Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG

RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971

ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner,

vs.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and CHIEF, PHIL. CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971

LUZVIMINDA DAVID, petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, COL. N. C.

CAMELLO, in his capacity as Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary and HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE in his capacity as Secretary, Department of National defense, respondents.

G.R. No. L-33982 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE

FELICIDAD G. PRUDENTE, petitioners,

vs.

GENERAL MANUEL YAN, GEN. EDU GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-34004 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF OF GERARDO

TOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS "GERRY TOMAS" AND FOR RETURN OF DOCUMENTS
ILLEGALLY SEIZED. DOMINGO E. DE LARA, in his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal
Assistance, Philippine Bar Association, petitioner,
vs.

BRIG. GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34013 December 11, 1971

REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34039 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF OF SGT.

FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO AND HIS WIFE, MRS. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO. CARLOS C.
RABAGO, in his capacity as President of the Conference Delegates Association of the
Philippines (CONDA),petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34265 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTOLIN ORETA, JR.
ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA and COL. PROSPERO OLIVAS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-34339 December 11, 1971

GARY B. OLIVAR, assisted by his father, GEORGE OLIVAR, petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, et

al., respondents.

Ignacio P. Lacsina for petitioners Teodosio Lansang, et al.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Rogelio V. Arienda.

E. Voltaire Garcia II for petitioner Luzvimindo David.

Verzola, Africa and Atencio, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Fortunato de Leon, R. G.
Suntay and Juan T. David for petitioner Felicidad G. Prudente.
Ruben L. Roxas for petitioner Reynaldo Rimando.

Nuñez, Acob, Del Rosario and Ramos for petitioner Carlos Rabago, etc.

E. Voltaire Garcia II and M. P. Vivo for petitioner Gary Olivar, etc., et al.

Jose W. Diokno and Juanito R. Remulla for petitioner Antolin Oreta, Jr.

Domingo E. de Lara for and in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo for
respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the
general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after
the other, at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight
(8) persons were killed and many more injured, including practically all of the aforementioned
candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been
fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them.

On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows:

WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established

that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar
ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material
support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by a well trained,
determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage of our constitutional
liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in
fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually
staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to
forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted
government, and supplant our existing political social, economic and legal order with
an entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose
conception of God and religion, whose notion of individual rights and family relations,
and whose political, social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist teachings and beliefs;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations

that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically
strengthened and broadened their memberships through sustained and careful
recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among our peasantry, laborers,
professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media personnel, and through such
sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating
almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to erode and
weaken the political, social, economic and moral foundations of our existing
government and to influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student
 and mass media organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against
our duly constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement
agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and

disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State, the latest manifestation
of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August
21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious injury of scores of persons;

WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in
order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the
authority of the State;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the
Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for the
persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or
in connection therewith.

Presently, petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled cases, by the following
persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority
of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that of their detention, namely:

1. TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI ALCALA, the petitioners in Case
No. L-33964 — filed on August 24, 1971 — who, on August 22, 1971, between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m.,
were "invited" by agents of the Philippine Constabulary — which is under the command of
respondent Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia — to go and did go to the headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for interrogation, and thereafter, detained;

2. ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, the petitioner in Case No. L-33965 — filed, also, on August 24, 1971 —
who was picked up in his residence, at No. 55 Road, 3, Urduja Village, Quezon City, by members of
the Metrocom and then detained;

3. Soon after the filing of the petition in Case No. L-33965 — or on August 28, 1971 — the same was
amended to include VICENTE ILAO and JUAN CARANDANG, as petitioners therein, although, apart
from stating that these additional petitioners are temporarily residing with the original petitioner,
Rogelio V. Arienda, the amended petition alleged nothing whatsoever as regards the circumstances
under which said Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang are said to be illegally deprived of their liberty;

4. LUZVIMINDO DAVID, petitioner in Case No. L-33973 — filed on August 25, 1971 — who was
similarly arrested in his residence, at No. 131-B Kamias Road, Quezon City, and detained by the
Constabulary;

5. Felicidad G. Prudente, who filed the petition in Case No. L-33982 — on August 27, 1971 — upon
the ground that her father, Dr. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, had, on August 22, 1971, at about 8 p.m.,
been apprehended by Constabulary agents in his house, at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, and
then detained at the Camp Crame stockade, Quezon City;
6. ANGELO DE LOS REYES, who was allowed — on August 30, 1971 — to intervene as one of the
petitioners in Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, he having been arrested by members of
the Constabulary on August 22, 1971, between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m., in his residence, at 86 Don
Manuel Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where
he is detained and restrained of liberty;

7. VICTOR FELIPE, who was similarly allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in said three (3)
cases, upon the ground that, on August 23, 1971, at about 8 a.m., he was, likewise, apprehended at
Sta. Rosa, Laguna, by members of the Philippine Constabulary and brought, first to the
Constabulary headquarters at Canlubang, Laguna, and, then, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where
he is detained and restrained of liberty;

8. TERESITO SISON, who was, also, allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in the same
three (3) cases, he having been arrested in his residence, at 318 Lakandula St., Angeles City, on
August 22, 1971, between 6 and 7 p.m., and taken to the PC offices at Sto. Domingo, Angeles City,
then to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, and eventually to Camp Crame, Quezon City,
where he is restrained and deprived of liberty;

9. GERARDO TOMAS, alias Gerry Tomas, a 17-year old second year college students of St. Louis
University, Baguio City, on whose behalf, Domingo E. de Lara — in his capacity as Chairman,
Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar Association — filed on September 3, 1971, the
petition in Case No. L-34004, upon the ground that said Gerardo Tomas had, on August 23, 1971, at
about 6 a.m., been arrested by Constabulary agents, while on his way to school in the City of
Baguio, then brought to the Constabulary premises therein at Camp Holmes, and, thereafter, taken,
on August 24, 1971, to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, and thence, on August 25, 1971, to the
Constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;

10. REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner in Case No. L-34013 — filed on September 7, 1971 — a 19-
year old student of the U.P. College in Baguio city — who, while allegedly on his way home, at
Lukban Road, Baguio, on August 23, 1971, at about 1 a.m., was joined by three (3) men who
brought him to the Burnham Park, thence, to Camp Olivas at San Fernando, Pampanga, and,
thereafter, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;

11. Sgt. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO and his wife, Mrs. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO, on whose
behalf Carlos C. Rabago — as President of the Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines
(CONDA) — filed the petition in Case No. L-34039 — on September 14, 1971 — against Gen.
Eduardo M. Garcia, alleging that, on August 27, 1971, at about 3 p.m., Mrs. De Castro was arrested,
while at Liamzon Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig, Rizal, by agents of the Constabulary, and taken to the
PC headquarters at Camp Crame, where, later, that same afternoon, her husband was brought,
also, by PC agents and both are detained;

12. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., who filed the petition in Case No. L-34265 — on October 26, 1971 —
against said Gen. Garcia, as Chief of the Constabulary, and Col. Prospero Olivas, Chief of the
Central Intelligence Service (CIS), Philippine Constabulary, alleging that, upon invitation from said
CIS, he went, on October 20, 1971, to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to see Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who referred petitioner to Col. Laroya of the CIS; that
the latter, in turn, referred him to CIS Investigator Atty. Berlin Castillo and another CIS against,
whose name is unknown to the petitioner; and that, after being interrogated by the two (2), petitioner
was detained illegally; and
13. GARY OLIVAR, petitioner in Case No. L-34339 — filed on November 10, 1971 — who was
apprehended, by agents of the Constabulary, in the evening of November 8, 1941, in Quezon City,
and then detained at Camp Crame, in the same City.

Upon the filing of the aforementioned cases, the respondents were forthwith required to answer the
petitions therein, which they did. The return and answer in L-33964 — which was, mutatis mutandis,
reproduced substantially or by reference in the other cases, except L-34265 — alleges, inter alia,
that the petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had
"participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that "their continued detention is justified due
to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of
the President of the Philippines;" that there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this country, and
that "public safety and the security of the State required the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus," as "declared by the President of the Philippines in Proclamation No. 889; that in
making said declaration, the "President of the Philippines acted on relevant facts gathered thru the
coordinated efforts of the various intelligence agents of our government but (of) which the Chief
Executive could not at the moment give a full account and disclosure without risking revelation of
highly classified state secrets vital to its safely and security"; that the determination thus made by the
President is "final and conclusive upon the court and upon all other persons" and "partake(s) of the
nature of political question(s) which cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry," pursuant to Barcelon v.
Baker, 5 Phil. 87, and Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882; that petitioners "are under detention
pending investigation and evaluation of culpabilities on the reasonable belief" that they "have
committed, and are still committing, individually or in conspiracy with others, engaged in armed
struggle, insurgency and other subversive activities for the overthrow of the Government; that
petitioners cannot raise, in these proceedings for habeas corpus, "the question of their guilt or
innocence"; that the "Chief of Constabulary had petitioners taken into custody on the basis of the
existence of evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable ground to believe that petitioners come within
the coverage of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended";
that the "continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona fide precautionary and preventive
measure demanded by the necessities of public safety, public welfare and public interest"; that the
President of the Philippines has "undertaken concrete and abundant steps to insure that the
constitutional rights and privileges of the petitioners as well as of the other persons in current
confinement pursuant to Proclamation 889 remain unimpaired and unhampered"; and that
"opportunities or occasions for abuses by peace officers in the implementation of the proclamation
have been greatly minimized, if not completely curtailed, by various safeguards contained in
directives issued by proper authority."

These safeguards are set forth in:

1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defense, dated August 21, 1971,
directing, inter alia, in connection with the arrest or detention of suspects pursuant to Proclamation
No. 889, that, except when caught inflagrante delicto, no arrest shall be made without warrant
authorized in writing by the Secretary of National Defense; that such authority shall not be granted
unless, "on the basis of records and other evidences," it appears satisfactorily, in accordance with
Rule 113, section 6(b), of the Rules of Court, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of the
acts mentioned in the proclamation; that, if such person will be charged with a crime subject to an
afflictive penalty under the Anti-Subversion Act, the authorization for his arrest shall not be issued
unless supported by signed intelligence reports citing at least one reliable witness to the same overt
act; that no unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in effecting arrests; and that arrested
persons shall not be subject to greater restraint than is necessary for their detention;

2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23, 27, and 30, 1971, to all units
of his command, stating that the privilege of the writ is suspended for no other persons than those
specified in the proclamation; that the same does not involve material law; that precautionary
measures should be taken to forestall violence that may be precipitated by improper behavior of
military personnel; that authority to cause arrest under the proclamation will be exercised only by the
Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers occupying position in the provinces down to provincial
commanders"; that there shall be no indiscriminate or mass arrests; that arrested persons shall not
be harmed and shall be accorded fair and humane treatment; and that members of the detainee's
immediate family shall be allowed to visit him twice a week;

3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, dated September 2, 1971, directing the
Chief of the Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups to prevent
and/or check any abuses in connection with the suspension of the privilege of the writ; and

4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a Presidential Administrative
Assistance Committee to hear complaints regarding abuses committed in connection with the
implementation of Proclamation No. 889.

Respondents in L-33965 further alleged that therein petitioners Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang
had been released from custody on August 31, 1971, "after it had been found that the evidence
against them was insufficient."

In L-34265, the "Answer and Return" filed by respondents therein traversed some allegations of fact
and conclusions of law made in the petition therein and averred that Antolin Oreta, Jr., the petitioner
therein, had been and is detained "on the basis of a reasonable ground to believe that he has
committed overt acts in furtherance of rebellion or insurrection against the government" and,
accordingly, "comes within the class of persons as to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has been suspended by Proclamation No. 889, as amended," the validity of which is not
contested by him.

On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending Proclamation No. 889,
so as to read as follows:

WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established

that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar
ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material
support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by a well-trained,
determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage of our constitutional
liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in
fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of [actually]
staging, undertaking, [and] wagging and are actually engaged in an armed
insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country,
overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social,
economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of government,
whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion, whose notion of
individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social and economic
precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teaching and beliefs;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations

that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically
strengthened and broadened their memberships through sustained and careful
recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among our peasantly, laborers,
professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media personnel, and through such
sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating
 almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to erode and
weaken the political, social, economic and moral foundations of our existing
government and influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student
and mass media organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against
our duly constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement
agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, by their acts of rebellion and insurrection, have
created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and security of the
State, the latest manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal
Party rally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious
injury of scores of persons;

WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in
order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the
authority of the State;

NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the
Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the
persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion [,] and [all] other [crimes and
offenses] overt acts committed by them in furtherance [or on the occasion] thereof[,].
[or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.]
1

On September 1, 1971, Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982 were jointly heard and
then the parties therein were allowed to file memoranda, which were submitted from September 3 to
September 9, 1971.

Soon thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889 was further amended by
Proclamation No. 889-B, lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
following provinces, sub-provinces and cities of the Philippine, namely:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Batanes 15. Negros Occ.

2. Ilocos Norte 16. Negros Or.
3. Ilocos Sur 17. Cebu
4. Abra 18. Bohol
5. Abra 19. Capiz
6. Pangasinan 20. Aklan
7. Batangas 21. Antique
8. Catanduanes 22. Iloilo
9. Masbate 23. Leyte
10. Romblon 24. Leyte del Sur
11. Marinduque 25. Northern Samar
12. Or. Mindoro 26. Eastern Samar
13. Occ. Mindoro 27. Western Samar
14. Palawan.

B. SUB-PROVINCES:
 1. Guimaras 3. Siquior
2. Biliran

C. CITIES:

1. Laog 10. Bacolod

2. Dagupan 11. Bago
3. San Carlos 12. Canlaon
4. Batangas 13. La Carlota
5. Lipa 14. Bais
6. Puerto Princesa 15. Dumaguete
7. San Carlos (Negros 16. Iloilo
Occ.) 17. Roxas
8. Cadiz 18. Tagbilaran
9. Silay 19. Lapu-lapu

20. Cebu 24. Tacloban

21. Mandaue 25. Ormoc
22. Danao 26. Calbayog
23. Toledo

On September 25, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-C, restoring the privilege of the
writ in the following provinces and cities:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Surigao del Norte 8. Agusan del Sur

2. Surigao del Sur 9. Misamis Or.
3. Davao del Norte 10. Misamis Occ.
4. Davao del Sur 11. Zamboanga del Norte
5. Davao Oriental 12. Basilan
6. Bukidnon 13. Pagadian
7. Agusan del Norte

B. CITIES:

1. Surigao 8. Tangub
2. Davao 9. Dapitan
3. Butuan 10. Dipolog
4. Cagayan 11. Zamboanga
5. Gingoong 12. Basilan
6. Ozamiz 13. Pagadian.
7. Oroquieta

On October 4, 1971, the suspension of the privilege was further lifted by Proclamation No. 889-D, in
the following places:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Cagayan 5. Camarines
2. Cavite 6. Albay
 3. Mountain Province 7. Sorsogon
4. Kalinga-Apayao

B. CITIES:

1. Cavite City 3. Trece Martires

2. Tagaytay 4. Legaspi

As a consequences, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is still suspended in the following
eighteen (18) provinces, two (2) sub-provinces and eighteen (18) cities, to wit:

A. PROVINCE:

1. Bataan 10. North Cotabato

2. Benguet 11. Nueva Ecija
3. Bulacan 13. Pampanga
4. Camarines Sur 14. Quezon
5. Ifugao 15. Rizal
6. Isabela 16. South Cotabato
7. Laguna 17. Tarlac
8. Lanao del Norte 18. Zambales
9. Lanao del Norte

B. SUB-PROVINCES:

1. Aurora 2. Quirino

C. CITIES:

1. Angeles 10. Manila

2. Baguio 11. Marawi
3. Cabanatuan 12. Naga
4. Caloocan 13. Olongapo
5. Cotabato 14. Palayan
6. General Santos 15. Pasay
7. Iligan 16. Quezon
8 Iriga 17. San Jose
9 Lucena 18. San Pablo

The first major question that the Court had to consider was whether it would adhere to the view
taken in Barcelon v. Baker, and reiterated in Montenegro v. Castañeda, pursuant to which, "the
2 3

authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts
and upon all other persons." Indeed, had said question been decided in the affirmative the main
issue in all of these cases, except
L-34339, would have been settled, and, since the other issues were relatively of minor importance,
said cases could have been readily disposed of. Upon mature deliberation, a majority of the
Members of the Court had, however, reached, although tentatively, a consensus to the contrary, and
decided that the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases
required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ; but before proceeding to
do so, the Court deemed it necessary to hear the parties on the nature and extent of the inquiry to
be undertaken, none of them having previously expressed their views thereof. Accordingly, on
October 5, 1971, the Court issued, in L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating
in part that —

... a majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire
in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of
Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus for all persons detained or to be detained for the crimes of rebellion
or insurrection throughout the Philippines, which area has lately been reduced to
some eighteen provinces, two subprovinces and eighteen cities with the partial lifting
of the suspension of the privilege effected by Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889-B,
889-C and 889-D) and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in
the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par.
2, of the Philippine Constitution; and considering that the members of the Court are
not agreed on the precise scope and nature of the inquiry to be made in the
premises, even as all of them are agreed that the Presidential findings are entitled to
great respect, the Court RESOLVED that these cases be set for rehearing on
October 8, 1971 at 9:30 A.M.

xxx xxx xxx

On October 8, 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but, this time jointly with
cases Nos. L-34004, L-34013, and L-34039, and the parties were then granted a period to file
memoranda, in amplification of their respective oral arguments, which memoranda were submitted
from October 12 to October 21, 1971.

Respondents having expressed, during the oral arguments, on September 1 and October 8, 1971,
their willingness to impart to the Court classified information relevant to these cases, subject to
appropriate security measures, the Court met at closed doors, on October 28 and 29, 1971, and, in
the presence of three (3) attorneys for the petitioners, chosen by the latter, namely, Senator Jose W.
Diokno, Senator Salvador H. Laurel, and Atty. Leopoldo Africa, as well as of the Solicitor General
and two (2) members of his staff, was briefed, by Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Felizardo Tanabe, Col.
Tagumpay Nanadiego, Judge Advocate General, JAGS (GSC), and other ranking officers of said
Armed Forces, on said classified information, most of which was contained in reports and other
documents already attached to the records. During the proceedings, the members of the Court, and,
occassionally, counsel for the petitioners, propounded pertinent questions to said officers of the
Armed Forces. Both parties were then granted a period of time within which to submit their
respective observations, which were filed on November 3, 1971, and complemented by some
documents attached to the records on November 6, 1971, and a summary, submitted on November
15, 1971, of the aforesaid classified information.

In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivar) had been filed and the parties
therein were heard in oral argument on November 4, and 16, 1971, respectively.

On November 15, 1971, the Solicitor General filed manifestations — motions stating that on
November 13, 1971, the following petitioners were:

(a) released from custody:

(1) Teodosio Lansang -- G.R. No. L-33964

(2) Bayani Alcala -- " " L-33964
 (3) Rogelio Arienda -- " " L-33965
(4) Nemesio Prudente -- " " L-33982
(5) Gerardo Tomas -- " " L-34004
(6) Reynaldo Rimando -- " " L-34013
(7) Filomeno M. de Castro -- " " L-34039
(8) Barcelisa de Castro -- " " L-34039
(9) Antolin Oreta, Jr. -- " " L-34264.

(b) charged, together with other persons named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, with a
violation of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City:

(1) Angelo de los Reyes -- G.R. No. L-22982 *

(2) Teresito Sison -- " " L-33982 *

(c) accused, together with many others named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, of a violation
of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the Court of First Instance of Rizal:

(1) Rodolfo del Rosario -- G.R. No. L-33969 **

(2) Luzvimindo David -- " " L-33973
(3) Victor Felipe -- " " L-33982 *

and continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and praying that the
petitions in G.R. Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013 and L-34039 be dismissed,
without prejudice to the resolution of the remaining cases. Copy of the criminal complaint filed, as
above stated, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-
1623 of said court — which was appended to said manifestations-motions of the respondent as
Annex 2 thereof — shows that Gary Olivar, the petitioner in L-34339, is one of the defendants in said
case.

Required to comment on said manifestations-motions, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, in

his comment dated November 23, 1971, urged the Court to rule on the merits of the petitions in all of
these cases, particularly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 889, as amended,
upon the ground that he is still detained and that the main issue is one of public interest involving as
it does the civil liberties of the people. Angelo de los Reyes, one of the petitioners in L-33964, L-
33965 and L-33973, Nemesio E. Prudente and Gerardo Tomas, for whose respective benefit the
petitions in L-33982 and L-34004 have been filed, maintained that the issue in these cases is not
moot, not even for the detainees who have been released, for, as long as the privilege of the writ
remains suspended, they are in danger of being arrested and detained again without just cause or
valid reason. In his reply, dated and filed on November 29, 1971, the Solicitor General insisted that
the release of the above-named petitioners rendered their respective petitions moot and academic.

Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr. in L-34265, question the formal validity of the
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In this connection, it should be
noted that, as originally formulated, Proclamation No. 889 was contested upon the ground that it did
not comply with the pertinent constitutional provisions, namely, paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III
of our Constitution, reading:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any way of
 which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the
necessity for such suspension shall exist.

and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of the same instrument, which provides that:

The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires
it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

Regardless of whether or not the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
case of "imminent danger" of invasion, insurrection or rebellion — which is one of the grounds stated
in said paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution, but not mentioned in paragraph (14),
section 1 of its Bill of Rights — petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the
existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof," and that,
consequently, said Proclamation was invalid. This contention was predicated upon the fact that,
although the first "whereas" in Proclamation No. 889 stated that "lawless elements" had "entered into
a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of
actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion," the actuality so
alleged refers to the existence, not of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or
insurrection, but of the conspiracy and the intent to rise in arms.

Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has been rendered moot and academic by
Proclamation No. 889-A, issued nine (9) days after the promulgation of the original proclamation, or
on August 30, 1971. Indeed, said Proclamation No. 889-A amended, inter alia, the first "whereas" of
the original proclamation by postulating the said lawless elements "have entered into a conspiracy
and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of staging,
undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to
forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant
our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one ...." Moreover, the
third "whereas" in the original proclamation was, likewise, amended by alleging therein that said
lawless elements, "by their acts of rebellion and insurrection," have created a state of lawlessness
and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State. In other words, apart from adverting
to the existence of actual conspiracy and of the intent to rise in arms to overthrow the government,
Proclamation No. 889-A asserts that the lawless elements "are actually engaged in an armed
insurrection and rebellion" to accomplish their purpose.

It may not be amiss to note, at this juncture, that the very tenor of the original proclamation and
particularly, the circumstances under which it had been issued, clearly suggest the intent to aver that
there was and is, actually, a state of rebellion in the Philippines, although the language of said
proclamation was hardly a felicitous one, it having in effect, stressed the actuality of the intent to rise
in arms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion itself. The pleadings, the oral arguments
and the memoranda of respondents herein have consistently and abundantly emphasized — to
justify the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus — the acts of violence and
subversion committed prior to August 21, 1971, by the lawless elements above referred to, and the
conditions obtaining at the time of the issuance of the original proclamation. In short, We hold that
Proclamation No. 889-A has superseded the original proclamation and that the flaws attributed
thereto are purely formal in nature.

II
Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended. Pursuant to the
above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the valid exercise of
the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent
danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. The Presidential
Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been and there is actually a state of
rebellion and
that "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace
4

and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State."

Are these findings conclusive upon the Court? Respondents maintain that they are, upon the
authority of Barcelon v. Baker and Montenegro v. Castañeda. Upon the other hand, petitioners
5 6

press the negative view and urge a reexamination of the position taken in said two (2) cases, as well
as a reversal thereof.

The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors, namely: (a) it relied
heavily upon Martin v. Mott involving the U.S. President's power to call out the militia, which — he
7

being the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces — may be exercised to suppress or prevent
any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof,
and is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty; and (b) the privilege had been suspended
by the American Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the
freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing
with the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all government
authority emanates. The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case was based mainly upon the
Barcelon case, and hence, cannot have more weight than the same. Moreover, in the Barcelon case,
the Court held that it could go into the question: "Did the Governor-General" — acting under the
authority vested in him by the Congress of the United States, to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus under certain conditions — "act in conformance with such authority?" In other
words, it did determine whether or not the Chief Executive had acted in accordance with law.
Similarly, in the Montenegro case, the Court held that petitioner therein had "failed to overcome the
presumption of correctness which the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive ...." In short, the
Court considered the question whether or not there really was are rebellion, as stated in the
proclamation therein contested.

Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence is neither explicit nor clear on the point under
consideration. Although some cases purport to deny the judicial power to "review" the findings made
8

in the proclamations assailed in said cases, the tenor of the opinions therein given, considered as a
whole, strongly suggests the court's conviction that the conditions essential for the validity of said
proclamations or orders were, in fact, present therein, just as the opposite view taken in other
cases had a backdrop permeated or characterized by the belief that said conditions were absent.
9

Hence, the dictum of Chief Justice Taney to the effect that "(e)very case must depend on its own
circumstances." One of the important, if not dominant, factors, in connection therewith, was
10

intimated in Sterling v. Constantin, in which the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
11

through Chief Justice Hughes, declared that:

.... When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has
overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one
for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals
charged with the transgression. To such a case the Federal judicial power extends
(Art. 3, sec. 2) and, so extending, the court has all the authority appropriate to its
exercise. .... 12
In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had "tentatively arrived
at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the
issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional
sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII,
sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court
are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said
factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority
conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is
limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an
exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its
importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended ...."
It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" — or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" — "when
the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during
such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist." For from being full and plenary, the
13

authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only
by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time
when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or
conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond
which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law
upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper
bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon
would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in
such a wasteful exercise in futility.

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political system is
essentially democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of the privilege affects
the most fundamental element of that system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom
includes and connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to
freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views, the policies and the
practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to
the commonwealth, regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The
untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right — which, under certain conditions, may be a
civic duty of the highest order — is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful
operation and wholesome growth and development.

Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and
exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of
the social order established by the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly,
when individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence, in
defiance of the Rule of Law — such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government to
overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion — there emerges a circumstance that
may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be
forewarned against mistaking mere dissent — no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be —
for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse —
when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably
be denied — to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a
power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such
power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the
Court is called upon to epitomize.
As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be
"invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the
Constitution — "imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must require the aforementioned
suspension. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions are
present.

As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence attests abundantly to the Communist activities in
14

the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally
at incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have waned notably; but, the outbreak
of World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the devastation and havoc, and the proliferation of
unlicensed firearms concomitant with the military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequent
liberation, brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with such vigor as
to be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army — called HUKBALAHAP, during the
occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMP) after liberation — which clashed
several times with the armed forces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue
Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v. Castañeda. Days before the
15

promulgation of said Proclamation, or on October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in
the Philippines were apprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the crime of
rebellion, they served their respective sentences. 16

The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were
concerned. Still, on June 20, 1957, Rep. Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act,
was approved, upon the ground — stated in the very preamble of said statute — that.

... the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in
fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime
subject to alien domination and control;

... the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines
constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines; and
17

... in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in
scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines
and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope with this
continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country....

In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4, 1971, by the Senate Ad
Hoc Committee of Seven — copy of which Report was filed in these cases by the petitioners herein
—

The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several
mass organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the
Philippines) among the workers; the Malayang Samahan ng mga Magsasaka
(MASAKA) among the peasantry; the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the
youth/students; and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN)
among the intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate,
influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand of
nationalism. 18
Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups, one of
which — composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction — reorganized the
Communist Party of the Philippines early in 1969 and established a New People's Army. This faction
adheres to the Maoist concept of the "Protracted People's War" or "War of National Liberation." Its
"Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution" states, inter alia:

The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general

programme for a people's democratic revolution. All Filipino communists are ready to
sacrifice their lives for the worthy cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of
building a new Philippines that is genuinely and completely independent, democratic,
united, just and prosperous ...

xxx xxx xxx

The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political power. The
Communist Party of the Philippines assumes this task at a time that both the
international and national situations are favorable of asking the road of armed
revolution ...19

In the year 1969, the NPA had — according to the records of the Department of National Defense —
conducted raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in other violent incidents numbering over
230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In 1970, its records of
violent incidents was about the same, but the NPA casualties more than doubled.

At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the traditional
group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of
their main and ultimate objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although they may
disagree on the means to be used at a given time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a New
People's Army, other, of course, that the arm forces of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such
New People's Army is per se proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its
establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the nature
of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war,
sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual
commencement of hostilities.

We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly
risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion
against the Government of the Philippines.

In fact, the thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People's Army proper is too small,
compared with the size of the armed forces of the Government, that the Communist rebellion or
insurrection cannot so endanger public safety as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. This argument does not negate, however, the existence of a rebellion, which, from
the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not be widespread or attain the magnitude of a civil
war. This is apparent from the very provision of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of
rebellion, which may be limited in its scope to "any part" of the Philippines, and, also, from
20

paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of the Constitution, authorizing the suspension of the privilege
of the writ "wherever" — in case of rebellion — "the necessity for such suspension shall exist." In
fact, the case of Barcelon v. Baker referred to a proclamation suspending the privilege in the
provinces of Cavite and Batangas only. The case of In re Boyle involved a valid proclamation
21

suspending the privilege in a smaller area — a country of the state of Idaho.

The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the validity of the
suspension of the privilege — namely, that the suspension be required by public safety. Before
delving, however, into the factual bases of the presidential findings thereon, let us consider the
precise nature of the Court's function in passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as
amended.

Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers
underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the
separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand
with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the
suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the
Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant —22

the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be
sure, the power of the Court to determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from being
identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto
by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of
the court of origin.

Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the judicial
authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as regards
findings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English law, the reviewing court
determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative findings; no
quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. The administrative findings can
be interfered with only if there is no evidence whatsoever in support thereof, and said finding is,
accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some
American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases,
in bothjurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence" rule, which has been construed to mean
"more than a mere scintilla" or "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion," even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
23

Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations involving the
exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of evidence. It does not and
cannot be applied, in its aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of Congress or of the
Executive, such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a general
rule, neither body takes evidence — in the sense in which the term is used in judicial proceedings —
before enacting a legislation or suspending the writ. Referring to the test of the validity of a statute,
the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, expressed, in the
leading case of Nebbia v. New York, the view that:
24

... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due
process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio ... With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practically of
the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to
deal ...

Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General —

 ... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no
further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and that
public safety was endanger by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ,
but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.

No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test. Indeed, the co-equality of
coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand that the
test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis,
fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper
standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in
Proclamation No. 889, as amended? Petitioners submit a negative answer upon the ground: (a) that
there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the
Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident,
confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that
the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e)
that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to
such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

As above indicated, however, the existence of a rebellion is obvious, so much so that counsel for
several petitioners herein have admitted it.

With respect to the normal operation of government, including courts, prior to and at the time of the
suspension of the privilege, suffice it to say that, if the conditions were such that courts of justice no
longer functioned, a suspension of the privilege would have been unnecessary, there being no
courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, petitioners' reference to the normal operation of
courts as a factor indicative of the illegality of the contested act of the Executive stems, perhaps,
from the fact that this circumstance was adverted to in some American cases to justify the
invalidation therein decreed of said act of the Executive. Said cases involved, however, the
conviction by military courts of members of the civilian population charged with common crimes. It
was manifestly, illegal for military courts to assume jurisdiction over civilians so charged, when civil
courts were functioning normally.

Then, too, the alleged absence of any untoward incident after August 21, 1971, does not necessarily
bear out petitioners' view. What is more, it may have been due precisely to the suspension of the
privilege. To be sure, one of its logical effects is to compel those connected with the insurrection or
rebellion to go into hiding. In fact, most of them could not be located by the authorities, after August
21, 1971.

The alleged July-August Plan to terrorize Manila is branded as incredible, upon the theory that,
according to Professor Egbal Ahman of Cornell University, "guerrilla use of terror ... is sociological
and psychologically selective," and that the indiscriminate resort to terrorism is bound to boomerang,
for it tends to alienate the people's symphaty and to deprive the dissidents of much needed mass
support. The fact, however, is that the violence used is some demonstrations held in Manila in 1970
and 1971 tended to terrorize the bulk of its inhabitants. It would have been highly imprudent,
therefore, for the Executive to discard the possibility of a resort to terrorism, on a much bigger scale,
under the July-August Plan.

We will now address our attention to petitioners' theory to the effect that the New People's Army of
the Communist Party of the Philippines is too small to pose a danger to public safety of such
magnitude as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The flaw in
petitioners' stand becomes apparent when we consider that it assumes that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines have no other task than to fight the New People's Army, and that the latter is the only
threat — and a minor one — to our security. Such assumption is manifestly erroneous.

The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, the Executive had information and
reports — subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by the abovementioned Report of the Senate
Ad-Hoc Committee of Seven — to the effect that the Communist Party of the Philippines does not
25

merely adhere to Lenin's idea of a swift armed uprising; that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh's
terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperative local official; that, in line with this
policy, the insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were
fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970; that the
Constitutional Convention Hall was bombed on June 12, 1971; that, soon after the Plaza Miranda
incident, the NAWASA main pipe, at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary, was bombed; that this
was followed closely by the bombing of the Manila City Hall, the COMELEC building, the Congress
Building and the MERALCO substation at Cubao, Quezon City; and that the respective residences of
Senator Jose J. Roy and Congressman Eduardo Cojuangco were, likewise, bombed, as were the
MERALCO main office premises, along Ortigas Avenue, and the Doctor's Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Building, in Caloocan City.

Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that — as per said information and reports — the
reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's concept of protracted
people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of the political,
economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves; that conformably to such
concept, the Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive and intensive program of
subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the organization of armed
city partisans and the infiltration in student groups, labor unions, and farmer and professional
groups; that the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor
organizations; that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making Communist fronts
of eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30)
mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are the Malayang Samahan
ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the Advancement of
Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang Molave (SM)
and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino(MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the KM had
two hundred forty-five (245) operational chapters throughout the Philippines, of which seventy-three
(73) were in the Greater Manila Area, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central Luzon,
forty-two (42) in the Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party had
recorded two hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended
in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured; that most of these
actions were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front organizations; that the
violent demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group of armed
agitators; that the number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those
of 1970; and that twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of
fifteen (15) persons and the injury of many more.

Subsequent events — as reported — have also proven that petitioners' counsel have
underestimated the threat to public safety posed by the New People's Army. Indeed, it appears
that, since August 21, 1971, it had in Northern Luzon six (6) encounters and staged one (1) raid, in
consequence of which seven (7) soldiers lost their lives and two (2)others were wounded, whereas
the insurgents suffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26, 1971, a well-armed group of NPA,
trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked the very command port of TF LAWIN in Isabela,
destroying two (2) helicopters and one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in
Central Luzon a total of four (4) encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of
the Government, one (1) BSDU killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an encounter at Botolan,
Zambales, one (1) KM-SDK leader, an unidentified dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of
the dissident group were killed; that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in the barrio of San
Pedro. Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC and the NPA, in which a PC and two (2) KM
members were killed; that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces have been
rendered more complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in mid-1971, a KM group, headed
by Jovencio Esparagoza, contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in their settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis
Oriental, and offered them books, pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted
teach-ins in the reservation; that Esparagoza an operation of the PC in said reservation; and that
there are now two (2) NPA cadres in Mindanao.

It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations are, according to
intelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives out of locally available
materials; that the bomb used in the Constitutional Convention Hall was a "clay-more" mine, a
powerful explosive device used by the U.S. Army, believed to have been one of many pilfered from
the Subic Naval Base a few days before; that the President had received intelligence information to
the effect that there was a July-August Plan involving a wave of assassinations, kidnappings,
terrorism and mass destruction of property and that an extraordinary occurence would signal the
beginning of said event; that the rather serious condition of peace and order in Mindanao,
particularly in Cotabato and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces sufficient to cope with
the situation; that a sizeable part of our armed forces discharge other functions; and that the
expansion of the CPP activities from Central Luzon to other parts of the country, particularly Manila
and its suburbs, the Cagayan Valley, Ifugao, Zambales, Laguna, Quezon and Bicol Region, required
that the rest of our armed forces be spread thin over a wide area.

Considering that the President was in possession of the above data — except those related to
events that happened after August 21, 1971 — when the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the
Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion
when he then concluded that public safety and national security required the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with violent demonstrations
staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance
and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and the bombing or water mains and
conduits, as well as electric power plants and installations — a possibility which, no matter how
remote, he was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest.

He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel that the situation was
critical — as, indeed, it was — and demanded immediate action. This he took believing in good faith
that public safety required it. And, in the light of the circumstances adverted to above, he had
substantial grounds to entertain such belief.

Petitioners insist that, nevertheless, the President had no authority to suspend the privilege in the
entire Philippines, even if he may have been justified in doing so in some provinces or cities thereof.
At the time of the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, he could not be reasonably certain, however,
about the placed to be excluded from the operation of the proclamation. He needed some time to
find out how it worked, and as he did so, he caused the suspension to be gradually lifted, first, on
September 18, 1971, in twenty-seven (27) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and twenty six (26)
cities; then, on September 25, 1971, in order fourteen (14) provinces and thirteen (13) cities; and,
still later, on October 4, 1971, in seven (7) additional provinces and four (4) cities, or a total of forty-
eight (48) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and forth-three (43) cities, within a period of forty-five
(45) days from August 21, 1971.

Neither should We overlook the significance of another fact. The President could have declared
a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No. 889 limited the suspension to
persons detained "for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith." Even this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-A, which withdrew from the
coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes and offenses committed "on the
occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident thereto, in or connection therewith." In fact, the
petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-34004 concede that the President had acted in good faith.

In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under
the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b)
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, which measure, however,
proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2)other alternatives, the suspension of the
privilege is the least harsh.

In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrary in issuing
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional.

III

The next question for determination is whether petitioners herein are covered by said Proclamation,
as amended. In other words, do petitioners herein belong to the class of persons as to whom
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended?

In this connection, it appears that Bayani Alcala, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Gerardo Tomas,
petitioner in L-34004, and Reynaldo Rimando, petitioner in L-34013, were, on November 13, 1971,
released "permanently" — meaning, perhaps, without any intention to prosecute them — upon the
ground that, although there was reasonable ground to believe that they had committed an offense
related to subversion, the evidence against them is insufficient to warrant their prosecution; that
Teodosio Lansang, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Rogelio Arienda, petitioner in L-33965,
Nemesio Prudente, petitioner in L-33982, Filomeno de Castro and Barcelisa C. de Castro, for whose
benefit the petition in L-34039 was filed, and Antolin Oreta, Jr., petitioner in L-34265, were, on said
date, "temporarily released"; that Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in
L-33964, Victor Felipe, an intervenor in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, as well as Luzvimindo
David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, are still under detention and,
hence, deprived of their liberty, they — together with over forty (40) other persons, who are at large
— having been accused, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, of a violation of section 4 of Republic
Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act); and that Angelo delos Reyes and Teresito Sison, intervenors in
said L-33964, L-33965 and
L-33973, are, likewise, still detained and have been charged — together with over fifteen (15) other
persons, who are, also, at large — with another violation of said Act, in a criminal complaint filed with
the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City.

With respect to Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang — petitioners in L-33965 — who were released as
early as August 31, 1971, as well as to petitioners Nemesio Prudente, Teodosio Lansang, Rogelio
Arienda, Antolin Oreta, Jr., Filomeno de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro, Reynaldo Rimando, Gerardo
Tomas and Bayani Alcala, who were released on November 13, 1971, and are no longer deprived of
their liberty, their respective petitions have, thereby, become moot and academic, as far as their
prayer for release is concerned, and should, accordingly, be dismissed, despite the opposition
thereto of counsel for Nemesio Prudente and Gerardo Tomas who maintain that, as long as the
privilege of the writ remains suspended, these petitioners might be arrested and detained again,
without just cause, and that, accordingly, the issue raised in their respective petitions is not moot. In
any event, the common constitutional and legal issues raised in these cases have, in fact, been
decided in this joint decision.

Must we order the release of Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in
L-33964, Angelo de los Reyes, Victor Felipe and Teresito Sison, intervenors in L-33964, L-33965
and L-33973, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, who
are still detained? The suspension of the privilege of the writ was decreed by Proclamation No. 889,
as amended, for persons detained "for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion and other overt acts
committed by them in furtherance thereof."

The records shows that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor Felipe, Angelo de
los Reyes, Teresito Sison and Gary Olivar are accused in Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal with a violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and that the similar charge against
petitioners Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison in a criminal complaint, originally filed with the
City Fiscal of Quezon City, has, also, been filed with said court. Do the offenses so charged
constitute one of the crimes or overt acts mentioned in Proclamation No. 889, as amended?

In the complaint in said Criminal Case No. 1623, it is alleged:

That in or about the year 1968 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter up to
and including August 21, 1971, in the city of Quezon, Philippines, and elsewhere in
the Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts became officers and/or ranking leaders
of the Communist Party of the Philippines, a subversive association as defined by
Republic Act No. 1700, which is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion
and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
communist totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;

That all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the
Communist Party of the Philippines conspiring, confederating and mutual helping one
another, did then and there knowingly, wilfully, and feloniously and by overt acts
committed subversive acts all intended to overthrow the government of the Republic
of the Philippines, as follows:

1. By rising publicly and taking arms against the forces of the

government, engaging in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property or committing serious violence,
exacting contributions or diverting public lands or property from the
law purposes for which they have been appropriated;

2. By engaging by subversion thru expansion and requirement

activities not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also
of the united front organizations of the Communist Party of the
Philippines as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), Movement for the
Democratic Philippines (MDP), Samahang Demokratikong Kabataan
(SDK), Students' Alliance for National Democracy (STAND), MASAKA
Olalia-faction, Student Cultural Association of the University of the
Philippines (SCAUP), KASAMA, Pagkakaisa ng Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (PMP) and many others; thru agitation promoted by rallies,
demonstration and strikes some of them violent in nature, intended to
create social discontent, discredit those in power and weaken the
 people's confidence in the government; thru consistent propaganda
by publications, writing, posters, leaflets of similar means; speeches,
teach-ins, messages, lectures or other similar means; or thru the
media as the TV, radio or newspapers, all intended to promote the
Communist pattern of subversion;

3. Thru urban guerilla warfare characterized by assassinations,

bombings, sabotage, kidnapping and arson, intended to advertise the
movement, build up its morale and prestige, discredit and demoralize
the authorities to use harsh and repressive measures, demoralize the
people and weaken their confidence in the government and to
weaken the will of the government to resist.

