LEGAL ETHICS CASE
A.C. No. 7593
ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA LOZADA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin
S. Feliciano (complainant) against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-
Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in
A.C. No. 6656 entitled "Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista
Lozada"3 suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby
found guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant, for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for
reconsideration.5
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled "Edilberto
Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.," where complainant was one
of the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as
counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively
participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation,
complainant submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the
hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein
Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted
direct examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial
proceedings.7
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel
while still suspended from the practice of law constitutes willfull
disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from
the practice of law for two (2) years.
On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to
comment on the complaint against him.8
In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that
she was forced by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of
her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she
believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is
not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is
defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is
1awp++i 1
a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake;
thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance.10
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.11
In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found
Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the
practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve with modification the report and recommendation of
the IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.
RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of
law. When this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law,
as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist from performing all
functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension.13
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service
[which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."14
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the
records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in
appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband,
conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct
and cross- examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the
findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of
actively engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done
within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was
suspended from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would
then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from
2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in
behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively
participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the
two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well
that at the time she represented her husband, she is still serving her two
(2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it.
Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she
can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and
desire to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave
injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an
officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended,
willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
1âwphi1
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court
recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an
adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a
family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that
Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband
and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a
spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib
and Jimmy P. Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court
suspended further respondents from the practice of law for six (6) months
for practicing their profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for
representing her husband as counsel despite lack of authority to practice
law.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law
profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the
nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has
the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate
its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it,
the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista- Lozada
is found GUILTY of violating Section 27,19Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the
practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information
and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a
copy of this Decision to respondent’s record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt
of this Decision, so that we can determine the reckoning point when her
suspension shall take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8313 July 14, 2015
PILAR IBANA-ANDRADE and CLARE SINFOROSA ANDRADE-
CASILIHAN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is an administrative case filed against Atty. Eva Paita-Moya by Pilar
Ibana-Andrade and Clare Sinforosa Andrade-Casilihan. On 7 December
2009, this Court, through the First Division, issued a Resolution1 referring
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from the
receipt of records.
After the proceedings, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted
to the Supreme Court on 18 November 2013 its Notice of
Resolution,2 alongside the Records of the case. The IBP Board of
Governors also passed a Resolution3 on 13 February 2013 adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation4 of the Investigating
Commissioner for this case.
The Report and Recommendation summarizes the facts of this case as
follows:
Here is complainants’ version. On October 3, 2007, complainant Pilar
Andrade, stockholder and Treasurer of Mabini College Inc. filed Civil
Case No. 7617 for Injunction, Mandamus and Damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte when she was illegally
suspended by Luz Ibana-Garcia, Marcel Lukban and respondent Atty.
Eva Paita-Moya. In the said case then pending before the Honorable
Executive Judge Arniel Dating, respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya
appeared as counsel for all respondents.
Complainant Clare Sinforosa I. Andrade-Casilihan likewise filed an illegal
dismissal case against Mabini College Inc. and now pending before the
Honorable Court of Appeals. In the said labor case, respondent stood as
counsel for Mabini College, Inc. and co-respondent Luz I. Garcia and
Marcel Lukban.
In another illegal dismissal case filed by Alven Bernardo I. Andrade on
September 28, 2005 currently pending before the Court of Appeals,
respondent acted as counsel for Mabini College, Inc. Luz I. Garcia and
Marcel Lukban.
After the aforementioned cases were filed, complainants had found out
that on June 27, 2008, the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated a
resolution in the case entitled Wilson Cham versus Atty. Eva Paita-Moya
docketed as A.C. No. 7484 suspending respondent from the practice of
law for one month.
Complainants were surprised. They later got a copy of the Office of the
Bar Confidant’s certification confirming that until date (apparently May 6,
2009, the dare [sic] OR No. 0304748 was issued) respondent’s
suspension order has not yet been lifted.
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
On June 2, 2009, complainants were able to obtain a copy of the
Supreme Court Circular No. 51-2009 informing all courts that respondent
was suspended from the practice of law for one month and said
suspension was received by respondent on June 15, 2008.
However, despite of the subject June 27, 2009 Resolution on July 15,
2008 and despite knowledge of her suspension from the practice of law,
the said resolution having been further posted in the website of the
Supreme Court and is available in CD Asia’s Lex Libris, respondent
continued to practice law in wilful disobedience of the Supreme Court’s
suspension order in A.C. No. 7494.
In fact from June 27, 2008 until May 2009, respondent filed the following
papers and pleadings as counsel in Civil Case No. 7617, to wit:
Comment to Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated July 15, 2008.
Motion to Admit Answer which was undated but submitted on November
12, 2008.
An undated Comments/Opposition to the Petitioner’s Formal Offer of
Evidence in Support of the Application for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction which was received by petitioners’ counsel on November 26,
2008.Motion to Admit Amended Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 9, 2009 which was received by petitioners’ counsel on February
12, 2009.
Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2009.
Motion to File Position Paper dated April 13, 2009; and
Pre-Trial Brief for Respondents dated May 13, 2009.
Also in connection with complainant Casahilan’s Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, respondent never withdrew her appearance.
The same is true in the case of Alven Bernardo Andrade. Respondent
never withdrew her appearance therein.
Likewise and notwithstanding such suspension, respondent continued to
practice law and respondent clients in other cases before the four (4)
branches of the Regional Trial Court in Daet, Camarines Norte.
Supporting this truthful assertion are the following:
CERTIFICATION dated May 29, 2009 issued by Atty. Michael Angelo S.
Rieo, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Daet,
Camarines Norte.
CERTIFICATION dated November 24, 2009 issued by Atty. Elaine Gay
R. Belen, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 39, Regional Trial Court, Daet,
Camarines Norte.
CERTIFICATION dated November 19, 2009 issued by Mr. Eddie E.
Balonzo, Acting Clerk of Court, Branch 40, Regional Trial Court, Daet,
Camarines Norte; and
CERTIFICATION dated November 5, 2009 issued by Mr. Chito B. Pacao,
OIC/Legal Researcher II, Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Daet,
Camarines Norte.
And per the November 5, 2009 letter of Atty. Michael Mortimer G.
Pajarillo, Chapter President, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Camarines
Norte Chapter, Daet, Camarines Norte, respondent "xxx Atty. Eva Paita-
Moya has not complied with the order of the Supreme Court relative to
her suspension from the practice of law from June 27, 2008 up to the
present.5
Respondent’s version, as stated in the Report,6 is that she started serving
the suspension order on 20 May 2009. This was also her position in her
Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings7 dated 30 September
2010. She likewise alleged therein that she had filed with the Supreme
Court in December 2009 an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Suspension
with the Supreme Court, which was unresolved as of the date of her
Manifestation.8Additionally, she argued that the resolution of the initial
administrative case docketed as A.M. No. 7464 was material to her
position in this particular case.9
The issue in this case falls solely on the question of whether Respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, that is, the practice of law
despite the clear language of this Court’s suspension order.
The Report and Recommendation recommended that Respondent be
found liable. We adopt the same, with modification.
The suspension order was received by Respondent on July 15,
2008.10 Despite this, she continued to practice law in various cases, as
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
shown by the pleadings she filed and the certifications noted by the
Report.11 In fact, she continued receiving various fees for her services
throughout the duration of her suspension.12
It is important to note that her defense consists of an admission that she
was indeed suspended, and allegedly served her suspension.13 She
claimed that she never received the resolution that had allegedly
suspended her.14 By logical inference therefore, her sole defense is
ignorance of the resolution that suspended her.
However, the records of this very Court belie her statements. Office of the
Court Administrator Circular No. 51-2009 stated the following:
For your information and guidance, quoted hereunder is the dispositive
portion of the Resolution of the Third Division dated 27 June 2008, in
Administrative Case No. 7494 entitled, "Wilson Cham vs. Atty. Eva Paita-
Moya", to wit:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct
and hereby SUSPENDED for one month from the practice of law,
effective upon her receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition
of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
On 15 July 2008, Atty. Moya received the said resolution as per Registry
Return Receipt No. 2320. (Emphases supplied)15
Moreover, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued a Certification dated 8
May 2009 that the suspension of Atty. Paita-Moya in A.C. No. 7494 had
not yet been lifted.16
We had laid down guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios,
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the
following guidelines be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order
suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from
the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the
penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15
days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent
shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of
the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted
from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during
the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local
Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts
where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
respondents compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the
lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.17
This case is not without precedent.18 Previously, we had already stated
the standard for discipline upon erring lawyers who continue practicing
despite being suspended by the Court, viz: Under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
In Molina v. Atty. Magat, this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R.
Magat from the practice of law for six months for practicing his profession
despite this court's previous order of suspension. We impose the same
1âw phi 1
penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director
despite lack of authority to practice law.19
The Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent from the
active practice of law for six ( 6) months with stem warning that any
similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.20 In light
of this and the jurisprudence already cited, we adopt the
recommendation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA is found
GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period of
six (6) months from her one (1) month suspension, totaling seven (7)
months from service of this resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information
and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a
copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Paita-Moya is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her
receipt of this Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her
suspension shall take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014
VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.
When this court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the
lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application
of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes
desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to
practice law.
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-
year suspension from the practice of law.1
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I.
Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's
Oath.4 Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in
their stead, in violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This
court suspended respondents from the practice of law for one year,
revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from
reappointment as notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for
reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be disbarred, not merely
suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution8 dated September 6,
2006, this court denied complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the
Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II, filed the
undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14,
2006, complainant Lingan wrote the Commission on Human Rights.
Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the
latter's suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution10 dated
January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney
VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II.
According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's
suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his
post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his
authority to practice law is suspended."11
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected
with his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director.
According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not
include his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of
this court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and
prejudice to [his] rights."12
This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory
pleading as this court does not render advisory opinions.13
On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan. In
