1. Quentin Reed is a consultant for OSI’s EU Accession Monitoring Program.
2. This study focuses on the 10 EU candidates of the former communist bloc. The acceding
states of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia are set to join the EU in May 2004; Bulgaria and Romania do not
have fixed dates, although the Commission has announced 2007 as the likely year of
accession. The three other candidates are Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.
3. ‘Enlargement – the final lap’, speech by Romano Prodi to the European Parliament,
Brussels, 9 October 2002; europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=
gt&doc=SPEECH/02/463|0|AGED&lg=EN&display=
4. OSI/EU Accession Monitoring Program, Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption
and Anti-corruption Policy, Budapest, 2002, www.eumap.org/reports/2002/content/50.
The OSI website is www.eumap.org
5. Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission to
the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee
on a Comprehensive EU Policy against Corruption’, COM (2003) 317 final, Brussels,
28 May 2003. See europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0317en01.pdf
6. UK National Audit Office, Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the Year 2000, Report
by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 859 Session 2001–2002, 8 May 2002.
7. GRECO, First Evaluation Round Evaluation Report on Greece adopted by GRECO at its
9th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 13–17 May 2002); Report on Spain Adopted by the
GRECO at its 5th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 11–15 June 2001). See www.greco.coe.int
8. Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal had ratified the convention by July 2002. Finland
is the only other EU country to have ratified it since then, in October 2002.
9. See for example Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2003
(page 282); www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.en.html
• Should governments set up specialised offices to handle foreign bribery cases? Such
offices could develop experienced staff capable of investigating and prosecuting
complex international cases.
• What steps can be taken to improve mutual legal assistance, particularly with
developing countries?
• Can procedures be developed to encourage the bringing of complaints by
companies that have lost orders to bribe-paying competitors or by other groups
or individuals interested in curbing corruption?
• What can be done to increase public awareness in both OECD countries and in
developing countries that foreign bribery is a crime?
Action to identify and overcome obstacles to enforcement should not wait for the
completion of the OECD’s Phase II reviews. Better understanding of the obstacles would
provide useful guidance for those reviews.
Monitoring enforcement
When the convention was adopted it was recognised that follow-up monitoring was
necessary, and that governments would be reluctant to prosecute their own companies
for foreign bribery unless they were assured that other governments would prosecute
their competitors. Peer-group monitoring provides the mutual discipline necessary to
ensure enforcement.
The first phase of OECD monitoring – reviewing the adequacy of national laws
passed to implement the convention – was successfully conducted between 1999 and
2001. The Working Group on Bribery identified deficiencies in the laws of many
countries, notably Japan and the UK. Governments had to return to their legislatures,
but most of the deficiencies have been corrected.
Phase II – monitoring national enforcement – began in 2001 with the goal of
reviewing all 35 signatories in five years. Because of inadequate funding, only four
countries were reviewed by the end of 2002. Increased funds were forthcoming for
2003–04 and 10 more countries are expected to be reviewed by the end of 2004.
TI and its national chapters played an active role in pressing the OECD and its
member governments to provide adequate funds for the monitoring process. Because
enforcement programmes require continuing political commitment, monitoring
enforcement must be organised as a long-term OECD project, with dependable funding.
The entire first round of reviews should be completed in 2006.
The first four reviews identified serious shortcomings, even in the United States,
which has more than two decades of enforcement expertise. To make up for the slow
start, the monitoring programme should focus first on the largest exporting countries.
Follow-up reviews are needed to ensure that identified deficiencies are corrected.
Governments must not be permitted to think that they will escape further scrutiny after
the first round of reviews.
Adequate staffing and preparation are key requirements for conducting effective
reviews. The review teams, made up of two countries acting as lead reviewers and of the
staff of the OECD Secretariat, must have experience with criminal law enforcement and
the capability to evaluate the effectiveness of corporate compliance programmes.
It is essential that OECD review teams meet with representatives of the private
sector and civil society – without the presence of representatives from the government
under review – in order to facilitate candid exchange. This is particularly important in
countries with inadequate enforcement programmes. Sound precedents for participa-
tion by NGOs were established during the first four Phase II reviews, in Finland, the
United States, Germany and Canada.
Because public opinion is needed to improve inadequate government enforcement,
the monitoring process should be as transparent as possible. In particular, government
responses to the OECD questionnaire should be publicly disclosed. Reports on country
reviews should be published without the lengthy delays that followed the US and
German reviews. Deficiencies in national enforcement should be clearly identified,
without diplomatic fudging.
Follow-up by civil society, private sector and media is essential. It is not enough to
publish the reports on an OECD website. Shortcomings identified in OECD reviews are
much more likely to be remedied if TI national chapters and other interested groups
take an active role in publicising the results of the review and press for corrective action.
There have been widespread allegations that multinational enterprises (MNEs) use their
foreign subsidiaries to pay bribes. Such concerns seriously undermine confidence in
the convention and must be addressed without further delay.
Objections have been raised, on jurisdictional grounds, to including subsidiaries based
in non-OECD states under the convention. There is a simpler solution: parent companies
in OECD countries can be required to assure that their controlled foreign subsidiaries
adopt anti-bribery compliance policies. MNEs generally have majority ownership in
most of their subsidiaries. Therefore, most foreign subsidiaries can be covered by such
a requirement without presenting jurisdictional concerns.
Traditional defences against parent company liability, based on the ‘corporate
separateness’ of subsidiaries, have largely been eroded in an age when all components
There is worldwide concern about bribes to political parties, party officials and candidates
for office. In this important area, unfortunately, the coverage of the convention is a
confusing and inadequate patchwork. The convention does not adequately address the
bribery of foreign political party officials who are not ‘public officials’. In particular,
paying a party official to influence government action is not covered at all. Some forms
of payment to party officials are covered, for example, when a party official is also a
public official, or when a public official directs that a payment should be made to a
political party or party official.
That some forms or political bribery may be prohibited is not enough, however,
because bribe payers and their lawyers can take advantage of the loopholes to avoid
the prohibition. Political party bribery is simply too important a subject to continue
with the current inadequate coverage. Because there is widespread concern about
political party corruption, there should be broad support for closing this loophole in
the convention.
In spring 2001, Transparency International submitted to the OECD the La Pietra
Recommendations calling for action prohibiting bribe payments to foreign political
parties. They proposed that bribery of political parties and party officials should be
covered in the same way that bribery of public officials is covered, that is, by prohibiting
payments ‘to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage’.
By prohibiting quid pro quo bribery, the convention would focus directly on
distortions of international competition without becoming involved with regulation
of political campaign financing.
While not on the OECD Council’s list of unresolved issues, the following issues also
need to be addressed.
• Bribery within the private sector has become transnational, as has bribery of
public officials. National laws covering commercial bribery usually do not cover
cross-border bribery.
• Privatisation has blurred the dividing line between the public and private sectors,
thereby providing opportunities for evading prohibitions that apply only to the
bribery of public officials.
• The private sector is substantially larger than the public sector in most countries.
By dealing only with bribery of public officials, the convention leaves large areas
of foreign bribery uncovered.
• Corruption in the private sector weakens support for privatisation and provides
a weapon for opponents of globalisation.
In April 2002, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) presented to the OECD
Working Group on Bribery a detailed study demonstrating the shortcomings of existing
laws dealing with private sector bribery in more than a dozen OECD countries.2
Dealing with private sector bribery is likely to require a combination of actions by
the OECD to address the transnational aspects; by national governments, to strengthen
existing laws against commercial bribery, unfair competition and breach of trust; and
by the business community, through improved compliance programmes. The transna-
tional aspects should be addressed by amending the convention. Actions by governments
and the business community could be addressed through an OECD Recommendation.
help lines that US companies can use to obtain diplomatic support in dealing with
extortion by foreign officials. The OECD Working Group on Bribery should encourage
other signatories to establish similar help lines. When they are in place, the OECD
should promote the organisation of a network of help lines that can undertake
multilateral interventions with governments whose officials engage in extortion. Such
multilateral interventions are likely to be more effective than unilateral interventions
and should be especially beneficial to companies from smaller countries whose diplomats,
acting alone, may not be able to do much to help their companies.
Conclusion
The adoption of the OECD convention and the passage of laws prohibiting foreign
bribery by all 35 signatories have put in place a legal structure capable of stopping
foreign bribery. The challenge now is to put that structure into operation. Because of
the high expectations raised by the OECD convention, its future is of transcendent
importance. Success in stopping foreign bribery will reinforce support for other anti-
corruption initiatives; lack of progress will enable sceptics to argue that international
corruption is an insoluble problem.
Notes
1. Fritz Heimann is a founding member of Transparency International and has led TI’s work
on the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
2. Günter Heine, Barbara Huber and Thomas O. Rose (eds), Private Commercial Bribery: A
Comparison of National and Supranational Legal Structures (Freiburg: ICC Press and the Max
Planck Institute, 2003).
and encouraging economic freedom’.2 The programme is striking because of its size:
the proposed US $5 billion annual budget (ramped up over three years) would increase
the US foreign assistance budget by nearly 50 per cent, and would be equivalent to about
9 per cent of global overseas development assistance. Perhaps more importantly, the
programme’s design could bring about the most fundamental change to US foreign
assistance policy in 40 years.
The basic idea of the MCA is to select a relatively small number of recipient countries
based on their demonstrated commitment to sound policies, provide them with large
sums of money, give them more say in designing aid-funded programmes and hold
them accountable for achieving results. If implemented carefully and effectively, the
MCA could fundamentally improve the effectiveness of US foreign assistance.3
The administration has proposed creating a new government corporation, called the
Millennium Challenge Corporation, to run the programme. The administration envisions
funding broad programmes designed by groups in qualifying countries, including the
government, NGOs and the private sector. The recipients would set priorities, propose
specific activities and establish benchmarks to be used to measure progress. This approach
would place responsibility for development programmes where it belongs – with the
recipient country. It aims to engender greater commitment and ownership of the
proposed activities and stronger results. In return for this flexibility, the administration
plans to demand greater accountability. Successful programmes would continue to
receive generous funding, while those that fail would lose their funding.
The administration will select qualifying countries from these groups on the basis
of 16 specific quantitative indicators aimed at measuring the extent to which countries
are ‘ruling justly’ (six indicators), ‘investing in their people’ (four indicators) and
‘promoting economic freedom’ (six indicators). These 16 indicators and their sources
are shown in Table 7.1. To qualify, a country must score in the top half (that is, above
the median) of the pool of broadly eligible countries on at least half the indicators in
each of the three categories. The corruption indicator is given special significance: a
country must score above the median on corruption as one of the three ‘ruling justly’
indicators in order to qualify. None of the other indicators are given this special ‘do or
die’ status. One implication is that, in the extreme, a country that passes 15 of the 16
indicators but fails to score above the median on corruption will not qualify for the MCA.
Indicator Source
I. Ruling justly
1. Control of corruption World Bank Institute
2. Rule of law World Bank Institute
3. Voice and accountability World Bank Institute
4. Government effectiveness World Bank Institute
5. Civil liberties Freedom House
6. Political rights Freedom House
II. Investing in people
7. Immunisation rate: DPT and measles WHO/World Bank
8. Primary education completion rate World Bank
9. Public primary education spending/GDP World Bank
10. Public expenditure on health/GDP World Bank
III. Economic freedom
11. Country credit rating Institutional Investor
12. Inflation IMF
13. Regulatory quality World Bank Institute
14. Budget deficit/GDP IMF/World Bank
15. Trade policy Heritage Foundation
16. Days to start a business World Bank
aTo qualify, countries must be above the median on half of the indicators in each of the three sub-groups. They
must also score above the median on the control of corruption indicator.
Source: ‘Fact Sheet: Millennium Challenge Account’, distributed by the US administration on 25 November 2002,
available at www.cgdev.org
The administration has not yet announced the qualifying countries for FY 2004, but
Table 7.2 contains a list of possible qualifiers, constructed using a strict interpretation
of the administration’s procedure. According to this illustrative list, which will change
as data are updated before the programme begins, 11 countries would qualify in the
first year. In the second year the number of qualifying countries increases slightly to
12, and in the third year perhaps six more would qualify. The table lists nine other
countries that fail to qualify during the three years because they fall below the median
on corruption, even though they pass sufficient hurdles in other areas.
Qualifying countries
1. Armenia Armenia Belize
2. Bhutan Bhutan Bulgaria
3. Bolivia Bolivia Jordan
4. Ghana Honduras Namibia
5. Honduras Lesotho South Africa
6. Lesotho Mongolia St Vincent & Gren.
7. Mongolia Nicaragua
8. Nicaragua Philippines
9. Senegal Senegal
10. Sri Lanka Sri Lanka
11. Vietnam Swaziland
12. Vietnam
Eliminated by corruption
1. Albania Bangladesh Romania
2. Bangladesh Ecuador
3. Malawi Malawi
4. Moldova Moldova
5. Mozambique Paraguay
6. Ukraine
Missed by one indicator
1. Benin Benin Maldives
2. Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Thailand
3. Cape Verde Cape Verde Tunisia
4. Georgia The Gambia
5. Guyana Ghana
6. India Guyana
7. Mali India
8. Mauritania Mali
9. Nepal Mauritania
10. São Tomé Morocco
and Príncipe
11. Togo São Tomé
and Príncipe
Eliminated for statutory
reasons
1. China
2. Syria
Source: Steven Radelet, Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker’s Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account (Washington,
D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2003).
Bear in mind that these lists are unofficial best estimates and are especially tenuous
in the second and third years, since the data will be significantly revised between now
and then. The two key points to bear in mind about the selection process are as follows.
First, by announcing the precise methodology and using publicly available data, the
administration is attempting to depoliticise the selection process to a remarkable extent.
Instead of allocating aid to its strongest political allies as in most programmes, the
MCA will focus aid on countries with good policies. Second, and related, the number
of qualifying countries is small. This is consistent with the administration’s intention
to keep the programme selective, and its plan to give recipients much more latitude
than they have had in the past in how they will use the funds.5
hurdle, but could qualify for the MCA so long as it passed half the hurdles in each of
the three categories.
A second alternative would be to retain something like the current system, but not
automatically eliminate those countries that score below the median on corruption.
For those countries that qualify except on this criterion, the administration and host
country could initiate a deeper investigation about both the extent and characteristics
of corruption. This would involve, as a first step, more in-depth diagnostic surveys of
thousands of public servants, business leaders and citizens as described by Kaufmann
and Kraay in the 2002 report and currently carried out in some countries. In cases
where the in-depth diagnostics revealed that control of corruption was better than the
country’s original score indicated, the country could be elevated to full MCA qualifi-
cation status. This could be a particularly important step when governments change,
as noted above. For other countries in which the diagnostics confirmed the initial
finding that corruption is an important issue, the country could design a specific
programme aimed at redressing the key problems as quickly as possible. The US
government could help fund the anti-corruption programme with the aim of helping
the country to gain full MCA eligibility within one to three years.
Not surprisingly, there also has been significant debate about funding levels for the
MCA. The administration proposed ramping up the funding over three years to US $5
billion per year. The administration actually requested US $1.3 billion for the first year
(October 2003 to September 2004). However, the final budgeted amount is likely to be
smaller, both because of budget deficit pressures and because the administration has
been slow to design some key aspects of the programme (such as precisely how MCA
aid will be delivered once countries are selected). Over the longer run, the growing US
budget deficit may mean that the MCA never reaches its proposed US $5 billion annual
budget. However, even with a more likely ultimate annual budget of US $3–4 billion,
the MCA will still represent a significant increase in US foreign aid.
The MCA signals a significant shift on the part of the US government towards
allocating at least some of its aid to countries with a stronger commitment to better
governance and fighting corruption. Other donors are likely to follow in different ways,
which could bring about one of the most significant shifts in donor and recipient
country behaviour in decades. This shift is welcome and long overdue. The system to
choose qualifying countries, while a good step forward, could be improved. The modest
changes outlined here could help strengthen the system, especially by using in-depth
diagnostics to help countries with weak corruption scores to address the key problems.
This strategy would build in appropriate incentives for countries to reduce corruption
while giving them the support (both technical and financial) needed to implement a
programme that can actually help them do it.
Notes
1. Steve Radelet is senior fellow, Center for Global Development, and formerly deputy
assistant secretary of the US Treasury from January 2000 to June 2002.
2. See www.mca.gov/iab_speech.html
3. For a more thorough analysis of the MCA see Steve Radelet, Challenging Foreign Aid: A
Policymaker’s Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Global Development, 2003).
4. See Craig Burnside and David Dollar, ‘Aid, Policies and Growth’, American Economic Review
90 (4), September 2000; and Paul Collier and David Dollar, ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty
Reduction’, European Economic Review 46 (8), 2002. For a critique that questions the earlier
empirical results, see William Easterly, Ross Levine and David Roodman, ‘New Data, New
Doubts: Revisiting “Aid, Policies and Growth”’, Center for Global Development Working
Paper #26 (February 2003), at www.cgdev.org/wp/cgd_wp026.pdf
5. These characteristics of the MCA open a range of questions on US government aid
operations in countries that do not qualify for the MCA, a topic that is addressed at
length in Radelet, Challenging Foreign Aid.
6. Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay (2002), ‘Governance Indicators, Aid Allocation, and the
Millennium Challenge Account’, www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/mca.htm; Daniel
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2003), ‘Governance Matters III: Governance
Indicators for 1996–2002’, www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3.pdf
8 Country reports
In this section, 34 country reports offer a more detailed look at key national corruption-
related developments of the period from July 2002 to June 2003. Most contributors are
members of TI’s more than 100 national chapters and contacts. Each report begins
with a country’s ranking on TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index and Bribe Payers Index
and a list of applicable anti-corruption conventions. Authors then identify and assess
recent legislation and institutional reform, discuss selected issues of particular importance
in depth and finally recommend resources for further reading. In choosing countries
to feature, we sought to ensure a regional balance as well as a diversity in economies
and government systems. The result is a group of reports that vary in terms of topics
and approach, reflecting the wealth of knowledge within TI’s worldwide movement.
Algeria
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 2.6 (88th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (adopted July 2003;
not yet signed)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified October 2002)
All Khalifa Group activities have since Algerians attributed the terrible death toll
halted, putting some 10,000 employees out to corruption in the housing and
of work, while the banking commission, the construction sector, and the lack of effective
temporary administrator and the courts state inspection. The domestic and foreign
continue their inquiries. The domestic press media ran countless stories on the high
– even so-called independent titles – failed casualty figure and its link with poor building
to publish any investigation on the affair as practices, pushing President Abdelaziz
the case first unravelled. This omission was Bouteflika into pledging that a disaster of
in all likelihood connected to Khalifa’s such dimensions would never happen again.
previous strategy of ingratiation: he had While the authorities called on foreign
allegedly distributed gifts to many publishers agencies to conduct site investigations and
and journalists, and the Khalifa Group had identify structural and systemic weaknesses,
been one of the sector’s largest advertisers. some Algerians accused the government of
Rafik Khalifa, meanwhile, remains at deliberately demolishing buildings in the
large.With a presidential election scheduled earthquake zone to prevent an accurate
for April 2004, unofficial campaigning has assessment of the causes of the damage.6
already begun. Candidates have not so far The government did make disaster relief
tackled the Khalifa affair, but analysts do not available for reconstruction in the most
expect them to: doing so might unlock a damaged areas and stiffened building codes
Pandora’s box too explosive for any side to in response to the protests. Experts pointed
exploit profitably. None of the inquiries has out, however, that the rules have been
unearthed the degree of facilitation provided consistently bent or ignored by developers,
to Khalifa by Algeria’s political, economic who also make use of sub-standard materials
and financial elite, or analysed the factors and methods. Amar Tinicha, head of the
that drove the authorities to ignore the national union of construction engineers,
warning signs until it was too late. claims the construction industry is riddled
with corruption, and public officials
The earthquake of 21 May 2003 repeatedly fail to implement housing
regulations. The head of an Algerian
On 21 May 2003, an earthquake measuring architects association, Ahmed Boudaoud,
6.8 on the Richter scale hit northeastern also stressed that the laws were not the
Algeria with an epicentre close to the coastal problem, but rather their enforcement.7
town of Boumerdès. The number of victims The new prime minister, Ahmed Ouyahia,
was high: 2,300 dead, 10,000 injured and acknowledged that corruption may have
more than 100,000 made homeless. Though played a role in the destruction of housing
long recognised as a seismic zone, the region and promised to request technical studies
was the site of hundreds of buildings – old and and take legal action. But now – in defiance
new – that simply folded in on themselves, of the national mood – the government is
indicating that no anti-earthquake measures considering relaxing contract regulations
were incorporated in their construction. The ‘with the aim of reducing the time involved
impact of such laxity was underlined a few in the tendering process’, a move more
days later, when an earthquake of even greater likely to encourage corrupt practices than
intensity struck Japan, causing only slight prevent them.
injuries to the inhabitants.5
Further reading
Weekly corruption column in the daily Le Soir d’Algérie (every Monday, except August),
www.lesoirdalgerie.com
Notes
1. Le Figaro (France), 8 March 2003; www.algeria-watch.de/farticle/economie/empire_
khalifa.htm; Le Monde (France), 9 April 2003.
2. Algérie Presse Service (Algeria), 29 May 2003.
3. El Moudjahid (Algeria), 4 June 2003.
4. Le Monde (France), 20 March 2003; Libération (France), 7 June 2003.
5. Le Nouvel Observateur (France), 29 May 2003; Lutte Ouvrière (France), 30 May 2003; Agence
France-Presse (France), 23 May 2003.
6. Algeria Interface, 5 June 2003, www.algeria-interface.com/new/article.php?lng=e&rub=3
7. Agence France-Presse (France), 25 May 2003.
Argentina
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 2.5 (92nd out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption (ratified October 1997)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ratified February 2001)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified November 2002)
• Twenty-three bills to regulate lobbying have been submitted to congress since 1992.
At this writing, two are under debate in the senate. One, proposed by the anti-
corruption office, would require the president, ministers, legislators and directors of
state-owned banks and social services to make publicly available the details of all
contact with lobbyists.
Press freedoms called into question ‘something must have happened’, though
he gave no further details.
after reporter alleges bribery in the Catan swore before Judge Bonadio that the
senate publishedinformationwastrue,butherefused
torevealhissources.Inacontroversialrequest,
In an article on 22 August 2002, Financial Judge Bonadio asked the state intelligence
Times correspondent Thomas Catan alleged office for a detailed list of Catan’s telephone
that senators had petitioned foreign bankers calls, violating the constitutional guarantee
in Argentina for bribes as a condition for of anonymity for a journalist’s sources.
halting legislation that would reinstate a 2 Catan’s life in Buenos Aires subsequently
per cent tax on banks to create a fund for turned into a nightmare. Rather than
dismissed bank employees. But rather than prompting thorough investigation of
leading to a thorough investigation of the corruption with his article, he became the
allegations, the case was notable because focus of investigations himself. When Catan
established press freedoms, such as the right heard of Judge Bonadio’s request to the
to sources’ confidentiality, were threatened intelligence services, his legal advisers applied
during the course of legal proceedings. to the federal courts for an injunction to
According to Catan, a person close to the safeguard his rights under article 43 of the
senator who allegedly solicited the bribe constitution, which protects the secrecy of
contacted the Argentine Bankers’ Association journalists’ sources, and article 18, which
(ABA), which represents foreign banks. ABA guarantees the privacy of addresses, corre-
representatives reported the request to the spondence and private papers. The courts
US and British embassies, according to the found in favour of the reporter and forced
the judge to destroy the lists. The senate
article. Lobbyist Carlos Bercun, a former
launched an investigation in late 2002, but
employee of Citibank, the central bank and
the recess intervened and the case had not
the economy ministry, was alleged to have
been resumed by mid-2003.
acted as broker of the deal.
This was the second case of suspected
The article prompted a judicial investiga-
bribery in the senate in two years. In 2000,
tion by federal judge Claudio Bonadio, who a local journalist published allegations that
ordered a number of senators, bankers, trade the executive paid a group of senators to
unionists, Catan and Bercun to testify. The vote in favour of labour reforms. The then
ABA president, Mario Vicens, denied vice-president, Carlos Alvarez, tried to
receiving any requests for bribes or knowing deepen the investigations, but resigned 10
anyone in the banking world who had heard months into his term of office.
of any such requests. Senators gave different
opinions. Carlos Maestro, senate leader for
the opposition Radical Civic Union (UCR), Overstepping the division of powers:
dismissed the story and threatened Catan judges penalised for tackling
with a judicial complaint if he did not back corruption
up his allegations. Senate president Juan
Carlos Maqueda, from the ruling Justicial- The division of powers of government is little
ista Party (PJ), said that he thought more than a theory in parts of Argentina. In
Salta, for example, the provincial practice to support his family while waiting
constitution was amended in June 1986 and for the court’s decision.
April 1998 to eliminate tenure for judges, This is not an isolated incident. In October
which is a condition of an independent 2002, José Manuel de la Sota, governor of
judiciary. They now serve only six years with Córdoba province, ordered the removal of
further terms dependent on the governor anti-corruption prosecutor Luis Juez on
and the provincial senate. Moreover, as the charges of ‘qualified fraud against the public
removal of Judge Roberto Gareca in late 2002 administration’. Juez claimed the allegations
demonstrated, even this restricted protection were spurious – he had been investigating
of judges is sometimes violated. members of de la Sota’s administration at
Gareca was removed by the Salta jury of the time, including Sota’s wife, Olga Riutort,
indictment in December 2002 on the who also held a senior public position.
grounds that he had delayed hearing a case
and had disclosed privileged information
about a second case in a radio interview. Opaque appointments at the
Gareca refuted the allegations and said his supreme court are challenged
removal was motivated by political consid-
erations arising from his record of issuing The independence of the courts has been a
independent judgments. point of controversy since former president
During his four years in office, Gareca Carlos Menem repeatedly tried to stack the
investigated and filed charges of corruption supreme court with party loyalists in 1989,
against more than 15 officials and former his first year in office. When that failed, he
officials from Governor Juan Carlos Romero’s proposed a bill expanding the number of
administration.2 When the jury of indictment sitting justices from five to nine, which
began proceedings against Gareca, he was congress approved. Menem had achieved
investigating former production and labour the automatic majority he sought. Since
minister Gilberto Oviedo and former secretary then, successive presidents have tried to
of public works Luis Siegrist for alleged irreg- unseat those loyal to Menem, often by less
ularities in awarding contracts worth more than transparent means.
than US $40 million. Efforts to rid the court of those loyal to
Despite demonstrations in Salta Menem resonate with public attitudes
supporting Gareca and protesting the towards the judiciary. Protesters gathered
violations of his right to due process, the weekly outside the supreme court in Buenos
judge was removed – a comparatively easy Aires at the height of Argentina’s economic
task since many members of the jury of and political crisis in 2002, to denounce
indictment are directly or indirectly related corruption in the country’s judiciary. They
to the governor.3 accused the courts of rubber-stamping
In February 2003, Gareca presented an crucial decisions, such as the privatisation
extraordinary appeal to the Salta supreme of the national airline in the face of
court claiming that his removal was uncon- widespread suspicion of corruption and
stitutional and requesting reinstatement. He other irregularities.4
foresees taking the case to Argentina’s highest In December 2002, interim president
court, the supreme court of justice, and, if Eduardo Duhalde nominated Senator Juan
necessary, the Inter-American Court of Carlos Maqueda to the post of supreme court
Human Rights. justice, sending the necessary documents to
The NGO Fundación Poder Ciudadano the senate for ratification. When the local
nominated Roberto Gareca for Transparency press reported the appointment as a fait
International’s Integrity Awards in 2003 and accompli, days before the decision was due,
a Salta newspaper honoured him as its civil society organisations canvassed the
‘person of the year’. Gareca has set up a law responsible senate authorities asking them
to ensure that a proper debate was held in Eugenio Zaffaroni, a respected practitioner
the senate and that representatives of civil and academic, is expected to be appointed.
society would be able to air their views about Kirchner has not broken entirely with past
the nomination. Their suggestions were appointment practices, however, as the
ignored and Maqueda was appointed within nomination of Alessandra Minnicelli to the
five days of being nominated. post of auditor of the national general
When President Néstor Kirchner came to auditing agency (Sindicatura General de la
office in May 2003, the debate was reopened. Nación, SIGEN) shows. Because she is
During a nationwide TV and radio address married to Julio De Vido, the minister of
10 days after his inauguration, Kirchner federal planning, public investment and
called on legislators to sack one or more of services – the ministry SIGEN is primarily
the ‘sad and famous automatic majority’ intended to monitor – there was a clear
from the Menem era. At the sharp end of his conflict of interest. Poder Ciudadano asked
criticism was Julio Nazareno, a former President Kirchner to revoke her nomination,
partner in Menem’s own law firm, who had citing the regulation that ‘close familial rela-
held the court presidency for more than a tionships’ are an impediment to employment
decade. Nazareno’s performance as judge, with SIGEN. Despite complaints, Minnicelli’s
Kirchner said, was ‘emblematic’ of the court’s nomination was confirmed in June 2003.
failings; namely corruption and political bias. The anti-corruption office defended the
The following day, civil society organisa- government’s position, saying there is
tions met Justice Minister Gustavo Béliz to ‘no legal impediment’ to Minnicelli’s
demand that the president abstain from appointment because she ‘can excuse herself
intervening in the selection of supreme court from dealing with matters relating to the
judges. In response, on 19 June 2003 ministry [that her husband is responsible for]’.
Kirchner issued a decree based on their But the portfolio in question embraces a wide
proposals, affirming that his government range of issues with scope for abuse, notably
would respect judicial independence. In the the allocation of state resources for contracts,
meantime, Julio Nazareno resigned under the renegotiation of rates for utilities and
the threat of a revived congressional probe other public services now in private hands,
into allegations of fraud and other charges. and the government’s ambitious infrastruc-
Wide-ranging public debates, including a ture plan, involving the construction of new
hearing in the senate, were held over who housing, water and sewage works, transport
should replace Nazareno. At this writing, links and port services.
Further reading
Fundación Poder Ciudadano, ‘Banco de Datos de Políticos Argentinos’ (Database of
Argentine politicians), Buenos Aires, 2003, www.poderciudadano.org/elecciones2003/
index.asp
Fundación Poder Ciudadano, ‘Contrataciones Transparentes’ (Transparent contracting),
Buenos Aires, 2003, www.accioncolectiva.net
Fundación Poder Ciudadano, ‘Primer diagnóstico sobre la independencia judicial’ (First
analysis of judicial independence), Buenos Aires, 2003, www.poderciudadano.org/
relaciones/210_justicia.doc
Organization of American States, ‘Informe del Comité de Expertos del Mecanismo de
Seguimiento de la Implementación de la Convención Interamericana contra la
Notes
1. The law was applied for the first time in the April 2003 presidential election. A survey of
campaign costs carried out by Fundación Poder Ciudadano shows that the 18 presidential
candidates only disclosed the origin of 20 per cent of funds from private sources. The
winner, Néstor Kirchner, disclosed just 0.2 per cent while runner-up Carlos Menem
disclosed 6 per cent.
2. Governor Romero was elected for a second consecutive four-year term in 1999. He ran
as a vice-presidential candidate in the elections of April 2003, alongside former president
Carlos Menem. Romero’s father, Roberto Romero, governed Salta from 1983 to 1987.
3. For more information on the lack of judicial independence in Salta see Fundación Poder
Ciudadano, ‘Primer diagnóstico sobre la independencia judicial’, 2003, www.poder
ciudadano.org/relaciones/210_justicia.doc
4. In 1990, the supreme court took the unprecedented move of declaring a ‘per saltum’ –
which wipes out all lower court rulings and gives the supreme court itself jurisdiction
over a case – after a trial court judge blocked the sale of Aerolíneas Argentinas on the
grounds of irregularities alleged by a commission of experts. In a single day, 21 November
1990, the case was reviewed by the supreme court and it decided that the sale to Spain’s
Iberia had been carried out lawfully.
Armenia
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.0 (78th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (not yet signed)
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (signed May 2003; not yet
ratified)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified July 2003)
prohibits party members who work in the state and local government from using
their positions for the benefit of the party.
• The laws on the tax service and customs service, both passed in July 2002, are designed
to ensure that government posts are filled through open competition and to prevent
employees from working with immediate relatives.
• The new criminal code, passed in April 2003, binds government officials to conflict
of interest regulations and enlarges the definition of corruption to include the
illegal involvement of public officials in business activities. Yet it also sets milder
penalties for corruption-related crimes, such as the abuse of power and position by
public officials and the giving and taking of bribes. Punishment for abuse of power
can vary from a fine of 200 times the defined minimum monthly salary to
imprisonment for two to six years.1
• The bill on freedom of information regulates the rights of those who possess
information and defines the rules, procedures and conditions for receiving information
from government institutions. The law ensures access to information as well as its dis-
semination and transparency. It also provides that requested information be delivered
within a five-day period, unless it requires additional work, in which case it must be
provided within 30 days. At this writing, the bill was expected to pass into law.
• The ombudsman law aims to regulate the appointment and dismissal of the
ombudsman, as well as related rights and obligations. It provides that the ombudsman
be appointed by the president and approved by the national assembly for a five-year
term. The ombudsman is to be independent, adhere to the constitution and enjoy
immunity during the term of office. The law has passed the second reading, but has
not yet been promulgated.
• A controversial law on mass media, allowing for increased state control of the media,
is in draft form. Protests prompted the justice ministry to submit a revised draft in
2003, but critics are still not appeased.
Using the project’s findings, the opposition to publicise their contributions to pre-
Ardarutyun (Justice) alliance appealed to the election funds.
constitutional court to nullify the election After two rounds of presidential elections
results. The alliance pointed to violations of in February and March 2003, only the
election procedures and voting irregulari- candidates’ total campaign revenues and
ties, alleging that tens of thousands of ballots expenditures were published. When queried
cast for Ardarutyun were allocated to other about the rationale behind not publishing
parties. The official result was that more detailed information, the CEC head,
Ardarutyun won 14 per cent, rather than the Artak Sahradyan, replied that the
50 per cent or more that it claimed. The commission had not published itemised
opposition also contested the election results accounts because it had not identified any
in 19 single-mandate constituencies. violations of party finance regulations.
Although Ardarutyun’s appeal was The monitoring team found that two of
dismissed due to insufficient evidence, the the 11 parties and blocs that agreed to
court admitted that the issue required provide campaign finance information had
attention and proposed to promote greater exceeded the limit of the pre-election fund.9
transparency and accountability in the An analysis of the figures showed discrep-
management of political party financing. ancies for all other parties except one, whose
Armenia’s election process is regulated by reported data was consistent with that of the
project’s findings. Indeed, the overall
an electoral code that needs considerable
tendency observed was that almost all the
revision. The provisions that cause most
parties avoided registering their campaign
concern relate to the opaque system of party
expenses in the pre-election fund and that
financing and the lack of enforcement
they spent most of their money ‘outside the
mechanisms.7
fund’.
According to article 25 of the code, the
Further results showed that violations of
parties’ declaration forms must be published
party finance regulations fell into two major
by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)
categories. First, large sums were not properly
in the format determined by the CEC. During
accounted with respect to political
the recent elections, the sources of the
advertising on television. TV companies
parties’ pre-election income were never
either offered certain parties discounts, or
published though the issue drew strong provided more airtime to selected parties
public interest and was regularly discussed than was officially declared.10 Second, the
in the media.8 Although required by law to code requires all party publications to
present this information to the CEC, the mention the number of copies printed and
parties and blocs were willing to publicise the name of the publisher. Several parties
only the number of contributors to pre- and some experts revealed that parties often
election funds. In some cases, parties did not printed more copies than officially declared.
reveal any information at all. In some cases, campaign materials were
Reasons for concealing the revenue ordered before the campaign period and paid
sources vary. Some parties may be involved for from the party account. Moreover, a
in money laundering or using foreign number of parties conducted transactions
funding, which is prohibited by law. with service providers without a contract;
Furthermore, as Armenia’s business sector is money for these services was paid in cash,
not well regulated and many businesses tend which is prohibited by law.11
to hide their real turnover, they may wish to These types of violations are motivated
prevent the tax authorities from learning of by several factors. By paying cash, parties
their donations to party pre-election funds. avoid the 20 per cent VAT and service
Finally, rivalry between the opposition and providers evade taxes. For parties, especially
government does not encourage businesses those exceeding fund limitations, such
dealings represent a way around the pre- travel expenses and administrative costs
election fund. were also apparent but difficult to monitor
Another concern is that the law is vague systematically.
about what expenses should be covered by The Control and Review Service (CRS) –
the pre-election fund, as opposed to the party established ad hoc under the CEC – is
account. During the campaign period, for responsible for regulating such violations
example, parties continued to pay expenses and taking the necessary action. Despite
related to their permanent office(s) through substantial media coverage and the results
the party accounts, while expenses related of the monitoring project, the CRS filed no
to temporary sub-offices were covered by the reports of party finance violations by the
fund. In general, parties hid the cost of review deadline. While the law itself provides
temporary offices, stating that party too much flexibility to parties and does not
members or relatives provided office space allow for easy monitoring, the reluctance of
free of charge. Armenia’s state institutions to enforce the
Salaries were another issue of concern, law is at the root of ongoing abuses in
since parties concealed their true expenses political party financing.
to avoid paying taxes. Violations related to
Further reading
Armenian Democratic Forum, ‘Sociological Survey on Public Sector Reforms’, for
enterprises and households, 2001; see lnweb18.worldbank.org/ECA/ecspeExt.nsf/0/
1B062B0DC8A543B485256C63005D49FD?Opendocument&Start=1&Count=1000&
ExpandView
Notes
1. The minimum monthly salary is 1,000 drams (around US $2), so the fine would be
equivalent to US $355.
2. Decision No. 4, adopted on 22 January 2001. The commission is headed by the prime
minister and includes the vice speaker of the national assembly (as deputy head), heads
of key ministries and the chief of staff of the president.
