The Operational Capability of PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula

Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government

Philippine Public Safety College
NATIONAL POLICE COLLEGE
Camp General Mariano N Castañeda,
Silang, Cavite
THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

POLICE ANTI–KIDNAPPING GROUP MINDANAO FIELD UNIT IN
COUNTERING KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM ACTIVITIES BY ABU SAYYAF
GROUP IN ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA
An Action Research Project

Presented to the Faculty of the National Police College
Camp General Mariano N Castañeda, Silang, Cavite
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Public Safety Officers Advance Course (PSOAC)
Class 2018-05
Submitted by:
PSINSP ARCELIA O BAS

PSINSP MARITES B BUENAFLOR
PSINSP ELMAR R CLARET
PSINSP HELEN L DELA CRUZ
PSINSP MIKE D DIAZ
PSINSP RICHARD JOHN DM MACACHOR
PSINSP ANGELITA D NASTOR
PSINSP VICENTE P TARIAO, JR
November 2018
DISCLAIMER
This is an official document of the Philippine Public Safety College.
Quotations from, counteraction, or reproduction of all or any part of this
document is not authorized without the specific permission/approval of the
Philippine Public Safety College.
The opinions, ideas, and proposals expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the official views of the Philippine
Public Safety College, or any other government agency. Any reference to this
work should include the foregoing statement.
PSINSP ARCELIA O BAS

PSINSP MARITES B BUENAFLOR
PSINSP ELMAR R CLARET
PSINSP HELEN L DELA CRUZ
PSINSP MIKE D DIAZ
PSINSP RICHARD JOHN DM MACACHOR
PSINSP ANGELITA D NASTOR
PSINSP VICENTE P TARIAO, JR
PSOAC Class 2018-05
i
APPROVAL SHEET
This Action Research Project entitled, “THE OPERATIONAL

CAPABILITY OF THE PNP ANTI–KIDNAPPING GROUP MINDANAO FIELD
UNIT IN COUNTERING KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM ACTIVITIES BY ABU
SAYYAF GROUP IN ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA” prepared and submitted by
PSINSP ARCELIA O BAS, PSINSP MARITES B BUENAFLOR, PSINSP
ELMAR R CLARET, PSINSP HELEN L DELA CRUZ, PSINSP MIKE D DIAZ,
PSINSP RICHARD JOHN DM MACACHOR, PSINSP ANGELITA D NASTOR,
and PSINSP VICENTE JR P TARIAO in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for Public Safety Officer Advance Course Class 2018-05, is hereby
recommended for approval.
PCSUPT RANDOLF REVITA DELFIN (Ret)

Chairman
DR. ROY R. CORREO PROF. MA. COSELYN R. SANTOS

Member Member
Accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for Public Safety

Officers Advance Course (PSOAC) Class 2018-05 with a grade of _______.
DR. ROMEO SEVILLA MAGSALOS

Director II / Dean
November 2018
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The completion of the research was made possible through the
assistance of many people whose name may not all be enumerated. Their
contributions are sincerely appreciated and gratefully acknowledged. Further,
the group would like to express their appreciation and indebtedness to the
following:
First and foremost to the Great Almighty, the author of the knowledge
and wisdom, for His countless love and blessings.
Their families, relatives, friends, and others who shared their moral and
financial support.
Prof. LLANA BARRO, Arch. KA KUEN CHUA, and Prof. MA. COSELYN
R. SANTOS for their endless support, kindness, and understanding during the
completion of the research.
The Director of the National Police College, Dr. ROMEO S. MAGSALOS,
for the approval, support and inspiration for the completion of this action
research.
PCSUPT GLENN DUMLAO, Director of the Anti-Kidnapping Group for
his approval to conduct this action research with his area of operation.
The AKG Mindanao Field Unit personnel led by PSSUPT RONALD
JOSEPH V OCAYA for welcoming them and giving all the necessary data and
documents needed pertaining to this research and imparted their time and
knowledge for consultation and advice.
All the respondents for making themselves available during the conduct
of the study in answering the survey questionnaire. We thank you!
iii
ABSTRACT
The study aimed to determine the status of the operational capability of
the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit (AKG MFU) in countering
Kidnapping-for-Ransom Activities (KFR) by Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of manpower, logistical, strategic and tactical,
and stakeholders’ collaboration capabilities.
The study utilized 207 respondents composed of 56 PNP personnel, 74
staff members of non-government organizations/civic organizations, and 77
KFR victims and/or relatives.
Based on the findings of the study, the following are the conclusions: A
grand mean of Effective was obtained as to Operational Capabilities of PNP
AKG MFU in countering KFR activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula, it was
concluded that there were some factors noted by the respondents that affect
the AKG MFU capability in response to KFR group.
The problems encountered by the of PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR
activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula were translated into verbal
interpretation of serious, affects the whole group having insufficient fund to train
personnel to be utilized in the operation and investigation of cases and the
allocation of the needed equipment used in the conduct of police operations.
The proposed measures to address the problems encountered by the
PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
attained a grand mean of Highly Recommended. The appropriate measures be
adopted to answer the problems encountered to update the knowledge and
skills of the police and able to establish well-coordinated police operations to
improve their efforts in fighting kidnap for ransom groups in Zamboanga
iv
Peninsula complemented with enough fund to establish a low level rate of
kidnapping incidents and maintain peace and order in the community.
The implementation of the proposed Action Plan to enhance the
effectiveness of the of PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities by ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula through manpower competence enhancement program,
strengthened logistical resources for police operation, networking and alliance
building towards rescue operations, and team building to foster cooperation and
revitalization of the anti – kidnap for ransom strategy towards a holistic
approach against kidnapping syndicates in Zamboanga Peninsula to fine tune
the present anti – kidnapping strategy of the group and to make it more
responsive and relevant in the continuing fight against kidnap for ransom group.
The study recommends that in order to improve the level of operational
capabilities of the PNP AKG MFU, it is necessary to enhance the knowledge
and operational performance of the police officers in countering kidnap for
ransom group’s activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula.
The seriousness of the problems encountered need to priorities as they
affect the overall responsiveness of the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR
activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula. The group requires motivation on
their personnel to become more dedicated and committed with their functions
to ensure a strong all-out campaign against kidnap for ransom group.
The proposed measures to enhance the responsiveness of the PNP Anti
– Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in fight against kidnap for ransom
groups require priority concern. Sufficient fund to pursue with the career
development program of the organization among individual personnel of the
AKG MFU has to be given emphasis, equipped with specialized equipment will
lead to higher quality of work in their field of work.
v
In the light of the findings and conclusion of the study, the researchers
strongly recommend the adoption and implementation of the action plan to
strengthen the operational responsiveness of the PNP AKG MFU in countering
KFR activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula and to sustain operation
against criminal gangs, terrorist threat groups, and other individuals.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page
Disclaimer Page i
Approval Sheet ii
Acknowledgement iii
Abstract iv
Table of Contents vii
List of Tables viii
List of Figures x
List of Appendices x
List of Acronyms xi
CHAPTER 1. THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND
Background of the Study 1
Conceptual Paradigm 7
Research Questions 11
Scope and Delimitations 12
Significance of the Study 13
Definition of Terms 14
CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND
STUDIES
Review of Related Literature and Studies 18
Synthesis and Gaps 32
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
Research Design 38
Locale of the Study 38
Respondents of the Study 45
Data Gathering Procedures 47
Data Gathering Instruments 48
Data Analysis 49
CHAPTER 4. PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND
INTERPRETATION OF DATA
Data Presentation, Analysis and Interpretation 52
CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATION
Summary 114
Conclusions 118
Recommendations 119
Action Plan 121
BIBLIOGRAPHY 131
APPENDICES 135
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 150
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table No. Title Pages

1 Victims by Nationality Calendar Year 2013 – 2016 6
2 Category of Respondents 13
3 Ten-Year Kidnap-for-Ransom Cases Perpetrated 43
by Anti-Kidnapping Group by Region (2006 - 2016)
4 Personnel Strength of AKG- Mindanao Field Unit 45
5 Respondents of the Study 46
6 Likert – Scale Table for Respondents’ Assessment 50
on the Operational Capability of PNP AKG MFU in
Countering KFR Activities of ASG in Zamboanga
Peninsula in terms of Stakeholders Collaboration
Capability
7 Likert –Scale Table for Respondents’ Assessment 50
on the Problems Encountered by the PNP AKG
MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Manpower
Capability
8 Likert –Scale Table for Respondents’ Assessment 51
on the Problems Encountered by the PNP AKG
MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Logistical
Capability
9 Respondents’ Assessment on the Operational 53
Capability of the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR
activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula in terms
of Manpower Capability
Capability of the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR
of Logistical Capability
Capability of PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR
of Strategic and Tactical Capability
of Stakeholders Collaboration Capability
13 Summary Assessment on the Operational 71
activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
viii
Table No. Title Pages
14 Respondents’ Assessment on the Problems 74
Encountered by the PNP AKG MFU in countering
KFR activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula in
terms of Manpower Capability
terms of Logistical Capability
terms of Strategic and Tactical Capability
terms of Stakeholders Collaboration Capability
18 Summary Assessment on the Problems 91
KFR activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
19 Respondents’ Assessment on the Proposed 94
Measures to Address the Problems Encountered
by the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities
by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of
Manpower Capability
Logistical Capability
Strategic and Tactical Capability
Stakeholders Collaboration Capability
23 Summary on the Proposed Measures to Address 110
the Problems Encountered by the PNP AKG MFU
in countering KFR activities by ASG in Zamboanga
Peninsula
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure No. Title Pages
1 Conceptual Framework 10
2 AKG Mindanao Field Unit Organizational Structure 44
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix Title Pages
1 Letter Request to Conduct Study 135
2 Survey Questionnaire and Interview Guide 136
3 Research Timeline/Itinerary 144
4 Transcript of Key Informant Interview (KII) 145
x
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACTAF Anti-Crime Task Force
AKG Anti-Kidnapping Group
AMLC Anti-Money Laundering Council
APPOI Association for Peace, Prosperity and Order Incorporated
ARMD Admin and Records Management Division
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
CAAC Citizens Actions Against Crime
CIDG Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
CMC Crisis Management Committee
DOJ Department of Justice
FFCCCII Federation of Filipino Chinese Chamber of Commerce and

Industries Incorporated
IEFLD Information, Education and Family Liaison Division
IG Intelligence Group
ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy
ISAFP Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
KFR Kidnap-for-Ransom
KFRG Kidnap-for-Ransom Group
MFU Mindanao Field Unit
MRPO Movement for Restoration, Peace and Order
NACC National Anti-Crime Commission
NACTAF National Anti-Crime Task Force
NAKTAF National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force
NBI National Bureau of Investigation
NGOs Non-Government Organizations
NICA National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
xi
OCG Organized Crime Group
PACER Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response
PAOCC Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission
PCCA Philippine Chinese Charitable Association
PNP Philippine National Police
xii
CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND
Background of the Study
The Philippine National Police (PNP) is tasked with maintaining peace
and order which includes the preservation, repression, and reduction of crime.
Although there are other agencies of the government that are tasked with law
enforcement, the PNP occupies the frontline in the first pillar of the justice
system in terms of law enforcement.
As embodied in its vision, the PNP promotes “the presence of resources,
a collaborative partnership with stakeholders from the community and the
presence of responsive, empowered and engaged citizenry who proactively
take part in the fight against criminality to ensure a stable and peaceful
community.”
In line with this vision, the PNP’s mission is to enforce the law, to prevent
and control crimes, to maintain peace and order, and to ensure public safety
and internal security with the active support of the community.
In law enforcement and anti – crime control and suppression functions
of the police, dealing with organized crime is one which poses heavy challenge
not only because organized crime groups are normally well – financed, capable
of securing sufficient manpower to do their nefarious activities, properly
equipped with firepower and have access to even the most advanced and
modern technology.
When police deal with organized crimes whose line of operation is
kidnapping for ransom, bank robbery, prostitution, drug trafficking, illegal drug
production, pornography, smuggling, and other lucrative criminal activities, the
approach to be taken should be strategic. While the police have its own
1
intelligence gathering capability, it would be inappropriate to think that the
organized crime syndicates have none.
In fact, the amount of bribes paid by organized crime syndicates to
unscrupulous and corrupt police personnel, court officials, government officials,
politicians, media, and others provide them support and assistance in terms of
counter – intelligence information many times greater than what the police
actually received from these stakeholders.
In the discharge of their duties, the police deal with the different people
and are subject to all kinds of situations and severe criticisms. As such, the
police must be well-educated, able to communicate clearly and precisely,
properly trained, always ready, alert, and equipped to make value judgements,
and physically, morally, spiritually, and mentally fit, the police exercise vast
power that they even have the power to avert life and death. But even with
these vast powers, they are faced with complexities and problems in the
efficiency and effectiveness of their works.
To fulfill the mandates of R.A. 6975, the PNP envisions the presence of
professional, dynamic, and motivated PNP personnel, the presences of
resources, a collaborative partnership with stakeholders from the community,
and the presence of responsive, empowered, and engaged citizenry who
proactively take part in the fight against criminality to ensure a stable and
peaceful community.
Republic Act No. 6975 established the Philippine National Police in 1990
under the reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG).
As embodied in the law, “It is the policy of the State to promote peace
and order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local government
2
capability aimed towards the effective provision of basic services to the citizenry
through the establishment of a highly efficient and competent police force that
is national in scope and civilian in character.”
As pointed out by Volemer (1990), a distinguished law enforcement
scholar, “a police officer is expected by the public to have the wisdom of
Solomon, the courage of King David, the strength of Samson, the patience of
Job, the leadership of Moses, the faith of Daniel, the diplomacy of Lincoln, the
tolerance of Carpenter of Nazareth, the readiness of the good Samaritan, and
above all the intimate knowledge of every branch of natural, biological, and
social sciences. If he has all of these, he might be a good police officer.”
The current thrust of police training and education in the PNP is strongly
predicated on this thinking. This is mainly because the present time makes
great and often conflicting demands on the police.
While we want police officers to demonstrate high levels of physical and
moral fortitude in the war against crime, we also call upon to exercise patience,
compassion, and deep concern in dealing with people that included even law
breakers. We expect them to live by the principle that they are not agents of
force, but are primarily agents of public service.
The crime of kidnap for ransom, more popularly known as KFR, has
become a 3-letter word that has sown fear in the hearts of our people. Although
the actual numbers of incidents of KFR are small percentage of the overall
nationwide crime volume, its impact on the peace and order situation is doubly
significant. Even more, the effect spills over to the business sector, eroding
confidence in the economy and creating a heightened sense of anxiety among
the citizenry.
3
The huge financial gain, minimal human and material requirements,
relative short period, and opportunity to choose when to strike are some of the
factors that make kidnapping more attractive to the criminal elements.
Apathy, insensitivity, selfishness, and fear among the citizenry have
made it easier for kidnappers to continue their nefarious trade.
Kidnapping remains a major security threats in the Philippines. Over the
years, kidnap for ransom has become a profitable business for many crime
syndicates and terrorist organizations, particularly in the southern island of
Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and Zamboanga Peninsula.
More disturbing is the increasing involvement of unscrupulous
government authorities who either collude with KFR syndicates/groups or run
these organizations themselves. Weak rule of law, graft and corruption,
ineffective law enforcement, and defective Criminal Justice System are the
factors that allow kidnapping activities to flourish in the country. Increased
poverty and unemployment due to the global financial crisis likewise have
contributed to the prevalence of KFR in the Philippines.
Kidnap for ransom (KFR) is so common here that the Philippines has
often been described as the kidnapping capital of the world.
Luzon remained the most common site of kidnappings, with 73% of
cases in 2013. These remain well within the established trend for the past three
years: in 2014, 79% of kidnapping were conducted in Luzon, 66% in 2015 and
69% in 2016. Half of the incidents in Luzon transpired in Metro Manila while the
rest in the areas surrounding Metro Manila (Bulacan and Pampanga to the north
and Cavite, Rizal, Laguna, and Batangas to the south). These provinces are
among the country’s 10 richest.
4
Mindanao accounted 23% of kidnapping roughly in the line with that
regions share the national population, which 24% with a high percentage of the
abductions taking place in the troubled Region’s lowest income areas. Some
25 of the 28 kidnapping that took place in the Mindanao in 2013 were in territory
where these secessionist groups are strongest, accordingly, these kidnapping
thereat were suspected of Moro Secessionist groups’ involvement. The high
correlation between their territory and kidnappings is because law enforcement
presence is insufficient to deter crime and per capita incomes are so low that
jobs are hard to come by.
There is a general perception in the Philippines that the wealthy are most
likely to be kidnapped, and particularly wealthy Chinese Filipinos. This is overly
simplistic. Data collected over the past three years suggest that Chinese
Filipinos account for only 35% of all kidnaps. Foreign nationals are often
perceived as the wealthiest account for only 11% of all cases. Most reported
cases involve ethnic Filipinos (www.psagroup.com/annual-kidnapping-report,
2016).
Table 1 shows the victims of Kidnap for Ransom (KFR) incidents by
nationality for calendar year 2013 to 2016. Of the total 280 victims, one hundred
nineteen (119) was committed by KFR syndicates and one hundred sixty – one
(161) by KFR Terrorist Group.
While the total number of Filipinos kidnapped is higher than Chinese
Filipinos, Chinese – Filipino resident is the most likely to be kidnapped of any
ethnic group in the country. Chinese Filipinos account for a marginal 3% of the
total population so on a percapita basis, Chinese Filipinos are kidnapped with
alarming frequency.
5
Table 1
Victims by Nationality Calendar Year 2013 – 2016
KFR by KFR by Terrorist
Nationality Total
Syndicates Groups
American / Fil – Am 1 4 5
Australian / Fil – Aus 1 1 2
Canadian 0 2 2
Chinese 16 6 22
Danish 0 2 2
Filipino 60 117 177
Filipino – Chinese 20 18 38
Indian 9 1 10
Irish 0 1 1
Italian 1 0 1
Korean 1 5 6
Malaysian 1 0 1
Pakistan 1 0 1
Sri – Lankan 0 1 1
Swiss 1 2 3
Taiwanese / Fil – Tai 7 0 7
Total 119 161 280
Source: (www.psagroup.com/annual-kidnapping-report, 2016)
As close knit society, they generally make attractive targets because
they rarely involve police officials in negotiation phase and they tend to pay
ransom demands quickly. Chinese–Filipino communities also control
approximately 60–70% of wealth in country and are largely perceived as
wealthier than their Filipino counterparts.
High profile abductions in the latter half of 2009 illuminated the haunting
realities of the kidnapping situation in the Philippines. These incidents
reconfirmed that the kidnapping industry, devoid of any religious or ideological
platform, is invariably a cash and carry business designed to reap financial
reward.
Because of their willingness to pay ransom and reluctance to involve
police authorities, wealthy Filipinos and Filipino-Chinese remain the target of
choice for nationwide kidnapping-for-ransom groups.
6
Similarly, circumstantial evidence suggests that Korean and Japanese
residents are being increasing targeted. Local Indian nationals, that run small
loan shark collection agencies, have also become a popular target for violent
abductions.
In the past ten years, the peace and order situation in this country saw
the rise of several criminal activities wherein crime syndicates proliferated in
view of the very high payoff obtained from successful criminal operation.
Conceptual Paradigm
The study used the rational choice theory conceptualized by Piquero and
Tibbets (2002), deterrence theory by Nagin (2001), and social learning theory
as cited by Akers (1993).
Based on the now outdated notion that regardless of the reason for
committing crime, the decision to do so is a rational choice made after weighing
up the benefits versus consequences of the crime, this theory treats all
individuals as rational operators, committing criminal acts after consideration of
all associated risks compared with rewards of crimes according to Piquero and
Tibbets.
Little emphasis is placed on the offenders’ backgrounds or
circumstances surrounding the crimes or offenders. The role of criminal
organizations in lowering the perceptions of risk and increasing the likelihood
of personal benefits is prioritized by this approach, with the organizations
structure, purpose, and activity being indicative of the rational choices made by
criminals and their organizers.
It ignores that in addition to financial gains, people commit crimes for the
need of acceptance, respect and trust by other members of the organization.
7
The deterrence theory sees criminal behavior as reflective of an
individual, internal calculation as cited by Nagin’s study. “Integrating Celerity,
Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General
Deterrence: Theory and Evidence” by the criminal that the benefits associated
with offending (whether financial or otherwise) outweigh the perceived risks.
The perceived strength, importance or infallibility of the criminal organization is
directly proportional to the types of crime committed, their intensity and
arguably the level of community response. The benefits of participating in
organized crime (higher financial rewards, greater socioeconomic control and
influence, protection of the family or significant others, perceived freedoms from
‘oppressive’ laws or norms) contribute greatly to the psychology behind highly
organized group offending.
Criminals learn through association with one another. This theory was
espoused by Akers (1993) entitled Deviant Behavior – Social Learning
Approach. The success of organized crime groups is therefore dependent upon
the strength of their communication and the enforcement of their value system,
the recruitment and training processes employed to sustain, build or fill gaps in
criminal operations. An understanding of this theory sees close associations
between criminals, imitation of superiors, and understanding of value systems,
processes and authority as the main drivers behind organized crime.
Interpersonal relationships define the motivations the individual develops, with
the effect of family or peer criminal activity being a strong predator of
intergenerational offending.
This theory also developed to include the strengths and weaknesses of
reinforcement, which in the context of continuing criminal enterprises may be
used to help understand propensities for certain crimes or victims, level of
8
integrations into the mainstream culture and likelihood of recidivism/success in
rehabilitation.
The safety and stability of a nation is the core vision of any police
organizations all over the world. The pride of any police is its ability to keep
crime rate at low level and maintain peace and order in the country. Crimes are
everywhere. They can happen to anyone at the most unexpected time. As good
citizens it is the duty of the PNP AKG to practice due to diligence in order to
alleviate criminal activity.
The sincere trust and confidence of the community towards any police
organization can only be achieve if they live in a safe society free from the
threats of any lawless elements.
This study is designed to probe into the present, existing operational
response or procedure adopted and implemented by the Philippine National
Police Anti-Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit (PNP-AKG MFU for brevity)
in strengthening its operational capability thrusts against kidnap-for-ransom.
The conceptual paradigm for the study utilized the Input-Process-Output. The
input comprises the four (4) major areas of concerns such as the: Manpower
Capability, Logistical Capability, Strategic and Tactical Capability, and
Stakeholder’s Collaboration Capability as shown in Figure 1.
Manpower Capability is the manner on how the PNP-AKG MFU
personnel work as a lean and mean force that fights kidnap for ransom groups.
It is their obligation to create an atmosphere (work condition) that will generate
total quality commitment and results to stakeholder satisfaction from within the
organization which ultimately will lead to improved performance
9
INPUT PROCESS OUTPUT
ASSESSMENT ON THE
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
OF THE PNP AKG MFU IN
COUNTERING KFR
ACTIVITIES BY ASG IN
ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA
 MANPOWER CAPABILITY
 LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY PROPOSED ACTION PLAN
 STRATEGIC AND STRENGTHENED
TACTICAL CAPABILITY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
ASSESSMENT OF SURVEY
 STAKEHOLDER OF THE PNP ANTI-
QUESTIONNAIRES AND
COLLABORATION KIDNAPPING GROUP,
INTERVIEW
CAPABILITY MINDANAO FIELD UNIT IN
COUNTERING
STATISTIC TREATMENT OF
KIDNAPPING-FOR-RANSOM
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DATA
ACTIVITIES BY ABU
BY THE PNP AKG MFU IN SAYYAF GROUP IN
COUNTERING KFR ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA
ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA
MEASURES TO ADDRESS
THE PROBLEMS
ENCOUNTERED BY PNP AKG
MFU IN COUNTERING KFR
ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA
FEEDBACK
Figure 1. Conceptual Paradigm
The PNP-AKG MFU needs to sustain its credibility as a well – rounded
professional capable of performing in almost any situation and environment.
.Logistical Capability refers to resources that will sustain the PNP-AKG
MFU in response to kidnap for ransom in Zamboanga Peninsula. A well-funded
organization able to fight crime particularly the KFR incidents and make
Zamboanga Peninsula or Mindanao Regions one of the safest place.
10
Strategic and Tactical Capability refers to the current anti–kidnapping
campaign programs implementation do weakness and defects lie for the
purpose of instituting corrective measures where these are needed the most.
Stakeholders Collaboration Capability refers to the concern of the
AKG MFU in collaboration with the LGUs, NGOs and other concerned agencies
to strengthen the relationship between the police and other stakeholders and
improving their coordination towards the prevention of kidnap for ransom
activities.
The process pertains to the assessment of survey questionnaires and
interview and statistics treatment of data.
The output requires a proposed action plan and to have strengthened
the operational capability of the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group, Mindanao Field
Unit in countering kidnapping-for-ransom activities by Abu Sayyaf Group in
Zamboanga Peninsula.
Research Questions
This study aimed to assess the operational capability of PNP-AKG MFU
in countering kidnapping activities of Abu Sayyaf in Zamboanga Peninsula.
Specifically, this study sought to answer the following questions:
1. How do the respondents assessed the operational capability of PNP-
AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG for brevity)
in Zamboanga Peninsula, in terms of:
1.1 Manpower Capability;
1.2 Logistical Capability;
1.3 Strategic and Tactical Capability;
1.4 Stakeholders Collaboration Capability?
11
2. What are the problems encountered by PNP-AKG MFU in countering
KFR activities of ASG Zamboanga Peninsula as regards to the above cited
variables?
3. What are the measures that can be proposed to address the
problems encountered by PNP-AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG
Zamboanga Peninsula relative to the aforementioned variables?
4. What action plan can be proposed based from the findings of the
study?
Scope and Delimitations
The study was limited to the following:
The setting of the study was in Zamboanga Peninsula in Mindanao.
Zamboanga Peninsula is selected as the locale of the study considering the
higher incidence of kidnap-for-ransom in this area perpetrated by the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG).
The study focused on the operational capability of PNP-AKG MFU in
countering KFR activities of ASG Zamboanga peninsula relative to manpower
capability, logistical capability, strategic and tactical capability, and stakeholder
collaboration capability.
Likewise, it also tackled the problems encountered by the PNP-AKG
MFU that hamper the effectiveness of the anti-KFR campaign, and the
measures that address the said problems as well as the formulation of an action
plan to enhance the anti-KFR campaign of the PNP-AKG MFU.
The responses of the study were solicited from the three groups of
respondents; selected PNP AKG personnel assigned in Zamboanga City. non–
government organizations/civic organizations that were directly participate in
the campaign against kidnapping such as Movement for Restoration, Peace
12
and Order (MRPO) and Association of Peace, Prosperity and Order
Incorporated (APPOI), and the kidnap for ransom victims, their families and
selected stakeholders in the community, for a total of hundred thirty-one (431)
population.
After the application of the Slovin’s Formula, the total sample size was
207 respondents.
Gathering of data was facilitated through the use of structured
questionnaires and interview guide.
Table 2
Category of Respondents
Sample
Category of Respondents Population %
Size
PNP AKG MFU Personnel 117 56 27%
NGOs/Civic Organizations 155 74 36%
KFR Victims and/or Relatives 159 77 37%
Total 431 207 100%
Significance of the Study
The findings of the study will be beneficial to the following:
Philippine National Police Leadership. The result of the study will be
of significance to the PNP leadership as this may serve as an evaluation tool
and/or basic for policy review or formulation of new policy towards an improved
operation of the Anti-Kidnapping Group.
PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group. The result of the study will be of
significance to the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel specifically to Anti–
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit, considering the fact that they are the
beneficiaries of the proposed action plan.
Government. The result of the study will be significance to the
government and other concerned agencies as they play a vital role as
13
stakeholders and active partners in the fight against the Kidnap-for-Ransom
menace.
Kidnap-for-Ransom Victims and their Families. The findings of this
study could better enhance the existing relationship between the AKG and KPR
victims to include their family members towards the end view of providing
support to future victims.
Policy Makers. This study can provide a template on how to analyze
critically and strategically the existing laws dealing with kidnapping giving them
insights and prospects to study or amend the same.
Civil Society Organizations, Non-Government Organizations,
Private Sectors and the Community. This study will provide hope to improve
the country’s security in terms of anti – kidnapping campaign that can raise the
potential of having a conducive place to live, work and do business. This will
also serve as an awareness and inspiration to whoever may come to read this
study to extend further support to the Philippine National Police Anti –
Kidnapping Group in the performance of its mission and functions.
The Researchers. This research will be a very enriching experience to
ascertain first-hand the issues and concerns besetting the unit that include the
formulation of an action plan.
Future Researchers. The result of the study will serve as a basis in the
conduct of other researches on areas related to the present study. Other
researchers may use the results of the study as a reference material in the
conduct of similar studies in other places and/or settings.
Definition of Terms
For a better understanding of the study, the following terms will be
conceptually and operationally used:
14
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). This refers to a group of Muslim extremist
operating in the area of Zamboanga Peninsula notoriously engaged in
kidnapping activities in exchange for large sum of money as a means to raise
fund to their terroristic campaign
Anti–KFR Infonet. This refers to a computer-based intelligence network
envisions the harnessing of the vast of supply of information from the internet
users.
Anti–KFR Speaker’s Bureau. This refers to another significant feature
of the Anti – KFR Preventive Program that will be tasked to wage an information
drive on KFR issues to the community at large.
Civic Organizations. These refer to groups formed by members of the
community to solve mutual problems and fulfil a common need or enjoy a
shared resource.
Effectiveness. This refers to the ability of a leader to get the right things
done, its goal or objectives with high standard quality.
Intelligence. This refers to a special class of information because it is
cultivated either to identify crimes that otherwise would not be identified (owing
to their hidden nature) or to identify offenses that are likely to occur at
prearranged time in the future.
Investigation. This refers to ability to gather sufficient evidences in
order to identify and locate the guilty party in preparation for filing of case in
court.
Kidnap-for-Ransom (KFR). This refers to the criminal act more
particularly described as the unlawful taking and carrying away of a person by
force or fraud or again his/her will, or in any manner depriving him/her of his/her
liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom as payment for hi/ her release.
15
Kidnap-for-Ransom Group (KFRG). This refers to an organized
criminal groups engage in criminal act more particularly described as the
unlawful taking and carrying away of a person by force or fraud or against
his/her will, or in any manner depriving him/her of his/her liberty for the purpose
of extorting ransom as payment for his/her release.
Logistics. This refers to the financial support of a unit or organization
receives as provided for the budget or additional funding for other sources as
authorized by higher authorities. Units prepare their budget proposals about
two quarters before the end of the year for their budget for the coming fiscal
period.
Manpower Capability. This refers to the ability or strength of the Anti-
Kidnapping Group personnel to undertake a certain specified task.
Modus Operandi. This refers to the operation styles of KFR groups that
distinguished one group from the other.
Non-Government Organizations. These refer to legally constituted
organization created by natural or legal people that operate independently from
any form of government.
Operational Capability. This refers to the capability to respond to the
community’s needs. In this study, this term is defined by the following indicators:
crime rate, crime trend, significant accomplishments and people’s awareness,
knowledge and favorable attitude towards the PNP Anti Kidnapping Group.
Operational Skills. These refer to the knowledge and skills to make
good judgements and to employ a range of tactical options in circumstances
where decisions must be made quickly.
Organized Crime. This refers to the unlawful activities of the members
of a highly organized, disciplined association engaged in supplying illegal goods
16
and services, including but not limited to kidnapping, gambling, prostitution,
loan sharking, narcotics traffic, labor racketeering and the unlawful activities of
member of such organizations.
Philippine National Police Anti-Kidnapping Group (PNP-AKG). This
refers to a unit within the Philippine National Police tasks to investigate and
conduct police operation against groups or individuals criminally engaged in
kidnap-for-ransom activities. Mindanao Field Unit (MFU). A unit of PNP AKG
stationed and based in Mindanao and responsible in investigating KFR
incidents in that area.
Stakeholders Collaboration. This refers to the collaboration,
partnership and cooperation in between the concerned PNP unit/s with the
other law enforcement agencies, other agencies of the government, NGOs,
CVOs, and private entities for a common interest and concern.
Strategies. These refer to the program of action undertaken by the AKG
in combating organized crime groups.
Tactical Skills. These refer to supporting limited police operations; it is
carried out in support of police/ military operations.
Task Force. This refers to a unit or formation established to work on a
single defined task or activity. For this study, it refers to the units formed
purposely to deal with kidnapping for ransom cases.
Technical Skills. These refer to the basic knowledge required to
perform a task. A skill that is required for the accomplishment of a specific.
17
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND STUDIES
This chapter is a presentation of the related literature and studies foreign
and local which have an important bearing to the present study at hard.
There is a universal saying which many people in various parts of the
globe subscribe to, especially when it comes to matters of public safety and
security. The saying goes: “An ounce of prevention is better than a pound of
cure” as cited by Barton (2004) in his book entitled “Management Fundamentals
for Public Servants”, and which can never be truer these days.
In the book written by Curtis (2005) entitled “Police Administration”, law
enforcement agencies in various parts of the world focus on the two major anti
– crime activities, namely: crime prevention to discourage or prevent a crime
from happening and, when a crime does occur, the employment of crime
suppression and control measures behind bars through the process of
embodied in the criminal justice system.
Crisis situation elicit the best and worst of human reaction. Under
extreme danger and risk to life, some persons are able to do what they would
otherwise believe could not be done under normal conditions.
In similar manner, people who are expected to have done things properly
and in accordance with rationale and logical reaction have sometimes acted
irrationally out of fear, pressure and sheer confusion according to Allyson (2007
entitled :Crisis Management”).
On the other hand Thornton (2010) study entitled “Heroism in the War
and in Peace” cited that environmental disaster are among the worst situation
that humans could face and not only the rationality of human behavior emerges
out of such situations but also the sterling act of heroism.