That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the

offense:

a. That the offense was committed in contempt of and with insult to the public
authorities;

b. That some of the overt acts were committed in the Palace of the Chief Executive;

c. That craft, fraud, or disguise was employed;

d. That the offense was committed with the aid of armed men;

e. That the offense was committed with the aid of persons under fifteen(15) years
old.

Identical allegations are made in the complaint filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, except that
the second paragraph thereof is slightly more elaborate than that of the complaint filed with the CFI,
although substantially the same. 26

In both complaints, the acts imputed to the defendants herein constitute rebellion and subversion, of
— in the language of the proclamation — "other overt acts committed ... in furtherance" of said
rebellion, both of which are covered by the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ. It is
clear, therefore, that the crime for which the detained petitioners are held and deprived of their liberty
are among those for which the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended.

Up to this point, the Members of the Court are unanimous on the legal principles enunciated.

After finding that Proclamation No. 889, as amended, is not invalid and that petitioners Luzvimindo
David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison are
detained for and actually accused of an offense for which the privilege of the writ has been
suspended by said proclamation, our next step would have been the following: The Court, or a
commissioner designated by it, would have received evidence on whether — as stated in
respondents' "Answer and Return" — said petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on
reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion."

It is so happened, however, that on November 13, 1971 — or two (2) days before the proceedings
relative to the briefing held on October 28 and 29, 1971, had been completed by the filing of the
27

summary of the matters then taken up — the aforementioned criminal complaints were filed against
said petitioners. What is more, the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges
contained in said complaints has already begun. The next question, therefore, is: Shall We now
order, in the cases at hand, the release of said petitioners herein, despite the formal and substantial
validity of the proclamation suspending the privilege, despite the fact that they are actually charged
with offenses covered by said proclamation and despite the aforementioned criminal complaints
against them and the preliminary examination and/or investigations being conducted therein?

The Members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of the opinion, and, so
hold, that, instead of this Court or its Commissioner taking the evidence adverted to above, it is best
to let said preliminary examination and/or investigation to be completed, so that petitioners' released
could be ordered by the court of first instance, should it find that there is no probable cause against
them, or a warrant for their arrest could be issued, should a probable cause be established against
them. Such course of action is more favorable to the petitioners, inasmuch as the preliminary
examination or investigation requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed to establish that
the Executive had not acted arbitrary in causing the petitioners to be apprehended and detained
upon the ground that they had participated in the commission of the crime of insurrection or
rebellion. And, it is mainly for the reason that the Court has opted to allow the Court of First Instance
of Rizal to proceed with the determination of the existence of probable cause, although ordinarily the
Court would have merely determined the existence of the substantial evidence of petitioners'
connection with the crime of rebellion. Besides, the latter alternative would require the reception of
evidence by this Court and thus duplicate the proceedings now taking place in the court of first
instance. What is more, since the evidence involved in the same proceedings would be substantially
the same and the presentation of such evidence cannot be made simultaneously, each proceeding
would tend to delay the other.

Mr. Justice Fernando is of the opinion — in line with the view of Mr. Justice Tuason, in Nava v.
Gatmaitan, to the effect that "... if and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and
28

the executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern ..."
— that the filing of the above-mentioned complaint against the six (6) detained petitioners herein,
has the effect of the Executive giving up his authority to continue holding them pursuant to
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, even if he did not so intend, and to place them fully under the
authority of courts of justice, just like any other person, who, as such, cannot be deprived of his
liberty without lawful warrant, which has not, as yet, been issued against anyone of them, and that,
accordingly, We should order their immediate release. Despite the humanitarian and libertarian spirit
with which this view had been espoused, the other Members of the Court are unable to accept it
because:

(a) If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid — and We so
hold it to be — and the detainee is covered by the proclamation, the filing of a complaint or
information against him does not affect the suspension of said privilege, and, consequently, his
release may not be ordered by Us;

(b) Inasmuch as the filing of a formal complaint or information does not detract from the validity and
efficacy of the suspension of the privilege, it would be more reasonable to construe the filing of said
formal charges with the court of first instance as an expression of the President's belief that there are
sufficient evidence to convict the petitioners so charged and that hey should not be released,
therefore, unless and until said court — after conducting the corresponding preliminary examination
and/or investigation — shall find that the prosecution has not established the existence of a probable
cause. Otherwise, the Executive would have released said accused, as were the other petitioners
herein;
(c) From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation — of the act of the President in having said
formal charges filed — is, We believe, more beneficial to the detainees than that favored by Mr.
Justice Fernando. His view — particularly the theory that the detainees should be released
immediately, without bail, even before the completion of said preliminary examination and/or
investigation — would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from filing formal charges as long as it
may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage the early filing of said charges, so that courts of
justice could assume jurisdiction over the detainees and extend to them effective protection.

Although some of the petitioners in these cases pray that the Court decide whether the constitutional
right to bail is affected by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, We do not
deem it proper to pass upon such question, the same not having been sufficiently discussed by the
parties herein. Besides, there is no point in settling said question with respect to petitioners herein
who have been released. Neither is necessary to express our view thereon, as regards those still
detained, inasmuch as their release without bail might still be decreed by the court of first instance,
should it hold that there is no probable cause against them. At any rate, should an actual issue on
the right to bail arise later, the same may be brought up in appropriate proceedings.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended,
and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;

2. Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039 and L-34265,
insofar as petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda, Vicentellao, Juan
Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente, Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando, Filomeno M. de Castro,
Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are concerned;

3. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting
the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion
Act filed against herein petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los
Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison, and to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if
probable cause is found to exist against them, or, otherwise, to order their release; and

4. Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of the
aforementioned preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of the proper orders
or resolution in connection therewith, the parties may by motion seek in these proceedings the
proper relief.

5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR.,
RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO,
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35538 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES,

TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALINA GALANG, GO ENG GUAN,
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35539 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I.
DIOKNO, *1 petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES. respondents.

G.R. No. L-35540 September 17, 1974

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO
TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35547 September 17, 1974 *2

ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, petitioner,

vs.
BRIG. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO,
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35556 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND
TAN CHIN HIAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO,
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35567 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA JUAN L.
MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN,
BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE
BAUN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO
ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35571 September 17, 1974. *3

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M.
GUIAO, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO,
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES: AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35573 September 17, 1974

ERNESTO RONDON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA, respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p

These cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of the President's
Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972.

At the outset a word of clarification is in order. This is not the decision of the Court in the sense that a
decision represents a consensus of the required majority of its members not only on the judgment
itself but also on the rationalization of the issues and the conclusions arrived at. On the final result
the vote is practically unanimous; this is a statement of my individual opinion as well as a summary
of the voting on the major issues. Why no particular Justice has been designated to write just one
opinion for the entire Court will presently be explained.

At one point during our deliberations on these cases it was suggested that as Chief Justice I should
write that opinion. The impracticability of the suggestion shortly became apparent for a number of
reasons, only two of which need be mentioned. First, the discussions, as they began to touch on
particular issues, revealed a lack of agreement among the Justices as to whether some of those
issues should be taken up although it was not necessary to do so, they being merely convenient for
the purpose of ventilating vexing questions of public interest, or whether the decision should be
limited to those issues which are really material and decisive in these cases. Similarly, there was no
agreement as to the manner the issues should be treated and developed. The same destination
would be reached, so to speak, but through different routes and by means of different vehicles of
approach. The writing of separate opinions by individual Justices was thus unavoidable, and
understandably so for still another reason, namely, that although little overt reference to it was made
at the time, the future verdict of history was very much a factor in the thinking of the members, no
other case of such transcendental significance to the life of the nation having before confronted this
Court. Second — and this to me was the insuperable obstacle — I was and am of the opinion, which
was shared by six other Justices at the time the question was voted upon, that petitioner Jose W.
1

Diokno's motion of December 28, 1973 to withdraw his petition (G.R. No. L-35539) should be
granted, and therefore I was in no position to set down the ruling of the Court on each of the
arguments raised by him, except indirectly, insofar as they had been raised likewise in the other
cases.

It should be explained at this point that when the Court voted on Diokno's motion to withdraw his
petition he was still under detention without charges, and continued to remain so up to the time the
separate opinions of the individual Justices were put in final form preparatory to their promulgation
on September 12, which was the last day of Justice Zaldivars tenure in the Court. Before they could
2

be promulgated, however, a major development supervened: petitioner Diokno was released by the
President in the morning of September 11, 1974. In view thereof all the members of this Court except
Justice Castro agreed to dismiss Diokno's petition on the ground that it had become moot, with those
who originally voted to grant the motion for withdrawal citing said motion as an additional ground for
such dismissal.

The petitioners in the other cases, except Benigno Aquino, Jr. (G.R. No. L-35546), either have been
permitted to withdraw their petitions or have been released from detention subject to certain
restrictions. In the case of Aquino, formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of
3

firearms were lodged against him with a Military Commission on August 11, 1973; and on the
following August 23 he challenged the jurisdiction of said Commission as well as his continued
detention by virtue of those charges in a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in this Court (G.R.
No.
L-37364). The question came up as to whether or not Aquino's petition for habeas corpus should be
dismissed on the ground that the case as to him should more appropriately be resolved in this new
petition. Of the twelve Justices, however, eight voted against such dismissal and chose to consider
the case on the merits. 4

On Diokno's motion to withdraw his petition I voted in favor of granting it for two reasons. In the first
place such withdrawal would not emasculate the decisive and fundamental issues of public interest
that demanded to be resolved, for they were also raised in the other cases which still remained
pending. Secondly, since it was this petitioner's personal liberty that was at stake, I believed he had
the right to renounce the application for habeas corpus he initiated. Even if that right were not
absolute I still would respect his choice to remove the case from this Court's cognizance, regardless
of the fact that I disagreed with many of his reasons for so doing. I could not escape a sense of irony
in this Court's turning down the plea to withdraw on the ground, so he alleges among others, that this
is no longer the Court to which he originally applied for relief because its members have taken new
oaths of office under the 1973 Constitution, and then ruling adversely to him on the merits of his
petition.

It is true that some of the statements in the motion are an affront to the dignity of this Court and
therefore should not be allowed to pass unanswered. Any answer, however, would not be foreclosed
by allowing the withdrawal. For my part, since most of those statements are of a subjective
character, being matters of personal belief and opinion, I see no point in refuting them in these
cases. Indeed my impression is that they were beamed less at this Court than at the world outside
and designed to make political capital of his personal situation, as the publicity given to them by
some segments of the foreign press and by local underground propaganda news sheets
subsequently confirmed. It was in fact from that perspective that I deemed it proper to respond in
kind, that is, from a non-judicial forum, in an address I delivered on February 19, 1974 before the
LAWASIA, the Philippine Bar Association and the Philippine Lawyers' Association. Justice
Teehankee, it may be stated, is of the opinion that a simple majority of seven votes out of twelve is
legally sufficient to make the withdrawal of Diokno's petition effective, on the theory that the
requirement of a majority of eight votes applies only to a decision on the merits.

In any event, as it turned out, after petitioner Diokno was released by the President on September 11
all the members of this Court except Justice Castro were agreed that his petition had become moot
and therefore should no longer be considered on the merits. This notwithstanding, some of the
opinions of the individual members, particularly Justices Castro and Teehankee, should be taken in
the time setting in which they were prepared, that is, before the order for the release of Diokno was
issued.

The Cases.

The events which form the background of these nine petitions are related, either briefly or in great
detail, in the separate opinions filed by the individual Justices. The petitioners were arrested and
held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), "for being participants
or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country
and to take over the Government by force ..."

General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by
virtue of Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial law.
The portions of the proclamation immediately in point read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by

virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the
Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1
of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.

In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others
who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
and all other crimes and offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes against national
security and the law of nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving
usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and insignia,
crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be enumerated
in orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence
of any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me personally or
promulgated upon my direction shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered
released by me or by my duly designated representative.

The provision of the 1935 Constitution referred to in the proclamation reads: "the President shall be
commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public
safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law."
1. The first major issue raised by the parties is whether this Court may inquire into the validity of
Proclamation No. 1081. Stated more concretely, is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the
exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question political or
justiciable in character?

Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino hold that the question is political and
therefore its determination is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The reasons are given at length in
the separate opinions they have respectively signed. Justice Fernandez adds that as a member of
the Convention that drafted the 1973 Constitution he believes that "the Convention put
an imprimatur on the proposition that the validity of a martial law proclamation and its continuation is
political and non-justiciable in character."

Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political questions are not per se beyond the
Court's jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being plenary and all-
embracing, but that as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain
from interfering with the Executive's Proclamation, dealing as it does with national security, for which
the responsibility is vested by the charter in him alone. But the Court should act, Justice Barredo
opines, when its abstention from acting would result in manifest and palpable transgression of the
Constitution proven by facts of judicial notice, no reception of evidence being contemplated for
purposes of such judicial action.

It may be noted that the postulate of non-justiciability as discussed in those opinions involves
disparate methods of approach. Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the President on the
existence of the grounds for the declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts.
He disagrees vehemently with the ruling in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971,
and advocates a return to Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905), and Montenegro vs. Castañeda, 91
Phil. 882 (1952). Justice Barredo, for his part, holds that Lansang need not be overturned, indeed
does not control in these cases. He draws a distinction between the power of the President to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which was the issue in Lansang, and his power to
proclaim martial law, calling attention to the fact that while the Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of
the privilege except in the instances specified therein, it places no such prohibition or qualification
with respect to the declaration of martial law.

Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino concur, finds that there is no
dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the
factor of necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare
martial law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided
to him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people.

Arrayed on the side of justiciability are Justices Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Muñoz Palma.
They hold that the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into by the Court,
and would thus apply the principle laid down in Lansang although that case refers to the power of
the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability
accorded to the question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is there expressly distinguished from
the power of judicial review in ordinary civil or criminal cases, and is limited to ascertaining "merely
whether he (the President) has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." The test is not whether the
President's decision is correct but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily.
Applying this test, the finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the
President's proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; and I concur with them in
that finding. The factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, particularly in regard to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, had not
disappeared, indeed had been exacerbated, as events shortly before said proclamation clearly
demonstrated. On this Point the Court is practically unanimous; Justice Teehankee merely refrained
from discussing it.

Insofar as my own opinion is concerned the cleavage in the Court on the issue of justiciability is of
not much more than academic interest for purposes of arriving at a judgment. I am not unduly
exercised by Americas decisions on the subject written in another age and political clime, or by
theories of foreign authors in political science. The present state of martial law in the Philippines is
peculiarly Filipino and fits into no traditional patterns or judicial precedents.

In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need of receiving evidence as in
an ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country when
Proclamation No. 1081 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance
not only of the courts but of all observant people residing here at the time. Many of the facts and
events recited in detail in the different "Whereases" of the proclamation are of common knowledge.
The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that while armed hostilities go on in
several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon,
and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the
sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of
armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes
subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is
no actual fighting. Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in
whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and
material, fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the
rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be
counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context.

Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as stated in their
opinions, is that the question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the
transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be
part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after ... the
ratification of this Constitution ..." To be sure, there is an attempt in these cases to resuscitate the
issue of the effectivity of the new Constitution. All that, however, is behind us now. The question has
been laid to rest by our decision in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30, March
31, 1973), and of course by the existing political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in
our relations with other countries.

On the effect of the transitory provision Justice Muñoz Palma withholds her assent to any sweeping
statement that the same in effect validated, in the constitutional sense, all "such proclamations,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President." All that
she concedes is that the transitory provision merely gives them "the imprimatur of a law but not of a
constitutional mandate," and as such therefore "are subject to judicial review when proper under the
Constitution.

Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this Court in the
present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial
law — has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-
28, 1973. The question propounded to the voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President,
if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to continue
beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law?" The overwhelming majority of
those who cast their ballots, including citizens between 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the
proposal. The question was thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the
Constitution and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the
exercise of that power by the President in the beginning — whether or not purely political and
therefore non-justiciable — this Court is precluded from applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the
sovereign.

2. With respect to the petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn
their petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions, the ruling of the Court is that the
5

petitions should be dismissed. The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to
the situation which justifies the proclamation of martial law, such as the existence of a state of
rebellion, necessarily implies the power (subject, in the opinion of the Justices who consider
Lansang applicable, to the same test of arbitrariness laid down therein), to impose upon the released
detainees conditions or restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out the purposes of
the proclamation. Justice Fernando, however, "is for easing the restrictions on the right to travel of
petitioner Rodrigo" and others similarly situated and so to this extent dissents from the ruling of the
majority; while Justice Teehankee believes that those restrictions do not constitute deprivation of
physical liberty within the meaning of the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

It need only be added that, to my mind, implicit in a state of martial law is the suspension of the said
privilege with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the
proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety
against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival take precedence.
On this particular point, that is, that the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the
privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to, the Court is practically unanimous. Justice
Fernando, however, says that to him that is still an open question; and Justice Muñoz Palma
qualifiedly dissents from the majority in her separate opinion, but for the reasons she discusses
therein votes for the dismissal of the petitions.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING AND FOR THE REASONS STATED BY THE MEMBERS OF
THE COURT IN THEIR SEPARATE OPINIONS, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED
DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS, EXCEPT THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY
WITHDRAWN BY THE RESPECTIVE PETITIONERS WITH THE APPROVAL OF THIS COURT, AS
HEREINABOVE MENTIONED. NO COSTS.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Prefatory Note

(written on September 12, 1974)

My separate opinion below in the nine cases at bar was handed to Chief Justice Querube C.
Makalintal on Monday, September 9, 1974, for promulgation (together with the individual opinions of
the Chief Justice and the other Justices) on September 12 (today) as agreed upon by the Court.

On September 11 the petitioner Jose W. Diokno was released from military custody. The implications
of this supervening event were lengthily discussed by the Court in its deliberations in the afternoon.
Eleven members thereafter voted to dismiss Diokno's petition as being "moot and academic;" I cast
the lone dissenting vote. Although perhaps in the strictest technical sense that accords with
conventional legal wisdom, the petition has become "moot" because Diokno has been freed from
physical confinement, I am nonetheless persuaded that the grave issues of law he has posed and
the highly insulting and derogatory imputations made by him against the Court and its members
constitute an inescapable residue of questions of transcendental dimension to the entire nation and
its destiny and to the future of the Court — questions that cannot and should not be allowed to
remain unresolved and unanswered.

I have thus not found it needful nor even advisable to recast my separate opinion or change a word
of it.

I invite the reader to assess my 38-page separate opinion which immediately follows, in the light of
the foregoing context and factual setting.

FRED RUIZ CASTRO

Associate Justice.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29755 January 31, 1969

DOMINGO N. SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RECAREDO CASTILLO, as Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur, and THE HON.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, respondents.

Sisenando Villaluz, Jr. for respondents.

Cristeto O. Cimagala for petitioner.

FERNANDO, J.:

Is the power of preventive suspension of a municipal mayor against whom charges have been filed
still vested in the provincial governor? That is the novel question presented in this petition for
certiorari and prohibition. Such an authority he did possess under the former law. 1 Then came the
Decentralization Act of 1967, which took effect on September 12 of that year. 2

What before could not be denied apparently no longer holds true. The statutory provision now
controlling yields a contrary impression. The question must thus be answered in the negative. We
hold that such a power has been withheld from the provincial governor and may no longer be
exercised by him.

Petitioner Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, running as an
independent candidate but winning, nonetheless, in the November 14, 1967 election, was charged
with misconduct and dishonesty in office by respondent Recaredo Castillo, the Provincial Governor
of Surigao del Sur. 3 The act constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in
petitioner allegedly "[conniving] with certain private individuals to cut and fell [timber] and [selling] the
[timber] or logs so cut or felled for their own use and benefit, within the communal forest reserve of
the Municipality of Barobo, Province of Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public
and of the government; ...." 4

In the answer of respondent Castillo as well as the other respondent, the Provincial Board of
Surigao del Sur, there was an admission of the fact that as set forth in the petition on October 4,
1968, such an administrative complaint for such an alleged offense was indeed filed by respondent
Governor with respondent Provincial Board. What was sought to be stressed in the answer,
however, was that as early as April 18, 1968, a charge under oath for abuse of official power in
consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by the
Municipal Council of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. He was then given the opportunity to answer and
explain within 72 hours, in an order of respondent Governor date May 21, 1968. The explanation
offered by petitioner contained the following: "These logs which I caused to be hauled sometime
within the month of January, 1968, were the same logs cut and tumbled down by the persons
abovementioned within the communal forests of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, and which were seized by
the patrolmen of the undersigned. The said logs were sold in order to raise funds for the purchase of
the police uniforms and arms." 5

It was on the basis of the above administrative complaint that respondent Governor, according to
the petition, ordered the "immediate suspension [ofpetitioner] from his position as Mayor of Barobo,
Surigao del Sur; the same Administrative Order ... [containing] the immediate designation of Vice-
Mayor [Brigido L. Mercader] of the same town as Acting [Mayor]." 6

Such administrative order for the preventive suspension of petitioner was admitted by respondent
Governor and sought to be justified thus: "[Considering] that the acts charged against and admitted
by the petitioner 'affects his official integrity,' as such Municipal Mayor, by his having taken the law
into his own hands; ..., there was an urgent necessity to order the immediate 'preventive suspension'
of the petitioner, in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, of Republic Act No. 5185, otherwise
known as the 'Decentralization Act of 1967'." 7

The decisive issue therefore, as set forth at the outset of this opinion, is whether or not respondent
Provincial Governor is vested with power to order such preventive suspension under the
Decentralization Act of 1967, more specifically Section 5 thereof. For if no such authority exists, then
whatever be the alleged justification for preventive suspension cannot validate the action taken by
theGovernor. To assert otherwise would be to negate the rule of law.

