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Transition of the Ernest Henry Mine from Open Pit to Underground Sub-Level
Cave

Conference Paper · May 2014

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 Transition of the Ernest Henry Mine
from Open Pit to an Underground
Sublevel Cave
A T McGrath1, A D Campbell2 and J B Tucker3

ABSTRACT
Situated in north-west Queensland, Australia, the Ernest Henry Mine (EHM) has been producing
copper and gold since 1996. Owned and operated by Glencore Xstrata, ore is currently sourced
from a newly developed underground sublevel cave (SLC) mine below the old EHM open pit (the
pit). Ore feed to the concentrator is supplemented by satellite open pits comprising the Mount
Margaret operation.
The transition from open pit to a producing underground mine involved a complex extraction
sequence for the first two production sublevels on RL1650 and RL1625. Underground mining
during cave initiation was further complicated when south wall instability prevented completion
of the final open pit shell. The transition mining phase included mass firing of an inclined crown
pillar between the initial SLC void and the pit followed by a combination of transverse and
longitudinal SLC mining.
The inclined crown pillar mass firing was the first significant milestone in the extraction of the
transition ore block. Comprising approximately 890 000 t of in situ material; 70 000 m of drilling
was charged with 351 t of emulsion and 6026 electronic detonators to initiate the single mass firing.
The firing contained five direction changes over 19 seconds making it one of the largest and most
complex underground blasts ever conducted in Australia.
Risk management was integrated into every facet of the technical and operational planning
and execution of the transition mining phase, whilst maintaining daily mine construction and
production commitments. This paper provides a detailed overview of the transition objectives and
constraints, mining method selection, post mass blast outcomes and the journey ahead.

INTRODUCTION
The Ernest Henry Mine (EHM) is located approximately 38 km
north-east of Cloncurry in north-west Queensland, Australia
(Figure 1). The mine is operated by Ernest Henry Mining Pty
Ltd, a 100 per cent owned subsidiary of Glencore Xstrata. It
is situated in the Eastern Fold Belt of the Mount Isa Inlier.
Operations comprise a producing underground sublevel cave
(SLC) mine below the completed pit and a number of satellite
open pits forming the Mount Margaret operation, which are
used to feed the EHM site concentrator.
The orebody is hosted by strong and competent Proterozoic
rocks consisting of intermediate and felsic volcanics overlain
by a 50 m thick cover of sand, clay, shale and gravel units.
Pipe-like in appearance, the orebody dips at approximately
45 degrees to the south and is as thick as it is wide.
The pit operated from late 1996 until November 2011.
During this period, the peak production rate was 11 Mt/a
of copper gold ore. The final pit crest at RL2160 measures
1.49 km wide in the east–west (E–W) direction by 1.56 km
long in the north–south (N–S) direction. The pit base is 535 m
below the surface at RL1625 and measures 130 m wide (E–W)
by 100 m long (N–S).
The EHM underground mine targets the orebody down
dip of the pit as depicted in Figures 2 and 3. The first cut
in the decline was fired on 20 February 2008 at the RL1902
switch back in the north wall of the pit. Underground mine
Ore Reserves currently measure 73 Mt at 0.97  per cent Cu
and 0.50 g/t Au. The first two production levels encircle
the pit at RL1650 and RL1625 to access a combination of
transverse and longitudinal SLC mining, mass firing and
uphole retreating. The conventional transverse SLC starts at
RL1600, which is approximately 25 m below the pit base, and
will extend to RL1200. In December 2011, the underground
mine commenced production via decline trucking. Ramp up
to a 6 Mt/a production rate via shaft hoisting will be realised
in 2014 following successful commissioning of the crushing,
conveying and hoisting systems. At these rates, current
reserves will be exhausted by 2026.

1. MAusIMM, Senior Mining Engineer, Ernest Henry Mining Pty Ltd, PO Box 527, Cloncurry Qld 4824. Email: andrew.mcgrath@glencore.com.au
2. MAusIMM(CP), Senior Geotechnical Engineer, Ernest Henry Mining Pty Ltd, PO Box 527, Cloncurry Qld 4824. Email: alex.campbell@glencore.com.au
3. MAusIMM, Technical Manager – DynoConsult West, 223 Adelaide Terrace, Perth WA 6000. Email: john.tucker@dynonobel.com

12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014 297
A T MCGRATH, A D CAMPBELL AND J B TUCKER
FIG 1 – Ernest Henry Mine location within the north-west Queensland minerals province (Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, 2009).
FIG 2 – Isometric view of the Ernest Henry Mine orebody, pit and underground
mine looking north-north-east.
This paper provides an insight into the complex and
unconventional design and operational methodologies for
transition mining of the first two underground sublevels.