his letter14 dated May 4, 2009, Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued
practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on
Human Rights En Banc 's resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional
Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty.
Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating] the
conditions of his commission as a notary public."15According to
complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for
reconsideration.16
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director necessarily required the
practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must
be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court
suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect
"a non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position of [Regional
Director] [during the effectivity of the order of suspension]."17 The
Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should
have ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as
Regional Director. Complainant Lingan prayed that this court give
"favorable attention and action on the matter."18
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for report and recommendation.19
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the
Bar Confidant found that the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib
and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that respondents be
required to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with
certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive
Judge of the court where they might appear as counsel and state that
they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga
to perform his functions as Regional Director during the period of
suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission
"deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension. According
to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had
no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of this court's resolutions]
which [have] become final and executory. "22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended that this court require him to submit a certification from the
Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted from performing
his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the
practice of law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga
and the Commission .on Human Rights be required to comment on
complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to perform his
functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice
of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his
suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from
public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of [his
suspension from the practice of law] to [his] public office would be
tantamount to [violating] his constitutional rights [sic] to due process and
to the statutory principle in law that what is not included is deemed
excluded."25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required
respondents to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension
considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court further
ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights to comment
on complainant Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing
his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the
practice of law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009 provides:
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public imposed on
respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice,
to FILE their respective motions to lift relative to their suspension
and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public
and SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and Executive Judge of the Court where they may
appear as counsel, stating that respondents have actually ceased
and desisted from the practice of law during the entire period of
their suspension and disqualification, unless already complied
with in the meantime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from
the Commission on Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has been
suspended from office and has stopped from the performance of
his functions for the period stated in the order of suspension and
disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;
(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT
on the allegations of complainant against them, both within ten
(10) days from receipt of notice hereof; ...27 (Emphasis in the
original)
In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed
their respective motions to lift order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed
his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued
performing his functions as Regional Director during his suspension from
the practice of law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as
Regional Director, he "perform[ed], generally, managerial
functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law. These managerial
functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of
the regional office and its personnel";31 "monitoring progress of
investigations conducted by the [Commission on Human Rights]
Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of all other services
and assistance programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the
different units at the regional level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary
requirement preparation and disbursement of funds and expenditure of
the [Regional Office]."34 The Commission allegedly has its own "legal
services unit which takes care of the legal services matters of the
[Commission]."35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice
of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's
resolution suspending him from the practice of law]."36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November
27, 2009. It argued that "the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a
member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that may be
imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts."38 According to
the Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a
"bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a Commission on
Human Rights official "is an entirely different thing, falling as it does
within the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this
court's resolution of the issue and would "abide by whatever ruling or
decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty. Baliga's
comment, complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed
this. court. Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification from the
Commission on Human Rights stating that he was suspended from office
and desisted from performing his functions as Regional Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his
position as Regional Director and only performed generally managerial
functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to
defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the
functions of a "lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark case of
Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan
reiterated that the position of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the
officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by
Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V.
Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held his
position as Regional Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in
reassuming his position as Regional Director, complainant Lingan
countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have
followed the initial resolution of the Commission on Human Rights
suspending him from office. Atty. Baliga did not even furnish this court a
copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on Human
8
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing ignorant on
what is 'practice of law', twisting facts and philosophizing,"46 complainant
Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has that] moral vitality
imperative to the title of an attorney."47 Compfainant Lingan prayed that
Atty. Baliga be disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty.
Calubaquib.48 He was allowed to resume his practice of law and perform
notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements for issuance of
a notarial commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant
for evaluation, report, and recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift
one-year suspension and the respective comments of Atty. Baliga and
the Commission on Human Rights.49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of
the Bar Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed
to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional Director]
which [required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty.
Baliga claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional Director
which required the practice of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be required to
comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also
recommended holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion
to lift suspension "pending [the Commission on Human Right's filing of
comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the
resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension. The
Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty. Baliga's
claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional
Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights
reiterated that the penalty imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the
bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed on him as
Regional Director. The Commission added that it is "of honest belief that
the position of [Regional Director] is managerial and does not [require the
practice of law]."55 It again manifested that it will "abide by whatever ruling
or decision [this court] arrives on [the] matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of
suspension should be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We,
therefore, suspend him further from the practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of
the [legal] profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is
considered practice. of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that
work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use
of] legal knowledge or legal talent"61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created
under the Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is divided into
regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to
investigate human rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each
regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the
position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring
of Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR
Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers and
functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to
"[Commission on Human Rights] matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of
human rights complaints in the absence of the legal officer or
investigator;67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among
parties and discuss "immediate courses of action and protection
9
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an
alternative dispute resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including
notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the
territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases
prepared by the legal officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession.
Oaths and affirmations are usually performed by members of the judiciary
and notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily members of the
bar.72Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the
Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and
protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of
human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of
extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional
Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and
authorized to practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this
authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to
the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer
must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on
June 15, 2006, "effective immediately."75From the time Atty. Baliga
received the court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76 he has been
without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to
his position as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney
VI. As the Commission on Human Rights correctly resolved in its
resolution dated January 16, 2007:
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents
Atty. Baliga from assuming his post, for want of eligibility in the meantime
that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is without prejudice to
the investigation to be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga,
which in the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally
allowed by the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human
Rights of the Philippines resolved to put into effect and implement the
legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the suspension of Atty.
Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities as
Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the period
for which the Supreme Court Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the
original)
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the
Commission on Human Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due
process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the
Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second,
the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he
filed his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not
supported by the record. It was also immaterial. He held the position of
1âwphi1
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of his authority
to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold
that position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have
desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
10
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R.
Magat from the practice of law for six months for practicing his profession
despite this court's previous order of suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as
Regional Director despite lack.of authority to practice law. 1âw phi 1
We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the
resolution dated April 13, 2007, reconsidering its first resolution
suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the
Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that
repeating the same offense will cause his dismissal from the service. The
resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007 reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty.
Jimmy P. Baliga prays before the Honorable Commission to recall and
annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the
Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January
2007 Commission en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the
Commission that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is totally blameless and should
not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is
concerned with the transgression by Atty. Baliga of his oath of office as
government employee. As records have it, the Commission granted Atty.
Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he
is mandated to act as a notary public in accordance with the rules and
regulations, to include the conditions expressly set forth by the
Commission.
With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in
SC Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15 June 2006, the Commission
cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant to
the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being
enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for having contravened the conditions
of his commission as a notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is
merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be
in equal footing with the constitutional mandate of the Commission.
Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that the Commission exacts
commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege the Commission grants
of every official and employee.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year
suspension imposed on him pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution.
The Commission believes that the further suspension of Atty. Baliga from
the office may be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court
penalty is being served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the
admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is sufficient to complete
the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution
CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and imposes the penalty of admonition with a
stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit a penalty of
dismissal from the service.80 (Emphasis in the original)
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated
April 13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his
position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority to
practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.81 The Commission cannot, by
mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders
of suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on
Human Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees,82 it
can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the positions
they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege
burdened with conditions."83 To enjoy the privileges of practicing law,
lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain]
the highest degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of
[the] legal profession."84
WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the
practice of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one
(1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the practice of law,
effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.
11
LEGAL ETHICS CASE