3. The grant was provided through the World Bank Institutional Development Fund.
4. The National Anti-corruption NGO Coalition was established in March 2001 under
the CRD/TI Armenia. Currently the Coalition has 26 members representing different
fields, including journalism, business development, human rights, environment, local
government, the army, tourism and education.
5. See the ‘Country Corruption Assessment: Public Opinion Survey’, carried out by CRD/TI
Armenia in March–April 2002. The sample of the survey included 1,000 households,
200 entrepreneurs and 200 public officials. In answering the question, ‘Who mainly
initiates corruption in Armenia?’, all three groups of respondents identified government
officials as the most corrupt.
6. Implemented in March–June 2003, the CRD/TI Armenia project, ‘Monitoring of the
Political Parties’ Finances during the 2003 Parliamentary Elections’, was funded by the
Open Society Institute, Assistance Foundation – Armenia. The report is available online
at www.transparency.am
7. The amended electoral code was adopted and ratified in July 2002; it entered into force
in August 2002. See par03.elections.am/?lan=eng&go=code
8. Legislation requires that participating parties and blocs open a pre-election fund during
the election campaign period.
9. Actually, three parties exceeded the limit of the pre-election fund, two of which provided
information within the framework of the monitoring project. The pre-election fund
limit is 60,000 times the minimum defined monthly salary, which for this year was
60,000,000 drams (US $110,000). Independent monitoring was conducted for all 21
parties and blocs.
10. Article 18.3 of the electoral code requires the mass media to provide equal airtime at
the same price to all parties. Article 11 of the Law on TV and Radio states that all the
TV and radio agencies must announce their rates for political advertising before the
pre-election campaign.
11. Article 25.7 notes that if during the pre-election campaign the candidate or party uses
financial means other than the pre-election fund, the court may consider the candidate
or party registration invalid.
Australia
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 8.8 (8th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: 8.5 (1st out of 21 countries)
Conventions:
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (ratified October
1999)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• The federal treasury issued proposals in September 2002 under its Corporate Law
Economic Reform Program (CLERP), which included only limited whistleblower
protection for disclosures to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.
Draft implementing legislation was equally insufficient in this regard. TI Australia
made a submission in November 2002 that argued for much broader protection for
corporate whistleblowers.1
• New South Wales (NSW): the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of
December 2002 amended the Protected Disclosures Act 1994. The general view is
that the legislation will still not be sufficient to overcome entrenched negative
attitudes to whistleblowing. A survey by NSW’s Independent Commission against
Corruption (ICAC) showed that nearly 70 per cent of state officials expect whistle-
blowers to suffer retribution.2
• Western Australia: the ongoing Royal Commission into Police Corruption issued an
interim report in December 2002. The government accepted its recommendation to
replace the Anti-Corruption Commission (generally considered to have inadequate
powers) with a new external oversight agency, the Corruption and Crime
Commission, with extended investigation and enforcement powers and the power
to conduct public hearings, like NSW’s ICAC and Police Integrity Commission.
• Victoria: Public calls for a royal commission into police corruption were rejected,
although more than 50 police officers are facing charges and the state’s most senior
detective is being prosecuted for drug trafficking and making death threats. In May
2003, the Ombudsman of Victoria issued an interim report on Operation Ceja,4 an
ongoing Police Ethical Standards Division investigation into allegations of corruption
at the former drug squad. The investigation has led to several criminal prosecutions
and disciplinary actions, as well as a recommendation that officers working in areas
at high risk of corruption should be rotated and drug investigators limited to three-
year postings.
• In July 2003, the national standards organisation launched a set of five standards
for effective corporate governance, including fraud and corruption and whistleblower
protection programmes.5
that govern Australian media ownership and The bill proposes an ‘editorial separation’
diversity of that ownership, and (2) the system as the key mechanism to preserve
stipulation that media companies seeking diversity. However, it ignores one of the long-
takeover authorisation must outline their standing reasons for media diversity (once
plans, rules and structures, avoiding a championed by Rupert Murdoch) – that
mischief to which ‘diversity of ownership’ different owners would have different views.
provisions in the old legislation were It does nothing to prevent those with
directed. The requirements for the latter were expanded media ownership from exercising
very weak, however. it to influence or even direct their expanded
In addition, the bill did not propose the media empires. The requirement of
removal of restrictions on cross-media and providing basic information on editorial
foreign ownership, but it granted discretion policy cannot fulfil that function and is not
to the relevant minister to waive these rules. designed to do so.
Although the Foreign Investment Review The senate eventually rejected the
Board (FIRB) vets foreign investments and Broadcasting Services Amendment Bill twice,
recommendations are made to the minister, but it was still on the government’s agenda
the FIRB is not privy to the discussions at the time of writing. It could be put to a
between media companies and ministers. joint sitting of both houses, if the
This might seem a recipe for corruption in government were to seek a double
the deal-making that goes on between dissolution of both houses of parliament in
politicians and media owners to support the next election.
governments at re-election time, or when Ministerial discretion in areas where media
government is about to pursue a controver- proprietors have huge financial interests
sial course of action. must be identified as constituting a clear risk
These proposals raised the concern that of corruption. The temptation to do what a
politicians might back legislation that media owner wants in return for improved
supports the interests of media owners in media treatment during an election or a con-
order to secure favourable coverage. This is troversial war is great. Even if media owners
not merely a theoretical risk. Media mogul never influence the content of their
Conrad Black claimed before a parliamen- newspapers, the belief is that they might
tary committee that then prime minister continue to affect a minister’s decision. One
Paul Keating once reneged on a deal to possible reform is that communications
increase the ceiling on media ownership to between media owners and either ministers
35 per cent in exchange for even-handed or ministerial staff should be recorded by
coverage in the 1993 elections. Paul Keating independent civil servants and filed with a
denied the claim. The issue is not whether relevant integrity agency. Another is to
this claim was true,6 but how the risk is develop a systematic regulatory framework
managed within democracies. or a media integrity regime.7
Further reading
Auditor-General of Australian Capital Territory, ‘Fraud and Corruption Prevention in
the ACT Public Sector’, Canberra, May 2003, www.audit.act.gov.au/auditreports/
reports2003/Rpt4_2003.pdf
Australian Institute of Criminology Research and Public Policy Series no. 48, ‘Serious
Fraud in Australia and New Zealand’ (Canberra/Melbourne: 2003). See www.
aic.gov.au/publications/rpp/48
NSW Audit Office Report no. 114, ‘Freedom of Information’, Sydney, August 2003,
www.audit.nsw.gov.au/perfaud-rep/Year-2003-2004/FOI-August2003/foi-contents.html
NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption, ‘The NSW Public Sector: Functions,
Risks and Corruption Prevention Strategies’, Sydney, January 2003, www.
icac.nsw.gov.au
Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission, ‘Public Perceptions of the Queensland
Police Service: Findings from the 2002 Public Attitudes Survey’, Brisbane, February
2003, www.cmc.qld.gov.au/library/CMCWEBSITE/PublicPerceptionsoftheQPS.pdf
TI Australia, Whistleblower Conference, Sydney, August 2002; Business Integrity Systems
in Australia, November 2001; Australian National Integrity Systems Assessment,
Queensland Handbook, July 2001, www.transparency.org.au
TI Australia: www.transparency.org.au
Notes
1. See www.transparency.org.au/documents/clerp9sub.pdf
2. See section 5.3 of ‘Unravelling Corruption II’, ICAC, Sydney 2001 ISBN 0731072871 at:
www.icac.nsw.gov.au/pub/summary_pub.cfm?ID=248
3. See www.crimecommission.gov.au
4. See www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/downloads/ceja.pdf
5. Copies of the standards can be downloaded from Standards Australia’s website
www.standards.com.au
6. Black had originally gained 15 per cent at a time when that was considered not to
constitute ‘control’; he then demanded the right to own more than 15 per cent on the
basis that he should have a greater share of the extra value generated by his control of
the assets.
7. The general issue of integrity systems for the media is covered in C. Sampford and R.
Lui, ‘Media Ethics Regime and Ethical Risk Management in Australia’, paper delivered
to Media Ethics Conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 3 July 2002.
Azerbaijan
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 1.8 (124th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (signed May 2003; not yet
ratified)
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (signed May 2003; not yet
ratified)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• In August 2002, the ministry of taxes closed down audit sections in its district
branches and passed its audit authority to a centralised body within the ministry.
One positive aspect of the change is that it led to a significant reduction in the
number of unjustified inspections of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs).
• Following the enactment of the law on public procurement, the president proposed
and parliament adopted amendments to the laws on investment activities, on the
electric energy industry and architectural activity in December 2002. In all three
laws, the amendments replaced the term ‘tender’ with the term ‘competition’. Critics
of the amendments described ‘tender’ as a legal term with a precise formal meaning,
while ‘competition’ was open to interpretation and thus seen as facilitating corrupt
procurement.
social programmes. The president’s speech Yet domestic critics and the International
seemed to imply that heads of the executive Monetary Fund have demanded full subor-
authority are empowered to force local dination of SOFAR to the legislative authority
businessmen to finance public services and to ensure its transparency and prevent the
reconstruction. diversion of funds. SOFAR was created by
In May 2003 the parliament passed a law presidential decree, its expenditures are
on administrative control over activities of largely controlled by the presidential admin-
municipalities, which empowers ‘an istration and its low levels of oversight render
appropriate organ of executive authority’ to it vulnerable to political manipulation.
conduct audits and general assessments of A panel discussion organised by Eurasianet
the municipalities. This measure further in June 2003 concluded that Azerbaijan,
reduced the independence of municipalities along with Kazakhstan, may see poverty
compared to that of the local executive worsen as oil exports grow. The discussion
authority. focused on the ‘resource curse’, a term that
Despite such setbacks, which have describes the pattern through which poor
increased the power of the local executive countries become poorer when they begin
authority throughout the country, a marked to sell lucrative oil exploration rights. Experts
improvement in the accountability of stressed the need to encourage corporate best
political leaders to the legislature is in practices in order to reduce the scope for
evidence. In June 2002, parliament adopted corruption in the oil industry. In particular,
the constitutional law on additional rights they argued for foreign companies to disclose
of parliament concerning confidence in the how much they pay to specific state
cabinet of ministers. The law obliges the ministries for the right to drill, a practice
cabinet to report to parliament on an annual
encouraged by the ‘Publish What You Pay’
basis and requires cabinet executives (with
initiative.10
consent of the government) to respond to
verbal and written questions at parliamen-
tary sessions. The first such exercise took Corruption persists in the military
place on 18 March 2003, when First Deputy
Prime Minister Yaqub Eyyubov made a Corruption and a lack of accountability in
presentation and answered questions. This the military remain burning issues of public
development is a move in the right direction, concern. Reports by local and international
as Azerbaijan has thus far lacked a tradition human rights activists have found that
of government reporting to the elected conscripts are targets of economic
legislature. exploitation in the army and that officials
Similarly, positive steps were taken to from the ministry of defence have extorted
improve accountability in the newly created informal fees – mostly in cash – for draft
independent State Oil Fund (SOFAR), which exemptions, deferrals and deployments to
accumulates all oil proceeds besides taxes, units in the least risky areas. In some units
which are funnelled directly to the state officers have siphoned off supplies or sur-
budget. SOFAR is to ensure transparency of reptitiously used conscripts as unpaid
oil revenues earned by the State Oil labourers. Eight conscripts died of sunstroke
Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan while working on a construction project in
(SOCAR).9 On 13 May 2003, parliament July 2002.11
amended the law on budget systems to As can be expected, conscripts who cannot
include SOFAR in the country’s consolidated bribe their way out of military service or into
budget, a first significant step towards easier service tend to be poor. Since they
making the oil fund accountable to frequently suffer from malnourishment or
legislative authority. tuberculosis, they are prone to accidents and
are often not fit enough to perform the tasks justified. By spring 2003 all command staff
assigned to them.12 at the college had been replaced, but the
On occasion, corruption in the army feeds leaders of the cadet protest were sent to serve
into major political scandals. In February as privates on the Armenian or Karabakh
2003, military journalist Uzeir Jafarov, who borders.
had been convicted of fraud and abuse of Further areas of concern involve the
power, held a press conference and charged ‘military commissariats’, or conscription
that his conviction had been ‘inspired’ by agencies, which enjoy a great deal of arbitrary
the newly dismissed deputy minister of authority, which is sometimes employed as
defence, Mammad Beydullayev. Jafarov a political tool against opponents. A case in
presented a list of facilities formerly owned point concerns Mahammad Ersoy, editor-
by the ministry of defence and implied that in-chief of the newspaper Bizim Yol.
they had been illegally privatised. No action Immediately after publishing a series of
has been taken.13 Alekper Mammadov, a articles criticising the government, Ersoy was
former high-ranking military officer, also called to military service and the newspaper
accused the ministry of defence of systemic was partially confiscated from newsstands.16
corruption.14 While such developments are dis-
In early September 2002, an uprising at a couraging, criticism of secrecy in the military
military college in Baku led to hundreds of was heard in August 2002 when President
cadets leaving the campus illegally to march Aliyev ordered the creation of a special fund
in protest against corruption in school. to collect donations from citizens and
Speaking in Ganja a few days after the companies willing to support the national
incident, President Aliyev admitted that army. In an apparent bid to silence critics of
there had been ‘violations of law, bribery by the lack of transparency in military
commanders and abuse of power for accounting, the president ordered that the
covetous aims’.15 Nevertheless, he stressed fund be audited once a year.17
that the cadets’ reaction had not been
Further reading
Sabit Bagirov, ed., Corruption, Transparency Azerbaijan, 2002
Turan news agency expert group, ‘Corruption in Azerbaijan’ survey, 4 April 2001
TI Azerbaijan: www.transparency-az.org
Notes
1. Ilham Aliyev was elected president in mid-October 2003, although election monitors
pointed to irregularities.
2. www.echo-az.com/archive/432/facts.shtml#11
3. Interview with ANS TV, 16 February 2003.
4. ECRI Report on Azerbaijan, Council of Europe, 15 April 2003, www.reliefweb.int/w/
rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/a2b221ae7a267396c1256d09002fcf5f?Op
enDocument
5. The presidential decree of January 2003 enacted amendments to the law on grants of
1998, which is actually dated April 2002.
6. www.vbp-az.org/english/presssl.html
7. The programme was launched by presidential decree in mid-August 2003.
8. Novoye Vremya (Azerbaijan), 4 April 2003.
9. Complicating matters further, Azerbaijan became the target of high-level allegations
in November 2002, when Czech businessman Viktor Kozeny accused the Azeri
government of defrauding him in connection with the privatisation of SOCAR; see
www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav111802.shtml
10. Eurasianet Organisation, ‘Will a “Resource Curse” Befall Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan?’,
27 June 2003. See also, Svetlana Tsalik, Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit?, OSI
Caspian Revenue Watch, Central Eurasia Project, 2003, www.soros.org/publications/
caspian/index.html
11. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003, www.hrw.org/wr2k3/europe3.html
12. Agence France-Presse (France), 31 July 2002.
13. Echo (Azerbaijan), 5 April 2003.
14. Interview with Alekper Mammadov, Echo (Azerbaijan), 25 January 2003.
15. Turan news agency, 12 September 2002.
16. Turan news agency, press review, 29 April 2003.
17. www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/08/23082002155927.asp
Brazil
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.9 (54th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption (ratified July 2002)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ratified August 2000)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• The CGU, created during the previous administration, shows signs of reinvigoration
under the new government of President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. The new inspector
general, Waldir Pires, has declared the fight against corruption a major concern and
has introduced some innovations. In May 2003 the CGU introduced a programme
to verify the use of federal resources in cities with populations of up to 20,000
inhabitants. The cities are selected at random each month.
• The minister of justice and the president of the central bank announced a series of
new measures to combat money laundering in June 2003 (see below).
Government fails to curb tax evasion overlook their tax evasion activities. One of
them, Rodrigo Silveirinha, was a deputy head
and money laundering
of the state tax-collection office, nominated
Tax evasion and money laundering have during the administration of former
been routine in Brazil for years. Money from governor, Anthony Garotinho. A state par-
illegal transactions such as bribery, political liamentary inquiry commission was
corruption and drug dealing is easily sent established to investigate the case. By mid-
abroad or diverted to fiscal havens. There is 2003, 12 tax inspectors had been arrested.
strong evidence that vast amounts of The case emerged 10 days after Garotinho’s
undeclared assets owned by Brazilians are wife was sworn in as the new governor of
held abroad, mostly by businessmen and the Rio and shortly after Garotinho – who stood
affluent seeking to avoid foreign exchange in the October 2002 presidential elections –
risk. So far the government has proved became the state’s secretary of public security.
unable to curb this capital flight. The direct participation of Garotinho and
Measures to stimulate the declaration of his wife in the fraud is under investigation,
assets maintained abroad have had little but has not been proven.
impact. The previous administration Another financial scandal, involving
introduced the voluntary declaration before Paraná state-owned bank Banestado, came to
the central bank of all transactions exceeding light in February 2003, in response to
US $10,000, including purchases of foreign accusations made by the newly elected
currency or money sent abroad. The measure senator for the neighbouring state of Santa
depended on far more good will than was Catarina, Ideli Salvati of the Workers’ Party.
available. It was hard to conceive that corrupt Federal investigations revealed the existence
politicians, public officials, drug dealers and of a tax evasion and money laundering
unethical businessmen would spontaneously scheme amounting to US $30 billion
declare to the authorities the fruits of bribery, between 1996 and 1999. The money was
tax evasion and other illegal transactions. transferred from a Banestado branch in Foz
Two recent cases are emblematic of the do Iguaçu, near the borders with Argentina
levels of tax evasion and money laundering and Paraguay, to 130 accounts in the bank’s
in Brazil. In January 2003, the Swiss courts New York branch through a special form of
announced that they had frozen US $36 account reserved for non-residents. The
million laundered by Brazilian account names of several politicians and well-known
holders and kept in Swiss banks, following businessmen were included in the list of
a request by the Brazilian authorities. The beneficiaries. The senate rejected a request
accounts were in the name of tax inspectors for an investigation, but in June 2003 the
from the Rio de Janeiro state government lower chamber of congress agreed to establish
whom companies had allegedly bribed to a parliamentary commission of inquiry.
Further reading
Larissa Bortoni and Ronaldo de Moura, O mapa da corrupção no governo FHC (A map of
corruption in the government of FHC) (São Paulo: Ed. Fund. Perseu Abramo, 2002)
Antoninho Marmo Trevisan, O Combate à corrupção nas Prefeituras do Brasil (The fight
against corruption in Brazilian city halls) (TBrasil, 2003), www.transparencia.org.br
Bulgaria
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.9 (54th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ratified June 2000)
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ratified November 2001)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ratified December 1998)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified December 2001)
• After a first reading in July 2002, the legislature passed controversial amendments
to the civic procedure code granting prosecutors the right to discretionary
interference in private contracts. Though still pending, a second hearing was
delayed in view of criticism from civil society organisations.
corrupt institutions in recent years. There One way to address this problem is to re-
are two major concerns: one relates to register parties according to the provisions
sources of party funding, the other involves of the act on political parties.
transparency, control and sanctions for Local election campaign financing also
offenders. needs tighter controls. The act on local
The act on political parties of March 2001 elections, passed in 1995 and last amended
confers the supervision of political party in mid-2003, provides for elections of
expenses and income to the National Audit municipal councillors and mayors.
Office (NAO), whose reports evaluate the Campaigns can be financed through funds
integrity of political party financing (see of political parties and coalitions, as well as
Chapter 14, ‘Measuring the transparency of by individual donations and corporate
political party financing in Bulgaria’, bodies, as long as their shares are not owned
page 298). The act requires parties to present by public or foreign entities.3
their annual reports to the NAO by 15 March, The lack of effective controls and the
or lose their state subsidy for the relevant failure to sanction offenders continue to
year. Within six months of receiving annual thwart transparency in the political
reports, the NAO must announce whether landscape. Spending limits are now
these comply with the relevant legislation. determined based on population figures, but
Parties are also required to file reports within the amended act still does not provide for the
one month of elections. control of candidates’ income and expenses,
Despite this new legislation, the NAO has or for the application of sanctions. The
identified several aspects of party financing problem is exacerbated by the lack of
as ongoing problems. Anonymous donations accounting requirements related to
allow parties to dodge naming donors or fundraising, as is the case for candidates for
declaring their gifts to the NAO. Secondly, municipal councillor who have access to
parties are not equally sanctioned for failing double funding if they set up personal bank
to submit their reports within the time accounts while also taking advantage of
prescribed by law. The act on political parties political party funding.
guarantees state subsidies only to parties that The poor control of local election
obtain 1 per cent of the vote during parlia- financing stems from the lack of legally
mentary elections; parties that do not reach binding reporting requirements for
that threshold are not punished for failing candidates and political parties after elections
to submit their statements. are held. Moreover, no body is legally
Numerous parties have failed to submit authorised to oversee electoral campaign
financial information in their annual reports financing. Control can only be exercised
and some are registered under incorrect when parties or coalitions request a review
addresses, leading observers to assume they of their adversaries’ financing.
are not truly engaged in political activity.
Further reading
TI Bulgaria: www.transparency-bg.org
Notes
1. See ‘Establishment of a New Anti-Corruption Body in Bulgaria: The President’s Position
and Public Debate’, Center for the Study of Democracy, www.csd.bg/news/
acagensy_stenograma.doc
2. See the annual report on Bulgaria for 2002 of the Access to Information Programme,
www.aip-bg.org/pdf/an_rep02.pdf
3. Local Elections Act, article 68.
Burundi
Conventions:
AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (adopted July 2003;
not yet signed)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
the accounts of all public organisations. This court will present a report on the
propriety of the state accounts to the national assembly. This report will establish
whether funds have been used in accordance with established procedures, and in
accordance with the budget approved by the above-mentioned assembly.’ The court
is also a requirement of the transitional constitution and the International Monetary
Fund made its creation a condition for the release of the second instalment of credit
to the government.
• The assembly adopted a law on the media in early August 2003 (see below).
Further reading
Association burundaise des consommateurs and Observatoire de l’action gouverne-
mentale , ‘Atelier de lutte contre la corruption au Burundi’ (Summary report on the
workshop for fighting corruption in Burundi), September 2002, www.ligue-iteka.bi/
d180902.htm
Report of the parliamentary inquiry commission investigating cases of misappropria-
tion of funds (Bujumbura: Assemblée Nationale, August 2000) [French]
UNDP Support Project for Promotion of Proper Government in Burundi, ‘Transparency
and the fight against corruption in Burundi: a quick diagnosis’, May–June 2000
Notes
1. www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/GNIPC.pdf
2. Économie (Burundi), 13 November 2002.
3. RTNB (Radio Télévision Nationale du Burundi), 23 August 2003.
4. Atelier de lutte contre la corruption (Workshop for fighting corruption), Association
burundaise des consommateurs (ABUCO, Burundi Consumers Association) and
Observatoire de l’action gouvernementale (OAG, Governmental Action Observatory),
12–13 September 2003, www.ligue-iteka.bi/d180902.htm
5. Julien Nimubona, ‘L’analyse critique de l’Accord d’Arusha’ (A critical analysis of the
Arusha treaty), OAG, May 2002, see www.ligue-iteka.bi/n121101b.htm
6. For more information, see ‘Rapport de la table ronde sur le projet de loi sur la presse au
Burundi’ (Report on the roundtable about the media bill in Burundi), Maison de la Presse,
Association burundaise des journalistes and Institut Panos, Bujumbura, 3 May 2003,
www.panosparis.org/fichierProj/fichierProj94.doc
Chile
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 7.4 (20th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption (ratified October 1998)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ratified April 2001)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• In June 2003 a new public administration law came into effect. The most significant
change concerns recruitment processes; jobs must be open to competition and
promotion must be based on merit, and the number of political appointments has
been reduced. It also regulates payment structure, probation processes, and bonus
and pensions arrangements.
• In July 2003 a new law on public supplies and services contracts came into effect.
The law makes the contracting process more transparent and stipulates that Internet-
based selection mechanisms should be used for contracts above a certain threshold.
• In July 2003 a new law on political party financing was adopted. The law introduces
direct public funding for political parties (Chile had been, along with Peru, one of
two countries in the region with no direct public funding for political parties). It
establishes ceilings on spending and calls for sources and amounts of donations to
be disclosed (see below).
• Congress is reviewing amendments to the immunity law and considering a bill that
would increase transparency of parliamentary funds.
Scandals provide new impetus for financing, and introducing a formal, non-
party national integrity commitment
reforms between government, political leaders,
In reaction to this spate of revelations (see businesses and civil society that would
above), the Lagos government created a establish more robust monitoring
transparency commission, composed of mechanisms.
representatives from government, the But typical of reforms that have been
opposition and two civil society organisa- enacted hastily, not all the changes were well
tions, with the task of drafting proposals to thought out. The campaign finance law, for
remedy the systems that had failed to detect example, makes a contribution to greater
corrupt practices. transparency in elections and introduces
Cross-party working groups were public funding for the first time, but it is
established in March 2003 to draft new undermined by a number of loopholes. It
legislation and propose amendments to laws establishes spending limits, but does not
that were currently being debated. Many of provide sanctions for those who exceed
the anti-corruption measures that were them.2 It allows as much as 30 per cent of
debated were based on proposals by civil donations to remain anonymous.3 It also
society organisations such as Corporación fails to restrict donations from private
Chile Transparente, Transparency Interna- companies and congress is discussing new
tional’s national chapter. An all-party bills that would even exempt these donations
anti-corruption pact, called the ‘Agreement from taxes. Another problem is that the law
for the modernisation of the state, does not provide strict enough safeguards
transparency and promotion of growth’, was against candidates violating the financing
launched. ceilings by creating their own campaign
The opposition lent its support to the funds, parallel to party funds. A further
governing coalition to help speed through criticism is that there is no regulation of
congress a dozen anti-corruption initiatives donations and spending outside of the
that have since passed into law. These were electoral campaign period.
part of the ‘short reform agenda’. Thirty- In other areas, reform proposals ran into
seven other reforms, the ‘long reform opposition. One proposal, aimed at avoiding
agenda’, are still being debated. future Inverlink-style scandals by giving
Among other areas, the new legislation regulators more control over banking and
raised government salaries across the board insurance licences, was derailed because of
to reduce the temptation to seek bribes, and perceived constraints to Chilean markets.
abolished the opaque system of bonuses. The By late 2003 the fate of the ‘long reform
number of civil service posts the president agenda’ looked uncertain. There was growing
is entitled to fill was reduced from 3,000 to concern that the ruling coalition might lose
about 700 and new campaign-finance opposition support for the remaining
regulations were passed. The new measures reforms as parties seek to position themselves
also included regulating the use of discre- for the 2005 elections.
tionary government expenses and political
Further reading
Centro de Estudios Publicos, Reforma del Estado Volumen II (State Reform Volume II)
(Santiago de Chile: Andros, 2002)
Notes
1. Codelco was the focus of Chile’s biggest financial scandal in 1994, when it emerged that
futures trader Juan Pablo Davila had cost the company US $200 million by inflating the
size of trades in order to generate higher commissions for his preferred brokers. More
recently, the company has come under fire for failing to be transparent in adjudicating
contracts. See Qué Pasa (Chile), 28 March 2003.
2. The first draft of the law was passed by the senate, but later challenged by the constitu-
tional court on the ground that it did not provide channels for the accused to seek legal
redress. Rather than develop the necessary dispute-resolution mechanisms (an electoral
tribunal), the government opted to erase sanctions from the bill and resubmit it for
approval.
3. As much as 20 per cent of the candidate’s total campaign expenditure can be made up
of anonymous donations as long as these do not exceed 340,000 pesos (US $484). A
further 10 per cent can come from donations as large as 10 million pesos (US $14,500),
which do not need to be disclosed to anyone other than the candidate.
China
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.4 (66th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: 3.5 (20th out of 21 countries)
Conventions:
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified September 2003)
• In December 2002 amendments to the criminal code were ratified. One of the
provisions stipulates that abuse of authority and dereliction of duty by judicial
officials are subject to a criminal penalty of up to 10 years’ imprisonment (see below).
• China’s new leadership, which came to office in March 2003 under President Hu
Jintao, called for an acceleration of the country’s anti-corruption drive. One of its
first measures was a new focus on monitoring provincial-level officials through
the dispatch by the Communist Party’s Central Commission of Discipline Inspection
(CCDI) of 45 inspectors to visit all the country’s provinces. The inspectors are expected
to finish their monitoring programme within four years. The decision should be
viewed in the context of criticisms made of the CCDI for failures to tackle corruption
effectively.
• In August 2003 a law on administrative licensing was passed by the NPC standing
committee. The new law, which takes effect from July 2004, will streamline and
introduce transparency into the system of administrative permits. Until now official
authority to issue licences for everything from marriage to establishing a business
has provided a lucrative source of corruption to supplement meagre wages. Those
seeking licences have often paid serial bribes to obtain approval from different
authorities. The new law seeks to tackle the problem by introducing one-stop
application procedures. The new rules also require licence applications to be filed
in writing in order to avoid face-to-face contact with officials, hopefully lessening
the incidence of ‘improper fee collection’.
in public procurement. The highest (US $0.4 billion) in 1998 to 65.3 billion yuan
occurrence was in construction, which (US $8.2 billion) in 2001, and is expected to
accounted for 63 per cent of all bribery cases. rise to 150 billion yuan (US $18.7 billion) in
In recent years the authorities have taken 2003. Since all levels of administration enjoy
steps to reform contracting procedures in overwhelming and barely checked power –
order to improve efficiency and curb and transparency and effective monitoring
corruption. Experiments with open bidding are generally low – the opportunities for
began in Shanghai in 1996 and spread corruption are high, and the task of curbing
rapidly to other cities, with a growing it Herculean.
proportion of bidding carried out by Internet. International commitments and
In 2000 open bidding was introduced into perceptions play an important role in
state-funded engineering projects, when the motivating the reform of public contracting.
Invitation and Submission of Bids Law came China has been a member of the World Trade
into effect. Most notably, the NPC passed a Organization (WTO) since 2001. Though it
government procurement act in June 2002, has not signed the WTO Agreement on
along with a series of other new regulations. Government Procurement, which requires
The new law standardises rules across the opening public procurement to foreign
country and at all levels of government, and suppliers on an equal basis, it is an observer
aims to increase transparency in public to the agreement and is negotiating to sign.
contracting. In addition the overseas involvement of
So-called ‘construction markets’ (Jianzhu Chinese companies is having a strong
Youxing Shichang) have been introduced in domestic impact.
most big cities with the aim of regulating Two weeks after the passage of the
bidding in construction projects and curbing government procurement act, the Beijing
under-the-table deals. Under the new system, municipal government and the Olympic
contractors have to win contracts through Organising Committee issued an action plan
transparent and fair competition conducted for the Olympics, which embraces a wide
at such trading centres. All procedures are range of associated construction projects.
computerised. The organising committee is cooperating
However, China’s rapid transition has with the Anti-Corruption Research Centre
resulted in huge investment in construction, at Tsinghua University, and other
breeding widespread corruption. The volume institutions, to introduce transparency into
of government expenditure in public all procurement projects for the 2008 games.
procurement jumped from 3.1 billion yuan
Further reading:
Angang Hu, ed., China: Challenging Corruption (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Press,
2001)
TI, Combating Corruption: Building a National Integrity System, translation of TI Source
Book 2000 into Chinese by the Anti-Corruption Research Centre, Tsinghua University
(Beijing: Fangzheng Press, 2002)
Minggao Wang, A Study of Special Strategies and Measures to Oppose and Control Corruption
in China in the New Century (Beijing: Hunan People’s Press, 2003)
Notes
1. www.jcrb.com.cn, 20 November 2002.
2. Chinese Chief Justice and Prosecutor’s Working Reports to the National People’s Congress,
2003.
3. Nanfang Metropolis (China), 18 January 2003.
4. Financial Times (Britain), 11 January 2003.
Costa Rica
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 4.3 (50th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not ranked
Conventions:
OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption (ratified June 1997)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified July 2003)
• Two specialised divisions within the attorney general’s office were established by
the law on the creation of the prosecutor’s office for public ethics, which was
promulgated in April 2002 and came into force three months later. One is for illicit
acts and falls under the treasury and public service jurisdiction (a new jurisdiction
established in May 2002 to deal with cases of corruption involving public servants)
and the other is for acts related to drug trafficking.
The same law obligates the attorney general’s office to carry out the administra-
tive activities necessary to prevent, detect and eradicate corruption and to increase
ethics and transparency in public service. It also states that the attorney general’s
office can denounce and accuse individuals before the courts of justice – a function
normally reserved for the public prosecutions service – for abuse of authority in
matters that fall within the treasury and public service jurisdiction.
In the case of non-government employees, the attorney general’s office will only
act when these persons have been involved in the administration of public property
or funds, have received benefits arising from subsidies or payments with public
funds, or have participated in a criminal offence committed by public servants. The
expanded functions of the attorney general’s office do not preclude criminal acts
from having to be processed additionally through existing administrative control
and supervision channels, and do not impinge on the powers of the auditor general.
• The General Law of Internal Control entered into force on 4 September 2002 and
establishes the minimum standards that must be followed by the national auditor
general’s office and the bodies under its supervision when setting up, improving,
evaluating and maintaining their internal control systems.
Court ruling highlights need to close ‘private investors’ in an effort to evade the
controls and limitations set by law, especially
political financing loopholes
when the funds used to guarantee their
Investigations into the source of financing investments are public. A trust fund set up
for the two main political parties, the for purely commercial purposes is different
National Liberation Party (PLN) and Social from a trust fund established to handle
Christian Unity Party (PUSC), during the political donations, which are subject to the
2002 presidential election campaigns, controls established by the electoral code,
uncovered a myriad of irregular funding tools as well as laws concerning the use and
– currently the subject of a congressional administration of public funds.
probe – and highlighted the need to tighten These obligations are set out in the law
political finance legislation. for the financial administration of the
Political parties have a substantial amount republic and public budgets, which stipulates
of their campaign costs reimbursed by the how and when public funds can be
state, according to the number of votes each authorised. It applies to all public bodies and
party obtains and with the authorisation of also to ‘private entities, in relation to the
the supreme elections tribunal (TSE). Parties resources of the public treasury that they
first have to find the funds to pay for their administer or dispose of’. The same law
campaigns. This sum is known locally as expressly prohibits the constitution of trust
‘political debt’ and the right to have it repaid funds using public money (unless there is a
by the state is enshrined in the constitution. special law authorising them), while the
The nature of ‘political debt’ was called electoral code expressly forbids donations
into question in May 2003 when the TSE and contributions in the name of third
ruled that it was lawful for the PLN to violate parties – which is a specific characteristic of
the ceiling on campaign contributions and a trust fund.
the requirement to report the names of At this writing, the congressional
contributors, because contributions by committee created to investigate the irreg-
individuals to a bank trust fund represented ularities in the financing of the last
an ‘investment in politics’, rather than a presidential campaign is debating whether
donation – which would come under the permitting the existence of trust funds of
category of ‘political debt’. The fund was set this kind would entail distorting the sense
up in September 2001 and party contribu- of electoral law and violate therefore the
tions were deposited on the basis that the limits and prohibitions that have been set for
money would be repaid after the elections political donations.
with the funds the state traditionally The committee is also investigating other
reimburses. sources of irregular funding, particularly the
The TSE ruling was criticised by NGOs and use of parallel fundraising systems by both
the press, who argued that parties and their the PUSC and the PLN to collect donations
funders should not resort to their role as that were not reported to the TSE.1
The findings of the committee include constitutional norm of the public nature of
donations that exceeded the legal ceiling the political parties’ private contributions,
several times, as well as donations from since the former institution does not have
foreign nationals, who are banned by law constitutional, but legal status’. It stressed
from contributing to political parties. Among that banking secrecy and the right to privacy
the transactions, according to the La Nación are still in force for every bank account not
newspaper, were unrecorded cheques connected with political parties. The decision
totalling US $500,000 from Taiwan’s Inter- reaffirms the right of an individual to ask
national Bank of China that were channelled for and receive information about the bank
to a secret PUSC account held at Banco Inter- accounts of the political parties, or of limited
nacional de Costa Rica (BICSA), an offshore companies that handle resources linked to
Costa Rican bank registered in Panama.2 political groups.
The scandals have prompted a wide- Many politicians were unhappy about the
ranging discussion on the adequacy of decision, claiming it compromised the
campaign-finance laws, and an agreement independence of the legislature, might worry
on the need to revise them. investors and violated the rights to privacy.
Bank officials also voiced complaints on the
grounds that the ruling violated customer
Court decision revives debate on privacy.
access to information law This ruling also helped to revitalise the
debate over the bill to regulate access to
In response to the PUSC and PLN financing information, which had become stuck in
scandals, the constitutional court ruled in parliament. Progress in establishing the new
May 2003 that the assets of political parties legislation can be expected in the near future.
are subject to the principles of ‘publicity and The party funding issue clearly has an
transparency’, pursuant to article 96 of the international dimension as well. The local
constitution. The lack of access to party press reported that the Panama branch of
accounts made it difficult to follow the Banco Internacional Costa Rica refused to
money trail and establish whether illegal open for inspection a current account
donations had been made. Since the ruling, registered in the name of Bayamo S.A., which
the movements and balances of current allegedly acted as a channel for funds from
accounts held by political parties in state or overseas contributors to the electoral
private commercial banks or in any other campaign of President Abel Pacheco. The
non-banking financial entity can, in branch defended its refusal by appealing to
principle, be accessed by anybody. Panamanian law.