EVOLUTION OF THE TRANSITION BLOCK
CONCEPT AND DESIGN SELECTION
Feasibility mine design
During the project feasibility stage, remaining unmined
material between the pit and the initial SLC void was
identified as ‘transition’ ore. Segregated into distinct zones,
the majority of this ore was classified within the Southern
Transition Block (STB). Comprising approximately 2 Mt of
298 12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014
FIG 3 – Isometric view of the Ernest Henry Mine orebody, pit and underground
mine looking north-west.
relatively high-grade ore, this material formed an inclined
crown pillar and barrier that prevented cave progression to
the south wall. Smaller transition blocks also existed in the
western and eastern walls of the pit. A number of preliminary
concepts and design iterations were investigated for the safe
and efficient extraction of the transition ore. Options included:
•• Modification of the final pit shell and in pit surface drilling
and charging of transition ore blocks for underground
extraction. However, this option was discontinued due to
concerns about personnel and equipment access in close
proximity to the south wall of the pit.
•• A combination of surface drilling to remove the ramp and
berms in the pit base and development of underground
access drives for the uphole drilling horizon. Initial
void would be created through the extraction of a
40 m (W) × 40 m (L) × 40 m (H) open stope from RL1600
to RL1646 in the south-east SLC. This option was not
selected due to previously stated south wall access
concerns and stope stability.
 TRANSITION OF THE ERNEST HENRY MINE FROM OPEN PIT TO AN UNDERGROUND SUBLEVEL CAVE
For all feasibility design iterations, the intention was to
cast fire multiple rings into the available pit void. This fired
material would not be recovered but instead would contribute
to an ore blanket for air blast protection, prevention of early
waste dilution and later extraction in the lower SLC levels.
Final open pit status and advanced
underground development
The south pit wall had a history of instability and failures due
to intersecting faults and an aggressive wall angle. During
the final stages of open pit mining, geotechnical monitoring
and analysis identified potential impacts to underground
workings. Consequently, the decision was made to leave some
material behind to confine dominant faults and structures
as risk mitigation to prevent premature south wall failure.
Figure 4 shows the location of RL1646 and RL1625 ore blocks
in relation to the RL1650 STB drilling access drives.
The 1646-212 pit blast was fired out of sequence causing
lower sections of the south wall, including the ramp, to
become unstable. A redesign of the remaining RL1646 and
RL1625 pit benches to reduce the wall angle was required.
To prevent additional instability in the pit wall and potential
damage to underground access drives, the decision was made
to cancel 1625-220 and 1625-221 pit blasts.
Changes to the final pit design and blast sequencing
significantly increased the volume of transition ore material
that remained for underground extraction. Compounding
the situation was the advanced completion of development
on RL1650 and RL1625 levels, which restricted available
alternatives. This development restricted conceptual drill ring
design options and reduced the volume of material that could
be effectively cast fired into the pit. As a result, the transition
mining methodology developed during the feasibility study
was no longer practical and required redesign.
FIG 4 – Section view of the final planned open pit shell relative to underground looking east (schematic not to scale).
12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014
Selection of the transition block mining
sequence
By March 2012, a number of extraction options had been
investigated. A road map depicting major milestones in the
transition phase, available options and the final selection is
presented in Figure 5.
Due to the geometry and location of existing development
and infrastructure on RL1650 and RL1625 levels and the
commencement of SLC production, reverse mining from
north to south (ie working away from the open pit) was not
a considered option. An additional factor to this decision
was the expected production delay when changing the
mining direction back to south to north on the third sublevel
(ie RL1600). Sequence 3 was selected for the open pit to
underground transition because it:
•• maximised stability
•• minimised the number of mass firings and potential for
mine development and infrastructure damage
•• minimised the load on production drilling and charging
resources and enabled earlier recovery of ore tonnes
•• minimised confinement issues associated with failed
material from the south pit wall and achieved realistic
blast void by using a combination of free faces in the pit
and underground
•• maximised contingency recovery options given the
dynamic nature of the south pit wall and transition pillar.
For extraction of the RL1650 Level STB, Option 4 was
selected because it:
•• provided the greatest volume and coverage of prefiring
void for the mass blast
•• maintained void stability, south wall integrity and did
not break out into the overlying pit, which would have
resulted in lower mine level ventilation impacts due to
short-circuiting
299
A T MCGRATH, A D CAMPBELL AND J B TUCKER
FIG 5 – Road map of extraction options for the transition ore block (SLC = sublevel cave).
•• maximised stability and allowed for continued safe access
to the mass blast area via RL1650 level access drives
•• achieved multiple firing fronts to reduce blast induced
ground vibrations and resultant damage to surrounding
infrastructure and development
•• enabled greater primary recovery of ore from RL1650 as
opposed to waiting for the material to report through the
cave at lower levels.