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,

the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Commission on Human Rights.

SO ORDERED.

12
LEGAL ETHICS CASE

LINGAN VS. CALUBAQUIBJune 30, 2014A.C. No. 5377

FACTS:

Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga was suspended from the practice of law for
one year for being found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibilty and of the Lawyer’s Oath because
they allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in
violation of Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law. Complainant
Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga, despite the suspension, continued to
practice law and discharge his functions as a Regional Director.When the
suspension order lapsed, it was recommended that both attorneys file
their respective motions to lift the order of suspension. The court lifted
Atty. Calubaquib’s but not Atty. Baliga’s. The latter was referred to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report, and
recommendation. The OBC recommended that Atty. Baliga should not
have been allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities to
the CHR which required acts constituting practice of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Baliga’s motion to lift order of suspension should be

granted.

HELD:

Practice of law is any activity, in or out of court, which requires the

application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is
considered practice of law.It was clarified that the position of Regional
Director necessarily required the practice of law in addition to its
qualifications being a member of the bar in good standing and authorized
to practice law. Hence, when Atty. Baliga was suspended, he lost the
authority to hold the position of regional director.The court finds that Atty.
Baliga violated this court’s order of suspension, therefore, suspending
him further from the practice of law for six months.QUERY OF ATTY.
KAREN M. SIVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER CLERK OF COURT – BR. 81,
ROMBLON, ROMBLON – ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN
THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW

13
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
A.C. No. 7472 March 30, 2010
LIGAYA MANIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007
filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de
Dios for engaging in the practice of law despite having been suspended
by the Court.
Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata,
a Japanese national, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo
City, Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 603, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The accused was represented by Atty. De
Dios, with office address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City.
Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty. De Dios had an
outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and
was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court. Complainant further
alleges that there is a civil case (Civil Case No. 355-0-2005) and another
case (Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against Miyata before the
RTC, Makati City, Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his
counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred
from the practice of law for her flagrant violation and deliberate
disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.
In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed
against her client, Miyata. She, however, denied that she was under
suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases.
Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed
against her by Diana de Guzman, docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she
was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the
suspension immediately upon receipt of the Court’s Resolution on May
16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October
19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she was resuming
her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting
Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo City, erroneously issued a
directive on March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to desist from
practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for the years 2007
and 2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable,
respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due deference to
the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with
the Supreme Court on account of Judge Farrales’ letters to all courts in
Olongapo City and to some municipalities in Zambales, which "gave the
impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of
law and that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is
revoked." Acting on the said motion, the Court issued a resolution on
April 23, 2007 in this wise:
A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) –
Respondent’s Urgent Motion for Clarification dated 14 March 2007
praying that the Court declare her to have served her six (6) months (sic)
suspension and her resumption of law practice on 17 November 2001
onwards as proper is NOTED.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to DEEM Atty.
Lourdes I. De Dios to have SERVED her six (6) month suspension and
her recommencement of law practice on 17 November 2001 as PROPER
pursuant to the Resolution dated 30 January 2002.
Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of
complainant Maniago, during which she allegedly practiced law, she was
neither suspended nor in any way prohibited from practice. The
complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious, and should be
dismissed outright.
In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the
matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the complainant to file a
supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period of appearances of
Atty. De Dios and the particular courts where respondent appeared as
counsel in the following cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil
Case No. 355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.
In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit
in the vernacular, which reads:
14
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si
Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach ang
Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,]
Olongapo City.
3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear
si Atty. de Dios noong October 10, 2005, nakasaad din ito sa
Certification mula sa Branch 73, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de
Dios noong September 26, 2005 at hanggang ngayon ay pending
pa sa Court of Appeals.
4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox
Copy ng Minutes of the Session ng Subic Municipal Trial Court na
kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case No. 042-
01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus- Simeon Pullido
noong December 14, 2001.
5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de Dios, x
xx-
5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios noong May 17,
2001 entitled Shirley Pagaduan vs. Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil Case
No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios isang (1) araw pa
lamang mula magsimula ang kanyang suspension noon[g] May
16, 2001.
5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May 18, 2001
entitled Filmixco versus Dr. Ma. Perla Tabasondra-Ramos and
Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay dalawang
(2) araw mula magsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong
May 16, 2001.
5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a) affidavit executed
by Carolina C. Bautista noong May 16, 2001, (b) Affidavit
executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at (c) isang
Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on May 16, 2001. Ang
mga pag notaryo na ito ay ginawa noong nagsimula na ang
suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang patunay sa
mga nakasaad base sa aking personal na kaalamanan at mga
dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty. de Dios
ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk of Court
and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa na may petsang 12
February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty. de Dios na nagsimula ang
kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.
A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that
there were no new matters raised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and
asserting that "the opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa,
as contained in her letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot supersede the
Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable Court." According to
her, the resolution should be the "final nail to the coffin of this case."
On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the
Court’s consideration.
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her
affidavit was the OBC’s reply to an inquiry made by the Office of the
Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De Dios.1 Therein, the
OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not
automatic, following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and
Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K.
Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales
Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G.
Encanto, et al., which states:
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would
have satisfactorily shown his compliance with the Court’s resolution is a
caveat that his suspension could thereby extend for more than six
months. The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the
end of the period stated in the Court’s decision, and an order from the
Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in order
to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession.2
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present
proof(s) of his compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed
desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension.
Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable
recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of
15
LEGAL ETHICS CASE

suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC
alleged that it was unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C.
No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice of law
without submitting the required certifications and passing through the
OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives
from the Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform
policy on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a lawyer
from the practice of law.1av vphi1
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local
Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts
where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the

The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC. lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere
privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the SO ORDERED.
Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities.3Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which
A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P
made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-31-SCC-P)
within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.4 However, as much as the Court
will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time,
also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to JUDGE BENSAUDI A. ARABANI, JR., Petitioner
exercise his profession unreasonably. vs.
RAHIM A. ARABANI, Junior Process Server, and ABDURAJI G.
BAKIL, Utility Worker I, both from Shari’a Circuit Court, Maimbung,
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the
Sulu, Respondents
following guidelines be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order
suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
x-----------------------x
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from
the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P
penalty; (Formerly A.M. No. 06-3-03-SCC)

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is JUDGE BENSAUDI A. ARABANI, JR., 4th Shari'a Circuit Court,
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 Maimbung, Sulu, Petitioner,
days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The vs.
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and RODRIGO RAMOS, JR., Clerk of Court, 4th Shari'a Circuit Court,
executory; Maimbung, Sulu, Respondent.

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent x-----------------------x

shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of
the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted A.M. No. SCC-11-17
from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during (Formerly A.M. No. 10-34-SCC)
the period of his or her suspension;