What does Section 5 provide? It opens with the categorical declaration: "Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, the suspension and removal of elective local officials shall be governed
exclusively by the provisions of this section."

After setting forth in the next paragraph the grounds for suspension and removal of elective local
officials, namely, disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, dishonesty, oppression, and
misconduct in office, it continues: "Written subscribed and sworn charges against any elective
provincial and city official shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines; against any
elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary of the provincial board
concerned; and against any elective barrio official before the municipal or city mayor or the municipal
or city secretary concerned."

Then comes the portion specifically dealing with preventive suspension. This paragraph reads thus:
"Within seven days after the charges are preferred, the President, Governor, or Mayor, as the case
may be, or his duly authorized representative, as provided in the preceding paragraph, shall notify
the respondent of such charges. The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipal Council, as
the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity of the charges within ten days after
receipt of such notice: Provided, That no investigation shall commence or continue within ninety
days immediately prior to an election. The preventive suspension of the respondent officer shall not
extend beyond sixty days after the date of his suspension. At the expiration of sixty days, the
suspended officer, shall be reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him until their completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to
the fault, neglect or request of the suspended officer, in which case, the time of delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of suspension: Provided, however, That if the suspended officer shall
have been found guilty as charged before the expiration of the thirty days, his suspension, in the
case of municipal and barrio officials, may continue until the case is finally decided by the Provincial
Board."

Considering that Section 5 leaves no doubt as to this particular paragraph governing exclusively
the suspension and removal of elective local officials, it must be apparent why, as previously stated,
respondent Provincial Governor lacks the authority to order the preventive suspension of petitioner.

1. Under the former law then in force which stands repealed by virtue of the Decentralization
Act, 8 the provincial governor, if the charge against a municipal official was one affecting his
official integrity could order his preventive suspension. 9 At present, the law is anything but
that. A reading of the pertinent paragraph above quoted makes manifest that it is the
provincial board to which such a power has been granted under conditions therein specified.
The statutory provision is worded differently. The principle, that the deliberate selection of
language other than that used in an earlier act is indicative that a change in the law was
intended, calls for application. 10

2. This conclusion has reinforcement from a fundamental postulate of constitutional law.

Public officials possess powers, not rights. There must be, therefore, a grant of authority
whether express or implied, to justify any action taken by them. In the absence thereof, what
they do as public officials lacks validity and, if challenged, must be set aside. To paraphrase
a leading American decision, 11 law is the only supreme power under constitutional
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its function is only the
more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it
imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.

Here, clearly, no such authority is vested in the provincial governor. Instead, the statutory scheme,
complete on its face, would locate such power in the provincial board. There would be no support for
the view, then, that the action taken by the provincial governor in issuing the order of preventive
suspension in this case was in accordance with law.

3. Moreover, any other view would be to betray lack of fidelity to the purpose so manifest in
the controlling legal provision. It is fundamental that once the policy or purpose of the law
has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. From Ty Sue v.
Hord, 12 decided in 1909, it has been our constant holding that the choice between conflicting
theories falls on that which best accords with the letter of the law and with its purpose. The
next year, in an equally leading decision, United States v. Toribio, 13 there was a caveat
against a construction that would tend "to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator."
Then came the admonition in Riera v. Palmaroli, 14 against an application so narrow "as to
defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator." This was repeated in the latest
case, Commissioner of Customs v. Caltex, 15 in almost identical language. 1awphil.ñêt

So it is in the United States. 16 Thus, in an 1898 decision, the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White
minimized reliance on the subtle signification of words and the niceties of verbal distinction stressing
the fundamental rule of carrying out the purpose and objective of legislation. 17 As succinctly put by
the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone: "All statutes must be construed in the light of their
purpose." 18 The same thought has been phrased differently. Thus: "The purpose of Congress is a
dominant factor in determining meaning." 19 For, to paraphrase Frankfurter, legislative words are not
inert but derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed. 20The same jurist likewise
had occasion to state: "Regard for [its] purposes should infuse the construction of the legislation if it
is to be treated as a working instrument of government and not merely as a collection of English
words." 21 In the sixth annual Benjamin Nathan Cardozo lecture delivered by him, entitled "Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes", he developed the theme further: "The generating
consideration is that legislation is more than composition. It is an active instrument of government
which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to be achieved. It is in this
connection that Holmes said, 'words are flexible.' Again it was Holmes, the last judge to give quarter
to loose thinking or vague yearning, who said that "the general purpose is a more important aid to
the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down." And it was Holmes who
chided courts for being 'apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law where those words
import a policy that goes beyond them.' Note, however, that he found the policy in 'those words'." 22

It may be noted parenthetically that earlier, the United States Supreme Court was partial more to
the term "objective" or "policy" rather than "purpose." So it was in the first decision where this
fundamental principle of construction was relied upon, the opinion coming from Chief Justice
Marshall. Thus: "The two subjects were equally within the province of the legislature, equally
demanded their attention, and were brought together to their view. If, then, the words making
provision for each, fairly admit of an equally extensive interpretation,and of one of which will effect
the object that seems to have been in contemplation, and which was certainly desirable, they ought
to receive that interpretation." 23

So, too, with his successor, Chief Justice Taney. Thus: "This construction cannot be maintained. In
expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but
look to the whole law, and to its object and policy." 24 It should not escape attention that the above
excerpt was quoted with approval by the present Chief Justice Warren as late as 1957. 25

What is the purpose of the Decentralization Act of 1967? It is set forth in its declaration of policy. 26 It
is "to transform local governments gradually into effective instruments through which the people can
in a most genuine fashion, govern themselves and work out their own destinies." 27 In consonance
with such policy, its purpose is "to grant to local governments greater freedom and ampler means to
respond to the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and happiness and to effect a
more equitable and systematic distribution of governmental powers and resources." 28

It is undeniable therefore that municipalities, as much as cities and provinces, are by this act
invested with "greater freedom and ampler means to respond to the needs of their people and
promote their prosperity and happiness." It is implicit in our constitutional scheme that full autonomy
be accorded the inhabitants of the local units to govern themselves. Their choice as to who should
be theirpublic officials must be respected. Those elected must serve out their term. If they have to be
removed at all it should be for cause in accordance with the procedure prescribed and by the
specific officials of higher category entrusted with such responsibility.

It is easily understandable why as held in a leading case, Lacson v. Roque, 29 "strict construction of
law relating to suspension and removal is the universal rule." As was further emphasized by Justice
Tuason who penned the opinion: "When dealing with elective posts, the necessity for restricted
construction is greater." Deference to such a doctrine possessed of intrinsic merit calls for due care
lest by inadvertence the power to suspend preventively is given to officials other than those
specifically mentioned in the act. For any other view would result in a dilution of the avowed purpose
to vest as great a degree of local autonomy as is possible to municipal corporations. That would be
to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster the policy of the act.
1awphil.ñêt

4. Lastly, the construction here reached, as to the absence of power on the part of provincial
governors to suspend preventively a municipal mayor is buttressed by the avoidance of
undesirable consequences flowing from a different doctrine. Time and time again, it has been
stressed that while democracy presupposes the right of the people to govern themselves in
elections that call for political parties contending for supremacy, once the election is over the
equally pressing and urgent concern for efficiency would necessitate that purely partisan
considerations be ignored, and if not entirely possible, be restricted to a minimum.

The present litigation gives rise to the suspicion that politics did intrude itself. Petitioner Municipal
Mayor, an independent candidate, and thus of a different political persuasion, appeared to have
been placed at a disadvantage. It would be a realistic assumption that there is the ever present
temptation on the part of provincial governors, to utilize every opportunity to favor those belonging to
his party. At times, it may even prove irresistible.

It is desirable therefore that such opportunity be limited. The statutory provision then should be
given such a construction that would be productive of such a result. That is what we do in this case.
To paraphrase Justice Tuason, we test a doctrine by its consequences.

It could be said, of course, that to deny such a power to a provincial governor but at the same time
to affirm the existence thereof insofar as the provincial board is concerned would not advance the
cause of decentralization any. In answer, it suffices to note that the Decentralization Act having so
recognized such an authority in the provincial board, the judiciary must perforce recognize its
existence. Until after the legislature decrees otherwise, the courts have no alternative but to accord
deference to such declared congressional policy. It may also be stated that the provincial board
being a collective body, the first, second and third class provinces being composed of the provincial
governor, the vice-governor and three other members elected at large by the qualified electors of the
province, and that in the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh class provinces having in addition to the
provincial governor and the vice-governor two other members likewise elected at large, 30 there is a
safeguard against the temptation to utilize this power of preventive suspension for purely partisan
ends. What one person may feel free to do, fully conscious as he is that the authority belongs to him
alone, may not even be attempted when such an individual shares such power with others who
could possibly hold dissenting views. At any rate, there is a brake, which it is hoped would suffice on
most if not all occasions.

Such a restraining influence is indeed needed for the undeniable facts of the contemporary political
scene bear witness to efforts, at times disguised, at other times quite blatant, on the part of local
officials to make use of their positions to gain partisan advantage. Harassment of those belonging to
opposing factions or groups is not unknown. Unfortunately, no stigma seems to attach to what really
amounts to a misuse of official power. The truism that a public office is a public trust, implicit in which
is the recognition that public advantage and not private benefit should be the test of one's conduct,
seems tohave been ignored all too often. The construction of any statute therefore, even assuming
that it is tainted by ambiguity, which would reduce the opportunity of any public official to make use
of his position for partisan ends, has much to recommend it.

5. We hold, therefore, that under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967, the power of
preventive suspension is not lodged in the provincial governor. To rule otherwise would be at war
with the plain purpose of the law and likewise fraught with consequences far from desirable. We
close with this appropriate excerpt from an opinion of Justice Holmes rendered on circuit duty: "The
Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will,
however indirectly, that should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the conclusion
expressed in a statute, the changeof policy that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms,
but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for the courts to say: We see what you are driving at but
you have not said it, and therefore, we shall go on as before." 31

WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are granted, the preventive suspension of petitioner by
respondent Castillo annulled and set aside with the result that his immediate reinstatement to his
position as Municipal Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, is ordered, without prejudice to any further
proceedings to be taken by respondent Provincial Board in connection with the charge of misconduct
and dishonesty in office against petitioner, respondent Provincial Board being strictly enjoined in the
disposition of such administrative complaint to act strictly in accordance with the applicable law.
Without costs.

Concepcion. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 210551 June 30, 2015

JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF
QUEZON CITY, and CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking to declare unconstitutional and illegal
Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage
Fee, respectively, which are being imposed by the respondents.

The Case

On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or
1 2

the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, Section 3 of which provides:

SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the

assessed value of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be
collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the
Quezon City Government. The special assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under a special
account to be established for the purpose.

Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax ( SHT ) shall be utilized by the Quezon City
Government for the following projects: (a) land purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of
current/existing socialized housing facilities; (c) land development; (d) construction of core houses,
sanitary cores, medium-rise buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of public-private
partners hip agreement of the Quezon City Government and National Housing Authority ( NHA ) with
the private sector.
3

Under certain conditions, a tax credit shall be enjoyed by taxpayers regularly paying the special
assessment:

SECTION 7. TAX CREDIT. Taxpayers dutifully paying the special assessment tax as imposed by this
ordinance shall enjoy a tax credit. The tax credit may be availed of only after five (5) years of
continue[d] payment. Further, the taxpayer availing this tax credit must be a taxpayer in good
standing as certified by the City Treasurer and City Assessor.

The tax credit to be granted shall be equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid
by the property owner, which shall be given as follows:

1. 6th year - 20%

2. 7th year - 20%

3. 8th year - 20%

4. 9th year - 20%

5. 10th year - 20%

Furthermore, only the registered owners may avail of the tax credit and may not be continued by the
subsequent property owners even if they are buyers in good faith, heirs or possessor of a right in
whatever legal capacity over the subject property.4

On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 was enacted on December 16, 2013 and took
5

effect ten days after when it was approved by respondent City Mayor. The proceeds collected from
6

the garbage fees on residential properties shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked
special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections. Section 1 of the
7

Ordinance se t forth the schedule and manner for the collection of garbage fees:

SECTION 1. The City Government of Quezon City in conformity with and in relation to Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 HEREBY IMPOSES THE
FOLLOWING SCHEDULE AND MANNER FOR THE ANNUAL COLLECTION OF GARBAGE FEES,
AS FOLLOWS: On all domestic households in Quezon City;

LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00

201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00
 1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00

On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;

FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 40 sq. m. PHP 25.00

41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP 50.00
61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP 75.00
101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PHP 100.00
151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP 200.00

On high-rise Condominium Units

a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high- rise condominiums shall

pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of the entire condominium and socialized
Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall be collected based on area occupied for
every unit already so ld or being amortized.

b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay the annual
garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire apartment and an additional garbage fee based
on the schedule prescribed herein for every unit occupied.

The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and shall be paid
simultaneously with the payment of the real property tax, but not later than the first quarter
installment. In case a household owner refuses to pay, a penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due,
8

plus an interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof, shall be charged.9

Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential property in

Quezon City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT ) No. 216288, and that, on
January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the garbage fee in the sum of

Php100.00. 10

The instant petition was filed on January 17, 2014. We issued a TRO on February 5, 2014, which
enjoined the enforcement of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 and required respondents to
comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course thereto. 11

Respondents filed their Comment with urgent motion to dissolve the TRO on February 17, 2014.
12

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply and a Memorandum on March 3, 2014 and September 8, 2014,
respectively.

Procedural Matters
A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari

Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is improper since they are not tribunals,
boards or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner, however, counters that in
enacting Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235, the Quezon City Council exercised quasi-judicial
function because the ordinances ruled against the property owners who must pay the SHT and the
garbage fee, exacting from them funds for basic essential public services that they should not be
held liable. Even if a Rule 65 petition is improper, petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number
of cases like in Rosario v. Court of Appeals, has taken cognizance of an improper remedy in the
13

interest of justice.

We agree that respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto
themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions
and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of person s or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy en suing therefrom is brought before a tribunal,
board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties. 14

For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The enactment by the Quezon City Council of the
assailed ordinances was done in the exercise of its legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function.
Under Republic Act (R.A.) No.7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), local legislative
power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city. Said law likewise is specific in
15

providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge , or to generate revenue shall be exercised
by the sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance. 16

Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, it essentially seeks to declare
the unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned ordinances. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
petition for declaratory relief, over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. 17

Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus,
over which we exercise original jurisdiction, in cases with far-reaching implications or one which
raises transcendental issues or questions that need to be resolved for the public good. The judicial
18

policy is that this Court will entertain direct resort to it when the redress sought cannot be obtained in
the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of Our primary jurisdiction.19
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances a petition for prohibition
may be filed:

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceeding in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.

In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person – whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions – who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the
respondents to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition. In this
case, petitioner's primary intention is to prevent respondents from implementing Ordinance Nos. SP-
2095 and SP-2235. Obviously, the writ being sought is in the nature of a prohibition, commanding
desistance.

We consider that respondents City Mayor, City Treasurer, and City Assessor are performing
ministerial functions. A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of
a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. Respondent Mayor, as chief executive
20

of the city government, exercises such powers and performs such duties and functions as provided
for by the LGC and other laws. Particularly, he has the duty to ensure that all taxes and other
21

revenues of the city are collected, and that city funds are applied to the payment of expenses and
settlement of obligations of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance. On the other hand, under
22

the LGC, all local taxes, fees, and charges shall be collected by the provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay treasurer, or their duly-authorized deputies, while the assessor shall take charge, among
others, of ensuring that all laws and policies governing the appraisal and assessment of real
properties for taxation purposes are properly executed. Anent the SHT, the Department of Finance
23

(DOF) Local Finance Circular No. 1-97, dated April 16, 1997, is more specific:

6.3 The Assessor’s office of the Identified LGU shall:

a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands within its jurisdiction which

shall be subject to the levy of the Social Housing Tax (SHT) by the local
sanggunian concerned;

b. inform the affected registered owners of the effectivity of the SHT; a list of
the lands and registered owners shall also be posted in 3 conspicuous places
in the city/municipality;

c. furnish the Treasurer’s office and the local sanggunian concerned of the
list of lands affected;

6.4 The Treasurer’s office shall:

a. collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real Property Tax, SEF Tax
and other special assessments;
 b. report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local Government Finance, and the
Mayor’s office the monthly collections on Social Housing Tax (SHT). An
annual report should likewise be submitted to the HUDCC on the total
revenues raised during the year pursuant to Sec. 43, R.A. 7279 and the
manner in which the same was disbursed.

Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct recourse to us should be
allowed. Aside from presenting a novel question of law, this case calls for immediate resolution since
the challenged ordinances adversely affect the property interests of all paying constituents of
Quezon City. As well, this petition serves as a test case for the guidance of other local government
units (LGUs).Indeed, the petition at bar is of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim , the Court
24

cited the case of Senator Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement & Gaming Corp., where We ratiocinated:
25

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar . x x x This is in accordance
with the well entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder
or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed. 26

B. Locus Standi of Petitioner

Respondents challenge petitioner’s legal standing to file this case on the ground that, in relation to
Section 3 of Ordinance No. SP-2095, petitioner failed to allege his ownership of a property that has
an assessed value of more than Php100,000.00 and, with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2335, by
what standing or personality he filed the case to nullify the same. According to respondents, the
petition is not a class suit, and that, for not having specifically alleged that petitioner filed the case as
a taxpayer, it could only be surmised whether he is a party-in-interest who stands to be directly
benefited or injured by the judgment in this case.

It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By
real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-
interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner
of the right sought to be enforced." 27

"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The concept has
28

been define d as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the government al act that is being challenged. The gist of the
29

question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 30

A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way." It must be shown that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which
he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
the statute complained of. 31

Tested by the foregoing, petitioner in this case clearly has legal standing to file the petition. He is a
real party-in-interest to assail the constitutionality and legality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-
2235 because respondents did not dispute that he is a registered co-owner of a residential property
in Quezon City an d that he paid property tax which already included the SHT and the garbage fee.
He has substantial right to seek a refund of the payments he made and to stop future imposition.
While he is a lone petitioner, his cause of action to declare the validity of the subject ordinances is
substantial and of paramount interest to similarly situated property owners in Quezon City.

C. Litis Pendentia

Respondents move for the dismissal of this petition on the ground of litis pendentia. They claim that,
as early as February 22, 2012, a case entitled Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners, Inc., et al., v.
Hon. Herbert Bautista, et al. , docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12- 7-820, has been pending in the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, which assails the legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095.
Relying on City of Makati, et al. v. Municipality (now City) of Taguig, et al., respondents assert that
32

there is substantial identity of parties between the two cases because petitioner herein and plaintiffs
in the civil case filed their respective cases as taxpayers of Quezon City.

For petitioner, however, respondents’ contention is untenable since he is not a party in Alliance and
does not even have the remotest identity or association with the plaintiffs in said civil case.
Moreover, respondents’ arguments would deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to determine the
constitutionality of laws under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. 33

Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously referred to in
some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. While it is normally connected with the
34

control which the court has on a property involved in a suit during the continuance proceedings, it is
more interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court. In Film
35

Development Council of the Philippines v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.,36 We elucidated:

Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to a situation where two actions
are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suit and authorizes a
court to dismiss a case motu proprio.

xxxx

The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia are: (a) the
identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) the identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the
identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other.

The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another
more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is
founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in
courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of
the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to
numerous suits.

Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common
cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and
second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the
complaint in the other.

The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for purposes of litis pendentia is
inextricably linked with that of res judicata , each constituting an element of the other. In either case,
both relate to the sound practice of including, in a single litigation, the disposition of all issues
relating to a cause of action that is before a court.
37

There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest between a party in
the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first
case. Moreover, the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first
38

case are the defendants in the second case or vice-versa, does not negate the identity of parties for
purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia . 39

In this case, it is notable that respondents failed to attach any pleading connected with the alleged
civil case pending before the Quezon City trial court. Granting that there is substantial identity of
1âwphi1

parties between said case and this petition, dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia still cannot be
had in view of the absence of the second and third requisites. There is no way for us to determine
whether both cases are based on the same set of facts that require the presentation of the same
evidence. Even if founded on the same set of facts, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for could
be different. Moreover, there is no basis to rule that the two cases are intimately related and/or
intertwined with one another such that the judgment that may be rendered in one, regardless of
which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Respondents contend that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his non-
compliance with Section 187 of the LGC, which mandates:

Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings. – The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings
shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any
question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on
appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render
a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such
appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and
payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting
upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.