A zone of ore needed to be extracted from RL1650 prior
to initiation of the RL1650 STB mass firing. This ore block is
depicted in Figure 6. The first SLC production firing occurred
on 9 December 2011 at RL1650 Slot 7 in the south-west section
of the cave. Within the initial production zone, approximately
343 kt of ore was extracted from RL1650 via 32 m high uphole
rings to a predetermined exclusion zone. This exclusion zone
preserved access to the RL1650 STB by ensuring:
•• geotechnical stability of the pillar between RL1650 and the
south pit wall
•• the rill pile from fired drawpoints did not extend into
intersections, thus restricting access.
A reduced draw strategy of 40 per cent was applied to
production rings within this initial zone to build up the ore
blanket for air blast control and to delay ore dilution in levels
below.
When production ring extraction on RL1650 had reached
the exclusion zone, the decision was made to mine 25 m high
FIG 6 – Isometric view of RL1650 sublevel cave mining to the exclusion zone
looking south-east.
300 12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014
internal slots for transition blast void. These uphole retreat
rings were mined from south to north in ore drives (OD) 11,
17 and 23 on RL1650 as is shown in Figure 7. Selection of the
internal slot locations was based on equidistant distribution
of void for the RL1650 STB firing.
During the design of the internal slots, the following
assumptions were made:
•• all material north of the RL1650 West Access drive would
report to the pit or would remain in situ, thus, not affecting
available void for the remaining block
•• void calculations did not include development within the
internal slots due to leftover material from firings and an
inability to remote bog
•• the two southernmost rings in each OD would see the
cave to the south as the free face.
Consequently, groups of ODs were organised into block
panels for void analysis. Based on geotechnical stability
assessments of the slot crown and side walls, the ring draw
strategy was increased to 80 per cent or until the brow
‘cracked’ open. The lowest available void was 16 per cent for
RL1650 OD 21–29. The highest available void was 19 per cent
for RL1650 OD 15–19. Final brows were closed and the rill pile
was sprayed with shotcrete to protect personnel and preserve
access.
The remaining material between the pit and the RL1650 STB
was drilled, charged and fired in a single mass firing. This
FIG 7 – Isometric view of RL1650 internal slots for blast void
looking south-east.
 TRANSITION OF THE ERNEST HENRY MINE FROM OPEN PIT TO AN UNDERGROUND SUBLEVEL CAVE

is represented in Figure 8. The east and west transition ore
blocks were extracted independently. Details of the extraction
of the RL1650 STB are discussed in greater detail later in this
paper.
After mining of the transition block on RL1650, the RL1625
STB was scheduled for production. Based on Figure 5,
option 3 was selected. Previously detailed changes to the pit
mine design coupled with the anticipated heaving of broken
rock and resultant lack of free firing face from the RL1650
mass firing presented a transition block that was significantly
larger and more confined than expected. Figure 9 provides an
isometric diagram of the block sequence and methodology.
As opposed to the mass firing approach that was employed
for RL1650, RL1625 incorporated transverse and longitudinal
SLC retreat. Production commenced in the south-west section
of the RL1625 cave during RL1650 production. As with
RL1650, the initial RL1625 STB production zone was retreated
from south to north to a predetermined exclusion zone. Ring
extraction then commenced from the open pit in the north
via a slot rise and modified SLC rings. An initial ‘cross over’
firing was completed in the central OD of the block to link the
northern and southern transition zones. This firing assisted
with the management of principle stress and resultant damage
to the rock mass and ground control. A chevron retreat to the
west and east was achieved via a combination of SLC and
multiple ring firings across RL1625 drive intersections. The
final mining sequence for the STB has been summarised in
Figure 10.
RISK MANAGEMENT – DESIGN AND
OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS FOR
TRANSITION MINING TO DATE
Risk management was incorporated into every facet of the STB
design, preparation and extraction on RL1650 and RL1625. All
decisions were based on internally and externally reviewed
designs and risk assessments. A significant portion of the risk

FIG 8 – Isometric view of RL1650 Southern Transition Block looking south-east FIG 9 – Isometric view of RL1625 sublevel cave (SLC) and Southern Transition
(SLC = sublevel cave). Block mining sequence looking east.

FIG 10 – Long section view and summary of the Southern Transition Block mining sequence looking east
(schematic not to scale; SLC = sublevel cave) of the Ernest Henry Mine.

12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014 301
A T MCGRATH, A D CAMPBELL AND J B TUCKER
was managed during the execution of the RL1650 STB mass
firing. The following sections depict identified hazards and
implemented risk controls.