Extraordinary individuals and those who rise above dangers and risks,
those who possess the character of stability under extremes pressure to life
and limb are few and organizations like the military as well as law enforcement
agencies have always been in the lookout for such people in view of the
dangerous nature of various operational procedures involved in military and
police work as cited by McGovern (2008) work Entitled “Extraordinary Men for
Extra – Ordinary Jobs.”
By far the most common form of kidnapping, this can be accomplished
in most part of the world minimal preparation, with a relatively low risk of failure.
Kidnapping will generally target local businessmen or their families; those
regarded as being “well off”, without having sufficient resources to spend a
great deal of money on security precautions. The kidnappers’ goal is a fast,
easy payoff.
Generally, the ransom requested is relatively easy for the victim’s family
or company to obtain high net worth individual kidnapping. This is the most
cinematically popular form of kidnapping: Generally, the intended target is
studied for some time prior to the actual kidnapping, allowing the perpetrators
to gather intelligence on security procedures and personal habits. After the
victim has been taken, his or her family or employer is contacted with the
ransom demand.
Generally, a negotiation process occurs. As most of these incidents are
perpetrators by experienced kidnapping gangs, the victim is generally released
if ransom is paid. As high – net – worth individuals become increasingly security
conscious, this type of kidnapping has been on the decline in recent years, in
favor of less involved kidnapping with smaller, but easier to obtain payoffs. Tiger
kidnapping is a crime involving a hostage taking in order to force the victim to
19
participate in a robbery. The robberies have become known as tiger
kidnappings because the raiders stalk their prey to study their movements
before striking.
The term was first used in the United Kingdom for crime against
immigrants, mostly illegal, from China and the Middle East, who were
kidnapped by armed gangs who then threatened their families back home with
death of the victim if ransom would not be paid. Express Kidnapping.
The victim is abducted, then forced to withdraw their own ransom from a
bank or ATM. If all goes well, the victim is released afterwards, generally after
having been relieved of all valuables on their person (and occasionally in their
residence). This type of kidnapping is popular in urban areas, due to the prolific
ATMs.
In some cases, this will develop into a standard kidnapping, with further
ransom demanded of the family or employer. In other cases, the victim is held
overnight, to get around a one – day withdraw limit. A Virtual Kidnapping is
more a scam than an actual kidnapping.
The perpetrators will wait until their target is unreachable (visiting an
area with no cellular coverage, for example,) then will contract the target’s
family or company, claiming they have kidnapped the target and demanding an
immediate ransom. The target eventually returns, unaware that anything
untoward has occurred.
Due to the need for haste, the ransoms demanded ate generally
relatively modest. Another common technique is to call the target pretending to
be cellular phone company representative, and ask them to turn off their phone
for a short while for a technical reason, during which the virtual kidnapping is
20
conducted. Thus far, virtual kidnapping are most common in Latin America,
specifically Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, and Mexico.
A kidnapping conducted to extort political concessions from
governments or security forces. As monetary ransom is no longer enough, it is
more difficult to negotiate kidnap victims freedom as in many cases the political
concessions or demands cannot be met by the involved governments, putting
the victim’s life at greater risk.
Bride kidnapping is a form of forced marriage in which the groom to be
kidnaps his bride. In many cases bride was raped in order to convince her to
stay with her husband, as in many traditional cultures the loss of virginity is
harshly judged. In some cultures a bride price is customary, so the kidnapper
may contact his victim’s family to demand compensation.
Kidnapping for ransom is a common occurrence in various parts of the
world today, and certain cities and countries are often described as the
“Kidnapping Capital of the World” according to the study made by Dickerson
(2008) entitled Police Linked to Rising Kidnapping.”
As of 2007, that title belongs to Iraq with possibly 1,500 foreigners
kidnapped. In 2004, it was Mexico, and in 2001, it was Colombia. Statistics are
harder to come by. Reports suggest a world total of 12,500 – 25,000 per year
with 3,600 per year in Colombia and 3,000 per year in Mexico around the year
2000. However by 2006, the number of kidnapping in Colombia had decline to
687 and it continues to decline to decline.
Mexican numbers are hard to confirm because of fears of police
involvement in kidnapping.
21
“Kidnapping seems to flourish particularly in fragile states and conflict
countries. As politically motivated militias, organized crime and the drugs mafia
fill the vacuum left by government.
In 2009, the Los Angeles Times named Phoenix, Arizona as American’s
kidnapping capital, reporting that every year hundreds of ransom kidnappings
occur there, virtually all within the underworld associated with human and drug
smuggling from Mexico, and often done as a way of collecting unpaid debts.
Other major U.S. cities that are hotbeds for kidnapping are Detroit, Atlanta, New
Orleans, Houston, and Chicago. Many of them are done by major street gangs
near tourist attractions.
During the year 1999 in the United States, there were 203,900 children
reported as the victims of family abductions and 58,200 of non – family
abductions. However, only 115 were the result of “stereotypical” kidnaps (by
someone unknown or of slight acquaintance to the child, held permanently or
for ransom) according to the study of made of by Quinones (2009) entitled
“Phoenix Kidnap-For-Ransom,”
In the past, and presently in some parts of the world (such as southern
Sudan), kidnapping is a common means used to obtain slaves and money
through ransom. In less recent times, kidnapping in the form of shanghaiing (or
“pressganging”) men was used to supply merchant ships in the 19th century with
sailors, whom the law considered unfree labor.
Kidnapping according to Perris’ (2009) study entitled “Evil twins of
Kidnap for Ransom” on the high seas in connection with piracy has been
increasing. It was reported that 661 crewmembers were taken hostage and 12
kidnapped in the first 9 months of 2009. Criminal gangs are estimated to make
up to $500 million a year in ransom payments from kidnapping. Kidnapping has
22
been identified as one source by which terrorists organizations have been
known to obtain funding.
The US, by a wide margin, is the world leader in kidnapping and the
kidnappers are becoming more predatory and beginning to demand higher
ransoms as the economic environment in the US continues to decline. In 2008
alone, 182,422 individuals were either accosted by armed criminals and often
time attacked in their own houses, taken and then put in cages throughout the
US. While 16,965 of them may have deserved to be kidnapped, 165,457 of
them, or 90.7%, had done anything violent to anybody.
The kidnappers target ethnic minorities by a wide margin. White males
have been getting kidnapped at a rate of 736 per 100,000. Latinos at 1,862 per
100,000 and black males at 4,789 per 100,000. In South Africa under apartheid,
in 1993, black males were kidnapped at 851 per 100,000. In the US, black
males are kidnapped at a rate of 4789 per 100,000.
The US apartheid system has more than a 500% higher kidnapping rate
of blacks than the South African apartheid. The kidnappers, hard up for money
in these tough economic times have begun to raise their ransoms.
Kidnappers in Arizona allow you to visit the person kidnapped but they
demand a fee $25 per visit. And now one criminal cartel that control the area
called Riverside Country in California has stated that they will be kidnapping
people and demanding a ransom of $142.42 per day. Cartel boss, Jeff Stone,
released this statement to the media about their increase in operations: “I think
we’re blazing a new trial here. In these very challenging economic times, I
believe this can be source of revenue…I believe this can return 3 to 5 million
(dollars) a year during these very challenging economic times.” Other cartels
throughout the US are likely watching this with great interest as cited in the
23
Dollar Vigilante (2011) entitled “Kidnapping and Ransom Rampant in the United
States.”
Given the exposures it is important to adopt a risk management strategy
that is active and multilateral. Many of its component are likely to be
preventative, with a focus upon preparation of those exposed to kidnap risk, as
well as developing response procedures to assist with smooth incident
management in the event of kidnapping. The initial consideration for most risk
managers should be to segment corporate exposure to kidnap risk based upon
severity. There are many risk databases that specifically identify and quantify
kidnap risk for each country in the world.
These tools can be integrated with a travel approval process if
necessary, to ensure that travelers to higher risk locations are subject to
additional risk controls before travel is permitted. Similarly overseas facilities
can be segmented according to risk and appropriate controls put in place.
Many corporate risk managers will engage specialist intelligence
providers to further analyze local kidnap threats in higher risk countries, to allow
them to better understand regional distribution of kidnap events, typical targets,
size of ransom, frequency and kidnap event outcomes. This again allows risk
controls be decided and targeted most effectively.
In many cases, additional security is likely to be applied to deter and
prevent kidnap attempts. This will vary according to local conditions, but may
include trained security drivers, armed or unarmed close protection, hardening
of security at homes and offices, tracking devices and panic alarms.
As cited by Claridge (2011) in his book ‘State Terrorism Applying a
Definition Model Terrorism and Political Video’ a very common and effective
additional measure is to conduct staff training security awareness and
24
additional measure is to conduct staff training to raise security awareness and
of the part that surveillance plays in the build – up to a kidnap is one of the most
effective ways disrupt a plot. The potential victim must learn to spot surveillance
and know how and where to report it.
Training should also emphasize ‘listening’ to instincts so that when, like
Alan Johnston, something does not quite seem right immediate evasive action
follows. Hostage survival training should explain the make – up of the kidnap
gang.
How the business of kidnapping works and how kidnap events are
resolved, the psychological pressures that a hostage will be under and how to
cope. With less uncertainty, kidnap victims are better able to take a positive
outlook on their predicament and emerge physically and psychologically
stronger than they otherwise would. Companies with exposure should also
consider kidnap amongst the scenarios they prepare for in their business
resilience planning. This means having a clearly developed response plan,
including where to access assistance from professional specialist advisers, a
worked up media plan and a considered position on ransoms and other
concessions on behalf of staff.
Many companies choose to purchase kidnap, ransom and extortion
(KRE) insurance policies in order to transfer some of the financial risks of a
kidnap event and ensure priority access to professional advice should it be
required. A common misunderstanding about KRE is that it provides
‘negotiators’ to intervene following a kidnap.
In fact, all decisions about management of a case will lie with the
company, which can choose to operate with the advice of a specialist provided
under the KRE policy.
25
Organized crime threatens peace and human security, violates human
rights and undermines economic, social, cultural, political and civil development
of societies around the world according to the Tinaypan (2005) entitled “Threats
of Organized Crime”. Organized crimes have diversified gone global and
reached macro-economic proportions: illicit goods maybe sourced from one
continent, trafficked across another, and marketed in a third. Transnational
organized crime can permeate government agencies and institutions, fueling
corruption, infiltrating business and politics, and hindering economic and social
development. And it is undermining governance and democracy by
empowering those who operate outside the law.
Transnational organized crime manifests in many forms, including
trafficking in drugs, firearms and even persons as cited by Claudio (2003)
entitled “Nature of Transnational Crime.” At the same time, organized crime
groups exploit human mobility to smuggle and undermine financial systems
though money laundering. The vast sum of money involved can compromise
legitimate economies and directly impact public processes by “buying” elections
through corruption. It yields high profits for its culprits and results in high risks
for individuals who fall victim to it.
Every year, countless individuals lose their lives at the hand of criminals
involved in organized crime, succumbing to drug-related health problems or
injuries inflicted by firearms, or losing their lives as a result of unscrupulous
methods and motives of human traffickers and smugglers migrants. The
transnational nature of organized crime means that criminal networks forge
bonds across borders as well as overcome cultural and linguistic differences in
the commission of their crime. Organized crime is not stagnant, but adapts as
new crimes emerge and as relationships between criminal networks become
26
both more flexible, and more sophisticated, with ever-greater reach around the
globe.
In short, transnational organized crime transcends cultural, social,
linguistic and geographical borders and must be met with a concerted
response.
Afante (2009) in his book ‘Kidnapping in the Philippines’ manifested that
the Philippines has been most affected by kidnapping and extortion and has
been for some time. Despite the fact that the amount of reported kidnappings
in the Philippines has decreased each year for at least the past three years,
numerous high – profile cases have served as reminders that the risk of being
kidnapped in the Philippines is still a significant concern.
Kidnap for ransom and other related activities have been part and parcel
of the national crime scene. There is no geographical limit to this endeavor and
there is practically no limit to its purpose or perpetrators. Perpetrators range
from small time criminal groups to extensive secessionists and communist rebel
movements. Kidnap for ransom is profitable and relatively low risk as the victim
doubles as a cash insurance and human shield at the same time.
A rise in kidnapping rates will translate to the deterrence of tourist
businessmen from visiting and investing in the country. According to statistics
from the Bureau of Immigration (BI), a total of 83,367 foreigners and
Balikbayans arrived in the country from February 2 to February 5, only a few
days after bandits kidnapped Swiss nationals Lorenzo Vinciguerra and Ewold
Horn in Tawi–Tawi. Bureau of Immigration said the statistics proves that an
influx of foreigners and balikbayans into the country persist despite the string
of negative travel advisories from Western countries.
27
Also, Department of Tourist (DOT) official downplayed the effects of
advisories, referring to the 3.9 million tourist who arrive in the country last year
compared to the 3.7 million who came in 2010. But perception is highly
influential and these statistics could easily change or be altered. Statistics may
give a general idea but it does not translate to a complete picture. People may
not be aware of all the organized crime groups operating in the Philippines but
vigilance is still the most essential part for one’s security. Organized crime
syndicates are everywhere. They operate not only in Metro Manila but also on
other places such as cities. The AFP, which had previously announced that
they’re bolstering their connections and intelligence with the PNP amidst terror
threats is an advantage for added safety and security for the people against
organized crime groups and syndicates as cited by Recueno (2012) in the
Manila Bulletin entitled “Kidnap for Ransom Cases Drop 50%”.
Kidnapping in the Philippines is a major problem that has been around a
long time. Basically, there are two main types of kidnapping. The first when
kidnappers take the children of rich families and hold them for ransom. The
second type which is the biggest problem in the Philippines these days is
foreign pedophile gang.
Kidnapping in the Southern Islands have left the terrorist organizations
such as MILF with better arms and a profitable business that is why they are
currently able to fight in full confrontation with the military. Kidnappings pay
millions and it is a big problem. Kidnappings-for-ransom has become a lucrative
business for rebels and criminal syndicates in Mindanao, where many areas
are underdeveloped and job opportunities are scarce. Sometimes gang kidnap
civilians and hand them over to rebels in exchange for a cut in the ransom.
Poverty has been blamed for many kidnappings in the South.
28
Kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) cases in the country has dropped by more
than 50 percent last year, with a police official attributing the significant
decrease to vigilance of potential victims through information dissemination by
the police and various groups. And the police’s elite anti-kidnapping unit Police
Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER) and now Anti-Kidnapping
Group (AKG) wants to level up further in terms of information dissemination by
tapping the film documentary of a kidnap victim himself that will be posted in
the internet.
The documentary, made by Julian Rodriguez as thesis for a master’s
degree at the De La Salle University, is now posted on
www.dontbekidnapped.com.ph. “We want to get all the help that we can get to
finally stamp out of this problem,” said Police Senior Supt. Isagani Nerez, the
then PACER chief. Based on the PNP records, only 10 KFR cases were
reported last year, compared to 21 in 2010. Most of the cases last year occurred
in Luzon. There were 16 more cases that occurred in Mindanao but Nerez said
they did not include those incidents since it is more of terrorism-related rather
than illegal money-making operation by criminal groups. “It’s actually the
cooperation between the police and the stakeholders which made this possible.
We want to sustain and further strengthen this cooperation”, said Nerez
when asked about the reason of the decrease. Nerez admitted that aggressive
police operation alone, which he said they did in the past years, are not enough
to stamp out illegal KFR trade since their assessment revealed it was when
several groups like the Movement for the Restoration of Peace and Order
(MRPO), cooperate with them. Nerez revealed that such cooperation resulted
in the mapping out information drive campaign which now proved to be
29
effective- the detailed “what-to-do-steps” to avoid being kidnapped when
already kidnapped.
Official efforts to promote the Philippines as a foreign investment and
tourism destination have suffered from a series of foreign kidnapping, including
two European birdwatchers who went missing on February 1 from the restive
southern region of Mindanao. Swiss national Lorenzo Vinciguerra and Dutch
citizen Ewold Horn set out late last month on a backcountry expedition to
photograph the critically endangered Sulu hornbill. The duo were abducted by
an unknown group of gunmen in Tawi- Tawi, a vast remote area which consists
of more than 300 small islands bordering Malaysia.
The kidnapping have reminded that the Philippines remains one of the
region’s most dangerous destination for foreigners. The government’s inability
to maintain security in remote areas, some analysts say has taken the shine off
President Benigno Aquino’s efforts to lure more foreign investment and tourism.
While kidnappings for ransom are attributed to one of three rebel or
military groups operating in the country in order to fund their insurgencies,
criminal gangs and even law enforcement personnel have also been implicated
in kidnappings. As cited by Miranda (2009) entitle “Current Issues on
Kidnapping”. Just like any other organization, there are inevitability black sheep
or rotten apples in the group. They are highly valuable member to KFR groups
as they have access to high-powered weapons dude to the nature of their work.
The affiliations with government agencies also give them more ability of
covering up their crimes.
During the Marcos years, there was a massive expansion in the power
of the military and police. By the early 1980’s, many officers realized that their
30
monopoly control of loyal forces and firepower could be turned entrepreneurial
endeavors.
Specifically, they began kidnapping rich Chinese for ransom, covert
operations that became increasingly organized and businesslike during the
Aquino administration. These activities became quite sophisticated, including
obtaining inside information from banks about net worth and knowing which
families were endowed large sums of cash. The military and police-associated
operations also became less tolerant of your average, small-time kidnapping
gangs (probably viewing them as competition?).
In several cases, freelance kidnapping gangs were quickly and
effectively exterminated. The best known example was that of the liquidation of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang, apparently perpetrated by certain elite security
units under the control of now Senator Panfilo Lacson.
It has been more than two years since Japanese treasure hunter
Katayama Mamaito was abducted by the Abu Sayyaf on the Island of
Pangutaran in the southern Philippine province of Sulu. Police said Katayama,
whose real name is Toshio Ito, 66, is still alive, but there have been efforts from
either the Philippines or Japanese government to rescue the foreigner. He was
last reported to have been helping the Abu Sayyaf in cooking food for them and
freely moves around, according to Senior Superintendent Antonio Freyra, the
provincial police chief.
Aside from Katayama, the Abu Sayyaf is also holding Jordanian
journalist Baker Atyani, 43, and his two Filipino assistants Rolando Letrero,22,
and Ramelito Vela, 39. The trio went to Sulu province in June to secretly film
the Abu Sayyaf for a documentary on Al Arabiya News Channel.
31
Prior to his detention, Atyani has had previously travelled to the province
in secrecy to interview terrorist leaders. The military has previously said it would
arrest Atyani for espionage should he be released by the Abu Sayyaf. Atyan
had also clandestinely interviewed Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden before
the 9/11 attacks in the United States. He said the government has a strict no
ransom policy and authorities would not negotiate with terrorists.
Synthesis and Gaps
The reviewed literature and studies discussed above reflect some
semblance and differences with the current study but together provided useful
insights to the researcher on the operational capability of Anti – Kidnapping
Group Mindanao Field Units countering kidnapping activities.
The study of Barton and Curtis entails the public safety embodied in the
criminal justice system, which in some manner related to the study at hand
when it comes to crime prevention.
On the other hand, Allyson Thornton and McGovern provide a insight
pertaining to crisis situation wherein an individual faces risk in dealing with such
incident. Mascioni, Casciani and Byrnes able to reveal the unlawful activities
kidnap for ransom menace in the United States, UK and Mexico, emphasizing
their demands for their own organization goals. The researcher’s study is
relevant when it comes to the modus operandi of the kidnap for ransom groups
wherein what they wanted is profit they will gain.
Violence in the International Trade is the main topic of Woodwiss,
Dickerson in ‘Police Linked to Rising Kidnapping’ and Quinones’ in ‘Phoenix
Kidnap – for – Ransom Capital’ study emphasized the effect of organized
criminal groups in the business world and to individual person. Their studies
reveal the reported kidnap victims and the manner on how they operate. Both
32
studies gave some pointers to the researcher when it comes to the customary
practiced of organized crime groups. The PNP Anti – Kidnapping group able to
cope up with transnational crime, even though in some manner organized
syndicates differ in their practice in doing their nefarious activities. Kidnapping
in the high seas in the main topic of Perri, wherein kidnappers able to make
bigger ransom of money.
On the other hand, in the Dollar Vigilante issue, it provides an insight
pertaining to kidnapping incidents in the United States, affecting their economic
growth which continues to decline. On the other hand, Claridge gives emphasis
on the importance of staff training to raise security awareness and make
hostage incident more survivable. In dealing with kidnap for ransom criminals,
the personnel manning this unit must be armed with knowledge to combat this
group.
Barlow’s study reveals that the kidnap for ransom groups continuously
spreading for monetary profit to sustain its group goal and to expand
themselves in the competition with other criminal groups. The study of Barlow
in some manner related to the study, when it comes to kidnap for ransom
criminal group, for they have their own motives and goal which is to gain
monetary profit. On the other hand, Sheptyciand Ratchlife, provides an insight
as to the changing context of intelligence led policing in gathering information
to make the necessary moves in dealing with lawless elements. The studies of
the above author are similar to the study of the researchers when it comes to
policing, which encompasses the maintenance of peace and order in
community.
While Gustafson (2007) reveal that transnational crime continues to
operate across different countries for power and for their expansion to label
33
activities of a major crime group that is centered in no one jurisdiction but
operating in many. The study of Gustafson attributes to the study of at hand
when it comes to kidnap for ransom groups, wherein just like other transnational
crime group they operate illicit activities in the insight as to personnel
administration in dealing with problems that the kidnap for ransom criminals
had. Their studies are related to the study at hand for the Anti – Kidnapping
Group needs to look upon the capability of their human resources in dealing
with kidnap for ransom criminals.
While, Stigail (2013) able to discuss crimes that are not only international
but crimes that by their nature involve border crossing as an essential part of
the criminal activity. This is in line with the study at hand when crime committed
in certain circumstance like kidnapping for ransom cases.
On the other hand, Carlson reveals that a weak unit, the whole
organization is affected that weakens its law enforcement capability. His study
is in line with the present study for it denotes that if ever the Anti – Kidnapping
Group is incapable in responding to Kidnap for ransom incidents, they will be
vulnerable to transnational criminal groups. While Rothe and Ross provide an
insight the proliferations and trafficking of small arms has fuelled internal unrest
and civil wars, leading to the deaths and injury of hundreds of thousands of
innocent civilians. This is related to the study of arms trafficking can be
considered as KFR cases which need to an explanatory value for policies and
or remedies to control this type of behaviour.
On the other hand, Levy’s study is on the connection between kidnap for
ransom criminals and terrorism. That funding through the use crimes activity
will affect the lethality of an organization, same with the PNP Anti – Kidnapping
Group that well-funded organized criminal group affect its operational
34
performance. Gardner, Garmerie, Marrison and Wellington study emphasize
that a specific techniques should be applied towards an effective criminal
investigation.
The study at hand is related in a way that it connotes on how criminal
investigation is being applied for police operation.
The greatest strength of investigation is the concept made by Ashley and
Anon that training facilities will surely enhance the capability of training school
to impart advanced skills and knowledge to detectives and investigators and
the police – administrator must hire people with better qualifications while Claire
and Hatties study give importance on knowledge and the excellence of teachers
in making a creative ideas in order to attain a certain goal. Just like the
graduates of Criminal Investigation Course in Negros Occidental that they will
be going to apply in their chosen profession of what they have learned during
their training.
Sumalileng (2010) identifies and explores the mandates and current
organizational set – up and logistical support of the Philippine Center on
Transnational Crime as well as the measures that can be adapted in order to
boost the Centers’ level of capability in combating the ever dynamic and multi
– faceted phenomenon that is transnational crime. He suggested that, the
government should intensifies it campaign against criminality; organized crime
groups diversify and evolve to transnational crime groups with area of
operations transcending national boundaries. His study recognized that the
need to expand and strengthen cooperation and coordination with foreign
counterparts becomes imperative.
The study of Bartolome entails the investigative capabilities of PACERS
in dealing with kidnap for ransom cases in the National Capital Region. Just like
35
the study of Pamintuan who provided an insight on how to deal with kidnap for
ransom incidents. Both studies are related to the study of the proponent when
it comes to kidnap for ransom cases, and the capability the unit concern in such
cases. On the other hand, Ferro’s study was able to discuss the impact of
kidnapping for the victims and his families as well.
Deynata (2002) touched on the policies on how to ensure greater
efficiency in dealing with offenders. This is related to the study when it comes
to preventive measure on how to deal with kidnap for ransom group, which is
of great help in promoting peace and security in the country, while the Doria’s
study emphasizes the role of InterPol National Cantered Bureau in combating
transnational crimes. In line with the study of Doria, it provides insight into how
peace and security promote and enhance the international law enforcement
cooperation in combating transnational crime. This is one way of promoting
peace and security in Zamboanga City just like what the study wants to point
out. While Turla (2009) emphasizes the role of intelligence gathering as one
major activity in community policing, this is also relevant in the study on how to
deal with lawless elements.
The study of Madrideo, Collo, and Asis (2010) centred their study in
criminal investigation. That investigation lies primarily on the successful
prosecution of cases. Criminal investigation requires the highly sophisticated
and coordinated efforts among several specialists to attain the ultimate goal of
police investigator. The studies made by the above author are related to the
study at hand when it comes to investigation of kidnap for ransom cases.
Pilar (2001) has recognized the necessity of organization to undergo
development both in business or government service. It claimed that any
organizational development process starts with the identification of problems
36
that can be solved within the organization. Also, one of the strategies of the
police to develop its organization is to become responsive to the changing
environment.
Past studies provide the researcher an output in an attempt to assess
the anti-kidnapping group Mindanao field units in Zamboanga City. None of the
studies mentioned above tackled the responsiveness of the anti-kidnapping
group Mindanao Field Unit countering kidnapping activities in Zamboanga City.
This is the identified gap of the studies which will be considered as the
contributions of these endeavors.
37
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents the discussions on the research methods used in
gathering data for the study, the sources of data, research instruments, data
collection procedures, and data analysis,.
Research Design
After careful evaluation of the nature and type of this social research
activity, the researchers opted to subscribe to the descriptive method of
research as the methodology most suited for this study.
The descriptive method of research was considered the most applicable
and suited to use for this study because it is “meant to describe events, trends,
circumstances as they exist and observed” (Strome, 2005). This is appropriate
to the strengthening the operational capability of PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit (PNP-AKG MFU) in countering kidnapping-for-ransom
activities by Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Zamboanga Peninsula.
The researchers adopted the three – pronged approach to determine the
validity of this research. First, we employed an extensive documentary analysis
of all related Anti – Kidnapping Group accomplishments reports from 2006 to
2016 to determine specific trends and other important information.
Then, we conducted interview with several key personalities who were
authorities on the subject matter to validate the results of the survey
questionnaire.
Finally, we conducted the survey questionnaire to 207 respondents.
Locale of the Study
The Philippine government and its premier law enforcement agency, the
Philippine National Police, have been battered by severe public criticisms for
alleged incapability to control and eradicate the social menace that victimizes
mostly Filipino-Chinese businessmen and their families, balikbayans, tourists,
businessmen, and industrialists.
At one point in time, the Filipino-Chinese community came close to rising
up in arms in order to protect themselves from victimization by KFR groups.
Sometimes referred to as Asia’s kidnapping capital, the Philippine
kidnapping threat continues to persist and evolve. Various Kidnap-for-Ransom
(KFR) groups have been successfully neutralized by Philippine law
enforcement agencies and yet this suggests otherwise as BBC dubbed the
country as the “kidnapping capital in the world”.
It was on their context that former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
issued Executive Order No. 8 on July 22, 1998 that created the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Commission (PAOCC) and a Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to investigate and prosecute criminal
elements in the country.
The Commission and the Task Force were under the Office of the
President chaired by the President himself with members composed of the
Secretary of Justice, National Security Adviser, the Undersecretary of the
Interior and Local Government, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Chief of the Philippine National Police and four representatives
from the private sector.
The Task Force was headed by then Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo
M Lacson and supervised by the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Commission.
On September 28, 2000, Executive Order No. 295 was issued amending
Executive Order No. 8 wherein the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
39
Force (PAOCTF) was placed under the control and supervision of the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission (PAOCC).
Executive Order No.1 was issued on April 16, 2001 abolishing the
PAOCTF thereby amending EO No. 8 and EO No. 295. Subsequently, a
Special Task Group (STAG) was activated under the command and supervision
of the Deputy Chief for Administration of the PNP, Police Deputy Director
General Hermogenes E. Ebdane Jr. During this time, all criminal cases
instituted by the PAOCTF pending before the Department of Justice or the
courts, and other cases undergoing investigation were handled and monitored
by the office of the Deputy Chief, PNP for Administration.
Moreover, this office was given the task to formulate rules and
regulations to implement this Executive Order subject to the approval of the
President.
On July 6, 2001, Executive Order No. 23 otherwise known as “Creating
the National Anti-Crime Commission (NACC) and other purpose” was issued.
NACC was under the Office of the President and chaired by the Secretary of
Justice. The commission’s main function was to formulate policies, develop
modes for coordination, and monitor implementations with regard to efforts in
preventing and combating crime.
Further, NACC created the Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF) as
the lead agency to unify, synchronize, and optimize all efforts and resources of
the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines, National
Bureau of Investigation, National Prison Service, and other concerned agencies
in handling, investigating, and prosecuting all KFR incidents/cases under Task
Force Chief.
40
On August 3, 2001, Executive Order No. 23-A or “Amending Executive
Order No. 23 dated July 6, 2001 to include the Executive Secretary as member
of the National Anti-Crime Commission” was issued.
On July 15, 2002, then the Officer-in-Charge of the PNP, PDDG
Hermogenes E. Ebdane Jr with the guidance of then President Gloria
Macapagal–Arroyo, issued LOI 12/02 to set forth the creation and
operationalization of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response
(PACER) and elaborate on its function and operational thrust. It was headed by
then PSSupt Alan LM Purisma.
Along with the creation of the office of the Anti-Kidnapping Presidential
Adviser, NAKTAF was placed under the supervision of the oversight committee
headed by the National Presidential Adviser who was then late Secretary
Angelo T. Reyes. PACER was placed as one of the line units of NAKTAF and
was headed then by PSSupt Robert B Delfin.
With the creation of the National Anti-Crime Task Force (NACTAF) under
the PAOCC, PACER was placed as one of the tasked groups along ISAF,
ACTAF, NAKTAF and AIDSOTF. PDG Edgar B Aglipay was designated as the
NACTAF Commander by Secretary Angelo T Reyes. Later, PACER was
headed by the PDG Oscar C Calderon.
On March 31, 2006, the National Anti-Crime Task Force pursuant to
Executive Order No. 463 dated September 23, 2005 was abolished by the virtue
of Executive Order No. 552. However, PACER remained to be under the Office
of the Chief, PNP.
On January 27, 2010, the Chief, PNP, PDG Jesus A Versoza approved
the PNP Letter of Instruction (LOI) 50/09 (PACER ALPHA) prescribing the
41
enhancement of actions to be undertaken by PACER to address the KFR
problem in the country. It was headed by PSSupt Isagani R Nerez.
The relentless effort of PACER had been proven effective in combating
KFR and had gained the trust and confidence of the community. Thereby, the
PNP Chief submitted for consideration by the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) a proposal to activate the PACER as a regular national support
unit of the PNP to be known as the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group (PNP AKG). It
was later approved by the Commission with the issuance of NAPOLCOM
Resolution No. 2012-027 on January 19, 2012 that abolished PACER and
simultaneously activated the Anti-Kidnapping Group (AKG) as a new National
Operational Support Unit of the PNP.
This new development widened the coverage of the PNP in addressing
kidnapping cases and created a unit that will handle all hostage situations in
the entire country.
AKG’s main function is to conduct an all-out and sustained operation
against kidnap-for-ransom groups and personalities. In doing so, AKG has
strengthened its operational capabilities to implement anti-KFR strategies and
to intensify its campaign against all forms of kidnapping and hostage situation.
The group continuously maintains linkages with other law enforcement
agencies and strengthens community participation in the fight against the
kidnap-for-ransom menace.
Lastly, it developed and maintained relevant to effectively and efficiently
and address KFR problems in the country.
The Philippine National Police Anti-Kidnapping Group (AKG) scored
some degree of success in dismantling some KFR group in the country. But the
war against kidnapping is far from over.
42
Table 3
Ten-Year Kidnap-for-Ransom Cases Perpetrated
by Anti-Kidnapping Group by Region (2006 - 2016)
Region 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
I 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
II 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
III 8 4 2 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1
IV 1 1 2 8 6 1 2 8 6 1 2
V 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
VI 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
VII 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VIII 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IX 2 0 0 3 1 2 0 1 1 25 29
X 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 0
XI 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
XII 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
XIII 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
ARMM 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
CAR 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
NCR 23 15 4 12 8 6 3 8 6 1 2
Source: AKG Accomplishment Report CY 2006 – 2016
Table 3 shows the 10-year kidnap for ransom cases perpetrated by Anti-
Kidnapping Group by region.
In the Region IX alone which is the area of the study, there were 25
cases reported for the Calendar Year 2015, and continuously increase in the
Calendar Year 2016, in the entire country region IX where most number cases
originate in the Zamboanga City.
Zamboanga Peninsula extends southwesterly toward the Sulu
Archipelago and Borneo islands. It has an area of roughly 5,600 square miles
(14,500 square km). It is between the Sulu Sea on the north and west, and
the Moro Gulf of the Celebes Sea on the south.
The boundary between the peninsula and the mainland is politically
defined by the border between the peninsula's Zamboanga del Sur province
and main island's Lanao del Norte province. The geographic Zamboanga
Peninsula consists of the provinces of Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del
Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay of Zamboanga Peninsula (Region IX); and the

