1.

Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 257 SCRA 430 , June 18,
1996
Case Title : MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A.
ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division, DENR,
respondents., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TERESITA
DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, and RI CHUY PO, respondents., MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special
Actions and Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and
FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., respondents.Case Nature : PETITIONS for
review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Administrative Law|Criminal Procedure|Constitutional
Law|Natural Resources|Forestry Laws|Illegal Logging|Revised Forestry Code
of the Philippines (P.D. 705)|Informations|Motion to
Quash|IllegalLogging|Words and Phrases|Statutory
Construction|Constitutional Law|Searches and Seizures|Search
Warrants|Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. 705)
Syllabi:
1. Administrative Law; Natural Resources; Forestry Laws; Illegal
Logging; Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. 705); Under
an administrative seizure, the owner retains the physical possession of the
seized articles.-
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the
owner retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an
inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his
representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further
orders.
2. Criminal Procedure; Informations; Motion to Quash; The test for the
correctness of the ground that the facts alleged in the information do not
constitute an offense is the sufficiency of the averments in the information,
that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of the offense.-
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an
information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do
not constitute an offense. It has been said that “the test for the correctness
of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is,
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements
of the offense, and matters aliunde will not be considered.” Anent the
sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense.
3. Administrative Law; Natural Resources; Forestry
Laws; IllegalLogging; Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D.
705); Words and Phrases; Possession of lumber without the required legal
documents is penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 because lumber is
included in the term timber.-
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an
affirmance of the respondent Judge’s conclusion that lumber is excluded
from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus
possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On
the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said
section because lumber is included in the term timber.
4. Administrative Law; Natural Resources; Forestry
Laws; IllegalLogging; Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D.
705); Words and Phrases; Simply put, lumber is processed log or timber.-
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of
Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of “Processing plant,” which reads: (aa) Processing plant is any
mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the
processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished
wood products. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as “timber or logs
after being prepared for the market.” Simply put, lumber is a processed log
or timber.
5. Administrative Law; Natural Resources; Forestry
Laws; IllegalLogging; Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D.
705); Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; In the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should
be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.-
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words
and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither
should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
6. Administrative Law; Natural Resources; Forestry
Laws; IllegalLogging; Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D.
705); Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Seizure of a truck
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber not accompanied with the required
invoices and transport documents is a valid exercise of the power vested
upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705; A search
could be lawfully conducted on a moving vehicle without a search warrant.-
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner’s truck with Plate
No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner’s lumberyard loaded with
lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The
seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested
upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended
by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a
moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a search
warrant.
7. Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Exceptions to the
constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by
virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause.-
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions
to the constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except
by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are: (1) search as an
incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs
searches, and (4) consented warrantless search.
8. Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; A
search warrant has a lifetime of ten days and it could be served at any time
within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in
one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until
completed.-
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April
1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990
by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any
time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be
accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day or
days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day
was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following
day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.
9. Administrative Law; Natural Resources; Forestry Laws; Illegal
Logging; Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. 705); Where
a lumber-dealer’s license or permit has been suspended, he has absolutely
no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber and the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources or his authorized representative has the
authority to seize the lumber.-
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner’s appeal from the
judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never
disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer’s license or permit had been
suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was
never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September
1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise
dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized
representative had the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-
A of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
10. Criminal Procedure; Informations; Motion to Quash; While
generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh in
resolving a motion to quash, there should, however, be no serious objections
to taking into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not
made out in the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the
parties.-
While generally factual matters outside of the information should not weigh
in resolving a motion to quash following the standing rule that the
allegations of the information must alone be considered and should not be
challenged, there should, however, be no serious objections to taking into
account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not made out in
the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties.

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 104988, G.R. No. 106424, G.R. No. 123784

Counsel: Francisco D. Estrada

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR

Dispositive Portion:
Petition in G.R. No. 106424 granted, while that in G.R. No. 104988 and G.R.
No. 123784 denied.

1.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform 541 SCRA 304 , December 21, 2007
Case Title : ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES, petitioner, vs.
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM and DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR (Region
V), respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Agrarian Reform|Statutory Construction|Retention
Limits|Ownership|Words and Phrases|Donations
Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 139285

Counsel: Padilla Law Office, The Solicitor General

Ponente: VELASCO, JR.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the February 4, 1999
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 48282.