Reactive ground
Initial discovery of reactive ground occurred whilst mining
the pit in 2003. This classification of the EHM orebody was
extended for the underground mine. A maximum 42 day
sleep time was recommended by the explosives manufacturer
for the tested and selected explosives product. Therefore,
a strict drilling and charging schedule was established to
closely monitor and meet blasting deadlines.
Ground conditions, air blast and seismicity
Drilling and charging was conducted in deteriorating ground
conditions on RL1650. As time progressed and the SLC void
was advanced closer to the nominated exclusion zones on
RL1650 and RL1625, a number of completed and uncharged
drill holes could not be charged due to hole dislocation along
rock mass structures. Consequently, drilling was scheduled
as late as possible (ALAP) with immediate charging after an
adequate 10 m buffer distance was established.
In the lead up to the RL1650 STB mass firing, changes to
prescribed ground control standards were made after a large
seismic event resulted in multiple rock falls on RL1650 on
31 August 2012. The direct cause was fault slip along a large
scale structure that was triggered by continued cave retreat
and simultaneous firing of multiple production rings earlier
in the day. Remedial actions included:
•• reactive installation of mesh and split sets over existing
fibrecrete and resin grouted bolts on RL1650
•• cable bolting of similar large scale structures
•• additional instrumentation and monitoring devices
including extensometers, SMART cable bolts, systematic
damage mapping and camera surveys of open holes
•• enforcement of production blasting rules including a
limitation in the maximum number of production rings
initiated during end of shift firings and the cessation of
adjacent OD ring firings.
Later proactive changes to preserve drive integrity included:
•• pre-emptive installation of mesh and split sets over
fibrecrete and resin grouted bolts on RL1625 and future
SLC drives for deformation support
•• systematic mapping of all drive scale structures to
correlate with damage mapping observations
•• a change from square to semi-arched ore and slot drive
profiles
•• use of decoupled perimeter blasting product to reduce rock
mass damage from development blasting and improve
drive profiles to enable compressive load transfer.
Prior to initiating the RL1650 STB mass firing, premature
failure of the south pit wall was identified as resulting in
elevated air blast risk, additional rock mass and ground
control damage and increased STB blast confinement.
Numerical modelling and geotechnical analysis was
conducted to determine the optimal mining sequence and
exclusion zone to reduce the inclined crown pillar thickness
whilst maintaining a relatively stable south pit wall. For air
blast protection, cave draw points were kept closed with a
sufficient broken ore buffer established through the reduced
draw strategy for RL1650. Additional contingency STB blast
void was created through the mining of the internal slots in
RL1650 OD 11, 17 and 23. Consequently, block sequencing
302 12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014
and blast designs were devised to achieve controlled failure
of the south pit wall.
The risk associated with seismic events and subsequent
rock mass damage extended to the immediate period after
the RL1650 STB mass firing. It was expected there would
be a short-term increase in levels of seismicity, which was
directly proportional to the size of the firing. A delayed mine
re-entry based on observed seismicity levels (ie frequency
and magnitude) was enforced to ensure safety to personnel
entering the underground mine. Post-firing seismicity was
measured against a previously defined background level.
Background levels needed to be sustained for the six hour
time window to allow safe re-entry. As part of contingency
planning, in the event that prefiring background levels were
never realised, the Omori analysis method was to be used to
determine a new flat line trend in seismic behaviour.
Ground water and the wet season
The jointed rock mass coupled with proximity to the pit
resulted in a significant volume of ground water entering
production drill holes in the STB. This had a detrimental effect
on emulsion retention and detonator integrity, particularly
during the RL1650 STB mass firing. Controls included ALAP
charging, blast hole sleeving, detonator testing and collar
priming as a last resort. In the lead up period to the mass
firing, a number of trials were conducted by the explosives
manufacturer and EHM personnel to determine the correct
recipe.
For the RL1650 STB mass firing, the approaching wet season
and expected water ingress into the pit and underground
workings posed an additional risk. Introduction of significant
volumes of water into drill holes was identified as seriously
compromising product retention and detonator integrity.
Furthermore, removal of the RL1650 STB effectively removed
the barrier between the pit and the underground thus
allowing for a direct water conduit to lower mine levels. To
manage flooding events, a number of prerequisite activities
were simultaneously completed to provide sufficient post-
firing water storage and pumping capacity. These included:
•• completion of a series of drain holes and pipe runs linking
the mine’s drainage system to its emergency storm water
system
•• completion of the emergency water storage stopes,
construction of a 6 m thick concrete plug, and pipe work
to the main pump station on RL1325
•• excavation, installation and commissioning of the main
pump station on RL1325 and additional pump stations at
RL1600
•• construction and commissioning of four in-pit dewatering
pump stations and rising mains for capture of storm water
and its staged lifting to the surface storage dams.
