PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN II G.R. No.

152662
G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN

FACTS:
Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against
the respondent, Pangilinan on September 16, 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
On December 5, 1997, a civil case was commenced by Pangilinan against Malolos for accounting,
recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance
before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City.
Five days thereafter or on December 10, 1997, Pangilinan filed a “Petition to Suspend Proceedings on
the Ground of Prejudicial Question” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as
basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The City Prosecutor
approved the petition upon the recommendation of the assistant City Prosecutor on March 2, 1998.
Malolos appealed the decision of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice. On January 5, 1999,
reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of informations on violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg.22. Said cases were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on
November 18, 1999.
Pangilinan filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.

HELD:
No, the action has not prescribed.
Act No. 3326 entitled “An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin,” as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg.
22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment
for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days
but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera (G.R. No. 80116)

Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling,
a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously
enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set
in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage,
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there
was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.

On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other
hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named
James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the
order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper.

Held: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power
to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence,
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, thus, presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the
time he filed suit.
24 DIMATULAC v VILLON

Facts:
§ In the prosecution of the Yabuts for the murder of Dimatulac, the Office of the Public Prosecutor
(particularly the Asst Prosecutor) and two Judges (who handled the case) committed serious procedural
flaws resulting in the impairment of due process (prejudicial to both the offended party and the
accused).
§ Procedural irregularities in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor:
o Warrants of arrest were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended, but the Yabuts were not
arrested or were never brought unto the custody of the law. Yet, Asst Fiscal Alfonso-Reyes conducted a
reinvestigation. Though a prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation (and conduct his own), the circumstance that the accused waived the filing of
their counter-affidavits left Alfonso-Reyes no other choice but to sustain the MCTC findings—which she
did not do. And later on, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the Yabuts to file their counter-affidavits without first
demanding that they surrender by virtue of the standing warrants of arrest.
o Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of 20k for the Yabuts despite the fact that they were charged of
homicide and that they were fugitives from justice (having avoided service of warrant of arrest).
o Alfonso-Reyes was aware of the private prosecution’s appeal to the DOJ from her resolution. (The
subsequent resolution of the DOJ Secretary exposed her blatant errors.) And despite the pending
appeal, she filed the Information. It would be more prudent to wait for the DOJ resolution.
o Office of the Prosecutor did not even inform the trial court of the pending appeal to the DOJ
Secretary.
§ Judge Roura’s procedural lapses:
o Deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until “such time that all the accused
who are out on bail are arraigned”
o Denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that “private prosecution has not shown any
indication that the appeal was given due course by DOJ”
§ Judge Villon’s procedural lapses:
o Ordered arraignment despite: a motion to defer proceedings; a ten-day period with which the
complainants can file petition with the CA; resolution of the CA ordering the Yabuts to comment on the
complainants’ action; pending appeal with the DOJ.

Issue:
Can the orders of Judge Roura and Judge Villon be sustained despite procedural defects?

Held:
No. The orders of Judge Roura denying Motion to Defer proceedings are void and set aside. The order of
Judge Villon on the arraignment, and the subsequent arraignment of the Yabuts are void and set aside.
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is ordered to comply with the DOJ Secretary’s resolution.

Prosecutors are the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. They are
servants of the law whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape and innocence shall not suffer.
The judge “should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice”. The judge’s action must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party.

When the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the case is void.

Leviste v. Alameda, et. al., G.R. No. 182677, Aug. 3, 2010

Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with homicide
for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private
complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the
motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial
court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty"
for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti
Cautela, which the trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is
not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial
court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an
appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a
preliminary investigation.

Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to
whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant
might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the
same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder
after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did not,
however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended
charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to
actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.

G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010 Leviste v. CA, et al. Digest Corono, J.:

FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in
the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should
be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an
appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

HELD:
Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of
discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the
absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court.
We disagree.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary.
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same
thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion.
 Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court
has the discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent
discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If
it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion
or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise
of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on
the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Choice occurs where, between “two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker.” On the other hand, the
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the
appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for
bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that
“upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.”
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to
read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final conviction be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases
before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning theeffectivity of
the bail of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out
on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the
complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994
which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit
the accused to bail.
 Denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.”
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the
risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.