The court declared that ‘banking secrecy
cannot be maintained in opposition to the
Further reading
Programa Estado de la Nación, Auditoría ciudadana sobre la calidad de la democracia
(Citizens audit on the quality of democracy) (San José: UNED, 2001), www.
estadonacion.or.cr
Programa Estado de la Nación, Octavo informe sobre el estado de la nación (Eighth report
on the state of the nation) (San José: UNED, 2002), www.estadonacion.or.cr
Roxana Salazar and Mario Carazo, ‘Guía de la Convención de la OEA’ (Guide to the
OAS Convention) (San José: Transparencia Internacional Costa Rica, August 2002)
Roxana Salazar and Mario Carazo, ‘Memoria del programa Elecciones Transparentes’
(Record of the Transparent Elections Programme) (San José: Transparencia Interna-
cional Costa Rica, December 2002)
Roxana Salazar and Mario Carazo, ‘Guía de acceso a la información’ (Guide for Access
to Information) (San José: Transparencia Internacional Costa Rica, March 2003)
Notes
1. In its evaluation of campaign expenditure for the 2002 elections (which is used to
calculate the level of government reimbursements to parties for funding), the general
auditor’s office found serious omissions in the information provided by parties, including
unauthorised spending and undocumented claims.
2. La Nación (Costa Rica), 12 September 2003.
Egypt
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.3 (70th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (adopted July 2003;
not yet signed)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• In November 2002, the government appointed new chief executives to the four
major public sector banks and required the establishment of an audit committee
within each, comprising three non-executive board members.3
• In May 2003 parliament passed the Unified Banking Law, which governs the Central
Bank of Egypt (CBE), the banking system and foreign exchange bureaus. The
government claims that the law will grant the CBE greater oversight powers by
entitling its governor to appoint senior banking officials. The change comes in
response to a recent spate of bad loans by public sector banks to tycoons who default
and often flee the country. Prime Minister Atef Ebeid claimed the law places a
premium on transparency and disclosure, but critics say it does nothing to change
the CBE’s supervision by the presidency.4 The CBE will be required to submit com-
prehensive reports regarding monetary conditions in Egypt to the president and the
assembly at the end of every fiscal year.
• In June 2003 parliament passed a package of reforms introduced by the NDP’s Policy
Secretariat, headed by President Hosni Mubarak’s son, Gamal. The package included
a law abolishing the state security courts. These exceptional courts, created in 1980,
were ostensibly designed to mete out swift justice on national security issues, but
have been used to try everyone from corrupt ex-ministers and businessmen to
democracy advocates, such as Egyptian-American sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim.
An NDP official asserted that abolishing the courts will facilitate the extradition of
corrupt businessmen who flee Egypt after defaulting on loans.5 Lawyers and human
rights activists point out that the new law leaves intact emergency state security
courts, whose verdicts are final and subject only to presidential review.6
to parliament, not the presidency, and the The Egyptian judiciary, particularly the
legislature needs to regain its oversight high court of appeal, the SCC and the admin-
powers over the executive. istrative courts, are virtually the only
remaining institutions to retain public
confidence, despite fears of corruption
The last refuge: the Egyptian judiciary among lower-ranking justices and those in
Former court of appeal judge Yahya al-Refai the exceptional judiciary. But it has become
dropped a bombshell in early 2003 when he an open secret in the legal community that
told the Judges Club and the Bar Association the executive has made dangerous inroads
that he was leaving the profession and aired into judicial independence.
startling revelations about government Despite the hoopla surrounding President
corruption of judges via the ministry of Mubarak’s appointment of the first woman
justice. Almost as startling was the silence judge to the SCC, there have been worrying
that greeted Refai’s allegations. No developments. For the first time in the SCC’s
government or ministerial spokesman either history, and contrary to its tradition of self-
addressed or denied the charges; only the selecting its chief justices, Mubarak
opposition, Nasserist weekly Al-Arabi printed appointed a chief justice and five judges to
Refai’s statement in its 5 January edition.13 the court from outside its own ranks in
The incident illustrated the effectiveness August 2001. The newly minted judges all
of the government’s gag on any discussion worked earlier in the ministry of justice,
of corruption that it does not design and designing restrictive press and NGO
choreograph itself. The issue of judicial legislation.16
corruption is a particularly sensitive subject, Yet the judiciary retains signs of vibrant
constituting a central taboo in Egypt’s public life in its upper echelons, despite attempts
discourse. While legal activists have been to rein it in. In December 2002, the highest
worried by trends in judicial politics over court of appeal accepted the appeal of former
the last 10 years, Refai was the first to finance minister Mohieddin El-Gharib,
articulate the details and practices. An unim- sentenced to eight years in prison in February
peachable career and his long activism on for accepting bribes from a businessman in
behalf of judicial autonomy lent even more
exchange for helping him evade customs
credibility to Refai’s whistleblowing.14
duties. The court overturned the supreme
The justice ministry, headed by a former
state security court verdict, released El-Gharib
chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional
and ordered a retrial. On 18 March 2003, the
Court (SCC), has worked overtime to take
same high appeals court ended the three-
full control of the nation’s judges, Refai
year saga of Egyptian-American sociologist
alleged. The minister appoints justices to
courts for as long as he wants and has powers Saad Eddin Ibrahim, finally exonerating him
to discipline and transfer judges. Refai also after two state security courts found him
touched on the issue of judges’ income, guilty of vague charges and sentenced him
describing how a freeze on their notoriously to seven years in prison.17
meagre salaries was complemented by a Both cases show that the judiciary
system of selective bonuses to identify pliant remains a viable refuge for those who fall
judges – and punish upstanding ones.15 For foul of the government, and that it refuses
the first time since the British occupation in to participate in government-sponsored
the nineteenth century, Refai continued, the smear campaigns. The high courts retain a
ministry has required judges to provide it significant degree of autonomy from
with copies of civil and criminal suits against executive dictates. In April 2003, an admin-
important officials, and adopted other istrative court dealt a further blow to the
measures to influence the outcome of high- government, issuing a precedent-setting
profile cases. decision allowing public demonstrations
and criticising the government for its uncon- ships, consultancy work or appointment to
stitutional ban on such gatherings.18 government posts, a fact stressed by Refai in
The fundamental problem is the lack of his statement. That judges do not have
institutional guarantees for the indepen- control over their budgetary or disciplinary
dence of the judiciary. The absence of matters is a further crippling feature. As with
lifetime tenure is the main way the executive parliament and civil society, the executive
controls the judiciary, dangling in front of must loosen its stranglehold on the judiciary
retiring judges lucrative offers of governor- and allow it to manage its own affairs.
Further reading
Administrative Control Authority (Cairo), Annual Report 2002 [Arabic]
Abdel Meguid, ed., Democratic Development in Egypt (Al-Ahram Centre for Political and
Strategic Studies, 2002) [Arabic]
Hanan Salem, The Culture of Corruption in Egypt: A Comparative Study of Developing
Countries (Cairo: Dar Misr al-Mahrousa, 2003) [Arabic]
Notes
1. Al-Ahram (Egypt), 1 August 2002.
2. New York Times (US), 3 October 2002.
3. Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt), 19 June 2003; Business Today (Egypt), 1 November 2002;
Financial Times (Britain), 1 February 2003.
4. Cairo Times (Egypt), 24–30 April 2003; Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt), 10–16 April 2003.
5. Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt), 13–19 March 2003.
6. Cairo Times (Egypt), 26 June–2 July 2003.
7. Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt), 6–12 February 2003.
8. Gamal’s proposal to do away with the state security courts (see above), and other reform
initiatives that passed into law in June, led some analysts to conclude that a campaign
was underway to legitimise his unelected entry into politics by portraying the president’s
son as the ‘saviour from corruption’. See Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt), 5–11 June 2003; Al-
Arabi (Egypt), 18 May 2003, p. 5; and Middle East Quarterly (US), Spring 2001.
9. Cairo Times (Egypt), 5–11 June 2003.
10. Cairo Times (Egypt), 26 June–2 July 2003.
11. Al-Arabi, 11 May 2003. As Eberhard Kienle, a Middle East expert at London’s School of
Oriental and African Studies, points out, the anti-corruption fervour ‘is always very
selective, so I wouldn’t conclude that it’s a general campaign to end corruption. It has
to be understood as power games between various groups’; Reuters, 23 September 2002.
12. Wali was demoted after his deputy, Youssef Abdel Rahman, was charged with receiving
bribes from a French pesticide company in exchange for allowing their carcinogenic
products to enter Egypt.
13. Cairo Times (Egypt), 10–16 July 2003.
14. Refai’s name came to national prominence in 1969 when he and 188 other respected
judges were dismissed or transferred to administrative positions as part of a purge by
the Nasser regime. The purge was in response to a 1968 statement the judges had
authored blaming Egypt’s 1967 defeat by Israel on the lack of democracy and political
accountability. After being reinstated by President Anwar Sadat, Refai went on to head
a circuit of the Court of Cassation (high court of appeal), Egypt’s most independent
judicial institution. Since no judges have lifetime tenure, Refai left the profession upon
reaching the mandatory retirement age. He opened a private legal practice and continued
to campaign for constitutional and legal reforms that would free judges from the
ministry of justice, and was one of the first to raise the issue of full judicial supervision
of parliamentary elections.
15. Cairo Times (Egypt), 30 January–5 February 2003.
16. Cairo Times (Egypt), 27 June–3 July 2002.
17. The state security courts were abolished when law 105 was repealed in June 2003.
18. The ruling came in response to a suit filed by activist Abdel Mohsen Hammouda to
hold a demonstration against the US invasion of Iraq. See Cairo Times (Egypt), 5–11
June 2003.
France
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 6.9 (23rd out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: 5.5 (12th out of 21 countries)
Conventions:
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (signed November 1999; not
yet ratified)
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (signed September 1999;
not yet ratified)
EU Convention on the Fight against Corruption (ratified August 2000)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ratified July 2000)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified October 2002)
ities and be prohibited from providing an audit and advice for the same client, unless
both services are part of the audit process. The law more clearly specifies what types
of conflict of interest preclude auditors from working on accounts. An independent
authority linked to the ministry of justice – the high council of the audit office – will
be responsible for regulating auditors. The law also calls for auditors’ remuneration
to be made public; for the annual general meeting to receive information on a board’s
work and on issues of internal control; and for all organisations making a public
share offer to publish all transactions carried out by their managing agent, or by the
latter’s associates.
• At this writing, parliament was reviewing a bill that would alter the justice system
to reflect recent developments in crime and that would overturn French criminal
law procedures. The bill introduces the concept of pleading guilty and contains rules
dealing with international legal cooperation that promote the effectiveness of anti-
corruption activities. In particular, it seeks to amend the criminal code to reflect the
May 2000 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member
States of the European Union, as well as the 2002 ruling to institute Eurojust, the
EU body dedicated to fighting serious cross-border or transnational crime.1
for €6.2 million (US $7.1 million) with the bidding process, recommended when
organisation of his choice without needing competition between companies is strong;
to refer to a tender commission or discussing a publicised negotiation process, which
the contract with a council. When asked allows communities to raise questions and
about the opportunities for corruption these call for improvements in the bids; and
reforms might create, the minister of competitive dialogue, in which the public
economy and finance responded that procurer defines needs to the company. For
corruption would not be eliminated through contracts involving more than €6.2 million
restrictive procedures since it was a ‘question (US $7.1 million), only the traditional
of the condition of the spirit’.5 bidding process will be authorised. Further,
Initial criticism of the first draft of the public procurers must regularly publish a list
reform prompted the government to of all significant transactions and vendors.
introduce major alterations to the text and, The finance ministry has decided to continue
in July 2003, to create a cross-party monitoring transactions with an eye to
commission of deputies to re-evaluate the enforcing the regulations.
more restrictive procedures set forth in the The reform was put forth in a climate that
regulations. broadly favours decentralisation, with central
The ministry of economy and finances government seeking to devolve increased
subsequently announced that the new responsibilities to regional, departmental
competitive threshold would be €240,000 and municipal authorities. In particular,
(US $275,000) for all public tenders. For authority for road construction is soon to
construction contracts between €240,000 be hived off to local authorities while
and €6.2 million (US $7.1 million), the state occupational and professional training, and
and the local communities will be able to non-national infrastructure projects, will be
choose one of three formulas: the traditional regional responsibilities.
Further reading
Thierry Beaugé, ‘Vers une nouvelle réforme du code des marchés publics’ (Towards a
reform of the code for public contracts), TI France, newsletter no. 17, April 2003
Yves-Marie Doublet, ‘Quel financement futur pour les partis politiques européens?’
(Questions of future financing for European political parties), TI France, newsletter
no. 17, April 2003
‘A propos de la réforme en cours du code des marchés publics, il est possible de concilier
simplification et transparence’ (The current reform process for public procurement
can reconcile simplification and transparency), TI France, newsletter no. 18, July
2003
‘La délinquance financière devant les tribunaux français’ (Financial criminality before
French courts), TI France, newsletter no. 15, October 2002
Service central de prévention de la corruption (Central service for the prevention of
corruption), 2001 report, Editions des journaux officiels, no. 4433 [in French]
‘En finir avec la criminalité économique et financière’ (Putting an end to economic and
financial criminal activity), Syndicat de la magistrature et ATTC, Editions mille et
une nuits, no. 46, November 2002
Notes
1. For more on the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the
Member States of the European Union, see europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33108.htm
and www.justice.ie/802569B20047F907/vWeb/pcSBHN548FKE
2. The court of cassation is the supreme court of the judiciary, which is the final court of
appeal against the judgments of the lower courts.
3. In France, judges and prosecutors form part of the same single body of magistrates. They
may be sitting magistrates or standing magistrates. Sitting magistrates are akin to judges
on the bench in the United States; they can issue ordinances, judgments and arrests.
Standing magistrates are public prosecutors who work for the government in the criminal
jurisdiction.
The principle of security of office applies to judges but not to prosecutors, the latter
being under the direction and supervision of their hierarchical superiors and the authority
of the minister of justice. French criminal procedure involves discretionary prosecution
by the public prosecutor’s office and so far has granted judges a greater role than parties
in the conduct of proceedings.
4. Eva Joly, Est-ce dans ce monde-là que nous voulons vivre? (Paris: Les Arènes, 2003).
5. La Tribune (France), 30 April 2003.
Greece
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 4.3 (50th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ratified February 2002)
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (signed January 1999; not
yet ratified)
EU Convention on the Fight against Corruption (ratified April 2001)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ratified February 1999)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
new institutions, rather than examining why the existing ones do not function
properly. The GIPA’s remit overlaps with several other agencies’, including the
economic fraud squad and the Inspectors–Controllers Body for Public Administra-
tion, created in 1997.
Construction for the Olympic Games million (US $1.7 million) in the case of
supplies and services, or twice that amount
multiplies opportunities for corruption
in the case of construction schemes, and can
Greece has been pursuing an accelerated conduct an ex post review of the selection
economic development programme over the procedure if it is challenged. The Greek
past few years, due to approval of a third EU Olympic Committee, in collaboration with
funding package and its hosting of the the government, also supervises infrastruc-
Olympic Games in 2004, which has ture projects associated with the games.
increased the need for public works. The two To increase transparency, parliament
programmes have multiplied opportunities ratified an act in June 2002 that prevents
for bribe taking and raised concerns about media firms from participating in public
the authorities’ ability to monitor such large works contracts because of their influence
procurements for maximum transparency on public opinion and politicians. It was
and optimal growth. feared they might enjoy beneficial treatment
EU development funds for 2000–06 as candidates to implement public works, or
amount to around €50 billion (US $57 that they might engage in influence
billion), much of which will be spent peddling.
improving the competitiveness of the More robust legislation on monitoring
economy by modernising infrastructure.1 public procurement was proposed in October
The cost of preparing for the Olympic Games 2002, but not passed. The main points
is over €4.4 billion (US $5 billion).2 included: the establishment of an
Three ministries supervise the awarding independent committee to supervise the
of contracts: the ministry of finance (service selection process for awarding contracts,
provision); the ministry of environment, guarantees to ensure that the cost and quality
planning and public procurement of public works are measured objectively,
(construction and real estate); and the and stricter penalties for corrupt officials and
ministry of development (state supplies). firms that distort procedures. Both GRECO
The Audit Court plays an important and TI-Greece, among other organisations,
monitoring role. It exercises prior control have proposed further detailed measures to
when the value of the contract exceeds €1.5 combat corruption.
The need for more effective mechanisms budget. Its proportional distribution depends
is underscored by indications of bribery, on the number of a party’s parliamentary
corruption and favouritism in the award members and votes it received. The total
of public contracts. An Audit Court amount spent by a party in the election
examination of preliminary contracts in 2000 season should not exceed 20 per cent of the
found 43 out of 182 were illegal, and 34 out previous public funding package. The new
of 164 in the following year.3 An opinion poll law also set regulations on private contribu-
conducted in February 2001 revealed that 72 tions. Greek nationals are permitted a
per cent of respondents believed that public maximum annual contribution of €15,000
administration bodies were responsible for (US $17,000) to a party and €3,000 to a
most corruption in Greece and needed to be candidate. Foreigners and Greek owners of
substantially reformed, while 86 per cent media firms are not allowed to donate to
were dissatisfied with the way they operate.4 political parties.
Floods seriously damaged many public works The new law is also more exacting about
in summer and autumn 2002, raising further how parties report their income. Accounts
questions about quality and the effectiveness that record expenses, revenues and the
of the monitoring authorities. Some 2,140 names of donors are required annually.
cases of corruption, mostly concerning public Monitoring them is the responsibility of a
officials, are currently under investigation committee composed of members of
by the authorities.5 parliament and judges. Those who violate
the new rules face fines or, in serious cases,
dismissal. The ministry of internal affairs,
Financing of political parties during the public administration and decentralisation
elections is to set up a special elections committee
before elections with responsibility for
Many candidates and parties in the 2000 implementing the act effectively.
elections were criticised for their lack of The concern, however, is not with the
transparency concerning donors and the true details of the new law, but whether political
amount of funding they received. Prompted parties actually follow them. After the 2000
to act by such dissatisfaction, parliament elections, TI Greece reported several
ratified a new law on political financing in instances where candidates had not followed
June 2002 that provides stricter penalties for the existing rules on promotional strategies,
candidates who do not comply with but nothing was done to punish the
campaign financing rules during elections. offenders.6 Rather than pass more legislation,
The new law set the level of public funding the priority should be ensuring compliance
for parties at 0.022 per cent of the national with existing laws.
Further reading
Center for the Development of Ideas for Greece in the 21st century, ‘Corruption: Policies
Aimed at the Containment of Corruption in the Public Sector’, 1998, www.E21.gr
[Greek]
Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), ‘Evaluation Report
on Greece’, May 2002, www.greco.coe.int/evaluations/cycle1/GrecoEval1Rep(2001)
15E-Greece.pdf
European Anti-Fraud Office, ‘European Commission Fight Against Fraud Reports’, 2000,
2001 and 2002, europa.eu.int/comm/anti_fraud/reports/commission/2002/en.pdf
TI Greece: www.transparency.gr
Notes
1. Ministry of Development, www.ypan.gr
2. TI Greece.
3. ‘GRECO: Evaluation Report on Greece’.
4. Opinion poll on transparency, conducted by TI Greece in collaboration with Prognosis.S.A.
The sample was 920 people from the region of Athens and Pireus, aged 16–69 in February
2001.
5. www.in.gr, 13 February 2003.
6. Although nothing was proven, TI Greece sent a report to the committee responsible for
the monitoring of the election process detailing several cases of candidates who had
failed to follow regulations concerning spending on publicity. But it faced resistance
and bureaucratic difficulties in getting the report to the committee. It is not known
whether the report actually reached the committee.
Guatemala
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 2.4 (100th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption (ratified July 2001)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified September 2003)
• A law on pre-trial hearings was approved by congress in December 2002 and entered
into force in February 2003. It extends to a greater number of public officials the
right to have cases heard by congress before they can be tried in court.1 It also gives
the congressional commissions unlimited time to decide whether or not to lift the
immunity of the accused, except in the cases of judges or magistrates when the
decision must be taken within two months.
• In December 2002, congress approved a decree that gives the attorney general’s office
responsibility to defend, both legally and extrajudicially, the interests of the state
both in Guatemala and abroad. This latter point has positive implications for the
repatriation of assets.
• A number of bills that would enhance transparency were presented to congress, but
there was little interest in discussing, let alone passing them. They included: a law
to regulate social funds, which are currently administered in an entirely discretional
way; a law on access to information (though this bill has been neutered by the
addition of 40 amendments in the legislature); definitions of the offences of transna-
tional bribery, illicit enrichment and influence peddling; and a law for the protection
of witnesses who denounce corruption.
Most worrying for civil society organisations and the media is the proposal to
reform the penal code to criminalise the ‘improper use of privileged information’,
which would encourage the denial of public information, limit freedom of expression
and reverse progress on making information public. What is understood by ‘privileged
information’ is not defined. There is little chance of the law being passed, however,
due to its unpopularity and the fact that 2003 is an election year.
Culture of impunity serves grand One of the biggest cases was the alleged
embezzlement of 4.5 million quetzals (US
corruption $600,000) of public funds by President
Recent years have seen several cases of grand Portillo, Vice-President Juan Francisco Reyes
corruption involving officials at the highest and his private secretary, Julio Girón. They
level. Many have not been resolved, were accused of setting up 13 bank accounts
reflecting a culture of impunity deeply and four ghost companies in Panama to
entrenched in the Guatemalan state. The launder the money. The so-called ‘Panama
scandals were exposed by an increasingly connection’ came to light in a report
vigilant local press. published by the newspaper Siglo XXI on 5
March 2002.
Further reading
Acción Ciudadana, ‘Manual Ciudadano: Conociendo y Denunciando la Corrupción’
(Citizens manual: knowing about and denouncing corruption), Guatemala, 2002
Acción Ciudadana, ‘Manual Ciudadano para el Acceso a la Información Pública’ (Citizens
manual on access to information), Guatemala, 2003
Notes
1. This portion of the law was declared unconstitutional and suspended on 2 September
2003.
2. All of the details from this case were reported in a special investigation by El Periódico
(Guatemala), 21–26 August 2002.
3. Congress elects the auditor general for a four-year term. The post holder can only be
removed by congress, in cases of negligence.
Japan
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 7.0 (21st out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: 5.3 (13th out of 21 countries)
Conventions:
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ratified October 1998)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• The Fair Trade Commission was relocated in April 2003 and now comes under the
direct control of the cabinet office. Since 2001 it had been a semi-autonomous agency
within the ministry of public management, home affairs, post and telecommunica-
tions. The FTC’s previous location raised doubts about its independence since its remit
included oversight of the post and telecommunications industries, which were
governed by another bureau in the same ministry.
Failure to extradite Fujimori between June 2001 and April 2002. The
purpose was allegedly to win bids on
Responding to Peru’s formal request in July construction projects for the Mongolian
2003 for the extradition of former Peruvian government, funded through Japanese
president Alberto Fujimori to face charges official development assistance. In September
of human rights abuse and corruption, an 2002 the Japanese prosecuting authorities
official said the Japanese government had decided not to file a case against the
no intention of overturning its principle of company or the employee, although the
not extraditing Japanese nationals. A bilateral public scandal led to the resignation of
extradition treaty could override this Mitsui’s chairperson and president.
principle, but no extradition treaty exists Reportedly, the supreme public prosecutor’s
between Japan and Peru. Fujimori was office determined that there was insufficient
granted citizenship when he fled Peru in evidence to prove that money had been
November 2000. While a campaign has been specifically given to obtain an illicit profit –
launched in Peru and worldwide to lobby an important requirement before the UCPL’s
for Fujimori’s extradition, it has received anti-bribery provisions can be applied. The
only limited support in Japan. (See Box 6.2, small amount of money allegedly involved
‘Campaigning for Fujimori’s extradition’, and its timing – long before Mitsui won the
page 94.) tender – were also cited as reasons for
dropping the case. However, dropping the
case may have sent the message to Japanese
Little action yet against foreign bribery companies that small bribes are permissible.
Japan also faced criticism from the OECD
Although there have been several reports of
Working Group on the Anti-Bribery
Japanese companies making illicit payments
Convention about loopholes in existing
to win business in international markets,
legislation. The UCPL does not apply to cases
none has yet been charged. The bribery of
where an overseas subsidiary of a Japanese
foreign public officials was made illegal in
company pays bribes to foreign officials. In
Japan in February 1999 through an
an apparent attempt to fend off criticism,
amendment to the Unfair Competition
the ministry of economy, trade and industry
Prevention Law (UCPL), which followed
announced in January 2003 that the
Japan’s signature of the OECD Anti-Bribery
government intended to enact a new law on
Convention.
bribing foreign officials within two years.
The most prominent case in 2002–03
The law is expected to replace the anti-
involved allegations that an employee of
bribery provisions of the UCPL and expand
Mitsui & Co. gave 1.3 million yen (US
the law’s jurisdiction.
$11,000) in bribes to a senior official in
Mongolia’s ministry of infrastructure
A year of scandal in the Diet paid to her secretaries. The first half of the
year also saw the resignations of Social
In March 2003 Takanori Sakai, a member of Democrat legislator Kiyomi Tsujimoto,
Japan’s lower house of parliament, the Diet, Koichi Kato (former secretary general of the
was arrested on suspicion of violating the ruling Liberal Democratic Party) and Yutaka
political funds control law. Prosecutors said Inoue, president of the upper house.
that Takanori Sakai violated the law by Tsujimoto resigned after allegations that she
ordering his secretaries not to report some misused funds provided for her secretary’s
120 million yen (US $1 million) in donations salary. The other two resigned following
he had received from businesses from 1997 allegations that businesses had channelled
to 2001. Sakai pleaded not guilty, and at this illicit funds to their secretaries. None of the
writing the case is still being heard in court. three was charged.
In the same month, agriculture minister There are a number of reasons behind the
Tadamori Oshima stepped down after his high rate of political resignations during the
secretaries faced a series of allegations that year. While there is no evidence of increased
they had failed to report receiving money levels of corruption in the Diet, the rate of
from businesses. detection has certainly shot up. Some cases
The cases were the latest of a string of were revealed by whistleblowers, and their
corruption allegations that led to the arrest actions have led to a growing demand for
or resignation of numerous Diet members the introduction of laws to protect them.
over the past 12 months. In November 2002 The media has also played an important role
Muneo Suzuki was charged on several in stoking public impatience with the actions
counts, including receiving a bribe worth 5 of politicians and their secretaries.
million yen (US $42,000) in 1998 from a The case of Takanori Sakai may also be
Hokkaido company in return for using his evidence of a more rigorous approach by the
influence to obtain business related to a prosecuting authorities in applying existing
national park. At this writing the case is being legislation on political funding. Prosecutors
heard in a district court. regarded Sakai’s alleged persistent demands
In August 2002, former foreign minister for political donations as tantamount to
Makiko Tanaka resigned from the Diet, extortion. It was the first time that a Diet
apparently due to increasing suspicion that member has been arrested under the political
she had embezzled part of the official salaries funds control law.
TI Japan
Further reading
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs and Posts and Telecommunications, ed.,
A Study of Corruption Cases in Local Governments: 2002 [in Japanese]
Tetsuro Murobushi, A 130-year History of Structural Corruption in Japan (Tokyo: Sekai
Shoin, June 2000) [in Japanese]
TI Japan: www.ti-j.org
Kazakhstan
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 2.4 (100th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• A new customs agency was established in August 2002. Previously, it had been part
of the ministry of public revenues and so lacked independence. This had resulted
in clashes between the minister of public revenues and the chair of the customs
committee, which the new structure seeks to avoid.
• The status of the disciplinary boards (DBs) of regions and of the cities of Astana
and Almaty was altered and their powers increased by a resolution in December
2002. The DBs are consultative bodies, set up in March 1999 to monitor the activities
of the akim (mayors) and the heads of other administrative and territorial agencies,
including law enforcement bodies that are financed from the local budget. They
issue recommendations about disciplinary action for public servants. The impact of
the DBs on curbing corruption is not likely to be great, however. They lack autonomy
because they depend on the akim for administrative personnel and resources. They
are also subordinate to a presidential commission on corruption and public service
ethics.
• The code on privatisation of land was approved in June 2003. It introduces private
ownership of agricultural land, regulates property rights (ownership and rental),
asserts the competence of the state and its bodies to oversee land disputes, and
introduces mechanisms to protect and regulate use of the land. The process of
privatising land has enormous potential to increase corruption if not properly
monitored.
• An amnesty for registering property was proposed in June 2003 to legalise property
acquired in the so-called ‘shadow economy’. It aims to incorporate small businesses
into the regulated economy and register property owned by rural immigrants in the
cities. This one-off process of registration also has potential for corruption since
information will not be disclosed and registration is voluntary. The draft law does,
however, stipulate that rights to property that have been challenged legally, or were
acquired through corrupt means, will not be granted.
Restrictive political party financing The official explanation for the new law
is that it strengthens the role of political
law threatens democratic parties and makes their financing more
principles transparent. By mid-2003 no political party
had been charged with violating the sections
Kazakhstan’s new law on political parties
of the new law relating to party funding.
introduces fundamental changes relating to
Where the new law began to take its toll,
the financial activities of political parties, however, was on party registration. The law
including their sources of funding. Any increases the number of members a party
beneficial outcomes that this might needs to qualify for registration from 3,000
represent in terms of more transparent and to 50,000, and requires that branches with
accountable funding are, however, no less than 700 members be established in
undermined by clauses in the law that every region in the republic. It also
constrain the formation and operation of introduces rigid mechanisms for the state to
new parties. regulate political party activity and increases
The new law allows political parties to seek opportunities for the state and its bodies to
funds through entrance and membership interfere in parties’ internal affairs.
fees, donations by Kazakh citizens and There were 19 registered parties before the
Kazakh NGOs, and from local businesses. It new law was passed: now there are seven.
stipulates that taxes on donations must be Many of the others were unable to collect
paid and that documentary evidence of the required number of members to qualify
donations must be provided. for re-registration.1 As a result, the only
A number of sources of financing for remaining opposition party in Kazakhstan is
parties that had been included in the former the Communist Party.
law of July 1996 are excluded in the new law, Some opposition groups, including the
such as the proceeds of lectures, exhibitions, Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan and
sports, lotteries and publications. Also worth Azamat, have refused to abide by the law,
noting is that the new law only calls for arguing that some of its clauses directly
information from parties about money held contradict the constitution and other
in accounts in banks registered under Kazakh legislation. For instance, the new mem-
legislation. The new law does not consider bership requirements for the formation of
money held in foreign banks. political parties contradict the 1996 Law on
Public Organisations that stipulates that only fees’ for its work in Kazakhstan. Giffen also
10 people are needed to create a public asked oil companies to pay about US $70
organisation. million into conditional deposit accounts
The effects of the law in its first year in Banque Indosuez and its receiver, Credit
suggest that its benefits in terms of Agricole Indosuez, in connection with the
transparency may well be outweighed by the purchase of oil and gas rights so that this
setback in democratic rights. In addition to money could then be transferred to
clauses that debar parties from running if confidential Swiss accounts under his
they fail to surpass the membership control. From the ‘success fees’ paid to
threshold, restrictions to opportunities for Mercator and the money transferred to
financing parties could force parties to resort confidential Swiss accounts, Giffen allegedly
to illegal means of financing their activities. made illegal payments totalling more than
US $78 million to two of the most high-
Civil society and opposition parties ranking officials of the Kazakhstan
government, referred to in the case file as
mobilise to stem flow of oil dollars ‘KO-1’ and ‘KO-2’. The Wall Street Journal of
into private accounts 23 April 2003 identified them as President
Nazarbaev and former prime minister Nurlan
A lack of accountability, transparency and
Balgimbaev.
public oversight has led to the sad reality
Opposition parties in Kazakhstan were
that some of the proceeds of Kazakhstan’s
aware of the fraud investigation long before
oil boom have been siphoned into private
the case erupted in the international press.
bank accounts rather than fueling long-term
In January 2003 the Democratic Party of
economic development. The following case,
Kazakhstan, Ak Zhol, launched a campaign
referred to as ‘Kazakhgate’, illustrates how
on ‘transparency of raw materials contracts’
oil revenues are misused and is striking
to alert the population to how the nation’s
because of the huge sums involved, the
wealth was being squandered. Activities
senior officials implicated and the array of
included collecting signatures in support of
multinational corporations and banks
greater transparency in awarding contracts
involved. Almost as important, it
demonstrates civil society’s intolerance of for raw materials and, by 4 June 2003, the
such institutional failings. party said it had collected over 650,000. Ak
The case gained prominence in March Zhol also worked on draft amendments to
2003 when US businessman James Giffen legislation relating to transparency of
was arrested in New York and charged with contracts between the government and
paying more than US $20 million in bribes energy companies with the aim of making
to senior Kazakh officials to secure lucrative all contracts public. The party co-chairman
contracts for his consulting firm, Mercator requested that legislators from the Majilis
Corporation.2 Giffen had been paid to advise (the board of parliament) support and begin
President Nursultan Nazarbaev on attracting work on the law. Lastly, party leaders
foreign, primarily US, capital to the oil and appealed to all leading foreign companies
gas sector since 1992. His main task was to working in the raw materials sector to
act as intermediary between oil companies remove confidentiality from oil contracts
and the Kazakh government, under an signed with the government.
agreement dated 21 December 1994 between The Communist Party also tried to obtain
Mercator and the ministry of oil and gas. more information about Kazakhgate. In
Mercator was paid ‘success fees’ for every October 2002, the party’s first secretary,
deal it brokered. Serikbolsyn Abdildin, repeatedly requested
From 1995 to 2000, Mercator received Prime Minister Imanghaliy Tasmagambetov
approximately US $67 million in ‘success to furnish details of the persons and sums of
money involved in the scandal – with no called on foreign oil and gas companies to
results. A request to include the issue on the disclose their payments so the use of these
parliament’s agenda was turned down by the revenues can be monitored. Without
speaker, Zharmakhan Tuyaqbaev. disclosure, the organisations insist, com-
Civil society has played an equally panies expose themselves to accusations that
prominent role in the struggle to ensure that they have underpaid the government and
oil revenues are not stolen or spent on pet are contributing to continued poverty.
projects or inefficient enterprises. The Such opposition efforts, plus pressure from
Caspian Revenue Watch project, coordinated civil society, are vital because the
by the Open Society Institute with input government has so far made little attempt
from local NGOs, is pushing for the either to remedy the problem or cooperate
government to implement systemic reforms with international investigators, pleading
in the management of oil revenues. It has ‘sovereign immunity’.
Further reading
Mark Braden, ‘Review of Kazakhstan’s New Law on Political Parties’, unpan1.un.org/
intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan006217.pdf
Andrei Chebotarev, ‘Reciprocity Payments’, Izvestia-Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan), 25 June
2002 and ‘The Fight against Corruption in Kazakhstan: New Stage or Immediate
Bluff?’, Towards Society Without Corruption, no. 3 (11), June 2002
Transparency Kazakhstan, Source book of the student conference ‘Youth against
Corruption’, 2001, www.transparencykazakhstan.org
Transparency Kazakhstan, ‘Problems and Perspectives of Development in the System
of Local Government’, 2001, www.transparencykazakhstan.org
Transparency Kazakhstan, ‘State of Corruption in Universities’, 2002, www.transparency
kazakhstan.org
Notes
1. In four cases, the reason given by the justice ministry for debarring registration was
infringement of the new law’s prohibition on gender- or ethnic-based parties.
2. See www.kub.kz material of 30 April 2003 for the bill of indictment on the Giffen case
issued by the court of the Southern District of New York.
Kyrgyz Republic
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 2.1 (118th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• President Askar Akaev signed a decree in February 2003 raising judicial salaries by
50 per cent. He called the decision a move to reduce corruption in the court system.
• President Akaev issued a decree in April 2003 that provides for the establishment of
a National Council on Conscientious Government (NCCG) to facilitate transparent
administration as part of the government’s anti-corruption strategy. The NCCG is
expected to eliminate government interference in the economy; provide openness
and accessibility of public services; and enhance the responsibility of officials and
supervisors to civil society and the state. Although the 25-member council is working,
provisions concerning its operation have yet to be approved by the president.1
• Together with the finance ministry, the interior ministry and the national security
service, the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan drafted a law against money laundering,
which was presented to the lower house of parliament in early 2003 and is expected
to be adopted before the end of 2003. The bill sets the maximum sum of money whose
origin does not have to be indicated at 1 million soms (US $23,000). The bank’s
director, Ulan Sarbanov, said the law would serve to establish a lawful foundation
to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.2
• In June 2003, the lower house of parliament adopted laws granting lifelong immunity
from prosecution to President Akaev and two former Communist Party first secretaries
who are now parliamentarians. The law applies to all actions taken during their
periods in office and also guarantees Akaev and his family lifelong privileges, such
as the retention of housing and the use of a car and driver. Proposed as a gesture of
respect for the country’s first president by parliamentarian Kubatbek Baibolov, the
benefits are not intended to apply to future heads of state. An opposition movement
that is calling for Akaev’s resignation and is comprised of parliamentarians, human
rights activists and opposition political figures issued a statement denouncing the
law as unconstitutional and anti-democratic.
• On the president’s orders, Prime Minister Tanaev, who also heads the NCCG, set up
an independent structure committed to the fight against corruption in July 2003.