The provision, the constitutionality of which was sustained in Drilon v. Lim , has been construed as
40

mandatory considering that –

41

A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is
the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities
of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general
welfare and enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay
in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that
protests over tax ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames. x x x. 42

The obligatory nature of Section 187 was underscored in Hagonoy Market Vendor Asso. v.
Municipality of Hagonoy: 43

x x x [T]he timeframe fixed by law fo r parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts
is not a "mere technicality" that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the
Local Government Code are mandatory. x x x Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the
government is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of
basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is
essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time.
Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures
and tax ordinances." 44

Despite these cases, the Court, in Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Malones, held that there was no need for
45

petitioners therein to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts, considering that
there was only a pure question of law, the parties did not dispute any factual matter on which they
had to present evidence. Likewise, in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. v. City of Cagayan
de Oro, We relaxed the application of the rules in view of the more substantive matters. For the
46

same reasons, this petition is an exception to the general rule.

Substantive Issues

Petitioner asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers and the collection of
garbage are basic and essential duties and functions of the Quezon City Government. By imposing
the SHT and the garbage fee, the latter has shown a penchant and pattern to collect taxes to pay for
public services that could be covered by its revenues from taxes imposed on property, idle land,
business, transfer, amusement, etc., as well as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA ) from the
National Government. For petitioner, it is noteworthy that respondents did not raise the issue that the
Quezon City Government is in dire financial state and desperately needs money to fund housing for
informal settlers and to pay for garbage collection. In fact, it has not denied that its revenue
collection in 2012 is in the sum of ₱13.69 billion.

Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by the Quezon City
Government as an exercise of its power to create sources of income under Section 5, Article X of the
1987 Constitution. According to petitioner, the constitutional provision is not a carte blanche for the
47

LGU to tax everything under its territorial and political jurisdiction as the provision itself admits of
guidelines and limitations.

Petitioner further claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a percentage of the
assessed value of the property, which is subject to revision every three (3) years in order to reflect
an increase in the market value of the property. The SHT and the garbage fee are actually increases
in the property tax which are not based on the assessed value of the property or its reassessment
every three years; hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the LGC. 48

For their part, respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of Ordinance
Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235, invoking Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias,
etc., People v. Siton, et al., and Hon. Ermita v. Hon. Aldecoa-Delorino . They argue that the
49 50 51

burden of establishing the invalidity of an ordinance rests heavily upon the party challenging its
constitutionality. They insist that the questioned ordinances are proper exercises of police power
similar to Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC52 and Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. and that their enactment finds basis in the social justice principle
53

enshrined in Section 9, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

54

As to the issue of publication, respondents argue that where the law provides for its own effectivity,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not punitive in character, citing
Balbuna, et al. v. Hon. Secretary of Education, et al. and Askay v. Cosalan .[56]] Thus, Ordinance
55

No. SP-2095 took effect after its publication, while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its
approval on December 26, 2013.

Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:

On the Socialized Housing Tax

Respondents emphasize that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice principle found in Sections 1
and 2, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 2 (a) and 43 of R.A. No. 7279, or the
57 58 59

"Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 ( UDHA ).

Relying on Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De La Fuente, and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
60

Municipality of Victorias, etc., respondents assert that Ordinance No. SP-2095 applies equally to all
61

real property owners without discrimination. There is no way that the ordinance could violate the
equal protection clause because real property owners and informal settlers do not belong to the
same class.

Ordinance No. SP-2095 is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent with
the UDHA. While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of
more than ₱50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers properties with an assessed value
exceeding ₱100,000.00. As well, the ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to the total
amount of the special assessment paid by the property owner beginning in the sixth (6th) year of the
effectivity of the ordinance.

On the contrary, petitioner claims that the collection of the SHT is tantamount to a penalty imposed
on real property owners due to the failure of respondent Quezon City Mayor and Council to perform
their duty to secure and protect real property owners from informal settlers, thereby burdening them
with the expenses to provide funds for housing. For petitioner, the SHT cannot be viewed as a
"charity" from real property owners since it is forced, not voluntary.

Also, petitioner argues that the collection of the SHT is a kind of class legislation that violates the
right of property owners to equal protection of the laws since it favors informal settlers who occupy
property not their own and pay no taxes over law-abiding real property owners w ho pay income and
realty taxes.

Petitioner further contends that respondents’ characterization of the SHT as "nothing more than an
advance payment on the real property tax" has no statutory basis. Allegedly, property tax cannot be
collected before it is due because, under the LGC, chartered cities are authorized to impose property
tax based on the assessed value and the general revision of assessment that is made every three
(3) years.

As to the rationale of SHT stated in Ordinance No. SP-2095, which, in turn, was based on Section 43
of the UDHA, petitioner asserts that there is no specific provision in the 1987 Constitution stating that
the ownership and enjoyment of property bear a social function. And even if there is, it is seriously
doubtful and far-fetched that the principle means that property owners should provide funds for the
housing of informal settlers and for home site development. Social justice and police power,
petitioner believes, does not mean imposing a tax on one, or that one has to give up something, for
the benefit of another. At best, the principle that property ownership and enjoyment bear a social
function is but a reiteration of the Civil Law principle that property should not be enjoyed and abused
to the injury of other properties and the community, and that the use of the property may be
restricted by police power, the exercise of which is not involved in this case.

Finally, petitioner alleges that 6 Bistekvilles will be constructed out of the SHT collected. Bistek is the
monicker of respondent City Mayor. The Bistekvilles makes it clear, therefore, that politicians will
take the credit for the tax imposed on real property owners.

On the Garbage Fee

Respondents claim that Ordinance No. S-2235, which is an exercise of police power, collects on the
average from every household a garbage fee in the meager amount of thirty-three (33) centavos per
day compared with the sum of ₱1,659.83 that the Quezon City Government annually spends for
every household for garbage collection and waste management. 62

In addition, there is no double taxation because the ordinance involves a fee. Even assuming that
the garbage fee is a tax, the same cannot be a direct duplicate tax as it is imposed on a different
subject matter and is of a different kind or character. Based on Villanueva, et al. v. City of Iloilo and
63

Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc., there is no "taxing twice" because the real
64

property tax is imposed on ownership based on its assessed value, while the garbage fee is required
on the domestic household. The only reference to the property is the determination of the applicable
rate and the facility of collection.

Petitioner argues, however, that Ordinance No. S-2235 cannot be justified as an exercise of police
power. The cases of Calalang v. Williams, Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals, and Social Justice
65 66

Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., which were cited by respondents, are inapplicable since
67

the assailed ordinance is a revenue measure and does not regulate the disposal or other aspect of
garbage.

The subject ordinance, for petitioner, is discriminatory as it collects garbage fee only from domestic
households and not from restaurants, food courts, fast food chains, and other commercial dining
places that spew garbage much more than residential property owners.

Petitioner likewise contends that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double taxation
because garbage collection is a basic and essential public service that should be paid out from
property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community tax certificate, other taxes, and
the IRA of the Quezon City Government. To bolster the claim, he states that the revenue collection of
the Quezon City Government reached Php13.69 billion in 2012. A small portion of said amount could
be spent for garbage collection and other essential services.

It is further noted that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section
47 of R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, which authorizes
68

LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing
a solid waste management plan, and that LGUs have access to the Solid Waste Management
(SWM) Fund created under Section 46 of the same law. Also, according to petitioner, it is evident
69

that Ordinance No. S2235 is inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003 for whil e the law encourages
segregation, composting, and recycling of waste, the ordinance only emphasizes the collection and
payment of garbage fee; while the law calls for an active involvement of the barangay in the
collection, segregation, and recycling of garbage, the ordinance skips such mandate. Lastly, in
challenging the ordinance, petitioner avers that the garbage fee was collected even if the required
publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He notes that on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty
tax which already included the garbage fee.

The Court's Ruling

Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.

An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though is
open to judicial inquiry. Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will
go slow in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be
prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance
is that factors relevant to such an inquiry are the municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of
the business made subject to imposition. 70

For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to
enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to
the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or
oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable. As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are
71

divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the
LGU and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the
substantive ( i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy). 72

An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the
prevailing laws. If not, it is void.
73 74

Ordinance should uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. As to conformity with
75

existing statutes,

Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals has this to say:

76

It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the
laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide
application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration
that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe
the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass
ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be
consistent with the general law. In the language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, in Magtajas
vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., ruled that:

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so
great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature.

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the
local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still
includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the
principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.77

LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the policy of ensuring the
autonomy of local governments was never intended by the drafters of the 1987 Constitution to create
an imperium in imperio and install an intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single
sovereign state. 78

"[M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local units of local self-
government, but as governmental agencies of the state. The legislature, by establishing a municipal
corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty
to administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of
the district which it possesses before the charter was granted." 79

LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature; they are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation. "Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various
80

LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the
power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be
complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each
LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory
limitations."
81

Specifically, with regard to the power of taxation, it is indubitably the most effective instrument to
raise needed revenues in financing and supporting myriad activities of the LGUs for the delivery of
basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace,
progress, and prosperity of the people. As this Court opined in National Power Corp. v. City of
82

Cabanatuan: 83

In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of state activity,
and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth,
economic progress and the protection of local industries as well as public welfare and similar
objectives. Taxation assume s even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies
are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5
of the 1987 Constitution, viz: "Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create
its own sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such
taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments."

This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be achieved only by
strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the
country’s highly centralized government structure has bred a culture of dependence among local
government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also "dampened the spirit of initiative,
innovation and imaginative resilience in matters of local development on the part of local government
leaders." The only way to shatter this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the
delivery of basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to generate their own sources for the
purpose. To achieve this goal, Section 3 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to
enact a local government code that will, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy , set the
guidelines and limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x x 84

Fairly recently, We also stated in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet that:
85

The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is
summarized in Icard v. City Council of Baguio :

It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of
taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality,
cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris . Any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the
municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions – all these – have no place in the interpretation of
the taxing power of a municipal corporation. [Underscoring supplied]

xxxx

Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on
Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other
charges." Nevertheless, such authority is "subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress
may provide."

In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local
taxation and fiscal matters.86

Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be
delegated to them either by the basic law or by the statute. "Under the now prevailing Constitution ,
87

where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute , the tax power must be deemed to exist
although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the
current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly
granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the
delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that,
while the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous , the
legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple
and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available
resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local
taxation will be fair, uniform, and just."
88
Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, every
LGU is now empowered and authorized to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
and charges which shall accrue exclusively to the local government unit as well as to apply its
resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or
furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions. The relevant provisions of
89

the LGC which establish the parameters of the taxing power of the LGUs are as follows:

SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles. – The following fundamental principles shall govern th e
exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of local government units:

(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;

(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay;

(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;

(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;

(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint of
trade;

(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be left
to any private person;

(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to the
benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee,
charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided herein; and,

(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of
taxation.

SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:

(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;

(b) Documentary stamp tax;

(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa, except
as otherwise provided herein;

(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharage on wharves, tonnage dues, and
all other kinds of customs fees, charges and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed
and maintained by the local government unit concerned;

(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or
passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of local government units in the guise of charges
 for wharfage, tolls for bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or charges in any form
whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise;

(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal
farmers or fishermen;

(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as pioneer or non-
pioneer for a period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively from the date of registration;

(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products;

(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar

transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided herein;

(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water,
except as provided in this Code;

(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;

(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all
kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles;

(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported, except as
otherwise provided herein;

(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprises and
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810 and Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine
hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938) otherwise known as the "Cooperative Code of the
Philippines" respectively; and

(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and local government units.

SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may
levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided,
however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent
component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or
municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement
taxes.

SECTION 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may
exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically
enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That
the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public
hearing conducted for the purpose.
On the Socialized Housing Tax

Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of
property bears a social function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common
good. The Court already recognized this in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.:
90 91

Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner,
but also a social function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of society.
The principle is this:

Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, no r injurious
to the right of the community. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are
subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the
governing an d controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient. 92

Police power, which flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law), is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
93

order to fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. In this jurisdiction, it
94

is well-entrenched that taxation may be made the implement of the state’s police power. 95

Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes a Socialized Housing Tax equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed
value of land in excess of Php100,000.00. This special assessment is the same tax referred to in
R.A. No. 7279 or the UDHA. The SHT is one of the sources of funds for urban development and
96

housing program. Section 43 of the law provides:

97

Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax . – Consistent with the constitutional principle that the ownership
and enjoyment of property bear a social function and to raise funds for the Program, all local
government units are hereby authorized to impose an additional one-half percent (0.5%) tax on the
assessed value of all lands in urban areas in excess of Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00).

The rationale of the SHT is found in the preambular clauses of the subject ordinance, to wit:

WHEREAS, the imposition of additional tax is intended to provide the City Government with sufficient
funds to initiate, implement and undertake Socialized Housing Projects and other related preliminary
activities;

WHEREAS, the imposition of 0.5% tax will benefit the Socialized Housing Programs and Projects of
the City Government, specifically the marginalized sector through the acquisition of properties for
human settlements;

WHEREAS, the removal of the urban blight will definitely increase fair market value of properties in
the city[.]

The above-quoted are consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged to implement in their
respective localities in coordination with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council,
the national housing agencies, the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, the private sector,
and other non-government organizations. It is the declared policy of the State to undertake a
98

comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program that shall, among others,
uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and in resettlement
areas, and provide for the rational use and development of urban land in order to bring a bout,
among others, reduction in urban dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely affect public health,
safety and ecology, and access to land and housing by the underprivileged and homeless
citizens. Urban renewal and resettlement shall include the rehabilitation and development of
99

blighted and slum areas and the resettlement of program beneficiaries in accordance with the
100

provisions of the UDHA. Under the UDHA, socialized housing shall be the primary strategy in
101 102

providing shelter for the underprivileged and homeless. The LGU or the NHA, in cooperation with
103

the private developers and concerned agencies, shall provide socialized housing or re settlement
areas with basic services and facilities such as potable water, power and electricity, and an adequate
power distribution system, sewerage facilities, and an efficient and adequate solid waste disposal
system; and access to primary roads and transportation facilities. The provisions for health,
104

education, communications, security, recreation, relief and welfare shall also be planned and be
given priority for implementation by the LGU and concerned agencies in cooperation with the private
sector and the beneficiaries themselves. 105

Moreover, within two years from the effectivity of the UDHA, the LGUs, in coordination with the NHA,
are directed to implement the relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as
esteros , railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places
like sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds. In coordination with the NHA, the LG Us shall
106

provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and access to employment
and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected families. 107

Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to
impose. Aside from the specific authority vested by Section 43 of the UDHA, cities are allowed to
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass
dwellings. The collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs and projects.
108

The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a
regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of
the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not
only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real
property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully
enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of
life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.

Though broad and far-reaching, police power is subordinate to constitutional limitations and is
subject to the requirement that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the 109

words of City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.: 110

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification,
limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

xxxx

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the
Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that
no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights – a violation of the due process clause.
111

As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if
there is a lawful subject and a lawful method or, to be precise, if the following requisites are met: (1)
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its
exercise and (2) the mean s employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 112

In this case, petitioner argues that the SHT is a penalty imposed on real property owners because it
burdens them with expenses to provide funds for the housing of informal settlers, and that it is a
class legislation since it favors the latter who occupy properties which is not their own and pay no
taxes.

We disagree.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guarantee means that no person or class of
113

persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in like circumstances. Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to give undue
114

favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The law may, therefore, treat and regulate
115

one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another. 116

An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same
class. For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development and
117

housing program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two
distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to
the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the
Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled
the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over another. It is inherent in the power to tax
118

that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation. Inequities which result from a singling out of
119

one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.120

Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or
oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows. As pointed
out by respondents, while the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value
of more than ₱50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed value
exceeding ₱100,000.00. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit
equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its
effectivity. Far from being obnoxious, the provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just.

On the Garbage Fee

In the United States of America, it has been held that the authority of a municipality to regulate
garbage falls within its police power to protect public health, safety, and welfare. As opined, the
121

purposes and policy underpinnings of the police power to regulate the collection and disposal of
solid waste are: (1) to preserve and protect the public health and welfare as well as the environment
by minimizing or eliminating a source of disease and preventing and abating nuisances; and (2) to
defray costs and ensure financial stability of the system for the benefit of the entire community, with
the sum of all charges marshalled and designed to pay for the expense of a systemic refuse disposal
scheme. 122

Ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of

validity. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of U.S. cases addressing a city's authority to
123

impose mandatory garbage service and fees have upheld the ordinances against constitutional and
statutory challenges. 124

A municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and control the collection of garbage within its
corporate limits. The LGC specifically assigns the responsibility of regulation and oversight of solid
125

waste to local governing bodies because the Legislature determined that such bodies were in the
best position to develop efficient waste management programs. To impose on local governments
126

the responsibility to regulate solid waste but not grant them the authority necessary to fulfill the same
would lead to an absurd result." As held in one U.S. case:
127

x x x When a municipality has general authority to regulate a particular subject matter, the manner
and means of exercising those powers, where not specifically prescribed by the legislature, are left
to the discretion of the municipal authorities. x x x Leaving the manner of exercising municipal
powers to the discretion of municipal authorities "implies a range of reasonableness within which a
municipality's exercise of discretion will not be interfered with or upset by the judiciary."
128

In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its corporate
powers under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local
legislative bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for
the genera l welfare of the city and its inhabitants. Section 16 of the LGC provides:
129

SECTION 16. General Welfare . – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to
LGUs. The provisions related thereto are liberally interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in
130

accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community. Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the
131

interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such
interests since the Sanggunian is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents. 132

One of the operative principles of decentralization is that, subject to the provisions of the LGC and
national policies, the LGUs shall share with the national government the responsibility in the
management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction. In this
133

regard, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities which include, among others, solid waste disposal system or
environmental management system and services or facilities related to general hygiene and
sanitation. R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, affirms this
134 135

authority as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of its provisions within their respective jurisdictions while establishing a cooperative
effort among the national government, other local government units, non-government organizations,
and the private sector.136

Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and
charges for services rendered. "Charges" refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against
137

persons or property, while "Fee" means a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or
inspection of a business or activity. 138

The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the
regulation of an activity. The basis for this could be discerned from the foreword of said Ordinance,
to wit:

WHEREAS, Quezon City being the largest and premiere city in the Philippines in terms of population
and urban geographical areas, apart from being competent and efficient in the delivery of public
service, apparently requires a big budgetary allocation in order to address the problems relative and
connected to the prompt and efficient delivery of basic services such as the effective system of
waste management, public information programs on proper garb age and proper waste disposal,
including the imposition of waste regulatory measures;

WHEREAS, to help augment the funds to be spent for the city’s waste management system, the City
Government through the Sangguniang Panlungsod deems it necessary to impose a schedule of
reasonable fees or charges for the garbage collection services for residential (domestic household)
that it renders to the public.

Certainly, as opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. In Smart Communications,
Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas , the Court had the occasion to distinguish these two
139

concepts:

In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that "if the generating of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if
regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make
the imposition a tax."
In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, the Court reiterated that the purpose and
effect of the imposition determine whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for
such imposition gives the presumption that the same is a tax.

We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does not decide whether
the imposition is properly a license tax or a license fee. The determining factors are the purpose
1awp++i1

and effect of the imposition as may be apparent from the provisions of the ordinance. Thus, "[w]hen
no police inspection, supervision, or regulation is provided, nor any standard set for the applicant to
establish, or that he agrees to attain or maintain, but any and all persons engaged in the business
designated, without qualification or hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of the stipulated
sum will issue, to do business, subject to no prescribed rule of conduct and under no guardian eye,
but according to the unrestrained judgment or fancy of the applicant and licensee, the presumption is
strong that the power of taxation, and not the police power, is being exercised."

In Georgia, U.S.A., assessments for garbage collection services have been consistently treated as a
fee and not a tax.140

In another U.S. case, the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather than a tax as it
141

was actually a fee for a service given by the city which had previously been provided at no cost to its
citizens.

Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates
the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.
142

Nonetheless, although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by a municipal

corporation, it must be reasonably commensurate to the cost of providing the garbage service. To 143

pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee must not produce revenue in excess of the cost of the
regulation because such fee will be construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated by the
regulation exceeds the cost of the regulation. 144

Petitioner argues that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 47 of
R.A. No. 9003, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of
preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan, and that it has access to the
SWM Fund under Section 46 of the same law. Moreover, Ordinance No. S-2235 is inconsistent with
R.A. No. 9003, because the ordinance emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee with
no concern for segregation, composting and recycling of wastes. It also skips the mandate of the law
calling for the active involvement of the barangay in the collection, segregation, and recycling of
garbage.

We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.