1.
Paredes vs. Feed the Children Philippines, Inc. 770 SCRA 203 ,
September 09, 2015
Case Title : ROSALINDA G. PAREDES, petitioner, vs. FEED THE CHILDREN
PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or DR. VIRGINIA LAO, HERCULES PARADIANG and
BENJAMIN ESCOBIA, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on
certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Resignation ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; The level of protection to labor should vary from case to
case; otherwise, the state might appear to be too paternalistic in affording
protection to labor.-
—It is settled that the law serves to equalize the unequal. The labor force is
a special class that is constitutionally protected because of the inequality
between capital and labor. This constitutional protection presupposes that
the labor force is weak. However, the level of protection to labor should vary
from case to case; otherwise, the state might appear to be too paternalistic
in affording protection to labor. Petitioner could not expect to have the same
level of ardent protection that the laws bestow upon a lowly laborer be given
to her, a high ranking officer of respondent FTCP. As proven, she was
considered on equal footing with her employer and even had the occasion to
demand the renewal of her contract by sending an e-mail to the
organization’s founder.
2. Labor Law; Appeals; The findings of facts and conclusion of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are generally accorded not only great
weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on the
Supreme Court (SC) as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
However, if the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter (LA) and the NLRC are
conflicting, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for
itself the questioned findings.-
—It is elementary that this Court is not a trier of facts, and only errors of law
are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari. Judicial review of
labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which its labor officials’ findings rest. As such, the findings of
facts and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great
weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this
Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. However, if the
factual findings of the LA and the NLRC are conflicting, as in this case, the
reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the
questioned findings. The exception, rather than the general rule, applies in
the present case since the LA and the CA found facts supporting the
conclusion that petitioner was not constructively dismissed, while the NLRC’s
factual findings contradicted the LA’s findings. Under this situation, such
conflicting factual findings are not binding on us, and we retain the authority
to pass on the evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom.
3. Same; Same; Courts generally accord great respect and finality to
factual findings of administrative agencies, like labor tribunals, in the
exercise of their quasi-judicial function.-
—Courts generally accord great respect and finality to factual findings of
administrative agencies, like labor tribunals, in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial function. However, this doctrine espousing comity to administrative
findings of facts are not infallible and cannot preclude the courts from
reviewing and, when proper, disregarding these findings of facts when
shown that the administrative body committed grave abuse of discretion.
4. Same; Same; Court of Appeals; In labor cases elevated to it via
petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals (CA) is empowered to evaluate
the materiality and significance of the evidence alleged to have been
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in relation to all other evidence on record.-
—It is settled that in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the
issues are limited to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
However, in labor cases elevated to it via petition for certiorari, the CA is
empowered to evaluate the materiality and significance of the evidence
alleged to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by
the NLRC in relation to all other evidence on record.
5. Same; Same; Same; The Court of Appeals (CA), by express legal
mandate and pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, may review factual findings
and evidence of the parties to determine whether the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) gravely abused its discretion in its findings.-
—Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the CA, by express legal mandate and
pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, may review factual findings and evidence
of the parties to determine whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
in its findings. Since this Court finds that the findings of the LA and NLRC
contradicting and that the findings of NLRC are not supported by the
evidence on record, we rule that it is within the CA’s power to review the
factual findings of the NLRC. Accordingly, this Court does not find erroneous
the course that the CA took in resolving that petitioner was not
constructively dismissed.
6. Same; Termination of Employment; Constructive Dismissal; Case
law holds that constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation
of work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or
diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or
disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.-
—Case law holds that constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation
of work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in
pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee. The test is whether a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to
give up his position under the circumstances. In this case, petitioner cannot
be deemed constructively dismissed. She failed to present clear and positive
evidence that respondent FTCP, through its Board of Trustees, committed
acts of discrimination, insensibility, or disdain towards her which rendered
her continued employment unbearable or forced her to terminate her
employment from the respondent. As settled, bare allegations of
constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record,
cannot be given credence.
7. Same; Same; Resignation; Such rule requiring an employee to stay or
complete the thirty (30)-day period prior to the effectivity of his resignation
becomes discretionary on the part of management as an employee who
intends to resign may be allowed a shorter period before his resignation
becomes effective.-
—We held that the act of the employer moving the effectivity of the
resignation is not an act of harassment. The 30-day notice requirement for
an employee’s resignation is actually for the benefit of the employer who has
the discretion to waive such period. Its purpose is to afford the employer
enough time to hire another employee if needed and to see to it that there is
proper turnover of the tasks which the resigning employee may be handling.
Such rule requiring an employee to stay or complete the 30-day period prior
to the effectivity of his resignation becomes discretionary on the part of
management as an employee who intends to resign may be allowed a
shorter period before his resignation becomes effective.
8. Same; In protecting the rights of the workers, the law does not authorize
the oppression or self-destruction of the employer.-
—We held that the law and jurisprudence guarantee security of tenure to
every employee. However, in protecting the rights of the workers, the law
does not authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer. Social
justice does not mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be
decided in favor of labor. Thus, the Constitution and the law equally
recognize the employer’s right and prerogative to manage its operation
according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play.

Division: THIRD DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 184397

Counsel: E.B. Ramos & Associates for respondents.