The agency will work with officials to fight bribery, embezzlement and cronyism,
but it has no enforcement powers or police functions.3
Bakir-uulu has given leading positions in his urged the government to postpone the
office to members of the opposition: referendum, calling it ‘a premature and hasty
Omurbek Subanaliev, a member of Feliks action’. They warned that citizens were ‘not
Kulov’s Ar-Namys party, is responsible for ready to answer the question “Do you agree
relations with the executive and enforcement with changes and additions to the
agencies and Zuura Umetalieva, a well- constitution?”’ Meanwhile, the OSCE
known human rights campaigner and civil declined to send an observer mission on the
society advocate, represents the ombudsman grounds that it needed at least two months
in the northern Naryn province.7 to prepare.10
But the future of the ombudsman’s office Even the president’s hand-picked expert
is uncertain. In June 2003, Bakir-uulu commission – which effectively replaced the
announced that the office might have to close constitutional assembly – called for a con-
due to lack of funding and several judges troversial amendment granting the president
accused him of interfering in the legal broad veto powers to be withdrawn.
process. UNDP made its grant the following Nevertheless, in mid-January, opposition
month and subsequently the government members warned that with the help of the
approved an allocation of 15 million Kyrgyz expert group, ‘the president has put a new
soms (US $350,000).8 Nevertheless, interna- edition of the text … up for referendum’.11
tional organisations are concerned about the Despite the opposition, the referendum
ombudsman’s lack of independence. took place as planned. The Central Election
Commission (CEC) announced that more
than three-quarters of voters had approved
Irregularities mar constitutional the amendments. The CEC claimed that
referendum more than 2 million people, or 86 per cent
of all registered voters, had cast their ballots
Despite intense opposition, a controversial with 76 per cent voting in favour. A
referendum on alterations to the constitution spokesman for the opposition Public
was held and approved on 2 February 2003. Headquarters for Monitoring the Referen-
The results were contested by the opposition dum claimed the official turnout figures
and civil society groups who levelled were exaggerated, estimating as few as 30–40
allegations of vote rigging. State control of per cent of voters had actually gone to the
television meant the president was able to polls. The Washington-based National
control the level of debate and few Kyrgyz Democratic Institute (NDI), which had also
had access to opposition newspapers or called for a postponement, reported that
alternative views. ‘polling officials stuffed ballot boxes and
The amendments guarantee President pressured voters into saying “yes” to
Akaev the right to remain in office until the questions’.12
end of his term in December 2005 and NDI referred to the inappropriate
strengthen his powers at the expense of involvement of state employees, harassment
parliament. It will be much more difficult of those calling for postponement and
to impeach the president: four-fifths of the official demands that villages supply
vote is required, instead of the two-thirds ‘turnout quotas’. The institute also reported
needed before the amendment. In addition, that abuses involved ‘local government
parliamentary deputies had their immunity officials telling voters how to cast their
restored, and the president’s was enlarged ballots’ as well as ‘ballot box stuffing,
(see above).9 repeated voting by a single person and so-
Critics accused the president of rushing called “family voting”’.13 The head of the
the process and not allowing sufficient par- CEC denied receiving any such complaints
liamentary time for consideration of the about the voting process and dismissed the
provisions. On 15 January, 22 NGO leaders critics’ claims.
Corruption and the media against it. MSN was ordered to pay 4 million
soms (US $95,000) in fines, with further
The law on the struggle against corruption 500,000 soms (US $12,000) in damages to
defined a clear role for the media: they are Prime Minister Tanaev. Kim links these cases
to investigate corruption cases and have to articles on corruption in the government.14
access to relevant information from Harassment of independent outlets
government institutions. It was passed less increased steadily over the year, and the
than a year after Human Rights Watch called number of information sources controlled
on the European Union to encourage the by the authorities has similarly grown in
Kyrgyz authorities to decriminalise libel to what may be an orchestrated campaign to
prevent it from being used to block investi- regain control of the media by buying some
gations of corruption charges. Since the law outlets and ruining others through libel
was passed, the newspaper Obshchestvennyi judgments. Freedom House notes that press
Reiting has been taken to court for slander by freedom declined ‘as a result of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs Askar Aitmatov. government’s attempts to introduce new
An anonymous article printed in the paper restrictions on independent media’, and
had alleged that the ministry was riddled classifies Kyrgyzstan’s press as ‘not free’.15
with corruption and cronyism. The Lenin Like much of the business sector in
district court in Bishkek ordered the paper Kyrgyzstan, the media is dominated by
to pay 50,000 soms (US $1,200) to Aitmatov President Akaev’s family. His son-in-law, Adil
and 25,000 soms (US $600) each to two of Toygonbaev, owns nearly all the cable TV
his employees. The first deputy minister of and several publications.16 Prior to the con-
foreign affairs has since filed a similar suit stitutional referendum – and in the months
against the paper. after it – the authorities launched a
In addition, the newspaper Kyrgyz Ordo crackdown against the media that included
ceased publication in January 2003 after its libel suits, the introduction of state bidding
assets were seized for non-payment of libel for TV and radio frequencies, replacement of
fines. Other independent outlets faced similar valid licences with temporary licences and
harassment. Alexander Kim, editor of a proposal to form a media council to fight
Kyrgyzstan’s flagship independent ‘political extremism’ in the press. Journalists
newspaper, Moya Stolitsa-Novosti (MSN), fear the media council’s true purpose is to
announced in June 2003 that the paper was further intimidate them and restrict their
bankrupt due to more than 30 lawsuits filed freedom of expression.
Further reading
Anders Åslund, ‘Specific Taxation Problems and Possible Solutions in the CIS’, 2000,
www.leontief.ru/rus/13_2001dok9.htm
Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform Project, ‘Strengthening Corporate
Governance and Judicial Reform’, a survey of 404 judges and lawyers, Asian
Development Bank, TA no. 3779-KGZ, 29 July 2003
TI Kyrgyzstan, ‘The problems of fighting corruption in Kyrgyzstan’ (forthcoming)
Notes
1. The government published provisions for this council’s operation in the 29 July 2003
issue of Slovo Kyrgyzstana, a pro-government newspaper.
Lebanon
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.0 (78th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2001; not
yet ratified)
of its shares should be listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange to ensure better corporate
governance, accountability and transparency. His suggestion was adopted.
• A consumer protection law was drafted in August 2003 as a precursor to the abolition
of Lebanon’s ‘exclusive agencies’, companies that have exclusive rights to import
specific products. This law would improve transparency in competition and is
especially relevant for the pharmaceutical industry: social programmes reportedly
pay exorbitant prices for medicines due to the existence of a pharmaceutical monopoly
that uses its political influence to keep prices artificially high.1
to many critics that sizable bribes were paid tarian. Politically the two Murrs are at
to powerful politicians in exchange for opposite ends of a wealthy and influential
protection from the law. family that provided one former interior
minister, Michel Murr, as well as current
Agricultural aid: squandering of Interior Minister Elias Murr, who is Myrna
Murr’s brother. Myrna Murr received
public funds? extensive support from her relatives in
government, while both Gabriel Murr and
The former agriculture minister, Ali
Ghassan Moukheiber, a longstanding activist
Abdullah, and 10 senior members of his
ministry were charged with embezzlement for civil society, democracy and human
and squandering public funds in September rights causes, ran on opposition tickets.
2003. He had allegedly allocated funds from Though electoral financing is not regulated
the US Agency for International Develop- in Lebanon, many considered that the large
ment and the International Fund for amount expended by the two leading
Agricultural Development to cooperatives candidates was tantamount to indirect vote
owned by his own relatives. buying. As a proprietor of television and radio
Despite plenty of documentary evidence stations, Gabriel Murr benefited from
available as early as June 2002 implicating unlimited access to free electoral publicity,
Abdullah, no judicial action was taken, nor in breach of electoral law, while Myrna Murr
was there any official reaction to the enjoyed the personal support of her brother,
allegations. At a later stage the former minister the interior minister, in what was
was expelled, for separate reasons, from the demonstrably a conflict of interest.
Amal Movement Party, effectively stripping Gabriel Murr was later prosecuted and
him of political protection. After he was convicted for using Murr Television (MTV)
dropped from the cabinet in the new as a political platform, leading to the closure
government announced in April 2003, his of his station. While there had been a clear
successor personally undertook to press for breach of electoral law, it was a controver-
charges of corruption, embezzlement and sial decision, which raised questions about
squandering of public funds against Abdullah. judicial independence. Most Lebanese
television stations are owned by prominent
Profiling political corruption: politicians who exploit them at election time,
without incurring judicial action (see below).
the Mount Lebanon by-elections On the eve of elections, the interior
minister announced a spontaneous reinter-
A by-election in the Metn region in June
2002, triggered by the death of parliamen- pretation of the electoral law to the effect
tarian Albert Moukheiber, was the focus of that voting behind closed curtains was now
heated political debate for months, and led optional, rather than compulsory, thus
to the closure of two media outlets in jeopardising the secrecy of the ballot.7 The
September of that year. opposition accused the minister of
The elections were a case study in attempting to influence the elections by
Lebanese political corruption, featuring intimidating voters. There were also
incidents of conflict of interest, abuse of allegations that the government monitored
power, inconsistent application of electoral voting patterns, particularly where votes were
law, vote buying, political pressure to allegedly bought, and that security forces
influence voters, excessive campaign affiliated to the interior ministry pressured
expenditures, unlawful use of media airtime voters and intimidated the opposition.8
and attacks on the freedom of the press. The tabulation process was similarly
The three leading candidates were Gabriel marred.9 Senior politicians allegedly
Murr, his niece Myrna Murr and Ghassan contacted the agency responsible for vote
Moukheiber, nephew of the dead parliamen- counting, the higher vote tabulation
Further reading
Arab Finance Corporation, ‘Report on the Republic of Lebanon 2003’, Beirut, 2003,
www.menafn.com/rc_country.asp?country=3
Albert Dagher, ‘L’administration libanaise après 1990’ (The Lebanese administration
after 1990), conference paper January 2002, thorstein.veblen.free.fr/pdf/A.DAGHER.pdf
European Union, ‘Lebanon: Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006’ and ‘National Indicative
Programme 2002–2004’, europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/lebanon/csp/
02_06_en.pdf
TI Lebanon: www.transparency-lebanon.org
Notes
1. Daily Star (Lebanon), 11 February 2002.
2. The agreement and the country strategy paper for Lebanon can be found at:
europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/lebanon/intro/ag.htm. It is noteworthy that
suspension has never been implemented based on the human rights or governance
violations of signatory countries.
3. The report presented by the government can be found at: www.lebanonwire.com/
paris2/index.htm
4. See www.fatfgafi.org/NCCT_en.htm
5. Daily Star (Lebanon), 14 July 2003.
6. Daily Star (Lebanon), 16 July 2003.
7. Daily Star (Lebanon), 4 June 2002.
8. Daily Star (Lebanon), 8 June 2002.
9. Daily Star (Lebanon), 4 June 2002.
10. Daily Star (Lebanon), 4 June 2002.
11. Daily Star (Lebanon), 8 June 2002.
12. Al-Ahram Weekly Online, Issue 603, 12–18 September 2002.
13. The Executive, ‘Losing our Voice. Freedom of Speech takes on new meaning with the
recent media oppression’, Beirut, October 2002.
Mali
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.0 (78th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (adopted July 2003;
not yet signed)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified April 2002)
• A decree of January 2003 provided for the creation within the Contrôle Général des
Services Publics (general public service control agency) of a commission for
monitoring internal control systems. Only an advisory body, the commission will
approve procedural manuals and training modules drafted by public organisations.
It is also responsible for follow-up evaluations.
Further reading
Sada Diarra, ‘Les fondements juridiques de la corruption sous la 3ème République au
Mali’ (Judicial foundations of corruption in the 3rd Republic of Mali), June 2000,
www.aidtransparency.org/francais/articleune.cfm?vararticle=267
Brahima Fomba, ‘Elections et corruption politique au Mali’ (Elections and political
corruption in Mali), conference paper, June 2002, available through GERDDES-Mali
(Groupe d’Etudes et de Recherches sur la Démocratie et le Développement Economique
et Social), www.gerddes.org
Notes
1. Decree no. 02-380/PM-RM of 30 July 2002 and decree (amendment) no. 02-400/PM-RM
of 7 August 2002 established the committee. Journal Officiel, no. 24, 31 August 2002.
2. In August 2003, the national assembly passed a law creating the auditor general’s office
by a large majority (126 to six with seven abstentions).
3. ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Charged with Investigating the Lifting of Parliamen-
tary Immunity from Deputy Mamadou Diawara’, 7 June 2002, National Assembly.
4. The body of magistrates is the Syndicat Autonome de la Magistrature.
5. ‘Rapport du Comité ad hoc de Réflexion sur les Recommandations de la Banque Mondiale
relatives au Renforcement du Programme Anti-Corruption au Mali’ (Report of the ad hoc
investigative committee on World Bank recommendations relating to strengthening
Mali’s anti-corruption programme), August 2002.
6. The committee is the Comité ad hoc de Réflexion sur les Recommandations de la Banque
Mondiale relatives au Renforcement du Programme Anti-corruption au Mali (the ad hoc
investigative committee on World Bank recommendations relating to the strengthen-
ing of the anti-corruption programme in Mali). See www.justicemali.org/divers197.htm
7. The current budget limit was established by order No. 97-1898/MF-SG on 19 November
1997.
Nepal
Conventions:
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2002; not
yet ratified)
could be used to target political opponents, though a number of local observers say
it has helped to foster an environment of intolerance of corruption.
• In January 2003, the CIAA created a planning division to expedite cases. A month
later it boosted its staff from 128 to 205 and extended CIAA branches to all five
regional development centres and the 10 districts considered most corrupt. In March
2003, the CIAA launched a five-year scheme to control corruption.
Anti-corruption laws adopted, but which strengthened the powers of the CIAA
by providing clearer definitions of corruption
compliance remains problematic
and the penalties for wrongdoers, even for
A ream of recent legislation and measures those found guilty after leaving their posts.
enacted by the executive aims to tackle the A special court was created the following
scourge of corruption by granting investiga- month to look into corruption cases,
tion and enforcement agencies greater previously the jurisdiction of the appeals
powers and by raising awareness of the court. This was followed by the
problem. But as important as the letter of impeachment act, which makes it easier to
the law and the intentions behind the legal take legal action against senior elected
and institutional changes, is whether they members of government, and a political
are actually enforced. Political instability and parties act, aimed at making funding more
the fact that the state apparatus is focusing transparent.
on fighting an insurgent movement, makes A second important change was the
compliance difficult. creation in March 2002 of a high-level
The first significant new piece of Judicial Inquiry Commission on Property to
legislation was the amendment of the investigate property held by officials and
Corruption Prevention Act in June 2002, politicians appointed after 1990. This is an
important area to tackle as one of the reasons million rupees (US $400,000) through illegal
for the popular perception that the level of telecommunication deals, unlawful
corruption in government is high is that procurement of mobile phone sets and
several politicians and officials had been seen wrongful renewing of cinema licences.
to buy houses and amass wealth shortly after Wagle was once acting prime minister and
taking office (see below). deputy chairman of the Nepali Congress
Finally, the government took steps to raise (Democratic) Party, while Khadka was
awareness of corruption. The public services secretary general of the same party. They
ordinance of November 2002 led to teams were in power for most of the last decade
being deployed to regional development until September 2002, when anti-corruption
centres to supervise all public services, their agencies took action against them. The three,
distribution, operation and management for who argue that they are being framed in a
six months from January 2003. The teams political vendetta, were released on bail
looked into public grievances related to irreg- pending the verdicts, which may take a long
ularities and corruption. The aim of the time being handed down.
exercise was to make officials aware that they Local analysts are confident the trials are
are accountable. The National Vigilance serving to give a badly needed warning to
Centre, established in January 2003, shares other public officials, though some observers
the same aim. have cautioned of the danger that the CIAA
It is too early to evaluate the impact of could, indeed, be used to target political
the changes. Implementation of some of opponents as it lacks cross-party represen-
them has been hampered by the institutional tation. In addition to investigating
and political context. For instance the CIAA allegations of corruption by elected
and other monitoring agencies faced politicians, the CIAA is scrutinising possible
difficulties making their reports public in acts of corruption by senior government
2002 and 2003.1 The procedure for doing so employees, heads of state-owned companies
is to submit them to the king, who then and police officials.
sends them to parliament; parliament has
been vacant since being dissolved in May
2002, however, and so the reporting process
Judicial property inquiry provides a
could not be carried out. much-needed check on corruption
Notwithstanding these difficulties, there by politicians
have been some high-profile successes.
Shortly after the new laws were enacted, the In March 2003, the Judicial Inquiry
CIAA prosecuted three former ministers, Commission on Property (JICP) presented a
Chiranjibi Wagle, Khum Bahadur Khadka 600-page report to King Gyanendra Bir
and Jayaprakash Prasad Gupta, for alleged Bikram Shah Dev to demonstrate that the
corruption, the first time senior Nepalese earnings of public officials will no longer
politicians have been indicted for the crime. remain beyond ‘judicial audit’ in the name
Wagle faces charges of misappropriating of private property or under considerations
more than 30 million rupees (US $400,000) of individual privacy.
by using his political influence to bolster his The JICP was headed by Supreme Court
son’s travel and trekking business, and of Justice Bhairab Prasad Lamsal, with two
declaring property falsely. Khadka was former justices sitting as members. It was
accused of taking a bribe from a contractor constituted in March 2002 during the admin-
worth more than 110 million rupees (US istration of former prime minister Sher
$1.5 million) in exchange for using his Bahadur Deuba to examine whether property
authority to provide a contract without owned by politicians and officials appointed
tender for construction work near the river after 1990 had been obtained legally. The
Bakraha. Gupta allegedly made more than 30 JICP required 41,900 politicians and officials
Further reading
Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), ‘Investigation and
Prosecution: Guidelines’, 2003
CIAA, ‘A Collection of Constitutional and Legal Provisions on Corruption and Principles
Enshrined in Supreme Court Verdict’, 2003
CIAA, ‘Quarterly Bulletin’, Kathmandu, www.akhtiyar.org.np [Nepali]
Hari Bahadur Thapa, Anatomy of Corruption (Katmandu: ESP, 2002)
TI Nepal, ‘A Household Survey on Corruption’, South Asian Report, August 2002,
www.tinepal.org
TI Nepal: www.tinepal.org
Notes
1. TI Nepal, ‘Newsletter’, April 2003.
2. The king dismissed the prime minister and his cabinet in October 2002 for ‘incompetence’
after they dissolved the parliament and were subsequently unable to hold elections
because of the ongoing insurgency. The country is now governed by the king and his
appointed cabinet until elections can be held at some unspecified future date.
Nicaragua
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 2.6 (88th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption (ratified May 1999)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified September 2002)
Further reading
Alejandro Serrano, ed., Etica y Política (Ethics and politics) (Nicaragua: Universidad
Politécnica de Nicaragua, 2003)
Reinaldo Antonio Téfel, El huracán que desnudó a Nicaragua (The hurricane that stripped
Nicaragua bare) (Managua: Foro Democrático, 1999)
Vice-Presidency of Nicaragua, ‘Plan nacional de anti-corrupción de Nicaragua’,
www.respondanet.com/espanyo1/anticorrupcion/Nicaragua1.htm
Nigeria
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 1.4 (132nd out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (adopted July 2003;
not yet signed)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified June 2001)
• In February 2003 the Senate passed the Corrupt Practices and Other Related
Offences Commission Act 2003, to replace and purportedly ‘strengthen’ the similarly
named act from 2000. However, the act was widely perceived to be a deliberate
weakening of existing legislation. The law was eventually blocked by the federal
high court (see below).
• In April 2002 the assembly passed the Electoral Act 2002, which replaced the Electoral
Act 2001. The law, which governed the conduct of the April 2003 general elections,
faced several constitutional challenges during 2002–03. Among other provisions,
the law empowered the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to place
a limit on donations to political parties by individuals or corporate bodies. The
apparent scale of expenditure and donations during the election period suggests,
however, that limits were not followed, although the INEC issued no complaints
against any party or candidate.
said, were less than 50 per cent of what was Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999.
budgeted.1 According to ICPC Chairman Obasanjo’s high-profile anti-corruption
Justice Mustapha Akanbi, the lack of funds campaign led many to expect that the
meant that the ICPC had not been able to president would push for freedom of
expand beyond the capital city, Abuja.2 information legislation – essential in the
The ICPC’s limited capacity across the fight against corruption – but he did not.
country is rendered more problematic by the Since then the campaign has been driven
fact that, although Nigeria is a federation of by a coalition of civil society groups,
states, there has been virtually no including the NGO Media Rights Agenda. A
independent, anti-corruption effort by any group of legislators did introduce a bill into
of the states, or by local government. The the National Assembly in July 1999, but after
introduction of Islamic shari’a law in 12 of initial progress it stalled. The bill’s third
the 36 states had brought expectations of reading did not take place until May 2001,
stronger anti-corruption efforts in them, but by which time the political terrain had grown
in practice the principal target has been petty more volatile. There was a widespread public
theft. The government recently embarked perception that the National Assembly was
on administrative reforms that are likely to morally compromised, especially over
enhance the supervisory role of state corruption. In this climate, members of the
governments over local councils. Because legislature feared that journalists would use
they rely on the will and capacity of state freedom of information legislation as a
governors themselves to maintain financial weapon against them. By the time the
integrity, however, an effective ICPC will be assembly’s tenure expired in April 2003, the
even more important. bill had made no further progress.
Some kind of reform of the ICPC is The general elections of April 2003
inevitable. Indeed, the ICPC has itself brought in a new leadership in both houses
initiated the process by pushing for reforms of the National Assembly, renewing hope
that, if successful, would include: reducing among civil society groups that the bill might
the size of the ICPC’s management; giving eventually be passed. International groups,
it powers to initiate investigations; removing such as the Committee to Protect Journalists,
some of the judicial obstacles to prosecution; have supported their case, urging the new
and enhancing its accountability. The ICPC lawmakers to pass the bill. The optimism
is also expected to strengthen links with civil may, however, be misplaced.
society institutions, to enhance its The newfound optimism assumes that the
preventive capacity. One reform that could old leadership of the legislature was the
significantly strengthen the ICPC would be problem. But the executive, led by the
giving it the power to prosecute – under the president, appears to have done little to help
2000 legislation, it can only recommend the bill’s cause. Secondly, the honeymoon
prosecution. period of the new legislature may not last
long. If members of the new legislature, like
the old, become the targets of anti-
What hope for the freedom of information corruption legislation, the new legislature
bill? may become just as reluctant to pass laws
that strengthen the hand of their
Nigeria still does not have freedom of ‘opponents’. However, if the campaign is
information legislation, despite years of intensified early enough, the good
campaigning. With a new leadership in the relationship that currently exists between
legislature since April 2003, there is now the executive and the legislature may yet
hope that legislation may be introduced, but ensure success.
political will is needed. The battle for Finally, the campaign for freedom of
freedom of information legislation predates information has not received sufficient
support from the media itself. The campaign the chief justice to clean up Nigeria’s justice
has instead been sustained largely by the system. Since 1999 dozens of cases of corrupt
effort of civil society groups. The freedom practices involving judges have been
of information bill would surely have been resolved, and the National Judicial Council
more successful if it had been highlighted has forcibly retired more than 20 judges.
by Nigeria’s vocal media. While this is definite progress, there is still
a long way to go, especially in rebuilding
First steps to strengthen judicial integrity public confidence in the judiciary.
Indeed the judiciary has repeatedly
Worried by the rising incidence of corruption hindered the ICPC’s anti-corruption work
in the judiciary, Chief Justice Muhammed since it began operating in 2000. In its early
Uwais, in conjunction with the UN Centre days, the agency was mired in controversy
for International Crime Prevention and the over the constitutionality of the act that
ICPC, initiated a project in 2001 to established it. Although this appeared to
strengthen judicial integrity. Four key have been settled by supreme court
concerns were identified: the quality and judgment in June 2002, the issue of the
timeliness of the trial process, access to ICPC’s constitutionality continues to
courts, public confidence in the judiciary,
resurface at every turn – actively abetted by
and efficiency in dealing with public
a number of judges.
complaints. The Nigerian Institute of
Despite repeated warnings from the chief
Advanced Legal Studies was contracted to
justice, judges continue to grant ex parte
conduct a comprehensive assessment of
applications that have stalled corruption
judicial integrity and capacity in the states
of Lagos, Delta and Borno. trials. Individuals who fall under ICPC
During 2002–03 efforts were made to scrutiny seek and obtain injunctions
improve judicial integrity in the pilot states challenging the constitutionality of one
through ICPC monitoring of judges and section of the act or other, even in courts
court staff; ethics training for judges and that are not officially designated to hear
court staff; the creation of a transparent corruption cases. Almost all the cases the
complaints systems, involving ‘court user ICPC has filed in court have been blocked
committees’; and increased coordination by such injunctions. If the ICPC’s attempts
within the criminal justice system. to combat corruption are to succeed, the
The measures pointed to a determined efforts to improve judicial integrity must be
effort by the National Judicial Council and stepped up.
Further reading:
Karl Meier, This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis (London: Penguin Books, 2001)
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, survey report on judicial integrity
(forthcoming)
World Bank, Nigeria Governance and Service Delivery Survey (forthcoming)
Notes
1. ThisDay (Nigeria), 23 January 2003.
2. M.A. Akanbi, ‘Current Policy Initiatives and Frameworks for Combating Corruption’,
unpublished conference paper delivered in Abuja, February 2003.
Palestinian Authority
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.0 (78th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
• Legislation for a new administrative and financial monitoring office was proposed
in March 2003. The office would replace the general monitoring authority established
in 1996. The president, his aides and advisers, as well as police and security officials,
would come under the new office’s scrutiny. The president would no longer have
the authority to appoint and depose the chairman of the monitoring office and the
office would have a special budget allocated from within the general budget.
• In March 2003 amendments were made to the Basic Law, which came into effect in
2002 and provides the legal foundation for the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the
transitional period. One amendment introduced the post of prime minister, with
responsibility for forming and modifying the council of ministers and overseeing
government institutions. The president was given authority to refer the prime minister
for investigation – and the prime minister the right to refer ministers to investiga-
tion – when accused of crimes. The amended law also allows 10 members of the
88-member legislative council to submit a request to hold a special session to withdraw
confidence from the government, or from any of its ministers, after investigation.
• The amendments also introduced the PA’s first disclosure requirements. All ministers,
including the prime minister, must now submit a financial report on themselves,
their spouses and dependant minors detailing the ownership of assets. Conflicts of
interest are prohibited.
• Under discussion is a law dealing with infractions of public employment duties (its
first reading was in April 2003). It would establish penalties of up to 10 years’
imprisonment for embezzlement of public funds, up to 15 years for bribery and
life imprisonment for destroying evidence to facilitate, or cover up, embezzlement.
Funds would be recovered and fines imposed equal to the amount of embezzled
funds or damages incurred.
draft laws, decrees and decisions that will be previously excluded from the budget, which
required once the Basic Law comes into force. exposed the PA to serious allegations of
President Arafat appointed a supreme judicial corruption and mismanagement.
council, which was supposed to be Work is being done to unify accounting
reformulated according to the law regulating systems in the West Bank and Gaza in order
judicial authorities, but it did little to to fully integrate financial operations. The
improve the structure of the courts and the development of a continuous online com-
process of nomination and promotion of munication system between the two areas
judges or the appointment of new staff. and the creation of a budget-monitoring unit
Lawyers, civil society actors and the interna- to guarantee that all expenses are in line
tional community pressured the president with the approved budget and audited
to change the council’s composition and a periodically will help the integration process.
new one was formed in June 2003. A new Also positive was a decision by the cabinet
prosecutor general was also nominated and in June 2003 to cease all illegal deductions
the state security court was annulled in from civil service salaries. Often amounting
August 2003. to 5–10 per cent of the total, some of these
Part of the blame for the failure to fully deductions were started in 1996 to contribute
implement reform plans lies with the Israeli to the unemployment fund. Investigations
occupation, which has hindered advocates are currently in place to uncover precisely
of reform by providing resisting parties with what happened to the funds.
pretexts for the avoidance of decision- In presenting the 2003 budget, Finance
making. But a lack of political will is also in Minister Salam Fayyad spoke of the need for
evidence. No high-ranking government more stringent compliance with the
official has been prosecuted for corruption procurement law, which calls for all public
which, as well as blocking reform, negatively procurement processes to be put out to
affects public perceptions of the process. The tender. He threatened to use his authority
reform of the judicial system and to halt funds to non-compliant parties. The
preparations for general and local integration of the petrol, tobacco and
government elections are all steps that can investment agencies with the finance
be achieved despite the political implications ministry in May 2003 was a further step
of the occupation.
forward.
There is still plenty of scope for
The finance ministry takes steps to improvement. The presentation of the
budget occurred two months after the date
increase transparency
prescribed by law and not all of the revenues
The finance ministry has taken steps to from state agencies were consolidated in the
improve transparency of its operations. The budget: the insurance and pensions fund
annual budget and detailed monthly reports accounts were missing. Some initiatives have
of budget expenditures are available to the been applied with little rigour. The payrolls
general public on the Internet and for the of security personnel were supposed to be
first time the investments of the PA have distributed through the banking system,
been subjected to independent scrutiny. replacing the habit of disbursing lump sums
The 2003 budget was presented for in cash to the heads of each service, but two
discussion to the legislative council in months after the decision was announced
December 2002 and published on the in April 2003, only two security agencies had
finance ministry’s new website. It included implemented the change. While Fayyad has
expected revenues from the investments started challenging the more powerful figures
managed by the recently established in his ministry, dismissing some (including
Palestine Investment Fund. These were directors from the finance ministry and from
the petrol bureau), suspending others, no were posted on the finance ministry website
attempts have been made to bring those in March 2003.3
tainted with corruption allegations to book. The report discusses the availability and
One of the most significant developments reliability of financial and other data, as well
was the decision to create the Palestinian as how each asset is owned, organised and
Investment Fund (PIF) to manage administered, and whether each could be
commercial assets. The PIF was established judged to be both transparent and
by presidential decree in October 2000, respectable according to international
though it was not actually constituted as a standards. According to the report, out of
separate legal entity until August 2002. the US $630 million the PA had invested in
Prior to the creation of the PIF little was 79 commercial ventures worldwide, own-
known about where and how PA funds were ership details of about one-third of the equity
invested. Suspicions abounded that officials were lacking. Fifteen of the companies
were using investments to buy favour with involved ceased operating during the Israeli
economic elites or abusing their positions reoccupation.
to seek partnerships in the private sector. Much remains to be done to ensure that
The PIF aims to ensure that commercial the PIF is an effective agency. Of particular
acquisitions and portfolio investments concern is the lack of mechanisms in place
promote economic growth and infrastruc- to regulate conflicts of interest. The articles
ture development in Palestine, and are not of association, which form PIF’s legal basis,
used for political or private gain. provide for a conflict of interest committee
The international ratings agency Standard to monitor investments, but lack details
& Poor’s and the US NGO Democracy about how the committee should be
Council evaluated the results of the PIF’s first constituted. Also worrying is the lack of
10 major investments to assess the fair legislative oversight of the investments and
market value of the investments and the a coherent national investment policy to
transparency of their transactions. Results guide the PIF.
Hada El-Aryan (AMAN, Palestinian coalition for accountability and integrity, Palestine)
Further reading
Inge Amundsen and Basem Ezbeidi, ‘Clientelist Politics, State Formation and Corruption
in Palestine 1994–2000’ (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2002)
Jamil Hilal Jamil, ‘Reform and Resistance’, May 2002, www.palestinecampaign.org/
archives.asp?xid=878
Palestine Investment Fund, ‘Initial Report on Valuation and Transparency’, January
2003, www.pa-inv-fund.com/lasse.asp
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Opinion polls 5, 6 and 7, www.
pcpsr.org/survey/index.html; Development Studies Programme at Birzeit University,
Opinion polls 9, 10 and 11, home.birzeit.edu/dsp/DSPNEW/polls/opinion_polls.htm
Michel Rocard, ‘Reforming the Palestinian Authority: An Update’, Council on Foreign
Relations, January 2003, www.cfr.org.pubs/5536_english.pdf
Coalition for Accountability and Integrity: www.aman-palestine.org
Notes
1. The poll was carried out by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in
April 2003 with a sample of 1,315 adults, and a sample error of 3 per cent. See www.aman-
palestine.org/opinion_polls.htm
2. The ‘Quartet’ of Middle East mediators comprises the European Union, Russian Federation,
United Nations and United States; four other bodies involved in negotiations are Japan,
Norway, the World Bank and the IMF.
3. ‘The Palestine Investment Fund, Initial Report on Valuation and Transparency’ at: www.pa-
inv-fund.com
Peru
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.7 (59th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption (ratified June 1997)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified January 2002)
• The law on transparency and access to public information came into force in
August 2002. It stipulates that information relating to state institutions should be
made public and obligates public bodies to create Internet portals and keep them
updated. It is the first law to give the press and public effective tools to demand
information. An initial limitation was the broad exception granted for military
purchases, but secondary legislation adopted in February 2003 closed the gap sub-
stantially. Now the main limitation is not legal, but practical: it is hard to process
information on government spending because the system is complex and monitoring
is costly.
• A law regulating the transparency of party financing was approved in October 2002,
but it is unlikely to have much impact on corruption. It requires candidates to provide
sources and amounts of funding 60 days after the elections, rather than 60 days
prior. The most important issue – disclosure of sources of financing (business and
individuals) – was not discussed and the law establishes no sanctions for infractions.
• The process of restructuring the judiciary got underway in January 2003 in response
to a series of scandals in which the executive was alleged to have exerted undue
influence – including through bribery – over a number of judges. By mid-2003 the
process was still in its early phase. Five working groups, including one on anti-
corruption and judicial ethics, were set up under the auspices of the restructuring
commission. One proposal was to create a national council for the promotion of
judicial ethics, but this is likely to be superseded by a second, which is to strengthen
the existing internal control body (the office of control of magistrates), rather than
opt for an autonomous external control mechanism.1
• A law to regulate lobbying was approved in July 2003. It establishes that all lobbying
activity aimed at influencing the decisions of public officials and congressmen must
be made available to the public.
A member of the congressional auditing collapsed, little was done to safeguard against
commission,2 Mufarech is suspected of them and allegations of government
contributing large sums to President Toledo’s interference have resurfaced.
election campaign. He is not the only With the transition to democracy,
congressman to have accused journalists, relations between state and media were the
businessmen and public officials of being focus of recommendations by the National
‘opponents of the government’, but he has Anti-Corruption Initiative (INA),3 and later
been one of the most outspoken. For of a bill submitted by opposition deputy
example, he criticised the interior ministry’s Natale Amprimo. Both spoke of the need to
decision to invite Proética, an NGO headed control transmission licences, create a civil
by Ugaz, to observe the 2001 public tender society organisation to monitor advertising
of a contract to provide uniforms for the and to regulate state advertising.4
police. Mufarech, who owns a textile The INA recommendations were adopted
company that failed to win the uniforms in a haphazard and inadequate manner.
contract, denounced the process though it Amprimo’s bill sparked intense public debate,
resulted in considerable savings for the but the media’s hostility to the new
government. regulatory proposals eventually prevailed
The outburst was illustrative of the and the bill was dropped.
multifaceted nature of corruption in Peru. Against this backdrop of heightened
On the one hand, resistance to preventative sensitivity toward government incursions
measures comes from those with ties to the into the media, a new series of scandals has
Fujimorato who are keen to dent prosecu- emerged to dog the Toledo government. The
torial efforts. But there are many others – most serious concerned efforts by César
sometimes these same people with links to Almeyda, former head of the National
the Fujimorato – who have strong personal Intelligence Council, and Rodolfo Pereyra,
and commercial motives for perpetuating a former government press secretary, to
climate that allows corruption to thrive. The pressure the board of Panamericana
situation is not assisted by the absence of Televisión (Pantel) to refrain from ‘attacking’
a national anti-corruption strategy co- the government.
ordinated by a strong organisation. The body Federico Anchorena, Pantel’s former
that should play that role, the National Anti- managing director, and Fernando Viaña, its
Corruption Commission, is hampered by its head of press, made the allegations in
dependence on the executive. February 2003. Pereyra resigned in the wake
of the scandal. The congressional auditing
commission, which is dominated by the
New allegations of government ruling coalition, launched an investigation
interference highlight the need but shelved it in April 2003, citing
for better regulation of the media insufficient evidence of executive
interference.
The Fujimori regime stayed in power for 10 In a related development, the press
years with high approval ratings thanks to published transcribed recordings of conver-
its control of information and the mass sations between Salomón Lerner Ghitis, a
media, both economically (through official friend of Toledo and former president of the
advertising and direct payments in exchange Financial Corporation for Development, and
for political support) and judicially (through the brothers Moisés and Alex Wolfenson,
favourable court decisions in exchange for owners of the newspapers El Chino and La
political support). Though such practices Razón.5 The conversations were aimed at
were widely condemned after the regime persuading the two newspapers to portray
technical secretary of the anti-monopolies council of ministers has failed to design and
commission, Jocelyn Olaechea, who had a implement a personnel policy for the public
reputation for competence in the post. Their sector. The result is nepotism, favouritism
replacements have tended to be pro- and patronage.
government in view.
Again, part of the problem is the lack of
robust anti-corruption mechanisms. The
Further reading
Apoyo Opinión y Mercado – Proética, ‘Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Corrupción y
Gobernabilidad’ (First national survey on corruption and governability), Lima, 2002,
www.proetica.org.pe/encuesta/frameset.htm
Omar Pereyra Cácares, Percepciones sobre la corrupción en la zona norte del Perú (Perceptions
about corruption in northern Peru) (Lima: Servicios Educativos Rurales, 2002)
Comisión Andina de Juristas (CAJ), Libertad de Expresión y Acceso a la Información Pública
(Freedom of expression and access to public information) (Lima: CAJ, 2002)
Comisión Andina de Juristas (CAJ), La Sombra de la Corrupción (The shadow of corruption)
(Lima: CAJ, 2002)
Instituto APOYO, ‘Estrategias Anticorrupción en el Perú’ (Anti-corruption strategies in
Peru), www.apoyo-inst.org/Agenda/Anticorrupcion/anticorrupcion.htm
Santiago Pedraglio, Diagnóstico del Estado de la Lucha contra la Corrupción 2000–02
(Diagnosis of the fight against corruption 2000–02) (Lima: Proética, 2002),
www.proetica.org.pe/diagnostico/frameset.htm
Proética: www.proetica.org.pe
Notes
1. The need to review the judicial system was highlighted in July 2003 when two separate
courts gave contradictory rulings in the battle for control of Panamericana TV, one of
Peru’s most important broadcasters. Each armed with favourable rulings, the two
competing companies, owned by Genaro Delgado Parker and Ernesto Schutz, respectively,
entered the Panamericana TV buildings on 11 July and broadcast conflicting programmes
from different corners of the same facility.