16
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
Clerk of Court RODRIGO RAMOS, JR., Process Server RAHIM A.
ARABANI and Utility Worker I ABDURAJI G. BAKIL, all of 4th Shari'a
Circuit Court, Maimbung, Sulu, and Utility Clerk SHELDALYN* I.
MAHARAN, 5th Shari'a Circuit Court, Patikul, Sulu, Petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE BENSAUDI A. ARABANI, JR., 4th Shari'a Circuit Court,
Maimbung, Sulu, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions involving the Judge and staff
of the 4th Shari'a Circuit Court (4th SCC) of Maimbung, Sulu.
The Facts
1. In A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P:
In a letter1 complaint dated July 17, 2009, Presiding Judge Bensaudi A.
Arabani, Jr. (Judge Arabani) charged respondents Rahim A. Arabani
(Rahim), Junior Process Server, and Abduraji G. Bakil (Abduraji), Utility
Worker I, with conduct unbecoming of a court employee, dishonesty,
insubordination, and misconduct2 arising out of Bakil's alleged punching
of Rahim's bundy card on three (3) occasions despite being repeatedly
warned by Judge Arabani.3
In a joint letter4 reply dated October 22, 2009, Rahim and Abduraji
countered that there were only two (2) instances of punching
involved, i.e.: (a) when Abduraji accidentally punched Rahim's bundy
card one afternoon that Rahim was absent, mistakenly thinking that it
was his bundy card, but he immediately informed Judge Arabani of the
mistake; and (b) when Abduraji punched Rahim's bundy card upon
seeing the latter approximately 3 to 4 meters away from the bundy clock
with his way blocked by another person, as it was "nearing time" already.
The latter incident was seen by Judge Arabani who happened to be
behind Rahim, and scolded them. However, Rahim immediately erased
the time and punched his bundy card again. They both apologized to
Judge Arabani and promised that it would not happen again.5
In the same letter, Rahim and Abduraji made counter-charges against
Judge Arabani, which are among the subject matter of A.M. No. SCC-11-
17, which will be discussed hereunder.
2. In A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P:
In a letter6 dated May 13, 2010, Judge Arabani charged Clerk of Court
Rodrigo Ramos, Jr. (Rodrigo) with conduct unbecoming a court
employee, alleging, among others, that, from the time Rodrigo reported
back to his station at the 4th SCC in January 2010, after his detail to the
3rd SCC of Parang-Indanan, Sulu was revoked by the Court in a
Resolution7 dated November 17, 2009 in A.M. No. 06-3-03-
SCC, Rodrigo: (a) was constantly not at his assigned table; (b) roams in
and out of the office openly; (c) does not attend to his work; (d) refused to
comply with the directive to place his bundy card on the designated rack,
thereby making it difficult to monitor the correctness and accuracy of the
entries therein for the months of March and April 2010; and (e) did not
properly fill-up his Application for Leave (leave application) filed in April
2010 with the specific dates of his intended leave of absence.8 In a
letter9dated May 17, 2010, Judge Arabani requested that all succeeding
unverified/unsigned bundy cards of Rodrigo be made part of the
complaint.
Responding to the Court's Resolution10 dated August 24, 2010 directing
him to comment on the charges against him, Rodrigo averred that he
kept with him his bundy cards for the months of January and February
201011 for reasons of convenience.12 He, however, complied with Judge
Arabani 's directive to place his March 2010 bundy card on the
designated rack13 but the latter took and hid the same in bad faith, and
submitted the same to the Leave Division, Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) after a few months without signing the
same.14 Accordingly, in a letter15 dated October 27, 2010 to the Leave
Division, OCA, Rodrigo manifested that he is submitting his April to
September 2010 Daily Time Records (DTRs) sans Judge Arabani 's
signature.16
Further, Rodrigo denied the charge of "loafing," and alleged that since the
court had no clients for the most part, and considering the strained
relations between him and Judge Arabani who surrounded himself with
bodyguards who tried to intimidate him, for his own protection, he started
to place himself within close range of the security guards and the
Philippine marines detailed at the Hall of Justice which is a stone's throw
away from his office, and where he can clearly see any client who goes
17
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
to the adjoining Shari' a Building.17 He, thus, claimed that he started
incurring absences as an act of self-preservation for fear of being killed.18
3. In A.M. No. SCC-11-17:
In separate Affidavits19 both dated May 31, 2010, Rahim and Abduraji
charged Judge Arabani with conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and many
abuses consisting, among others, of his absences without filing the
corresponding leaves of absence, and toleration of the absences and
tardiness of members of his family.20 Rahim further claimed that Judge
Arabani was courting a court employee, Sheldalyn A. Maharan
(Sheldalyn), who he asked to accompany him on his motorcycle to go
around town, professing his love and buying her gifts.21 At one time,
Judge Arabani made a drawing of a vagina and a penis and tried to show
it to Sheldalyn, but their Clerk, Mirad Ahmad (Mirad), grabbed the
drawing, tore the same, and told Judge Arabani "Lummuh kaw sir."22 The
incident was reported to Rodrigo who even picked up the drawing from
the wastebasket.23
On the other hand, Sheldalyn, in an Affidavit24 dated January 26, 2010,
charged Judge Arabani of sexual harassment, alleging, among others,
that: (a) when they were still holding office at the residence of Judge
Arabani, he would take her for a ride on his motorcycle, and while going
around town, he would court her; (b) there were instances when he would
suddenly step on the brakes so that her body would touch his; (c) he
once took her to a snack house, called her at home, and bought her
lotion, baby powder, and other things; (d) he also made a drawing of a
penis and a vagina on a piece of paper and tried to show it to her, but the
same was crumpled by Mirad who threw it in a wastebasket; (e) one time,
he forced her to learn karate, and while teaching her, she felt him
caressing her arms; (j) when he professed his for love for her, she started
avoiding him by going out with Rodrigo; and (g) because she was afraid,
she and her officemate, Jean Maldisa (Mrs. Maldisa) would accompany
each other in going to the comfort room.25
In several letters dated May 8, 2010,26 June 16, 2010,27 and July 30,
2010,28 Rodrigo charged Judge Arabani with grave abuse of authority,
verbal abuses, dishonesty in his certificate of service, and sexual
harassment,29 arising out of the following acts, among
others: (a) harassing him by taking and hiding his DTR for the month of
March 2010; (b) surrounding himself with goons who tried to intimidate
him with their "tiger look";30 (c) his wife's tardiness;31 (d) irregularities in the
conduct of flag ceremony;32 (e) molestation of a "labandera" and her
teenage daughter;33 and (j) courting Sheldalyn to whom he had shown a
drawing of a penis and a vagina.34
Responding to the Court's directive35 to comment on the charges against
him, Judge Arabani filed his Comment36dated October 27, 2010
essentially denying the same, and claiming that the accusations were
merely fabricated to muddle the issues involving the complaints he filed
against Rodrigo, Rahim and Abduraji,37 and were mere repetition of
issues already resolved and terminated in A.M. No. 06-3-03-SCC,38 like
the one involving his wife's purported tardiness in coming to office, which
remained unsubstantiated and uncorroborated in the present
complaints.39 He further maintained that: (a) his absences were covered
with the corresponding leave applications40 and/or certificates of
appearance;41 (b) he does not have even a single body guard;42 (c)
Rodrigo was the only employee complaining about the location of the
bundy clock and the placing of the bundy card on the designated
rack;43 (d) he did not steal Rodrigo's bundy card, which was submitted to
the OCA together with his leave application to support the complaint
against him;44 (e) it is not true that he was courting Sheldalyn who is
publicly known to be a tomboy, and the story of immorality was fabricated
to destroy his credibility; and (j) the drawing of a penis and vagina which
purportedly occurred in 2005 when the court was still holding office in his
residence was merely fabricated; otherwise, it would have been included
in Rodrigo's previous complaints against him between the years 2005
and 2006.45
In a Resolution46 dated November 15, 2011, the cases were consolidated,
and referred for joint investigation, recommendation and report by the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Jolo, Sulu, Branch 3.
The Investigating Judge's Findings and Recommendations
In a Joint Investigation, Report and Recommendation47 dated April 8,
2013, the Investigating Judge, Betlee-Ian J. Barraquias (Judge
Barraquias), made the following findings and recommendations:
With respect to A.M. No.SCC-10-14-P, Judge Barraquias found that
there was an irregularity in the punching of the bundy card of Rahim by
Abduraji, and Rahim's silence and inaction despite his awareness thereof
made him equally responsible as he is deemed to have consented to the
commission of the improper act.48 This is bolstered by the fact that
Abduraji: (a) admitted having punched the bundy card of Rahim
18
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
sometime in the first week of June 2009 (first incident) but explained that
he did the same by mistake, thinking that it was his own bundy card, and
on June 16, 2009 (second incident), thinking that Rahim was already at
the door of the office; and (b) averred that he could not recall whether or
not he punched the bundy card of Rahim on June 30, 2009 (third
incident; subject incidents).49Judge Barraquias then concluded that their
collaboration (1) is a clear violation of (a) Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) Circular No. 7-2003 on the accomplishment/submission of
Certificates of Service and Daily Time Records, and (b) Section 4, Rule
XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
29250 (Civil Service Rules); and (2) is an act of dishonesty. Noting,
however, that it is the first offense of Abduraji and Rahim, he
recommended that they be suspended for six (6) months without pay with
a stem warning that similar acts would be dealt with more severely.51
On the charge of insubordination and conduct unbecoming of court
employees, however, Judge Barraquias found no deliberate intent on the
part of Abduraji and Rahim to defy the authority of Judge Arabani and,
thus, deemed it proper to recommend that they be reprimanded and
given a stern warning for their non-compliance with the latter's
memorandum requiring them to explain the subject incidents in writing.52
Anent A.M. No, SCC-10-15-P, Judge Barraquias found sufficient
evidence on record showing that Rodrigo (a) did not leave his bundy card
at the designated bundy card rack,53 and (b) failed to heed Judge
Arabani's directive to refrain from bringing home and carrying in his
possession his bundy card, and to leave it in its designated rack.
Consequently, he recommended that Rodrigo be meted a two (2) month
forfeiture of salary (February and March 2010; sic) with a stem warning
that any similar incident would be dealt with more severely. However, he
found to be unsubstantiated the allegations that Rodrigo was constantly
not at his assigned table, roams in and out of the office, and is not
attending to his work. He further held that Rodrigo's failure to indicate the
specific dates of his absence was a mere formal defect which can be
remedied by specifying the dates of his leave.54
As regards A.M. No. SCC-11-17, Judge Barraquias found that the issues
raised by Rodrigo, Rahim and Abduraji against Judge Arabani were mere
rehash of those already deliberated upon by the Court in A.M. No. 06-3-
03-SCC, which was already closed and terminated. Accordingly, Judge
Barraquias refused to pass upon the same.55
On the other hand, Judge Barraquias recommended the dropping of the
sexual harassment charge filed by Sheldalyn against Judge Arabani for
insufficiency of evidence,56 noting that other than her own account and the