Under R.A. No. 9003, it is the declared policy of the State to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and
ecological solid waste management program which shall, among others, ensure the proper
segregation, collection, transport, storage, treatment and disposal of solid waste through the
formulation and adoption of the best environmental practices in ecological waste management. The 145

law provides that segregation and collection of solid waste shall be conducted at the barangay level,
specifically for biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes, while the collection of non-
recyclable materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or
city. Mandatory segregation of solid wastes shall primarily be conducted at the source, to include
146

household, institutional, industrial, commercial and agricultural sources. Segregation at source

147

refers to a solid waste management practice of separating, at the point of origin, different materials
found in soli d waste in order to promote recycling and re-use of resources and to reduce the volume
of waste for collection and disposal. Based on Rule XVII of the Department of Environment and
148

Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 2001-34, Series of 2001, which is the
149

Implementing Rules and Regulations ( IRR ) of R.A. No. 9003, barangays shall be responsible for
the collection, segregation, and recycling of biodegradable, recyclable , compostable and reusable
wastes.150

For the purpose, a Materials Recovery Facility (MRF), which shall receive biodegradable wastes for
composting and mixed non-biodegradable wastes for final segregation, re-use and recycling, is to be
established in every barangay or cluster of barangays. 151

According to R.A. 9003, an LGU, through its local solid waste management board, is mandated by
law to prepare a 10-year solid waste management plan consistent with the National Solid Waste
Management Framework. The plan shall be for the re-use, recycling and composting of wastes
152

generated in its jurisdiction; ensure the efficient management of solid waste generated within its
jurisdiction; and place primary emphasis on implementation of all feasible re-use, recycling, and
composting programs while identifying the amount of landfill and transformation capacity that will be
needed for solid waste which cannot be re-used, recycled, or composted. One of the components
153

of the so lid waste management plan is source reduction:

(e) Source reduction – The source reduction component shall include a program and implementation
schedule which shows the methods by which the LGU will, in combination with the recycling and
composting components, reduce a sufficient amount of solid waste disposed of in accordance with
the diversion requirements of Section 20.

The source reduction component shall describe the following:

(1) strategies in reducing the volume of solid waste generated at source;

(2) measures for implementing such strategies and the resources necessary to carry out
such activities;

(3) other appropriate waste reduction technologies that may also be considered, provide d
that such technologies conform with the standards set pursuant to this Act;

(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;

(5) the methods that the LGU will use to determine the categories of solid wastes to be
diverted from disposal at a disposal facility through re-use , recycling and composting; and

(6) new facilities and of expansion of existing facilities which will be needed to implement re-
use, recycling and composting.

The LGU source reduction component shall include the evaluation and identification of rate
structures and fees for the purpose of reducing the amount of waste generated, and other source
reduction strategies, including but not limited to, program s and economic incentives provided under
Sec. 45 of this Act to reduce the use of non-recyclable materials, replace disposable materials and
products with reusable materials and products, reduce packaging, and increase the efficiency of the
use of paper, cardboard, glass, metal, and other materials. The waste reduction activities of the
community shall al so take into account, among others, local capability, economic viability, technical
requirements, social concerns, disposition of residual waste and environmental impact: Provided ,
That, projection of future facilities needed and estimated cost shall be incorporated in the plan. x x
x154

The solid waste management pl an shall also include an implementation schedule for solid waste
diversion:

SEC. 20. Establishing Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion. – Each LGU plan shall include an
implementation schedule which shows that within five (5) years after the effectivity of this Act, the
LGU shall divert at least 25% of all solid waste from waste disposal facilities through re-use,
recycling, and composting activities and other resource recovery activities: Provided , That the waste
diversion goals shall be increased every three (3) years thereafter: Provided , further, That nothing in
this Section prohibits a local government unit from implementing re-use, recycling, and composting
activities designed to exceed the goal.

The baseline for the twenty-five percent (25%) shall be derived from the waste characterization
result that each LGU is mandated to undertake. In accordance with Section 46 of R.A. No. 9003,
155 156

the LGUs are entitled to avail of the SWM Fund on the basis of their approved solid waste
management plan. Aside from this, they may also impose SWM Fees under Section 47 of the law,
which states:

SEC. 47. Authority to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees – The local government unit shall
impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid
waste management plan prepared pursuant to this Act. The fees shall be based on the following
minimum factors:

(a) types of solid waste;

(b) amount/volume of waste; and

(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.

The fees shall be used to pay the actual costs incurred by the LGU in collecting the local fees. In
determining the amounts of the fees, an LGU shall include only those costs directly related to the
adoption and implementation of the plan and the setting and collection of the local fees.

Rule XVII of the IRR of R.A. No. 9003 sets forth the details:

Section 1. Power to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees . – The Local SWM Board/Local SWM
Cluster Board shall impose fees on the SWM services provided for by the LGU and/or any
authorized organization or unit. In determining the amounts of the fees, a Local SWM Board/Local
SWM Cluster Board shall include only those costs directly related to the adoption and
implementation of the SWM Plan and the setting and collection of the local fees. This power to
impose fees may be ceded to the private sector and civil society groups which have been duly
accredited by the Local SWM Boar d/Local SWM Cluster Board; provided, the SWM fees shall be
covered by a Contract or Memorandum of Agreement between the respective boa rd and the private
sector or civil society group.

The fees shall pay for the costs of preparing, adopting and implementing a SWM Plan prepared
pursuant to the Act. Further, the fees shall also be used to pay the actual costs incurred in collecting
the local fees and for project sustainability.
Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees

Reasonable SWM service fees shall be computed based on but not limited to the following minimum
factors:

a) Types of solid waste to include special waste

b) amount/volume of waste

c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility

d) capacity or type of LGU constituency

e) cost of construction

f) cost of management

g) type of technology

Section 3. Collection of Fees. – Fees may be collected corresponding to the following levels:

a) Barangay – The Barangay may impose fees for collection and segregation of
biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from households, commerce, other
sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of Barangay MRFs. The computation of the fees
shall be established by the respective SWM boards. The manner of collection of the fees
shall be dependent on the style of administration of respective Barangay Councils. However,
all transactions shall follow the Commission on Audit rules on collection of fees.

b) Municipality – The municipal and city councils may impose fees on the barangay MRFs for
the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of
these into the sanitary landfill. The level and procedure for exacting fees shall be defined by
the Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board and supported by LGU ordinances;
however, payments shall be consistent with the accounting system of government.

c) Private Sector/Civil Society Group – On the basis of the stipulations of contract or

Memorandum of Agreement, the private sector or civil society group shall impose fees for
collection, transport and tipping in their SLFs. Receipts and invoices shall be issued to the
paying public or to the government.

From the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that the authority of a municipality or city to impose fees
is limited to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of
these into the sanitary landfill. Barangays, on the other hand, have the authority to impose fees for
the collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from
households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay MRFs. This
is but consistent with

Section 10 of R.A. No. 9003 directing that segregation and collection of biodegradable, compostable
and reusable wastes shall be conducted at the barangay level, while the collection of non-recyclable
materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or city.
In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the garbage fee is the volume
of waste currently generated by each person in Quezon City, which purportedly stands at 0.66
kilogram per day, and the increasing trend of waste generation for the past three
years. Respondents
157

did not elaborate any further. The figure presented does not reflect the specific types of wastes
generated – whether residential, market, commercial, industrial, construction/demolition, street
waste, agricultural, agro-industrial, institutional, etc. It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to
presume that such amount pertains to the totality of wastes, without any distinction, generated by
Quezon City constituents. To reiterate, however, the authority of a municipality or city to impose fees
extends only to those related to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes.

Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per day refers only to non-
recyclable and special wastes, still, We cannot sustain the validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an
ordinance must be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay, and not
unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.158

In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor area and whether
the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing project or apartment. For easy
reference, the relevant provision is again quoted below:

On all domestic households in Quezon City;

LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00
201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00
1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00

On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;

FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 40 sq. m. PHP 25.00

41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP 50.00
61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP 75.00
101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PH₱100.00
151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP 200.00

On high-rise Condominium Units

 a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high rise condominiums shall
pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of the entire condominium and socialized
Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall be collected based on area occupied for
every unit already so ld or being amortized.

b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay the annual
garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire apartment and an additional garbage fee based
on the schedule prescribed herein for every unit occupied.

For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an
occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing
project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of
occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just
and equitable. 159

The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit
in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot
similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have
to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of
whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.

Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of
"promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-
consuming the present resources and in generating waste." Instead of simplistically categorizing
160

the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the
amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among
others, household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay
or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property. R.A. No. 9003 may also be looked
into for guidance. Under said law, WM service fees may be computed based on minimum factors
such as type s of solid waste to include special waste, amount/volume of waste, distance of the
transfer station to the waste management facility, capacity or type of LGU constituency, cost of
construction, cost of management, and type of technology. With respect to utility rates set by
municipalities, a municipality has the right to classify consumers under reasonable classifications
based upon factors such as the cost of service, the purpose for which the service or the product is
received, the quantity or the amount received, the different character of the service furnished, the
time of its use or any other matter which presents a substantial difference as a ground of
distinction. [A] lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful discrimination. The
161

establishment of classifications and the charging of different rates for the several classes is not
unreasonable and does not violate the requirements of equality and uniformity. Discrimination to be
unlawful must draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance between those in like circumstances
having equal rights and privileges. Discrimination with respect to rates charged does not vitiate
unless it is arbitrary and without a reasonable fact basis or justification.
162

On top of an unreasonable classification, the penalty clause of Ordinance No. SP-2235, which
states:

SECTION 3. Penalty Clause – A penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due plus an interest of 2% per
month or a fraction thereof (interest) shall be charged against a household owner who refuses to pay
the garbage fee herein imposed. lacks the limitation required by Section 168 of the LGC, which
provides:
SECTION 168. Surcharges and Penalties on Unpaid Taxes, Fees, or Charges. – The sanggunian
may impose a surcharge not exceeding twenty-five (25%) of the amount of taxes, fees or charges
not paid on time and an interest at the rate not exceeding two percent (2%) per month of the unpaid
taxes, fees or charges including surcharges, until such amount is fully paid but in no case shall the
total interest on the unpaid amount or portion thereof exceed thirty-six (36) months. (Emphasis
supplied)

Finally, on the issue of publication of the two challenged ordinances.

Petitioner argues that the garbage fee was collected even if the required publication of its approval
had not yet elapsed. He notes that he paid his realty tax on January 7, 2014 which already included
the garbage fee. Respondents counter that if the law provides for its own effectivity, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not penal in nature. Allegedly, Ordinance No. SP-
2095 took effect after its publication while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its
approval on December 26, 2013.

The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:

SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. – (a) Unless otherwise stated in the
ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program,
the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin
board at the entrance of the provincial capital or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may
be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.

(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or
resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capital and the city, municipal,
or barangay hall in at least two

(2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days
after approval thereof.

The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or
English and in the language or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the local
government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a
book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.

(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In
the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such
ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the
sanggunian of origin is situated.

(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of
the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be
published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in
the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of
general circulation.

SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. – Within ten (10) days after
their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue
measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation:
Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of
local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible
places. (Emphasis supplied)

On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, which
provides that it would take effect after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. On the
163

other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, which was passed by the City Council on December 16, 2013,
provides that it would be effective upon its approval.
164

Ten (10) days after its enactment, or on December 26, 2013, respondent City Mayor approved the
same. 165

The case records are bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner’s negative allegation that
respondents did not comply with the posting and publication requirements of the law. Thus, We are
constrained not to give credit to his unsupported claim.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of Ordinance
No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the "Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City," is· SUSTAINED for being
consistent ·with Section·43 of Republic Act No. ·7279. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235,
S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon City, is hereby
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with
reasonable dispatch the sums of money collected relative to its enforcement. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court on February 5, 2014 is LIFTED with respect to Ordinance No.
SP-2095. In contrast, respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from taking any further action to
enforce Ordinance No. SP. 2235.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve

urgent problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the
best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law.
Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA
to open for public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold
that the general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be
achieved at the expense of the rule of law. h Y
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA)
is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in
Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the
registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its

Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice
reads: Court

"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic

"Dear President Lindo,

"Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA

law or Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to
rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and
convenient movement of persons, Neptune Street shall be
opened to vehicular traffic effective January 2, 1996.

"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily

open the points of entry and exit on said street.

"Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that

may be extended by your association to the MMDA personnel
who will be directing traffic in the area.

"Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten

instruction of the President on the matter.

"Very truly yours,

PROSPERO I. ORETA

Chairman" [1]

On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating
the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished. Sppedsc
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for
injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and
prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a
temporary restraining order the following day.

On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a
preliminary injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of
[2]

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular

inspection of Neptune Street and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of
[3]

preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDAs proposed

action.
[4]

On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of
the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of
Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of
Makati by ordinance. The decision disposed of as follows: Jurissc

"WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order

dated January 23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE
and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 13, 1996
is hereby made permanent.

"For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite

Roberto L. del Rosario in contempt is denied. [5]

"No pronouncement as to costs.

"SO ORDERED." [6]

The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28,
1998. Hence, this recourse. Jksm

Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:

"I

HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE
 STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS
REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?

II

IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION

PRECEDENT BEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE
OPENING OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?

III

IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.

ESTOPPED FROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY
OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET? Jlexj

WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE

THE SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE
AFFECTED BEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?

HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN

HANDS?" [7]

Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-

Air Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and
commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a
national road open to the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a
concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end
of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a
subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end
intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are
guarded by iron gates. Edp mis

Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to
public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in
the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is
traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares
to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is
alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the
consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. From the
[8]

premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the
City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. [9]

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the

power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
[10]

pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety,
public morals, and the general welfare. [11]

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National

Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
[12]

possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may

[13]

delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once [14]

delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are
conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. [15]

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is

constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." The Local
[16]

Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic

and corporate" -- one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the
[17]

National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of

its territory. Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities
[18]

and barangays. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the
[19]

state.
[20]

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in

the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16
of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz: Chief

"Sec. 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall

exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
 right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants."
[21]

Local government units exercise police power through their respective

legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is
the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is
the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is
the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang
barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of
the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the
Code x x x." The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to
[22]

"enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities

conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of
the inhabitants thereon." [23]

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local

government units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely,
the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon,
Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the
municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With
the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan
[24]

Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative

region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting
the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the
MMDA. [25]

"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact

and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that
it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local
government units comprising Metro Manila." There are seven (7) basic
[26]

metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1)
development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste
disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5)
urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health
and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety.
The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the
following: Lexjuris

"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the

formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies,
standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of
thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient
movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass
transport system and the institution of a system to regulate
road users; administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a
single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;" [27]

In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the
following powers and functions: Esm

"Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development

Authority.The MMDA shall:

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of

medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of
metro-wide services, land use and physical development within
Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development
objectives and priorities;

(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of

medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services which
shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and
projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects and
presentation to funding institutions; Esmsc

(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and

projects for the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction,
subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA
can create appropriate project management offices;
 (d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans,
programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and
adopt solutions to problems of implementation;

(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in

Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning
traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be
extended assistance and cooperation, including but not
limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government
agencies and offices concerned;

(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix,

impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or
non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the
contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority
shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila,
through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government
units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-
governmental organizations to whom may be delegated
certain authority, subject to such conditions and
requirements as the Authority may impose; and

(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the

objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of
basic services to the local government units, when deemed
necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the
local government unit concerned." Jurismis

The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is

undertaken by the local government units, national government agencies,
accredited peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the
private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has
the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other
cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required
services within Metro Manila.
[28]
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The
Council is composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5
municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and the
president of the Metro Manila Councilors League. The Council is headed by
[29]

a Chairman who is appointed by the President and vested with the rank of
cabinet member. As the policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila
Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and issues the
necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it
approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgates the rules and
regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of service and
regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These functions are particularly
enumerated as follows: LEX

"Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. -

(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;

(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and

issue rules and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to
carry out the purposes of this Act;

(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the
members of the Council to be effective during the term of the
succeeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the officers
and personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual budget
thereof for submission to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM);

(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and
standards for metro-wide application governing the delivery of
basic services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory fees,
and impose and collect fines and penalties." Jj sc

Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the
seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management
which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and
projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure
requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement
of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the
institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila
for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to
set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA
may "install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect
fines and penalties for all traffic violations. Ca-lrsc

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative
bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924
that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
[30]

coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples

organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually
summed up in the charter itself, viz:

"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development

Authority. -- x x x.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and

coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory
and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy
of the local government units concerning purely local matters."
[31]

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate

Appellate Court where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro
[32]

Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of

police power. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition,
while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in
[33]

addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals. [34]

Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent

BAVA and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the
Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development
Corporation, as the developer of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to
enforce certain restrictive easements in the deeds of sale over their respective
lots in the subdivision. These were the prohibition on the setting up of
commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the lots
be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondents,
who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their
residences into commercial establishments in violation of the "deed
restrictions," and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full
commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that
separated the commercial from the residential section of the village. [35]

The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal

Council of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission
(MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A
Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of
Jupiter Street. The Municipal Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region and
promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated
therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent thereto was
classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone. [36]

We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the

boundary between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street
was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the
perimeter wall on said street was constructed not to separate the residential
from the commercial blocks but simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing
down said wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the
deeds of sale. Scc-alr

We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a

legitimate exercise of police power. The power of the MMC and the Makati
[37]

Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed
over the "deed restrictions".

In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter

Street was warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic
decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal
Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the
Village. The same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic
[38]

of Orbit Street, a road inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in
Orbit Street was also made under the police power of the municipal
government. The gate, like the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public
nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its
summary abatement by the mayor was proper and legal. [39]

Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to

the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the
municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the
proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December
22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The
notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the
proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its
authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares
for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of
roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of
transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however,
can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making
power, much less police power. Misjuris

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC

in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA,
an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the
MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not
bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex

Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.)

No. 824. It comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous
four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13)
municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon,
Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the
province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province of Bulacan. Metropolitan
[40]

Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid growth of
population and the increase of social and economic requirements in these
areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public
services rendered by the respective local governments could be administered
more efficiently and economically if integrated under a system of central
planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance of peace and
order and the eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of
rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform measures under Martial Law
essential to the safety and security of the State."
[41]

Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the

following powers: Calrs-pped
 "Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.There is hereby
created a public corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan
Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation
including the power to make contracts, sue and be sued,
acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of
property and such other powers as are necessary to carry
out its purposes. The Corporation shall be administered by a
Commission created under this Decree." [42]

The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:

"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The

Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

1. To act as a central government to establish and administer

programs and provide services common to the area;

2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and

expend money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other
obligations of indebtedness. Existing tax measures should,
however, continue to be operative until otherwise modified or
repealed by the Commission;

3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;

4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan

government and review appropriations for the city and municipal
units within its jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if
found to be not in accordance with the established policies of the
Commission, without prejudice to any contractual obligation of the
local government units involved existing at the time of approval of
this Decree;

5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances,

resolutions and acts of cities and municipalities within
Metropolitan Manila;

6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix

penalties for any violation thereof which shall not exceed a
fine of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or both such
fine and imprisonment for a single offense;
 7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making
functions;

8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct

the fire services of the city and municipal governments in the
metropolitan area;

9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall

direct garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;

10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which

shall direct traffic activities; Jjjuris

11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities

pertaining to essential services such as transportation, flood
control and drainage, water supply and sewerage, social, health
and environmental services, housing, park development, and
others;

12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive

social, economic and physical planning and development of the
area;

13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in

the affairs of their respective local governments and to propose to
the President of the Philippines definite programs and policies for
implementation;

14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal
year an annual report to the President of the Philippines and to
submit a periodic report whenever deemed necessary; and

15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed

by the President of the Philippines." Sc jj

The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the
area. As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and
special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to
appropriate money for its operation, and at the same time, review
appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was
bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and fix
penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had the
power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts
of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro
Manila.

P. D. No. 824 further provided:

"Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four

cities and thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall
continue to exist in their present form except as may be
inconsistent with this Decree. The members of the existing city
and municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila shall, upon
promulgation of this Decree, and until December 31, 1975,
become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby
created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan
Manila.

In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as

many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by
the Commission, and such number of representatives from other
sectors of the society as may be appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Commission.

x x x.

The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission

ordinances, resolutions or such measures as it may adopt;
Provided, that no such ordinance, resolution or measure
shall become effective, until after its approval by the
Commission; and Provided further, that the power to impose
taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money and
the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal
sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the Commission."

The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the
Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the members of the component
city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and
sectoral representatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang
Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances,
resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself, however, that possessed
legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended
by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs approval. Moreover,
the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money,
and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were
vested exclusively in the MMC. Sce-dp

Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC

which fully possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever
legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all
subject to review and approval by the MMC.

After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to

restore the autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila. Hence,
Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided: Sj cj

"Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic

of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.

Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local

autonomy."

The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan

regions not only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potential
equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao. Section 11 of the same Article X
[43]

thus provided:

"Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special

metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set
forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and
municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be
entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be
created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination."

The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create
"special metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this
subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive and
legislative assemblies. Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory
[44]
Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power
to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:

"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President

may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the
heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan
Manila area."[45]

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and
functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be[46]

stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were
passed to the MMA. The MMAs power was limited to the "delivery of
basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan
Manila." The MMAs governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council,
[47]

although composed of the mayors of the component cities and

municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies
on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and
consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances,
approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making
power. [48]

Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions.
The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems
involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have
legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local government units
technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any
semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation
proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among
local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro
Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly." [49]

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special
development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the
autonomy of the affected local government units." The character of the
MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.

R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was introduced
by several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano
Belmonte. It was presented to the House of Representatives by the
Committee on Local Governments chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor.
The bill was a product of Committee consultations with the local government
units in the National Capital Region (NCR), with former Chairmen of the MMC
and MMA, and career officials of said agencies. When the bill was first taken
[50]

up by the Committee on Local Governments, the following debate took place:

"THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain.