2. At this writing, Jorge Yamil Mufarech Nemy held a congressional seat for Perú Posible.
3. The INA was created by the transition government and includes members of government
and civil society. It was asked to produce a study on the state of corruption in Peru and
propose anti-corruption policies, but its recommendations have not been adopted by
Toledo’s government in any substantive way.
4. Proética, Diagnóstico del Estado de la Lucha contra la Corrupción en el Perú 2000–02 (Analysis
of the fight against corruption in Peru 2000–02) (Lima: Proética, 2002).
5. The meeting took place on 14 May 2002 and the recordings were released in batches.
The entire conversation was reproduced in May 2003 at www.agenciaperu.com/
investigacion/2003/may/audio_wolfenson.htm
6. Almeyda stepped down from the presidency of Indecopi in January 2003 to take up the
post of president of the National Intelligence Council (NIC). He resigned as head of the
NIC in April 2003, partly over allegations that he pressured Panamericana Televisión to
change its editorial line (see above).
Philippines
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 2.5 (92nd out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified May 2002)
• Three bills on political financing were introduced into the Senate in December
2002. One aimed to strengthen the political party system by providing funds. The
second provided for the institutionalisation of campaign finance reforms. The third
provided for the establishment of a presidential campaign fund to cover allowed
expenditures in presidential and vice-presidential elections. At this writing, all three
bills are pending in the Senate.
• Under pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the legislature passed
an Anti-Money Laundering Act in March 2003, amending legislation that dated
from 2001. The new legislation lowers the threshold for reporting transactions to
regulators from 4 million pesos (US $75,000) to 500,000 pesos (US $9,000); expands
the range of unlawful activities covered; and grants the Philippine central bank
• In June 2003 a bill was proposed that would create local government control over
the local police: an Act Expanding the Powers of Local Chief Executives Over Local
Philippine National Police Forces. If passed, there is a risk that the act will simply
serve to underpin the coercive powers of corrupt local administrations.
The PAGC’s lifestyle check initiative understanding (MoU). The coalition includes
the six member agencies of the Inter-Agency
‘Lifestyle check’ is the most recent anti- Anti-Graft Coordinating Council: the PAGC,
corruption reform initiative proposed by the the ombudsman, the department of justice,
administration of President Gloria Macapagal the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Arroyo. In October 2002 she ordered lifestyle Commission on Audit, and the Civil Service
checks on all government officials including Commission. The coalition also includes the
the police and military. Lifestyle checks National Youth Commission, as well as
provide a means by which corruption may several anti-corruption NGOs and the
be detected through disparities between Catholic Bishops Conference of the
earned income and apparent lifestyle. They Philippines. The MoU formed task forces to
are to be based on four ‘probe areas’: sift through information on officials’
behavioural, such as leisure habits; asset lifestyles that is gathered and submitted by
value or net worth; kin checks, looking at civil society groups. Law enforcement
relatives who could have gained employ- agencies then assess the information and
ment through the official’s influence; and follow up with investigations as appropriate.
conflicts of interest. The Presidential Anti- The PAGC has disseminated its Lifestyle
Graft Commission (PAGC) is the initiative’s Check Investigation Primer and is organising
primary agency, with the office of the capability-building seminars and workshops
ombudsman as enforcer. Heads of for their personnel and the civil society
government agencies notorious for high groups involved.
levels of corruption, such as the Philippine To date, mainly low-profile, middle-
National Police, the Department of Public ranking officials have been exposed. The
Works and Highways, and the Bureau of reform initiative has so far proved largely
Internal Revenue (BIR), immediately ineffective against high-level officials. In part
announced they would take part in the this is because it is easier to detect the ill-
initiative. gotten gains of lower-ranking officials due
In March 2003 a Lifestyle Check Coalition, to the local spending behaviour of this group.
bringing together government and civil The PAGC also faces problems of jurisdiction
society bodies, signed a memorandum of and resources, however. Its most prominent
Further reading
Amando Doronila, The Fall of Joseph Estrada: The Inside Story (Manila: Inquirer Books
and Anvil Publishing, 2001)
Sheila Coronel and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, eds, Investigating Corruption: A Do-It-Yourself Guide
(Quezon City: Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism, 2002), www.pcij.org
David Kang, ‘Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the
Philippines’, Journal of Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 3, 2002
TI Philippines: ti-ph.tripod.com
Note
1. Philippine Daily Inquirer (Philippines), 19 December 2002.
Poland
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.6 (64th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (not yet signed)
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ratified July 2002)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ratified September 2000)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified November 2001)
• The Constitutional Tribunal passed a judgment on the 1998 law on the civil service
in December 2002, effectively enhancing the political neutrality of civil servants, as
top positions can only be filled through a public and transparent recruitment
procedure.
• The minister of finance issued a decree on accounting for political parties in January
2003. It lays down standardised principles for preparing financial reports and
submitting them to the state election commission (see below).
• In February 2003 the Sejm amended the 2001 law on the prevention of money
laundering and of financing of terrorism. The amendment requires financial
institutions to report transactions exceeding €15,000 (US $17,000) in value starting
in December 2003.
• In June 2003 President Aleksander Kwasniewki signed into law amendments to the
penal code that increase penalties for corruption from three to eight years’ and from
five to 12 years’ imprisonment. The amendments facilitate combating corruption in
sports: organisers of, and participants in, competitions may be prosecuted for accepting
benefits. The new legislation, which is part of the anti-corruption strategy adopted
by the government in September 2002, also allows for the use of main witnesses in
combating corruption. Under the amendments, people who bribe civil servants will
not be penalised if they report their activities to the police or public prosecutors.
While numerous parties failed to meet The subsidy for each member of parliament
minimum standards since the legislation was was 111,000 new Polish zlotys (US $28,000).
first applied, an unprecedented level of In July 2002, the PKW provided the public
transparency is evident in the financing of prosecutor’s office with a list of people who
political parties. Parties’ and election had allegedly violated election regulations.
campaign financial statements are examined The list includes the financial officers of the
by the state election commission, or PKW. election committees of Samoobrona, the PSL
If the PKW finds a party to have violated the and LPR, individuals who are deemed
rules, it may reject a financial statement or responsible for a total of 88 misdemeanours
election campaign statement. In August or offences.
2002, after reviewing the parliamentary Most campaign reports did not meet the
elections of September 2001, the PKW standards of the election law, prompting the
announced that it had approved the PKW to reject them or raise objections. These
financial statements of five of the seven results reflect the poor professional
parties that had received the required capabilities of members of the political class
amount of votes.2 In 2002, the treasury paid and raise questions as to their honesty.
these parties nearly 30 million new Polish Nevertheless, the rules constitute a
zlotys (US $7.6 million) in the form of budget significant step in strengthening democratic
subsidies. procedures, as they call for an enhanced level
To comply with new regulations, parties of scrutiny. Moreover, the regulations make
that ran were required to submit campaign cheating the system somewhat more
financing statements to the PKW in complicated and risky, in terms of legal
December 2001. The statements – a total of sanctions and concrete financial losses, as
93 reports – were subsequently published on well as future electoral support.
31 March in the Polish Monitor. The PKW, Although it introduced a new level of
which had four months to examine the transparency, however, the recent political
reports, announced its decision on the party legislation is undermined by serious
statements in April 2002. weaknesses and loopholes. In particular, a
It rejected the reports of the Polish People’s number of amendments weakened penalties
Party (PSL), the League of Polish Families for failing to abide by regulations. An
(LPR) and Samoobrona (the Self-Defence amendment adopted by the Sejm in July
Party), as well as those of some parties that 2002, for example, drastically reduced the
had not secured any seats in the parliament, penalties for the year 2002 for parties whose
such as Solidarity Election Action of the Right financial statements were rejected by the
(AWSP). As a result, the PSL’s and LPR’s PKW. Their budget subsidies were only cut
campaign refunds were reduced by 75 per by 30 per cent – as opposed to completely,
cent and Samoobrona’s by 65 per cent. The or by up to 75 per cent of the amount
most common infringements were payment originally allocated, as envisioned by
irregularities – in cash or by post – and previous regulations.
exceeding the limit on contributions from Another weakness relates to conducting
individuals, which is set at 11,400 new Polish economic activity for profit and on earning
zlotys (US $2,900). Another common fault income from real estate leasing, both of
was that many parties did not establish a which were banned in November 2002.
separate election fund for the purpose of Article 27 of the amended act on political
collecting money for the election campaign. parties allows political parties to conduct
The PSL, LPR and Samoobrona appealed their ‘own activity’, such as selling
to the supreme court, which upheld the programmes, promotional objects or
PKW’s decision, and the campaign refunds publications. Consequently, anyone who
of these parties were reduced accordingly. has contributed the maximum donation may
make additional donations by buying a copy by making use of the provision allowing
of the party’s programme, for example, at political parties to establish foundations.3
an unrestricted price. Similarly, companies To maintain control over its real estate, the
can circumvent the ban preventing them PSL had created a foundation, the Fundacja
from financing parties by purchasing a Rozwoju, in August 2002. The party
substantial amount of the party’s transferred its property – a dozen buildings
promotional material. Another provision in the largest cities and several dozen in
allows party leaderships to establish smaller towns – to the foundation, donating
foundations, which are entitled to hire three buildings and selling the rest for 90
activists. The employment of such staff by million new Polish zlotys (US $23 million),
the foundation – instead of the party itself to be paid in instalments over a 10-year
– allows the party to save money from public period. The stakes were high: the PSL
funds. In addition, corporate donors are free reportedly earned around 13 million new
to sponsor such foundations. Polish zlotys (US $3.2 million) on the lease
Concerns over these loopholes appeared of its real estate in 2002. Such a manoeuvre
justified in April 2003, when the media is a mockery of the law, calling into question
alleged that the PSL had circumvented the the true value of the anti-corruption
ban on earning income from property leasing provisions in the act on political parties.
Further reading
.
Piotr Bogdalski, Graz yna Ke˛dzierska and Wiesl⁄ aw Pl⁄ ywaczewski, eds, Unia Europejska:
wyzwanie dla polskiej Policji (European Union: challenge for the Polish police) (Szczytno:
.
Wydawnictwo Wyz szej Szkol⁄ y Policji, 2003)
EU Accession Monitoring Program, ‘Korupcja i polityka antykorupcyjna: Raporty krajowe
Polska’ (Corruption and anti-corruption policy: country reports on Poland), Open
Society Institute, Warsaw, 2002, www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/przeciw-korupcji/
publikacje/inne_publikacje/korupcja_i_polityka_antykorupcyjna.pdf
Andrzej Kojder, ‘Korupcja i poczucie moralne Polaków’ (Corruption and morality among
Poles), in Janusz Mariański, ed., Kondycja moralna spol⁄ eczeństwa polskiego (The Moral
condition of Polish society) (Krakow: Polska Akademia Nauk, 2002)
Andrzej Kojder, ‘Przeste˛pczość i korupcja’ (Crime and corruption), in Andrzej Kojder,
ed., Dawne i nowe problemy spol⁄ eczne: Szkice do obrazu spol⁄ eczeństwa polskiego u progu
XXI stulecia (Old and new social problems: sketches of Polish society on the threshold
of the 21st century) (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Kancelarii Sejmu, 2002)
Andrzej Kojder and Andrzej Sadowski, eds, ‘Klimaty korupcji’ (Corruption climates),
Centrum im. A. Smitha, Warsaw, 2002
Niels von Redecker, ‘Das polnische Beamtenrecht’ (Polish civil service law), in Studien
des Instituts für Ostrecht (Studies of the Institute for Eastern Law), vol. 45, (Frankfurt
am Main, 2003)
Marcina Waleckiego, ed., Kulisy finansowania polityki (Secrets of policy financing)
(Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2002)
TI Poland: www.transparency.pl
Notes
1. RFE/RL, 18 February 2003 and 28 April 2003; Warsaw Voice (Poland), 26 June 2003 and
10 July 2003.
2. Individual parties must receive 3 per cent and election coalitions must receive 6 per cent.
3. These foundations can employ party personnel and be sponsored by private companies,
allowing parties to create an alternative and non-transparent financial circuit that is not
subject to control.
Russia
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 2.7 (86th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: 3.2 (21st out of 21 countries)
Conventions:
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (not yet signed)
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (signed January 1999; not
yet ratified)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• In August 2002 President Vladimir Putin signed a decree designed to improve the
ethics and integrity of the state bureaucracy. According to the decree, civil servants
will be expected to observe the law, serve the public efficiently, avoid conflicts of
interest and remain politically neutral. A number of commentators were sceptical
of the effectiveness of this latest measure and demanded tougher action to prosecute
senior officials on corruption charges. The decree is advisory, not binding.
• The Russian Federation law on the election of deputies to the state Duma, the lower
chamber of the Russian legislature, was passed in December 2002. It updates the
1999 law on Duma elections. New provisions are primarily concerned with finance,
• The OECD Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering struck Russia off
its blacklist after a new federal law to amend and supplement an acting law against
money laundering entered into force in January 2003.
• A draft law that would convert Russia’s military forces from a conscript to a pre-
dominantly professional basis by 2007 was approved by Putin in March 2003, and
passed its first reading in the Duma in May. If adopted, it might decrease corruption
since fewer potential conscripts would try to bribe their way out of military duty.
• A major restructuring of the security agencies took place in March 2003 (see below).
private companies and government. The the Western press without being called to
discussion raged for six weeks until, in mid- account.6 One factor in particular may have
August, the anti-monopolies ministry fed into this apparent bias. While other
approved the merger of Yukos with its smaller recently privatised companies have remained
rival Sibneft, creating a new oil giant – politically loyal to Putin and his supporters,
YukosSibneft – with Khodorkovsky still at both Khodorkovsky at Yukos and Berezovsky
the top. This calmed investors and Yukos used their newfound wealth to fund the
shares began to rise again. political opposition.7 By focusing on cases
Media interest petered out to a trickle of of alleged murder, attempted murder and
articles, the most notable of which was a call theft of state property, the prosecution was
by Yabloko party leader Grigoriy Yavlinsky able to sidestep the political minefield of
for a 10-year ban on political activity by any pursuing corruption allegations; it would
private businessmen or political leaders who have been difficult to prevent investigations
had been involved in the ‘loans-for-shares’ from spreading to other formerly state-
programme.3 This scheme, whereby the owned companies.8 President Putin faces a
government borrows money from Russian dilemma: in putting Khodorkovsky on trial,
banks and offers shares in state-owned he risks accusations that he is playing politics
enterprises as collateral, was responsible for with Russia’s economic rebirth; in setting
the knockdown price Menatep paid for Yukos him free, he may send the message that
in 1995 – US $159 million for one of the corruption does pay in Russia, and pays very
world’s largest oil companies.4 handsomely.
Several points are worth noting about the The Yukos affair is expected to prompt
current case. the debate for tighter legislation to regulate
First, its timing. The arrests took place at the role oligarchs can play in the creation
the start of what Russians call the ‘cucumber and funding of political parties and the
season’ when the state Duma is on vacation. legality of party funding by state-owned
At the same time, the Russian media enterprises. But given that a law regulating
(including outlets taken over by the funding was passed in November 2002, and
government in the days prior to the arrests) that many political parties are dependent
began to air programmes portraying the on funding from big businesses, it is doubtful
lifestyles of rich and famous oligarchs. The that the Duma would pass any tougher law
arrests also came shortly after the Kremlin on party funding – or that the president
asked the British government to arrest and would sign it.
extradite to Russia another oligarch, the self-
exiled Boris Berezovsky, on charges of
defrauding the state. And, finally, the
Reshuffle at state security services
apparent crackdown may have been an may not be enough to curb police
attempt to influence public opinion in the corruption
run-up to December’s parliamentary
elections. Opinion polls show that Russians In March 2003 President Putin restructured
are overwhelmingly critical of the privatisa- the state security services in order to reduce
tions of the mid-1990s; any attempt to corruption and tackle drug trafficking and
punish those who ‘stole Russia’ would be terrorism – two crimes that have benefited
very popular with the electorate.5 in the past from official collusion. Though
A second point worth noting was the these are still early days, there are already
selective use of state prosecutorial capacity doubts over what effect the structural
in the Yukos affair. Even as investigators were changes will have on the battle against
looking for evidence to build a case against corruption.
Yukos, state-owned companies like Gazprom Putin’s decree disbanded the Federal
were being accused of serious illegalities in Agency of Governmental Communications
and Information (FAPSI) and the Federal country’s 89 regions. Speaking a day after
Border Guard Service (FSP), incorporating Putin’s decree was announced, Deputy
them with the Federal Security Service (FSB). Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov called
The move will lead to substantial savings, the ministry’s claims ‘greatly exaggerated’.
according to audit chamber head Sergei He said that most of the dismissed officers
Stepashin, who estimated that the previous were engaged in petty corruption, and the
FSP budget was twice that of the FSB, with interior ministry had failed to tackle the
three times as many employees and 10 times corruption higher in its ranks.
as many generals. The interior ministry’s poor record of
In addition, a state defence procurements going after corrupt senior officers changed
committee was created at the defence in June 2003, when it conducted a joint
ministry and the federal tax police service operation with the FSB and the prosecutor
(FSNP) was abolished, its functions being general’s office in which they arrested three
transferred to the interior ministry. The decree colonels and three lieutenant-colonels from
also created a new state committee on drug Moscow’s criminal investigations depart-
trafficking, which will employ staff of the ment (MUR), as well as Vladimir Ganayev,
defunct FSNP, once considered one of the a lieutenant-general who headed the security
more efficient, but most corrupt, agencies of department of the emergency situations
the state. The move, therefore, allows the new ministry with responsibility for certifying all
agency to be staffed with experienced officers buildings for fire safety. They were accused
– while turning a blind eye to past misde- of leading a gang of renegade police who
meanours committed by any such officer. planted guns, ammunition and drugs in
The extension of the interior ministry’s order to blackmail citizens, and of extorting
powers jars with the widespread perception protection money from Moscow casinos,
that it is one of the most corrupt federal shopping centres and restaurants.
structures. According to an opinion poll For many observers, the arrests were just
carried out by TI Russia between January the latest in a series of cosmetic gestures
2002 and January 2003, 75 per cent of linked to electoral advantage or political
respondents consider the law enforcement rivalry. Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov heads
agencies to be dishonest.9 Unity, one of the leading parties of the ruling
The interior ministry has claimed some coalition. The raids were televised and
success in combating corruption, however. designed to play well to audiences. Gryzlov
In 2002, it censured 21,000 police officers announced the crackdown while his officers
for criminal or other offences and fired were filmed knocking on doors across
17,000, including police chiefs in 10 of the Moscow, prior to arresting the residents.
Further reading
M. Gornij, Civil Society Against Corruption (St Petersburg: St Petersburg Humanitarian
Political Strategy Centre, 2002)
Ivan Sikora, Anti-Corruption Strategies for Transition Economies (Kiev: TI Russia, National
Anti-Corruption Programme ‘Freedom of Choice’ Coalition and TI Ukraine, 2002)
St Petersburg Humanitarian Political ‘Strategy’ Center, ‘Prevention of Corruption in
Budgetary Strategy’, 2002, www.strategy-spb.ru/Koi-8/Proekt/Vibori/inforpis.htm
[Russian]
TI Russia: www.transparency.org.ru
Notes
1. Moscow Times (Russia), 25 July 2003.
2. See series of articles by Timothy L. O’Brien for the New York Times (US), August 1999.
See also Robert Friedman, Red Mafiya: How The Russian Mob Has Invaded America (New
York: Little Brown and Co., 2000), which cites a 1995 CIA report that states that Menatep
was ‘controlled by one of the most powerful crime clans in Moscow’ and had established
‘an illegal banking operation in Washington’.
3. Financial Times (Britain), 2 September 2003.
4. Under the scheme, banks were given the right to auction shares if the government could
not repay them; the loans were heavily over-collateralised and default would mean that
banks would reap huge profits.
5. Izvestia (Russia), 25 July 2003. Russia’s leading polling agencies have carried out surveys
on how the bourgeoisie is viewed in Russia. According to a ROMIR Monitoring poll, 74
per cent of Russian citizens assess the role of oligarchs (also known as ‘major capitalists’)
in the 1990s as absolutely or partially negative; 77 per cent say the oligarchs currently
play a negative role in Russia. About the same number believe that the outcomes of the
1990s privatisations should be completely or partially revised.
6. See Wirtshaftswoche (Germany), 9 September 2001, for further information about
Gazprom’s alleged dealings with a suspected Russian criminal organisation.
7. Liberal Russia relies heavily on Berezovsky. Khodorkovsky funded Yabloko and the Union
of Right Forces.
8. For a discussion of recent alleged corruption in Gazprom see ‘Naftohaz Ukrayiny – A Study
in State-Sponsored Corruption’, RFE/RL Organized Crime and Terrorism Watch, vol. 3, no.
25, 18 July 2003, www.rferl.org/corruptionwatch/archives.asp
9. TI Russia, ‘Corruption Indices for Russian Regions’, 2003, available at www.transparency.
org.ru/proj_index.asp
Senegal
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 3.2 (76th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (adopted July 2003;
not yet signed)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• In April 2003, the state approved a draft decree on the establishment of a monitoring
council for good governance and anti-corruption measures (see below).
Plans for a monitoring council state, the council was empowered to hear
complaints regarding cases of alleged
In April 2003, the state approved a draft corruption and provide relevant information
decree on the establishment of a council for for the purpose of deciding whether a case
monitoring good governance and anti- should be brought to court.
corruption measures. At this writing, the draft Representatives of civil society organisa-
was being assessed by political parties, the tions such as the Forum Civil, TI’s national
private sector and civil society organisations. chapter, proposed that the council should
President Abdoulaye Wade had argued for have greater independence and executive
the creation of the council in December powers. They called for a strengthening of
2002, prompting the government to its prerogatives, including the right to bring
withdraw a year-old bill for setting up a cases to court on its own account; the right
national anti-corruption office (OFNAC). to communicate its findings; and immunity
The OFNAC was envisioned as an and adequate compensation for its members.
independent agency designed to counter The government has considered the
corruption and the illicit acquisition of proposals and consulted with civil society
wealth. It was to use a legal approach based representatives, but further action remains
on giving responsibility to all of the to be taken.
country’s common law courts and reversing
the burden of proof. The bill set out to
restrict the mandate period for personnel The new procurement code:
assigned to the OFNAC to three years, non- an assessment
renewable, and offer them immunity while
employed by the organisation. As far as After eight years of preparation, a new
effective anti-corruption measures were procurement code was introduced by
concerned, OFNAC offered the best hope presidential decree in May 2002. The
for legal and institutional solutions. Critics legislation applies the new constitution’s
interpreted the government’s withdrawal of principles of transparency to public
the bill as a favour to the new administra- procurement, but inherent flaws demand
tion and a way of protecting those further revision.1
implicated in corrupt activities. The code includes provisions for open
Four months after the OFNAC bill was competition and advertising, ensures greater
withdrawn, the government and its political transparency and, under special circum-
partners submitted for discussion the draft stances, introduces the option of resorting
decree aimed at creating a council for to mutual agreements. It removes all existing
monitoring good governance and anti- derogation arrangements, including those
corruption measures. The proposal that enjoyed by the project for the construction
emerged was for a corruption investigation and the restoration of state heritage, or
body composed of nine representatives PCRPE.2 Closely associated with the
drawn equally from the state, private sector presidency, the PCRPE has been widely
and civil society. Reporting to the head of criticised by the opposition and civil society
Further reading
Giorgio Blundo and J.P. Olivier de Sardan, ‘La corruption au quotidien en Afrique de
l’Ouest’, Politique africaine (France), no. 83, October 2001; see also www.uni-
mainz.de/~ifeas/workingpapers/corruption.pdf
Forum Civil and Orgatech, ‘Enquête ménages sur la perception de la corruption au
Sénégal’ (Survey on the household perception of corruption in Senegal), May 2002,
www.forumcivil.sn/Rapport%20entreprises%20.doc
Forum Civil and Orgatech, ‘Enquêtes: secteur privé, sur la perception de la corruption
au Sénégal’ (Private sector survey on the perception of corruption in Senegal), May
2002, www.forumcivil.sn
World Bank, ‘Evaluation de la pratique des marchés publics’ (Evaluation of tender
practices), Université Cheikh Anta DIOP, Dakar, December 2002
TI Senegal: www.forumcivil.sn
Notes
1. In January 2001, Senegal adopted a new constitution whose preamble establishes the
principles of transparency and good governance in the conduct of public affairs.
2. The PCRPE is the Projet de Construction et de Réhabilitation du Patrimoine de l’Etat.
3. That agency is the Agence Chargée de la Promotion de l’Investissement et des Grands
Travaux, known as APIX.
Serbia
NB: This report does not cover developments in Montenegro or Kosovo
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score:1 2.3 (106th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption (not yet signed)
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ratified December 2002)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified September 2001)
• A budget system law was adopted in April 2002 and amended in December 2002.
Its implementation, which began in 2003, is conducted by the consolidated treasury
account (CTA) and the general treasury ledger (GTL), established by the ministry of
finance and economy and local self-government bodies. All financial resources of
the national and local budget will be deposited in the CTAs; the ministry and local
bodies responsible for finance will enter all transactions into the GTL. Besides
compulsory internal budgetary control, annual account statements of the republic
of Serbia and its local authorities will be subject to external audit. Amendments to
the law established the public payment administration as the administrative body
within the ministry of finance and economy.
• In force from January 2003, the law on tax procedure and tax administration defines
the procedure of establishing, collecting and monitoring public revenues, the duties
and obligations of taxpayers and tax offences in Serbia. Since the accounting and
payment operations bureau (ZOP) was abolished in January 2003 and the payment
system shifted to commercial banks, the law aimed to bring all tax activities under
the umbrella of a single state body for tax administration.
• In May 2003, the government appointed four new members to the anti-corruption
council, an advisory body launched in December 2001.6 The council has actively
initiated investigations into corruption, but some critics have called for a new anti-
corruption agency with executive and police-style powers. Entrusted with monitoring
anti-corruption activities and the implementation of existing regulations, the body
may also propose legislation and programmes in the anti-corruption sector.
• Adopted in May 2003, the law on urban planning and construction simplifies
procedures for obtaining construction permits and limits the time it should take for
a permit to be issued to 15 days. The law also introduces penalties for the responsible
authority in case the time limit is exceeded.
Unearthing corruption in the battle ing. Although the ministry of the interior
presented a report on organised crime
against organised crime
activities in 2001, no action followed, which
With the passing of a law on combating weakened public trust in the government’s
organised crime in July 2002, Serbia has made commitment.
advances in combating corruption. The law After numerous statements of intent, the
was fully implemented after the assassina- government took its first concrete step in
tion of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in July 2002 with a dedicated law. The law’s
March 2003, when police units were granted provisions were derived from the experiences
increased authority to pursue suspects. of other countries with high levels of
The government made some efforts to organised crime, but they did not fully accord
suppress organised crime in Serbia in 2001 with Serbia’s procedural and judicial system
and early 2002, but results were disappoint- at the time. Subsequently, more efficient
measures were introduced for proceeding members of the government claimed that
with most offences related to organised organised gangs owed their success to
crime. Special police, public prosecution and connections with politicians, or, at the least,
court units were also introduced. their tacit approval. Some critics argued that
The law applies to bribe taking and bribe Operation Sable had been selective in its
paying within the context of organised crime fight against organised crime, and had
(along with all other offences that carry a merely served as a political tool.
potential sentence of more than five years’ Amendments promulgated during the
imprisonment).7 It introduces conflict of state of emergency also came under attack.
interest provisions, such as financial Originally designed to prolong the imple-
disclosure requirements for heads of special mentation of security measures, they drew
units and their families.8 Judges have vigorous criticism from opposition parties,
assessed the law as ‘decent’, although some human rights activists and legal experts, as
members of the judiciary called it well as diplomats and international organi-
redundant.9 sations. The constitutional court resolved
Initially, the lack of financial and human the problem in June 2003 by issuing a
resources represented an obstacle to the decision that denied the constitutional base
smooth implementation of the law. Yet this for the disputed amendments.
problem was overcome during the final days
of the state of emergency in April 2003, Serbia introduces public procurement
which the government declared after the
assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic.
legislation, reaps benefits
During the 42-day state of emergency, as part
Serbia introduced a law on public
of Operation Sable, police forces received procurement in July 2002. Until then,
more authority to detain and imprison provisions were dispersed in numerous laws
suspects and potential informants. Police regulating contractual activities, none of
questioned 10,111 and detained 2,599 which featured any provisions for
individuals; 4,000 criminal charges were later transparency, other than measures requiring
filed against 3,500 persons suspected of fair competition. The selection of bids and
committing about 5,900 criminal acts. Forty- award of contracts were completely opaque,
five individuals were indicted by the end of subject only to the discretionary oversight
August 2003. of the procurement officials themselves.
Though corruption was not a priority in Abuses were particularly glaring in the
the operation, officials had expected cases acquisition of goods for commodity stocks,
to emerge since bribery and other corrupt the commissioning of capital projects and
activities tend to be staples of organised acquisitions through intermediaries. Corrupt
crime. One case involved allegations that a practices included the bypassing or non-
senior public prosecutor had accepted bribes application of laws and regulations, private
to disclose the address of a protected witness agreements, commissions and the division
and to sabotage trials against gang members; of profits.
others implicated attorneys for allegedly By late 2000, domestic pressure for new
bribing public prosecutors and judges. legislation – coupled with repeated calls for
Despite the upsurge in public expectations reform from international financial organi-
and trust in government, critics began sations – prompted the authorities to
voicing concerns in May and June 2003 over examine ways to regulate public
the government’s own role in facilitating procurement procedures. The resulting
corruption and organised crime activities. public procurement act largely replicates the
Opposition politicians and even some approach of the European Union (EU). The
act’s directives on the use of open procedures nor bidders were familiar with the new
actually exceed the minimum standards set regulations.
in EU directives. When a limited number of Despite its weaknesses, however, the act
suppliers are available for short-term does promote transparency in public
standardised purchasing needs, restricted procurement procedures thanks to several
procedures apply and pre-qualification conflict of interest provisions. One provision
proceedings are always the first step. regulates the publicising of the bidding
The act includes a negotiated procedure process; another specifies deadlines for the
modelled closely on the method described submission of bids, which has a very strong
in the EU’s minimum standards for anti-corruption effect.12
procurement. Restricting negotiated methods Furthermore, government officials have
of procurement had been a challenge in the confirmed that the act has contributed to
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, given the substantial savings and a 50 per cent drop
widespread practice of awarding contracts in purchasing prices. Of the country’s total
on the basis of negotiations and non- annual public procurement budget, as much
technical factors.10 as 25 per cent had previously been used
The new legislation focuses on curbing ‘inefficiently’.13
nepotism, which was never addressed in During the first nine months of imple-
previous legislation. Studies show that many mentation, the act saved the state some US
of the firms taking part in public tenders $70 million. Two examples of savings stand
were owned by family members or close out: the public enterprise Telekom saved 19.6
friends of senior state officials.11 per cent (or US $620,000) of the procurement
Within one month of its implementation, value of vehicles and the ministry of the
however, the new act was revealed to be interior saved 26 per cent (or US $430,000)
riddled with problems: it defined the on insurance.14 The law has also been found
contracting authority too broadly; its value to curb corruption by eliminating interme-
limit on small procurement was too low; diaries, improving conditions for local and
public announcements in the Official Gazette foreign suppliers and bolstering
were too expensive; and neither purchasers competition.15
Further reading
Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies, ‘Corruption at the Customs: Combating
Corruption at the Customs Administration’, Belgrade, 2002, www.clds.org.yu/html/
e0.html
Center for Policy Studies, Korupcija u novim uslovima (Corruption in a new environment),
Belgrade, 2002, www.cpa-cps.org.yu/cpa-cps/cpa/projekti/zavrseni/Sadrzaj/ent_2002-
10-06-16-26-02
European Commission, ‘The Western Balkans in Transition’, European economy
occasional paper, Brussels, 2003, europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/
occasional_papers/occasionalpapers1_en.htm
OSCE Mission to the FRY, ‘Report on Judicial Reform in Serbia’, March 2003,
www.osce.org/yugoslavia/documents/reports
Slobodan Vukovic, Vladavina prava i korupcija (Rule of law and corruption), Institut
drustvenih nauka, Belgrade, 2001, institut.instifdt.bg.ac.yu/ifdt/izdanja/zbornici/rekon
strukcija/27VukovicS.pdf
TI Serbia: www.transparentnost.org.yu
Notes
1. The CPI score applies to Serbia and Montenegro.
2. See Article 1 in www.mediacenter.org.yu/english/dokumenti/tranzicija/broadcast190901.
asp; see also www.mediacenter.org.yu/english/dokumenti/tranzicija/memorandum-e.
pdf
3. The SBC’s image was tarnished by resignations, a parliamentary debate on council
staffing issues and conflicts within the council. Criticism of the recent privatisation of
B92 radio and television stations, which was conducted without a public tender, led
the US ambassador to intervene on the side of the new owner which in turn contributed
to an unprecedented diplomatic cooling between Serbia and the United States. For
more information, see www.freeb92.com. For more on the delay in making appointments,
see www.anem.org.yu/eng/medijska_scena/micic.htm
4. International Crisis Group, ‘Serbian Reform Stalls Again’, www.intl-crisis-group.org/
projects/europe/serbia/reports/A401049_17072003.pdf
5. See www.vojvodina.sr.gov.yu/dokumenti/OmbudsmanSRL.htm
6. The council, which has not enjoyed government support, has failed to uncover any
corruption cases since its creation.
7. With the adoption of amendments in 2003, the limit decreased to four years (for all
criminal offences related to organised crime), while bribery is no longer identified
separately. Indeed, the limit applies to almost all corruption-related offences.
8. Special units include the special prosecution office, the police service for combating
organised crime, the special unit of the district court in Belgrade, the special unit of
the court of appeal in Belgrade and the special unit for temporarily arrested persons.
9. OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, ‘Report on Judicial Reform in Serbia’, Belgrade,
2003.
10. World Bank, ‘Country Procurement Assessment Report’, 2002.
11. See Transparency International (TI) Serbia, ‘The National Integrity System – Serbia and
FRY’, Belgrade, 2001.
12. TI Serbia, ‘Information Accessibility in the Public Procurement Procedure’, Belgrade,
2003.
13. Statement of Minister Bozidar Djelic, Belgrade, 24 April 2003, www.serbia.sr.gov.yu/
news/2003-04/24/328902.html
14. Public procurement agency documentation; see www.ujn.sr.gov.yu/engleski/
summary.htm and www.ujn.sr.gov.yu/Attachments/drzavne%20javne%20nabavke.pdf
15. Djelic statement, www.serbia.sr.gov.yu/news/2003-04/24/328902.html
South Africa
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 4.4 (48th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (adopted July 2003;
not yet signed)
SADC Protocol on Corruption (ratified May 2003)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• In October 2002 the South African police announced the closure of its Anti-Corruption
Unit (ACU), which had been investigating corruption within the police since 1994.
The decision was supposedly intended as an efficiency measure: ACU employees
will be integrated into the Organised Crime and General Detective Units – but the
ACU had until recently been investigating some members of the Organised Crime
Unit for corruption. It remains unclear how effectively police corruption will be
investigated in future.
Further developments in the arms engagement across the continent, the bill
criminalises the bribery of foreign public
procurement scandal officials abroad. The bill also places a duty
An arms procurement scandal that goes to on citizens to report instances of public
the heart of South Africa’s government corruption to the authorities, though this
continued to unravel in 2002–03, attracting provision may face constitutional challenges
widespread public attention. The chief whip given the state’s limited capacity to protect
of the ruling party was sentenced to four whistleblowers. The original draft has also
years in prison for accepting a bribe as part been extended to include private-to-private
of the deal, and investigations were corruption, and a procurement blacklisting
conducted into allegations that Deputy mechanism is being drafted for inclusion.