43
northwestern province of Misamis Occidental in the Northern
Mindanao (Region X), and the independent Zamboanga City.
It is the land of almost 4 million people belonging to the people of
Mindanao, the Lumad groups who are pagans, the converted Moro groups, the
converted Christian groups and the Christians and non-Christian settlers. The
region is believed to be first inhabited by Subanon, which is considered as the
largest Lumad ethnic group in Mindanao.
During the Islamic colonization, some Subanon converted to Islam and
accepted the Islamic culture whom we call today the Kalibogan and those
Subanon who accepted the Christian faith, Hispanic Culture and names are
today's Zamboangueño.
C h i ef , M in d a n a o F ie ld U n it
A s s t C h ie f, M in d an ao Fie l d U n i t
A c t i on PN C O
In t el / R e s e ar c h / A n a lys i s Se c I n fo / E d u c/ F am il y L ia i so n S ec O p e ra ti o n M a n a ge m e n t Se c I n ve s t/ C a s e M o n i to ri n g Se c
C o u n ter I n te lli ge n c e/ O B A c t i on PN C O A c tio n P N CO Ev id e n c e C u s to d ia n

Sp e c ia l is t
N eg o ti at io n S p e c ia li s t T ea m Le a d e rs I n ve s tig a to r s
In t e l lig e n c e O pe ra t iv e s
A s s t N e g o Sp e c i a lis ts O p e ra tio n s P N C O s
C o m m u n i ty In fo P N C O O p e r ati ve s
As s t C o m m u n ity I n fo P N C O
C o tab ato S ate l lite O ff ic e Il ig a n Sa te lli te O ffic e D a va o Sa te lli te O ffi ce
Figure 2. AKG Mindanao Field Unit Organizational Structure

(Source: AKG MFU Brief Background)
The PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group derives its strong foundation from
different Task Forces created before it to address the Kidnapped-for-Ransom
(KFR) menace in the country.
This development has established the Anti-Kidnapping Group (AKG) as
a dedicated PNP National Support Unit to fight Kidnap-for-ransom group.
44
Table 4
Personnel Strength of AKG- Mindanao Field Unit
MFU OFFICES Actual

HQs 24
ISO 8
CSO 14
DSO 11
TOTAL 57
Source: AKG-Mindanao Field Unit PROFILE 2016
Table 4 presents the personnel strength of the PNP AKG-Mindanao
Field Unit. It has a total strength of 57 personnel composed of 5 police
commissioned officers (PCOs) and 52 police non-commissioned officers
(PNCOs).
Specifically, Zamboanga City was chosen as the locale of the study
because there were rampant cases of kidnapping incidents. To address this
problem, this study was conceptualized.
Respondents of the Study
The respondents of the study comprised of three groups of respondents.
The groups were highly knowledgeable about the matters pertaining to kidnap-
for-ransom in the Zamboanga City, Mindanao.
The first group included the Anti-Kidnapping Group personnel assigned
in the Mindanao Field Units in Zamboanga City, and Local Police in Mindanao
whereby all personnel operating in Mindanao particularly based in Zamboanga
City.
The second group was non-government organizations and/or civic
organizations that directly participate in the campaign against kidnapping such
as the Movement for Restoration, Peace and Order (MRPO), and Federation
of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce Incorporated (FFCCI).
The third group was composed of Kidnap-for-Ransom victims and their
families.
45
The members of the Philippine National Police Anti-Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Units were considered source of respondents of this study in
view of their training and experiences in conduct of intelligence work in general
as applied in countering kidnap for ransom activities.
Random Sampling was used to determine the target population among
non-government organizations that directly participated in the campaign
against kidnapping and Kidnap-for-Ransom victims and their families. The
Philippine National Police Anti-Kidnapping Group - Mindanao Field Units
considered respondents were picked at random.
Table 5
Respondents of the Study
Sample
Category of Respondents Population Percentage
Size
Philippine National Police Anti-
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field 117 56 27%
Units and Territorial Units
Non-Government
155 74 36%
Organizations/Civic Organizations
Kidnap For Ransom Victims and or
159 77 37%
Relatives
Total 431 207 100%
The first group of respondents were the Philippine National Police Anti-
Kidnapping Group - Mindanao Field Units and local police had 57 manpower
strength assigned in the Mindanao. However, as far as this study was
concerned, those operating within the Mindanao were also considered target
respondents. These operatives had a total manpower strength of 57, broken as
10 police commissioned officers and 47 police non-commissioned officers, and
60 territorial police.
For the second group of respondents, a total of 155 NGOs and civic
organizations were considered respondents of the study. For the third group of
46
respondents, a total of 159 victims and their families were chosen through
random sampling.
The application of the Slovin’s Formula using 5% margin of error is given
below:
N
N =
1 + Ne2
Where: n = number of desired sample size

N = number of population
e = margin of error at .05 level
Data Gathering Procedures
Prior to the administration of the instrument, the researchers requested
permission from the Director, Anti-Kidnapping Group. Likewise, the researchers
sought permission from the non-government organizations/civic organizations
before conducting the survey.
Having obtained such endorsements, the interview and survey were
done at a date and time convenient for all. The document review and analysis
was conducted ahead since it enabled the gathering of preliminary information
and data about the subject of this study.
Interview was conducted in order to establish and validate the
problematic issues. The instrument was administered personally to the
respondents. After the administration and gathering of the accomplished
questionnaires, the researchers tallied and summarized the data.
Statistical treatment of the data was undertaken under the guidance of
an expert statistician. Presentation, analysis, and interpretation of data were
made in accordance to the questions posed in the statement of the problem.
The organized findings were made bases in arriving at the conclusions and in
making recommendation for the study.

47
Data Gathering Instruments
Primary data for this study was gathered using the survey questionnaire
and the interview guide questions both of which were designed and constructed
by the researchers.
Survey Questionnaire was used as a tool or instrument to determine
what issues and concerns were considered by the respondents of the study to
have the greatest impact of current operational capability of Anti-Kidnapping
Group Mindanao Field Units in countering kidnapping activities.
The questionnaire had four major parts. Part 1 was intended to
determine the profile of the respondents in terms age, gender, educational
attainment and civil status.
Part 2 contained the assessment of the three groups of respondents on
the operational capability of Anti-Kidnapping Group - Mindanao Field Units in
countering Kidnapping Activities in terms of manpower capability, logistical
capability, strategic and tactical capability, and stakeholders’ collaboration
capability.
Part 3 contained the problems encountered by the Anti-Kidnapping
Group - Mindanao Field Units in countering kidnapping activities.
Part 4 was the proposed measures that may be instituted to address
problems encountered by Anti-Kidnapping Group - Mindanao Field Units in
countering kidnapping activities in terms of manpower capability, logistical
capability, strategic and tactical capability, and stakeholders’ collaboration
capability.
48
The interview guide was used in interviewing key officers of the
respondents groups involved in the study as well as other major stakeholders
against KFR groups and among others.
In gathering secondary data or those coming from printed literature,
journal and publications, the documentary review and analysis or the more
commonly known as “Library Technique” were used. The internet was also
tapped for up – to date information. Along this area of data – gathering, the
index card, notebook and computer data downloading were the most useful
instruments in data – banking.
Data Analysis
The following statistical tool and techniques were used to ensure the
valid and systematic presentation, analysis, and interpretation of data:
a. Percentage distribution was used in determining the percentage of the
respondents or the sample size.
The formula used in the application of the percentage distribution is
given below:
f x 100
% =
N
Where: % = Symbol for Percentage

f = frequency or number of cases
N = total population or respondents
100 = Constant
b. Weighted Mean was used to measure the central tendency in analyzing
the results of the survey conducted. The obtained weighted mean is an
average of all the scores by the two groups of the respondents in
response to question items raised in Part 2, 3 and 4 of the questionnaire.
49
This was computed to determine the average response of the
respondents on the various factor considered in the study.
The formula for the computation of weighted mean is given below:
𝛴𝑓(𝑤)
𝑥̅ =
𝑁
Wherein:
X - Computed weighted mean score

