CONFIOENTIM

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR "THE DAY AFTER"

The ABC feature film "The Day After" (to be presented

November 20) depicting a simulated nuclear attack on the city
of Lawrence, Kansas, will undoubtedly have a powerful emotional
impact on viewers. Its implicit message is that the very
existence of nuclear weapons is dangerous because they will
eventually be used: the consequences of nuclear war are so
horrible they outweigh any other considerations: and the use of
nuclear weapons would not only lead to massive immediate
destruction, but life for the few survivors would hardly be
worth living.

The reaction of many viewers is likely to be heightened

fear of nuclear war, revulsion against nuclear weapons and a
desire to find a quick or easy "solution" to the problem. In
this sense, the film is likely to stimulate and reinforce
anti-nuclear sentiment in the US and lead to questioning of the
wisdom and efficacy of deterrence. It will be invoked by the
nuclear freeze movement to support its call for a halt to the
production and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their
delivery systems, or used to encourage groups calling for
unilateral disarmament. These groups reportedly plan to replay
the film to audiences around the country to build pressure for
a freeze.

We should not attempt to dispute the film's message -- that

nuclear war would be terrible -- but to address the fears and
practical questions generated by the broadcast. Our public
affairs effort should seek to:

allay public concerns about the likelihood of

nuclear war:

translate emotional reaction against nuclear

weapons into support for US arms control and
national security strategy by emphasizing its
preventative nature and our responsible
program to negotiate for genuine arms
reductions:

foster greater awareness of on-going US

initiatives to reduce the risk of war and
reverse the growth in nuclear arsenals: and

provide information, if asked, on civil

defense programs which can help save lives in
time of war or natural disaster.

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Our overall strategy, therefore, should be to attempt to

move the public discussion from the indisputable consequences
of nuclear war to what we must do to prevent such a war from
ever happening. In addition, we should be prepared to answer
questions when asked about our civil defense effort and
programs. However, this should be on an ''if asked" basis only,
otherwise there is a danger of having our larger message, i.e.
our commitment to preventing war, overshadowed by the civil
defense aspect of the problem. Emphasizing civil defense
could fuel charges that we are indeed contemplating fighting a
nuclear war. We should treat the fears of nuclear war as
serious and legitimate public concerns, which we share.

Our public statements should indicate that we welcome

open discussion of these issues. We should explain our strategy
and objectives to preserve peace with freedom: maintaining a
strong and effective deterrent, while working to reach
agreement to reducing nuclear arsenals and to discourage the
resort to force; and engaging in dialogue to overcome
suspicions and build mutual trust. By offering a positive
vision of how our strength and commitment to arms reductions
work together to prevent war -- and have done so for over 38
years -- we can help reassure the public and focus discussion
on the significant issues we wish to address.

Themes

The film performs an important public service

in depicting, as no number of books, articles
or speeches could ever do, the horror of
nuclear war.
We welcome public discussion of this vital
issue and believe it essential that the
American people are informed about these
issues and how our efforts to reduce the risk
of war require active public support and
understanding.

As the President has often said, "Nuclear war

cannot be won and must never be fought." No
objective has higher priority for this
Administration. Every President since the
nuclear age began has pursued a policy that
keeps America strong so that we will never be
attacked by the Soviets, and has proposed arms
control initiatives to reduce the risk of
nuclear war.

The desire for peace must be coupled with a

sound strategy for maintaining our own
strength and working to reduce nuclear
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arsenals in a balanced and verifiable manner,
and to reduce the risk of war by accident or
miscalculation.

This parallel course has the support of our

Allies and friends around the world,
bipartisan support in Congress, and has worked
to prevent nuclear war for over 38 years. It
has also worked to prevent or limit
conventional conflict.

But we are not complacent. We are aware of

the need to continue to do everything possible
to reduce the risk of war. For this reason,
in addition to the President's modernization
program, we have undertaken a broad program of
arms control initiatives to reduce nuclear and
conventional arsenals:

o In START, we have proposed deep reductions

in strategic nuclear arsenals, focusing on
the most powerful categories of weapons.
Most recently, we have offered a guaranteed
mutual builddown of nuclear forces.

o We have proposed to the Soviets the

complete elimination of an entire category
of longer-range land based nuclear missiles
or their reduction and limitation to the
lowest possible levels, wherever they may
be located.

o We have also made proposals to reduce

conventional forces in Central Europe, for
a verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and
to continue dialogue in other areas of arms
control, such as radiological weapons and
improved verification of nuclear testing.