parties to this case who have declared their ill-feelings against Judge
Arabani, Sheldalyn has no other witness to corroborate the said
charge.57 On the contrary, the charge was disputed by the testimony of
Mrs. Maldisa which failed to show any single act of sexual harassment
committed by Judge Arabani on Sheldalyn.58 Nonetheless, Judge
Barraquias found it an established fact that Judge Arabani made a
drawing of a vagina and a penis in front of his staff, and recommended
that the latter (a) be reprimanded therefor with a stem warning that any
similar distasteful acts would be dealt with more severely; and
(b) undergo mandatory gender sensitivity seminar so that he may be
apprised of the value of giving due respect to the opposite sex.59
In a Resolution60 dated June 23, 2015, the Court referred Judge
Barraquias' Joint Investigation, Report and Recommendation dated April
8, 2013 to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The OCA's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum61 dated August 25, 2016, the OCA adopted the
findings62 contained in Judge Barraquias' Joint Investigation, Report and
Recommendation dated April 8, 2013, and recommended:
1. in A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P, that: (a) Rahim and Abduraji be found guilty
of committing irregularities in the punching of Rahim's bundy card on
three (3) occasions (i.e., on the subject incidents), which are also acts of
dishonesty, and be suspended for six (6) months without pay with a stern
warning that similar acts would be dealt with more severely; (b) the
complaint for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a court employee
against Rahim and Abduraji be dismissed for lack of intent to deliberately
defy Judge Arabani's authority as the head of office; and (c) Rahim and
Abduraji be reprimanded for their non-compliance with Judge Arabani 's
memorandum requiring them to explain the subject incidents in writing,
and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or any similar act shall
also be dealt with severely;63
2. in A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P, that: (a) Rodrigo be found guilty of violation
of reasonable office rules and regulations for his refusal to leave his
bundy card on the designated rack, and be meted the penalty of forfeiture
of two (2) months' salary (February and March 2010; sic) with a stern
19
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
warning that the commission of the same or any similar act shall be dealt
with more severely; (b) the complaint charging Rodrigo of being
constantly not at his assigned table, roaming in and out of the office, and
not attending to his work (loafing) be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence; and (c) Rodrigo be allowed to remedy his failure to indicate the
specific dates of his leave of absence for April 2010 for being a mere
formal defect;64 and
3. in A.M. No. SCC-11-17, that: (a) the complaint of sexual harassment
filed by Sheldalyn against Judge Arabani be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence; (b) Judge Arabani be found guilty of the distasteful act of
drawing a vagina and a penis in front of his court staff, and be
reprimanded and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or any
similar act will be dealt with more severely; and (c) the other charges
raised therein be dismissed for being a mere rehash of those already
deliberated upon and resolved by the Court En Banc in the Resolution
dated November 17, 2009 in A.M. No. 06-3-03-SCC.65
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the factual findings of the OCA, but differs in some of
the conclusions and the imposed penalties as shall be hereunder
discussed:
1. In A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P:
a. on the charge of dishonesty against Abduraji and Rahim:
Dishonesty is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity."66 As correctly ruled by the
OCA, Abduraji and Rahim are guilty of dishonesty by committing
irregularities in the punching of Rahim's bundy card/DTR on three (3)
occasions, i.e., on the subject incidents. The punching of a court
employee's DTR is a personal act of the holder which cannot and
should not be delegated to anyone else.67Moreover, every court
employee has the duty to truthfully and accurately indicate the time of his
arrival at and departure from the office.68 Thus, case law holds
that falsification of DTRs is an act of dishonesty and is reflective of
respondent's fitness to continue in office and of the level of discipline and
morale in the service,69rendering him administratively liable in accordance
with Section 4,70 Rule XVII of the Civil Service Rules.
Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of
official documents (such as DTRs) and dishonesty are both grave
offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time
offenders. Nonetheless, while it is the Court's duty to sternly wield a
corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those
who are undesirable, it also has the discretion to temper the harshness of
its judgment with mercy, taking in mind that the objective for discipline is
not their punishment, but the improvement of the public service, and the
preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the government.71
In this relation, Section 48,72 Rule 1.0 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service grants the disciplining authority
the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of
the proper penalty. Among the circumstances jurisprudentially held as
mitigating include, among others, the erring individual's admission of
guilt, remorse, high performance rating, and the fact that the infraction
complained of is his/her first offense.73 Thus, in several cases involving
first time offenders,74 as Abduraji and Rahim in this case, the Court has
reduced the imposable penalty of dismissal to suspension of six (6)
months without pay. Following judicial precedents, the Court adopts the
penalty recommended by the OCA, and accordingly suspends Abduraji
and Rahim for a period of six (6) months without pay.
b. On the charge of insubordination and conduct unbecoming a court
employee against Abduraji and Rahim:
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a
superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed, and imports a willful
or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the
Judge.75
In this case, the Court finds to be likewise well-taken the OCA's
recommendation for the dropping of the said charges against Abduraji
and Rahim considering the perceived absence of intent on their part to
deliberately defy Judge Arabani 's authority as the head of office.
However, they should be reprimanded for their failure to comply with
Judge Arabani's memorandum requiring them to explain the subject
incidents in writing, which constitutes a violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations, a light offense punishable with reprimand for the
first offense.76
2. in A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P:
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
The OCA correctly found Rodrigo to have violated reasonable office rules
and regulations when he refused to leave his bundy card or DTR on the
designated rack despite orders from Judge Arabani. Records show that
Rodrigo himself admitted that he did not leave his bundy card/DTR on the
designated bundy card rack for the months of January and February
2010 (not the months complained of) for reasons of convenience, and
from the months of April to September 2010 for fear of getting lost.77 As
aptly observed by the OCA, "[t]he reason he provided is not convincing
enough and raises doubt as to its truthfulness since other court
employees are able to comply and leave their bundy cards on the racks
specifically provided therefor."78
Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations is only a light offense
punishable with reprimand for the first offense.79 Nonetheless, in addition
to such non-compliance, Rodrigo likewise failed to secure the signature
of Judge Arabani on his bundy cards for the months of March to
September 2010 when they are required to be certified correct by the
Presiding Judge.80 Rodrigo's avowed reason for his failure to leave his
bundy cards on the designated rack having been found to be unjustified,
the forfeiture of his entire salary for the said months should have been in
order, if not for the Certification81 dated October 5, 2010 issued by Mirad,
Clerk II/Timekeeper of the 4th SCC of Maimbung, Sulu, certifying the
number of absences incurred by Rodrigo for the months of April through
September 2010, which Judge Arabani submitted, thus, impliedly
admitting that Rodrigo was present on the working days not so indicated
therein.
1âwphi 1
In relation thereto, the failure of Rodrigo to specify the number of working
days of leave applied for and the inclusive dates in his leave
application82 filed on April 12, 2010, which merely indicated the type of
leave as "SPL [special privilege leave] & VL" (vacation leave), is not a
mere formal defect that may be remedied by the expedience of
subsequently stating the specific dates of leave. It must be pointed out
that leave of absence for any reason other than illness of an official or
employee or of any member of his immediate family must be contingent
upon the needs of the service. Hence, the grant of vacation leave .shall
be at the discretion of the head of department/agency.83
In this case, Judge Arabani as the approving authority cannot properly
act on Rodrigo's leave application because it was not filled-up
completely, rendering the latter's immediately succeeding and continuous
absence on the working days on April 19 to 23 and 26 to 30, 2010, and
May 4 to 7, 2010 as unauthorized. Consequently, the latter shall not be
entitled to receive his salary corresponding to the period of his
unauthorized leave of absence, but said absences shall not be deducted
from his accumulated leave credits, if any.84
Records also show that Rodrigo further incurred numerous
unauthorized85 monthly absences from May to September 2010,86 totalling
44 whole days and 12 half-days.87 Notably, in letters dated July 30,
201088 and October 27, 2010,89 Rodrigo admitted that he did not submit
his bundy cards from April 2010, and his leave applications for Judge
Arabani's signature.90
While the mere failure to file a leave of absence in advance does not ipso
facto render an employee administratively liable, the unauthorized leave
of absence becomes punishable if the absence is frequent or
habitual. An officer or employee in the civil service shall be considered
habitually absent if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the
allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit under the Leave law at least
three (3) months in a semester or at least three (3) consecutive months
during the year.91
In this case, Rodrigo incurred consecutive unauthorized monthly
absences of more than 2.5 days from April to September
2010,92 rendering him administratively liable for the offense of frequent
unauthorized absences. Moreover, contrary to the OCA's finding, the
Court finds Rodrigo guilty of loafing or frequent unauthorized absences
from duty during regular hours for more than once.93 It is imperative that
as Clerk of Court, Rodrigo should always be at his station during office
hours.94 However, records show that he incurred 12 half day absences
from May to September 2010,95 which were undisputedly without previous
notice to the Presiding Judge.
Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
mandates that court personnel shall commit themselves exclusively to the
business and responsibilities of their office during working hours. Court
personnel should strictly observe the prescribed office hours and the
efficient use of every moment thereof to inspire public respect for the
justice system. Thus, court officials and employees are at all times
behooved to strictly observe official time because the image of a court of
justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the
men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the last and lowest
of its employees.96 Loafing results in inefficiency and non-performance of
duty, and adversely affects the prompt delivery of justice.97
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