Σ - Symbol of summation
f - Frequency or number of cases
w - Weight point in a given scale
N - Total number of population
c. A 5 – Point scale patterned after the Likert – Scale was used as a tool in
making a descriptive evaluation of the quantitative data obtained from
the survey results. For verbal interpretation of the computed weighted
means, the following interval were be closely observed:
Table 6
Likert – Scale Table for Respondents’ Assessment on the Operational
Capability of PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities by ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Stakeholders Collaboration Capability
Limits and
Scale Adjectival Equivalent
Boundaries
5 4.20 – 5.00 Very Effective
4 3.40 – 4.19 Effective
3 2.60 – 3.39 Moderately Effective
2 1.80 -2.59 Less Effective
1 1.00 – 1.79 Not Effective
Table 7
Likert –Scale Table for Respondents’ Assessment on the Problems
Encountered by the PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG
in Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Manpower Capability
Limits and
Boundaries
5 4.20 – 5.00 Very Serious
4 3.40 – 4.19 Serious
3 2.60 – 3.39 Moderately Serious
2 1.80 -2.59 Less Serious
1 1.00 – 1.79 Not Serious
50
Table 8
Likert –Scale Table for Respondents’ Assessment on the Problems
Encountered by the PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG
in Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Logistical Capability
Limits and
Boundaries
5 4.20 – 5.00 Highly Recommended
4 3.40 – 4.19 Recommended
3 2.60 – 3.39 Moderately Recommended
2 1.80 -2.59 Less Recommended
1 1.00 – 1.79 Not Recommended
51
CHAPTER 4
PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA
This chapter covers the presentation, analysis, and interpretation of all
the data gathered for the study, in response to the research question in Chapter
I. The respondents’ answers to the survey questionnaires were tallied,
classified, processed, and tabulated.
There 207 respondents comprised of fifty-seven (57) PNP AKG MFU
personnel, sixty (60) PNP territorial police personnel in the Mindanao, 155
NGOs and civic organizations representative and 159 victims and their families
were chosen through random sampling.
As for the age category of the respondents: 25 respondents belongs to
ages 20-30 years old; 128 respondents belong to ages 31 to 40 years old; 37
respondents from ages 41 to 50 years ; and 17 respondents from ages 51-60
years old.
Respondents’ Assessment on the Operational Capability of PNP Anti-
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in Countering KFR Activities of
Abu Sayyaf in Zamboanga Peninsula
The assessment on the operational capability of PNP AKG MFU in
countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula are demonstrated
in the following tables as to manpower capability, logistical capability, strategic
and tactical capability, and stakeholder collaborative capability.
The assessment on manpower capability pertains to the ability or
strength of the AKG MFU to undertake a certain specified task; logistical
capability which is the financial support of a unit or organization receives as
provided for the budget or additional funding for other sources as authorized by
higher authorities; strategic and tactical capability which look forward on the
program of action undertaken by the PNP AKG MFU in combating syndicates
of kidnap for ransom and stakeholders’ capability whereas collaboration,
partnership and cooperation in between the concerned PNP units with the other
law enforcement agencies, other agencies of the government, non –
government organizations, civic volunteers organizations, and private entities
for a common interest and concern.
Table 9
Respondents’ Assessment on the Operational Capability of
PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Manpower Capability
KFR
NGOs/CIVIC GRAND
PNP AKG VICTIMS/
INDICATORS MEMBERS MEAN
RELATIVES
WM VI WM VI WM VI AWM VI
1. Respond promptly to report
Kidnap – for – Ransom (KFR)
4.27 VE 3.68 E 3.38 ME 3.78 E
incidents in accordance with
the existing procedures.
2. Aid and assist the distress
family of the victim during 4.41 VE 3.76 E 4.08 E 4.08 E
negotiations.
3. Influence KFR victims and
their families to be cooperative 4.43 VE 3.82 E 4.04 E 4.10 E
with the authorities.
4. Organize a cohesive action
among personnel for the
conduct of follow – up 3.81 E 3.39 ME 3.33 ME 3.51 E
operation and investigation of
unsolved cases.
5. Motivate members of the PNP
AKG for them to be more
4.08 E 3.36 ME 3.31 ME 3.58 E
dedicated in performing their
assigned task.
Overall Weighted Mean 4.20 VE 3.60 E 3.63 E 3.81 E
VI – Verbal
LEGEND: WM – Weighted Mean
Interpretation
AWM – Average Weighted
Mean
4.20 – 5.00 Very Effective (VE)
3.40 – 4.19 Effective (E)
2.60 – 3.39 Moderately Effective (ME)
1.80 – 2.59 Less Effective (LE)
1.00 – 1.79 Not Effective (NE)
53
Manpower Capability
Table 9 presents the respondents’ assessment on the operational
capability of PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga
Peninsula as to Manpower Capability.
As for the indicator ‘organize a cohesive action among personnel for the
conduct of follow – up operation and investigation of unsolved cases,’ obtained
the lowest rating with a weighted mean of 3.81 was observed for the PNP Anti
– Kidnapping Group personnel with a verbal interpretation of effective, a
moderately effective mean rating 3.39 for the non – government
organization/civic organization’ members and a mean rating of 3.33 for the
Kidnap – for – Ransom victims or relatives, with a verbal interpretation of
‘moderately effective’. An Average of Weighted Mean of 3.51 was obtained,
verbally interpreted as Effective when it comes to cohesive action among
personnel in the investigation of unsolved cases.
The three groups of respondents assessed the effectiveness of the
group when it comes to ‘motivate the members of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping
Group for them to be more dedicated in performing their assigned task,’ For the
PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group for personnel a weighted mean of 4.08 was
obtained with a verbal interpretation of effective, the NGOs/Civic Organizations’
members received a weighted mean of 3.36 and the KFR victims/relatives
obtained a weighted mean 3.31 both verbally interpreted as moderately
effective. Based from the table we can notice that there are disparities on the
assessment made by the three (3) groups of respondents. Police officers follow
orders from their subordinate but it is important that they must self-motivate to
initiate and complete any crime prevention efforts of their own.
54
Based from the data gathered, ‘respond promptly to report Kidnap – For
– Ransom (KFR) incidents in accordance with the existing procedures’ showed
weighted mean of 3.78 interpreted as effective. As shown in the table, the PNP
Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel obtained a weighted mean of 4.27
equivalent to very effective, whereas the NGOs/Civic Organizations’ members
received a weighted mean of 3.68 equivalent to effective whereas the KFR
victims or relatives themselves received a weighted mean of 3.38 believed to
be moderately effective.
The same table reveals that the group ‘aid and assist the distress family
of victim during negotiations’ rated by the PNP AKG personnel, non –
government organizations/civic organizations members and KFR
victims/relatives as effective with weighted means of 4.41, 3.76 and 4.08,
respectively. Posting an Average Weighted Mean of 4.08 when it comes to
assisting victims’ family during negotiations.
As shown in the table, the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel
obtained a weighted mean of 4.43 interpreted as very effective in ‘influence
Kidnap – for – Ransom victims and their families to be cooperatives with the
authorities’ was considered the highest rating. Whereas, the NGO/Civic
Organizations members rated effective of the AKG in influencing the families of
victims to be cooperative as effective obtained weighted mean 3.82, while the
KFR victims/relatives also rated effective yield weighted mean of 4.04. The
respondents rated effective with an Average Weighted Mean of 4.10.
The above results imply that as far as manpower capability is concerned
the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel showed an overall weighted mean
of 4.20 verbally interpreted as very effective, the non – government
organization/civic organizations members respondents showed an overall
55
weighted mean of 3.60 while the KFR victims or relatives respondents showed
an overall weighted mean of 3.63 with a verbal interpretation of effective. In
summary, an overall AWM of 3.81 was obtained in terms of manpower
capability as perceived by the three (3) groups of respondents.
Comparing the assessment made by the three (3) groups of
respondents, it was observed that the indicators on the organized a cohesive
of unsolved cases was rated with lowest weighted mean rating of 3.81, 3.39,
and 3.33 by the PNP AKG MFU personnel, NGOs/Civic Organizations’
members and KFR victims/relatives respectively. Although the group of
respondents differed in their verbal interpretations with effective from the police
personnel, and moderately effective from the NGOs/Civic organization’s
members and KFR victims/relatives.
The three groups of respondents had different observations on the
indicator that obtained the highest weighted rating. For the PNP AKG
personnel, the highest weighted mean of 4.43 was recorded on the indicators
‘influenced KFR victims and their families to be cooperative with the authorities’,
same with the NGOs/civic organizations members but differ in rating with
weighted mean of 3.82 to an effective mean, which was contrast with the KFR
victims/relatives weighted mean of 4.08 on the indicators ‘aid and assist the
distress family of the weighted during negotiations.
As shown in the table, all the three (3) groups of respondents are in one
opinion that the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel in assessing the
operational capability of PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula. This only shows that the effectiveness of the group rely
on its human resources wherein they are performing their tasks accordingly
based on their assigned task. This is congruent with the finding of Garcia
56
(2003), ‘PNP Capabilities in Handling Crime Using Computer and the Internet,’
narrated that being the primary law enforcement agency in the country, the
Philippine National Police must consider human resources in order to establish
an effective working mechanism that will address computer crimes. Experts or
specialist must be developed. Due to the fast rate at which communications and
computer technologies evolve, personnel who will be tasked to work on this
area must receive regular and frequent training in the investigation and
prosecution of computer crimes.
Table 10
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Logistical Capability
KFR
NGOs/CIVIC GRAND
INDICATORS PNP AKG VICTIMS/
MEMBERS MEAN
RELATIVES
1. Sufficient vehicles for the
conduct of covert police 3.57 E 3.29 ME 3.25 ME 3.37 ME
operations against kidnappers.
2. Reliable equipment to be used
in the conduct of surveillance 3.41 E 3.17 ME 3.29 ME 3.29 ME
operations.
3. Suitable armaments and
tactical gears to be used in the 4.33 VE 3.60 E 3.83 E 3.92 E
conduct of rescue operation.
4. Consistent technical
equipment to be used in the 3.49 E 3.20 ME 3.03 ME 3.24 ME
conduct of technical analysis.
5. Sufficient funds in the conduct
of lengthy and continuous 3.46 E 2.90 ME 2.60 ME 2.99 ME
police pursuit operations.
Overall Weighted Mean 3.65 E 3.23 ME 3.20 ME 3.36 ME
WM– Weighted VI – Verbal
Legend:
Mean Interpretation
AWM – Average Weighted Mean
Moderately
2.60 – 3.39 (ME)
Effective
57
Logistical Capabilities
The level of assessment on the operational capability of PNP AKG MFU
in countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula as to logistical as
assessed by the three groups of respondents is presented in Table 10.
From the aforementioned table, the respondents perceived to be
effective on ‘sufficient funds in the conduct of lengthy and continuous police
pursuit operations’ as the lowest rating with an average weighted mean of 2.99
verbally interpreted as effective. Whereas the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
personnel obtained a weighted mean of 3.46 equivalent to effective, the
NGOs/civic organizations’ members obtained a weighted mean of 2.90 and
2.60 on the part of KFR victims or relatives equivalent to moderately effective.
It could be gleaned from the findings reflected in the table, that an
average weighted mean 3.24 interpreted as effective on ‘tools in the conduct of
technical analysis’ as assessed by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping personnel to be
effective with a weighted mean of 3.49. The NGOs/civic organizations’
members and KFR victims/relatives group of respondents believed to be
moderately effective with a weighted means of 3.20 and 3.03 respectively. This
tend to show that the PNP AKG personnel differ from the assessments made
by the other two (2) groups of respondents, for they are the one who knows
what are the equipment being used by the group in relation to their functions in
the conduct of all out and sustained operation against KFR groups.
While ‘equipment in the conduct of monitoring/surveillance operations
against kidnappers’ received a weighted mean of 3.41 effective mean as
perceived by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel, whereas a 3.17
mean was perceived by the NGOs/civic organizations’ members interpreted as
58
effective, while the KFR victims/relatives received a weighted mean of 3.29 with
a verbal interpretation also of effective.
From the viewpoint of the PNP Anti Kidnapping Group personnel, an
effective mean was obtained that ‘sufficient vehicles for the conduct of police
operations against kidnappers’ obtained a weighted mean of 3/57. The
NGOs/civic organizations’ members and KFR victims/relatives differ from the
assessment made by the AKG personnel, with mean scores of 3.29 and 3.25
to a moderately effective mean respectively. This concept got the mean scores
of 3.37 verbally interpreted as moderately effective. In spite of limited funds to
purchase additional vehicles in conduct of police operations, the PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group able to commit themselves to fight KFR groups in the
Zamboanga Peninsula. Even though looking forward on the disparities on the
assessment of booth respondents, what is important the AKG personnel were
able to serve and protect the community.
On ‘armament and tactical gears in the conduct of tactical operation’ was
perceived to be highest rating on the part of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
personnel with a weighted mean of 4.33 equivalent to highly effective on the
part of the NGOs/civic organizations’ members and KFR victims or relatives
both the said indicators to be effective with weighted means of 3.60 and 3.83
respectively. An overall average weighted mean of 3.92 was obtained as
perceived by the three groups of respondents themselves.
Data in Table 10 reveal that the overall Weighted Mean scores of 3.65
or Effective mean rating was obtained from PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
personnel 3.23 or moderately effective was obtained as assessed KFR
victims/relatives respondents in the assessment on the operational capability of
PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
59
in terms of Logistic Capability posting a overall weighted mean of 3.36 with a
verbal interpretation of moderately effective.
The table shows that Philippine National Police Anti –Kidnapping Group
provided “very effective” rating to item number 3 as the highest rating,
armaments and tactics gears in the conduct of tactical operations, as the
highest rating. Same with the other two (2) groups of respondents although they
provided an “effective” rating to the same indicator. Overall, the respondents
gave “moderately effective” rating to the responsiveness of the PNP AKG
assessment on the operational capability of PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR
activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Logistical Capability.
Taking into account the combined assessment of the three (3) groups of
respondents, the operational capability of Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao
Field Unit countering kidnapping activities in Zamboanga peninsula in terms of
Logistic Capability was generally “moderately effective” based on the overall
grand mean of 3.36. The PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group was observed to be
most effective that armaments and tactical gears in the conduct of tactical
operation. On the other hand, top priority should be given to the item 5 ‘sufficient
funds in the conduct of lengthy and continuously police pursuit operations’ since
this was found to be the least effective area. This is in line with the study made
by Alluigan (2008) “Crime Prevention through Intelligence Operations’ that in
order to enhance capability in intelligence operations, so that they will be able
to observe proper techniques with lawless elements. The police organization,
exerts every means available to provide their operations with every support and
assistance for the successful conclusion of their mission pertaining to
intelligence operations.
60
Strategic and Tactical Capability
Table 11 shows the respondents’ assessment on the operational
capability of PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga
Peninsula in terms of Strategic and Tactical Capability.
Table 11
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Strategic and Tactical Capability
NGOs/CIVIC KFR VICTIMS/ GRAND
INDICATORS PNP AKG
MEMBERS RELATIVES MEAN
1. Liaison with the victims’ family 4.51
VE 4.26 VE 3.92 E 4.23 VE
for the early solution of the case
2. Dispatch negotiable team that
will assist the family victim
4.56 VE 4.24 VE 4.17 E 4.32 VE
throughout the duration of
negotiation phase.
3. Coordinate with territorial police
units and other law enforcement
agencies in areas where kidnap 4.46 VE 4.34 VE 4.29 VE 4.36 VE
– for– ransom incidents have
been taken place.
4. Collaborate with the concerned
territorial police and other law
enforcement personnel involved
4.59 VE 4.00 E 3.83 VE 4.14 E
to include the prosecutor on
case to ensure the filling air tight
cases against the kidnappers.
5. Train its personnel to improve
their tactical capabilities in
rescue operation of victim and 4.43 VE 3.90 E 3.52 E 3.95 E
in neutralizing kidnap-for-
ransom groups.
Overall Weighted Mean 4.51 VE 4.15 E 3.95 E 4.20 VE
Legend: WM – Weighted Mean VI – Verbal Interpretation

As shown in the table a “very effective” rating to the indicator ‘train its
personnel to improve their tactical capabilities in rescue operation of victim/s
and in neutralizing kidnap – for –ransom groups, obtained the lowest mean with
61
a weighted mean of 4.43 as assessed by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
personnel, whereas non – government organizations/civic organizations’
groups and KFR victims/relatives themselves believed to be effective with a
weighted mean of 3.90 and 3.52 respectively. When it comes to improve the
tactical capabilities of PNP AKG in rescuing the victims of syndicates groups
the three groups of respondents adhere to themselves that the PNP AKG in
response to KFR groups. Nevertheless, 207 respondents yielded an Average
Weighted Mean of 3.96 equivalent to Effective. In spite of a majority rating of
very effective in the five indicators, still it has been affected by two (2) ratings
of effectives as observed by the NGOs/civic organizations’ members and KFR
victims/relatives. Although in some manner, still a very effective mean was
observed.
Another assessment made by the three groups of respondents with an
Effective response at the practice was indicator 4, ‘collaborate with the
concerned territorial police and other law enforcement personnel involved to
include the prosecutor on case to ensure the filing of air tight cases against the
kidnappers’ with 4.14. The said issue, the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
personnel respondents considered to be very effective with a weighted mean
of group personnel respondents considered to be very effective with weighted
mean of 4.59 although in some manner, the NGOs/civic organizations’
members and KFR victims/relatives themselves give an effective rating 4.0 and
3.83 respectively. The three (3) groups of respondents themselves adhere to
the notion that the PNP AKG is effective in collaboration with other concerned
police personnel involve in this particular case.
From the standpoint of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel, they
viewed the indicator ‘liaison with the victims’ family for the early solutions of the
62
case’ as very effective as manifested by their ratings of 4.51 mean. The findings
indeed, supported by the second group of respondents as the PNP AKG able
to liaison with victims family was very effective as evidenced by weighted mean
of 4.26. Meanwhile, the KFR victims/relatives assessed to be effective as
evidence by the weighted mean of 3.92. In some, the three groups of
respondents have indeed assessed the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group to be
Very Effective as indicated with their general weighted average 4.23.
Comforting the victims’ family is one way of showing that the PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group are looking forward in the welfare of the victims family. It is
important on the part of the police personnel to liaison with the said family in
order to ensure that they know that what conversation lies between the family
and kidnappers.
In reference to the ‘dispatch negotiable team that will assist the family
victim throughout the duration of negotiation phase’ the PNP Anti Kidnapping
Group personnel perceived this performance to be effective with VM of 4.56
while the NGOs/civic organizations’ members believed that the group able to
dispatch a team for negotiation as very effective indicated by the obtained
weighted mean 4.24, whereas, the KFR victims/relatives yielded a weighted
mean of 4.17 to the level of effective. The groups of respondents carried out to
the level of very effective with an average weighted mean of 4.32. This aspect
of the PNP Anti –Kidnapping Group shows that they were able detail negotiation
team during the negotiation phase in dealing with organized criminal groups to
ensure that the victims’ family are aware of what the kidnappers wanted to
during the negotiation.
The three groups of respondents do not differ in their perception on
‘coordinate and link up with territorial police units and other law enforcement
63
agencies in areas where kidnap for ransom incident has taken place’. The PNP
AKG personnel respondents that this performance was very effective as
indicated an obtained mean of 4.46. On the other hand, the NGOs/civic
organizations members also indicated that coordination with other territorial
police units was very effective as supported by the obtained mean of 4.34, while
the KFR victims/relatives assessed to a weighted mean of 4.29 interpreted also
as very effective, garnering an overall weighted mean of 4.36 as manifested by
their ratings of very effective.
Even though the three groups of respondents had differences in their
assessments on the individual indicators of the strategies variable, the PNP
AKG personnel, NGOs/civic organizations group and KFR victims/families
showed conformity in their overall assessment as to strategies on the
responsiveness of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group against organized criminal
groups. It was found out that respondents groups differ in their adjectival
ratings, with overall weighted mean of 4.51, 4.15 and 3.96 corresponding to the
assessment of the PNP AKG personnel, NGOs/civic organizations’ members
and KFR victims/relatives respectively. The grand mean was computed to be
4.20 viewed as very effective.
The continuing challenge faced by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group is
to help crack kidnap for ransom syndicates not only in the Zamboanga
Peninsula but throughout the country. The group able to be keep crime rate at
low level and maintain peace and order in the society, display strength in
suppressing kidnap – for – ransom which is a perennial problem of the country
though their operational aspect’ ability in dealing with lawless elements. The
Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field unit employed multitude of operational
64
strategies in order to deal with a vast array of problems and situations in the
line of duty.
This is in support to the Downing (2008) ‘Policing Syndicated Crime in
the United States: The Los Angeles Department’s Converge Strategy,’ denotes
that for local police to successfully meet the challenges posed by syndicated
groups, the time tested approaches that emphasize prevention must converge
with new ones that focus on prediction. The systems designed to protect
sensitive information must converge with efforts to cooperate and collaborate
with law enforcement partners in the United States and abroad. Self –
contained, territorial methods of operation must give way to strategic
relationships and the development of an international consciousness that
remains anchored in local communities.
Stakeholder Collaboration Capabilities
Table 12 shows presents the respondents’ assessment on the
operational capability of PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Stakeholders Collaboration Capability.
As reflected in the table, the three (3) groups of respondents perceived
‘facilitate for the Memorandum of Agreement and/or Memorandum of
Understanding with stakeholders’ was indicated to be moderately effective as
shown by its obtained average weighted mean of 3.14, was considered as the
lowest mean. As to implementation of Memorandum of Agreement, the PNP
Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel yield a weighted mean
of 3.94 equivalent to effective, the NGOs/civic organizations’ members received
a weighted mean of 2.59, verbally interpreted of 2.90 equivalent to be
moderately effective.
65
Table 12
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Stakeholders Collaboration Capability
KFR
NGOs/CIVIC GRAND
PNP AKG VICTIMS/
RELATIVES
1. Expand its intelligence
network with other police
units, other law enforcement
agencies and other 4.04 E 3.63 E 3.57 E 3.75 E
government units in the fight
against kidnap-for-ransom
activities.
2. Conduct meeting and
dialogue with stakeholders
4.07 E 3.61 E 3.49 E 3.72 E
as a means of sharing inputs
and feedback mechanism.
3. Facilitate anti-kidnapping-for-
ransom awareness and
advocacy seminars to the 3.98 E 3.36 ME 3.30 ME 3.55 E
community as a means of
target hardening measure.
4. Initiate team building
activities with the
stakeholders to strengthen
3.63 E 3.47 E 3.35 ME 3.48 E
cohesiveness and
cooperation in the fight
against kidnapping activities.
5. Facilitate for the
establishment of
Memorandum of Agreement /
3.94 E 2.59 LE 2.90 ME 3.14 ME
Memorandum of
Understanding with
stakeholders.
Overall Weighted Mean 3.93 E 3.33 ME 3.32 ME 3.53 E
Forgoing a Memorandum of Agreement is one way of showing the
concerned of both parties to ensure peace and security in the community to
fight crime particularly the Kidnap for Ransom incidents. The group in line with
the awareness strategy in dealing with community, they shall establish rapport
66
to maintain a harmonious working relationship with other concerned agencies
and civic organizations to give and coordinate the desired understanding and
cooperation.
The indicator on ‘Initiate team building activities with stakeholders to
strengthen cohesiveness and cooperation in the fight against kidnapping
activities’ as effective by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel by the
obtained weighted mean of 3.63, while a weighted mean of 3.47 was obtained
from the assessment made by the NGOs/civic organizations’ members for
effective rating.
On the other hand, a moderately effective rating was obtained on the
assessment made by the KFR victims/relative with weighted mean of 3.35.
Posting an overall Average Weighted Mean of 3.48, verbally interpreted as
effective. The Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao
Field Unit have come a long way adapting to the increasingly complex threats
of today which is Kidnap – for - Ransom.
They are responsible for producing cohesiveness and cooperation in the
realization towards understanding the environment and what to get target in the
environment. In response, the Anti – Kidnapping Group entails the inclusion of
the private sector in the fight against KFR syndicates.
For the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel, non – government
organizations/civic organizations’ members and KFR victims/relatives
respondents, ‘facilitate for ransom awareness and advocacy seminars to the
community as a means of target hardening measure’ obtained a weighted
means of 3.98, 3.36 and 3.29 respectively with a verbal interpretation of
effective. Although the AKG personnel differ from the assessment made by the
other two groups of respondents, what is important both groups are in one in
67
that seminars is important to promote awareness on how to deal with kidnap
for ransom incidents.
As reflected on the table, the indicator that ‘conduct meeting and
dialogue with stakeholders as a means of sharing inputs and feedback’ were
similarly perceived by the PNP AKG personnel, NGOs/civic organizations’
members and KFT victims/relatives as effective as shown by the obtained
weighted means of 4.08 , 3.61 and 3.50, respectively.
An Average Weighted Mean of 3.73 posted with a verbal interpretation
of effective. Building a meaningful and responsive collaboration with the
community make the management of law enforcement operates efficiently in its
proactive and reactive functions. Understanding and yielding avowed social
contract; that is, the ultimate law for enforcement lies with the people.
As pointed out in the study made by Villanueva (2006) ‘The Barangay
Public Safety Force in the Province of Bulacan: An Assessment’ cited that an
effective meaningful and successful public relations program is continuous day
to day process.
Every police officer shall endeavor to constantly leave an impression
upon the citizenry that honesty, courtesy, and dedication are by the words of
the police existence. To this end, every police shall always demonstrate a
strong desire to improve the welfare of the community.
The conduct of dialogue with the community would let them feel their
safety and concern over their participation in the safety of the place where they
live in.
On the other hand, the ‘expand its intelligence network with other police
units, the other law enforcement agencies and other government units in the
fight against kidnap for ransom activities’ were assessed effectively with an
68
obtained mean of 4.03 as assessed by the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group
personnel, while with the assessment made by the KFR victims/ relative for 3.56
mean. Resulting in an average weighted mean of 3.74 which also translates
into a verbal rating of effective.
The findings on the level of effectiveness of the PNP Anti-Kidnapping
Group in response to organized criminal group received an overall average
weighted mean of 3.53 in terms of stakeholders collaboration which correspond
to a verbal interpretation of effective as assessed by the Anti-Kidnapping Group
personnel, non-government organizations/civic organizations’ members and
KFR victims/relatives.
The similarity of indicator ‘expand its intelligence network with other
police units, other law enforcement agencies and other government units in the
fight against kidnap for ransom’ with the highest rating under the aspect of
stakeholders collaboration indicating to an effective mean only shows that using
intelligence can be created and shared among law enforcement agencies, for
crime trends and agencies can take preventive measures to intervene or
mitigate the impact of those crimes.
On the contrary, the three groups of respondents had different
observations on the indicator that obtained the lowest weighted means values.
For the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group personnel, the mean of 3.94 was recorded
on the indicator ‘facilitate for the establishment of Memorandum of Agreement
and or Memorandum of Understanding with stakeholders’ which was in contrast
with the non-government organizations/civic organizations’ members with a
weighted mean of 2.59 to a less effective rating.
The KFR victims/relatives, on the other hand, recorded a moderately
mean of 3.14 which can be observed that the three groups of respondents were
69
contrast in their assessment. The reason behind this opinion is that both the
other two groups of respondents are not aware on the existence of
Memorandum of agreement with other stakeholders shall promote mutual
understanding on how to fight kidnap for ransom incidents.
Based from the assessment made by the three group of respondents,
this is in consonance with the study of Richardson (2006), ‘Understanding the
Enemy, Containing the Threat’, the police hold the key to mitigating and
ultimately defeating syndicated groups in the United States. Local agencies
throughout the country have the ideas and the technology to create counter
multijurisdictional, multiagency efforts, police can cast redundant network of trip
wires to determine whether individuals or enterprises represent an active threat
that warrants investigation or enforcement action. But agencies will need to be
flexible, adaptable, and transparent enough to collaborate with one another.
They will need to develop more meaningful and trusting partnerships and to
create policy that maximizes law enforcement resources. Most importantly, they
will need to go to work with communities to counter the extremism that foments
acts of syndicated crime. Policing must be a convergent strategy that fights
crime and disorder while creating hostile environments for organized criminal
groups.
Table 13 demonstrates the summary assessment of the group of
respondents on the assessment on the operational capability of Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in countering Kidnap – For – Ransom
activities of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Zamboanga City as to manpower
capability, logistics capability, strategic and tactical capability, and stakeholder
collaboration capability.
70
Table 13
Summary Assessment on the Operational Capability of PNP AKG MFU in
Countering KFR Activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
NGOs/CIVIC’ KFR VICTIMS/
INDICATORS PNP AKG GRAND
MEMBERS RELATIVES
MEAN
OWM VI OWM VI OWM VI AOM VI
1. Manpower Capability 4.20 VE 3.60 E 3.63 E 3.81 E
M M
2. Logistical Capability 3.65 E 3.23 3.20 ME 3.36
E E
3. Strategic and Tactical
4.51 VE 4.15 E 3.95 E 4.20 VE
Capability
4. Stakeholder
M
Collaboration 3.93 E 3.33 3.32 ME 3.53 E
E
Capability
Grand Mean 4.07 E 3.58 E 3.53 E 3.73 E
Legend: WM – Weighted Mean VI– Verbal Interpretation
OWM – Overall Weighted Mean
A recapitulation of the overall assessment of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping
Group Mindanao Field Unit respondents showed their highest rating on
‘strategic and tactical capability’ with an overall mean of 4.51; followed by
‘manpower capability’ with an overall mean of 4.20. ‘Stakeholder collaboration
capability’ recorded an overall mean of 3.93 and ‘logistic capability’ received
the lowest overall mean of 3.65. The grand mean of the overall assessments of
AKG respondents was 4.07, which infers their overall ‘Effective’ rating on the
responsiveness of the operational capability of Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit in countering Kidnap – For – Ransom activities of Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Zamboanga City.
For the non – government organization/civic organizations’ members
respondents, ‘strategies’ was rated effective as this called their highest overall
mean of 4.15. This was followed by ‘manpower capability’ with an overall mean
of 3.60; and then by ‘stakeholder collaborative capability’ and ‘logistical
capability’ with an overall means of 3.33 and 3.23 respectively with an adjectival
71
interpretation of moderately effective. The NGOs/civic organization members’
respondents recorded a grand mean of 3.58 which reflects their ‘effective’ rating
on the responsiveness of the operational capability of PNP AKG MFU in
countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula.
The KFR victims/relatives respondents rated effective on ‘strategic and
tactical capability’ as this elicited their highest overall mean of 3.95, this was
followed by an effective mean of 3.63 on the variable ‘manpower capability.’
Whereas, stakeholder capability and logistical capability obtained an overall
weighted mean of 3.32 and 3.20, respectively. The overall assessment of KFR
victims/relatives respondents recorded a grand mean of 3.52, which indicates
their overall ‘effectives’ rating on the responsiveness of the PNP AKG MFU in
countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula.
Considering the combined perspective of the three groups of
respondents, the responsiveness of the operational capability of PNP AKG
MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula was found
most very effective in terms of strategic and tactical capability with an average
overall mean of 4.20, while it was observed moderately effective in terms of
logistics capability. An analysis of this finding showed that the AKG implements
a variety of strategies and methods to combat organized criminal crimes and
ensure public safety.
On the other hand, it is evident that among the components of the PNP
Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit is ‘logistic capability’ which is the
most needed in the Zamboanga peninsula and the region of Mindanao for its
limited logistical support affecting the operational capabilities aspect of the
group in the fight against crime, particularly kidnap for ransom incidents to
ensure the safety of the citizenry.
72
In summary, strategic and tactical capability garnered an average overall
mean of 4.20 equivalent to a very effective rating, while manpower capability
yield an Average Overall Mean 3.81, also to an effective mean. The three
groups of respondents assessed that stakeholders’ collaboration capability is
effective with Average Overall Mean of 3.53, while an Average Overall Mean of
3.36 was obtained on logistical to a moderately effective mean. An overall AWM
of 3.73 was obtained on the effectiveness of the operational capability of PNP
AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula.
Respondents’ Assessment on the Problems Encountered by the PNP
AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula.
The problems encountered by the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR
activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula as to manpower capability, logistical
capability, strategic and tactical capability, and stakeholder collaborative
capability are presented in the following tables.
Manpower Capability
Table 14 describes the result of the responses by the respondents on
the problems encountered by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field
Unit in countering kidnapping in terms of personnel capability.
73
Table 14
Respondents’ Assessment on the Problems Encountered by
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Manpower Capability
KFR
NGOs/CIVIC GRAND
PNP AKG VICTIMS/
INDICATORS MEMBERS
RELATIVES
MEAN
1. Shortage of well trained and
capable personnel to be
2.51 LS 3.82 S 4.19 VS 3.51 S
utilized as first responder to
incident reported.
2. Shortage of well-versed and
experienced personnel to
aid and assist the distress 2.24 LS 4.0 S 4.21 VS 3.48 S
family of the victim during
negotiations.
3. Poor rapport with previous
2.41 LS 3.60 S 4.10 S 3.37 MS
victims and their families.
4. Insufficient personnel to be
utilized for the conduct of
manhunt operation and 3.19 MS 4.20 VS 4.25 VS 3.88 S
investigation of unsolved
cases.
5. Very exhausting and risky
assignment comparable to
that of personnel performing 3.03 MS 4.18 S 4.21 VS 3.81 S
regular police work with
other PNP units.
Overall Weighted Mean 2.68 MS 3.96 S 4.19 S 3.61 S
4.20 – 5.00 Very Serious (VS)
3.40 – 4.19 Serious (S)
2.60 – 3.39 Moderately Serious (MS)
1.80 – 2.59 Less Serious (LS)
1.00 – 1.79 Not Serious (NS)
The three (3) groups of respondents arrived a moderately serious
problem with the answers of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field
Unit in countering kidnapping in terms of personnel as it has a weighted mean
of 3.19, non – government organization/civic organizations’ members has a
weighted mean of 4.20 to a very serious problem and the KFR victims/relatives
got a weighted mean of 4.25 verbally interpreted as very serious that
‘insufficient personnel to utilized for the conduct of manhunt operation and
investigation of unsolved cases’ , posting an average weighted mean of 3.88
74
verbally interpreted to a serious problem as the highest rating when it comes to
insufficiency of personnel of the PNP AKG in the conduct of man operations
when comes to unsolved cases. This implies that in spite of the effectiveness
of the Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group in countering
kidnapping, they lack the necessary human resources to look forward in the
follow up of cases being unsolved that affect the group investigative skills.
As deemed from the aforementioned table, the group of PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel in the survey conducted, it
would show that their answer arrived at an average weighted mean of 3.03 and
interpreted as moderately serious problem when asked about the ‘exhausting
and risky assignment comparable to that of personnel performing regular police
work with other Philippine National Police Units’. On the other hand, the non –
government organization/civic organizations’ members arrived at a weighted
mean of 4.18 serious problem and the KFR victims/relatives arrived at a
weighted mean of 4.21 interpreted as very serious problem. The results showed
an average weighted mean of 3.81 equivalent to serious problem when it comes
to risky assignment of AKG personnel compared to other PNP units.
Meanwhile, the three (3) groups of respondents believe that ‘shortage of
well trained and capable personnel to utilize as first responders to incident
reported’ the average weighted mean 3.51 which is considered serious
problem. The PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel gave a rating of 2.51
equivalent to less serious, which is in contrast with the assessment made by
the non – government organization/civic organizations’ members with a rating
of 3.82 to a serious problem. On the other hand, the KFR victims/relatives gave
also serious problems in the said issue which yield a weighted mean of 4.19.
The assessment made by the non – government organization/civic
75
organizations’ members and KFR victims/relatives which in contrast with the
AKG personnel maybe due to the continuous KFR incidents that occur not only
in the Zamboanga Peninsula but throughout the archipelago.
It is the community whom determine the extent of kidnap – for – ransom
(KFR) which has become a profitable business for many organized crime
syndicates and terrorist organizations. On the part of the AKG personnel, they
do accept that in some manner they are shortage of personnel as first
responders and they cannot move at once due to lack of personnel detailed in
their respective units.
In the same table, it can be noted that the PNP AKG personnel obtained
a weighted mean of 2.24 to less serious problem, whereas the non –
government organization/civic organizations’ members obtained a weighted of
4.0 equivalent to serious problem. Whereas the KFR victims/relatives received
a weighted mean 4.21 which correspond to a verbal interpretation of very
serious believes that ‘shortage if well versed and experienced personnel to aid
and assist the distress family of the victim during negotiations’ poses a serious
problem when the result of the survey had an AWN of 3.48. The shortage of
knowledgeable AKG personnel to look forward on how to please KFR victims
during negotiations needs to look upon. It is important on the part of the AKG
personnel in spite that they consider a less serious problem for they are
determined to combat organized criminal groups. The other group of
respondents believed that kidnapping remains a primary security threat in the
Philippines despite the PNP efforts to downplay the problem.
The lead in rank pertains to ‘poor rapport with previous victims and their
families to include anti – crime organizations that have great influence with the
victims and their families’ whereas the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Mindanao field
76
units personnel received a WM of 2.41 to a less serious problem. The non –
government organization/civic organizations’ members received a WM 4.10
both equivalent to serious problem. An overall Average Weighted Mean of 3.37
was obtained interpreted as moderate serious problem. The three (3) groups of
respondents differ in their opinions when it comes to the inability of the AKG
personnel to provide welfare to victims and their families.
The other groups of respondents considered serious problem for they
are the ones who felt the situation between the personnel and the victims or
families when certain issues regarding kidnap for ransom incidents happen.
Overall, the Grand Mean score was computed 3.61 mean interpreted as
Serious as to assessment on the problem encountered by the PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Units in countering kidnapping in
Zamboanga City as to personnel capability as assessed by the PNP AKG
personnel, non – government organization/civic organizations’ members and
KFR victims/relatives themselves.
Even though the three (3) groups of respondents had difference in their
assessment on the individual indicators as to personnel capability, these
respondents groups showed conformity in their overall assessments of the
personnel capability aspect on the PNP AKG Mindanao Field unit countering
kidnapping. It was found out they differ in adjectival ratings, with overall
weighted mean values of 2.68, 3.96, and 4.19 corresponding to the assessment
of the AKG personnel, in response to non – government organization/civic
organizations’ members and KFR victims/relatives respectively.
Specifically, the PNP AKG Mindanao Field unit personnel gave
“moderately serious” rating on the two given indicators except on the shortage
of well trained personnel, shortage of well-versed and experienced personnel
77
and poor rapport with previous victims and their families with a verbal
interpretation of less serious. The moderately serious problem on the part of
the AKG personnel is in contrast on the opinions made by the NGOs which
considered to be serious problem and every problem on the part of the KFR
victims/relatives. Human resource is the backbone of any organization, so it is
important that the personnel assigned in the PNP AKG Mindanao Field Unit
shall be courteous enough in dealing with their assigned task.
The nature of police work requires specific qualities of police officials to
face many challenges. Among the quantities that are needed are both physical
and mental fitness. Police work also demands that police officials confront all
types of hostilities from different groups. People joining police institutions as
police officers need to be hardworking, honest and committed to police work,
to the extent that they will sacrifice their lives to combat crime. In this regard,
Bennett (2000) ‘Management and Supervision in Law Enforcement,’ stresses
that the central fact of police officers life is that she or he must be prepared to
step forward to protect the rest of us from life – threatening danger.
Thus, to recruit and retain this kind of police officer to the organization,
police institutions should have capable personnel managers who can create
attractive and motivating working conditions, lack of competence of members
is a rampant problem in the force.
78
Table 15
Respondents’ Assessment on the Problems Encountered
by PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Logistical Capability
INDICATORS NGOs/CIVIC KFR VICTIMS/ GRAND