President Jacob Zuma had solicited a bribe There were still limitations to the bill at
(see ‘The politics of corruption in the arms this writing. Most significantly, it does not
trade: South Africa’s arms scandal and the address nepotism or the private financing
Elf affair’, Chapter 4, page 59). of political parties (see Box 2.1, ‘The
challenge of achieving political equality in
South Africa’, page 21). The African Union
Legislation improving but anti-corruption convention, adopted in July
implementation weak 2003, includes provisions on legislation
governing the funding of political parties
A major hurdle in South Africa’s fight against and may provide added impetus for the issue
corruption in the past has been the lack of to be addressed at a national level. It was
adequate legislative instruments to prosecute also not clear how the bill would facilitate
offenders. The Corruption Act of 1992 whistleblowing.1
proved ineffective and was rarely invoked Whatever the final form of the legal text,
to formulate charges of bribery or corruption. however, the greatest limitation is likely to
New anti-corruption legislation that should lie in the law’s implementation. A compre-
remedy many weaknesses in the existing hensive review of South Africa’s fight against
framework is currently being examined and corruption, published by the UN Office on
should become law by early 2004. What it Drugs and Crime in April 2003, praised the
will not resolve, however, is the weakness of proposed Prevention of Corruption Bill but
implementation. warned that ‘there are serious weaknesses
Legislative reform was a key component and shortcomings in the capacity and will
of the cabinet-endorsed Public Service of public sector bodies to implement and to
National Anti-Corruption Strategy of 2002. comply with the laws’.2
As part of that strategy, a new Prevention of The institutions responsible for imple-
Corruption Bill was tabled for debate in mentation face decreasing budgets, pressure
parliament in April 2002. The bill follows for rationalisation, increased caseloads and
the international trend of ‘unbundling’ other resource constraints, and difficulties
crimes of corruption by defining and of transformation. The most pressing
prohibiting specific practices. In this regard concern is the provinces, where 70 per cent
it is substantially based on the provisions of of public officials work, anti-corruption
Nigeria’s Corruption Practices and Other policies are minimal and there are critical
Related Offences Act of 2000. Unlike South backlogs in resolving disciplinary cases (less
Africa’s 1992 legislation, the new bill than 10 per cent are given adequate
recognises both the supply and demand side attention). The government strategy
of corruption by reinstating the common includes: creating a minimum capacity to
law offence of bribery, with a maximum tackle corruption in all state departments;
sentence of 15 years and/or a fine. incorporating risk management systems,
Importantly, given corporate South Africa’s fraud prevention plans and professional and
security clearance for all managers; the accountable for the commitments they had
promotion of whistleblowing, investigative made. Unfortunately, none of the forum’s
capability and proper information systems; main actors – government, business or civil
and programmes to promote professional society – are bound by its actions. Apart from
ethics. Though neatly expressed on paper, sharing and publicising information on fraud
these ambitious plans remain in their management in business and the govern-
formative stages. ment’s efforts to address corruption, little
Part of the problem lies in the lack of else has been achieved.
financial resources. The introduction of the The work of the forum is partly
anti-corruption strategy has not been constrained by limited capacity and low
accompanied by additional financial budgets, but also by weak civil society rep-
support. Government departments are resentation. The Institute for Democracy in
expected to resource their added activities South Africa (Idasa) has been instrumental
from within existing budget allocations, or in raising awareness of whistleblowing and
else seek donor assistance. Lack of party financing, but all civil society leaders
information is a further obstacle. The UN will have to become more vigilant in
report speaks of a ‘grave shortage of mobilising opinion on corruption. Private
information management’, making it sector representation has been more com-
impossible to measure the effectiveness of prehensive, involving the South African
anti-corruption strategies, though the UN Chamber of Business, the Black Management
assessment process itself offers a solid basis Forum, Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut and the
for further investigation. National African Federated Chamber of
Commerce, but the forum’s impact on
business practice has so far been minimal.
Little achieved yet by the National In November 2002 the government took
Anti-Corruption Forum steps to address the forum’s leadership
vacuum by appointing the minister for
Since the transition to democracy, South public services and administration, Geraldine
Africa has been infamous for racing to set up Fraser-Moloketi, as its chair. In March 2003
new institutions before carefully considering the forum made an inaugural presentation
their impact. The National Anti-Corruption to the parliamentary committee on public
Forum, whose membership is drawn from services and administration, where it
government, the private sector and civil reported some progress.
society, was no exception when it was set up
in June 2001 after a lengthy process that
began with the first National Anti-Corruption New initiatives to strengthen
Summit in 1999. While the forum embodies corporate accountability
the vital principle that government should
not shoulder the burden of fighting Two new initiatives could strengthen
corruption alone, little has happened since corporate accountability in South Africa, if
it was launched, though 2002–03 saw some followed through. The King Code for
attempts to revitalise the forum. Corporate Governance, developed by the
The forum was intended to operate as a King Committee under the auspices of the
non-statutory and cross-sectoral body that Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, was
would ‘contribute towards the establishment launched in March 2002, setting the
of a national consensus through the corporate sector a huge ethical challenge.3
coordination of sectoral strategies against The code provides a comprehensive
corruption’. While the formation of a framework for corporate governance
compact across sectors was welcome, it could standards, calling on directors and boards
only be effective if partners were held to be far more transparent and accountable
Further reading
Lala Camerer, ‘Controlling Corruption in South Africa: Results of an Expert Panel
Survey’, Institute for Security Studies monograph series no. 40 (Pretoria, 2001)
Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, Regional Office for Southern Africa (UNODCCP), ‘Country Corruption
Assessment Report: South Africa’, DPSA/UNODCCP (Pretoria, 2003)
Tom Lodge, ‘Political Corruption in South Africa: from apartheid to multiracial state’,
in Arnold Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston, eds, Political Corruption: Concepts
and Contexts (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2002)
Tom Lodge, ‘Countering Corruption’, in Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003)
Ugljesa Zvekic, ed., Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Southern Africa (Hatfield: UNODC
Regional Office for Southern Africa, 2002)
Notes
1. The South African Law Commission has also been examining the question of whether
the ambit of the Protected Disclosures Act 2000 should be extended to protect whistle-
blowers beyond the employer/employee relationship, though it is by no means certain
that this will result in a change to the law.
2. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Regional Office for Southern Africa, and
Government of South Africa, Department of Public Service and Administration, ‘Country
Corruption Assessment Report: South Africa’ (Pretoria, 2003).
3. King Committee on Corporate Governance, ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for
South Africa’, Institute of Directors (Johannesburg, 2002).
4. Ethics Institute of South Africa, ‘Corporate Ethics Indicator: Business Ethics South Africa
(BESA) Survey 2002’ (Pretoria, 2002).
Uganda
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 2.2 (113th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (adopted July 2003;
not yet signed)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
Kampala, and about 50 more staff were of votes were cast in favour of continuing
engaged to run them. the ‘movement’ system of governance.
Whether these new resources will make However, the new legislation met
the IGG a more convincing performer is considerable opposition and caused intense
uncertain. As noted above, no action has debate in the press. Some politicians said
followed several of the IGG’s recent they would not respect the law’s provisions.
complaints and evidence so far suggests the In March 2003 the constitutional court
IGG has not in practice gained greater dismissed elements of the new law and ruled
independence from the executive, despite that the governing ‘movement’ system
the new legislation. While the IGG’s inves- should itself be classified as a political
tigative capacity has been strengthened, organisation and, therefore, subject to the
without political will the IGG’s presence restrictions inherent in the new legislation.
could simply provide a cover for corruption, The Uganda Human Rights Commission,
allowing impunity to continue. which has a constitutional mandate to
monitor government compliance with inter-
national treaties – including the right to
Uncertainty remains over the freedom of association – also criticised the
freedom of political opposition legislation.2
The constitutional issues are not yet
Since President Yoweri Museveni came to
resolved. The government appealed against
power in 1986, Uganda has claimed to be a
the court’s ruling, and at this writing the
‘no-party’ democracy – opposition parties
verdict is still awaited. Even if a multiparty
have been heavily restricted and the
democracy is permitted to develop, it will
government has claimed to be not a party
take some time before there is any
but a ‘movement’. The absence of a
meaningful analysis of the government’s
functioning opposition has almost certainly
record on corruption. Up to now, opposition
facilitated corruption by minimising the
parties have done little to formulate
scope for political parties and voters to hold
alternative programmes to confront
the government to account. While
corruption and there is little evidence that
corruption involving senior members of
voters react to it as an issue.
government is frequently exposed in the
media, the government’s record is
unquestioned at a political level and the Failure to resolve conflicts of interest
government lacks any competition in the
formulation of policies to fight corruption. After the 2001 elections, the government
New legislation in 2002 was intended to reappointed two ministers, in spite of the
reinforce the existing restrictions on political fact that they had both been censured by
freedoms. In practice, however, it has parliament for conflict of interest and
exacerbated uncertainty about the future of corruption, and the conflicts of interest had
Uganda’s system of governance. still not been resolved. At this writing Sam
In June 2002 parliament enacted the Kutesa and Jim Muhwezi remain in their
Political Parties and Organisations Act 2002, posts in spite of protests. At a donors’ group
which regulates the formation, financing, consultative meeting in May 2003,
management and activities of political parties governments from around the world
and organisations. It bars parties from demanded that the president dismiss the
campaigning for any elective office, limits ministers.
their freedom to hold public meetings and Contrary to the leadership code, Kutesa,
bans them from opening offices outside the a minister of state in the department of
capital. The parliamentary vote followed a finance, planning and economic
referendum in 2000 in which the majority development, remained chair of the board
Further reading
Hassan B. Muloopa, Stephanie McIvor and Allan Doig, ‘National Integrity Systems
Country Study Report: Uganda 2003’ (Transparency International, forthcoming)
Inspectorate of Government, ‘The 2nd National Integrity Survey Report’ (Kampala:
2003)
Notes
1. New Vision (Uganda), 4 May 2003.
2. Uganda Human Rights Commission, Annual Report to Parliament: January 2001–September
2002.
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 7.5 (18th out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: 5.3 (13th out of 21 countries)
Conventions:
OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption (ratified September 2000)
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ratified December 1998)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000; not
yet ratified)
• The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to create a Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to set auditing, quality control, ethics, independence
and other standards for auditors of listed companies. It also has the authority to
conduct inspections of accounting firms, to enforce compliance with professional
standards and relevant securities laws and to discipline accountants and auditing
firms. Two of its five members must be certified public accountants (CPAs) and three
may not be CPAs. The SEC appoints them after consultation with other senior
officials.
• The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), through its subsidiary, the NASDAQ Stock Market, have developed
corporate governance proposals for listed companies and the board of the NYSE
has also approved sweeping reform of its own governance and disclosure practices.
• As the Sarbanes-Oxley Act moved toward final passage, the Bush administration
established a Corporate Fraud Task Force. Headed by the justice department, the
16-member force includes the secretaries of the Treasury and Labor Departments
and the chairman of the SEC. Its objectives are to enhance investigation and criminal
prosecution of financial crimes and to recover proceeds.
liability for executives who knowingly file standards.6 The NASDAQ has devised its own
false financial reports; and makes it easier to set of standards, similar to those of the NYSE,
prosecute executives who shred documents. mandating independent directors and an
Congress has remedied the inadequacy of audit committee charter.7 It most recently
resources that impeded the SEC’s work in proposed a rule that requires chief executives
the past. It appropriated US $716 million for and chief compliance officers at brokerage
the SEC for fiscal year 2003 and is considering houses to annually certify that their firms
a request for over US $840 million for 2004. have adequate compliance and supervisory
This should enable the agency to handle the policies to protect investors.8
sharp increase in caseload. The NYSE has also undertaken reform of
Legislation is under consideration that its own management systems. It adopted
would enable the SEC to increase civil admin- new rules to reduce conflicts of interest for
istrative fines on corporate officers and directors and senior officials and to make
directors up to US $2 million per violation senior officials’ compensation public.
without first obtaining federal court Many credit the impetus for reform to
approval. The legislation was passed by the
activities at the local level, particularly by
Senate and awaits a vote in the House of Rep-
officials like New York State Attorney General
resentatives.5 The SEC is already setting aside
Eliot Spitzer, Time magazine’s ‘Crusader of
revenues from fines in a restitution fund set
the Year’ in 2002. Spitzer launched an inves-
up under the act.
tigation in 2001 into how investment
Charged with implementing the Sarbanes-
analysts altered stock information on which
Oxley Act, the SEC has published numerous
the public relies. He secured a US $100
proposed rules for comment prior to their
million fine against Merrill Lynch. Since
adoption. It approved new rules requiring
then, regulators in almost a dozen states have
the audit committee, rather than
investigated the practices of Wall Street firms.
management, to hire and fire outside
In May 2003, Spitzer and other regulators,
auditors and preventing audit committee
members from having consulting relation- along with SEC Chairman William
ships, or other financial ties, with the Donaldson, charged 10 of Wall Street’s
corporation. New rules require greater biggest firms with fraud and announced a
disclosure and auditor independence and US $1.4 billion settlement, the biggest in
impose penalties for improper influence on Wall Street history.
the conduct of audits. With new regulations, new leadership at
The NYSE has also submitted new the SEC and at the Public Company
governance rules for SEC approval, including Accounting Oversight Board, prosecutions
requirements that listed companies have a and unprecedented fines imposed, reform
majority of independent directors, that non- efforts are underway. Further actions are still
management directors meet regularly anticipated, including SEC reviews every
without management, that companies must three years of all listed companies and a con-
have a corporate governance committee sideration of the merits of convergence
composed entirely of independent directors, between rules-based and principles-based
and that they must have an independent accounting.
audit committee of at least three It will take time to determine the extent
independent directors. Listed companies to which reforms are adopted. The jury,
must additionally adopt and disclose comprised of the public and financial
corporate governance guidelines, a code of markets, is still out on whether corporate
business conduct and ethics, and annually officials, accountants and auditors, lawyers,
certify that the CEO is not aware of any analysts, rating agencies, investors,
violation in the corporate governance listing legislators, regulators and even the media
have taken all steps necessary to ensure the environment and issue advocacy.
integrity and restore public trust. Reflecting their growing importance,
Congress is turning its attention to
governance as it considers legislation to
Transparency and accountability in promote charitable giving. Senator Chuck
the NGO sector Grassley, the senior Republican on the Senate
finance committee that oversees tax-exempt
The non-profit sector has also had its share organisations, has called on United Way and
of governance scandals. One concerned the Nature Conservancy for information
United Way of the National Capital Area, a about the press allegations. He has intro-
local chapter of a nationwide charity that duced several disclosure requirements for
collects and distributes donations to other non-profits that benefit from the CARE act,
charities. In 2001, the local group collected a charitable-giving bill under consideration
more than US $97 million from over 300,000 in Congress.11
donors, including government employees.9 Donors and those who contract with non-
A federal inquiry was launched into profits are beginning to focus on governance
allegations that it had misstated and misused and internal oversight issues. A recent study
contributions. There were also allegations of examined these practices among boards and
questionable payments of millions of dollars senior management at over 1,000 non-profit
to senior management, which reportedly organisations doing business with New York
refused to turn over important financial City.12 According to one of the authors,
information to its board of directors. corporate governance expert Ira Millstein,
Following widespread media coverage, the boards have a duty ‘to hold management
charity lost significant corporate support and accountable for the use of assets entrusted
individual contributions. to them – whether these assets derive from
Another high profile case concerned the charitable contributions or state largesse in
Nature Conservancy, an environmental the form of tax breaks, incentives or direct
group well known internationally for its grants. The non-profit board is not
efforts to save endangered land and water, accountable to shareholders, but to a more
which is estimated to have amassed US $3 amorphous constituency – the public,
billion in assets. A series of articles in the through the mission for which the state has
Washington Post described alleged financial granted the special non-profit status.’
transactions, including preferential land sales This status permits non-profits to be
and loans to its governing board members, exempt from taxes but requires transparency.
their companies, state and regional trustees It is due to this status that US law currently
and contributors, which raised serious requires public disclosure of information on
concerns. According to the articles, the their activities and some aspects of their
organisation undertook business ventures financial status. There is growing pressure
that failed, leaving millions worth of debt. for more transparency and better
Neither these failures nor the legal issues governance.
pending against Nature Conservancy are Among the findings in the New York
mentioned in the charity’s annual reports, study are that non-profit boards of directors
nor is there disclosure of business dealings should be more aware of their responsibil-
with trustees, directors or family members. ity for financial oversight and should
Information provided on executive communicate directly with auditors. They
compensation was considered highly highlight interested party transactions as an
inaccurate.10 important problem for non-profit boards to
Non-profit sector organisations represent address and recommend formal, written
a wide range of interests, including social conflict of interest policies and enforcement
services, health, education, arts and culture, mechanisms.
As noted by BoardSource, formerly the compile factual data’, but the underlying
National Center for Non-Profit Boards, ‘there impetus appears to be to object to NGO
was a time when service on many non-profit positions and tactics, including those that are
boards was perceived mainly as an honorary ‘anti-free market’ and ‘internationalist’.15
role. Today, non-profit boards are expected NGOs will clearly have to address issues
to govern.’13 of accountability if they are to maintain their
While there is evidence of the need for credibility, but acting on this imperative may
greater transparency and voluntary reform take time. According to another recent study,
getting underway, external pressure is ‘The 21st Century NGO’, some ‘see the issue
growing. A UN Commission, chaired by coming, but want to postpone the day of
former Brazilian president Henrique Cardoso, reckoning. The reaction was strongly
is set to recommend the adoption of reminiscent of corporate responses to the
guidelines and other mechanisms to whole reporting agenda a decade or so ago
promote accountability among NGOs when the triple bottom-line agenda began
accredited to the UN.14 to emerge.’16
However, some organisations are taking For those seeking to address these issues,
advantage of the focus on governance to there are many who provide advice. The
target NGOs whose policy stances they find American Bar Association recently published
objectionable. Pointing to the ‘unprece- a ‘Non-Profit Governance Library’. It consists
dented growth in the power and influence of three publications with legal guidance,
of non-governmental organisations’ in June checklists and policies.17 There are also new
2003, the American Enterprise Institute and transparency standards, such as the Global
the Federalist Society launched a website to Reporting Initiative and AccountAbility’s
monitor them. The NGOWatch.org website AA1000 standard that may help NGOs
indicates that it will ‘without prejudice, comply with best practice.
Nancy Z. Boswell (TI USA), Phyllis Dininio (Transnational Crime and Corruption
Center, American University) and Michael Johnston (Colgate University)
Further reading
Nancy Boswell and Peter Richardson, ‘Anti-Corruption: Unshackling Economic
Development’, Economic Perspectives (March 2003), www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/
ites/0303/ijee/boswell.htm
Michael Lippe, ‘Corruption at the Local Government Level: The U.S. Experience’, March
2002, www.transparency-usa.org/documents/corruptioninlocalgovernmentin america.
doc
D. Renzulli, Capitol Offenders: How Private Interests Govern Our States (Washington D.C.:
Center for Public Integrity, 2002)
TI USA, ‘Anti-Bribery Toolkit: Guidance for Small and Medium Companies to Develop
Compliance Programs’, May 2002, www.transparency-usa.org/Toolkit.html
TI USA, ‘Statement on Corporate Governance and Accounting Reforms’, July 2002,
www.transparency-usa.org/Corporate%20Governance%20Statement.htm
TI USA, ‘Corporate Governance: Code of Conduct/Compliance Programs Leading
Practices Survey’, February 2003, www.transparency-usa.org/documents/03020397750_
CorporateGovernanceSurvey-FINAL.pdf
TI USA: www.transparency-usa.org
Notes
1. Charles Lewis, ‘The Enron Collapse: A Financial Scandal Rooted in Politics’, Center for
Public Integrity, www.publici.org
2. New York Times (US), 31 December 2002.
3. See ‘Statement of Government Accountability Project’ at www.whistleblower.org
4. Time (US), 22 December 2002.
5. Reuters (Britain), 9 April 2003; New York Times (US), 10 April 2003.
6. ‘NYSE Corporate Governance Proposal’, Commission File No. SR-NYSE-2002-33, Release
No. 34-47672.
7. ‘NASDAQ Corporate Governance Proposal’, Commission File No. SR-NASD-2002-141,
Release No. 34-47516.
8. New York Times (US), 4 June 2003.
9. See www.unitedway.org
10. Washington Post (US), 4 and 7 May 2003.
11. ‘Grassley Seeks Details on United Way’s Financial Management’, press release, 20 August
2002, www.grassley.senate.gov/releases/2002/p02r8-20a.htm; ‘Senate Finance Committee
Passes Non-Profit Bill’, OMB Watch, June 2002.
12. Alan G. Hevesi and Ira Millstein, ‘Non-profit Governance in New York City’,
www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/opm/Nonprofit%20Governance%20In%20New%20Y
ork%20City.pdf
13. Charles F. Dambach, Structures and Practices of Non-profit Boards (Washington, D.C.:
BoardSource, 2003).
14. OneWorld (US), 12 June 2003, www.us.oneworld.net
15. Much of this emerged in a conference hosted by the American Enterprise Institute and
the Institute of Public Affairs of Australia, ‘Non-Governmental Organizations: The
Growing Power of an Unelected Few’, www.ngowatch.org
16. SustainAbility, The 21st Century NGO: In the Market for Change (Washington, D.C.:
SustainAbility, 2003).
17. See www.abanet.org
Zambia
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003 score: 2.5 (92nd out of 133 countries)
Bribe Payers Index 2002 score: not surveyed
Conventions:
AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (adopted July 2003;
not yet signed)
SADC Protocol on Corruption (ratified July 2003)
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (not yet signed)
that alleged to have taken place under former president Frederick Chiluba. The task
force is a loose coalition of officers from the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Drug
Enforcement Commission, the police, the Zambia Revenue Authority, the director
of public prosecutions and the intelligence service. The appointment as its executive
chairperson of Mark Chona, previously convenor of the NGO umbrella group Oasis
Forum, was intended to improve coordination, but questions about the legal status
of the task force remain. The task force has already arrested several prominent figures
in the previous administration, who are being prosecuted on various charges of
alleged abuse of authority or office and corruption.
• In December 2002 the president gave his assent to the Independent Broadcasting
Authority Act and the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment)
Act. The former allowed for the establishment of an independent regulatory body
for broadcasting. The latter transferred the power to issue broadcasting licences
from the minister of information to the proposed Independent Broadcasting Authority
(see below).
• Although the Zambia Police (Amendment) Act was passed in 1999, the Police Public
Complaints Authority, which it created, was not constituted until March 2003.
The authority is intended to provide an avenue through which police officers may
be reported for various infractions of the law, including corruption. Previously it
was difficult for any person aggrieved by the conduct of a police officer to obtain
redress because the superior to whom the report had to be submitted invariably
shielded the officer from prosecution. Although it is too early to assess the authority,
its chairperson, Christopher Mundia, is a respected lawyer who, as chair of the Law
Association of Zambia, in league with other civil society organisations successfully
opposed former president Chiluba’s bid for a third term of office.
theft of public funds, including one charge Government limits media reforms
that he stole US $29 million from the
ministry of finance. While the government has shown a
The fight against corruption gathered reasonable degree of commitment in
momentum in the year after the lifting of fighting corruption, it has not easily accepted
Chiluba’s immunity. Chiluba’s fate sent a major media reforms despite mounting
clear message that the stature of one’s office pressure from the media and civil society
was no insulation against criminal charges, organisations.
and has encouraged a more confrontational The leading umbrella organisations of
stance by prosecutors and the judiciary. A media and journalists, the Zambia
campaign against the pillage of resources by Independent Media Association (ZIMA) and
the former government has seen the arrest the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA),
for alleged corruption of senior members of pushed for three reforming pieces of
the previous government and, more recently, legislation: the Freedom of Information (FOI)
members of the current one. Prominent cases Bill, the Independent Broadcasting Authority
included the former managing director of (IBA) Bill, and the Zambia National
Zambia’s largest commercial bank, ZANACO Broadcasting (Amendment) Bill. In August
– partly owned by government – and the 2002, the bills were presented to parliament
secretary to the treasury, who were both as private member’s motions. The FOI Bill
arrested in January 2003 but subsequently was intended to compel public institutions
discharged. More recently, the director to release information to the media and
general of the Zambia National Broadcasting public without undue prosecution. The IBA
Corporation was arrested for alleged abuse Bill aimed to establish an independent
of office, and Arthur Yoyo, the president’s regulatory body. The Broadcasting Bill would
press aide, was suspended after the Anti- have repealed the Zambia National
Corruption Commission handed his case to Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) Act of
the director of public prosecutions. The 1987 and transformed the ZNBC from a state-
allegations against Yoyo dated from 2001, controlled broadcaster into a public service
when he was permanent secretary in the broadcaster, allowing it to operate without
ministry of information under the Chiluba official interference.
government. In early November 2002, the speaker of
In the past, courts were reluctant to hand parliament rejected all three bills, citing
down custodial sentences against persons procedural rules that required bills with
convicted of corruption and abuse of office, financial implications to receive initial
principally because it was felt that white- consent from the president through the vice-
collar criminals did not deserve to go to jail. president or minister of finance. Shortly after,
The courts typically gave suspended the government introduced its own versions
sentences for corruption charges. The new of the bills, with some important modifica-
climate of hostility to corruption has tions. Notably, the government cut the plan
encouraged judges to give custodial to repeal the ZNBC Act, thus retaining
sentences. In April 2003, a magistrate in control of the broadcaster. Instead, it
Solwezi, northwestern Zambia, sentenced an proposed an amendment to the ZNBC Act,
official to five years’ imprisonment with hard transferring the power to issue broadcasting
labour for embezzling public funds. In May licences from the minister of information to
2003, former minister of tourism Reverend the proposed IBA. In December 2002, after
Anoshi Chipawa was sentenced to five years’ intensive lobbying and consultations,
imprisonment with hard labour for stealing President Mwanawasa signed the revised IBA
29.9 million kwacha (US $6,200) from and ZNBC (Amendment) Acts into law.
constituency development funds while a However, the reforms have been still more
member of parliament. limited. The FOI Bill was deferred for further
consultation. The members of the IBA have The push for freedom of information
not yet been appointed. And in March 2003 legislation has continued through advocacy
it was alleged that the government threatened and lobbying. The main target is the consti-
to close down Radio Ichengelo for giving tutional review process that is currently
airtime to Michael Sata, leader of the underway, through which there is an
opposition Patriotic Front party, who attacked opportunity to ensure the introduction of
the government for corruption and tribalism. such legislation.
Further reading
Alfred Chanda, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report: Zambia 2003 (TI Zambia,
2003), www.tizambia.org.zm/research.html
Inyambo Mwanawina et al., Transparency and Participation in the Budget Process – Zambia:
A Country Report (2002)
TI Zambia, 2001 State of Corruption Report (2002)
TI Zambia: www.tizambia.org.zm
Part three
Corruption research
TI 05 chap09 6/1/04 16:16 Page 276
TI 05 chap09 6/1/04 16:16 Page 277
9 Introduction
Pablo Zoido and Larry Chavis1
Does corruption hit poor people harder than the middle class? Corruption hinders
growth, yes, but through what channels? What policies work best in fighting corruption?
Do organisational structures hamper women’s ability to fight corruption once they
achieve significant power? Is corruption worse in eastern or western Russia? Which
Colombian institutions are clean and which ones corrupt? Does public mistrust lead
to more corruption, or is it the other way around?
These are the kinds of questions social scientists are researching today. Questions
about how to measure corruption or how to improve on current forms of measurement
still linger, but the view that corruption cannot be measured, or that evidence is purely
impressionistic or anecdotal, has been soundly defeated. A deeper understanding of
how corruption works is allowing us to move from the broad questions to the specifics.
Since 1995, when Transparency International (TI) first published its Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI), empirical research on the effects of corruption has grown
tremendously and ultimately matured. Few continue to argue that corruption might
‘grease the wheels of commerce’, as suggested by Samuel Huntington and others in the
1960s. The demand for data and analysis continues to grow and research is starting to
have a direct impact on policy-making, as demonstrated by the inclusion of a corruption
index in the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the most recent US aid-allocation
initiative. The fight against corruption has barely started but we are beginning to see
signs of progress – it is easier now to find success stories, or to come up with a set of
policies that work and point to results (for an example, see Chapter 23 by Reinikka and
Svensson, page 326). In sum, exciting new lines of research are adding to our knowledge
about the causes and consequences of corruption.
Many of these new lines of research are present in this year’s contributions to the
Global Corruption Report. Below, we review these contributions, which can be divided
into three groups: corruption indices, micro-level research and studies of poverty and
corruption.
Introduction 277
TI 05 chap09 6/1/04 16:16 Page 278
Subjected to statistical analysis, indices such as the CPI have helped establish the
link between corruption, growth and development (see Paolo Mauro’s seminal 1995
paper2), and more recently they are having a direct policy impact, in particular in aid
allocation. One of the main criticisms made of perceptions indices, however, is that
they do not reflect the actual situation in a country. Seligson, for example, stresses the
need to measure what percentage of a population actually experiences various forms
of corruption (Chapter 17, page 307). Kaufmann and Kraay, presenting their latest set
of governance indicators (Chapter 16, page 302), counter that objective measures may
contain measurement error or be mere proxies for what they are intended to quantify.
As a result, they argue, subjective measures are just as precise as objective ones. But
Kaufmann and Kraay also warn against using corruption indices alone to determine
policy decisions, since their imprecision may lead to the misclassification of countries.
Corruption indices have also motivated new areas of research, notably the channels
through which corruption affects an economy and, in particular, the relationship
between corruption and foreign direct investment. In studying the impact of corruption
on development, Lambsdorff stresses the correlation between high levels of corruption
(low CPI scores), lower annual capital inflows and also lower productivity (Chapter 18,
page 310). Corruption may deter foreign investors because of its associated lack of
secure property rights or ‘low bureaucratic quality’. Habib and Zurawicki find that
corruption is associated with lower levels of investment, especially from foreign investors
(Chapter 19, page 313). Local investors may be less affected because they are used to
‘navigating’ the local conditions, or do not have the option to invest abroad. It is also
important to take into account the level of corruption of a foreign investor’s home
country, since this may also have an impact on investment decisions.
single score, he argues, can accurately portray the situation in a whole country. Using
a different angle, Chirkova and Bowser conducted an extensive preliminary survey
covering about half of Russia (Chapter 13, page 295). They have produced a corruption
map where the indices vary significantly across Russia’s regions and territories. Under-
standing the source of this variance may be one of the most interesting challenges that
lie ahead. Taken together, Court and Chirkova and Bowser suggest that while a single
index score might be a valid means of comparison across countries, more country-
specific analysis is needed to understand the corruption and governance problems
within a country.
Single-country studies have the advantage of being able to utilise local expertise and
integrate country-specific idiosyncrasies. The fruits of this kind of analysis are visible
in the work of Transparencia por Colombia and TI Bulgaria. In Colombia, Transparen-
cia por Colombia created an index to monitor the performance of a number of public
institutions, marrying hard data with survey responses (Chapter 12, page 292). In
Bulgaria, data from a sociological survey and from the National Audit Office were
combined to create an index of the transparency of political party financing (Chapter
14, page 298). These new approaches integrate the methodological advances made in
corruption research at the macro level with the advantages of solid micro-level studies.
Introduction 279
TI 05 chap09 6/1/04 16:16 Page 280
Other examples of successful anti-corruption policies are the studies carried out by
the International Budget Project (IBP) (Chapter 24, page 330). Working with national
experts and NGOs, IBP has made extensive studies of budget processes across Africa
and Latin America with the intention of identifying the specific areas where reforms
are needed to promote more transparency.
Though very different in approach, the work of Azfar and Nelson also illustrates
the benefits of transparency (Chapter 25, page 333). Using an experimental economic
model, they demonstrate in a controlled environment how corruption is reduced when
more information is made available to the electorate. Because of the lack of direct data
on corrupt transactions, the use of experimental settings has great potential to help
explain corrupt behaviour in certain situations. The results from Azfar and Nelson give
both possible policy prescriptions and areas for further testing.
Conclusion
The array of research presented here reflects how research on corruption has moved
forwards. While comparative indices continue to garner wide attention, they now
represent only one strand in this research. The majority of research presented here has
a micro-level focus. The level of research analysis is shifting as we move away from
comparing countries to the study of regions or groups within countries. This approach
is helping to build a more comprehensive picture of how corruption operates within
different societies.
There are many other avenues still to explore. As anti-corruption programmes take
off, research such as Reinikka and Svensson’s offers an evaluation of anti-corruption
measures at work (Chapter 23, page 326). Such studies are valuable policy tools. To address
the current interest in micro-level studies on corruption, more work is required that
uses the firm as a unit of analysis, with the aim of providing a broader view of the impact
of corruption in an economy. One current weakness of macro-level research is that the
CPI and other cross-country indices do not allow for the comparison of changes in
corruption over time. As new tools become available, we will be better able to track
changes that help to identify the policies that are most useful in fighting corruption.
Notes
1. Pablo Zoido and Larry Chavis are at the graduate school of business at Stanford University,
United States. Contact: zoido_pablo@gsb.stanford.edu and chavis_larry@gsb.stanford.edu
2. Pablo Mauro, ‘Corruption and Growth’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, no. 110 (1995).
Introduction 281
TI 05 chap09 6/1/04 16:16 Page 282
The high correlation of the different sources used in the CPI indicates its overall
reliability. The reliability is also depicted in Figure 10.1, which shows the 90 per cent
confidence intervals for each country included in the 2003 CPI. This range indicates
how a country’s score may vary, depending on measurement precision. Most countries
are measured with sufficient precision to allow a ranking of nations.
10
a ‘CPI 2003 score’ relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and
risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
b ‘Surveys used’ refers to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. A total of 17 surveys were
used from 13 independent institutions, and at least three surveys were required for a country to be included
in the CPI.
c ‘Standard deviation’ indicates differences in the values given by the sources: the greater the standard deviation,
the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources.
d ‘High–low range’ provides the highest and lowest values given by the different sources.
e ‘90% confidence range’ provides a range of possible values of the CPI score. It reflects how a country’s score
may vary, depending on measurement precision. There is a 5 per cent probability that the score is above this
range and 5 per cent that it is below. This interval, particularly when only three sources are available, should
only be regarded as a rough guide.
represented. For the 2003 CPI, however, Gallup International on behalf of Transparency
International surveyed respondents from less-developed countries, asking them to
assess the performance of public servants in industrial countries. The same approach
was applied by Beirut-based Information International. The results from these groups
of expatriates correlate well with the other sources used in the 2003 CPI.
Note
1. Johann Graf Lambsdorff is professor of economics at the University of Passau, Germany,
and director of statistical work on the CPI for TI. Contact: jlambsd@uni-passau.de
The Global Corruption Barometer is a new global, public opinion survey of perceptions,
experiences and attitudes towards corruption. The barometer was carried out in
association with Gallup International, as part of their first Voice of the People survey.
The Voice of the People Survey involved interviews in July 2002 with 40,838 people
in 47 countries across all continents.1
Complementing TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the barometer involved questions
intended to capture different aspects of corruption’s extent and impact. Questions
addressed the impact of corruption on different spheres of life, as well as perceptions
of change in previous years and expectations of the future. TI hopes to repeat the survey
in future years, which would allow an assessment of trends over time in both the
perception and experience of corruption.
The most striking finding came when respondents were asked from which institution
they would choose to eliminate corruption first if they had a magic wand. The
overwhelming first choice was political parties, followed by the courts and the police.
Political parties was the most frequently chosen institution in 33 of the 45 countries
where this question was asked,2 most notably in Argentina and Japan, where more
than 50 per cent of respondents picked political parties. In total, almost 30 per cent of
all respondents worldwide singled out political parties as the institution from which
they would most like to eliminate corruption (see Figure 11.1).
The courts were selected by 14 per cent of respondents worldwide, most notably in
Cameroon, Indonesia and Peru, where they were pinpointed by more than 30 per cent.
The police were singled out by 12 per cent of respondents worldwide, but by more
than 30 per cent in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico and Nigeria. The medical services,
the fourth choice globally, were selected by more than 20 per cent of respondents in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Poland.
The survey also posed a series of questions about the effect of corruption on personal
and family life, on the business environment, on political life and on the culture and
values of society. Notably the survey found that corruption hits the poor hardest (see
Table 11.1). More than 40 per cent of respondents who indicated they were on a low
income believe that corruption has a very significant effect on their personal and family
life. The same answer came from only 25 per cent of respondents who indicated they
were on a high income. The correlation with income was found to be very significant.
It was found that attitudes towards corruption and its impact vary substantially
across the world, and that they do not necessarily correlate with corruption levels.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Proportion of respondents selecting the institution (%)
a Respondents were asked: ‘If you had a magic wand and you could eliminate corruption from one of the following
a One in six respondents (17.4%) refused to provide information about their income.
Table 11.2 (with a small sub-sample of countries) shows that in some countries with a
relatively low incidence of corruption (for example, Canada), people view corruption
as having a significant impact. On the other hand, some countries with a relatively
high incidence of corruption (including Pakistan) view its impact as low.
Two questions addressed perceptions of change in corruption levels over time.
Firstly, respondents were asked how they felt corruption had changed over the past three
years. Of those surveyed 47 per cent felt that it had increased, and only one in 10 felt
a Data were missing for Brazil and China. Data from the Palestinian Authority are not included in the overall total.
Table 11.3: Expected change in corruption over the next three years
Overall:
AVERAGE for
45 countriesa 20.1 22.0 27.1 15.4 4.6 10.8
a Data were missing for Brazil and China. Data from the Palestinian Authority are not included in the overall total.
that it had decreased. This finding mirrors the 2002 Bribe Payers Index, where less than
one-third of respondents thought that international bribery involving senior public
officials had declined over the past five years, and only 6 per cent experienced a
significant decline.
When asked about the future, more people expected corruption to increase than
expected it to fall over the next three years. While 42 per cent predicted it would
increase either ‘a lot’ or ‘a little’, only 20 per cent predicted it would fall (see Table
11.3). In Colombia and Indonesia, the most optimistic in the survey, more than 50 per
cent expected corruption levels to decrease. By contrast, the majority of respondents
in Cameroon, Georgia, India, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa and Turkey
expected corruption to increase in their countries.
The data analysis was conducted by Frances Smith and Professor Ross Homel of the
Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance at Griffith University, Queensland,
Australia. The full data is available at www.transparency.org/surveys
Notes
1. The 47 countries were: Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil,
Britain, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico,
Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States.
Data on corruption questions were missing for Brazil and China. In a separate survey,
1,315 people were surveyed in the Palestinian Authority by the Palestinian Center for
Policy and Survey Research in April 2003, the results of which are not included in the
overall totals reported here.
2. Data were missing for this question in Brazil, China and Pakistan, but was available in
the Palestinian Authority.
The process of constructing the index revealed how limited public access to information
is in Colombia. Hard data is scattered, disorganised and barely systematised, while
officials often refuse or are ‘inefficient’ when asked to provide information to civil
society organisations.
Only institutions that could provide enough information for all of the scores to be
calculated were included. In total, the 2002 Integrity Index rated 88 national public
50.00
16:16
45.00
40.00
35.00
Page 293
30.00
25.00
Index score
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
House of Ministry of Senate National Social Ministry of Congress Superintendency Communication ETESA (Health Ministry of
Representatives education Protection transportation Social of Ports and Sector’s Social financing defence
Fund Protection Transportation Protection institution with
CAJANAL Fund Fund resources from
CAPRECOM gambling taxes)
Figure 12.1: Institutions with a high risk of corruption (index scores lower than 50)
TI 05 chap09 6/1/04 16:16 Page 294
institutions. The institutions covered most functions of the state, from policy definition
and implementation, legislation and regulation to the relevant punishment mechanisms.