o Just last month, we and our NATO allies

decided to remove 1400 tactical nuclear
weapons from Europe, in addition to the
1000 weapons we withdrew from there in
1980. !It Jbq the alliance has taken steps
to reduce its crrsenal of tactical nuclear
weapons by 1/3 in the last 4 years alone.
In all, the U.S. has decreased the total
number of weapons in its stockpile by
one-third since the mid-60's, and the
megatonnage of our stockpile by 75% •

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o We have a number of agreements with the

Soviet Union to reduce the risk of war oy
accident or miscalculation and have
proposed others, for which we are seeking
agreement. These include measures to build
confidence, improve communications in time
of crisis and consult in case of an
incident involving nuclear weapons and
terrorists.
But negotiating for arms control and
reductions agreements is not enough. We must
also maintain our own strength to make sure
that no one believes there is anything to be
gained by initiating an attack against us or
our Allies. In the past, weakness, not
strength has invited attack.

Some have suggested that because nuclear war

would be so horrible, any alternative is
preferable. We believe that the choice need
not be between having to defend our values or
risking our very existence. By maintaining
our strength and a stable balance with the
Soviet Union, we and our Allies can protect
the things we value -- our democratic
government, religious freedom, personal
liberty -- and preserve the peace. If we fail
to sustain our deterrent forces, we will
actually increase the risk of war and
aggression.

We should bear in mind that over the past

10-15 years the Soviet Union has been engaged
in a massive buildup of its military forces
while the U.S. has exercised considerable
restraint. Nothing in our past dealings with
them suggests they would be willing to reduce
their own nuclear or conventional weapons
unless they have a real incentive to do so.
That incentive is provided by our
determination to maintain credible and
effective nuclear forces of our own.

Tactics

Our response to the ABC program should mesh with our

public affairs activities on all other arms control issues.
Most of the following action proposals are already planned or
proposed, and would be worth doing whether or not "The Day
After" is shown. They reflect our continuing efforts to foster

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greater public awareness of U.S. nuclear strategy and arms

control initiatives. A steady and systematic program to
provide information on our policies would respond to public
interest and concerns without stimulating additional audience
interest in the film.

A. Prior to Showing

1. Setting the scene.

High level statements and/or media appearances by U.S.

officials to discuss the U.S. program for arms reductions and
our efforts to reduce the risk of war proceeding the program.
These could include:

o continuing to focus media attention on

the Allied decision to reduce number of
tactical nuclear warheads in Europe.

o Presidential Radio address on Veteran's

Day weekend, emphasizing our
determination to prevent war.

o Major arms control speech by President or

Secretary of State - November.

Preparation of by-lined arms control/deterrence

articles by ACDA, State, and Defense principals.

Preparation of Civil Defense material

information (FEMA) for use strictly on an "if
asked basis."

Alert military bases to the program so that

they can respond to public inquiries, be
sensitive to possible anti-nuclear
demonstrations.

Find out if European networks will be picking

up (USIA has inquired) and inform host
governments of our public affairs themes and
plans in the appropriate forum (possibly the
Quint).

B. Immediately Following Showing:

1. USG spokesman on Nightline such as Under

Secretary of State Eagleburger, Richard Burt, and on
Monday morning or night talk shows if requested.

2. Spokesmen available, if requested, to comment,

do direct line radio interviews, travel to major media

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markets to do TV talk show appearances (organized by State
PA).

3. Find out if non-government spokesmen have been

asked to appear on media i.e., Scowcroft, Harold Borwn,
etc.

4. Civil Defense spokesman prepared to provide

information where requested.

5. Draft replies to public queries, letters.

6. For Europe:

President/Sec.State speech to be made

available via USIA.

Comments by Adrnin spokesman to be made

available as requested to European posts
via USIA teleconference service,
wireless file.

c. Follow-Up

keep up steady and systematic public affairs

programming.

consider new initiatives.

D. Need to Find Out:

1. What groups/organizations will be showing film?

2. What non-governmental individuals would be available

to discuss the need for deterrence, arms control?

3. Psychological impact of film?

4. Will ABC do "balanced follow-up"? If so, who will

participate?

5. Are there alternative films available on history of

U.S. arms control efforts, importance of deterrence, origins of
World War II.

E. FEMA

Draft guidance prepared by FEMA for use by State and local

civil defense workers.