PNP AKG MEMBERS RELATIVES MEAN
1. Insufficiency of vehicles for
the conduct of covert police 4.0
3.78 S S 4.21 VS 4.0 S
operations against 2
kidnappers.
2. Unreliable and obsolete
equipment to be used in the 4.2
4.05 S VS 4.25 VS 4.17 S
conduct of surveillance 0
operations.
3. Insufficient of suitable
armaments and tactical gear 3.7
3.37 MS S 4.10 S 3.73 S
to be used in the conduct of 2
rescue operation.
4. Outmoded or unreliable
4.1
equipment in the conduct of 3.94 S S 4.17 S 4.07 S
0
technical analysis.
5. Insufficient funds in the
conduct of lengthy and 4.2
3.95 S VS 4.29 VS 4.17 S
continuous police pursuit 8
operations.
Overall Weighted Mean 4.0
3.82 S S 4.20 S 4.03 S
6
3.40 – 4.19 Serious (S)
Table 15 describes the result of responses by the respondents on the
problems encounter by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
in countering kidnapping in terms of logistical capability.
Dissecting the table, the groups of respondent perceived ‘Insufficient
funds in the conduct of lengthy and continuous police pursuit operations.’ As
the highest rating, whereas the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group personnel
obtained a weighted mean of 3.95, the non – government organization/civic

79
organizations’ members governed a weighted mean of 4.28 equivalent to very
serious and the KFR victims/relatives garnered a weighted mean of 4.29 also
to a very serious problem posting an AWM of 4.17 equivalent to serious
problem. It is true that the nature of police operation requires that adequate
funds be available for the lack of funds in a certain operation not only affects
the AKG but at the same time the credibility of the police themselves.
For indicator ‘Obsolete and or Outmoded or unreliable equipment in the
conduct of technical analysis like monitoring surveillance operations, handheld
radios, videotapes camera’ it obtained the second highest weighted mean of
4.17 with a verbal interpretation of serious problem. The assessment that gives
a rating of serious as assessed by the PNP Anti Kidnapping Group personnel
obtained a weighted mean of 4.05 the non – government organization/civic
organizations’ members received a weighted mean of 4.20 very serious very
problem and the KFR victims/relatives had a weighted mean of 4.25 also
equivalent to very serious. The outmoded equipment hinders the operations of
the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group particularly in monitoring to pursue their
battles against organized criminal group in Zamboanga City.
As far as the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Units
personnel are concerned, indicator: ‘outmoded tools in the conduct of technical
analysis like the manual recording and analysis computer software’ garnered
the third highest weighted mean of 3.94 with a verbal interpretation of serious.
On the other hand, the non – government organization/civic organizations’
members facilitated a weighted mean of 4.10 also equivalent to serious problem
and the KFR victims/relatives received a weighted mean of 4.17 to a serious
problem. Posting an average weighted mean of 4.07 described as serious
problem. Just like outmoded equipment in the conduct of surveillance, the
80
outmoded tools in the conduct of technical analysis also hampers the
operational aspects of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Units
in the conduct of an all-out and sustain operation against kidnapped for ransom
groups.
Followed by the ‘insufficiency of vehicles for the conduct of police
operations against kidnappers’ had a weighted mean of 3.78 interpreted as
serious problem as assessed by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao
Field Unit personnel, the non – government organization/civic organizations’
members (WM = 4.02) to a serious problem and the KFR victims/relatives
themselves (WM = 4.21) to a serious problem posting an average weighted
mean of 4.0 with a verbal interpretation of serious problem. This tends to show
that the group of respondents themselves are aware on the seriousness of the
problem when it comes to insufficiency of vehicles affecting their efficiency
throughout their operations.
For the indicator: ‘shortage of armaments and tactical gears in the
conduct of rescue operations’ as the lowest with an average weighted mean if
3.73 with a verbal interpretation of serious problem. The PNP Anti – Kidnapping
Group Mindanao Field Unit as moderately serious with a weighted mean of 3.51
to a serious problem. The KFR victims/relatives gave the same notions when it
comes to the said problem wherein a weighted mean of 4.16 was obtained.
They were assessed by the three (3) groups of respondents as serious problem
with an average weighted mean of 3.73. Sometimes, the personnel of the PNP
Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit were not able to strengthen their
operations due to the shortage of armament. They are the one exerts means
available to provide their operations with every support and assistance for the
successful conclusion of their mission in countering kidnapping groups.
81
The answer of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit,
non – government organization/civic organizations’ members and KFR
victims/relatives respondents resulted into an overall average weighted mean
of 4.03 on the problems encountered by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping verbal
interpretation of serious problem.
Specifically, the three groups of respondents gave a very serious and
serious rating in the four indicators except on indicator ‘shortage of armaments
and tactical gears in the conduct of rescue operation’ as observed by the PNP
Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit themselves which verbally
interpreted as moderately serious problem.
In spite of the prevailing constraints encountered by the PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit particularly on the inadequacy of funds
to support police operations, they were able to continue effort to address kidnap
for ransom incidents with the support and cooperation of the families of the
victims themselves and other law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, Zeray
(2000) study ‘The need of additional and international reform in promoting
human right: The Ethiopian Police Project,’ cited the maximum attention from
the executive and top police leadership in building police institutions to produce
skilled, knowledgeable, ethical and confident personnel with financial and
logistical support, are basic for rescuing the organization, that need due
attention.
problems encountered by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field
Unit in countering kidnapping in terms of strategic and tactical capability.
82
Table 16
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Strategic and Tactical Capability
NGOs/CIVIC KFR VICTIMS/

PNP AKG GRAND
INDICATORS MEMBERS RELATIVES
MEAN
1. Hesitancy of the family to
report the incident to the police
3.67 S 4.20 VS 4.31 VS 4.06 S
due to fear of reprisal with the
kidnappers.
2. Rejection of the Family victim
to cooperate with the
negotiation team due to the 4.02 S 4.04 S 4.10 S 4.05 S
safety of the victim under
captivity
3. Involvement of some misfit
and undesirable police and
other law enforcement agency
personnel assigned in the 3.56 S 4.26 VS 4.27 VS 4.03 S
area with the involved
members of kidnap – for –
ransom group.
4. Poor collaboration with the
concerned territorial police
and other law enforcement
personnel involved to include M
3.32 4.18 S 4.29 VS 3.93 S
the prosecutor on the case S
that resulted to dismissal of
case in court against the
kidnappers.
5. Insufficient fund for the
conduct of needed training to
its personnel to improve their
tactical capabilities in rescue 3.92 S 4.30 VS 4.35 VS 4.19 S
operation of victim and in
neutralizing kidnap – for
ransom groups.
Overall Weighted Mean 3.70 S 4.20 VS 4.27 VS 4.05 S
3.40 – 4.19 Serious (S)
As revealed in the table, the highest perceived rating pertains to the
indicator ‘Insufficient fund for the conduct of needed training to its personnel to
improve their tactical capabilities in rescue operation of victim and in

83
neutralizing kidnap – for ransom groups’ which gathered a weighted mean of
3.92 as assessed by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit,
the non – government organization/civic organizations’ members gathered a
weighted mean of 4.30 equivalent to a very serious problem and 4.35 as seen
by the KFR victims/relatives also to a very serious problem yielding an average
weighted mean of 4.19 also equivalent to a serious problem.
In the same manner, the Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
(WM = 3.67), equivalent to serious problem, non – government
organization/civic organizations’ members (WM = 4.20) with a verbal
interpretation of very serious and the KFR victims/relatives (WM = 4.31) rated
the indicator ‘hesitancy of the family to report the incident to the police due to
fear of reprisal with the kidnappers’ as very serious problem, with an average
weighted mean of 4.06 which corresponds to a verbal interpretation of serious
problem. It is important that AKG personnel themselves shows professionalism
and commitment in dealing with KFR victims’ families. Showing comfort to
distress families is one way of promoting total commitment on their part and
determines to punish those abductors.
As to ‘rejection of the family victims to cooperate with the negotiable
team due to the safety of the victim under captivity’, an average weighted mean
of 4.06 with a verbal interpretation of serious. Results showed that the Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit received a weighted mean of 4.02,
equivalent to serious problem, on the other hand, the non – government
organization/civic organizations’ members obtained a weighted mean of 4.04
also to a serious problem and the KFR victims/relatives had similar serious
problem verbal interpretation (WM = 4.10).
84
The survey results on the group of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit with respect to the indicator ‘involvement of some misfits
and undesirable police and other law enforcement agency personnel assigned
with the territorial unit/area of operation with members of kidnap for ransom
group’ show a weighted mean of 3.556, with a verbal interpretation of serious
problem. On the other hand, the response of the non – government
organization/civic organizations’ members garnered a weighted mean of 4.26
verbally interpreted as very serious problem and the KFR victims/relatives
assessed also very serious as evidence by the weighted mean of 4.27. Posting
an average weighted mean of 4.03, interpreted as serious problem when it
comes to involvement of some misfits of the police organization in kidnap for
ransom group in Zamboanga City. It is true that some man in uniform are in line
with kind of activity, for the benefits they gained in one transaction only of kidnap
for ransom cases which greatly affects the PNP organization.
Based on the findings of the study, an average weighted mean of 3.93
serious problem was obtained on the indicator ‘poor collaboration with the
concerned territorial police and other law enforcement personnel involved to
include the prosecutor on case that resulted to the dismissal of case/s in court
against the kidnappers’. Whereas the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao
Field Unit gave an weighted mean of 3.32 to a moderately serious problem, the
non – government organization/civic organizations’ members obtained a
weighted mean of 4.18 equivalent to serious while the KFR victims/relatives
yield a weighted mean of 4.29 with a verbal interpretation of very serious.
Overall, the Grand Mean Score of 4.05 was obtained which means that
the respondents saw it to be serious problem as to the problems encountered
by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in countering
85
kidnapping in Zamboanga City in terms of strategic and tactical capability.
Based in the assessment made by the respondents themselves, it shows that
there were some lapses in the strategies undertaken by the police personnel
themselves in dealing with kidnap for ransom cases.
The table shows that the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field
Unit, non – government organization/civic organizations’ members and KFR
victims/relatives considers the problem encountered in the strategies aspect to
be serious particularly in the indicators ‘insufficient fund for the conduct of
needed training to its personnel to improve their tactical capabilities in rescue
operation of victim and in neutralizing kidnap for ransom groups’. In line with
the above, as far as the contribution of personnel management practice to
police service is concerned, Giller (2003) ‘leadership skills for bounty
performance’ has indicated that: “The quality of policing depends on the quality
of people doing policing and the success of police organization depends on how
well these people are selected, trained, evaluated, promoted and supported.
problems encounter by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
in countering kidnapping in terms of stakeholders collaboration capability.
Dissecting the table, the groups of respondent assessed ‘absence of
memorandum of Agreement/Memorandum of Understanding with the
stakeholders’ as the highest rating of 4.05, equivalent to serious problem. Non
– government organization/civic organizations’ members and KFR
victims/relatives considered this issue as very serious of 4.38and 4.29
respectively. The PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel
perceived serious problem with a weighted mean of 3.48. The disparity on the
assessment made by the three groups of respondents only show that it is the
86
non – government organization/civic organizations’ members and KFR
victims/relatives knows the absence of MOA particularly in binding the police
and a certain organization for a common purpose particularly in abating kidnap
for ransom cases.
Table 17
PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in Zamboanga
Peninsula in terms of Stakeholders Collaboration Capability
INDICATORS NGOs/CIVIC KFR

The following are the problems PNP AKG ORGANIZATION VICTIMS/ GRAND
S’ MEMBERS RELATIVES MEAN
that affect the PNP AKG as to
stakeholder collaborative WM VI WM VI WM VI AWM VI
capabilities:
1. Poor intelligence networking with
other police units, other law
enforcement agencies and other
3.08 MS 4.04 S 4.10 S 3.74 S
government units in the fight
against kidnap-for-ransom
activities.
2. No regular meeting and dialogue
with stakeholders as a means of
3.02 MS 4.18 S 3.90 S 3.70 S
sharing inputs and feedback
mechanism.
3. Limited conduct of anti – kidnap –
for – ransom awareness and
advocacy seminars to the 3.27 MS 4.36 VS 4.40 VS 4.01 S
community due to voluminous
tasking to attend to.
4. Lack of team building activities
with the stakeholders to
strengthen cohesiveness and 3.81 S 4.16 S 4.13 S 4.03 S
cooperation in the fight against
kidnapping activities.
5. Absence of Memorandum of
Agreement / Memorandum of 3.48 S 4.38 VS 4.29 VS 4.05 S
Understanding with stakeholders.
Overall Weighted Mean 3.33 MS 4.22 VS 4.16 S 3.91 S
Legend: WM – Weighted Mean VI– Verbal Interpretation
3.40 – 4.19 Serious (S)
87
The groups of respondents believed that ‘lack of team building activities
with the stakeholders to strengthen cohesiveness and cooperation in the fight
against kidnap activities’ to be serious problem. The assessment made by the
PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel gives a rating of
a serious problem with a weighted mean of 3.18 and non – government
organization/civic organizations’ members received a weighted mean of 4.16
and the KFR victims/relatives had a weighted mean of 4.13 also equivalent to
serious problem, posting an average weighted mean of 4.03 verbally
interpreted as serious problem when it comes to lack of tram building in the fight
against kidnapping activities. The inability of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit in promoting cohesiveness and cooperation affects their
performance for crime prevention is not only the sole responsibility of the police
but need also the cooperation of other concerned organizations.
The survey results on the group of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit personnel with respect to the indicator ‘limited conduct of
anti – kidnap for ransom awareness and advocacy seminars to the community
due to voluminous tasking to attend to’ show a weighted mean of 3.27, with a
verbal interpretation of moderately serious problem. On the other hand, the
response of the non – government organization/civic organizations’ members
garnered a weighted mean of 4.36 verbally interpreted as very serious and the
KFR victims/relatives assessed also a very serious as evidence by the weighted
mean of 4.40. Posting an average weighted mean of 4.01, interpreted as
serious problem when it comes to limited conduct of seminars pertaining to anti
– kidnap for ransom awareness to the community. This imply that the office
concern fail to coordinate with the community affecting their police operation.
88
It is important on the part of the Anti – Kidnapping Group to ensure
awareness to the community so that they will know what to do during this kind
of situation. But with the kind of work that the personnel had, in some manner
they neglect their obligations in doing so.
Followed by the ‘poor intelligence networking with other police units,
other law enforcement agencies and other government units, in the fight against
kidnap for ransom activities’ had an average weighted mean of 3.08 interpreted
as moderately serious problem perceived by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit personnel, the non – government organization/civic
organizations’ members obtained a weighted mean of 4.04 to a serious problem
and the KFR victims/relatives themselves yield a weighted mean of 4.10
equivalent to serious problem, with an AWM of 3.74, also equivalent to serious
problem when it comes to poor intelligence networking.
Developing a police intelligence operation networking is to create a
seamless, real time information network capable of providing actionable
intelligence against then full range of threats affecting the organization. The
PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit must identify and develop
networking stance with other law enforcement agencies in order to develop a
successful intelligence network.
The PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel
believed that ‘no regular meeting and dialogue with stakeholders as a means
of sharing inputs and feedback mechanism’ to be moderately serious problem,
with a weighted mean of 3.02, the non – government organization/civic
organizations’ members gave a serious problem when it comes to limited and
dialogue with stakeholders wherein a weighted mean of 4.18 was obtained
whereas the KFR victims/relatives also gave the same notion of serious
89
problem with a weighted mean of 3.90, with an overall average weighted mean
of 3.70 equivalent to serious problem.
The answer of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit,
non – government organization/civic organizations’ members, and KFR
victims/relatives respondents resulted into an overall average weighted mean
of 3.91 on the problems encountered by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit in countering kidnapping in Zamboanga City in terms of
stakeholders collaboration capability with a verbal interpretation of Serious
Problem. The PNP AKG personnel assessment is moderately serious shown
by the obtained mean of 3.32, non – government organization/civic
organizations’ members is very serious shown by the mean of 4.22 and a
serious mean was obtained by the KFR victims/relatives (WM = 4.16)
The KFR victims/relatives gave the highest rating to the problems
encountered pertaining to ‘limited conduct of anti – kidnap of ransom
awareness and advocacy seminars to the community due to voluminous
tasking to attend to’ with a weighted mean of 4.40. This proves that the PNP
Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit needs also to equip the
community with knowledge on the modus operandi of kidnappers.
This is in support to the study made by Groesch (2010) entitled ‘Self
Motivated Crime Prevention Strategy’ that it is universally recognized that the
major problem facing humanly today are related mainly to the preservation of
peace. With the global phenomena of kidnap for ransom syndicates, the law
enforcement agencies simply cannot perform peacekeeping in isolation.
The community and the police have important roles to play, recognizing
that all must share in the decision that affects lives.
90
Table 18 shows the summary of assessment made in determining the
problems encounter by the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG
in Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of manpower capability, strategic and tactical
capability, logistical capability, and stakeholders collaboration capability.
Table 18
Summary Assessment on the Problems Encountered by PNP AKG MFU
in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
NGOs/CIVIC
KFR VICTIMS/
INDICATORS PNP AKG ORGANIZATIO
RELATIVES
GRAND
NS’ MEMBERS MEAN
1. Manpower Capability 2.68 MS 3.96 S 4.19 S 3.61 S
2. Logistical Capability 3.82 S 4.06 S 4.20 VS 4.03 S
3.70 S 4.20 VS 4.27 VS 4.06 S
Capability
4. Stakeholders
3.33 MS 4.22 VS 4.16 S 3.91 S
Collaboration Capability
Overall Weighted
3.36 MS 4.11 S 4.21 VS 3.90 S
Mean
Legend: AOM – Average Overall Mean VI – Verbal Interpretation
OWM –Overall Weighted Mean
3.40 – 4.19 Serious (S)
A rundown of the problems encountered that affect the effectiveness of
the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit, the Anti – Kidnapping
Group personnel respondents showed their grand mean of moderately serious
problem with an overall weighted mean of 3.36.
According to the Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
respondents, problems under logistics were most serious as this elicited their
highest overall mean of 3.82. Next were problems under strategies with an
overall mean of 3.70; followed by problems under stakeholders collaboration
capability, with an overall mean of 3.33 to a moderately serious. The lowest
overall mean of 2.68 was on problems under manpower capability also to a
moderately serious.
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On the part of the non – government organization/civic organizations’
members respondents, they considered problems under stakeholders
collaboration capability as the most serious problems encountered as this
aspect elicited their highest overall mean 4.22, which was verbally translated
as very serious.
Likewise, problems under strategies were rated as very serious based
on the overall mean of 4.20. On the other hand, problems relative to logistics
and manpower capability were considered as ‘serious problem based on overall
means of 4.06 and 3.96 respectively.
For the KFR victims/relatives respondents, three of the problem
indicators were considered as very serious. Problem under strategic capability
were rated by the KFR victims/relatives respondents as most serious based on
their highest overall mean of 4.27.
Next were the problems under logistics capability obtained an overall
mean of 4.20, followed by the problems relative to manpower capability
obtained an overall mean of 4.19 verbally interpreted as serious problem.
Problem relative to stakeholders’ collaboration capability elicited the lowest
overall mean of 4.16 to a serious problem, posting a grand mean of 4.21 very
serious mean.
Based on the combined perspective of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit personnel, non – government organization/civic
organizations’ members, KFR victims/relatives respondents on the problems
related to strategic capability were the most serious problem encountered that
affects the responsiveness of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field
Unit in combating kidnap for ransom menace in Zamboanga City as this is
elicited the highest overall combined mean of 4.06.
92
Furthermore, it is ironical that although the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit was effective in countering kidnapping in Zamboanga City
was observed as very effective in the strategic and tactical capability aspect, it
is the same aspect which is the best with more serious problems.
An overall Average Weighted Mean of 3.90 was obtained on the
problems encountered by the Philippines National Police (PNP) Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in countering kidnapping in Zamboanga
City in terms of manpower capability, logistical capability, strategic and tactical
capability, and stakeholders collaboration capability.
Respondents’ Assessment on the Proposed Measures to Address the
Problems Encountered by PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of
ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
The proposed measures to address the problem encountered by the
PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
in terms of manpower capability, logistical capability, strategic and tactical
capability, and stakeholder collaborative capability.
Manpower Capability
Table 19 demonstrates the proposed measures to address the problems
encountered by the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of manpower capability.
As gleaned from the table, the respondents highly recommended on the
need for ‘recruit and assign more personnel to Anti – Kidnapping Group to be
utilized for the conduct of follow up operation and investigation of unsolved
cases’ which received an average weighted mean of 4.39.
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Table 19
Problems Encountered by PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities
of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Manpower Capability
PNP AKG
INDICATORS MEMBERS RELATIVES MEAN
1. Provide regular training to
enhance the needed
operational capabilities and 4.03 R 4.32 HR 4.29 HR 4.22 HR
skills of Anti – Kidnapping
Group personnel.
2. Provide regular and
specialized training on 4.0 R 4.35 HR 4.25 HR 4.20 HR
negotiations.
3. Organize association and
develop good rapport with the
4.02 R 4.22 HR 4.21 HR 4.15 R
previous victims and their
families.
4. Recruit and assign more
personnel to Anti – kidnapping
Group to be utilized for the
4.49 HR 4.32 HR 4.35 HR 4.39 HR
conduct of follow – up
operation and investigation of
unsolved cases.
5. Develop proportional reward
system to motivate personnel
to be more dedicated in 4.37 HR 4.29 HR 4.33 HR 4.33 HR
performing their assigned
task.
Overall Weighted Mean 4.18 R 4.30 HR 4.29 HR 4.25 HR