Blast vibrations, over-pressure and gases
Damage caused by blast vibrations had the potential to
adversely impact underground drives and infrastructure
in close proximity to the RL1650 STB mass firing location.
In particular, damage to the RL1625 Fan Chambers was
unacceptable due to the potential for drive shaft and bearing
misalignment to the fan units and the resultant mechanical
damage sustained through continued operation (Campbell,
Lilley and Henley, 2011). A number of horizontal and vertical
near field (ie minimum distance of 10 m to a maximum distance
of 90 m) blast vibration measurements were recorded by
Dyno Nobel and EHM personnel prior to the mass firing. This
data was correlated with previous vibration data, including
 TRANSITION OF THE ERNEST HENRY MINE FROM OPEN PIT TO AN UNDERGROUND SUBLEVEL CAVE
FIG 11 – Comparison of blast vibration results.
far field measurements conducted by Campbell, Lilley and
Henley (2011). In Figure 11, it can be seen that based on the
distance and maximum instantaneous charge (MIC) weight
of the mass firing, the RL1625 Fan Chamber (far field) and
RL1625 OD’s (near field) have scaled distances of 18 and 3,
respectively. Therefore, the maximum vibration level that was
expected in the RL1625 Fan Chamber was less than 10 mm/s.
The risk of blast over-pressure and fly rock resulting from
the RL1650 STB mass firing had to be controlled. Figure 12
shows the straight line distances between the RL1650 STB,
pit shell and major surface infrastructure. A 500 m radius
surface exclusion zone was established around the RL1650
STB. Surface infrastructure that was unable to be moved
FIG 12 – Plan view of RL1650 Southern Transition Block mass firing in relation
to surface mine infrastructure.
12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014
(ie including in-pit dewatering pumps and substations at
Sumps 1 to 4) was shielded with fly rock barriers.
Critical underground infrastructure in close proximity to the
firing location included the RL1625 Fan Chambers housing the
two 1.6 MW mixed flow exhaust fans, RL1650 substation and
the main access decline. Containment of blast over-pressure
was via construction of 500 mm thick firing bulkheads in
addition to the placement of blast protection bunds and
shotcrete ribs in all underground accesses to the RL1650 STB
mass firing. Fans were replaced with cover plates in fresh air
rises and all essential services and ducting were stripped.
Although switched off during the blast, it was decided that
the primary exhaust fans should be ‘windmilling’ to minimise
the likelihood of bearing damage. The underground mobile
equipment fleet was removed from the mine for opportune
maintenance or parked in areas below RL1600 that were
identified as low risk for flooding and ground instability. A
truck, loader and telehandler were parked along the decline
between the RL1902 portal and RL1650 as a pre-emptive
measure for potential post-firing remedial works.
Due to the size of the RL1650 STB mass firing, a significant
volume and concentration of blast fumes was generated.
Whilst the majority of the fumes expelled into the pit, it
was decided that personnel would not re-enter the mine
for a minimum of 12 hours. Mine ventilation models and
simulations indicated that natural but restricted ventilation
would flow down the decline to RL1625. By sealing up the
RL1650 prior to firing, all efforts were made to contain the
blast gases to the area with minimal leakage into the rest of
the underground workings.
RL1650 MASS BLAST OVERVIEW, DESIGN AND
OPERATIONAL OUTCOMES
Overview
At 10.34 pm on 29 November 2012, a significant milestone
in the EHM transition mining phase was achieved when the
RL1650 STB mass firing was successfully initiated. In total,
893 258 t of in situ material was remotely initiated from the
surface. This material was unmined by the overlying pit and
303
A T MCGRATH, A D CAMPBELL AND J B TUCKER

formed the inclined crown pillar between the final pit shell
and the newly developed underground SLC mine.
The total block was accessed via conventional uphole and
horizontal drilling from RL1650. Atlas Copco Simba L6C and
Sandvik DL420-15C production drills were concurrently used
to complete 66 810 m of 102 mm diameter blast hole drilling.
Total redrills due to cleaning and reboring was approximately
16 per cent. Due to rig dump constraints, 5646 m of acute
(ie horizontal to 45° dump angle) 64 mm diameter blast hole
drilling was performed by an Atlas Copco Cabletec LC rig.
Charging commenced on 19 October 2013. Two Dyno Nobel
Mobile Processing Units and additional charge up operators
were deployed to site to assist with 24 hour blast hole
preparation and charging. A mine development Dyno Miner
unit was used as contingency for charging short and shallow
dumped 64 mm and 102 mm blast holes. In 41 days, 351 t of
Titan 7000SX emulsion with a density of 1.0 g/cc was primed
with 6026 SmartShot detonators. Primers were vertically
offset by a minimum of 2 m between adjacent holes to reduce
the risk of interaction. Primers were also located at least 1.5 m
back from the toe of breakthrough holes. As a minimum,
all holes were double primed as contingency for detonator
failure and to ensure full charge column initiation. Figure 13
shows a charged drive within the RL1650 STB. The RL1650
STB mass firing involved a multidirectional firing sequence
making it one of the largest and most complex underground
firings accomplished in Australia.