Section 23 (q),98 Rule XIV of the Civil Service Rules punishes "[f]requent
unauthorized absences,99 loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from
duty during regular office hours" with suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the
second offense. Records are bereft of showing, however, that Rodrigo
had been previously found guilty of such offense. Consequently, the
Court deems it proper to impose upon him the penalty of six (6) months
and one (1) day suspension. The OCA's recommendation for the
forfeiture of salary for the months of February (sic; not the month
complained of) and March, 2010 must be, therefore, modified
accordingly.
3. In A.M. No.SCC-11-17:
a. On the various charges hurled by Rodrigo, Rahim and Abduraji against
Judge Arabani:
The Court finds no reason to disturb the OCA's recommendation
upholding Judge Barraquias' finding that the issues raised by Rodrigo,
Rahim and Abduraji against Judge Arabani, save as shall be hereunder
discussed, were mere rehash of those already deliberated upon by the
Court in A.M. No. 06-3-03-SCC,100 which was already closed and
terminated.101 Moreover, other than their own testimonies which must be
taken with a grain of salt considering their manifest ill-feelings towards
Judge Arabani, they failed to present sufficient evidence to corroborate
their charges against him.
b. On the charge of sexual harassment against Judge Arabani, and of
making a drawing of a vagina and a penis in front of his court staff:
Section 3 of the "Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment
Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the
Judiciary"102 defines work-related sexual harassment as follows:
Section 3. Work-related Sexual harassment; definition. – Work-related
sexual harassment is committed by an official or an employee in the
Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires
any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand,
request or requirement for submission is accepted by the latter.
Section 4 of the same rules provides the modes of commission of the
said act, to wit:
Section 4. Work-related Sexual harassment; how committed. Work-
related sexual harassment is committed when:
(a) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual,
or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in anyway would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee. It shall include, but shall not be limited to,
the following modes:
1. Physical, such as malicious touching, overt sexual advances, and
gestures with lewd insinuation.
2. Verbal, such as requests or demands for sexual favors, and lurid
remarks.
3. Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or written notes with sexual
underpinnings.
4. Other acts analogous to the foregoing.
(b) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under
existing laws; or
(c) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for the employee.103 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 53, Rule X of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 01-
0940, otherwise known as the "Administrative Disciplinary Rules on
Sexual Harassment Cases", classifies sexual harassment into grave, less
grave and light offenses, viz.:
Section 53. Sexual harassment is classified as grave, less grave and light
offenses.
A. Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
22
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
1. unwanted touching of private parts of the body (genitalia, buttocks and
breast);
2. sexual assault;
3. malicious touching;
4. requesting for sexual favor in exchange for employment, promotion,
local or foreign travels, favorable working conditions or assignments, a
passing grade, the granting of honors or scholarship, or the grant of
benefits or payment of a stipend or allowance, and
5. other analogous cases.
B. Less Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
1. unwanted touching or brushing against a victim's body;
2. pinching not falling under grave offenses;
3. derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the
members of one sex, or one's sexual orientation or used to describe a
person;
4. verbal abuse with sexual overtones; and
5. other analogous cases.
C. The following shall be considered Light Offenses;
1. surreptitiously looking or staring a look of a person's private part or
worn undergarments;
2. telling sexist/smutty jokes or sending these through text, electronic mail
or other similar means, causing embarrassment or offense and carried
out after the offender has been advised that they are offensive or
embarrassing or, even without such advise, when they are by their nature
clearly embarrassing, offensive or vulgar;
3. malicious leering or ogling;
4. the display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti;
5. unwelcome inquiries or comments about a person's sex life;
6. unwelcome sexual flirtation, advances, propositions;
7. making offensive hand or body gestures at an employee;
8. persistent unwanted attention with sexual overtones;
9. unwelcome phone calls with sexual overtones causing discomfort,
embarrassment, offense or insult to the receiver; and
10. other analogous cases. (Emphases supplied)
Despite his protestations, the charge that Judge Arabani made a drawing
of a vagina and a penis, and thereafter showed it to Sheldalyn was
corroborated by Mirad, a disinterested witness,
who categorically declared that it was Judge Arabani who made the
drawing, and affirmed that it was he (Mirad) who crumpled it.104 The act
was enough to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment
for Sheldalyn such that all subsequent interaction with Judge Arabani
became unwelcome on her part. In fact, the substantial evidence on
record showed that Sheldalyn became afraid of Judge Arabani105 and
started to avoid him.106
The distasteful act by Judge Arabani of making a drawing of a vagina and
a penis, and thereafter showing it to an employee of the court of which he
is an officer constitutes sexual harassment. It is an act that constitutes a
physical behavior of a sexual nature; a gesture with lewd insinuation. To
the Court's mind, Judge Arabani deliberately utilized this form of
expression, i.e., drawing, to maliciously convey to Sheldalyn his sexual
desires over her; hence, his conduct cannot be classified as a mere
display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti under Section
53 (C) (4), Rule X of CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, such as one who is
caught watching or reading pornographic materials. Rather, Judge
Arabani's behavior should be classified as an analogous case (Section
53 [B] [5]) of verbal abuse with sexual overtones under Section 53 (B) (4)
of the same issuance, which thus, qualifies the same as a less grave
offense. Section 56 (B), Rule XI of CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 states
the penalties for less grave offenses:
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
B. For less grave offenses:
1st offense - Fine or suspension of not less than thirty (30) days and
not exceeding six (6) months
2nd offense - Dismissal
Accordingly, as it appears that this is Judge Arabani's first infraction of
this kind, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of suspension for a
period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. in A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P:
a. respondents Rahim A. Arabani (Rahim), Junior Process Server, and
Abduraji G. Bakil (Abduraji), Utility Worker I, both of the 4th Shari'a Circuit
Court (4th SCC) of Maimbung, Sulu, are found GUILTYof committing
irregularities in the punching of Rahim's bundy card/DTR on the subject
incidents, and hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay, with
a STERN WARNING that similar acts would be dealt with more severely;
b. the complaint for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a court
employee against Rahim and Abduraji are DISMISSED for lack of merit;
c. Rahim and Abduraji are REPRIMANDED for failing to comply with
Judge Arabani 's memorandum requiring them to explain the subject
incidents in writing, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or any similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
2. in A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P:
a. respondent Rodrigo Ramos, Jr. (Rodrigo), Clerk of Court of the 4th
SCC of Maimbung, Sulu is found GUILTY of violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations, and is hereby REPRIMANDED, and STERNLY
WARNED that the commission of the same or any similar act shall be
dealt with more severely;
b. Rodrigo is declared GUILTY of frequent unauthorized absences, and
loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular office
hours, and is accordingly SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1)
day without pay, with a STERN WARNING that similar acts would be
dealt with more severely. He shall not be entitled to receive his salary
corresponding to the period of his unauthorized leave of absence as
afore-discussed, but said absences shall not be deducted from his
accumulated leave credits, if any; and
3. in A.M. No. SCC-11-17:
a. respondent Judge Arabani, Presiding Judge of the 4th SCC of
Maimbung, Sulu, is found GUILTY of sexual harassment classified as a
less grave offense under Section 53 (B) (5), Rule X of Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 01-0940, and is
accordingly SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt
with more severely; and
b. the other charges raised in the case are DISMISSED for being mere
rehash of those already deliberated upon and resolved by the Court in
the Resolution dated November 17, 2009 in A.M. No. 06-3-03-SCC, and
for being unsubstantiated.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to
respondents' respective records.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11256
FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA, Complainant
vs
ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA, Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not only violates
the court and its processes, but also betrays the trust and confidence
reposed in him by his client and must be disbarred to maintain the
integrity of the Law Profession.
24
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
Antecedents
In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the
respondent in his law office in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to inquire about
the process of annulling her marriage with her husband, Juan C. Madria.
After giving th e details of her marriage and other facts relevant to the
annulment, the respondent told her that she had a strong case, and
guaranteed that he could obtain for her the decree of annulment. He told
her, too, that his legal services would cost ₱25,000.00, and that she
should return on November 19, 2002 inasmuch as he would still prepare
the complaint for the annulment. At the time of the consultation, she was
accompanied by her daughter, Vanessa Madria, and her nephew, Jayson
Argonza.1
The complainant returned to the respondent's office on November 19,
2002. On that occasion, he showed her the petition for annulment, and
asked her to sign it. She paid to him an initial amount of ₱4,000.00.2 He
acknowledged the payment through a handwritten receipt.3
The complainant again went to the respondent's office on December 16,
2002 to deliver another partial payment, and to follow up on the case.
The respondent advised her to just wait for the resolution of her
complaint, and assured her that she did not need to appear in court. He
explained that all the court notices and processes would be sent to his
office, and that he would regularly apprise her of the developments.4 On
December 28, 2002, she returned to his office to complete her payment,
and he also issued his receipt for the payment.5
The complainant's daughter Vanessa thereafter made several follow-ups
on behalf of her mother. In the latter part of April 2003, the respondent
informed the complainant that her petition had been granted.6 Thus,
Vanessa went to the respondent's office and received a copy of the trial
court's decision dated April 16, 2003 signed by Judge Lyliha Abella
Aquino of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, in Tuguegarao City.7
According to the complainant, the respondent advised her to allow five
months to lapse after the release of the decision before she could safely