4.20 – 5.00 Highly Recommended (HR)
3.40 – 4.19 Recommended (R)
2.60 – 3.39 Moderately Recommended (MR)
1.80 – 2.59 Slightly Recommended (SR)
1.00 – 1.79 Not Recommended (NR)
respondents obtained a weighted mean of 4.49, the non – government
organization/civic organizations’ members received a weighted mean of 4.32
and the KFR victims/relatives themselves obtained a weighted mean of 4.35
considered also a highly recommended mean in order to solve the problem
encountered affecting the responsiveness of the Philippine National Police Anti
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– Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in countering kidnapping activities in
Zamboanga City.
For the respondents, this a good measure to resolve the problem of the
PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit when it comes to personnel
capability. Recruiting and dealing personnel in the conduct of follow up
operation and investigation establish a well-rounded organization in the fight
against kidnap for ransom incidents. Detailing more personnel in the street is a
must that the higher headquarters must look upon. The limited personnel affect
the responsiveness of the group in countering kidnapping in Zamboanga City.
In line with this, the need to increase manpower to ensure follow up
operation and investigation was observed systematically and accordingly in line
with their functions.
On the other hand, the respondents perceived highly recommended on
the need to ‘develop proportionate reward system to motivate personnel to be
more dedicated in performing their assigned task’ received a weighted mean of
4.37 as garnered by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
personnel, a weighted mean of 4.29 equivalent to highly recommend yielded by
the non – government organization/civic organizations’ members and a
weighted mean of 4.33 also to a highly recommended rating on the part of KFR
victims/relatives, posting an average weighted mean of 4.33. The facilitation of
reward program will motivate personnel to exert more effort in performing their
tasks.
By working as a team to accomplish their goals, the police officers would
not only help themselves personnel but also improve the appeal of community
policing to other officers and strengthen the camaraderie of the police
organization. Developing a reward system, the personnel themselves will
95
become more motivated in doing their task. The implementation of a reward
system will improve the performance of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit in fighting lawless elements particularly kidnapping groups
and make sure that they are fully punished.
The respondents believed that there is a need to ‘provide regular training
to enhance the needed operational capabilities and skills of anti – kidnapping
group personnel to promptly respond to reported incident in accordance with
existing procedures’ had an average weighted mean of 4.21 as assessed by
the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel, non –
government organization/civic organizations’ members and KFR
victims/relatives themselves when it comes to regular training to ensure
operational capabilities and skills of the group individual personnel. It is
important that personnel assigned in this unit must be trained enough in
promoting their functions.
A highly recommended mean on the indicator ‘provide regular and
specialized training on negotiations’ observed an average weighted mean of
4.20 based the assessment made by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit personnel will yield a weighted mean of 4.0 equivalent to
recommended, non – government organization/civic organizations’ members
obtained a weighted mean of 4.35 verbally interpreted as highly recommended
and KFR victims/relatives received a weighted mean of 4.25 with a verbal
interpreted of highly recommended.
Training is the most certain method instilling organizational values and
pride in the individual police officer. The better a police officer is trained, the
less supervision is required to assure proper behavior during negotiation.
96
This is followed by the indicator ‘organized association and develop good
rapport with the previous victims and their families to include anti – crime
syndicates to be utilized as partners in influencing hesitant victims or their
families’ which posted an average weighted mean of 4.15 also to a
recommended mean. As observed by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit personnel, non – government organization/civic
organizations’ members and KFR victims/relatives, a weighted mean 4.02,
4.22, and 4.21, respectively.
This implies that organization of concerned organizations in countering
kidnapping is a must in order to attain camaraderie or rapport between the
police and anti – crime organizations. Associated with other organizations will
be of great help in dealing with the problem of kidnap for ransom cases in
Zamboanga City.
In relation to the proposed measures to solve problems encountered
affecting the responsiveness of the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities
of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula obtained an overall grand mean of 4.26 in
terms of manpower capability which corresponds to a verbal interpretation of
highly recommended.
There is a need to look upon on the given measures in this particular
issue that the unwavering courage and determination of the group in the
conduct of an all-out and sustained operation against Kidnap for Ransom will
prevail.
This is in support to the study of Frias (2003). “Police Training and
Education in the Philippine National Police’ narrated that over the years, police
career education and training have always been considered one of the rational
and fundamental cornerstones for improving police efficiency and
97
effectiveness. By educating the police, we can expect them to be competent in
their jobs, that is ‘the ability to perform job requirements to a specified standard,
and to be able to transfer the skill and knowledge to new situations’. We also
expect them to enable them to perform a job better in more situations, more
often with better result in delivering their sole purpose, to serve and protect.
Table 20
Problems Encountered by the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR
activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Logistical
KFR
NGOs/CIVIC
INDICATORS PNP AKG VICTIMS/ GRAND MEAN
MEMBERS
RELATIVES
1. Procure sufficient vehicles to be utilized
in the conduct of police operations 4.22 HR 4.35 HR 4.38 HR 4.32 HR
against kidnappers
2. Procurement of reliable equipment to be
used in the conduct of surveillance 4.46 HR 4.30 HR 4.33 HR 4.36 HR
operations.
3. Solicit for alternative resources that will
address the needed logistical 4.06 R 4.10 R 4.15 R 4.10 R
requirements.
4. Properly dispose outmoded or
unreliable equipment and programmed
4.27 HR 4.28 HR 4.21 HR 4.25 HR
the procurement of reliable needed
technical equipment.
5. Propose and prioritize a budget for
contingency fund to be used in the
4.43 HR 4.46 HR 4.52 HR 4.47 HR
conduct of lengthy and continuous
police pursuit operations.
Overall Weighted Mean 4.29 HR 4.30 HR 4.32 HR 4.30 HR
Capability
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of logistical capability.
The Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field
Unit personnel a weighted mean of 4.43 on the indicator ‘allocate and prioritize
a budget for contingency fund to be used in the conduct of lengthy and police
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pursuit operations’ equivalent to highly recommended, the non – government
organization/civic organizations’ members and KFR victims/relatives
respondents governed a weighted mean of 4.46 and 4.52 respectively verbally
interpreted as highly recommended. ‘The perception that gives a rating of highly
recommended as perceived by the three (3) groups of respondents had an
average weighted mean of 4.47 has the highest rating. The increase of fund
allocation will be of great help on the part of the Philippine National Police Anti
– Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit to maintain well-balanced police
operations.
While ‘procurement of sufficient/reliable equipment in the conduct of
monitoring/surveillance operations like digital handheld radios and digital
storage disk video camera (WIFI ready)’ garnered an average weighted mean
of 4.38 equivalent to highly recommended. Whereas, the PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel received a weighted mean of
4.46 equivalent to highly recommended same with the non – government
organization/civic organizations’ members and KFR victims/relatives with a
weighted mean of 4.30 and 4.33 respectively also equivalent to highly
recommended.
As to the changing role of the police in the community and with the
changing modus operandi of kidnap for ransom groups, it is important that the
PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit shall avail of high tech
equipment in the conduct of surveillance and monitoring operations to ensure
the KFR groups are being monitor of their activities.
believed that there is a need to ‘procure sufficient vehicles to be utilized in the
conduct of police operations against kidnappers’ wherein a weighted mean of
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4.22 was obtained, also highly recommended rating was obtained from the non
– government organization/civic organizations’ members with a weighted mean
of 4.35, while the KFR victims/relatives posting a highly recommended with a
weighted mean of 4.38.
An overall 4.32 average weighted with an adjectival equivalent to highly
recommended was assessed by the three (3) groups of respondents
themselves. The PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit was
proven to respond to the needs and demands of the community in spite of
limited vehicles utilized in the countering kidnapping in Zamboanga City.
The group still considers a well-funded group to cater the needs of their
personnel in the pursuit of countering kidnapping.
The groups of respondents believed that there is a need to ‘procure of
up to date technical tools like the electronic automatic analysis computer
software’ had a weighted mean of 4.27 as observed by the PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel, a weighted mean of 4.28 by
the non – government organization/civic organizations’ members and 4.21 by
the KFR victims/relatives to a highly recommended mean score, posting an
AWM of 4.25 also to a highly recommended mean.
The respondents themselves felt that procurement of up to date
technical tools for data banking will ensure that the activities of kidnap for
ransom group put into data banking.
As shown in the table, the three (3) groups of respondents believed on
the need to ‘procurement of sufficient armaments and tactical gears in the
conduct of tactical operation’ as shown by the average weighted mean of 4.10,
with a verbal interpretation of recommended. Whereas, the PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel respondents garnered a
100
weighted mean of 4.06 verbally interpreted as recommended, the non –
government organization/civic organizations’ members, received a weighted
mean of 4.10 to a recommended rating.
While the KFR victims/relatives yield weighted mean of 4.15 also
equivalent to recommended. Adequacy of sufficient armaments is one way of
attaining the effective of the operational functions of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping
Group Mindanao Field Unit in dealing with organized criminal groups to
continue strive and improve their efforts in fighting lawless elements.
The answers of the respondents resulted into an overall average
weighted mean of 4.30 on the proposed measures to address the problem
Zamboanga Peninsulain terms of logistics, with a verbal interpretation of highly
recommended.
Unit considers a well-funded unit of the police organization will bring the AKG
to greater heights of performance and achievement. The personnel themselves
are able to serve and protect the community without reservation even with
limited logistical support given to them. This is in line with the study of made by
Cayabyab (2011) entitled ‘Performance Evaluation of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Logistic Division Basis to Enhance Public Safety Service’ cited
logistical supplies and financial support are inevitable requirements for the
successful operations of the different police stations in the country.
The availability of logistical support is one important factor in the delivery
of basic services to the community unfortunately, there were certain problems
attributed to the delay of police response, particularly the lack of logistical
101
support which hampers the effective and quick police response in their
respective areas.
On this premise, the Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
is aware of the problems on logistics, exert efforts to exhaust available means
within its resource to provide operational support and assistance to all its units
for the successful attainment of their mission. Proper utilization of logistical
support is constantly being streamlined to become effective and efficient to
keep place with the ever increasing requirements of the police. Logistics
planners must not lose sight in refining and rationalizing supply procedures.
The involvement of an effective proper utilization of supplies and equipment
mechanism among the end users is bottom line and the responsibility lies
collectively on the shoulders of all personnel working in logistics organization.
Strategic and Tactical capability
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of strategic and tactical capability.
As reflected from the table, the respondents highly recommended on the
need to ‘allocation of funds for the conduct of regular training to its personnel
to improve their tactical capabilities in rescue operation of victim and in
neutralizing kidnap for groups’ which received an average weighted mean of
4.41.
For the respondents, this is a good measure to resolve the problems of
the Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit to
ensure that their performance will be improved and enhanced in dealing with
kidnap for ransom groups. The higher Headquarters needs to look upon in
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increasing the allocated funds in neutralizing kidnap for ransom groups in
Zamboanga peninsula.
Table 21
Problems Encountered by PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG
in Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of Strategic and Tactical Capability

PNP AKG
MEMBERS RELATIVES MEAN
INDICATORS W AW
WM VI VI WM VI VI
M M
1. Designation of senior and credible
officers to act as the liaison to the 4.48 HR 4.28 HR 4.44 HR 4.40 HR
victims’ family with designation order.
2. Assure the development of a well
experienced and well versed 4.25 HR 4.25 HR 4.33 HR 4.28 HR
negotiation team.
3. Conduct of aggressive counter –
intelligence operation and institute
appropriate action against involved 4.33 HR 4.20 HR 4.25 HR 4.26 HR
personnel in kidnapping – for –
ransom activities.
4. Conduct of cases conference before
the court with the concerned territorial
police and other law enforcement
personnel involved to include the 4.06 R 4.10 R 4.21 HR 4.12 R
prosecutor on case to ensure the
filling of air tight cases against the
kidnappers for their eventual.
5. Provide regular training or facilitate
foreign training to its personnel to
improve their operational and tactical
4.56 HR 4.30 HR 4.38 HR 4.41 HR
capabilities in rescue operation of
victim and in neutralizing kidnap-for-
ransom groups.
On the other hand, the respondents perceived highly recommended on
the need for the ‘deployment of acceptable and dependable officers to act as
the liaison with the victims’ family’ received an AWM of 4.40. whereas the PNP
Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit received a weighted mean of 4.48
and the non – government organization/civic organizations’ members, received
a weighted mean of 4.28 and the KFR victims/relatives yield a weighted mean
103
of 4.44 verbally interpreted as highly recommended. The deployment of
personnel as liaison with the victims’ family is important so that they victims’
relatives themselves will trust them of what will be the outcome of the case. For
some reason is that KFR victims’ family do not trust the police especially in this
kind of situation particularly in the negotiation stage, they the families
themselves make the necessary moves in dealing with the kidnappers.
The three (3) groups of respondents believed also to be highly
recommended on the indicator ‘assure the deployment of a well experienced
and well versed negotiation team with the aid and assistance of previous kidnap
victims and their family thru convincing if needed and necessary’ had an AWM
of 4.28. The respondents PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
received a weighted mean of 4.25, the non – government organization/civic
organizations’ members garnered a weighted mean of 4.25 and the KFR
victims/relatives yield a weighted mean of 4.33 all verbally interpreted as highly
recommended. The PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit shall
use full force of law in order to combat this menace by deploying a well
experienced negotiation team towards a peaceful negotiation between the
police and the kidnappers.
Also highly recommended mean on the ‘conduct of aggressive counter
intelligence operation and institute appropriate action against involved
personnel in kidnapping for ransom activities’ observed an average weighted
mean of 4.26 based by the assessment made by the PNP Anti – Kidnapping
Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel (WM = 4.33). Non – government
organization/civic organizations’ members (WM = 4.20) and Kidnap – for –
Ransom victims or relatives (WM = 4.25) all verbally interpreted as highly
recommended. The assessment made by the respondents themselves, it
104
shows that there are some misfits in the PNP organization who are involved in
the kidnap for ransom activities. The higher Headquarters will make the
necessary move for stiffer penalties for those police personnel caught involved
in such activity.
To ensure an honest commitment and performance to the PNP mandate
to serve and protect the community always along the core ideas of service,
honor and justice.
This is followed by the indicator ‘conduct of case conference before the
court with the concerned territorial police and other law enforcement personnel
involved to include the prosecutor on case to ensure the filing of air tight cases
against the kidnappers’ which posted an average weighted mean of 4.12 to a
recommended mean. Whereas the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao
Field Unit personnel obtained a weighted mean of 4.06, non – government
organization/civic organizations’ members received a WM of 4.10 and the KFR
victims/relatives a 4.21 mean rating was observed interpreted as overall
Weighted of 4.29 was obtained on the proposed measures to address the
problems encountered by the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of
ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula with a verbal interpretation of highly
recommended as assessed three (3) groups of respondents.
As cited in the ‘Australian Crime Commission’ (2012), the government
response to kidnap for ransom incorporates a number of agencies with
responsibilities for delivering demand, supply and harm reduction strategies.
Understanding changes to international and domestic situations help law
enforcement and governments determine appropriate responses to kidnap for
ransom and guides operational activity. Law enforcement agencies monitor a
range of markets to determine changes in the nature and extent of syndicates’
105
criminal involvement. We know that globalization, changing political, social and
economic dynamics and advances in technology continue to create
opportunities for exploitation by Kidnap for Ransom syndicates.
Table 22
Respondents’ Assessment on the Proposed Measures to Address the Problems
Encountered by the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga
Peninsula in terms of Stakeholders Collaboration Capability
KFR
NGOs/CIVIC GRAND
PNP AKG VICTIMS/
RELATIVES
1. Facilitate the conduct of good intelligence
fusion with other police units, other law
enforcement agencies and other 4.17 R 4.24 HR 4.27 HR 4.23 HR
government units in the fight against
kidnap-for-ransom activities.
2. Conduct regular meeting to develop
feedback mechanism system to include
3.67 R 4.22 HR 4.25 HR 4.05 R
open lines communication among
stakeholders.
3. Recruit and train additional personnel
purposely for the regular conduct of anti –
kidnap – for –ransom awareness and
advocacy seminars to the community 4.25 HR 4.28 HR 4.31 HR 4.28 HR
especially on the kidnap prone areas and
would be target individuals as means of
target hardening measure.
4. Maintenance of good rapport and regular
conduct of team building activities with the
stakeholders to strengthen cohesiveness 4.51 HR 4.25 HR 4.35 HR 4.37 HR
and cooperation in the fight against
kidnapping activities
5. Crafting of Memorandum of Agreement /
Memorandum of Understanding among
stakeholders for the smooth conduct of
4.27 HR 4.32 HR 4.29 HR 4.29 HR
investigation, manhunt operation and
prosecution of kidnapping cases against
kidnap-for-ransom groups.
Overall Weighted Mean 4.17 R 4.26 HR 4.30 HR 4.24 HR
Stakeholders Collaboration Capability
Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of stakeholders’ collaboration capability.

106
As gleaned from the table, the respondents highly recommended on the
need for the need for the ‘maintenance of good rapport and regular conduct of
team building activities with a the stakeholders to strengthen cohesiveness and
cooperation in the fight against kidnapping activities’ which received an average
weighted mean of 4.37. The Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit personnel believed to be highly recommended, with a
weighted mean of 4.51. The non – government organization/civic organizations’
members gave also a highly recommended mean when it comes to the
maintenance of good rapport and regular of team building wherein a weighted
mean of 4.26 was obtained whereas KFR victims/relatives also gave the same
notion of highly recommended with a weighted mean of 4.35 mean rating. The
respondents themselves felt that it is important on the part of the police
personnel themselves cooperate with other stakeholders in the fight against
kidnap for ransom group.
On the other hand, the respondents perceived highly recommended that
the indicator ‘crafting the Memorandum of Agreement/Memorandum of
Understanding among concerned stakeholders to promote strong advocacy
among kidnap victims/their families and witnesses to pursue criminal cases until
conviction of suspects’ an average weighted mean of 4.29. It is important on
the part of Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field
Unit to craft a Memorandum of agreement with other stakeholders to make the
necessary obligation in the fight against kidnap for ransom group. The said
agreement will ensure that they will bind themselves together in the battle for
the sake of the community they are serving.
The respondents highly recommended on the indicator ‘recruit and train
additional personnel purposely for the regular conduct of anti – kidnap for
107
ransom awareness and advocacy awareness seminars to the community
especially on the kidnap prone areas and would be target individuals as a
means of target hardening measures’ had an average weighted mean of 4.28.
The Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
personnel believed to be highly recommended, with a weighted mean of 4.25,
the non – government organization/civic organizations’ members gave also a
highly recommended mean when it comes awareness and advocacy in the
conduct of kidnap for ransom a weighted mean of 4.28 was obtained whereas
KFR victims/relatives also gave the same notion of highly recommended with a
weighted mean of 4.31.
Also a highly recommended mean of the need for ‘facilitation in the
conduct of good intelligence fusion like workshop validation fellowship/team
building with other police units, other law enforcement agencies and other
government unit in the fight against kidnap for ransom activities’ observed an
average weighted mean of 4.23 based by the assessment made by the
Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
personnel which governed a weighted mean of 4.17 equivalent to
recommended, a highly recommended mean as was observed by the non –
government organization/civic organizations’ members which received a
weighted mean of 4.24 and the KFR victims or relatives garnered as weighted
mean of 4.27 verbally interpreted as highly recommended.
This is followed by the indicator ‘ conduct of regular meeting to develop
feedback mechanism system to include open lines of communication among
stakeholders’ to be recommended with a weighted mean of 3.67 as observed
by the Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
personnel, non – government organization/civic organizations’ members
108
observed a highly recommended rating of 4.22, whereas the KFR victims or
relatives, yield a weighted mean of 4.25 equivalent to highly recommended.
Posted an average weighted mean of 4.05 with a verbal interpretation of
recommended mean based on the assessment made the three (3) groups of
respondents. The conduct of regular meeting with stakeholders will establish
and develop mutual partnership among them to enhance support towards the
attainment of a safer community to live with.
As depicted in the data gathered an overall Weighted Mean of 4.24 was
obtained on the proposed measures to address the problems encountered by
the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga
Peninsula in terms of stakeholder collaborative capability with a verbal
interpretation of highly recommended.
As noted in the book of Mattessich (2001) ‘Collaboration: what makes it
work’ narrated that many issues facing communities today are dynamic and
interrelated, necessitating a coordinate approach on the part of organizations
and individuals aiming to make a positive impact on their communities. Such
an approach allows needs to be addressed that exceed the scope of a single
organization.
Moreover, with the continuing rise of information technology and the
increasing eagerness of funding bodies to support joint efforts in the
community, initiating and maintaining collaborative relationships is a more
readily attainable goal than ever before. Collaborative is a mutually beneficial
and well defined relationship entered into by two or more organizations to
achieve common goals. The relationship includes a commitment to mutual
relationships and goals; a jointly developed structure and shared responsibility;
109
mutual authority and accountability for success; and sharing of resources and
rewards.
Table 23
Summary on the Proposed Measures to Address the Problems
KFR activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
NGOs/CIVIC KFR
ORGANIZAT VICTIMS/
INDICATORS PNP AKG GRAND
IONS’ RELATIVE
MEAN
MEMBERS S
1. Manpower Capability 4.16 R 4.30 HR 4.29 HR 4.26 HR
2. Logistical Capability 4.29 H 4.30 HR 4.32 HR 4.30 HR
4.34 HR 4.23 HR 4.32 HR 4.29 HR
Capability
4. Stakeholders
Collaboration 4.17 R 4.26 HR 4.30 HR 4.24 HR
Capability
Legend: AOM – Average Overall Mean VI – Verbal Interpretation
OWM –Overall Weighted Mean
3.40 – 4.19 Serious (S)
Table 23 shows the summary of assessment made in determining the
proposed measures to address the problems encountered by the PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in countering kidnapping in Zamboanga
Peninsula in terms of manpower capability, logistical capability, strategic and
tactical capability, and stakeholders collaboration capability.
A summary of the overall assessments of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping
Group Mindanao Field Unit personnel respondents showed their consistent
highly recommended on the proposed measures with a grand mean of 4.25.
Under each component of the proposed measures on the variable strategies
should be given top most priority based on their highest overall mean of 4.34.
This is followed by the logistics capability aspect with an overall weighted mean
110
of 4.29, also to a highly recommended mean. A recommended rating was
observed on the variables manpower capability and stakeholder collaborative
capability with OWM of 4.18 and 4.17, respectively.
For the non – government organization/civic organizations’ members
respondents, recommendations to address problem encountered under the
manpower capability should be given a utmost attention by the PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit as these are the components which
elicited the highest rating of 4.30. On the other hand, the two other variables
also to a highly recommended whereas the stakeholders collaboration aspect
received an OWM of 4.26 and 4.23 respectively.
For the KFR victims or relatives respondents, recommendations to
address problems encountered logistics and strategies should be top priority of
the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit as this is the component
which elicited the highest rating of 4.30 with a verbal interpretation of highly
recommended. Both components stakeholders’ collaboration capability and
manpower capability to highly recommended rating based on their OWM of 4.30
and 4.29.
Taking the combined perspective of the three (3) groups of respondents,
solution to address problem encountered the four given components were
highly recommended by the PNP – Anti Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit,
non – government organization/civic organizations’ members and KFR victims
or relatives with their Average Overall Mean of 4.27. The group of respondents
believed that the components herein cited shall be given priority to strengthen
the operational responsiveness of the group in countering kidnapping in
Zamboanga City.
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Interview Result and Analysis
The Philippine National Police Mindanao Field Unit follows and
implements the Anti – Kidnapping Campaign in accordance with integrated
scheme of operational performance according to PSSupt Ronald Joseph V
Ocaya, Director, Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit. With limited
resources of the AKG MFU, he believed that the unit is very capable in handling
its given mandate. The PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities of ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula is highly proven by the high crime solution efficiency
rating and the decline on kidnap for ransom incidents for the past year.
In order to improve the program of activities of the Philippine National
Police Anti-Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in countering kidnapping
activities in Zamboanga City, PSSupt Ronald Joseph V Ocaya, Chief,
Investigation and Case Monitoring Division, PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit recommended that there is a need to upgrade the technical
capability and mobility equipment of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit, continuous training in the field of intelligence,
investigation, operation and administration and innovation for development of
the organization.
PCInsp Jonathan O Rabanal, Chief, Intelligence, Research and Analysis
Division, PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit commended that
understanding the changing criminal environment is crucial in shaping not only
an effective response by the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
but also a collaborative respond by other law enforcement agencies which are
also responsible for regulation and monitoring of key sectors.
A relative of KFR victims provides an insight on how to deal with KFR
syndicates; she does believe that increased public awareness of the activities
112
of KFR menace plays a key role in the effective prevention and reduction of
such activity. Many crimes are rendered ineffective when the potential victim is
able to recognize the attempted crime. Crime can be prevented by improving
the processes that support identity verification and by educating people in
techniques to protect their identities.
This is seconded by a non – government organization member, I
understand that there is a need for holistic approach in the Anti – Kidnapping
campaign of the PNP AKG Mindanao Field Unit. It is a clear threat not only to
the victims themselves and their immediate families but more so to society in
general that is why there is a need for us to support the Anti – Kidnapping
Campaign.
According to a civic organization member, in the City of Zamboanga,
police strategy formulation is something which is a matter for the police. I have
no idea about police anti – crime program formula. But we do participate in any
program in order to abate KFR syndicates in our community.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter presents the summary of the significant findings of the
study, the conclusions drawn, and the recommendations offered.
Summary of Findings
As depicted in the data gathering, the following were the finding of study.
1. Operational Capability of PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR
Activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
1.1 Manpower Capability. Influence KFR victims and their families to
be cooperative with the authorities obtained the highest weighted
mean of 4.10 with as verbal interpretation of effective, while
organize a cohesive action among personnel for the conduct of
follow up operation and investigation of unsolved cases had the
lowest weighted mean of 3.51 also to a effective mean. An overall
AWM of 3.81 was obtained in terms of manpower capability
equivalent to effective.
1.2 Logistical Capability. Suitable armaments and tactical gears in the
conduct of rescue operation obtained the highest weighted mean
of 3.92, while sufficient funds in the conduct of lengthy and
continuous police pursuit operations had the lowest weighted mean
of 2.99 to moderately rating. An overall AWM of 3.36 was obtained
equivalent to Moderately Effective.
1.3 Strategic and Tactical Capability. Coordinate and link up with
territorial police units and other law enforcement agencies in areas
where kidnap for ransom incident has taken place obtained the
highest weighted mean of 4.36 to a very effective mean, while train
its personnel to improve their tactical capabilities in rescue