Dyno Nobel and EHM staff developed a timing solution
that enabled use of available void within the 20 000 ms system

FIG 13 – RL1650 Southern Transition Block charged rings in ore drive 19.

FIG 14 – Plan view of RL1650 Southern Transition Block firing directions.

304 12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014
 TRANSITION OF THE ERNEST HENRY MINE FROM OPEN PIT TO AN UNDERGROUND SUBLEVEL CAVE
limit. Figure 14 is a plan view representation of the firing
progression and the free face seen by each block of rings. In
Figure 14, the arrows indicate the direction of free face seen by
the fired ring and the circled letters are firing block reference
points. In devising the timing solution, single hole firing
was successfully achieved to reduce blast induced ground
vibrations. Over the entire blast duration, an MIC of 272.5 kg
was designed to occur at 7880 ms. The first hole was designed
to be fired in RL1650 Southern Transition Drive (STD) 01 at
2100 ms. All rings within the RL1650 STB access drives were
designed to be fired within 9665 ms (ie Block A) with 4 ms and
10 ms inter-hole delays between 64 mm and 102 mm holes,
respectively. A 5 ms offset was used between each adjacent
drive.
Rings within the RL1650 West Access and OD 17 used a
combination of open pit and RL1650 OD 17 internal slot void
as the designated ‘cross over’ point for firings (ie Block B).
The first two panels of rings in RL1650 OD 13–15 (Block C1)
and OD 19–21 (Block C2) sequentially fired into the southern
SLC and adjacent internal slot voids. Application of 5 ms
offsets between panels saw completion of this firing phase
at 13 690 ms using 10 ms inter-hole and 20 ms inter-ring
delays. Retreat was designed along the RL1650 West and East
Accesses using created void in RL1650 STD 01–05, OD 13–15
and OD 19–21 (Blocks D1, E1, D2 and E2). Rings were
progressively retreated in a ‘centre out’ approach by initially
using the southern SLC void and internal slots in RL1650
OD 11 and 23. Initiation of the final holes in the RL1650 east
and west was achieved at 17 755 ms (Block E2) and 19 000 ms
(Block E1), respectively.
Mass blast performance
Blast initiation occurred from the surface via wireless
communication link to the bench boxes. With an original plan
to fire at 8.00 am, the mine was fully cleared of personnel
and non-essential underground equipment by 6.00 am.
Throughout the day, failed attempts were made to initiate the
firing resulting in multiple re-entries to address issues within
the shot. The primary reason for these failed attempts was a
poor communication link between the base station and four
bench boxes via a repeater. Successful initiation was achieved
by removing the repeater and establishing an alternative
direct line of sight firing location.
Blast vibration measurements and seismic analysis were
conducted during the RL1650 STB mass firing. The measured
vibration level in RL1625 OD 14, which was 25 m below the
fired block, was 138 mm/sec. The measured vibration level in
the RL1625 Fan Chamber was 1.17 mm/sec. A comparison of
the actual and predicted results may be observed in Figure 11.
In the first 24 and 36 hours following the blast, there were
1065 and 1180 seismic events recorded, respectively. The
largest seismic event was 0.3 ML. In all, blast vibrations were
in line with predictions and seismicity consisted of many
small events due to the tensile failure mechanism and low
energy release during rock breakage in the cave back.
The immediate post-firing effects were not assessed until
12 hours later when the mine was re-entered at 10.34 am
on 30 November 2012. Following the blast, seismic activity
rapidly decreased allowing for earlier than expected re-entry
into both ‘low risk’ and ‘high risk’ areas. A preselected team
consisting of two mining superintendents, an electrician,
pumping technician, ventilation and geotechnical engineers
were briefed and completed a pretask risk assessment prior
to being deployed underground. In order of mine priority,
the team re-entered from the portal and cleared the decline
12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014
and level accesses for blast fumes, observed the satisfactory
condition of the main underground exhaust fans at the
RL1625 Fan Chambers and electrical switch room and checked
ground conditions in the closest drives to the RL1650 STB.
An engineering inspection of RL1650 identified a number
of detonators in the West Access and adjacent ODs that had
failed to initiate either due to hole cut-offs or disconnection
from the shot in the lead up to firing. These detonators were
repaired, reconnected and successfully refired following the
RL1650 STB mass firing.