claim the status of "single." After the lapse of such time, she declared in
her Voter's Registration Record (VRR) that she was single.8
The complainant, again through Vanessa, received from the respondent
a copy of the certificate of finality dated September 26, 2003 signed by
one Jacinto C. Danao of the RTC (Branch 4).9
Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant used the
purported decision and certificate of finality in applying for the renewal of
her passport.10 However, she became the object of an investigation by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) because her former partner,
Andrew
Dowson Grainge, had filed a complaint charging that she had fabricated
the decision for the annulment of her marriage. Only then did she learn
that the decision and the certificate of finality given by the respondent did
not exist in the court records, as borne out by the letter signed by Atty.
Aura Clarissa B. Tabag-Querubin, Clerk of Court of the RTC Branch IV,
to wit:
MS. RACHEL M. ROXAS
Officer-in-Charge
Regional Consular Office
Tuguegarao City
Madam:
This is in reply to your letter dated June 23, 2011 inquiring on whether
Civil Case No. 6149 for the Annulment of Marriage between Flordeliza
Argonza Madria and Juan C. Madria was filed and decided by this Court.
As per records of this Court, the above-entitled case was filed on April
25, 2003 but was dismissed as per Order of this Court dated April 6,
2004.
The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha Abella Aquino as appearing in the
alleged decision attached to your letter is a blatant forgery.
For your information and guidance.
Very truly yours,
(sgd)
AURA CLARISSA B. TABAG-QUERUBIN
Clerk of Court V11
25
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges for violation of
the Philippine Passport Act in the RTC in Tuguegarao City.12 She claims
that she had relied in good faith on the representations of the respondent;
and that he had taken advantage of his position in convincing her to part
with her money and to rely on the falsified court documents.13
In his answer,14 the respondent denies the allegations of the complainant.
He averred that he had informed her that he would still be carefully
reviewing the grounds to support her petition; that she had insisted that
he should prepare the draft of her petition that she could show to her
foreigner fiance; that she had also prevailed upon him to simulate the
court decision to the effect that her marriage had been annulled, and to
fabricate the certificate of finality; that she had assured him that such
simulated documents would be kept strictly confidential; that he had
informed her that the petition had been filed in April 2003, but she had
paid no attention to such information; that she had not appeared in any of
the scheduled hearings despite notice; and that he had not heard from
her since then, and that she had not even returned to his office.
Findings and Recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
After conducting her investigation, IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and Recommendation15 wherein
she concluded that the respondent had violated his Lawyer's Oath; and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two
years.
The IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, modified the recommendation of
suspension from the practice of law for two years to disbarment through
its Resolution No. XXI-2015-242, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-242
CDB Case No. 14-4315
Flordeliza A. Madria vs.
Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A", considering violation of his lawyers' oath
as a lawyer and a member of the Bar by preparing a simulated Court
decision granting the petition for annulment of marriage of complainant
and a certificate of finality of the annulment petition. Hence, Atty. Carlos
P. Rivera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.16
Ruling of the Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for annulment of
marriage, and of the simulation of the decision and certificate of finality.
His explanation of having done so only upon the complainant's persistent
prodding did not exculpate him from responsibility. For one, the
explanation is unacceptable, if not altogether empty. Simulating or
participating in the simulation of a court decision and a certificate of
finality of the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or forgery.
One need not be a lawyer to know so, but it was worse in the
respondent's case because he was a lawyer. Thus, his acts were legally
intolerable. Specifically, his deliberate falsification of the court decision
and the certificate of finality of the decision reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of the administration of
justice in this country. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.
The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules 1. 01
and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
26
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
xxxx
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOY AL TY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness.
The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a lay person like
the complainant could have swayed a lawyer like the respondent into
committing the simulations was patently improbable. Yet, even if he had
committed the simulations upon the client's prodding, he would be no
less responsible. Being a lawyer, he was aware of and was bound by the
ethical canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
those quoted earlier, which would have been enough to deter him from
committing the falsification, as well as to make him unhesitatingly
frustrate her prodding in deference to his sworn obligation as a lawyer to
always act with honesty and to obey the laws of the land. Surely, too, he
could not have soon forgotten his express undertaking under his
Lawyer's Oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to its
commission."17 Indeed, the ethics of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined
every lawyer like him to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.18 As we have
observed in one case:19
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should
1âw phi 1
determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the
Bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost
fidelity and good faith.
Also, Canon 1520 and Rule 18.0421 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility required the respondent be true to the
complainant as his client. By choosing to ignore his fiduciary
responsibility for the sake of getting her money, he committed a further
violation of his Lawyer's Oath by which he swore not to "delay any man's
cause for money or malice," and to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients." He compounded this
violation by taking advantage of his legal knowledge to promote his own
selfish motives, thereby disregarding his responsibility under Canon 17.22
Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be
disbarred on any of the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a
case without authority so to do.
Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice
or misconduct in office, any of which was already a ground sufficient for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.24 The moral
standards of the Legal Profession expected the respondent to act with
the highest degree of professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course
of their practice of law.25 That he turned his back on such standards
exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of
probity and general unworthiness to continue as an officer of the Court.26
We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for
unprofessional conduct. In Cruz-Villanueva v. Rivera,27he was suspended
from the practice of law because he had notarized documents without a
notarial commission. This circumstance shows his predisposition to
beguile other persons into believing in the documents that he had
falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop to such proclivity. He should
be quickly removed through disbarment.
It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution
and only for the most imperative reasons or in cases of clear misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and member of the bar.28 But we do not hesitate when the
misconduct is gross, like in the respondent's case. We wield the power
now because the respondent, by his gross misconduct as herein
described, absolutely forfeited the privilege to remain in the Law
Profession. As we reminded in Embido v. Pe,29 in which we disbarred the
respondent lawyer for falsifying a court decision:
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal
profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only to the
27
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him
who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer's Oath and the canons of
ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and
omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings,
but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional
duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the
principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him. Verily, no
lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty
and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct
committed either in a professional or private capacity. The test is whether
the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.30
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. CARLOS P.
RIVERA guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION OF THE
LAWYER'S OATH; and, ACCORDINGLY,
ORDERS his DISBARMENT. Let his name be STRICKEN from
the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country for their information and guidance; (b) the INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES; (c) the OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT for
appending to the respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar;
and (d) the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE for possible criminal prosecution of the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
A.C. No. 11128
PEDRO RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIA NYMPHA C. MANDAGAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainant Pedro Ramos (Ramos) against respondent Atty. Maria
Nympha C. Mandagan (Atty. Mandagan) for gross misconduct in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Complaint, Ramos alleged that Atty. Mandagan demanded from
him the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) in
connection with the criminal case filed against him for murder before the
Sandiganbayan. According to Ramos, the P300,000.00 shall be used as
bail bond in the event that his petition for bail in the said criminal case is
granted.2 Also, Atty. Mandagan collected an additional amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) for operating expenses. In both instances,
an Acknowledgment Receipt was issued in his favor as proof of
payment.3
Contrary to the assurance, however, of Atty. Mandagan, Ramos’ petition
for bail was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, Atty. Mandagan
withdrew as his counsel without returning the amount of ₱300,000.00
despite the demand sent by Ramos’ counsel.4
On December 19, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued an Order5 directing Atty.
Mandagan to submit her Answer to Ramos’ complaint within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the Order.
In her Answer,6 Atty. Mandagan argued that the amount of ₱300,000.00
was not intended for payment of bail, but as mobilization expenses for
preparation of witnesses, defenses, and other documentary exhibits for
both Ramos and his co-accused Gary Silawon.7 Atty. Mandagan likewise
alleged that Ramos never paid her for acceptance, appearance fees, and
legal services rendered in the entire course of the proceedings until her
withdrawal as counsel.8
On April 26, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Mandatory
Conference9 directing the parties to appear for a mandatory conference.
During the mandatory conference, however, only Atty. Joselito Frial
appeared, as counsel for Ramos, while Atty. Mandagan was absent.
28
LEGAL ETHICS CASE