operation of victims and in neutralizing kidnap for ransom groups
had the lowest weighted mean of 3.95 verbally interpreted as
effective. An overall AWM of 4.20 was obtained in terms of
strategies capability equivalent to Very Effective.
1.4 Stakeholders Collaboration Capability. Expand its intelligence
network with other police units, other law enforcement agencies
and other government unit in the fight against kidnap for ransom
activities obtained the highest weighted mean of 3.74 while
facilitate for the establishment of Memorandum of Agreement and
or Memorandum of Understanding with stakeholders had the
lowest weighted mean of 3.14 to a moderately effective mean. An
overall of AWM of 3.53 was obtained in terms of stakeholders’
collaboration capability to Effective.
2. Problems Encountered by PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR
Activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
2.1 Manpower Capability. The most problem under this area was
insufficient personnel to be utilized for the conduct of manhunt
operation and investigation of unsolved cases. This aspect had an
average weighted mean of 3.88 which qualifies as Serious
2.2 Logistical Capability. In terms of logistics one of the noted problems
was the insufficiency of funds in the conduct of lengthy and
continuous police pursuit operations obtained a weighted mean of
4.17 equivalent to serious problem. The AWM in this aspect was 4.03
and was placed as serious rating.
2.3 Strategic and Tactical Capability. Majority of the respondents
expressed that the insufficient fund for the conduct of needed
115
trainings to its personnel to improve their tactical capabilities in
rescue operation of victim and in neutralizing kidnap for ransom
group is a serious problem, with a 4.19 mean. Nevertheless, the
general assessment was serious for the four (4) other attendant
problem as listed. The overall AWM of 4.05 is recorded which is
equivalent to serious problem.
2.4 Stakeholders Collaboration Capability. Majority of the respondents
expressed that the absence of Memorandum of Agreement /
Memorandum of Understanding with stakeholders is serious for the
(4) other attendant problem as indicated. Overall, the average
weighted mean is 3.91 recorded as a serious problem.
3. Proposed Measures to Address the Problems Encountered by
PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities by ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula
3.1 Manpower Capability. The groups of respondents shared the
common opinion that the measures most address the problem in
terms manpower capability: recruit and assign more personnel to
AKG to be utilized for the conduct of follow operation and
investigation of unsolved cases, develop proportionate rewards
system to motivate personnel to be more dedicated in performing
their assigned task and provide regular training to enhance the
needed operational capabilities and skills of AKG personnel to
promptly respond to reported incidents in accordance with the
existing procedures. This is evidenced by the overall average
weighted mean of 4.26 which corresponds to Highly Recommended.
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3.2 Logistical Capability. Highly Recommended by the respondents on
this aspect are: Allocate and prioritize a budget for contingency fund
to be used in sufficient reliable equipment in the conduct of
monitoring/surveillance operations like digital handled radios and
digital storage disk video camera and procure sufficient vehicles to
be utilized in the conduct of police operations against kidnappers.
The overall weighted mean was recorded at 4.30, also equivalent to
Highly Recommended.
3.3 Strategic and Tactical Capability. The highest perceived highly
recommended mean is on the need for allocation of fund for the
conduct of regular training to its personnel to improve their tactical
capabilities in rescue operation of victim and in neutralizing kidnap
for ransom groups, and the deployment of an acceptable and
dependable officer to act as the liaison with the victims’ family and
assure the deployment of a well experienced and well versed
negotiation team with aid and assistance of previous kidnap victims
and or their family if needed and necessary garnering 4.41, 4.40 and
4.28 respectively. All of the responses reflect an overall average
weighted mean of 4.29 which to a rating of Highly Recommended.
3.4 Stakeholders Collaboration Capability. In terms of stakeholders
collaboration capability, the highly recommended measures
‘maintenance of good rapport and regular conduct of team building
activities with the stakeholders to strengthen cohesiveness and
cooperation in the fight against kidnapping victims, crafting of
Memorandum of Agreement / Memorandum of Understanding
among concerned stakeholders to promote strong advocacy among
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the kidnap victims their families and witnesses to pursue criminal
cases until conviction of suspects, and recruit and train additional
personnel purposely for the regular conduct of anti-kidnap for ransom
awareness and advocacy seminars to the community especially on
the kidnap prone areas and would be target individual as a mean of
target hardening measures, with 4.37, 4.29 and 4.28, respectively.
All of the response suggested an overall average weighted mean of
4.24 recorded as Highly Recommended.
Based from the findings of the study, there is a need to enhance the skills
and knowledge of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
personnel so that they could be able to effectively perform an all-out and
sustained operations against KFR groups.
Conclusions
In the light of the foregoing findings, the following conclusions were drawn:
1. A grand mean of Effective was obtained as to Operational Capabilities
of the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities by ASG in
Zamboanga Peninsula, it was concluded that there were some factors
noted by the respondents that affect the AKG MFU capability in response
to kidnap for ransom group.
2. The problems encountered by the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR
activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula was translated into verbal
interpretation of serious, affects the whole group having insufficient fund
to train personnel to be utilized in the operation and investigation of
cases and the allocation of the needed equipment used in the conduct
of police operations.
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3. The proposed measures to address the problems encountered by PNP
AKG MFU in countering KFR activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula
attained a grand mean of Highly Recommended. The appropriate
measures be adopted to answer the problems encountered to update
the knowledge and skills of the police and able to establish a well-
coordinated police operations to improve their efforts in fighting kidnap
for ransom groups in Zamboanga City complemented with enough fund
to establish a low level rate of kidnapping incidents and maintain peace
and order in the community.
4. Implementation of the proposed Action Plan to enhance the
effectiveness of the PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities by ASG
in Zamboanga Peninsula through manpower competence enhancement
program, strengthened logistical resources for police operation,
networking and alliance building towards rescue operations, team
building to foster cooperation and revitalization of the anti – kidnap for
ransom strategy towards a holistic approach against kidnapping
syndicates in Zamboanga City to fine tune the present anti – kidnapping
strategy of the group and to make it more responsive and relevant in the
continuing fight against kidnap for ransom group.
Recommendations
Based on the conclusion drawn from the findings of the study, the
following recommendations are henceforth submitted:
1. To improve the level of operational capabilities of the PNP Anti –
Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit, it is necessary to enhance
the knowledge and operational performance of the police officers in
countering kidnap for ransom groups in Zamboanga Peninsula.
119
2. The seriousness of the problems encountered need to priorities as
they affect the overall responsiveness of the PNP AKG MFU in
countering KFR activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula. The
group requires motivation on their personnel to become more
dedicated and committed with their functions to ensure a strong all
out campaign against kidnap for ransom group.
3. The proposed measures to enhance the responsiveness of the PNP
AKG MFU to fight against kidnap for ransom groups require priority
concern. Sufficient fund to pursue with the career development
program of the organization among individual personnel of the AKG
MFU has to be given emphasis, equipped with specialized equipment
will lead to higher quality of work in their field of work.
4. In the light of the findings and conclusion of the study, the researcher
strongly recommends the adoption of the proposed public safety
development program to enhance the responsiveness of the PNP
AKG MFU in all out and sustained operation against organized
criminal groups.
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Action Plan
Program Title : The Operational Capability of the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group, Mindanao Field Unit in Countering
Kidnapping-for-Ransom Activities by the Abu Sayyaf Group in Zamboanga Peninsula
Objective : To strengthen and intensify the Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
Against all forms of kidnapping and hostage situation.
Proponent : PSOAC 2018-05
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBLE TIME

OBJECTIVES BUDGET
COMPONENTS STRATEGY UNIT/GROUP FRAME
To increase and update skills of the PNP AKG

MFU personnel to stop / minimize kidnapping Prepare and submit the
Manpower
activities, neutralize kidnap for ransom crime proposed training program to
Competence First Quarter
menace with the end view of assuring the safety, DHRDD for approval and AKG Php120,000
Enhancement of 2019
peace and tranquility of our citizens and their prepare training directive with
Program
guests here and abroad, especially foreign the attached POIs
nationals.
Outsource from the non –

PNP AKG MFU
Strengthened To sustain the needed logistical requirements of government organizations and January to
NGOs
Logistical Resources the PNP AKG MFU in countering Kidnapping civic organizations the purchase December Php300,000
Civil
for Police Operations Groups of additional needed equipment 2019
Organizations
to use in operation.
Frequent consultation and

Networking and networking with other law PNP AKG MFU
To develop unification with other law enforcement
Alliance Building enforcements in developing Law First Quarter
agencies and KFR victims and their families to Php50,000
towards Rescue institutional framework in dealing Enforcement of 2019
ensure safe release of victim/s under captivity.
121
Operation with Kidnap For Ransom Agencies

Criminals
121
ACTION PLAN Continued…
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBLE TIME

OBJECTIVES BUDGET
COMPONENTS STRATEGY UNIT/GROUP FRAME
To improve efficient unity among the PNP AKG

Emphasize the importance of
MFU, Law Enforcement Agencies, and KFR
team unit in accomplishing
Team Building to victims and their families in promoting progress
specific goals, encourages PNP AKG MFU November
Foster Cooperation and achieving better efficiency Php50,000
enthusiasm, and stress the Stakeholders 2019
and Unity
necessity of working in response
To provide quality police service and to create
to kidnap for ransom groups
an atmosphere of safety and security
The PNP AKG MFU through its

Revitalization of the To revitalize and fine tune the strategy of the staff shall supervise the
January to
Anti – Kidnapping PNP AKG MFU in the countering kidnapping implementation of this action
PNP AKG MFU December Php500,000
Strategy towards and the conduct of an all of campaign against plan and program in accordance
2019
holistic approach KFR groups with the formulated tasking of
every divisions
122
122
1.0 Rationale/Public Safety Situation
The Philippine has been most affected by kidnapping and extortion and
has been for some time. Despite the fact that the amount of reported
kidnappings in the Philippine has decreased each year for at least the past
three years, numerous high – profile cases have served as reminders that
the risk of being kidnapped in the Philippines is still a significant concern.
Kidnap for ransom and other related activities have been part and parcel of
the national crime scene. There is no geographical limit to this endeavor
and there is practically no limit to its purpose or perpetrators. Perpetrators
range from small time criminal groups to extensive secessionists and
communist rebel movements. Kidnap for ransom is profitable and relatively
low risk as the victim doubles as a cash insurance and human shield at the
same time. The crime of kidnap for ransom more popularly known as KFR
has become a 3 – letter word that has own fear in the hearts if the people
for the 13 years.
There is indeed an upsurge in kidnapping in the country, especially
within Zamboanga City. According to Terisita Ang See of the Citizens
Actions Against Crime (CAAC) revealed that kidnap for ransom groups are
back with vengeance, resulting in more kidnapping in and around
Mindanao.
In Zamboanga peninsula there were eight (8) cases reported for the
Calendar of 2017, or a reduction of 2 incidents for the Calendar Year of
2016. The Anti 0 Kidnapping Group were recorded disclosed that Calendar
Year of 2015 three kidnap for ransom cases were recorded in Zamboanga
City. Though slightly went down from 6 cases in 2014 to 3 cases in 2012,
123
Zamboanga City obtained the highest trend in kidnapping incidents in
Mindanao Region by the same PNP AKG report being dubbed as
kidnapping capital in Asia.
Perhaps kidnapping reporting is down but not the trend, hiding the read
fact about the incidents will only further aggravate the kidnapping problem
Although the actual number of incidents of KFR are small percentage if
the overall nationwide crime volume, its impact on the peace and order
situation is doubly significant. Even more, the effects spill over to the
business sector, eroding confidence in the economy and creating a
heightened sense of anxiety among the citizenry.
The huge financial gain, minimal human and material requirements,
relative short “gestation period,” and latitude to choose when to strike are
some of the factors that make KFR more attractive to criminal elements.
Apathy, insensitivity, indifference, selfishness, and fear among the citizenry
have made it easier for kidnappers to continue their nefarious trade.
However, considering the increase in the recent kidnapping incidents
which according to perception of some observers have already become
deplorable, no less than the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
called for all concerned agencies to craft a new target focused action plan
designed to thwart kidnapping incidents in the country and to get the highest
results possible.
2.0 Public Safety Development Program
The matrix shows in detail the action plan order to enhance the
responsiveness of the Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Units in the campaign against kidnap for ransom group. It
124
elaborates the objectives of the action plan, the implementation strategy,
and the responsible unit in the implementation of the plan.
The sets forth the conduct of the proposed Public Safety Development
Program to enhance the PNP by the year 2030, the Anti – Kidnapping Group
Mindanao Field Unit shall be a highly capable unit well trained and equipped
personnel working in partnership with the community. This public safety
development program is anchored on the PNP Integrated Transformation
Program as basis of the conceptualize framework provided.
The proposed public safety development program is in response to the
findings of the study as can be seen in the action plan matrix, is categorized
into four areas of consideration namely:
Personnel Competence Enhancement Program. The Personnel
Competence Enhancement Program of the PNP AKG MFU is designed to
enhance their already established policing skills and to develop competence
to a level which will let them effectively perform their duties in the PNP Anti
– Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit Countering Kidnapping Activities
in Zamboanga City. Their previous experiences and backgrounds add to
the diversity in the community and enhance the understanding and
cooperation between the police and the community. The enhancement
program will add significantly to their policing abilities in respond to KFR
incidents.
Logistical Resource for Police Operations. A clear mandate and well
planned logistic support are essential to successful anti – kidnapping
campaign. The provision of the logistical support is ultimately the
responsibility of the PNP Directorate for logistics to ensure collective or
125
individual provisions of logistic support resources to achieve maximum
effectiveness. It is important to ensure the readiness of logistical systems
and equipment. The PNP AKG MFU is united with the community through
partnership and shared responsibility, to have confidence in them. Provides
all police services with the equipment resources they need, this will enabled
the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group to expand their fields of operation. To
consolidate resources for anti – kidnap – for – ransom operation, the PNP
Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field, should embark in more
aggressive revenue generation and cost sharing practices with the local
government units and the non – governmental organizations. Since one of
the problem of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group MFU is the obsolete and
or outmoded equipment in the conduct of monitoring/ surveillance
operations, there is need to coordinate with local government units and non
– government organizations for financial or equivalent support in the form
of donations or dole outs.
Networking and Alliance Building Towards Rescue Operation Personal
relations and networking are of great importance in the establishment of
collaboration with territorial police and other law enforcement personnel to
develop efficient response mechanism to kidnap – for – ransom groups.
Active liaison with other law enforcement agencies and victim’s family to
provide vital information on certain issues. The possibility of working shift in
attitude in the police organization. This view has now mature to reflect the
changing needs of policing. Police leaders have recognized for a long time
that they need the support of the community to prevent and detect crime.
They have promoted the concept of community policing to achieve their
126
aims and this has involved members of the community working more closely
with the police work with business, as well as community groups.
Team Building towards Cooperation and Unity. Every organization has
potential within individuals at all levels, bring groups together for an in –
depth purpose into the issues of teambuilding, unity and diversity. Team
building in the Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group will bring
greater unity and sense of belonging. The PNP AKG Mindanao Field Unit
and other stakeholders shall work together to accomplish task more quickly
and efficiently in response to KFR groups.
The result of the finding led to the formulation of the proposed public
safety development program in order to enhance the responsiveness of the
PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit Anti – Kidnapping
campaign plan.
The study set forth the conduct of the proposed Public Safety
Development Program to enhance the PNP that by the year 2030, the Anti
– Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit shall be highly capable unit well
trained and equipped personnel working in partnership with the community.
This public safety development program is anchored on the PNP Integrated
Transformation Program as basis of the conceptualize framework provided.
Since one of the problem of the PNP Anti – Kidnapping Group is the
obsolete and or outmoded equipment in the conduct of
monitoring/surveillance operations, there is need to coordinate with local
government units and non – government organizations for financial or
equivalent support in the form of donations or dole outs.
127
3.0 Purpose of the Program
The primary purpose of this Action Plan is to strengthen and to intensify
the Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit
Campaign against all forms of kidnapping and hostage situation.
4.0 Mechanism of Program Implementation
The PNP AKG MFU conducts all out and sustained Anti – KFR campaign
to stop/minimize kidnapping activities, neutralize KFR groups including its
network and support system and effect the safe release of KFR victims, with
end view of assuring the safety, peace and tranquility of our citizens and
their guest from here and abroad, especially the foreign nationals.
A full – court pressed approach shall be adopted to address all the
stages of kidnapping (planning, casing, abduction, negotiation, payment of
ransom, arrest and prosecution) utilizing all available resource in close
coordination with other concerned government agencies.
Aggressive and sustained police operations against Kidnap For Ransom
Groups, its network and support system shall be undertaken by the PNP
AKG MFU to be headed by the director, AKG as the Commander and shall
be assisted by a deputy commander and an Executive Officer. It shall be
composed of four (4) Coordinating Staff (Administrative and Logistic
Division, Intelligence and Investigation Division, Operation and Plans
Division and Information and Education Division) and three (3) area Offices,
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
Unit shall perform the following phases:
128
PHASE I – INTELLIGENCE BUILD UP
1. Update Data Bank
2. Improvement of Coordinative effort with the intel communities and other
government agencies.
3. Enhancement of coordination with foreign law enforcement agencies to
improve intelligence capabilities and networking.
4. Tighten links with various civil society and business groups for exchange
of information regarding KFR.
5. Implementation of DILG Memorandum Circulars on Reward System for
Kidnap For Ransom Groups wanted personalities
PHASE II – HARDENING OF TARGETS
It shall consist of measures to protect and secure potential victims
of kidnapping. It includes the conduct of dialogues and other informative
sessions with would be victims, individually or collectively, such as
discussions with various Filipino- Chinese Organization and
Communities. In these gathering the participants are forewarned of the
various modus operandi of known Kidnap For Ransom Groups. They
are also lectured on the techniques and preventive measures to avoid
being victimized. It also entails the assignment of personal security
officers in a case to case basis, and the improvement of the level of
response to public complaints.
PHASE III – CREATION OF RESPONSE / REACTION TEAMS
1. On – alert Response teams to immediately respond to complaints on
Kidnap for ransom incidents
129
2. Undertake intensive manhunt on identified members of KFR groups
and identified fly by night kidnappers.
PHASE IV – PROVIDING SUPPORT TO VICTIM’S FAMILIES
1. Negotiation and technical monitoring
2. Surveillance
3. Organization of Non – Government Organization to assist the police.
PHASE V – ARREST AND PROSECUTION OF KFR SUSPECTS,
POLITICAL BACKERS AND JUDICIAL CONNECTIONS
1. Investigation
2. Legal Offensive
3. Implementation of Money Laundering Law and Tax Evation Law
4. Improve media relations
PHASE VI – MONITORING AND EVALUATION
The monitoring and evaluation of this Public Safety Development
Program will be conducted after one (1) year of its implementation. This
will serve as a basis for continuous enhancement and improvement of
the Philippine National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field
Unit and other Units
5.0 Program Monitoring and Evaluation
After going through the different phases there is a need for
periodic evaluation of the program. This is to ensure that the program is
attuned to the renewed anti – kidnapping strategy of the Philippine
National Police Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit and other
Units provide avenue for changes/modification.
130
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134
Appendix A. Letter Request to Conduct Study

PHILIPPINE PUBLIC SAFETY COLLEGE
Camp General Mariano N. Castañeda
Silang, Cavite
September 18, 2018
PCSUPT GLENN G DUMLAO

Director, Anti-Kidnapping Group
Camp Crame, Quezon City
Dear Director Dumlao:
The student-officers of Philippine Public Safety College, National Police

College (PPSC-NPC), Public Safety Officers Advance Course (PSOAC) Class
2018-05 will be conducting an Action Research on Preventing and Countering
Violent Extremism as partial fulfilment to the course.
The undersigned student-officers of Group 5 of PSOAC Class 2018-05

had chosen a study entitled: “THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE PNP
ANTI-KIDNAPPING GROUP MINDANAO FIELD UNIT IN COUNTERING
KIDNAP FOR RANSOM ACTIVITIES BY ABU SAYYAF GROUP IN
ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA”. It aims to determine that operational readiness
and possible necessities of that particular unit in addressing the threat and
mitigating incidents.
In this regard, may we respectfully request your precious time and

permission for the following activities:
 Courtesy call and visit with the Director, AKG and/or the
Command Group;
 Conduct of interview and survey thru questionnaires
 Access to statistical data/information
 Visit to AKG Mindanao Field Unit in Zamboanga City for
similar purpose
Rest assured that all information and data gathered on the subject matter
will be treated with utmost confidentiality.
Further request approval.
Very truly yours,
The Researchers
135
Appendix B. Survey Questionnaire and Interview Guide
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I: Profile of the Respondents
DIRECTIONS: Please provide all pertinent information on the items below by

checking the appropriate box and/or supplying the answers on the blank space.
Name: (Optional)__________________________________________
Personnel Category :( ) PNP AKG Personnel
:( ) NGOs/Civic Organizations
:( ) KFR Victims/Relatives
1. Age :( ) 20 and below :( ) 51 – 60
:( ) 21 – 30 :( ) 61 and above
:( ) 31 – 40
:( ) 41 – 50
2. Gender :( ) Male :( ) Female
3. Educational Attainment: :( ) Graduate Studies

:( ) College Graduate
:( ) College Undergraduate
:( ) High School Graduate
:( ) Elementary Graduate
4. Civil Status :( ) Single :( ) Married
:( ) Separated :( ) Widow/er
5. Length of Service (only for PNP) ( ) 1 to 5 years

( ) 6 to 10 years
( ) 11 to 20 years
( ) 21 year and more
136
PART II: Assessment on the Operational Capabilities of AKG Mindanao
Field Unit in Countering Kidnap for Ransom Activities in Zamboanga
Peninsula
Instruction: Please put a check (√) mark in the appropriate column in the
answering the questions concerning assessment on the Operational
Capabilities of Anti–Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit countering
kidnapping activities in Zamboanga Peninsula. Please use the scale below for
your reference:
Scale Verbal Interpretation Symbol

5 Highly Capable HC
4 Capable C
3 Moderately Capable MC
2 Less Capable LC
1 Not Capable NC
A. MANPOWER CAPABILITY
HC C MC LC NC
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1. Respond promptly to the reported Kidnap – for
– Ransom (KFR) incidents in accordance with
the existing procedures.
2. Aid and assist the distress family of the victim
during negotiations.
3. Influence KFR victims and their families to be
cooperative with the authorities.
4. Formulate a cohesive action among personnel
for the conduct of follow – up operation and
investigation of unsolved cases.
5. Motivate members of the PNP AKG for them
to be more dedicated in performing their
assigned task.
B. LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY
HC C MC LC NC
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1. Sufficient vehicles for the conduct of covert
police operations against kidnappers.
2. Reliable equipment to be used in the conduct
of surveillance operations.
3. Suitable armaments and tactical gears to be
used in the conduct of rescue operation.
4. Sophisticated technical equipment to be used
in the conduct of technical analysis.
5. Sufficient funds in the conduct of lengthy and
continuous police pursuit operations.
137
C. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CAPABILITY
HC C MC LC NC
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1 Liaison with the victims’ family for the early
solution of the case
2 Dispatch negotiable team that will assist the
family victim throughout the duration of
negotiation phase.
3 Coordinate with territorial police units and
other law enforcement agencies in areas
where kidnap – for– ransom incidents has
been taken place.
4 Collaborate with the concerned territorial
police and other law enforcement personnel
involved to include the prosecutor on case to
ensure the filling air tight cases against the
kidnappers.
5 Train its personnel to improve their tactical
capabilities in rescue operation of victim and in
neutralizing kidnap-for-ransom groups
D. STAKEHOLDERS COLLABORATION CAPABILITY

HC C MC LC NC
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1 Expand its intelligence network with other
police units, other law enforcement agencies
and other government units in the fight
against kidnap-for-ransom activities.
2 Conduct meeting and dialogue with
stakeholders as a means of sharing inputs
and feedback mechanism.
3 Facilitate anti-kidnapping-for-ransom
awareness and advocacy seminars to the
community as a means of target hardening
measure.
4 Initiate team building activities with the
stakeholders to strengthen cohesiveness and
cooperation in the fight against kidnapping
activities.
5 Facilitate for the establishment of
Memorandum of Agreement / Memorandum
of Understanding with stakeholders.
138
PART III: Problems Encountered by PNP AKG-MFU in Countering KFR
Activities of Abu Sayyaf Group in Zamboanga Peninsula
Instruction: Please put a check (/) mark in the appropriate column in the
answering the questions concerning the problems encountered by the PNP
AKG, Mindanao Field Unit in Zamboanga peninsula. Please use the scale
below for your reference:

5 Very Serious VS
4 Serious S
3 Moderately Serious MS
2 Less Serious LS
1 Not Serious NS
VS S MS LS NS
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1 Shortage of well trained and capable
personnel to be utilized as first responder to
incident reported.
2 Shortage of well-versed and experienced
personnel to aid and assist the distress family
of the victim during negotiations.
Poor rapport with previous victims and their
3
families.
4 Insufficient personnel to be utilized for the
conduct of manhunt operation and
investigation of unsolved cases.
5 Very exhausting and risky assignment
comparable to that of personnel performing
regular police work with other PNP units.
B. LOGISTICS CAPABILITY
VS S MS LS NS
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1 Insufficiency of vehicles for the conduct of
covert police operations against kidnappers.
2 Unreliable and obsolete equipment to be used
in the conduct of surveillance operations.
3 Insufficient of suitable armaments and tactical
gear to be used in the conduct of rescue
operation.
4 Outmoded or unreliable equipment in the
conduct of technical analysis.
5 Insufficient funds in the conduct of lengthy and
139
VS S MS LS NS
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1 Hesitancy of the family to report the incident to
the police due to fear of reprisal with the
kidnappers.
2 Rejection of the Family victim to cooperate with
the negotiation team due to the safety of the
victim under captivity
3 Involvement of some misfit and undesirable
police and other law enforcement agency
personnel assigned in the area with the
involved members of kidnap – for – ransom
group.
4 Poor collaboration with the concerned territorial
police and other law enforcement personnel
involved to include the prosecutor on the case
that resulted to dismissal of case in court
against the kidnappers.
5 Insufficient fund for the conduct of needed
training to its personnel to improve their tactical
capabilities in rescue operation of victim and in
neutralizing kidnap – for ransom groups.

VS S MS LS NS
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1 Poor intelligence networking with other police
units, other law enforcement agencies and
other government units in the fight against
kidnap-for-ransom activities.
2 No regular meeting and dialogue with
stakeholders as a means of sharing inputs and
feedback mechanism.
3 Limited conduct of anti – kidnap – for – ransom
awareness and advocacy seminars to the
community due to voluminous tasking to attend
to.
4 Lack of team building activities with the
stakeholders to strengthen cohesiveness and
cooperation in the fight against kidnapping
activities.
5 Absence of Memorandum of Agreement /
Memorandum of Understanding with
stakeholders.
140
PART IV: Proposed Measures to Address the Problems Encountered by
the PNP AKG-MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in Zamboanga
Peninsula
Instruction: Please put a check (√) mark in the appropriate column in the
answering the questions concerning measure to address the problems
encountered by the Anti–Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in Zamboanga
City. Please use the scale below for your reference:

5 Strong Agree SA
4 Moderately MA
3 Agree A
2 Slightly Disagree SA
1 Disagree D
SA MA A SA D
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1 Provide regular training to enhance the needed
operational capabilities and skills of Anti –
Kidnapping Group personnel.
Provide regular and specialized training on
2
negotiations.
3 Organize association and develop good rapport
with the previous victims and their families.
4 Recruit and assign more personnel to Anti –
kidnapping Group to be utilized for the conduct of
follow – up operation and investigation of
unsolved cases.
5 Develop proportional reward system to motivate
personnel to be more dedicated in performing
their assigned task.
B. LOGISTICS CAPABILITY
SA MA A SA D
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1 Procure sufficient vehicles to be utilized in the
conduct of police operations against kidnappers
2 Procurement of reliable equipment to be used in
the conduct of surveillance operations.
3 Solicits for alternative resources that will
address the needed logistical requirements.
4 Properly dispose outmoded or unreliable
equipment and programmed the procurement of
reliable needed technical equipment.
5 Propose and prioritize a budget for contingency
fund to be used in the conduct of lengthy and
141
SA MA A SA D
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1 Designation of senior and credible officers to act
as the liaison to the victims’ family with
designation order.
2 Assure the development of a well experienced
and well versed negotiation team.
3 Conduct of aggressive counter – intelligence
operation and institute appropriate action against
involved personnel in kidnapping – for – ransom
activities.
4 Conduct of cases conference before the court
with the concerned territorial police and other law
enforcement personnel involved to include the
prosecutor on case to ensure the filling of air tight
cases against the kidnappers for their eventual.
5 Provide regular training or facilitate foreign
training to its personnel to improve their
operational and tactical capabilities in rescue
operation of victim and in neutralizing kidnap-for-
ransom groups.