They include the executive, legislative and judicial branches, tax offices, the attorney
general’s office and the ombudsman.
On a scale from 0 to 100 (where 100 is the best possible score), only one institution
exceeded 90 points, while 22 institutions obtained a score of between 70 and 90 points.
Sixty-five institutions fell below this level.
The most worrying results were those of the 10 institutions that scored below 50
points (see Figure 12.1). This group included the national congress (senate and chamber
of representatives), several ministries responsible for large portions of budget (transport,
education and defence), four of the funds and institutions managing health and social
security resources, and two important institutions for rural development.
The index will be published annually, allowing the monitoring of performance over
time. A number of institutions have already stated their interest in making internal
reforms to improve their performance in future indices.
The task now is to improve the index’s potential by including new institutions,
improving procedures for assessment and overcoming obstacles to the acquisition of
information. Publication of the index has already encouraged the government to adopt
policies aimed at improving the availability of relevant information.
Note
1. At Transparencia por Colombia, Marcela Rozo Rincón is research director and Ana Maria
Torres Soto is head researcher. Contact: indiceintegridad@ transparenciacolombia.org.co
Levels of corruption
6/1/04
Low
Below average
St Petersburg
16:16
Above average
High
No data
Page 296
Moscow
than the west. However, the western area known as the capital region – St Petersburg,
Moscow city and Moscow oblast – was assessed as one of the most corrupt regions.
Thirdly, counter to popular expectations, the degree of corruption in areas that are
rich in natural resources – such as Tyumen oblast and Bashkortostan – was viewed as
below average.
In order to be able to monitor changes in the scope and structure of corruption,
similar surveys are planned on an annual basis. It is hoped that in future the survey
will encompass all of Russia’s 89 regions.
Notes
1. Elena Chirkova is programme coordinator for corruption research at TI Russia. Donald
Bowser is programme development coordinator at TI Russia and director of IMPACT, a
private consultancy firm.
2. The project may be downloaded from www.transparency.org.ru/proj_index.asp
3. Oblast and krai are the administrative districts of the Russian Federation.
• The qualitative component was a survey of personal assessments among four target
groups: local and national leaders of political parties, representatives of the business
sector, NGO activists and journalists. The survey was carried out from
October–December 2002 in the cities of Sofia, Burgas, Varna, Veliko Turnovo and
Kurdzhali. In total, around 180 people were interviewed. The survey asked a series
of questions, including whether party financing is sufficiently transparent, whether
control measures are effective, whether there are sufficient legal mechanisms for
limiting illegal financing, and whether legislation needs amending.
• The quantitative component was an empirical assessment based on the regular
reports submitted by political parties to the National Audit Office (NAO). Every
year all parties are required to submit their annual reports to the NAO. Within
one month of all elections, they are required to report their campaign incomes
and expenses. Within six months of receiving the parties’ annual reports, the
NAO has to announce publicly whether the reports are in compliance with
legislation. (If a party is found not to be in compliance, it is deprived of its annual
state subsidy for the relevant year.)
The survey results showed agreement between the four different groups on several
issues. Many respondents felt that the mechanisms limiting illegal financing are not
applied effectively – they noted a persistent problem concerning the financial control
of political parties and the implementation of sanctions. A large majority of those
interviewed believed that the public does not have enough information on the principles
of financing and control of political parties (see Table 14.1). Among all groups the
dominant opinion was that Bulgaria’s party financing law needs amending – 64 per
cent of all respondents thought so, and only 9 per cent disagreed.
Table 14.1: Do you agree that political party financing in Bulgaria is sufficiently transparent?
On the basis of both the qualitative and quantitative components of the evaluation,
a new index was developed: the Index for Transparency of Political Party Financing.
The qualitative component was based on the survey results and represents the perceptions
of the level of transparency of political party financing. On a range from 0 (highly
corrupt) to 10 (highly clean), the political parties themselves gave the highest rating
(2.25) and business representatives the lowest (0.71). NGO representatives gave a score
of 1.30 and journalists 1.76. The combined perceptions score was 1.52. The quantitative
component was based on the NAO’s review of parties’ financial reports and was calculated
as the proportion of parties that had submitted their financial reports on time. The score
was 3.36.2 Giving equal weight to the qualitative and quantitative components, this
first use of the index indicated a low level of transparency in political party financing
in Bulgaria: an aggregate score of just 2.44 out of 10.
A strength of the survey is that it can be used regularly for measuring the dynamics
of transparency in party and campaign financing. All groups of respondents in the first
survey agreed that the index should be tested during elections. Local elections in
Bulgaria are scheduled for October 2003, and on the eve of the local elections TI Bulgaria
is planning to assess transparency in campaign financing of both political parties and
independent candidates.
The survey could be applied in any country with minimal legal provisions and
guidelines on reporting contributions and expenses, though it would be necessary to
adapt the methodology to the particular regulations in a given country. It would be
particularly interesting to use the index to compare the transparency of election
campaign financing with the transparency of political financing between elections.
Notes
1. For further information contact Katia Hristova-Valtcheva, programme director at TI
Bulgaria: katia@transparency-bg.org
2. According to the NAO, only 90 out of 268 parties (33.6 per cent) had submitted reports
of their revenues and expenses by 15 March 2002.
South Asia accounts for 30–40 per cent of the world’s poor and more than 40 per cent
of its 1.4 billion people live in poverty. Corruption is rampant in public services across
the region and impinges directly on everyday life. Across South Asia, the state has a
monopoly on the delivery of critical public services such as potable water, health,
education and power. Given the overarching role of the state, there is no real ‘exit’ option
whereby the majority of the population could move to another provider.
In such an environment, ‘voice’ mechanisms, such as citizen feedback surveys, are
particularly important. Surveys highlight an interesting array of useful information for
service providers and at the same time empower other stakeholders to demand more
accountability from the state.
Transparency International (TI), which has a strong presence in South Asia through
its national chapters, designed a project in 2001 to assess the levels and forms of
corruption in the five large countries of the region. What made the initiative unique
was that a common questionnaire was used to capture perceptions and experiences across
the region, making it possible to compare emerging trends. The focus of the survey was
on a set of public services of particular importance to the poor: healthcare, education,
power, land administration, taxation, police and the judiciary.
The surveys were conducted in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
between November 2001 and May 2002 and focused on urban and rural households
in each country, ranging from 2,278 households in Sri Lanka to 5,157 in India. Three
thousand households were surveyed in Pakistan, 3,030 in Bangladesh and 3,060 in Nepal.
The survey results reveal the grip of petty corruption on the everyday lives of citizens
in South Asia. Access to public services was found to be an important issue for a large
proportion of the population in all five countries, especially in Bangladesh, Pakistan
and Sri Lanka. The finding implies that the poor in these countries face the danger of
exclusion from access to public services due to the high artificial barriers, economic
and otherwise.
Petty corruption was found to be endemic in all key public sectors in the five
countries, with citizens reporting moderate to high levels of corruption in their regular
interaction with public services. Lack of accountability and monopoly of power were
quoted as major factors contributing to corruption in public services. Extortion was
the most prevalent form of corruption, with middle and lower-level functionaries
identified as the key facilitators of corruption in all sectors studied.
The survey revealed that bribes impose a heavy financial burden on South Asian
households, because of both the high frequency of demands and the large sums paid.
More than half of the users of public hospitals in Bangladesh, for example, reported
that they had paid a bribe to access a service, with bribes averaging 1,847 takas (US
$33). In Pakistan, 92 per cent of households with experience of public education reported
having to pay bribes: the average amount paid was 4,811 rupees (US $86). These sums
are substantial given that per capita gross national income in Bangladesh and Pakistan
is US $360 and US $410 per annum, respectively.
When asked about perceptions of specific sectors, respondents identified the police
as the most corrupt sector in four out of five countries. In Nepal, the police were
perceived to be the third most corrupt after land administration and customs. Asked
about their experiences, actual users of services in all countries (see Table 15.1) indicated
that the police and judiciary were the two most corrupt sectors, followed by justice,
land administration and the tax department.
Table 15.1: Percentage of respondents reporting bribery in their interaction with different
public services
Bangladesh 40 58 32 73 19 84 75
India 34 15 30 47 15 100 100
Nepal 25 18 12 17 25 48 42
Pakistan 92 96 96 100 99 100 96
Sri Lanka 61 92 Sample 98 Sample 100 100
too small too small
The survey revealed the pervasive nature of corruption in critical public services across
South Asia, with large numbers of the population victims of extortion. The survey
strongly supports the case for empowering regulatory bodies, such as the office of the
ombudsman, to oversee the activities of public agencies, which are the sole providers
of many basic necessities across the region.
For more information about the survey, including the full report, see www.transparency.
org/pressreleases_archive/2002/2002.12.17.south_asia_survey.html
Note
1. Gopakumar K. Thampi is chief of programmes of the Public Affairs Foundation, India,
and former executive director for Asia at Transparency International. Contact:
gopa66@yahoo.com
2.5
Denmark
Canada
1.5
Belgium
Chile
1
Governance rating
Hungary
Slovenia
Italy
Greece
0.5
Botswana
Costa Rica
0
Bulgaria
Thailand
–0.5
Ecuador
–1
Bangladesh
Ukraine
Indonesia
Libya
Cuba
Paraguay
–1.5
Belarus
Georgia
Zimbabwe
Nigeria
Iraq
–2
–2.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Percentile rank
a The figure shows estimates for all countries of the rule of law in 2002 (on the vertical axis), with each country’s
percentile rank on the horizontal axis. Vertical bars show the statistically likely range of values for each country,
with the midpoint corresponding to the best single estimate. Selected countries are labelled. The ranking of countries
along the horizontal axis is subject to significant margins of error and in no way reflects the official view of the
World Bank, its executive directors or the countries they represent.
For many dimensions of governance, subjective data is the only data that is even
potentially informative – especially for corruption, which is almost impossible to
measure directly given its illegal and clandestine nature. Nevertheless, recent research
has made an effort to document corruption ‘objectively’, for example by comparing
differences in prices paid for similar objects in public procurement.3 However, given
the immense data problems associated with such an exercise, it is unlikely that cross-
country comparable measures based on this idea will be a viable alternative in the
near future.
In contrast, we currently have a wealth of perceptions-based data on corruption from
diverse sources, among which there is broad agreement regarding cross-country
differences. Furthermore, subjective data contains significant ‘signal’ content, and
2. Since the margins of error are large, shouldn’t we rely on ‘objective’ indicators that
do not have these measurement problems?
Objective measures of governance also have measurement error, and hence should also
have associated margins of error. Consider, for example, using the share of trade tax
revenue in total revenues to capture the inability of a government to broaden its tax
base. This measure will be a ‘noisy’ indicator of overall government effectiveness for
at least two reasons: the tax revenue itself may contain a variety of errors, and the
extent of the tax base is only one dimension of government effectiveness. Our
calculations suggest that measurement error in many objective sources is at least as
important as the measurement error in subjective governance indicators.
3. Do the perceptions of think tanks and commercial risk rating agencies reflect the
ideological biases of these institutions?
4. Since the indicators only capture countries’ relative positions, is it possible that some
countries’ scores worsen simply because the others are getting better?
The limited information that we have on absolute trends over time in governance, if
anything, suggests a small worsening worldwide. We reviewed the global averages of
the individual sources that are available in a consistent format since 1996. While most
of the changes in these global averages are small, most of the statistically significant
ones point to deteriorations. Whether this reflects a true worsening of institutional
quality, or reflects other factors at play, is an open question. However, there is no
evidence of a worldwide improvement in governance, and thus downward trends in
individual countries cannot be justified with the argument that the world at large is
getting better.
5. Are these governance indicators sufficiently informative to be used as a basis for aid
allocation or other policy decisions?
This question has become relevant with the US government’s recent proposal to rely
in part on our governance indicators to allocate funds from the new Millennium
Challenge Account (MCA) (see ‘Governance, corruption and the Millennium Challenge
Account’, Chapter 7, page 135).4 In order to be eligible, low-income countries need to
score well on a number of governance indicators, including several of ours. Most
prominently, countries need to be in the top half of low-income countries on our
control of corruption indicator. A mechanistic rule such as this one risks misclassify-
ing countries, given the substantial margins of error in the governance indicators.
The risk of misclassification is illustrated in Figure 16.2, which shows our control
of corruption indicator for countries potentially eligible for the MCA. The vertical lines
indicate the margin of error for each country, with the mid-point the best single estimate.
While for countries well below and well above the median the risk of misclassification
is low, there is a non-trivial risk that many countries near the median will be misclas-
sified. For the latter group of countries, the probability that the corruption score is
above the median is between 25 and 75 per cent. The large margins of error point to
the importance of complementing cross-country indicators such as ours with more
nuanced and in-depth information from country governance diagnostics.
More generally, we recognise that there are limitations to what can be achieved
with this kind of cross-country, highly aggregated data. This type of data cannot
substitute for in-depth, country-specific governance diagnostics as a basis for policy
advice. Thus a significant complementary effort has taken place to develop country-
based governance diagnostic methodologies, based on in-depth surveys of enterprises,
users of public services and public officials.5 Such diagnostics unbundle governance
performance by type of governance and institution, permitting the use of the significant
variations within a country to learn about the priorities for action for a country.
Notes
1. Daniel Kaufmann is the director for global governance and regional learning at the World
Bank Institute, United States. Contact: dkaufmann@worldbank.org. Aart Kraay is a senior
economist in the development research group at the World Bank. Contact:
akraay@worldbank.org. The opinions expressed here are the authors’ and do not necessarily
reflect the official views of the World Bank, its executive directors or the countries they
represent.
2. For the full paper, see www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html. The
data and a graphical interface are available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
govdata2002
3. See for example R. DiTella and E. Schargrodsky, ‘The Role of Wages and Auditing During
a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires’, Journal of Law and Economics,
April 2003; Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2003.
4. See www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/mca.html
5. See www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/capacitybuild/index.html
1
6/1/04
1 Probability that a
country’s corruption
BTN
Probability that country is
score is above the in top half of sample
median: 0.5
16:16
MNG
SEN
LKA
IND
STP
LSO
MLI
NPL
–0.5
ETH
GHA
KIR
NIC
VUT
GUY
TMP
GIN
BIH
RWA
BEN
0.5
GNB
TGO
VNM
YEM
DJI
PAK
ARM
COM
HND
YUG
Median corruption score
BOL
SLE
CIV
GMB
–1
ALB
KGZ
SLB
MDA
KHM
PNG
MWI
UGA
COG
ZMB
BDI
TZA
LBR
MOZ
KEN
UZB
GEO
TCD
CAF
TJK
AZE
SDN
NER
CMR
AGO
BGD
IDN
ZWE
SOM
Probability (0–1)
LAO
–1.5
NGA
AFG
MMR
ZAR
Corruption Rating for 2002
0.25
HTI
–2
0 –2.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Country rank (0–1)
a The figure shows estimates of the control of corruption in 2002 (right-hand vertical axis) for all 74 countries potentially eligible for the first round of the MCA, with
each country’s percentile rank on the horizontal axis. The vertical line for each country indicates the 90 per cent confidence interval, with the mid-point showing the
best single estimate. The ranking of countries along the horizontal axis is subject to significant margins of error, and the ordering in no way reflects the official view of
the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent.
TI 05 chap09 6/1/04 16:16 Page 307
TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index is the most widely used measure of corruption
available today, providing a picture of corruption perceptions aggregated at the national
level. If researchers want to know the characteristics of people most likely to have been
victims of corruption, however, or to know in which nations the experience (rather
than perception) of corruption is greater, then a measure of corruption experience at
the individual level can help. The University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public
Opinion Project developed a series of questions that it included in national samples in
several Latin American countries to provide such information.
The questions were inspired by crime-victimisation surveys, the mainstay of
sociological investigation into crime. They built on work by the United Nations Centre
for International Crime Prevention – launched in 1989, the International Crime Victims
Survey now includes more than 70 countries and in 1996, for the first time, it included
a question on bribe victimisation.2 But a broader series of questions is preferable, since
anti-corruption projects need much more detailed information about the nature and
level of corruption than any single question can provide.
In 1996 the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project therefore
began applying a broader approach, as did the World Bank in 1998. These efforts, which
may also ask about perceptions of corruption, focus on citizens’ actual experience (vic-
timisation) with public sector corruption. At Pittsburgh the aim has been to measure
both corruption and its impact.3 A module of questions on corruption experience was
included in public opinion surveys of democratic values and behaviour applied to a
random (probability) sample of the nation being studied.4
Respondents were asked a series of questions recording their experience with
corruption over the year immediately prior to the survey. The forms of corruption
measured were selected on the basis of focus groups and are the ones found to be most
commonly experienced in Latin America. The questions varied between the question-
naires, but included items such as: observing a bribe being paid to a public official, being
asked to pay a bribe to a police officer, paying bribes to a public utility to avoid paying
the full bill, or being asked to pay a bribe in the school system. Respondents were also
asked questions on their trust in the system of government, so that the impact of
corruption victimisation on trust can be measured (controlling for other factors, such
as the respondent’s income, education, gender, region and party affiliation).
The data allow particular forms of corruption to be highlighted. For example, Figure
17.1 shows the proportion of respondents (men and women shown separately) who
reported that a public employee solicited a bribe from them during the preceding year.
The proportion ranges from less than 10 per cent in El Salvador and Honduras to well
above 20 per cent in Bolivia. While corruption-victimisation rates vary substantially
from country to country in Latin America, in all the countries studied it is substan-
tially higher than in advanced industrial countries. According to the UN data, in
advanced industrial countries the corruption-victimisation rate is less than 1 per cent
in any given year. The figure also shows that men are more likely to be the victims of
corruption than women in Latin America.
40
Male
Mean public employee bribe (%)
Female
30
20
10
0
El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Ecuador Paraguay Bolivia
50 3.4
Mean legitimacy
3.2
Legitimacy scale
40
3.0
Mean fair trial
30 2.8
1 Std. Dev.
20 2.6
2.4
10
2.2
Sig. < .001 Sig. < .001
0 2.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00 100.00
Corruption victimisation scale Total personal experience with corruption
Figure 17.2: The impact of corruption Figure 17.3: Belief in ability to get a fair
victimisation on legitimacy in Nicaragua trial in Nicaragua and total personal
experience with corruption
Notes
1. Mitchell A. Seligson holds the Daniel H. Wallace Chair of Political Science and is also a
Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, both at the University
of Pittsburgh, United States. Contact: seligson@pitt.edu
2. See Global Corruption Report 2001.
3. The World Bank surveys do not include questions on the impact of corruption victim-
isation.
4. The surveys reported on in this project are all national probability samples carried out
at various times from 1998 to 2002 in Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua
and Paraguay. The samples each have between 2,500 and 3,000 respondents, except for
Paraguay, which included only 1,463. The first survey, conducted in Nicaragua, was
developed with Casals and Associates. The author would like to thank Sergio Dias Briquets
of Casals and Andrew Stein, now of the US Department of State, for assistance in that
early work. Orlando Pérez of Central Michigan University has assisted in more recent
studies in Ecuador and Honduras.
5. When formed as a scale, the items were found to be reliable (Coronach Alphas of around
0.75, depending on the country).
6. We can be confident that the direction of causality runs from corruption victimisation
to reduced legitimacy because corrupt officials could not be selecting their victims based
on the former’s foreknowledge of the latter’s belief in the legitimacy of the political system.
0.1
0.06
0.04
0.02
–0.02
0 2 4 6 8 10
High corruption Low corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index 2002
and the resulting insecurity of property rights which alienates investors. We found the
other governance indicators to be less significant in the calculus of investors.
Corruption can also be shown to lower capital productivity, as shown in Figure
18.2.3 The relationship with productivity can be traced to a variety of channels. A
country’s tradition of law and order is insignificant in this context, but other governance
indicators come into play.
One mechanism through which corruption reduces productivity is the undermining
of government stability. Politicians’ search for corrupt income is commonly in contrast
to their declared programmes, reducing their popular support and threatening their
ability to stay in office. When office holders devote themselves to obtaining illegal,
additional payoffs, the allocation of capital goods will not be optimal, because they
prefer projects that promise large side-payments and low risks of detection to those that
benefit the public at large. Reduced productivity is the result.
A second mechanism is the link between corruption and restricted civil liberties
because such restrictions tend to distort markets, inducing the search for illegal ways
to circumvent them. Distorting markets can be lucrative when corrupt politicians have
the power to manage the resulting bottlenecks. Such bottlenecks, however, ‘sand the
wheels’ of business and lower productivity.
But the crucial reason why corruption has an adverse impact on productivity is
related to accompanying low levels of bureaucratic quality. Corruption may imply that
public servants are appointed on the basis of nepotism or bribes, without regard to
efficiency and capacity concerns. In addition, the effort level of public servants may
suffer from adverse incentives because creating artificial bottlenecks can increase the
0.3
Productivity as determined by the ratio of
0.1
–0.1
–0.2
0 2 4 6 8 10
High corruption Low corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index 2002
need to pay ‘speed money’. Attempts to increase productivity must address corruption
through public sector reform aimed at improving integrity in the bureaucracy.
Anti-corruption reform strategies should be fine-tuned, depending on whether
countries are primarily concerned with increasing productivity or attracting foreign
capital. Public sector reform aimed at increasing bureaucratic quality, improving
government stability and expanding civil liberties should be given priority if countries
are to increase productivity. Legal reform should be addressed primarily with the aim
of improving law and order and the security of property rights if countries want to attract
foreign capital.
Notes
1. Johann Graf Lambsdorff is professor of economics at the University of Passau, Germany.
Contact: jlambsd@uni-passau.de
2. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, ‘How Corruption Affects Persistent Capital Flows’, Economics
of Governance, vol. 4, no. 3 (2003); Johann Graf Lambsdorff, ‘How Corruption Affects
Productivity’, Kyklos, vol. 56, no. 4 (2003).
3. This finding, again, is robust to statistical tests related to the inclusion of further
explanatory variables, sample selection, measurement error and endogeneity. Contrary
to the argument that corruption has had less of an impact on economic development
in Asian countries, these countries performed no better than others in our regressions.
1. Foreign investors are more sensitive to corruption than their local counterparts.
2. Individual countries involved in FDI respond differently to host country corruption.
3. Corruption is one of the dimensions of the psychological distance separating the
home and the host countries. For that reason, FDI is affected by the differences in
corruption between the home and the host countries.
Corruption is often expected to exert negative influences on both FDI and local
investment. In fact, because of their more extensive experience in the domestic market,
local investors are better positioned to manage the local transaction costs than their
foreign counterparts. Moreover, unlike foreign investors, most local investors do not
have the option to invest abroad and must become more creative to make the best
under difficult circumstances. Accordingly, this research verifies statistically that
corruption affects the rate of FDI more than it does domestic investment.
Table 19.1 shows that corruption, as measured by the CPI, negatively affects FDI.
Holding everything else constant, countries with a higher corruption level receive
relatively less FDI. The table also indicates that corruption has a significant negative
effect on local investment. When compared, the magnitude of the CPI coefficient for
FDI is double that for local investment. Corruption appears to be twice as important
for foreign investors as for local ones.
The effect of host country corruption on incoming FDI was further analysed by
controlling for variables such as cultural similarity, the openness of the economy
(trade/GDP) and economic ties. These variables are expected to promote FDI and weaken
the effects of corruption. The results show that corruption remains a significant negative
factor but that the magnitude of its impact is less. The findings suggest that, for example,
a decrease of corruption from the level of Pakistan to the level of Morocco or Jamaica
(roughly one point on the CPI) will result in an estimated 19 per cent increase in FDI
for Pakistan. That shift corresponds to about US $130 million of foreign investment.
a The CPI coefficients are based on regressions of log FDI (or log local investment) on corruption (CPI), log
population, GDP growth, log GDP/capita, unemployment, trade/GDP, cultural distance, log distance, economic
ties, political risk and price index. The ‘absolute difference in CPI’ coefficient is based on a PROBIT analysis of log
FDI on similar variables. All reported results are statistically significant. The FDI data are for 89 countries for the
period 1996–98.
A separate study focused on the similarity in the levels of corruption between the
home and host countries. FDI becomes a challenge for companies that are unwilling
to or incapable of working in a country that is more corrupt than their own. In such
cases, corruption can result in a decision to avoid FDI. In contrast, exposure to corruption
at home can prepare individual companies for work in corrupt environments abroad.
This advantage is lost, or turns into a disadvantage, when expertise in corruption
becomes redundant in ‘clean’ markets. The difference in the exposure to corruption
between the host and home countries is thus expected to affect foreign investors.
This analysis used data on aggregate bilateral FDI flows. The absolute difference in
corruption levels between the host and the home countries was calculated with CPI
data. The results of the analysis, shown in the bottom part of the table, indicate that
the absolute difference in CPI variables has a significant negative effect on the share
of FDI flow.
Finally, separate analyses were carried out of each investing country and its bilateral
FDI flows. In Figure 19.1, the vertical axis highlights the differences in response to host
country corruption for 17 investing OECD countries. As the scores on the vertical axis
show, the magnitude of the CPI regression coefficients, which reflect the impact of
host country corruption on FDI inflow, varied considerably. The horizontal axis shows
the corruption levels of the investing countries. As expected, the figure shows that the
two factors are correlated: investing countries that are more exposed to corruption in
their home markets are relatively less sensitive to corruption in foreign markets.
In conclusion, the negative effect of corruption on FDI suggests that firms do not
support corruption. The difference in corruption levels between the home and host
countries also has a negative impact on FDI. Foreign investors may shun corruption
because they believe it is morally wrong or because it is costly and difficult to manage.
Public officials must realise that the macro-environment and the institutional
framework play a critical role in FDI decisions, and that corruption is one relevant
factor in this respect.
0.6
incoming FDI (CPI regression coefficient)
Impact of host country corruption on
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Home country corruption (CPI)
Figure 19.1: Home country corruption and responses to host country corruptiona
a The CPI coefficients are based on regressions of log FDI on host country corruption (CPI), log population, trade/GDP,
log distance, economic ties and political risk for 17 home countries. The home country CPIs are for Australia,
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK and USA. The correlation between the two variables is 0.62.
Notes
1. Mohsin Habib is assistant professor in the department of management at the University
of Massachusetts, United States. Contact: mohsin.habib@umb.edu. Leon Zurawicki is
professor in the department of marketing at the University of Massachusetts, United
States. Contact: leon.zurawicki@umb.edu
2. See Mohsin Habib and Leon Zurawicki, ‘Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment’,
Journal of International Business Studies, 2002, vol. 33, no. 2; ‘Country-Level Investments
and the Effect of Corruption: Some Empirical Evidence’, International Business Review,
2001, vol. 10, no. 6; ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Corruption: Conceptual and Method-
ological Issues’, Journal of Transnational Management Development, 2001, vol. 6, no. 4;
and ‘National Differences in Investors’ Responses to Corruption: An International
Comparison’, International Business and Economics Research Journal, 2002, vol. 2, no. 1.
International companies have an important role to play in the struggle against corruption.
In the worst case, by paying bribes too easily, they help perpetuate the problem. In the
best case, they can serve as positive agents for change by implementing high standards
within their own operations, and by using their influence to lobby for reform. But
what do leading business people really think about corruption? In August and September
2002, Control Risks Group commissioned a survey of business attitudes in six jurisdic-
tions. The results give a revealing indicator of current business views.2
On Control Risks’ behalf, IRB Ltd conducted a total of 250 telephone interviews
with 50 companies each in Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States,
and 25 each in Hong Kong and Singapore. All respondents were senior decision-makers
at or near board level, and all the companies operated internationally. The respondents
represented eight different commercial sectors: banking and finance; public
works/construction; arms and defence; oil, gas and mining; telecoms; power generation;
retail; and pharmaceuticals. Control Risks commissioned a similar survey with a smaller
sample in 1999.3
The respondents made clear that graft can have a major impact on commercial
success (see Table 20.1). More than half of the Hong Kong and Singaporean companies
believed they had lost business in the previous year because a competitor had paid a
bribe. The figure was lower for companies from the United States and Europe but, even
so, a quarter of British companies thought they had lost business to corrupt competitors
in the last five years.
Table 20.1: Percentage of companies that lost business because a competitor paid a bribe …
The sector worst affected was public works/construction: about 40 per cent of
companies believed that they had lost business to bribe-paying competitors in the last
year, and about 55 per cent in the last five years.
General awareness of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is low,4 though new
legislation introduced as a result of the convention is beginning to have an impact on
business thinking. The survey suggested that 68 per cent of companies in Britain were
familiar with their country’s new anti-corruption laws, and more than half had reviewed
business practices as a result. In response to a separate question, 84 per cent of British
companies said that they banned facilitation payments (‘speed money’), compared
with only 60 per cent in the 1999 survey: the new British law makes no distinction
between these payments and other forms of bribery. By contrast, German companies
appeared more cynical: 52 per cent of respondents were aware of new national legislation,
but only 24 per cent had reviewed their business practices.
If outright bribery is forbidden, companies will look for other means of exercising
influence. Some of these approaches are legitimate, others more controversial. One of
the most sensitive issues is the use of middlemen, such as agents, consultants and joint
venture partners. The survey points to a widespread belief that both US companies and
their counterparts from other OECD countries ‘occasionally’ or ‘regularly’ use such
middlemen to get round anti-corruption laws.
Similarly, there was a general perception that both US and other OECD-based
companies gain business advantage as a result of political pressure from their
governments, either ‘regularly’ or ‘occasionally’ (see Table 20.2). This issue may become
more controversial in future. Embassies play a valuable role in helping companies
identify openings in new markets, and political pressure from the home government
can help companies resist demands for bribery. Nevertheless, pressure that is seen as
inappropriate may create problems. If a company or project is thought to be ‘imposed’
on the host country, it may eventually face a backlash.
Table 20.2: How often do international companies benefit from political pressure from their
home governments to gain business advantage?
Respondents’ views of the future were mixed. Overall, nearly half believed that
current corruption levels would remain the same. The Dutch were the most optimistic,
with 42 per cent believing that corruption levels would decrease. Hong Kong correspon-
dents were the most pessimistic with 48 per cent believing that current levels would
remain the same, and 42 per cent expecting an increase.
Notes
1. John Bray is director for analysis at the Tokyo office of Control Risks Group, Japan.
Contact: John.Bray@control-risks.com
2. A summary of the findings is available on www.crg.com. The results are discussed in greater
detail, together with a presentation of business strategies to counter corruption, in
Control Risks’ report, Facing Up to Corruption (London: Control Risks, 2002).
3. See Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2001, pp. 279–81.
4. The findings were similar in Transparency International’s 2002 Bribe Payers Index. See
Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2003, pp. 266–8.
Is it possible to assess governance at the national level in countries with diverse economic,
social and political contexts? India provides an important and interesting case to
investigate this question. Groups of governance experts from four states – Andhra
Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi and Kerala – were surveyed to assess the extent to which they
had different views on governance at the national level. The findings suggest that even
in a country with the diversity and complexity of India it is feasible and valuable to
carry out national governance assessments.
The India study was part of the World Governance Survey (WGS) project, a com-
prehensive assessment of governance in 16 developing and transition countries
representing 51 per cent of the world’s population. Using a cohesive framework and
questionnaire, the WGS generated responses from a panel of governance experts in each
country. The general findings were reported in the Global Corruption Report 2003.2 The
panels in the WGS countries were mostly from capital cities – in India, for example,
Delhi was surveyed.
Given the size, complexity and diversity of India, however, surveys were also carried
out in three other regions to compare the results to the Delhi-based survey. These
surveys were undertaken from May to July 2001 in partnership with local researchers.
The assessments were conducted in four very different Indian states:
• Andhra Pradesh, with its dynamic state government and innovative information
technology-based development strategy
• Bihar, with its violence, criminality and the lowest literacy rate and per capita
income in India, often seen as the worst-governed of India’s states
• Delhi, the political heart of the country; with high-growth industry and significant
foreign investment
• Kerala, with the highest literacy rate in the country, a reform-oriented state
apparatus and an active and highly politicised public.
extensive comments to support their rating. Table 21.1 reports on how the expert panels
in different parts of India assess governance at the national level, with an aggregate
score for each of the six arenas.
Three general observations deserve mention. The first is that experts in all four
states give roughly similar ratings at the aggregate levels. The average rating for the
country was ‘moderate’ for all regions, with a range from 3.03 in Andhra Pradesh to
3.25 in Delhi. It does seem surprising that the variation is not more pronounced given
the vastly different nature of the regions where the survey was undertaken. This seems
to indicate that experts are looking beyond local circumstances to give roughly similar
governance ratings at the national level.
Second, the ratings are relatively similar for many of the arenas – particularly civil
society, political society and the judiciary. But the ratings for the government arena
differ the most markedly. This difference is generated by a very high rating for Delhi
– likely due to high self-evaluations by bureaucrats and government officials there –
contrasting with a very low rating of the government by respondents in Bihar.
A third important finding is that respondents from Delhi consistently give higher
ratings for the quality of national governance than the experts in other states. While
the difference is not substantial, it would be prudent to draw on national panels rather
than just to focus on experts in the capital city.
Next, it is worthwhile looking at the findings for specific questions. Figure 21.1
shows the average rating for all 30 questions by respondents in the four states. The key
finding is that the difference in ratings between specific questions is sometimes greater
than the difference between the four states. For example, within the civil society
dimension experts in all four regions agree that freedom of expression (question 1) is
‘high’ (score of 4.00) in India, whereas they also agree that there is ‘moderate’ (score
of 3.00) discrimination in politics (question 3). In contrast, the average score for the
civil society dimension varies little, from a low of 2.96 in Andhra Pradesh to a high of
3.16 in Delhi. The pattern seems to indicate that experts are looking beyond local cir-
cumstances. Given the expected disparity in conditions, this is an important finding
in terms of methodology.
5.00
16:16
4.00
Page 321
3.00
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Delhi
Kerala
Average
2.00
1.00
0.00
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Question
Figure 21.1 Comparing governance perceptions across India: ratings for each question
TI 05 chap09 6/1/04 16:16 Page 322
The perceptions of experts in Delhi and Bihar differ markedly with regard to the
government arena, particularly regarding question 14 (the subordination of the military
to civilian government). This difference is almost certainly explained by the violence
that characterises politics and society in Bihar.
A key conclusion is that great diversity within a country does not present a major
problem for assessing governance at the national level. For most issues, experts in
very diverse parts of the country gave relatively similar assessments of governance at
the national level. There were certainly specific areas where state issues affected the
expert’s views significantly, but it was surprising that the number of such cases was
relatively low.
Although methodological considerations mean findings are indicative rather than
conclusive, the survey does highlight some bright spots, including high levels of freedom
of expression and association; high levels of political competition; a respected
bureaucracy; and a military that accepts its subordination to civilian government.
There was an overarching concern, however, that policy-making is rather divorced
from the people – especially the poorest members of society. Democracy in India is more
impressive in form than substance. More specifically, the survey found that corruption
was the most important governance challenge in the country. As one respondent
dejectedly put it: ‘Right from birth to death, nothing happens without bribery and
corruption. People can neither live nor die with dignity.’
The full paper and additional information can be found on the project website:
www.unu.edu/p&g/wga
Notes
1. Julius Court is a research fellow at the Overseas Development Institute, Britain. Contact:
j.court@odi.org.uk
2. The pilot phase of the WGS was carried out in early 2001 with support from the United
Nations University and United Nations Development Programme. A larger round of
country assessments is planned for early 2004.
Estonia 51 38 11 0 0
Latvia 72 25 3 0 0
Lithuania 61 35 2 0 0
Russia 69 23 8 0 0
Estonia 4 35 56 4 2
Latvia 11 44 40 2 3
Lithuania 14 37 44 2 2
Russia 21 40 31 4 4
a Respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement that public officials in their country pursue
their self-interest more than the good of the people.
Many population surveys show that people’s confidence in political and adminis-
trative institutions is very low in post-communist countries. The outlook of the elites
reflects a level of confidence that is considerably higher than the population average.
Table 22.3 considers an institution that is particularly important for political performance,
namely the ministries, and shows how the elite’s confidence compares with its perception
of people’s confidence in the leaders of these institutions. Put differently, the table
shows how the elite assesses mass public opinion.
Table 22.3: Elite confidence in ministries and elite images of people’s trust in leaders of ministriesa
Estonia 7 1 63 43 26 50 4 4 0 3
Latvia 2 0 53 22 38 73 7 4 1 1
Lithuania 0 0 41 18 45 69 11 10 3 4
Russia 0 1 31 38 52 48 14 7 3 6
a The ‘elite’ columns indicate the attitude of elites towards ministries in their own country. The ‘people’ columns
indicate what the same elites believe the attitudes are of most people in their country towards the leaders of
ministries.
The results demonstrate that very few members of elites have considerable trust in
the ministries. In Estonia, 70 per cent of the elite have either ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a great
deal’ of confidence in the ministries, whereas 55 per cent do so in Latvia, 41 per cent
in Lithuania and only 31 per cent in Russia. The Estonian elite also makes the most
positive evaluation of people’s trust in the ministries. While the Russian elite’s trust in
ministries is very low, they have a more positive impression of people’s attitudes towards
ministry leaders. The Latvian and Lithuanian elites are significantly more pessimistic
about the public’s trust in ministries.
The findings clearly demonstrate that post-communist elites see corruption as a
serious problem that requires attention. The data suggest that Estonia may have a less
serious corruption problem than Latvia, Lithuania or Russia. These results dovetail with
those of various studies on Estonia’s leading position among post-communist countries
in overcoming the legacies of communist practices. A new, younger generation of
politicians and administrators is supporting this positive development, which seems
to correlate with an elite culture distinguished by relatively high confidence in institutions
and other leaders. The responses of elites in all four countries also conform well to the
ranking of TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index.
Note
1. Anton Steen is professor of political science at the University of Oslo, Norway. Contact:
anton.steen@stv.uio.no
A well-known survey of primary schools in Uganda revealed that only 13 per cent of
student capitation grants made it to schools in 1991–95, and comparable surveys in
other countries recently made similar findings. When the Ugandan government launched
an information campaign targeting the schools, the level of leakage fell significantly.