On August 29, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued an Order10 terminating the return the amount to Ramos. Worse, she unjustifiably refused to turn over
mandatory conference and directed both parties to submit their the amount to Ramos despite demand from Ramos’ counsel.
respective position papers within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
upon receipt of the said order. Clearly, Atty. Mandagan failed to act in accordance with the rule stated in
Canon 16 of the CPR, to wit:
On December 18, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,11 finding Atty. Mandagan liable for gross misconduct Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
and for failure to render an accounting of funds, and recommended that client that may come into his possession.
Atty. Mandagan be suspended for a period of one (1) year.
Subsequently, the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD was Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in a received for or from the client.
Resolution12 dated October 11, 2014.
xxxx
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Atty. Mandagan, but the same
was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution13 dated June
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
5, 2015.
when due or upon demand. x x x.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds the
In Belleza v. Atty. Macasa,17 this Court stated that:
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, as adopted and approved
by the IBP Board of Governors, to be proper under the circumstances.
[A] lawyer has the duty to deliver his client’s funds or properties as they
fall due or upon demand. His failure to return the client’s money upon
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on
demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for
those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him
qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to
by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
1âw phi 1

maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,

honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts, and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms embodied in the Code. 14
In Cruz-Villanueva v. Atty. Rivera,15 this Court held that:
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose,
the lawyer must render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer
does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to the client.16 (Citations omitted)
In the present case, Atty. Mandagan never denied receiving the amount
of ₱300,000.00 from Ramos for the purpose of posting a bond to secure
the latter’s provisional liberty. When the petition for bail of Ramos,
however, was denied by the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Mandagan failed to
professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment. Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it may
constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.18 (Citations omitted)
This court cannot give credence to Atty. Mandagan’s defense that the
amount she received from Ramos was not for bail but merely for
mobilization expenses. Records show that Atty. Mandagan failed to
substantiate her claim. At any rate, as correctly observed by the IBP-
CBD, "[Atty. Mandagan] should be forthright in stating what constitutes
legal mobilization expenses if only to dispel any doubt as to its intended
purpose."19
Atty. Mandagan’s failure to make an accounting or to return the money to
Ramos is a violation of the trust reposed on her. As a lawyer, Atty.
Mandagan should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to
her in her professional capacity because the CPR exacts a high degree
of fidelity and trust from members of the bar.
29
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Maria Nympha C.
Mandagan GUILTY of violating Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS her from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon receipt of this
Resolution, with WARNING that a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of Atty.
Maria Nympha C. Mandagan as a member of the Philippine Bar and
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
A.C. No. 5816
DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E.
BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by
Dr. Elmar 0. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on
August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and
Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality
and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been
friends since the mid-1960’s when they were both students at the
University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation.
Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again
crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.2
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily
Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at
the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a
Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon
City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez
because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make
a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which
could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.4
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a
divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that
he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed.
Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a
divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty.
Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid
and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.5
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of
Virginia in the United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed
with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is
a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican
Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws.
When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured
Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He
also promised to legally adopt their son.7
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to
legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of
Gomez to the said petition.8
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous
letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with
Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25,
2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo,
promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed." Apparently,
five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to
put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the
30
LEGAL ETHICS CASE
annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a
petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son;
he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City
where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.12
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the
respondents to file their respective comments, which they separately did
on November 25, 2002.14
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May
15
18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding,
Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her
marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while
their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply
deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation
in 1984. They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a
mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property
regime of complete separation of property. She likewise advised the
couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for
whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them.16
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a
Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of
San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted
that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic
court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint
Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.17
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the
fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not
have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the
marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez
demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr.
Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not
valid since his previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that
he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of
losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of
legitimacy to their relationship.19
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour.
Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony
from developing.20
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez,
claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early
as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did
not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty.
Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig.
She claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was
employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic
overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since
he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite
being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason
why she resigned from his law firm.22
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within
90 days from notice.23
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued
an Order24 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on
July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the
conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the
case for resolution based on the pleadings already submitted.
Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective
position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig
and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 200325 and
October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on
October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner
of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation,28 which
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality,
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty.
Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his
previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and
illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the
admissions of Atty. Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral
conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was
not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest
degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both
in his official and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior.
Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital
adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching
professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his students,
his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of
emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a
second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior
valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an
otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally
accepted moral standards of the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
the charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr.
Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of the
alleged affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution,30 which adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating
Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated
allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported by
affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or
by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite
the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any
felony; that he never concealed the status of his marriage from anyone.
In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent with
both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29,
2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross
immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and
the circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board
of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as
far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order
to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character.
Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This
must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s
property, reputation, his life, his all."34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a
lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia,
for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing
any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor."35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is
gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as
the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly
immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.36
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts
to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and,
ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern
of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled,
but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the
Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic
wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their
paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four
children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then
already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation
from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a
divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr.
Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted
with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he
could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance of
legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he
obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in
our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time.
He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry
anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding,
he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint
Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant
and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig
married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that
his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he
wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding
any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside
Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it
matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact
still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render
a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE
act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the
highest degree. 1âwphi1
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the
various legal actions he resorted to in order to give their union a
semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at
that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first
marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the
much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to
pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral
conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity
towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of
gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr.
Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’"37 In various
cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer
abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another
woman who has borne him a child.38
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his
previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed
by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of
the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the
process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of
disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of
the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears
to be the most appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not
credible since they are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits
contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant
consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that
he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with
Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis
for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the
respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there
is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship
between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by
Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter
informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the
purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove
the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required m suspens10n or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.39
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez
only proves that the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the
alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity
of the allegations therein. Similarly,. the supposed love letter, if at all, only
provesAtty.that Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for
her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with
Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court
resolves to ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A.
Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the
Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law.
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LEGAL ETHICS CASE

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A.
Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision
shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated
by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo 1s hereby

DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

35