SA MA A SA D
Indicators
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
1 Facilitate the conduct of good intelligence fusion
with other police units, other law enforcement
agencies and other government units in the fight
against kidnap-for-ransom activities.
2 Conduct regular meeting to develop feedback
mechanism system to include open lines
communication among stakeholders.
3 Recruit and train additional personnel purposely
for the regular conduct of anti – kidnap – for –
ransom awareness and advocacy seminars to
the community especially on the kidnap prone
areas and would be target individuals as means
of target hardening measure.
4 Maintenance of good rapport and regular conduct
of team building activities with the stakeholders
to strengthen cohesiveness and cooperation in
the fight against kidnapping activities
5 Crafting of Memorandum of Agreement /
Memorandum of Understanding among
stakeholders for the smooth conduct of
investigation, manhunt operation and
prosecution of kidnapping cases against kidnap-
for-ransom groups.
142
INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS
1. What is your assessment on the Operational Capabilities of Anti –

Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit (AKG-MFU) in countering
kidnapping activities in Zamboanga Peninsula?
2. What are the problems encountered by the Anti – Kidnapping Group

Mindanao Field Unit in Zamboanga Peninsula that which were not
mentioned on this questionnaire?
3. Do you have any recommendation that will address the problems

encountered in enhancing the Anti – Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field
Unit in Zamboanga Peninsula? If there are any, what are those?
4. Is there a need to change and improve the program of activities of Anti

– Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in Zamboanga Peninsula? If
there are any, what are those?
5. What do you think are the benefits of this study to the AKG-MFU in
countering kidnapping activities in Zamboanga Peninsula?
143
Appendix C. Research Timeline/Itinerary

PHILIPPINE PUBLIC SAFETY COLLEGE
Camp General Mariano N. Castañeda,
Silang, Cavite
ITINERARY
September 24-30, 2018
Stakeholder’s Perspective on the “The Operational Capability of the PNP Anti-

Kidnapping Group Mindanao Field Unit in Countering Kidnap For Ransom
Activities by Abu Sayyaf Group in Zamboanga Peninsula”
DATE ACTIVITY OUTPUT

September 24,  Courtesy call to the Approval for the
2018 Command Group, Anti- conduct of survey
(Monday) Kidnapping Group, Camp and interview
Crame, Quezon City
 Interview with the Stakeholders’
respondents from AKG, Perspective
Camp Crame, Quezon City (Retrieval of SQ)
 Distribution of Survey Stakeholders’
questionnaires to AKG Perspective
personnel/respondents
September 25-26,  Interview with the Stakeholders’
2018 Stakeholders in Luzon/Metro Perspective
(Tuesday- Manila
Wednesday)  Distribution Of Survey Stakeholders’
Questionnaires To Perspective
Stakeholders In Luzon/
Metro Manila
September 27,  Courtesy call to the Chief, Approval for the
2018 Mindanao Field Unit, Anti- conduct of survey
(Thursday) Kidnapping Group, and interview
Zamboanga City
September 28-30,  Interview with the Stakeholders’
2018 Stakeholders in Zamboanga Perspective
(Friday-Sunday) City
 Distribution of Survey Stakeholders’
questionnaires to Perspective
Stakeholders in Zamboanga
City
APPROVED/DISAPPROVED:
DR. ROMEO S MAGSALOS

Director II/Dean
144
Appendix D. Transcript of Key Informant Interview (KII)
KEY INFORMANT: ARCHITECT KA KUEN CHUA

a. Filipino-Chinese National;
b. Kidnap-For-Ransom Victim;
c. Chairman, Movement for Restoration for Peace and
Order (MRPO); and
d. Vice Chairman, National Advisory Council, PNP
Anti-Kidnapping Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City
DATE/TIME/PLACE OF INTERVIEW: September 24, 2018, 4:00-5:00 PM

Trinoma Mall, Quezon City
===========================================================
1. Preliminaries: Good afternoon Sir, thank you for approving our request
for interview and for spending your precious time amidst your hectic
schedule to meet us today.
Answer: Good afternoon too. It is always my pleasure and honour.
2. Preliminaries: Thank you Sir. First of all, my name is PSINSP Helen L
Dela Cruz from CIDG, with me are my group mates, PSINSP Marites
Buenaflor and PSINSP Mike Diaz from the Anti-Kidnapping Group;
PSINSP Richard John Macachor from CIDG; PSINSP Vicente Tariao
from CSG; and PSINSP Angelita Nastor from Maritime Group, we are all
undergoing mandatory schooling- Public Safety Officers Advance
Course (PSOAC) course at the National Police College, Silang, Cavite.
Answer: Nice meeting you all. (Shaking of hands)
3. Question: Sir, as stated on our letter to you, one of the requirements of
the PSOAC course is for us to conduct an Action Research. The title of
our Action Research is “The Operational Capability of the PNP Anti-
Kidnapping Group- Mindanao Field Unit in Countering Kidnapping For
Ransom Activities by Abu Sayyaf Group in Zamboanga Peninsula.” In
this connection Sir, we would like to ask your perspective on the
145
kidnapping for ransom activities/incidents in the Philippines particularly
in Mindanao particularly in Zamboanga Peninsula and the operational
capability of the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group in countering said activities.
Answer: Yes, I can give my general perspective on the issue.
4. Question: We learned Sir that you are a successful businessman and
an Architect; once a KFR victim; presently the Chairman of the
Movement for Restoration for Peace and Order (MRPO); and Vice
Chairman of the National Advisory Council, PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group,
Camp Crame, Quezon City. Can you give us more information on these
Sir?
Answer: Yes everything are correct. I am Architect Ka Kuen Chua, a
Filipino-Chinese national, I was a victim of kidnapping- for- ransom on
September 27, 2008, almost ten years today. Being a victim, I am
qualified to be a member of the Movement for Restoration for Peace and
Order (MRPO). For four (4) years now, I am the Chairman of the MRPO;
and presently, being a stakeholder and an active supporter of the PNP
Anti-Kidnapping Group, I am chosen as the Vice Chairman of the
National Advisory Council of PNP AKG.
5. Question: As an organization, what is the mission of the MRPO?
Answer: The MRPO is a non-governmental organization, the members
of which are all kidnap victims, regardless of nationality, gender, status
in the society. Its mission is to help the victims and victims’ family from
negotiation up to the prosecution of the crime.
6. Question: Sir, basing on your records, who are the target victims
for KFR?
146
Answer: Ninety (90) percent of the victims of KFR is the “Big Bosses”
and/or owners of companies/businesses, mostly Filipino-Chinese and/or
Chinese nationals doing business or staying in the country.
7. Question: Sir you mentioned about negotiation, can you further
comment on this?
Answer: Yes, as I had said earlier, MRPO’s help starts from negotiation
to prosecution because negotiation is very critical in all KFR incidents,
there lies the safety and survival of the victims. And the MRPO is
supporting the victims until the prosecution of the case.
8. Question: What is your comment on the “No Ransom Policy” of the
government?
Answer: The MRPO’s priority and concern is always the safety and
survival of the victim.
9. Question: What is your perspective on the KFR activities in the
Philippines?
Answer: KFR in the Philippines became a lucrative business, and there
is a problem on the real statistics on the KFR incidents because only
20-25% of the total incidents is being reported by victims to the PNP
AKG.
10. Question: Is the KFR landscape in Metro Manila/Luzon differs from that
of Mindanao?
Answer: Yes, KFR activities and attributes vary according to location.
KFR in Metro Manila and/or Luzon is entirely different in Mindanao. In
Metro Manila/Luzon, it is perpetrated by syndicates, while in Mindanao,
it is more on banditry.
147
11. Question: Have you ever encountered or known of a KFR activities in
Mindanao?
Answer: I am more familiar with the KFR activities and attributes in
Metro Manila/Luzon, but I happened to work with the PNP AKG as an
interpreter for the Filipino-Chinese victims who were abducted by Abu
Sayyaf Group in Sabah and hidden in Mindanao for a period of time, and
I was instrumental for their release. This experience made me realized
that KFR in Metro Manila/Luzon is entirely and completely different in
Mindanao.
12. Question: Sir what happened or problems encountered by these victims
who were with their captors for a period of time?
Answer: The victims suffered or experienced a “Stockholm syndrome”
with their Abu Sayyaf Group abductors.
13. Question: Sir what is your perspective on the operational capability of
the PNP AKG in fighting and solving KFR activities in the Philippines?
Answer: The PNP AKG is operational capable in fighting and solving
KFR activities here in Metro Manila/Luzon, but do not have same
operational capability in Mindanao due to some factors.
14. Question: Do you have any comment and recommendation on the PNP
AKG on investigating and solving KFR activities?
Answer: As the Chairman of the MRPO, victims and their families came
to me and reported to me their complaints and or concerns towards PNP
AKG. The PNP AKG personnel should be sensitive to the feelings of the
victims and their families. Example, when the victims and their family
are making follow-up on the development of their cases, the PNP AKG
148
personnel should listen to their comments and should have patient in
answering their concerns.
15. Question: Do you have an additional or final comment before we end
this interview Sir?
Answer: During the oath taking of PDG Ronald Dela Rosa as the new
Chief of Philippine National Police in 2016, our beloved PRESIDENT
RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE (PRRD) announced, as I quote, “all kidnap
victims can sit down with me in Malacanang Palace and we will talk about
the problem on kidnapping”. This pronouncement of PRRD gave us, the
victims, the MRPO, so much comfort, because we have someone to turn
to and lean on against the kidnappers.
16. Question: That’s a very good note to end this interview Sir. Thank you
very much for the answers, information and comments on our subject
matter, and for sparing us your precious time for this interview.
Answer: Thank you very much too, and you are most welcome.
149
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
PSINSP ARCELIA OLIQUIANO BAS was born on December 26, 1974

in Pandan, Ligao City, Albay. She graduated her elementary education in March
1988 at Pandan Elementary School, finished her secondary education at St.
Stephen’s Academy in Ligao City. She completed her baccalaureate degree of
Bachelor of Science in Criminology major in Police Administration at Bicol
College, Daraga Albay in March 1996 and passed the Licensure Examination
for Criminologists of the same year. She acquired her Certificate in Professional
teaching at Aquinas University of Legazpi City in April 2014.
Her eligibilities are NAPOLCOM Superintendent and RA 6506.
Her previous assignments include the following: Civil Security Group,
SOSIA, Ligao City Police Station, Chief, Women & Children Protection Desk,
Deputy Chief of Police, Libon Municipal Police Station, Deputy Chief of Police,
Guinobatan Police Station, Deputy Chief of Police, Oas Municipal Police
Station, Deputy Chief of Police, Guinobatan Municipal Police Station, Albay
Police Provincial, Office, Deputy Chief of Police, Basud Municipal Police
Station, Camarines Norte, Camarines Norte Police Provincial Office, Chief,
Women & Children Protection Desk, Field Training Program, Tabaco City
Police Station, Public Safety Officers Basic Course, RTS 5, Police Regional
Office 5, Directorate for Operations, Aviation Security Group, Force Support
Battalion, Special Action Force, First Battalion, Special Action Force, Rapid
Deployment Battalion, Special Action Force, and Special Action Force Training
School, Special Action Force Class 2002-02.
Her awards/recognitions/commendations include the following: Medalya
ng Kasanayan, Medalya ng Papuri, Medalya ng Palilingkod sa Luzon,
Certificate of Recognition (5), Certification of Appreciation (20), and
Certification of Commendation (20).
150
She attended seminars/training courses such as the following:
Managers Course, Leadership Course, Certified Safety and Security
Practitioner, Chief of Police Refresher Course, Human Rights Training of
Trainor’s, Investigation Officers Basic Course, Public Safety Officers Basic
Course, Women and Children Specialized Course, Media Relation Seminar,
Seminar on Trafficking in Person, Public Safety Traffic Investigation Course,
and International Human Rights Seminar.
151
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
PSINSP MARITES BUSTAMANTE BUENAFLOR was born in Oas,

Albay, on December 24, 1970. Proud of being a pure blooded Bicolana, she
was born to parents Salvador Reonal Bustamante and Teresita Romero Relato,
who hails from the town of Oas in the province of Albay.
Braving the challenge of growing up in the busy neighborhood of Ilaor
Norte, Oas, Albay, she finished her secondary school in Oas Polytechnic High
School and later graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Elementary Education (BEED) from Bicol College, Daraga, Albay in 1992.
She was a public elementary school teacher before joining the elite PNP
Special Action Force where she belonged to PSBRC CL 02-1995 and the first
female police of the elite PNP Unit from 1995 to 2000 where she trained in
various disciplines: Administrative and Human Resource Management,
Investigation, and Intelligence, among others.
As a member of the defunct Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER) and now the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group specialized in
anti-kidnapping operations and counter terrorist operations, she was trained in
hostage negotiation by the Germany’s Bandiskriminalant Police through the
Hostage Negotiation Course and the KFR Incident Management Course by the
PNP-AKG.
She was commissioned via vertical entry in 2012 and on the same year
she served in peacekeeping missions of the United Nations in South Sudan
East Africa for one year where she distinguishly represented the country and
the Philippine National Police.
In her 23 years of police service, she has received numerous awards
and decorations. Her most recent assignment was the Secretary to the Chief
of Staff of the PNP AKG and one of the primary negotiators of the unit during
its live KFR cases.
152
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
PSINSP ELMAR ROZ CLARET is a member of PNP Lateral Entry 2010.

He is happily married to Mary Chatty L. Claret and blessed with two children.
He was assigned as Chief of Police of Lingig Municipal Police Station, Lingig,
Surigao del Sur prior to his schooling at the National Police College, Silang,
Cavite. He had held several positions from Intelligence Operative; Chief,
Provincial Intelligence Branch of Surigao del Sur, Police Provincial Office, and
Team Leader on Anti-Insurgency Operation of Provincial Public Safety
Company.
He is a Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) Licensed

Criminologist and a graduate of specialized training such as of Police
Intelligence Course, Tactical Commanders Course, Post Blast Investigation
Course and attended/completed numerous schooling and seminars.
His dedication and strong commitment to police service earned him

numerous awards, medals, and commendations such as Medalya ng Papuri,
Medalya sa Paglaban sa Manliligalig, Medalya sa Paglingkod sa Mindanao,
Medalya ng Ugnayang Pampulisya, Medalya ng Kasanayan, Medalya ng
Kagalingan, and Medalya ng Pagtulong sa Nasalanta.
This God-centered and humble police commissioned officer will continue

to work hard in the best of his ability with utmost integrity, undying commitment
to public service and in the best interest of the community.
153
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Excellence is an art won by training and habituation. We do not act rightly

because we have virtue or excellence, but we rather have those because we
have acted rightly - Aristotle.
PSINSP HELEN L DELA CRUZ’s deep passion for public service runs
in her blood. She was born to a family of public servants, with her father working
for 42 long years with the Department of Public Works and Highways, and her
grandfather a dedicated school teacher who served in Bulacan and Nueva Ecjia
in the 1950s. Inspired by them and raised by her parents with a deep sense of
service to others, PSInsp Dela Cruz chose to enter the teaching profession,
serving as a public school teacher in a far-flung municipality of Davao Oriental
prior to joining the Philippine National Police (PNP) in 1997. Equipped with
Bachelor Degrees in Education; Criminology; and Law, she is putting to good
use her education and other specialized training programs as a police operative
and crime investigator at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG), the premier investigative arm of the PNP, where she is presently
assigned.
Her track record in her assignments in various CIDG operating units
such as the Anti-Fraud and Commercial Crimes Division (AFCCD); the
Detection and Special Operations Division (DSOD); the Women and Children
Protection Desk (WCPD) of CIDG Region 4A and NCR-CIDG; Chief of Case
Management and Analysis Section (CMAS) of Intelligence Division, HCIDG and
CIDG Region 4A; and Deputy Provincial Chief of CIDG Cavite, undoubtedly
prove her exemplary skills, commitment to duty, and outstanding performance
in the field of operations and investigation, which earned for her numerous
awards and commendations through the years. In all her endeavors, PSInsp
154
Dela Cruz displays a genuine heart for service that puts a premium on the rights
of persons, particularly of women and children.
A Licensed Criminologist in 2012, she joined the PNP Officer Corps via
Lateral Entry and took her oath as Police Inspector, Line Officer of Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG).
PSInsp Dela Cruz is a recipient of two National Awards, the Metrobank
Foundation, the Country’s Outstanding Police Officers in the Service (COPS)
in 2011 and PNP Achievement Award for being the Best Junior Police
Commissioned Officer (PCO) in the Field of Administration and General
Services during the 114th Police Service Anniversary in 2015.
In 2012, she was chosen by Female Network, a private group,
recognizing excellent Filipinas in their field of work, as one of the 100 Amazing
Filipinas 2012, “Warriors for a Cause” category. In 2015, she was a recipient
of Special Award/PNP Efficiency Medal for her invaluable service and
contribution being a member of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) on Mamasapano
Incident.
Prior to her attendance to Public Safety Officers Advance Course
(PSOAC) schooling, she was the Deputy Provincial Chief of CIDG Cavite Filed
Unit.
155
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
PSINSP MIKE DURAN DIAZ was born in Curva, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
on September 7, 1980. He was born to parents Adolberto Patubo Diaz and
Erlinda Almazan Duran, who hail from the town of Burgos, Ilocos Sur and
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.
Braving the challenge of growing up in the poor and far flung

neighborhood of Subadi Sur, Burgos, Ilocos Sur, he finished his primary and
secondary school at Oas Roxas High School in Baguio City as working scholar
and later graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Criminology (BS
Crim) from Baguio Colleges Foundation now known as University of Cordilleras,
Baguio City in 2001.
He entered the police service through the elite PNP Special Action Force
quota where he belonged to PSBRC CL 02-2003 where he trained in various
disciplines especially in Police and Military Tactics. As member of the PNP-
SAF, he was deployed in Mindanao area for three (3) years.
After eight years of service as member of the PNP-SAF, he transferred
as investigator of the defunct Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response
(PACER) and now the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group specialized in anti-
kidnapping operations and counter terrorist operations. He was trained in
hostage negotiation by the United States of America through its Hostage
Negotiation Course and the KFR Incident Management Course by the PNP-
AKG.
He was commissioned via lateral entry in 2012 and in 2014, he was
again assigned in Zamboanga as team leader of Anti-kidnapping Group,
Mindanao Field Unit for three years.
156
In his 14 years of police service, he has received numerous awards and
decorations and the most distinguished award he received is Best in Manhunt
in 2016 and Best in Operation 2017 Junior PCO Category. His most recent
assignment was the Chief Investigation of Anti-kidnapping Group, Luzon Field
Unit.
157
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
POLICE SENIOR INSPECTOR RICHARD JOHN DM MACACHOR, O-

26451 is a member of PNP Lateral Entry 2012. He is married and blessed with
three children. He was assigned with the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) prior to his schooling at NPC, Silang, Cavite. Said PCO has
been a field operative, investigator, team leader, and section chief in various
CIDG field units.
He is a Certified Security Professional (CSP) under the Philippine
Society for Industrial Security (PSIS) and a Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC) Licensed Criminologist.
In 1993, he started his PNP career with the PNP Intelligence Group
wherein he was exposed in various intelligence operations. His training and
experience honed his tradecraft skills in dealing various threats to national
security particularly perpetrated by the CPP/NPA/NDF and the Islamic
Extremist Groups both domestic and international.
In 1995, as a young intelligence officer he paved way to the discovery of
OPLAN “BOJINKA”, a blueprint of an International Terrorist link to Al Qaeda
to bomb vital US infrastructures and buildings that includes bombing of World
Trade Center in February 1993; Pope assassination plan of Pope John Paul II
in Manila; and the September 11, 2001 incident. He played a vital role on the
successful prosecution of three international terrorist personalities namely:
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Abdul Hakim Murad, and Wali Khan Amin Shah in the
court of New York, USA. Such accomplishment placed the PNP contributions
to National Security as well as to international law enforcement fight against
terrorism.
158
His reassignment to CIDG in 2004 provided him exposure to anti-
criminality operations and investigations. He handled in the investigation of
fraud and commercial crimes, violations in the RPC and Special Laws including
sensational and high profile incidents.
Among others, he contributed in bridging the gaps of law enforcement
and private and business community by sharing his technical expertise and
applied knowledge in corporate-industrial security and investigation, loss
control/prevention, and risk identification.
These various assignments and accomplishments had provided him the
opportunities to exercise leadership and management over small unit and
teams of operators and investigators as well as informants and agents. He
acquired and developed the values of patience, hard work, paying particular
attention to details and teamwork.
Likewise, it provided him opportunities to acquire trainings and seminars
in the field of intelligence operations and crime investigations.
In his 27 years’ service, he received numerous awards and recognitions,
to name a few:
 Medalya ng Kadakilaan (PNP Heroism Medal) and USA Department of
Justice Plaque of Appreciation
 Eleven (11) Medalya ng Kagalinga (PNP Merit Medal),
 Fifteen (15) Medalya ng Kasanayan (PNP Efficiency Medal),
 Twelve (12) Medalya ng Papuri (PNP Commendation Medal),
 Nine (9) Medalya ng Paglilingkodsa Luzon (PNP Luzon Campaign
Medal), Four (4) Medalya ng PaglilingkodsaVisayas (PNP Visayas
Campaign Medal)
 Twenty seven (27) Letters of Commendation.
159
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
PSINSP ANGELITA DAMANCE NASTOR was born in Sablayan,

Occidental Mindoro on July 16, 1981 to parents Prudencio Enoro Nastor and
Pastora Valeroso Damance, who hail from the province of Isabela and Nueva
Ecija, respectively.
She grew up in Antipolo City where she awarded as Athlete of the Year
after consistently competing in Palarong Pambansan in Bagong Nayon II,
Elementary School and Antipolo National High School in 1994 and 1998,
respectively. She finished her tertiary education at the Philippine College of
Criminology (PCCr), Sta. Cruz, Manila with the degree of Bachelor of Science
in Criminology in 2001 where she was proclaimed as Corps Commander of
PCCr Corps of Cadets. She passed the Licensure Examination for
Criminologist in 2002.
She was commissioned Second Lieutenant (2Lt), Res. Philippine Army
(PA) before joining the Philippine National Police, MIMAROPA Class “Unang
Lahi” in 2002 where she got her first PNP Leadership Award as PSBRC CL 03-
2002 Female Class Marcher. In 2005 after her assignment as Intelligence and
Investigation PNCO of San Jose MPS and Occidental Mindoro PPO,
respectively, she was reassigned to the Directorate for Personnel and Records
Management (DPRM), Camp Crame, Quezon City. In 2009, she was
reassigned to PNP Maritime Group where she was promoted to Senior Police
Officer 1 (SPO1) and member of morning runners of the then CPNP, PDG
JESUS A VERZOSA. From PO1 to SPO1, she underwent various training
courses such as PNP SCOUT, Police Intelligence Course (PIC), Criminal
Investigation and Detection Course (CRIDEC), and attended various work
related seminars, symposiums, and workshops.
She entered in the PNP Maritime Group Officer Corps in 2011 via Lateral
Entry and designated as Station Chief, Plans and Programs Officer, Police
Community Relation Officer in the different stations and units of MG from 2012
160
to May 2018. As a young PNP officer, she was trained in Police Community
Relation, Planning, Counseling, SCUBA Diving and other training programs
where she honed her skills as a public servant. She was awarded as Best
Operation Junior PCO of the Year during the 2013 Maritime Group Anniversary
at Camp Crame, Quezon City after numerous operational accomplishments in
the implementation of national and local laws including ordinances in our
Philippine Sea Waters and coastal areas during her stint as Station Chief of
1301st and 1302nd Maritime Stations (MARPSTAs), Surigao City and Cantillan,
Surigao del Norte Stations, respectively.
In her more than 15 years in the police service, she received numerous
awards and decorations. Her most recent assignment was as Station Chief of
302nd MARPSTA, Zambales, Philippines where she personally joining
seaborne police operations and experienced capsized in their motorized banca
in different occasions while performing her duties and responsibilities.
She is also one of the strong MG and PNP players in Taekwondo,
Swimming, and Track Events during yearly NSU-NHQ Olympics and AFP-PNP-
PCG Olympics since 2013 to present.
When not wearing uniform, she was in her plain motherly clothes and
consistently conducting intentionally parenting to her four children, namely:
Gab, Pol, Lily, and Pau.
161
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
PSINSP VICENTE PACQUIAO TARIAO JR was born on October 22,

1968 in Cebu City. He completed his baccalaureate degree of Bachelor of
Science in Criminology major in Police Administration in University of the
Visayas, Cebu City. He entered in the service/recruit on December 16, 1993 at
Police Regional Office 7, Camp Sergeio Osmena Sr., Jones Avenue, Cebu City.
He is a member of the PNP via Lateral Entry 2012 and married to Johyne
Onos Tariao and they are blessed with three (3) honorable children. In 2014,
he was assigned as Officer-in-Charge of Lake Wood Municipal Police Station,
Zamboanga Del Sur, prior to his schooling at the National Police College,
Silang, Cavite. He had several positions from AKG Luzon Field Unit, SOU-AKG,
Regional Public Safety Batallon PRO6 and Chief Operation of SOSIA, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, among others.
He is a holder of Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) Licensed
Criminologist and a graduate of specialized training such as SURE SHOCK,
PNP SCOUT, EICC Bomb Technician, VIP Course and attended/completed
numerous schooling and seminars.
His dedication to serve as public servant earned him a numerous latest
awards/recognitions/recommendations such as Medalya ng Kagalingan (4),
Medalya ng Kasanayan (6), Medalya ng Papuri (3), and Medalya ng
Paglilingkod sa Mindanao, among others.
Being a police officer amidst of it all, in the battle and in the face of
danger and death; however, horrible the incident maybe, we as police officers
are called upon to offer the greatest act of religious training is the “Ultimate
Sacrifice” it is noblest profession I can think of.
162

The Operational Capability of PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula

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The Operational Capability of PNP AKG MFU in Countering KFR Activities of ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula

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Republic of the Philippines

Department of the Interior and Local Government

THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

An Action Research Project

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

PSINSP ARCELIA O BAS

This is an official document of the Philippine Public Safety College.

Quotations from, counteraction, or reproduction of all or any part of this

document is not authorized without the specific permission/approval of the

Philippine Public Safety College.

work should include the foregoing statement.

PSINSP ARCELIA O BAS

PSOAC Class 2018-05

This Action Research Project entitled, “THE OPERATIONAL

PCSUPT RANDOLF REVITA DELFIN (Ret)

DR. ROY R. CORREO PROF. MA. COSELYN R. SANTOS

Accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for Public Safety

DR. ROMEO SEVILLA MAGSALOS

The completion of the research was made possible through the

contributions are sincerely appreciated and gratefully acknowledged. Further,

and wisdom, for His countless love and blessings.

completion of the research.

The Director of the National Police College, Dr. ROMEO S. MAGSALOS,

PCSUPT GLENN DUMLAO, Director of the Anti-Kidnapping Group for

The AKG Mindanao Field Unit personnel led by PSSUPT RONALD

knowledge for consultation and advice.

of the study in answering the survey questionnaire. We thank you!

The study aimed to determine the status of the operational capability of

Kidnapping-for-Ransom Activities (KFR) by Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in

Zamboanga Peninsula in terms of manpower, logistical, strategic and tactical,

and stakeholders’ collaboration capabilities.

The study utilized 207 respondents composed of 56 PNP personnel, 74

staff members of non-government organizations/civic organizations, and 77

KFR victims and/or relatives.

grand mean of Effective was obtained as to Operational Capabilities of PNP

AKG MFU in countering KFR activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula, it was

the AKG MFU capability in response to KFR group.

The problems encountered by the of PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR

activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula were translated into verbal

personnel to be utilized in the operation and investigation of cases and the

allocation of the needed equipment used in the conduct of police operations.

The proposed measures to address the problems encountered by the

PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula

attained a grand mean of Highly Recommended. The appropriate measures be

adopted to answer the problems encountered to update the knowledge and

skills of the police and able to establish well-coordinated police operations to

improve their efforts in fighting kidnap for ransom groups in Zamboanga

kidnapping incidents and maintain peace and order in the community.

The implementation of the proposed Action Plan to enhance the

effectiveness of the of PNP AKG MFU in countering KFR activities by ASG in

Zamboanga Peninsula through manpower competence enhancement program,

strengthened logistical resources for police operation, networking and alliance

revitalization of the anti – kidnap for ransom strategy towards a holistic

approach against kidnapping syndicates in Zamboanga Peninsula to fine tune

The study recommends that in order to improve the level of operational

capabilities of the PNP AKG MFU, it is necessary to enhance the knowledge

and operational performance of the police officers in countering kidnap for

ransom group’s activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula.

The seriousness of the problems encountered need to priorities as they

activities by ASG in Zamboanga Peninsula. The group requires motivation on

to ensure a strong all-out campaign against kidnap for ransom group.

The proposed measures to enhance the responsiveness of the PNP Anti

development program of the organization among individual personnel of the