This has been debated a long time ago, you know. Its a special
we can create a special metropolitan political subdivision. Supreme

Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in
the Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province, and we
have the Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the
Cordillera. So we have 6. Now.

HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of

the Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated by the
Constitution.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thats correct. But it is considered to be a

political subdivision. What is the meaning of a political
subdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its own government,
it has its own political personality, it has the power to tax,
and all governmental powers: police power and everything.
All right. Authority is different; because it does not have its
own government. It is only a council, it is an organization of
political subdivision, powers, no, which is not imbued with
any political power. Esmmis

If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of

the Metro Manila Development Authority, it is purely
coordinative. And it provides here that the council is policy-
making. All right.

Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with

coordinative power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the
different basic services which have to be delivered to the
constituency. All right.

There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective as
a political subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and protected
and guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the
exercise of that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other
local government units. So, we are forming an authority where all of these will
be members and then set up a policy in order that the basic services can be
effectively coordinated. All right. justice

Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We

have to provide some funds, resources. But it does not
possess any political power. We do not elect the Governor.
We do not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was
trying to intimate to the author that it must have the power to sue
and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinates
practically all these basic services so that the flow and the
distribution of the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we
cannot deny that. Its before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control,
water system, peace and order, we cannot deny these. Its right on
our face. We have to look for a solution. What would be the right
solution? All right, we envision that there should be a coordinating
agency and it is called an authority. All right, if you do not want to
call it an authority, its alright. We may call it a council or maybe a
management agency.

x x x." [51]

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power

delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the
MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior
to the bills presentation to Congress. Thus: Ed-p

"THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested

revision. I think this was already approved before, but it was
reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA
stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph "f" And
then next is paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall approve
metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue
ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to
carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers?
Does the MMDA because that takes the form of a local
government unit, a political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor.
When we say that it has the policies, its very clear that those
policies must be followed. Otherwise, whats the use of
empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the policies may be
in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a ordinance.
The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more teeth, your
honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have
the power to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick
as in the case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he
will agree that that is the case now. Youve got the power to set a
policy, the body wants to follow your policy, then we say lets call it
an ordinance and see if they will not follow it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thats very nice. I like that. However, there is a

constitutional impediment. You are making this MMDA a
political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be
subject to a plebiscite. That is what Im trying to avoid. Ive
been trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Under the
Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision, once it is
created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. Im trying to make
this as administrative. Thats why we place the Chairman as a
cabinet rank.

HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are
saying there is .

THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political

exercise. Believe me.

HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into

issuances of rules and regulations. That would be it shall
also be enforced. Jksm

HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will .

HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such
rule, you impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a
different legal connotation.

HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your

Honor. sc
 THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and
regulations.

HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually

considering resolutions now.

THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.

HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions." [52]

The draft of H. B. No. 14170/ 11116 was presented by the Committee to the
House of Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that the
proposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a "national agency, not
a political government unit." The explanatory note was adopted as the
[53]

sponsorship speech of the Committee on Local Governments. No

interpellations or debates were made on the floor and no amendments
introduced. The bill was approved on second reading on the same day it was
presented. [54]

When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made.
These amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA as
originally conceived in the House of Representatives. [55]

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or
a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11,
Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political
subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not
[56]

submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of

the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his
function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the
President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises
[57]

supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the

MMDA. Newmiso

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the
MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to
enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did
not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are
unnecessary. Esmso

We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to
solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and
traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards
and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with
motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our
peoples productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the
country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan
transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are
limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private
street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the
general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. Sdjad

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed. Sppedsc

SO ORDERED.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs. DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924
creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which
authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the
enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin,
a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers
license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo,
Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements were printed on the
TVR:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC

OPERATIONS CENTER PORT AREA MANILA AFTER 48 HOURS FROM DATE
OF APPREHENSION FOR DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION THEREON.
CRIMINAL CASE SHALL BE FILED FOR FAILURE TO REDEEM LICENSE
AFTER 30 DAYS.

VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVERS LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE

OF APPREHENSION.[1]

Shortly before the expiration of the TVRs validity, the respondent

addressed a letter[2] to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the
return of his drivers license, and expressing his preference for his case to be
filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint[3] with
application for preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Paraaque, on 12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence
of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924
grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their
licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation,
thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent
further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other
penalties on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin
alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable damage
because of the deprivation of his license and that, absent any implementing
rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his
license have no legal basis.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
pointed out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are
limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic
violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary
retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further
argued that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude admixture
of the three powers of government in administrative agencies.[4]
The MMDA also refuted Garins allegation that the Metro Manila Council,
the governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to
formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and
directed the courts attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001
dated 15 April 1995. Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of
MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it was passed
by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26
September 1995, extending the validity of the TVR as a temporary drivers
license for twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted
on 23 October 1995, and the MMDA was directed to return the respondents
drivers license.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision [5] in favor
of the herein respondent and held that:

a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council
held on March 23, 1995, hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001,
authorizing confiscation of drivers licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.

b. The summary confiscation of a drivers license without first giving the driver an
opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (drivers license) without
DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction,
cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made

permanent; th(e) MMDA is directed to return to plaintiff his drivers license; th(e)
MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from confiscating drivers license without first
giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.

In filing this petition,[6] the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in
the court below and contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is
neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable
regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and
welfare. The petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this
privilege does not constitute a taking without due process as long as the
licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and
the judiciary retains the power to determine the validity of the confiscation,
suspension or revocation of the license, the petitioner points out that under
the terms of the confiscation, the licensee has three options:
1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,
2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA Adjudication
Committee, or
3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutors Office.
 The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was
validly passed in the presence of a quorum, and that the lower courts finding
that it had not was based on a misapprehension of facts, which the petitioner
would have us review. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis
for the issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is
Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself, and that such power is self-executory and
does not require the issuance of any implementing regulation or circular.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani
Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004,
outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT)
scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be
paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate
drivers licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All
motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of
implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license
or vehicle plates.[7]
It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case
to enjoin the petitioner from confiscating drivers licenses is concerned, recent
events have overtaken the Courts need to decide this case, which has been
rendered moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular
No. 04, Series of 2004.
The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing
Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that matter,
that would entail confiscating drivers licenses. For the proper implementation,
therefore, of the petitioners future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to
make the following observations:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may
withhold in the exercise of its police power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle
is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be
suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the
interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process
requirements. This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board
of Rizal[8] on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of
Forestry[9] and Oposa v. Factoran[10] on timber licensing agreements,
and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao[11] on a legislative
franchise to operate an electric plant.
 Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such
as State ex. Rel. Sullivan,[12] which states in part that, the legislative power to
regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the state for the
general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to
conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are
instruments of potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their
operators have been required almost from their first appearance. The right to
operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a
privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the
interest of the public safety and welfare. The power to license imports further
power to withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with
prescribed conditions.
Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. Funk,[13] to the effect that: Automobiles are vehicles of
great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element of danger to
persons and property upon the highways. Carefully operated, an automobile is
still a dangerous instrumentality, but, when operated by careless or
incompetent persons, it becomes an engine of destruction. The Legislature, in
the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must,
prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the
highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of
the subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency
of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed to
the promotion of public safety and is well within the police power.
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the
legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and
responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be operated
on the state highways.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,
we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA
[14]

with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
administrative in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed
that it had the authority to open a subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. to public traffic because it is an agent of the state
endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
From this premise, the MMDA argued that there was no need for the City of
Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.
 Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we
concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the
Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare
of the community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of
Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid.
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case
at bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of
the same.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by
the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local
Government Code of 1991.[15] A local government is a political subdivision of a
nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs.[16] Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services
affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the
MMDA. Thus:

. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in
R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare"
of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- -x x x.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative

functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority
over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without
diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning
purely local matters.

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules
and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. [17] (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the
lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate
and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the Functions and Powers of
the Metro Manila Development Authority. The contested clause in Sec. 5(f)
states that the petitioner shall install and administer a single ticketing system,
fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic
rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate
and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws
and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 [18] and P.D. No. 1605[19] to
the contrary notwithstanding, and that (f)or this purpose, the Authority shall
enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic
operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of
local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-
governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority,
subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose.
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the
legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated
(the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded and in fact is
duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the
exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the
administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs.[20]
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a
development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which
may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction
that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather
than defeat it,[21] and is supported by the criteria in cases of this nature that all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute.[22]
A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-
wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge
expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to
transport and traffic management,[23] and we are aware of the valiant efforts of
the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro
Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDAs enabling law,
which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in
this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation
arising from a legitimate source.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17689 January 30, 1962

JOSE BELEY, in his capacity as Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office, Nueva Ecija
Agency, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GENARO TAN TORRES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and
FELIX B. MARBELLA, respondents.

Mariano Capuyoc for petitioner.

Rafael Villarosa for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review and reverse an order of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Hon. Genaro Tan Torres, presiding, dated October 20, 1960, issued
in Civil Case No. 3446, entitled "Felix B. Marbella, plaintiff, versus Jose A. Tan, Felipe Villajuan and
Pacifico Mendoza and Elpidio A. Tangunan, defendants," ordering Jose Beley, petitioner herein, in
his capacity as Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cabanatuan City, to return to the respondent
herein Felix B. Marbella Plate No. T-30271 and to Quirico Curamen his driver's license, within 10
days from receipt of the order.

On May 9, 1960, Felix B. Marbella instituted said Civil case No. 3446 in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija against Chief of Police Jose A. Tan, Mayor Felipe Villajuan, Police Sgt. Pacifico
Mendoza and Patrolman Elpidio A. Tangunan, all of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, alleging that the defendants
have illegally detained a truck with ten tires and its plate No. T-30371, Nueva Ecija 1960, and
praying for their release and for damages for their alleged illegal seizure and detention. Upon motion
of respondent herein Marbella on May 17, 1960 and his filing a bond, said truck was ordered
released by the lower court.

However, on May 25, 1960, the defendants Jose A. Tan and Pacifico Mendoza again tried to seize
said truck but succeeded in taking only its plate number and the license of its driver Quirico
Curamen. Consequently, respondent Marbella filed a criminal action against said defendants Tan
and Mendoza for grave coercion with the Provincial Fiscal, which case is still pending action.

On July 5, 1960, plaintiff Marbella's counsel filed a motion with the lower court, in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 3446, for the release by the defendants or by the Registrar of the
Motor Vehicles Office of said plate number and driver's license. (Note that neither the Registrar nor
Quirico Curamen, the driver was a party to Civil Case No. 3446). Acting upon said motion, the lower
court on September 7, 1960 issued an order directing the defendants and German Magno, Registrar
of the Motor Vehicles Office at Cabanatuan City, to return to the plaintiff Marbella and to Quirico
Curamen said plate number and driver's license. On September 15, 1960, plaintiff moved to amend
said order in that it should be directed to Jose Beley, petitioner herein, instead of to German Magno,
because the latter has ceased to be the Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office and that he was
changed by the former. 1äwphï1.ñët

On September 22, 1960, the Registrar, petitioner herein, through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, filed
a special appearance in said Civil Case No. 3446, only for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the lower court to issue said order to him. He also asked for a reconsideration of the order of the
lower court dated September 7, 1960 and furthermore objected to the motion for amendment filed by
plaintiff Marbella. Petitioner herein claimed in his objection that the lower court had not acquired
jurisdiction either over his person or of his predecessor in office, German Magno. On October 20,
1960, the lower court denied the objection of the Registrar and amended its order of September 7,
1960 in the manner prayed for in plaintiff Marbella's motion. Consequently, Registrar Jose Beley filed
the present petition with this Court.
The sole issue in this appeal refers to the validity of the order of the lower court dated October 20,
1960, insofar as it orders the petitioner herein to return to the respondent Marbella the aforesaid
plate number and driver's license.

We have examined the records of the case filed in the court below and we have found that the cause
of action of said case, as contained in the complaint, is the seizure and detention of the truck, its
plate number and 10 tires on April 28, 1960 while the act complained of in plaintiff Marbella's motion
of July 5, 1960 is the seizure of said plate number and driver's license on May 25, 1960. The two
incidents complained of are entirely different from each other.

The motion for the release of the license plate and driver's license, dated July 5, 1950, copy of which
motion is attached to the answer of the respondents, makes the following allegation in its paragraph
1.

1. That on May 25, 1960, the defendants, Jose A. Tan, Jr., and Pacifico Mendoza, seized the
plates of the truck of the plaintiff, with number T-30271; that on the same occasion, the same
defendants also seized the driver's license of the driver of the plaintiff, Quirico Curamen; ....
(Annex VI).

The facts alleged in the answer to the motion to release may be briefly stated as follows: When the
defendant Jose Tan learned that the truck impounded in April, 1960 belonged to Marbella, plaintiff,
Tan asked Marbella to explain why the plate of the truck was not displayed at the back part thereof;
that by reason of the non-display of the plate at the back of the truck Marbella was accused before
the Justice of the peace court of Rizal, Nueva Ecija; that even upon the delivery of the truck to
plaintiff Marbella, by order of the court, the said plate had not been delivered to Jose Tan; that the
reason for the failure or refusal of Marbella to deliver the plate as demanded was due to the fact that,
as found out later, upon verification from the Motor Vehicles Office, Cabanatuan City, the truck was
not registered during the current year 1960, although it bore plate No. T-30371 1960 in the name of
Agripina Vidal of San Jose, a plate which was reported as having been lost in the Motor Vehicles
Office, etc.

It is apparent from the above circumstances, therefore, that the plate and license number of the
truck, which were ordered in the court's order now subject of the petition to be delivered back to
Marbella, were taken by Tan because the truck had not been registered and was using a plate of a
vehicle registered in the name of Agripina Vidal of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in violation of Section 36
of the Motor Vehicle Law. The confiscation of the plate and the driver's license was, therefore, due to
a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law by Marbella, for operating a vehicle on the public highways
without the corresponding certificate of registration and plates (Sec. 21, Ibid). The plate was
evidently a stolen plate and the same was being used by Marbella for a truck of his own which was
not registered.

The law furthermore permits the retention by the police or by the public prosecuting officer of the
thing stolen, or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense (Section 12,
Rule 122, Rules of Court).

The license plate in question was the object which was stolen from the truck of Agripina Vidal and at
the same time constitutes evidence that Marbella was using a stolen plate on his truck that was
operating on the highways. The retention of the driver's license was also justified in view of the fact
that the truck was found being used with a stolen plate, and the driver's license is to be utilized as
evidence against the driver of the truck.
The above circumstances certainly justify the employee of the Motor Vehicles Office at Cabanatuan
City to impound the plate and the driver's license, and the judge below should have refused to order
the return of the articles, which were lawfully confiscated and lawfully retained by the predecessor of
the petitioner herein.

One other point may be considered, and that is, the claim of the petitioner herein that since Beley
was not a party to the original action, and neither was his predecessor in interest, the order in
question for the delivery to Marbella of the license plate and the driver's license is beyond the
jurisdiction of the court. The objection is a technical one. We prefer to base our decision in the case
on the ground that petitioner herein had the right to retain possession of the articles mentioned
because they are the instruments of an offense or evidence thereof.

WHEREFORE, the writ is hereby issued, the order subject of the petition set aside, and the articles
subject of the petition ordered to be returned to the petitioner. With costs against the respondent
Felix B. Marbella.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and
De Leon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. No. 179554

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
-versus- CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT
ADVERTISING, VENDING Promulgated:
AND PROMOTIONS, INC.,
Respondent. December 16, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

R E S O LUTIO N

BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns whether the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) could unilaterally dismantle the billboards, signages and other
advertizing media in the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3 (MRT3) installed by
respondent advertising company by virtue of its existing contract with the owner of
the MRT3.

The trial and appellate courts ruled that MMDA did not have the authority to
dismantle. MMDA is now before the Court to assail such adverse ruling.

Antecedents

In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and

Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement)
with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to
build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years,
upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government.

The BLT agreement stipulated, among others, that MRTC could build and
develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structures, or obtain advertising income
therefrom, viz:

16.1. Details of Development Rights. DOTC hereby confirms

and awards to Metro Rail the rights to (a) develop commercial premises
in the Depot and the air space above the Stations, which shall be allowed
to such height as is legally and technically feasible, (b) lease or sub-lease
interests or assign such interests in the Depot and such air space and (c)
obtain any advertising income from the Depot and such air space and
LRTS Phase I.

LRTS Phase I means the rail transport system comprising about

16.9 line kilometers extending from Taft Avenue, Pasay City, to North
Avenue, Quezon City, occupying a strip in the center of EDSA
approximately 10.5 meters wide (approximately 12 meters wide at or
around the Boni Avenue, Santolan and Buendia Stations), plus about 0.1
to 0.2 line kilometers extending from the North Avenue Station to the
Depot, together with the Stations, 73 Light Rail Vehicles and all
 ancillary plant, equipment and facilities, as more particularly detailed in
the Specifications.

16.2. Assignment of Rights. During the Development Rights

Period, Metro Rail shall be entitled to assign all or any of its rights, titles
and interests in the Development Rights to bona fide real estate
developers. In this connection, Metro Rail may enter into such
development, lease, sub-lease or other agreements or contracts relating
to the Depot and the air space above the Stations (the space not needed
for all or any portion of the operation of the LRTS) for all or any portion
of the Development Rights Period.

In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions,

Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC.
Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other
advertizing media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA
requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertizing
media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the
posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters,
streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and
open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to
dismantle the formers billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

On March 1, 2002, Trackworks filed against MMDA in the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) in Pasig City an injunction suit (with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order [TRO] and preliminary injunction), docketed as Civil
Case No. 68864.

On March 6, 2002, the RTC (Branch 155) issued a TRO, enjoining MMDA
from dismantling or destroying Trackworks billboards, signages and other
advertizing media. On March 25, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction for the same purpose.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration to challenge the RTCs issuances,

MMDA brought a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals (CA), docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 70932, but the CA denied the
petition and affirmed the RTC on August 31, 2004. The CA ultimately denied
MMDAs motion for reconsiderationthrough its resolution issued on March 14,
2005.

Thence, MMDA appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 167514), which denied
MMDAs petition for review on October 25, 2005.[1]

Ruling of the RTC

In the meanwhile, on October 10, 2005, the RTC (Branch 155) rendered its
decision permanently enjoining MMDA from dismantling, removing or destroying
the billboards, signages and other advertizing media installed by Trackworks on
the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.[2]

Ruling of the CA

MMDA appealed the RTCs decision to the CA.

On April 30, 2007, the CA denied the MMDAs appeal, [3] holding that
Trackworks right to install billboards, signages and other advertizing media on the
interior and exterior structures of the MRT3 must be protected by a writ of
permanent injunction; and that MMDA had no power to dismantle, remove or
destroy Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertizing media.[4]

MMDA moved for reconsideration, but the CA resolution denied the motion
for reconsideration on September 3, 2007.[5]

Hence, this appeal by petition for review.

Issues

MMDA claims that its mandate under its charter[6] of formulating,

coordinating and monitoring of policies, standards, progress and projects for the
use of thoroughfares and the promotion of safe and convenient movement of
persons and goods prompted its issuance of MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, which
reads in part:

h. ) It is unlawful for any person/s, private or public corporations,

advertising and promotions companies, movie producers, professionals
and service contractors to post, install, display any kind or form of
billboards, signs, posters, streamers, professional service advertisements
and other visual clutters in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island,
posts, trees parks and open space.
MMDA avers that the conversion of the center island of Epifanio Delos
Santos Avenue (EDSA) into the carriageway of the MRT3 line did not exempt the
EDSA center island from the coverage of the MMDA regulation; [7] that the
Governments grant of development rights to MRTC was not an abdication of its
right to regulate, and, therefore, the development of the MRT3 remained subject to
all existing and applicable national and local laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations;[8] that MMDA was merely implementing existing and applicable laws;
[9]
that Trackworks advertising materials were placed indiscriminately and without
due regard to safety, and as such might be classified as obstructions and
distractions to the motorists traversing EDSA;[10] and that the interests of a few
should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose
safety and general welfare MMDA was mandated to protect.[11]

Trackworks maintains, on the other hand, that MMDAs petition was defective for
its failure to raise any genuine question of law; and that the CAs decision
dated April 30, 2007was valid and correct.[12]

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other
advertizing media in the MRT3 from MRTCs authority under the BLT agreement
to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising
income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed,
MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would
transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.

Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the
time material to this case, and until this date, MRTCs entering into the contract for
advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the
former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail
Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc.,[13] this Court expressly recognized
Trackworks right to install the billboards, signages and other advertising media
pursuant to said contract. The latters right should, therefore, be respected.

It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling
of Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply
had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages
and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by
Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc.,[14] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron
Transportation Co., Inc.,[15] and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Garin,[16] the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDAs powers were limited to
the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power.[17]

Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:

xxx The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development

authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these
are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the
process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
 services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of local government
units concerning purely local matters.[18]

The Court also agrees with the CAs ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-
009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks
billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting,
installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied
only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT
agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to
which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09
did not apply to Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising media in
MRT3, because it did not specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a
year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the center island of EDSA. Clearly,
MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included MRT3 in its
prohibition.