New research measured the power of information by gauging the extent to which
leakage fell when transparency was increased.
For every dollar spent by the central government on non-wage education items in
1995, only 20 cents actually reached schools, with local governments capturing most
of the rest.2 Poor students suffered disproportionately because schools catering to them
received even less than others. Disbursements were rarely audited or monitored, and
most schools and parents had little or no information about their entitlements to the
grants. To respond to the problem, the central government began publishing data on
monthly transfers of capitation grants to districts in newspapers, and to broadcast them
on the radio. It required primary schools and district administrations to post notices
of all inflows of funds. This promoted accountability by giving schools and parents access
to the information needed to understand and monitor the grant programme.
An evaluation of the information campaign reveals a large improvement. Not all
schools are receiving the entire grant and there are delays. But capture by interests
along the way was reduced from 80 per cent in 1995 to 20 per cent in 2001 (Figure 23.1).
A before-and-after assessment comparing outcomes for the same schools in 1995
and 2001 – and taking into account school-specific factors, household income, teachers’
education, school size and supervision – suggests that the information campaign explains
most of the massive improvement. However, the results of the assessment should be
interpreted with care.
To identify a causal effect we should be able to control for all time-varying factors
– including policy changes – that have occurred since 1995 and that may have influenced
the relationship between schools and district officials. During this period Uganda’s
education sector saw a number of other reforms, such as improved monitoring and
supervision by the central government, increased capitation grants and a reduction of
school fees. It is possible that these policy measures, or some other time-varying factor,
influenced the degree of capture of funds.
7000 90
Average capitation grant P1–P7
Average share of funds 80
3000 40
30
2000
20
1000
10
0 0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2001
Year
Figure 23.1: Schools received what they were due after an information campaigna
aAmount of capitation grant (Uganda shillings) that schools were supposed to receive, and average (mean and
median) percentage actually received by schools, 1991–2001.
Sources: R. Reinikka and J. Svensson, ‘Explaining Leakage of Public Funds’, Centre for Economic Policy Research
(CEPR) Discussion Paper 3227 (London, 2002); and R. Reinikka and J. Svensson, ‘The Power of Information: Evidence
from a Campaign to Reduce Capture’ (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003).
the one carried out in Uganda and subsequently in several other countries (findings
on leakage summarised in Table 23.1) – tracks the flow of resources through various
layers of government, on a sample survey basis, in order to determine how much of
the originally allocated resources reach each level. The survey also collects other data
to help explain variation in leakage across service providers.3
Leakage of non-wage funds is a major issue in all cases. According to the public
expenditure tracking survey in Zambia – unlike in Uganda in the mid-1990s – rule-based
allocations seemed to reach the intended beneficiaries: more than 90 per cent of all
schools received their rule-based non-wage allocations. But rule-based funding accounted
for only 30 per cent of all funding. In discretionary allocations (70 per cent of total
spending) the positive results no longer held: less than 20 per cent of schools received
any funding from discretionary sources.
Table 23.1: Leakage of non-wage funds in primary education: evidence from public
expenditure tracking surveys (%)
Country Mean
Ghana 2000 50
Peru 2002a 30
Tanzania 1999 57
Zambia 2002 60
a Utilities only.
Sources:
Ghana: X. Ye and S. Canagarajah, ‘Efficiency of Public Expenditure Distribution and Beyond: A Report on Ghana’s
2000 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey in the Sectors of Primary Health and Education’, World Bank Africa
Region Working Paper Series No. 31 (Washington, D.C., 2002).
Peru: Instituto Apoyo and the World Bank, ‘PETS: The Education Sector in Peru’, background paper for Public
Expenditure Review: Peru, Restoring Fiscal Discipline for Poverty Reduction, World Bank Report No. 24286-PE (Washington,
D.C., 2002).
Tanzania: PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘Tanzania Public Expenditure Review: Health and Education Financial Tracking
Study. Final Report, Vol. I–II’ (Dar es Salaam, 1999).
Zambia: J. Das, S. Dercon, J. Habyarimana and P. Krishnan, ‘Rules vs. Discretion: Public and Private Funding in
Zambian Basic Education. Part I: Funding Equity’ (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Development Research Group,
2002).
The extent of corruption and leakage seems to have less to do with conventional
audit and supervision mechanisms, and more with the opportunity that schools – or
clinics in the health sector – have to voice their claims for funds. Traditionally, it is left
to government and a country’s legal institutions to devise and enforce public account-
ability. The Uganda experience questions this one-sided approach. With an inexpensive
policy action – the provision of mass information – Uganda dramatically reduced the
capture of public funds. Because poor people were less able than others to claim their
entitlement from district officials before the campaign, they benefited most from it.
Collusion, inefficiencies, abuse and lack of responsiveness to citizens’ needs cannot
easily be detected and rectified even with the best of supervision. When institutions
are weak, the government’s potential role as auditor and supervisor is even more
Notes
1. Ritva Reinikka is research manager in the development research group at the World
Bank. Contact: rreinikka@worldbank.org. Jakob Svensson is assistant professor at the
Institute for International Economic Studies at Stockholm University, Sweden, and senior
economist in the development research group at the World Bank. Contact:
jakob.svensson@iies.su.se
2. Case study evidence and other data showed that the school funds were not going to other
sectors either. A. Jeppson, ‘Financial Priorities Under Decentralisation in Uganda’, in
Health Policy and Planning, vol. 16, no. 2, 2001.
3. For the survey instruments and other methodological issues visit www.publicspending.org
The lack of public access to reliable and timely information about government budgets
greatly contributes to governance problems. Secret accounts, off-budget activities and
the lack of public scrutiny all lend themselves to corrupt practices. An increasing number
of NGOs recognise the need to draw attention to budget transparency. Recent research
has focused on the availability of specific budget information, assessing its timeliness,
accuracy and usefulness. It also emphasises the importance of scrutiny at all stages of
the budget process, from opportunities for civil society to comment on budgetary
priorities to the careful auditing of revenue and expenditure after a fiscal year has ended.
An early NGO effort to research budget transparency was carried out in 1999 by the
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), in cooperation with the Washington-
based International Budget Project (IBP). Following its initial study of budget transparency
in South Africa, Idasa’s African Budget Project joined with four other NGOs in Africa
to expand the research to cover Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia. The participating
organisations included Isodec in Ghana, Transparency International in Kenya, Integrity
in Nigeria and, in Zambia, Women for Change, the Catholic Commission for Justice
and Peace and a consultant from the University of Zambia.
The researchers for this multi-country project, initiated in 2000, relied on a case-
study method to explore the legal underpinnings of each country’s budget process and
budget information requirements, as well as the practices that each country actually
followed. In each country, the researchers conducted extensive interviews with officials
in the executive and legislative branches, civil society groups and the media. Interviews
were supplemented by a review of budget documentation, audit reports, policy papers
and legislation. A peer review group was established in each country to check the
results. The group published its study, Budget Transparency and Participation: Five African
Case Studies, in June 2002.
The study finds that aspects of transparency and participation in the budget process
are weak in each country, though there are important differences (see Figure 24.1). In
South Africa, the researchers consider the legal framework ‘good’, due to the compre-
hensive overhaul of the budget process undertaken since 1994. The legal frameworks
in Kenya and Ghana are also viewed positively, but their effectiveness is weakened by
a number of factors. Kenya’s framework is outdated and in conflict with government
attempts to improve budget management while Ghana’s is compromised by official
secrets legislation. In Zambia and Nigeria, the legal frameworks are judged to be ‘weak’.
The budget laws in Zambia allow for almost limitless expenditure with approval after
the fact and require little information to be published. In Nigeria, they can be contra-
dictory and ambiguous, confusing responsibility for budget management.
Good
South
Africa
Legal framework
Moderate
Ghana
Kenya
Nigeria
Weak
Zambia
Note
1. Joel Friedman is a senior fellow at the International Budget Project (IBP) at the Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, United States. At the IBP, contact: Joel Friedman
(friedman@cbpp.org) or Pamela Gomez (gomez@cbpp.org). On the Africa study, contact:
Marritt Claassens (marritt@idasact.org.za).
Assessing the causes of corruption is difficult with real world data, given problems of
inference.2 In an experiment we can overcome these problems through controlling the
environment in which people act. The use of experiments in economics is a growing
field. In the past economists were largely sceptical of the approach, but experimental
economists have recently shown that their results hold both in different societies and
when the stakes are raised. Indeed the 2002 Nobel Prize in economics was awarded to
Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith for their pioneering experimental investigations.
The game
The experiment involved a game with eight players who, at different times, played the
role of voters, the executive and the attorney general. The incentives that players faced
were designed to mimic those in the real world. Participants played for real stakes: at
the end of a session, each player was allowed to take home his winnings from one
randomly selected round of the 12 rounds played. The average take-home winnings
were approximately US $25 per player for a two-hour session. The six-round game was
played 24 times in total, generating 144 observations, with the experimental design
changing between games. The set of players was changed 12 times.
The basic idea of the game is as follows:
• The executive distributes six tiles to the voters. It is up to him how many of the
valuable tiles he corruptly keeps for himself.
• The attorney general may then attempt to expose corruption by turning over up
to four of the tiles kept by the executive. The executive keeps any valuable tiles
that he successfully hides, while nobody gains from those that are exposed. To
mimic the effort involved in being vigilant, the more tiles the attorney general
turns over, the more he must pay from his own wage. The attorney general’s
efforts may be rewarded through re-election or through election to the executive.
• The executive (and, in some games, the attorney general too) stands for re-election,
and another round is played. The game involves six successive rounds.
We decomposed accountability into one factor that influenced the cost of being caught,
wages while in office, and two factors that determined the probability of being caught,
transparency and the separation of powers. Hence, three variables were used to test the
effects on corruption of these components of accountability:
• Half the games were played with high wages and half with low wages.
• The total number of tiles distributed to the executive varied: the larger the total
number, the more difficult it was for the attorney general to expose corruption.
One-third of the games were played with 10 tiles in total (high transparency), one-
third with 14 (medium transparency) and one-third with 22 (low transparency).
• In half the games the attorney general was elected (separation of powers); in half
he was appointed by the executive (no separation of powers).
Each of the findings has important real-world parallels and implications. There is a
continuing debate about the importance of high wages in reducing corruption. Some
anecdotal accounts suggest an effect. For instance, a devaluation that dramatically
lowered the real wages of government officials in Cameroon was reportedly followed
by a sharp increase in corruption. Our findings (result 2) confirm this anecdotal evidence
in an experimental setting: higher wages reduced corruption.
1.2
0.8
Wages
0.6 High
Low
0.4
0.2
0
High Medium Low
(10 tiles) (14 tiles) (22 tiles)
Transparency
a The average number of valuable tiles per round was 3.6, of which the executive on average chose to keep 0.46.
30
25
Number of observations
20 Selection of
(max. 72)
attorney
general
15
Elected
10 Appointed
0
0 1 2 3 4
Low High
Vigilance of the attorney general
(no. of tiles turned over)
a The average number of tiles turned over per round by the attorney general was 2.6.
In almost all countries the attorney general is appointed by the executive and has
weak incentives to investigate the executive branch of government. It is very difficult,
using real world data, to evaluate the impact on corruption of direct elections for
attorney general, given the lack of examples. Within the United States, of the 50 attorney
generals at state-level, 44 are directly elected and six appointed. But the small number
appointed and the poor quality of corruption data for US states make conventional
analysis difficult. However, it is possible to examine this issue with experimental data.
Our findings (result 4) indicate that elected attorney generals are more vigilant than
appointed attorney generals.
Experimental data does suffer from a lack of environmental validity. Situations
created in the laboratory imperfectly mimic real world situations and the stakes are usually
much lower. In future, we hope to conduct corruption experiments in developing
countries where the greater prevalence of corruption, and our ability to provide stakes
equal to several days’ wages, will improve the credibility of our results. We invite
potential collaborators to contact us.
Notes
1. Omar Azfar is research associate at the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal
Sector at the University of Maryland, United States. Contact: omar@iris.econ.umd.edu.
William Robert Nelson Jr is assistant professor in the University at Buffalo School of
Management, United States. Contact: wrnelson@buffalo.edu
2. The problems of inference include overlapping definitions, reverse causality, co-linearity
and omitted variable bias.
If women are less corrupt than men, as is commonly believed, increasing women’s rep-
resentation in public employment should reduce corruption in public organisations.
Very little is known, however, about possible connections between corruption and
women’s participation in government. Two previous studies have explored whether
corruption is connected with women’s share in a country’s labour force and women’s
representation in parliament.2 Our focus was public sector organisations; this study
examined whether corruption in public sector organisations is linked to the percentage
of women employed in them.
The investigation relied on survey responses from nearly 4,000 public officials in
90 public sector organisations in six countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Guyana,
Indonesia and Moldova. Officials employed by public organisations were asked about
their institutional environment, including the severity of corruption and the probability
of it being reported.3 We used survey responses to calculate corruption indicators for
each public organisation. We then checked the organisation’s corruption level against
the percentage of women it employs.
Recognising that responding officials were reporting perceptions on a sensitive
issue, we checked the reliability of officials’ self-reported perceptions with TI’s 2001
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which is not based on self-reporting. As Table 26.1
shows, we found that public officials’ perceptions correlated well with the CPI. We also
checked for other biases, such as women systematically under- or overestimating
corruption: as Table 26.1 indicates, we found that the perception of female public
officials was very similar to that of male officials.
Percentage of women in
the institutions surveyed 42 29 68 60 26 44 47
Perceptions of corruption
TI CPI 3.5 2.0 3.9 – 1.9 3.1 –
Percentage of all officials who
reported that corruption is a
significant problem 62 88 50 32 93 73 67
Percentage of female officials
who reported that corruption
is a significant problem 61 87 53 34 93 76 62
We found that a statistically significant relation exists between gender and corruption
in public sector organisations. The level of corruption declines initially as the percentage
of women in an organisation increases, but only if women continue to be in the
minority. After a certain threshold, increasing the proportion of women actually
reverses the trend of reduced corruption: corruption increases as women become more
of a majority in an organisation, as is summarised in Figure 26.1. In other words,
having too few or too many women is associated with an increase in the severity of
corruption. Rather, a balance between women and men appears to minimise corruption
in an organisation.
100
Percentage of officials who reported that
corruption is a significant problem
Indonesia
Bolivia
75
Moldova
Argentina
50 Bulgaria
Guyana
25
25 50 75
Figure 26.2 shows that, in four of the six sampled public sectors (Argentina, Bulgaria,
Guyana and Indonesia), organisations with lower-than-average numbers of women
had higher corruption levels than organisations with a higher-than-average proportion
of women. The reverse was found to be true in Bolivia and Moldova. However, when
all 90 public sector organisations – from all six countries – were pooled, we found that
organisations with lower representation of women had more corruption than organi-
sations with higher representation of women.
These findings suggest that countries with a low proportion of women in the
workforce (Argentina, Guyana, Bolivia and Indonesia among the six countries that we
studied) may benefit from increasing the proportion of women in public organisations.
But, in countries that already have a fairly large percentage of women in public
employment (Bulgaria and Moldova in our study), recruiting more women might
increase corruption in public organisations.
2
Severity of corruption (in standard deviations
1.5 1.36
from the national average)
1 0.80
0.59 0.61
0.53
0.5
0.14 Low
0 High
–1.5
–1.54
–2
Argentina Bolivia Bulgaria Guyana Indonesia Moldova
Figure 26.2: Severity of corruption in public organisations with higher or lower than average
number of female officials
A possible explanation for this conclusion is that corruption levels may have more
to do with group dynamics than with gender. We also recognise that the direction of
causality might in fact be the reverse of what is often hypothesised: corruption might
actually be the cause of an imbalance in the representation of men and women in the
public sector.
Notes
1. Ranjana Mukherjee works in the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network
at the World Bank. Contact: rmukherjee@worldbank.org. Omer Gokcekus is at the John
C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University,
United States. Contact: gokcekom@shu.edu
2. D. Dollar, R. Fisman and R. Gatti, ‘Are Women Really the “Fairer” Sex? Corruption and
Women in Government’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 46 (2001);
A. Swamy, S. Knack, Y. Lee and O. Azfar, ‘Gender and Corruption’, Journal of Development
Economics, vol. 64 (2001).
3. See www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/surveys.htm
a probit model was designed to ascertain various factors that might influence the
attitude of the representatives towards rent seeking – gender was not found to be a
significant factor. Instead, factors that were found to affect attitudes towards corruption
were the effectiveness of transparency and accountability measures, the risk of getting
caught and punished, and the size of election expenses.
There was a difference in the attitude of representatives between Kerala and Karnataka:
views from Kerala were less openly supportive of corruption. This finding may be linked
to the higher levels of civil society participation in Kerala, which, while not necessarily
reducing the prevalence of corruption, could discourage elected representatives from
expressing tolerance of corruption.
Conclusion
The findings indicate that having women in elected positions does not reduce the level
of corruption, even when the findings were controlled for panchayats where women
were presidents or chairpersons. The evidence suggests that women too exhibit
profiteering tendencies when acting as officials or elected representatives.
Notes
1. V. Vijayalakshmi is project coordinator of Decentralised Governance, Representation
and People’s Participation at the Institute for Social and Economic Change, India. Contact:
vijayalakshmi@vsnl.com
2. For a more detailed discussion, see V. Vijayalakshmi, ‘Rent Seeking and Gender in Local
Governance’, paper presented at the Conference on Re/constructing Corruption, University
of East Anglia, Britain, April 2003; and ‘Corruption and Local Governance: Evidence
from Karnataka’, paper presented at the seminar on Lok Ayukta and Governance, at
ISEC, Bangalore, India, 28 June 2003. This study is a part of a research programme on
decentralised governance and civil society, carried out at the Institute for Social and
Economic Change, Bangalore, India, and financially supported by the Ford Foundation.
Household surveys are the best way to gauge the population’s view of corruption.
During the last quarter of 2002, a module on governance, corruption and citizen par-
ticipation was introduced into a survey on living conditions of Peruvian households
(ENAHO), which was carried out by Peru’s National Statistics Institute, or INEI.2
Three main characteristics distinguish this survey from prior efforts to measure
corruption in Peruvian households. First, its sample size and geographic scope are quite
superior to those of other surveys on the subject: nearly 20,000 households were
surveyed on the basis of a departmentally representative household survey design.3
Second, matching the module on corruption with other information collected by the
ENAHO – such as income, expenses, social programmes, human capital and physical
assets, work and economic activity – opens many possibilities for the analysis of
corruption. Finally, the fact that the INEI conducted the survey and addressed such
questions for the first time ensures that the data is treated as a public good and that a
true institutionalisation process may be launched countrywide.
The corruption section of the ENAHO survey differs from other surveys in two
additional respects. First, instead of being limited to heads of households, it is repre-
sentative of the whole population aged 18 years or older. As a result, we can identify
who is more vulnerable to corruption by considering gender and youth issues in
particular. Second, the survey features a detailed assessment of whether household
members have had any contact with public institutions during the last year. Based on
this information, estimates of the incidence and cost of corruption can be restricted to
individuals who have made use of public institutions. Since poor people have less access
to public services, estimates of the incidence of corruption and its costs are usually
upward-biased. The study also investigates whether households reported corruption cases
in which they were victims, or their reasons for not complaining. Information on
income and expenditures gathered for each household were used to investigate whether
poorer households were more or less prone to becoming victims of corruption.
In answer to an open question on the issue, households responded that
unemployment and poverty were the country’s two main problems (74 per cent and
61 per cent, respectively). Corruption was third, with 32 per cent, far ahead of other
problem areas, such as government transparency and credibility, the quality of public
education, and crime.
As Table 28.1 shows, the percentage of individuals residing in households in which
at least one member had been a victim of corruption in 2002 was 5.2 per cent. If the
15 per cent who had no contact with public institutions are excluded, the incidence
of corruption reached 6.1 per cent. The amounts paid by households to corrupt civil
servants represented 0.4 per cent of their total expenses, and 1.1 per cent with respect
to their food expenses. This amount is far from negligible, representing approximately
one-third of government transfers to households through anti-poverty social
programmes.
a The table reflects the number of individuals residing in a household in which at least one member has been a
victim of corruption.
b The difference between poor and non-poor is significant at 1 per cent.
Source: estimate by authors based on ENAHO 2002, IV quarter, INEI, 18,598 households.
As the table also shows, corruption in Peru seems to affect the poor less than the
non-poor, contrary to common expectations. More generally, the incidence of corruption
increases according to the standard of living. Two factors qualify this finding, however.
Firstly, corruption is a root cause for differential access to public services, as it generally
discourages individuals who are less equipped to protect their rights – the poor. Secondly,
although the absolute average cost of corruption and its relative budgetary pressure (as
a percentage of food expenditures) appear to weigh heavier on non-poor households,
poor households are not meeting food, health, education and other essential
requirements partly because of the direct cost of corruption. For the poor, the marginal
utility of one nuevo sol (about US $0.30) paid or extorted as a bribe is thus greater than
for the non-poor.
The institutions in charge of fighting corruption, namely the judiciary and the
police, were found to be precisely those in which the most corruption cases occurred
(accounting for 31 per cent and 15 per cent of cases, respectively). Higher proportions
of cases of judicial and police corruption were found to affect the poor. It is thus not
surprising that the judiciary and the police were among the five institutions of which
Peruvians were most critical in the survey: respectively 65 per cent and 58 per cent had
little or no confidence in them.4 These findings may help explain why nine out of 10
victims of corruption did not denounce the acts to which they fell prey, especially
because of a fear of reprisals. For this reason, insufficient government action in response
to corruption penalises the poor more than the non-poor.
Not surprisingly, the survey found that more than one-third of the population
considered corruption to have worsened between 2001 and 2002, despite the mechanisms
put in place to fight it, as opposed to barely 15 per cent who thought otherwise. Sig-
nificantly, the poor were less optimistic than the non-poor regarding the fight against
corruption.
Notes
1. Javier Herrera works at Peru’s National Statistics Institute. Contact: jherrera@inei.gob.pe.
François Roubaud is an economist at DIAL and director of the research unit CIPRE at the
Institut de recherche pour le développement, France. Contact: roubaud@dial.prd.fr
2. The module was adapted from surveys 1–2–3 conducted by DIAL, a European public
research centre based in Paris and dedicated to applied economic research in developing
countries; see www.dial.prd.fr
3. Only about 1,000 households were surveyed for the Latinobarómetro; the Apoyo survey
focused on 5,122 households.
4. The other three institutions are political parties, parliament and trade unions.
Corruption incidence
(% of total adult population) 8.1 8.4 8.7 9.1 10.3 10.9 16.5
No contact with the
administration (%) 33.0 23.5 43.1 41.1 37.3 19.0 28.7
Corruption incidence
(% of those in contact
with the administration) 12.1 11.0 15.3 15.5 16.4 13.4 23.1
Notes
1. Mireille Razafindrakoto is an economist at DIAL (Développement et insertion interna-
tionale), France. Contact: razafindrakoto@dial.prd.fr. François Roubaud is also an economist
at DIAL and director of the research unit CIPRE at the Institut de recherche pour le
développement, France. Contact: roubaud@dial.prd.fr
2. Surveys were conducted in Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey and
Ouagadougou.
3. The greater extent of corruption in Abidjan was found to be significant at the 1 per cent
level.
4. A few exceptional cases include the Jola in Dakar, who are relatively spared for reasons
that need to be explored in detail.
Index
Compiled by Sue Carlton
Abacha, Sani 2, 11, 13, 69, 101–2, 113 Berlusconi, Silvio 1, 97–9, 114
Abdullah, Ali 212 Bermuda 69
access to information 4, 6–7, 22, 146, 151, Bhutto, Benazir 2, 89, 102–4
183, 197, 226–7, 232, 247, 273–4, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA),
279–80, 326–32, 333–6, see also budget United States 25–6, 28, 266
transparency; disclosure Bolaños, Enrique 221, 222–3
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Bolivia 6, 32, 33, 34, 35, 308, 335, 337–9
Rights 117, 119 Bosnia and Herzegovina 288
African Union Convention against Botswana 331
Corruption 3, 116–21 Brazil 4, 163–6, 331; campaign airtime 50,
Akayev, Askar 90, 206, 207, 208, 209 57; and FDI 313; and political finance 28,
Alemán, Arnoldo 2, 13, 93, 221–2, 223 33, 34, 35; and vote buying 76, 78–9, 81
Algeria 3, 143–6 Bribe Payers Index 143, 290
Aliyev, Heydar 159, 160–1, 162 bribery 12, 30, 59–60, 222; foreign 17,
Amnesty International 95, 117 128–35, 197, 200, 211–12; in private
Andhra Pradesh 319–21 sector 132–3, see also Elf scandal; illicit
Angola 69, 70 enrichment; OECD Anti-Bribery
Arafat, Yasser 228, 229, 230 Convention
Argentina 4, 32, 146–50, 331, 337–9; and FDI Britain 53, 54, 55, 60, 69, 102, 129, 317
313; and political finance 33, 34, 35, 42, British Virgin Islands 69
146, 288; and vote buying 77, 78, 79, 80 budget transparency 330–2
Armenia 150–4 Bulgaria 3, 54, 166–70, 298–9, 337–9
arms trade 2–3, 14, 59–67, 259 Burkina Faso 117, 246, 331
Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal 238, 239, 240 Burundi 4, 170–3
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Bush, George 2, 135–6, 266
Agreement, Burundi 170–1
assets: disclosure of 16, 28, 52–3, 181, Cameroon 288, 289, 331, 335
219–20, 228, 238–9; recovery of 12, 14, Canada 6, 28, 56, 72–3, 129, 131
17, 89, 100–6, 113, 119, 197, 222 Caspian Revenue Watch project 205
auditing: financial markets 189–90; political Cayman Islands 69
party finance 53–4, 298; public Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 23, 24,
companies 133, 266, 267; reforms 133, 25, 122, 124, 125, 126
159, 170–1, 174, 258, 266 Channel Islands 69
Australia 4, 53, 155–8 Chile 34, 35, 50, 57, 173–7, 331
Azerbaijan 28, 93, 158–63, 207 Chiluba, Frederick 4, 93, 272–3
China 30, 177–81, 313
Bakir-uulu, Tursunbai 207, 208 civil service 123–4, 240, 242, 246
Bangladesh 300–1 civil society 6, 7, 15, 38, 163, 251, 252; and
banking: and illegal wealth 100, 101, 102, Armenia’s anti-corruption programme
105, 197, 204; money laundering 69, 152; and budget transparency research
144, 164–5, 207, 211, 237–8, 240; 330–2; and Chile’s anti-corruption
reforms 185 programme 176; and Kazakhstan’s oil
Benin 346–7 revenues 204–5; and media regulation
Index 349
TI 06 index 6/1/04 16:12 Page 350
235; NGO disclosure-monitoring projects embezzlement 2, 13, 118–19, 197, 212, 221,
50–1; and regulation of political finance 222, 228
2, 17, 46, 50–3; role in AU convention energy sector 3, 14, 59, 67–71, 74, 204–5,
117, 118, 120–1; role in OECD see also Elf scandal; Enron
convention 134–5; transparency 269–70 Enron 2, 74, 114, 267
Colombia 32, 33, 35, 77, 289, 292–4, 331 Estonia 123, 125, 323–5
conflicts of interest 1, 5, 12, 16, 39, 70, 122, Estrada, Joseph 13
126, 151, 221, 228, 231, 238, 246, 264–5 European Union: accession process 121–7;
construction 3, 62–3, 145, 160, 194–5 anti-corruption policies 123–7; and fraud
Copenhagen criteria 122, 123, 125, 127 124; and public procurement 123, 124,
corporate governance 134, 156, 260–1, 266, 126, 255
267–9 Expo 2010 179
corruption, definitions of 118–19 extortion 133–4, 160, 300–1
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 4, 122, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
143, 277–8, 282–7, 302, 307, 310, (EITI) 70
313–14, 325, 337 extradition 2, 12, 89, 91–2, 185, 189;
Costa Rica 28, 33, 49–50, 181–4, 331 bilateral agreements 92, 113, 200, see also
Côte d’Ivoire 346–7 Fujimori, Alberto
Council of Europe: Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption 124, 127; Federal Election Commission (FEC), United
Group of States against Corruption States 55, 74
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 211, 224,
(GRECO) 124, 125, 127, 194
237–8, 247
Croatia 288
Finland 32, 40, 131
customs 151, 174, 202, 232
foreign direct investment (FDI) 4, 313–15
France 3, 60, 189–93; Elf scandal 23, 63–4;
Democratic Republic of Congo 100, 116, see
and immunity rules 90–1, 93; and
also Mobuto Sese Seko
Khalifa affair 144; political finance 53,
Denmark 32
54, 55; public procurement 125, 191–2
Devaud, Daniel 102–4
FSU nations (Former Soviet Union) 44,
disclosure: of assets 16, 28, 52–3, 181,
323–5
219–20, 228, 238–9; of political finance
Fujimori, Alberto 2, 13, 77, 91, 94–5, 114,
5, 12, 14, 16, 27, 38–53, 74 200, 233–5
Djindjic, Zoran 254, 255
Dominica 87, 88 Gabon 68, 69
donations, to political parties 1, 22–3, 30–2, gender 280, 337–9, 340–2
182–3, 224, 259 Georgia 289
drug trafficking 75, 94 Germany 3, 129, 131, 317; and Elf scandal
Dumas, Roland 63–4, 68, 191 64–5; political finance 53, 54, 55, 125
Duvalier, Jean-Claude 13, 91 Ghana 116, 328, 330–1
Gibraltar 69
East Asia 50, 83–8 Global Corruption Barometer 12, 281,
Ecuador 32–3, 35, 51–2, 331 288–91
Egypt 4, 41, 184–8 Global Organization of Parliamentarians
El Salvador 308, 331 Against Corruption (GOPAC) 36
elections: campaign finance 5, 12–14, 16, Global Witness 69, 70
20, 25–6, 34–5, 41–2, 152–4, 195, 246–7, governance, measuring quality of 302–6,
298–9; and media 49–50; monitoring of 319–22
50–3; political corruption 212–13; vote Greece 1–2, 32, 93, 124, 125, 193–6; and
buying 14, 17, 20, 24, 76–88 Olympic Games 2004 194–5
Elf scandal 3, 23, 59, 70, 125, 191; arms Guatemala 32, 50, 93, 196–9
dimension of 63–5; investigations 67–9 Guyana 337–9
Haiti 91, see also Duvalier, Jean-Claude Kyrgyz Republic 2, 4, 90, 93, 206–10
Honduras 32, 308
Hong Kong 288, 316, 317, 335 Latin America 6, 331; corruption victimisa-
human rights 7–8, 12, 117, 264 tion scale 307–9; media access 49–50;
Hungary 47, 54 and political finance reform 24, 25, 32–5,
54, 56–7; and vote buying 76–80, 82–3
illicit enrichment 68, 118–19, 181, 197, 222 Latvia 47, 50–1, 323–5
immunity laws 2, 12, 14, 89–91, 174, 194, Lebanon 210–14
196, 207, 218; bilateral immunity Lithuania 47, 323–5
agreements 92; Italy 95–7; Mali 215; lobbying, regulation of 72–3, 147, 174, 233
Nicaragua 221–2; recent developments Lula da Silva, Luis Inácio 4, 164, 165
93; Uganda 263–4, see also Alemán,
Arnoldo; Chiluba, Frederick; Fujimori, McCain-Feingold-Cochran Bill 25–6, 28,
Alberto 266
India 52–3, 240–2, 289, 300–1, 319–22 Madagascar 32, 91, 346–7
Indonesia 1, 288, 289, 337–9 Malaysia 288
information see access to information Mali 214–17, 346–7
Institute for Democracy in South Africa Marcos, Ferdinand 13, 101, 113
(Idasa) 22, 260, 330 media: corruption investigations 209;
Integrity Index for Public Institutions 292–4 ownership 1, 4, 156–7, 212, 243; political
International Budget Project (IBP) 330 advertising 5, 17, 49–50, 51, 56–7, 153,
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 212–13; press freedom 147, 172–3,
133, 134 185–6, 209, 213, 226; regulation 34,
international financial institutions (IFIs) 5, 97–9, 122, 127, 151, 234–5, 253, 272,
17, 116–17 273–4; role in AU convention 120
International Foundation for Election Mexico 2, 47, 55–7, 288, 313, 331; and vote
Systems (IFES) 44, 47 buying 76–7, 78, 79–80, 82
International Whaling Commission (IWC) military 161–2, 171–2, 247, see also arms
87–8 trade
Internet: electronic government 174, 237; Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) 3,
Palestinian Authority financial reports 135–42, 277, 305; debate about 141–2;
230; political finance reports 47, 56 selection procedure 136–41
Iraq 60, 62, 63 Milosevic, Slobodan 13
Ireland 32, 125 Mitterand, François 63–4, 68, 191
Isle of Man 69 Mobuto Sese Seko 13, 91, 100, 113, 116
Israel 54, 289 Moldova 337–9
Italy 32, 54, 125; control of media 1, 97–9; money laundering 17, 69, 247, 267; AU
immunity laws 2, 93, 95–7 convention and 119; measures to combat
144, 164–5, 207, 211, 224, 232, 237–8,
Japan 54, 62, 199–201, 288; corruption 240, 242; Nicaragua 222–3, see also
scandals 201; foreign bribery 200; and Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
Fujimori 2, 91, 94–5, 200; vote buying at Mongolia 200
IWC 87–8 Montesinos, Vladimiro 94, 233, 235
Jordan 32 Mozambique 57–8
judiciary: independence of 4, 147–9, 187–8, Mubarak, Hosni 4, 185–6, 187
233; and judicial corruption 178–9, multinational companies 32–3; foreign
187–8, 206, 227, 233, 288 subsidiaries 131–2
Mwanawasa, Levy 271, 272, 273
Kazakhstan 28, 69, 90, 161, 202–5, 207
Kenya 19, 28, 36, 330 Namibia 331
Khalifa Group affair 144–5 Nepal 93, 217–20, 300–1
King Code for Corporate Governance 260–1 nepotism 235–6, 256, 259
Index 351
TI 06 index 6/1/04 16:12 Page 352
Netherlands 125, 289, 317 monitoring 48; new legislation 146, 163,
New Zealand, and IWC 88 174, 195, 203–4, 217–18, 228, 232, 237,
Nicaragua 2, 4, 93, 221–3, 308–9, 331, see 243–5, 266; public funding 24–5, 28, 29,
also Alemán, Arnoldo 33–4, 182, 272; regulation 1–2, 6–7,
Niger 346–7 21–2, 24–9, 32–4; standards 16–17;
Nigeria 2, 69, 101–2, 224–7, 288, 330–1; transparency 34–5, 119, 127, 232, 298–9;
freedom of information campaign 226–7, types of corruption 20, 22
see also Abacha, Sani political parties 28, 150–1, 159, 202, 203–4,
Norway 289 217, 288
Portugal 53
Obasanjo, Olusegun 2, 102, 225, 226 poverty 5, 6, 21–2, 280–1, 288, 343–5
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 3, 5, 17, press freedom 147, 172–3, 185–6, 209, 213,
65, 115, 128–35, 200, 279, 317; Business 226
and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) private sector 2–3, 12, 14, 23, 132–3
134; Trade Union Advisory Committee privatisation 170, 203, 210
(TUAC) 134 procurement/public contracting 3–4, 62–3;
oil industry 3, 67–71, 161, 204–5, see also new legislation 143, 159, 166, 168, 174,
Elf scandal; energy sector; Sonangol; 177, 191–2, 199, 237, 251–2, 253, 255–6,
Yukos affair 262
Olympic Games: 2004 194–5; 2008 179, public works see construction
180 Publish What You Pay (PWYP) 69–70
ombudsmen 151, 168, 193–4, 202, 206, Putin, Vladimir 62, 246, 247, 248
207–8, 238, 239, 253
Open Society Institute (OSI) 122, 205, 295 reconstruction, post-war see construction;
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 116, procurement/public contracting
117 Road Map to Peace 229
OSCE (Organization for Security and Romania 32, 47, 123
Cooperation in Europe) 98, 208; and Russia 54, 62, 69, 112, 246–50, 295–7,
Joint Task Force (JTF) 152 323–5
Rywin affair 243
Pakistan 2, 102–4, 300–1, 313
Palestinian Authority 228–32 Samoa 94
Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF) 230, 231 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 133, 266, 267–8
Panama 32, 80, 222 Scott Report 1996, Britain 60
Paraguay 32–3, 34, 35 Senegal 3, 250–3, 346–7
Peru 232–7, 288, 328, 331; and extradition Serbia 3, 253–7
of Fujimori 2, 94–5, 200; political finance Singapore 32, 316, 335
32, 34, 35, 48; poverty and corruption 5, Slovakia 207
343–5 Slovenia 123, 125
Philippines 32, 101, 237–41, 335; and vote Sonangol 70
buying 83–5 Soros Foundation 48, 51, 295, see also Open
La Pietra Recommendations 132 Society Institute (OSI)
Poland 23, 242–5, 288 South Africa 3, 19, 21–2, 258–61, 289, 331;
police 248–9, 258, 272, 288, 301 arms scandal 59, 60–2, 259; and Elf
political corruption: definitions of 1, 11, 21, scandal 64
22–3; global comparison 30–2; impact of South Asia 5, 300–1
11–12; and prosecution 2, 11, 12, 14, Southern African Development Community
89–97, see also extradition; immunity (SADC) Protocol against Corruption 120
political finance 13–14, 19–37, 68, 182–3; Spain 54, 124
Armenia 152–4; disclosure 5, 12, 14, 16, Sri Lanka 300–1
27, 28–9, 38–53, 74; enforcement 12, 14, state capture 24, 29, 122
16, 17, 27, 29, 53–8; international Suharto, Mohamed 1, 11, 13
Index 353