Auditing and reconciliation of the final detonator counts
was undertaken off-site via downloading of the bench boxes.
The initial download was provided to EHM on 10 December
2012. Final reconciliation was received in February 2013. Both
sets of results indicated a significant variance in the actual
number of detonators fired versus plan. For the four bench
boxes, a total of 6531 detonators were planned in the initial
design. Due to deteriorating ground conditions and hole
loading issues, 6026 detonators were actually loaded into the
available blast holes.
On 9 February 2013, three significant seismic events ranging
from 1.0 ML to 1.8 ML occurred following the firing of
RL1625 OD 08. Further analysis of the RL1650 STB mass firing
detonator variance and interpretation of unfired and adjoining
blocks, which were fired under non-ideal conditions, indicated
the presence of remnant pillars above the RL1650 STB. As the
RL1625 OD rings were retreated to the north, these remnant
pillars were undercut resulting in destabilisation, failure and
vertical stress loading on remaining pillars. Figure 15 shows a
section view schematic of the STB and remnant pillars.
The stress redistribution depicted in Figure 15 resulted in
rock mass and ground control damage along the RL1625 and
RL1650. The immediate response involved isolation of RL1625,
pillar analysis and level damage mapping. A detailed ground
control rehabilitation plan was developed and scheduled to
achieve the most efficient re-access back into affected areas.
Following the seismic events, a number of holes had to be
redrilled and charged. A methodical approach was adopted
to charge, fire and bog RL1625 OD rings that were found to be
undercutting the remnant pillars. Strict post-firing mine and
level re-entry protocols were enforced to minimise personnel
exposure to seismic events. Omori graphs and flat line trends
were analysed to determine appropriate isolation times for
the duration of pillar undercutting.
Prior to the RL1650 STB mass firing, the Hydraulic Radius
(HR) was 12 m. The baseline condition of the south pit wall
may be seen in Figure 16. Following the mass firing, the HR
reached 28 m. Seismic activity and modelled displacement
FIG 15 – Section view of RL1650 Southern Transition Block and remnant pillars
looking east (schematic not to scale).
305
A T MCGRATH, A D CAMPBELL AND J B TUCKER
FIG 16 – South facing photo of the south pit wall on 22 April 2012
(hydraulic radius = 12 m).
FIG 17 – South facing photo of the south pit wall on 30 November 2012
(hydraulic radius = 28 m).
demonstrated that the cave hanging wall had begun to yield
(see Figure 17). However, a progressive stage of caving
expected with a predicted HR of 34 m (Campbell, 2013) had not
yet been reached. The continued retreat of RL1625 OD rings,
undercutting of RL1650 STB and the subsequent increase in
the HR resulted in significant south wall movement in the pit
in late May 2013. From 2 June 2013 until 25 June 2013, there
were a number of large and staggered toppling failures up
to RL1900 that were influenced by the relatively strong rock
mass and presence of Fault 2 parallel structures. These events
aligned with earlier predictions. A photo of the south pit wall
showing the cave propagation is shown in Figure 18.
KEY LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The intention of this paper is to document the lessons that have
been learnt during the transition mining phase. Should the
need to conduct a similar size or orientated block extraction
arise in the future, it is hoped that the following points will be
taken into consideration. Particular emphasis is given to the
RL1650 STB mass firing.
Positive outcomes included:
•• the coordinated and team-based approach between
personnel from different disciplines, backgrounds and
organisations
306 12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014
FIG 18 – South facing photo of the south pit wall on 25 June 2013
(hydraulic radius = 34 m).
•• successful initiation of the RL1650 STB mass firing within
the allowable sleep time limit and prior to damaging
seasonal rainfalls and significant south wall failure in the
pit
•• no immediate post blast damage to the rock mass
and ground control on RL1650, RL1625 and RL1600
underground access drives and excavations
•• air blast and concussion successfully controlled by firing
bulkheads and protection bunds on RL1650; blast gases
were contained on RL1650
•• the design MIC of 272.5 kg achieved through single hole
firings, which minimised blast vibrations; the entire
RL1650 STB mass firing achieved within firing system
time limits (ie 20 000 ms)
•• no blast damage incurred to mine infrastructure including
the 1.6 MW exhaust fans on RL1625 and the in-pit
dewatering pump stations
•• seismic activity successfully monitored and tracked as a
means of determining safe re-entry following the RL1650
STB mass firing; the mine fully re-entered within 16 hours
of firing, which was ahead of expectations
•• the performance of primary ground support and
reinforcement during the extraction of the RL1625 STB,
which was based on stress redistribution and resultant
deformation.