MMDAs insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096
(Building Code) and its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The
power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering
the laws following provision, thus:

Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement.

The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code
including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof
is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, hereinafter referred to as the Secretary.

There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to
implement the Building Code.

WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review, and affirm

the decision dated April 30, 2007 and the resolution dated September 3, 2007.

Costs against the petitioner.

 SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as

Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners,
vs.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.

x --------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007

HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN MANILA

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority,petitioners,
vs.
MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The following conditions in 1969, as observed by this Court:

Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved from bad to worse, from
tolerable to critical. The number of people who use the thoroughfares has multiplied x x x, 1

have remained unchecked and have reverberated to this day. Traffic jams continue to clog the
streets of Metro Manila, bringing vehicles to a standstill at main road arteries during rush hour traffic
and sapping people’s energies and patience in the process.

The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the
authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial
bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila.

Specifically challenged are two Orders issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224.

The first assailed Order of September 8, 2005,2 which resolved a motion for reconsideration filed by
herein respondents, declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, hereafter referred to as the E.O.,
"unconstitutional as it constitutes an unreasonable exercise of police power." The second assailed
Order of November 23, 20053 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The following facts are not disputed:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for the
Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System," the pertinent portions of which read:

WHEREAS, Metro Manila continues to be the center of employment opportunities,

trade and commerce of the Greater Metro Manila area;

WHEREAS, the traffic situation in Metro Manila has affected the adjacent provinces
of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal, owing to the continued movement of residents
and industries to more affordable and economically viable locations in these
provinces;

WHEREAS, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is tasked to

undertake measures to ease traffic congestion in Metro Manila and ensure the
convenient and efficient travel of commuters within its jurisdiction;

WHEREAS, a primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the
numerous buses plying the streets that impedes [sic] the flow of vehicles and
commuters due to the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes;

WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating

the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing
more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate
the existing transport modes, namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT,
MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the improved
connectivity of the different transport modes;

WHEREAS, the national government must provide the necessary funding

requirements to immediately implement and render operational these projects; and
extent to MMDA such other assistance as may be warranted to ensure their
expeditious prosecution.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

Section 1. THE PROJECT. – The project shall be identified as GREATER MANILA

TRANSPORT SYSTEM Project.

Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. – In accordance with the plan proposed by

MMDA, the project aims to develop four (4) interim intermodal mass transport
terminals to integrate the different transport modes, as well as those that shall
hereafter be developed, to serve the commuting public in the northwest, north, east,
south, and southwest of Metro Manila. Initially, the project shall concentrate on
immediately establishing the mass transport terminals for the north and south Metro
Manila commuters as hereinafter described.
 Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. – The Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing Agency
for the project. For this purpose, MMDA is directed to undertake such infrastructure
development work as may be necessary and, thereafter, manage the project until it
may be turned-over to more appropriate agencies, if found suitable and convenient.
Specifically, MMDA shall have the following functions and responsibilities:

a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for the projects,

including the designs and costing;

b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or properties needed for the
project with the respective agencies and/or entities owning them;

c) Supervise and manage the construction of the necessary

structures and facilities;

d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may be necessary, with

the appropriate government agencies, entities, and/or private
persons, in accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations,
to facilitate the implementation of the project;

e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as may be necessary for

the construction and/or implementation of the projects, in accordance
with prevailing accounting and audit polices and practice in
government.

f) Enlist the assistance of any national government agency, office or

department, including local government units, government-owned or
controlled corporations, as may be necessary;

g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the above purposes;

and

h) Perform such other related functions as may be necessary to

enable it to accomplish the objectives and purposes of this Executive
Order.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro
Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the
different transport modes;5 and the MMDA had "recommended a plan to decongest traffic by
eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing
more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the
provision of mass transport terminal facilities"6 which plan is referred to under the E.O. as
the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).

The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.

Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body
of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003 7 expressing full support of the Project.
Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of
common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located
along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8

On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, 9 filed a petition for declaratory
relief10 before the RTC11 of Manila.

In its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850, Viron alleged that the MMDA,
through Chairman Fernando, was "poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or
tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis
under the pretext of traffic regulation."12 This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of
its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.

Alleging that the MMDA’s authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to
abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked
the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic
under R.A. No. 7924, "An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its
Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes."

Viron also asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of provincial bus terminals would
contravene the Public Service Act and related laws which mandate public utilities to provide and
maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers. 13

Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator, later filed a similar
petition for declaratory relief14 against Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman
Fernando.

Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the
possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective
terminals.

Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and eliminate all
provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their
operations to common bus terminals,15 Mencorp prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the impending closure of its bus terminals
which it was leasing at the corner of EDSA and New York Street in Cubao and at the intersection of
Blumentritt, Laon Laan and Halcon Streets in Quezon City. The petition was docketed as Civil Case
No. 03-106224 and was raffled to Branch 47 of the RTC of Manila.

Mencorp’s petition was consolidated on June 19, 2003 with Viron’s petition which was raffled to
Branch 26 of the RTC, Manila.

Mencorp’s prayer for a TRO and/or writ of injunction was denied as was its application for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.16

In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the
MMDA’s power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus
operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct
business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the
Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due
process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals.
Upon the agreement of the parties, they filed their respective position papers in lieu of hearings.

By Decision18 of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the
E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manila’s basic
services including those of transport and traffic management.

The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State as it satisfied
the two tests of lawful subject matter and lawful means, hence, Viron’s and Mencorp’s property rights
must yield to police power.

On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial court, by Order of
September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable
exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does
not include the power to order the closure of Viron’s and Mencorp’s existing bus terminals; and that
the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2005.

Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court for failing to rule that: (1) the requisites of declaratory
relief are not present, there being no justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-
106224; and (2) the President has the authority to undertake or cause the implementation of the
Project.19

Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as
nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along
the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Viron and Mencorp, they argue, failed to produce any letter
or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close
down their bus terminals.

And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to
coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and
South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the
Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons.

The petition fails.

It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency of the consolidated petitions to
meet the requirement of justiciability was not among the issues defined for resolution in the Pre-Trial
Order of January 12, 2004. It is equally true, however, that the question was repeatedly raised by
petitioners in their Answer to Viron’s petition,20 their Comment of April 29, 2003 opposing Mencorp’s
prayer for the issuance of a TRO,21 and their Position Paper of August 23, 2004.22

In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the existence of the
essential requisites for their respective petitions for declaratory relief, 23 and refuted petitioners’
contention that a justiciable controversy was lacking.24 There can be no denying, therefore, that the
issue was raised and discussed by the parties before the trial court.

The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the
issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.25
The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy
or the ripening seeds thereof exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the
court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.26 A question becomes justiciable
when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested. 27

In the present cases, respondents’ resort to court was prompted by the issuance of the E.O. The 4th
Whereas clause of the E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDA’s plan to "decongest traffic
by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing
more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision
of mass transport terminal facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the immediate establishment of common bus terminals for
north- and south-bound commuters. For this purpose, Section 8 directs the Department of Budget
and Management to allocate funds of not more than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to
cover the cost of the construction of the north and south terminals. And the E.O. was made effective
immediately.

The MMDA’s resolve to immediately implement the Project, its denials to the contrary
notwithstanding, is also evident from telltale circumstances, foremost of which was the passage by
the MMC of Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003 expressing its full support of the immediate
implementation of the Project.

Notable from the 5th Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the plan to "remove the bus
terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent need to integrate the
different transport modes." The 7th Whereas clause proceeds to mention the establishment of the
North and South terminals.

As alleged in Viron’s petition, a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal had been drawn
up, and construction of the terminal is already in progress. The MMDA, in its Answer 28 and Position
Paper,29 in fact affirmed that the government had begun to implement the Project.

It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is merely conjectural
or anticipatory.
lawphil

Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the MMDA of an order
for the closure of respondents’ bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to
bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which, under Section 1, Rule 63 30 of the Rules of
Court, must be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.

As for petitioners’ contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative issuance which creates no
relation with third persons, it does not persuade. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the
Project for which the concerned government agencies are directed to coordinate their activities and
resources, the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons like respondents
would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate from the common bus
terminals.

It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of
their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or
rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to
property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such
that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.’s]
enforcement."31 Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative
issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has
been satisfied by respondents.

On to the merits of the case.

Respondents posit that the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of their bus
terminals under the E.O. which, they argue, is unconstitutional because it violates both the
Constitution and the Public Service Act; and that neither is the MMDA clothed with such authority
under R.A. No. 7924.

Petitioners submit, however, that the real issue concerns the President’s authority to undertake or to
cause the implementation of the Project. They assert that the authority of the President is derived
from E.O. No. 125, "Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications Defining its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes," her residual power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the E.O. is also a valid exercise of the
police power.

E.O. No. 125,32 which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of legislative powers,
reorganized the then Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications. Sections 4,
5, 6 and 22 of E.O. 125, as amended by E.O. 125-A,33 read:

SECTION 4. Mandate. — The Ministry shall be the primary policy, planning,

programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity of the
Executive Branch of the government in the promotion, development and regulation of
dependable and coordinated networks of transportationand communication systems as
well as in the fast, safe, efficient and reliable postal, transportation and communications
services.

To accomplish such mandate, the Ministry shall have the following objectives:

(a) Promote the development of dependable and coordinated networks of

transportation and communications systems;

(b) Guide government and private investment in the development of the

country’s intermodal transportation and communications systems in a
most practical, expeditious, and orderly fashion for maximum safety, service,
and cost effectiveness; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. — To accomplish its mandate, the Ministry shall have
the following powers and functions:

(a) Formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the
preparation and implementation of integrated and comprehensive
transportation and communications systems at the national, regional and
local levels;
 (b) Establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs
for transportation and communications, and for this purpose, may call on
any agency, corporation, or organization, whether public or private, whose
development programs include transportation and communications as an
integral part thereof, to participate and assist in the preparation and
implementation of such program;

(c) Assess, review and provide direction to transportation and

communications research and development programs of the government in
coordination with other institutions concerned;

(d) Administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of

transportation and communications; (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

xxxx

SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility. — The authority and responsibility for the
exercise of the mandate of the Ministry and for the discharge of its powers and
functions shall be vested in the Minister of Transportation and Communications,
hereinafter referred to as the Minister, who shall have supervision and control over the
Ministry and shall be appointed by the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

SECTION 22. Implementing Authority of Minister. — The Minister shall issue such orders,
rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective
implementation of the provisions of this Executive Order. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

It is readily apparent from the abovequoted provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, that the
President, then possessed of and exercising legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the
primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative
entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of
authority to the DOTC includes the power to establishand administer comprehensive and
integrated programs for transportation and communications.

As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested with the authority and
responsibility to exercise the mandate given to the department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is
authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to
ensure the effective implementation of the law.

Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for
transportation, it follows that the President may exercise the same power and authority to order the
implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for transportation.

Such authority springs from the President’s power of control over all executive departments as well
as the obligation for the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution
which provides:

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Notably, Section 38, Chapter 37, Book IV of the same Code defines the President’s power of
supervision and control over the executive departments, viz:

SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. — Unless otherwise expressly

stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:

(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to
act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine
priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly
provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies the word
"control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the President
may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty.34

Respecting the President’s authority to order the implementation of the Project in the exercise of the
police power of the State, suffice it to stress that the powers vested in the DOTC Secretary to
establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and
communications and to issue orders, rules and regulations to implement such mandate (which, as
previously discussed, may also be exercised by the President) have been so delegated for the good
and welfare of the people. Hence, these powers partake of the nature of police power.

Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the
good and welfare of the people.35 This power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the recognition
that salus populi est suprema lex ─ the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact
increasingly being delegated.36 By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the
President and administrative boards37 as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations
or local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of 1991. 38

The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the
designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It
is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the
MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the
cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of
the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the
primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of
networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as
the Project in question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of
authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.

To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area 39 as a "special development and
administrative region" and placed the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the
region under the MMDA.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform "planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the
delivery of metro-wide services," including transport and traffic management. 40 Section 5 of the same
law enumerates the powers and functions of the MMDA as follows:

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term
plans and programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land use and physical
development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development
objectives and priorities;

(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment

programs for metro-wide services which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for
priority programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects and
presentation to funding institutions;

(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the
delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the
Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management
offices;

(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects
in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of
implementation;

(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and
shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects
concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and
cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other
government agencies and offices concerned;

(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines
and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether
moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA
4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority
shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic
operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local
government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions
and requirements as the Authority may impose; and

(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA,
including the undertaking of delivery of basic services to the local government units,
 when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the local
government unit concerned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating and policy-setting body has
been settled in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc.41 In that case, the Court stressed:

Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic
services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation
and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport
operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe
movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the
institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the
institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service,
the MMDA is expressly authorized to "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate
and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA
may install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all traffic violations.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924
that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the
local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to ‘enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare’ of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as
termed in the charter itself, a ‘development authority.’ It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and
the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the
vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

‘SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . .

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and
in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery
of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of
the local government units concerning purely local matters.’ 42 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by
the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination
of respondents’ terminals.

Even the MMDA’s claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with
the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Court’s subsequent
ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin43 that the MMDA is not vested with
police power.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power
does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.44 Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the
means.

As early as Calalang v. Williams,45 this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely
a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute
authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control
traffic on national roads.

Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any
regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety."47 As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people
using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise
of police power.

Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be
addressed immediately. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening
traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing
volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport
systems. It is thus beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of the E.O. is the
interest of the public in general.

Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?

With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila, the E.O. seeks to "eliminate[e] the
bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provid[e] more convenient
access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass
transport terminal facilities x x x."48 Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of
Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the
MMDA-designated common parking areas.

In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,49 two city ordinances were passed by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena, directing public utility vehicles to unload and load
passengers at the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, which was given the exclusive franchise to
operate a single common terminal. Declaring that no other terminals shall be situated, constructed,
maintained or established inside or within the city of Lucena, the sanggunian declared as inoperable
all temporary terminals therein.

The ordinances were challenged before this Court for being unconstitutional on the ground that, inter
alia, the measures constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private
property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Citing De la Cruz v. Paras50 and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,51 this Court held that the assailed
ordinances were characterized by overbreadth, as they went beyond what was reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city. And it found that the compulsory use of the Lucena
Grand Terminal was unduly oppressive because it would subject its users to fees, rentals and
charges.
 The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so
that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights.

A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of
solutions to societal problems.

From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the
indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city
proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses
obstructing traffic on the city streets.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of
traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from
that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the
traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space
such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of
inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be
instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the
specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of respondents’
terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On
the contrary, the elimination of respondents’ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the
equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference
from one site to another.

Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans and taxis
entering Metro Manila and using the streets for parking and passenger pick-up points, as
respondents suggest, might even be more effective in easing the traffic situation. So would the strict
enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from major thoroughfares.

As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents’
certificates of public convenience confer no property right, and are mere licenses or privileges. 52 As
such, these must yield to legislation safeguarding the interest of the people.

Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents’
terminals not only because no authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or
police power been delegated to it, but also because the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy
the standards of a valid police power measure.

Finally, an order for the closure of respondents’ terminals is not in line with the provisions of the
Public Service Act.
Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 of Executive Order
No. 202, creating the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the
Public Service Commission (PSC, now the LTFRB) with "x x x jurisdiction, supervision and control
over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties x x x."

Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to "impose such conditions as
to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and
convenience may reasonably require"53 in approving any franchise or privilege.

Further, Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act 54 provided that the Commission shall have
the power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act,
subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:

(g) To compel any public service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper service as regards
the manner of furnishing the same as well as the maintenance of the necessary material and
equipment.

(h) To require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any
reasonable extension of its existing facilities, where in the judgment of said Commission,
such extension is reasonable and practicable and will furnish sufficient business to justify the
construction and maintenance of the same and when the financial condition of the said
public service reasonably warrants the original expenditure required in making and operating
such extension.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is
generally considered a necessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators like
respondents, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable
terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Public
Service Act.

This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving
the pestering problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say
the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court
can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC ─
as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and
administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and
communications ─ which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project
like the Project subject of the case at bar.

No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or project which it
is not authorized to implement cannot pass muster.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is
declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., G.R. No. 166501
Petitioner,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JJ.
HON. BAYANI F. FERNANDO,
in his capacity as Chairman of the
Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority, and METROPOLITAN
MANILA DEVELOPMENT Promulgated:
AUTHORITY,
Respondents. November 16, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x

R E S O LUTIO N

CARPIO, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs
of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin
respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further
implementing its wet flag scheme (Flag Scheme).[1] The Mandamus writ is to
compel respondents to respect and uphold the x x x rights of pedestrians to due
process x x x and equal protection of the laws x x x.

Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the
MMDAs governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2)
violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for
jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading,
and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates pedestrian rights as it exposes
pedestrians to various potential hazards.[2]
In their Comment, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for petitioners
lack of standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Alternatively, respondents contended that the Flag Scheme is a valid preventive
measure against jaywalking.

Petitioner filed a Reply, claiming that the Court should take cognizance of the case
as it raises issues of paramount and transcendental importance. Petitioner also
contended that he filed this petition directly with the Court because the issues
raised in the petition deserve the direct x x x intervention of the x x x [C]ourt x x x.

We dismiss the petition.

A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury. [3] On the
other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute.[4] Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either
category.

Nor is there merit to petitioners claim that the Court should relax the standing
requirement because of the transcendental importance of the issues the petition
raises. As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance
of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition.[5] Thus, the party invoking it
must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition.[6] Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or
statutory violation.

On the Flag Schemes alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and
municipalities within the MMDAs jurisdiction,[7] except Valenzuela City, have each
enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions
for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents
implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking
ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative
agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper
authorities.[8] The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does
not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the
Flag Scheme in that city.
Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag
Scheme is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar
enactments.This Court is not a trier of facts.[9] The petition proffers mere surmises
and speculations on the potential hazards of the Flag Scheme. This Court cannot
determine the reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere surmises and
speculations.
Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this
petition directly with us. This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with
the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants
unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.[10] We
relax this rule only in exceptional and compelling circumstances. [11] This is not the
case here.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989

DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC
DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID
SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of
Mindanao, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989

ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651 and 89965.

Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.

CORTES, J.:

The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in
Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No.
1

6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."

These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from
releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional .

After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the respondents, which the Court
considered as the answer, the case was deemed submitted for decision, the issues having been
joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a "Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Reply on
Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral Arguments," which the Court noted.

The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of
the following:

(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and

(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the government of the Republic of
the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the
Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General
of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he
establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces
comprising the "areas of autonomy." 2
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for regional autonomy,
Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."

To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:

Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or
by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.

Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with
the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed
of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen
months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide
for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

 (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion
of the general welfare of the people of the region.

Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and
security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1,
1989.

1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by petitioners, i.e. that
certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.

Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law
of the land, being a binding international agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli
Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic of the
Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987
Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.

We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli
Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public international or
internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation
of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A.
No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the
provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of
enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli
Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of
the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress
of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and
Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli
Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734
contravened the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought. 3

2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have been raised by
petitioners.

Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region
which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.

In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares
that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of
provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision
makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in
favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces
where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.

Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
which sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference
to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the
autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second,
there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which
incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the
details, thus:

SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take
effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided
in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the
approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge
the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take
effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and
only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in
the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be
included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of
the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734
shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734
will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall
compromise it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482-492 (1986)].

As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made
effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this majority
means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units,
or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?

We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.

If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the
plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his
Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the
autonomous region, which reads:

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].

it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total
majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the
proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority
of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used
for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."

It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the
organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent
units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.

More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote
requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the
people when they ratified the Constitution.

Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains
that only those areas which, to his view, share common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics should be properly
included within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and
cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the
same characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the
others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the
constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.

Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress
shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these
constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is
within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have
to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of
governmental powers. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R.
No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].

After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner
Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should
likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its
scope should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order
for the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and therefore is
violative of the Constitution.

Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he had earlier invoked.
Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should compromise the autonomous
region, taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As
earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act
for the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may not
be inquired into by this Court.

Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1963);
Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-
21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In Dumlao v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 52245,
January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the Court ruled that once class may be treated differently from
another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal
protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress on the
basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.

Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the
constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a
provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim
Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on
the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners
maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law.
Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this
objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and
national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious
convictions.

As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition
precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist
[Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972,
43 SCRA 677]. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no
conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious
freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a
perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.

Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among
others, states:

. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and
cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the President
may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power
which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to
merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X,
Section 10 of the Constitution which provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative
regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was
made as part of the law of the land by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions
are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see
Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President
to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec.
4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge
administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local
government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to
provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.

Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight
Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the powers, appropriations, and
properties vested upon the regional government by the organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said
provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national government offices and their properties to the
regional government shall be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee,
and that such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the
regional government.

It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while the Constitution
states that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the
requirement of organizing an Oversight committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers
and properties to the regional government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous
region.

Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the
plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the
scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect delay the
creation of the autonomous region.

Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the
plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the
scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. The
questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer
do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight
Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at
effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government. The constitutional objection on this
point thus cannot be sustained as there is no bases therefor.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387
(1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v.
Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis
for such a declaration. otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners
to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.