Lambino vs.
COMELEC attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the
505 SCRA 160 G.R. No. 174299.
October 25, 2006
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section
73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum
Act on 25 August 2006. Lambino’s camp alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. They also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the
6.3 million individuals. Lambino’s camp initiative petition
changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article
VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
“Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government. On 30 August 2006, the
Lambino’s Camp filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.The COMELEC
denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Lambino, et al. initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative
RULING: No. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the
governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. Section 2
states that, “Sec. 2- Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x x The framers of the
Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the
people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly
stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should
sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
“prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The fundamental nature of amendments “directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative
upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign
on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures –
that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments. Lambino’s camp did not
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The
Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when
they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.Thus, The
Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Magallona vs. Ermita
655 SCRA 476 G.R. No. 187167.
August 16, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III) in March 2009, which the Philippines
ratified on February 27, 1984. Professor Merlin Magallona et al
questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among
others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically,
the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation
of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of
the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
b) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging
marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
c) RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not
only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also
prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. For this
reason, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and
prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines
and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine
Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
Ruling: No. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not
to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf. The Court
also finds that the conversion of internal waters into
archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in
the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has
sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of
archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its
archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters
and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein. The
Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere
mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the
delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of
states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like
enlargement or diminution of territories. The Court finds R.A.
9522 constitutional.
Reagan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
30 SCRA 968 No. L-26379.
December 27, 1969
Fernando,J.:
FACTS: Petitioner questioned the payment of an income tax
assessed on him by public respondent on an amount realized
by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US
Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark
Field Air Base. Petitioner contends that the base is outside
Philippine territory and therefore beyond the jurisdictional
power to tax.
ISSUE: Whether or not a sale made on a foreign military base
is excluded from tax.
RULING: No. The Clark Air Force Base is not a foreign soil or
territory for purposes of income tax legislation. There is nothing
in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to such
assertion, It has not become foreign soil or territory. The
Philippine's jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding
the power to tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax
matters, an appropriate exemption was provided for. That is the
concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct
language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination
and self-restriction."7 A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain
from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.
Thus, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of May 12, 1966
denying the refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by
petitioner is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
Lee Hong Hok vs. David
48 SCRA 372 No. L-30389.
December 27, 1972.
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an
order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to
public auction) was made by the Director of Lands on June 18,
1958, covering Lot 2892.On the basis of the order of award of
the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous
Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City on October 21,
1959. Land in question is not a private property as the Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained the public character for
having been formed by reclamation (as opposed to peittioners
contention that it is accretion).The only remedy: action for
reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But there was no fraud
in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the
government grant
RULING: Only the Government, represented by the Director of
Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued
pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said officers
but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that
the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since
they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been
declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming
it as their private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is
undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law
or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it
is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant
cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question
between the grantee and the government.
IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:
The government authority possessed by the State which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty comes
under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire
property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate
with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary
character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation
and use of lands and other natural resources, including their
disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
Macariola vs. Asuncion
114 SCRA 77 Adm. Case No. 133-J.
May 31, 1982.
MAKASIAR,J.:
FACTS: On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion
rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an
appeal. On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of lots
was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the
respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R.
Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October
23, 1963. One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot
1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot
1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31,
1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338 of
the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965,
Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his
wife. On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon
conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot 1184-E to
the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge
Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the
Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the
stockholder of the corporation. Respondent Macariola charged
Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating
the following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil
Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3
par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. On November 2,
1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the
complaints filed against Asuncion.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the
mentioned provisions.
Ruling: No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned
provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities. Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly
on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon
who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the
Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon
after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8,
1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October
and November, 1963. The said property was no longer the
subject of litigation. In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US
and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of
Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of
Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because
whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of
the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they
are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.
Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of
RA 3019, citing that the public officers cannot partake in any
business in connection with this office, or intervened or take
part in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife had
withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold
their respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the
corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or against it in
court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the
Court of First Instance from the time of the drafting of the
Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966
up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized
early that their interest in the corporation contravenes against
Canon 25.
Bacani vs. National Coconut Corporation
100 Phil. 468 , No. L-9657
November 29, 1956
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts: Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court
stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. During the pendency of a civil case in the
said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation,
Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for
Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the
transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the
hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to
Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages
and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of
their fees. The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid
the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo
A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the
Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said
amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice circular which
stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt
from the payment of the fees in question. For reimbursement to
take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25 per
payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from
the salary of Matoto. Petitioners filed an action in Court
countering that NACOCO is not a government entity within the
purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, the defendants set up a defense that NACOCO is
a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted
from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
Issues: Whether or not National Coconut Corporation
(NACOCO), which performs certain functions of government,
make them a part of the Government of the Philippines.
RULING: No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the
simple reason that they do not come under the classification of
municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized
for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position
independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of
providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and
the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which
our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut
industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct
from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions
of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and
the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and
4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the
same manner as any other private corporations, and in this
sense it is an entity different from our government.
Cabanas vs. Pilapil
58 SCRA 94 No. L-25843
July 25, 1974
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in
his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also
indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the
proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother,
Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when
Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of
Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child..On
the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in
favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee.
Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that
as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding
only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of
“parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy.
RULING: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening
of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any
member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced
and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has
been filed should resolve that case according to the best
interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the
trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate
relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother
shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The
application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this
country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family
hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed. Thus, the
decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-
appellant.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System
267 SCRA 408 G.R. No. 122156.
February 3, 1997.
BELLOSILLO,J.:
FACTS: The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The
winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide
management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price
and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS
refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
RULING: It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected,
is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
Section 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that
in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there
is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional
right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to
issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
People vs. Gozo
53 SCRA 476 No. L-36409.
October 26, 1973.
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was
located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an
assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some neighbors, she
demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the
necessary permits and then later on erected another house.
She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for
violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits
for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was
convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed
and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative
jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base
of a foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US
Naval Base?
RULING: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated
its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory
or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United
States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government
retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all
such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for
reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases
Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State
through the City of Olongapo does have administrative
jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. Thus
hatte court decided the appealed decision of November 11,
1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a
fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to demolish
the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being
given a period of thirty days from the finality of this decision
within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure
to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring
demolition be enforced. Costs against the accused.
FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
415 SCRA 44 G.R. No. 160261
November 10, 2003
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes.” The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same on October
22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date,
the CommitteeReport to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks
since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was
filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac)
and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines
Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3)
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13 Since
the first impeachment complaint never made it to the floor for
resolution, respondent House of Representatives concludes
that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been
violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as
the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body,
has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand
interpreted the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the
complaint. Since there was already a first complaint that never
got through the Committee, no impeachment complaint maybe
filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.
ISSUE/S: 1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2.
Is the second impeachment complaint valid?
RULING: 1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the
Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of
the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean,
as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means “to perform or facilitate
the first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional
ConventionRecords to ascertain the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the
filing of the verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of
the Lower House. This is also based on the procedure of the
U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of
the impeachment complaint.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association vs. Duque
535 SCRA 265 G.R. No. 173034
9 October 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS : Named as respondents are the Health Secretary,
Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department
of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is
deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents
issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said
executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was
issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under
the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of
the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article
112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA
adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding
should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should
be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24
of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and
children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which
was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
RULING: YES. under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA
do not come into force for members,in the same way that
conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations
under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO
Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter
within the competence of the Organization for an international
rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established
that such rule is being followed by states because they
consider it obligatory to comply with such rulesUnder the 1987
Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method
applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international
law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the
provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as
part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature. Thus, the court ruled that the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order
No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and
respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said
provisions.The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August
15, 2006 is LIFTED insofar as the rest of the provisions of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 is concerned.