In retrospect, areas that could have been improved are
stated as follows:
•• selection of a dedicated team of personnel to manage the
project who were separate from daily operational roles
and requirements
•• commencing the detailed planning phase earlier so that
drill ring and horizontal development design align with
the finalised blasting concept; RL1650 development was
completed and ring design had started prior to selection
of the final blasting methodology
•• earlier prioritisation of charging activities to minimise
detonator and product sleep time
•• in the lead up to the RL1650 STB mass firing,
conducting actual production ring firings using wireless
communication link between the bench boxes and base
station via the repeater; ideally, this could have been
completed at the proposed surface firing position and may
have allowed for errors and shortcomings to be resolved
in advance
 TRANSITION OF THE ERNEST HENRY MINE FROM OPEN PIT TO AN UNDERGROUND SUBLEVEL CAVE
•• detonator checks by representatives from the contractor
and client prior to firing; prior understanding and formal
sign-off of significant deviation from the original plan
(eg what detonators were to be disconnected following
failed firing attempts)
•• on-site bench box download and detonator reconciliation
to facilitate quicker turnaround for post-blast analysis and
remediation
•• pre-event testing of all dewatering infrastructure and
fixtures
•• formalised project debrief with all key stakeholders.
THE JOURNEY AHEAD
At the time of writing, remaining transition ore blocks included
the southern and western transition blocks on RL1625 and the
RL1650 Eastern Transition Block. Table 1 provides a summary
of key features for these ore blocks.
TABLE 1
Remaining transition ore blocks.
Area Tonnes Mining method
1625 Southern 336 kt Combination of transverse (in
Transition Block a north and south direction)
and longitudinal sublevel cave
retreat
1625 Western 624 kt Transverse sublevel cave retreat
Transition Block from pit wall to the west
1650 Eastern 458 kt Transverse sublevel cave retreat
Transition Block from pit wall to the east
To date, the after effects of the RL1650 STB mass firing
have been managed. The remnant pillars from unfired
regions have been handled through controlled undercutting.
Unfired Smartshot detonators from the RL1650 STB present
an ongoing hazard and will continue to be managed through
misfire management and secondary breakage protocols. Areas
of concern have been identified based on cave flow modelling
and the post blast analysis and interpretation.
Steady state caving should be realised from May 2015. This
coincides with production of RL1600, RL1575 and RL1550
transverse SLC retreats beneath the pit and the cessation of
uphole retreating on RL1625. A total of 16 production levels
shall take the SLC down to RL1200. Each level will produce
an average of 3.7 Mt. The draw strategy will range from
40 per cent (ie for southern production rings close to the
12TH AUSIMM UNDERGROUND OPERATORS’ CONFERENCE / ADELAIDE, SA, 24–26 MARCH 2014
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hanging wall) to greater than 160 per cent (ie deeper in the
mine and closer to the foot wall).
CONCLUSIONS
The transition of EHM from open pit to underground SLC
operation has been a challenging and complex undertaking.
Site personnel have coordinated with a range of external
parties to achieve the desired outcomes. The governing
factor to achieving the objectives has been meeting deadlines
associated with explosives sleep times, deteriorating ground
conditions and the looming threat of rainfall.
The RL1650 STB was one of the largest known firings
conducted in an Australian underground metalliferous
mine. The blast was successfully initiated via wireless
communication link with all personnel and equipment
removed from the immediate vicinity. No direct blast damage
was sustained to surface or underground infrastructure. As a
result of this firing, a large section of the inclined crown pillar
between the pit and underground mine was fragmented
and formed an ore blanket for air blast management and
prevention of early waste dilution.
Status The extraction method was altered for RL1625 STB due to
confinement and completed level development. By applying
In progress until
lessons learnt from the RL1650 STB mass firing, this phase
September 2014
of transition mining has progressed according to plan.
During the next year, the remaining transition ore blocks will
continue to be removed as supplementary and independent
In progress until underground ore feed to the conventional transverse SLC
November 2015 production.
Producing from
December 2013 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
until October 2014 The authors wish to acknowledge and thank Glencore
Xstrata and Dyno Nobel for supporting and approving the
publication of this paper. In addition, gratitude is expressed
to the many mine site personnel and industry experts who
have contributed towards the ongoing safe and efficient
extraction of the transition ore blocks.
REFERENCES
Campbell, A, 2013. Cave management plan, internal document,
Ernest Henry Mine, pp 27–31.
Campbell, A, Lilley, C and Henley, K, 2011. Prevention of blast
induced damage at EHM, in Proceedings EXPLO Conference 2011,
pp 1–14 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy:
Melbourne).
Department of Employment, Economic Development and
Innovation, 2009. North West Queensland Mineral Province
[online]. Available from: <http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/
assets/tenders/nwqmp_map_2.pdf> [Accessed: 1 October 2013].
307