Ponente: PERALTA

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari, dated October 23, 2008,
of petitioner Rosalinda G. Paredes is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly,
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated March 25, 2008, that
petitioner was not constructively dismissed, is hereby AFFIRMED. However,
the awards of P34,438.37 and P109,208.36 for the unpaid debt of petitioner
and reimbursement of the FTCP Provident Fund, respectively, are hereby
SET ASIDE.

1.
Pelizloy Realty Corporation vs. Province of Benguet 695 SCRA 491 ,
April 10, 2013
Case Title : PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its
President, GREGORY K. LOY, petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET,
respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Br. 62.
Syllabi Class : Taxation|Percentage Tax|Amusement Tax|Local Government
Units
Syllabi:
1. Taxation; The power to tax “is an attribute of sovereignty,” and as
such, inheres in the State. Such, however, is not true for provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays as they are not the
sovereign; rather, they are mere “territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines.”-
—The power to tax “is an attribute of sovereignty,” and as such, inheres in
the State. Such, however, is not true for provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays as they are not the sovereign; rather, they are mere “territorial
and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines.” The rule
governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
is summarized in Icard v. City Council of Baguio: It is settled that a
municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent
power of taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power
when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against
the municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions—all these—have no
place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation.
2. Same; Same; Same; Resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs
and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they
cannot be considered as among the ‘other places of amusement’
contemplated by Section 140 of the Local Government Code and which may
properly be subject to amusement taxes.-
—As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means “a
spectacle or display of something, typically an impressive one”; while
‘performance’ means “an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or
other form of entertainment.” As such, the ordinary definitions of the words
‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only visual engagement (i.e., the
seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging
or presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and (correspondingly)
perceived by an audience. Considering these, it is clear that resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be
considered venues primarily “where one seeks admission to entertain oneself
by seeing or viewing the show or performances”. While it is true that they
may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily
venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present
shows and/or performances. Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that
they cannot be considered as among the ‘other places of amusement’
contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject
to amusement taxes.
3. Same; Same; Same; In Philippine Basketball Association v. Court of
Appeals, 337 SCRA 358 (2000), the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
interpret a starkly similar provision or the counterpart provision of Section
140 of the Local Government Code in the Local Tax Code then in effect.-
—In Philippine Basketball Association v. Court of Appeals, 337 SCRA 358
(2000), the Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret a starkly similar
provision or the counterpart provision of Section 140 of the LGC in the Local
Tax Code then in effect. Petitioner Philippine Basketball Association (PBA)
contended that it was subject to the imposition by LGUs of amusement taxes
(as opposed to amusement taxes imposed by the national government). In
support of its contentions, it cited Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 231,
otherwise known as the Local Tax Code of 1973, (which is analogous to
Section 140 of the LGC).
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 140, Local Government Code (R.A.
No. 7160) expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement
taxes on “the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement.” However,
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not
among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the Local
Government Code as being subject to amusement taxes.-
—Evidently, Section 140 of the LGC carves a clear exception to the general
rule in Section 133 (i). Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by
provinces of amusement taxes on “the proprietors, lessees, or operators of
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of
amusement.” However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs,
and tourist spots are not among those places expressly mentioned by
Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the
determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots hinges
on whether the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ encompasses resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.
5. Same; Same; Amusement Tax; Local Government Units; Provinces
are not barred from levying amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are
a form of percentage taxes.-
—Amusement taxes are fixed at a certain percentage of the gross receipts
incurred by certain specified establishments. Thus, applying the definition in
CIR v. Citytrust and drawing from the treatment of amusement taxes by the
NIRC, amusement taxes are percentage taxes as correctly argued by
Pelizloy. However, provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes
even if amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. Section 133 (i) of
the LGC prohibits the levy of percentage taxes “except as otherwise
provided” by the LGC.
6. Same; Percentage Tax; National Internal Revenue Code (R.A. No.
8424); Words and Phrases; In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Citytrust Investment Phils. Inc., 503 SCRA 398 (2006), the Supreme
Court defined percentage tax as a “tax measured by a certain
percentage of the gross selling price or gross value in money of
goods sold, bartered or imported; or of the gross receipts or earnings
derived by any person engaged in the sale of services.”-
—In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Citytrust Investment Phils., Inc.,
503 SCRA 398 (2006), the Supreme Court defined percentage tax as a “tax
measured by a certain percentage of the gross selling price or gross value in
money of goods sold, bartered or imported; or of the gross receipts or
earnings derived by any person engaged in the sale of services.” Also,
Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC), in Section 125, Title V, lists amusement taxes as among the
(other) percentage taxes which are levied regardless of whether or not a
taxpayer is already liable to pay value-added tax (VAT).
7. Same; Constitutional Law; Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, “the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on
Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy
taxes, fees and other charges.”-
—Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, “the power to tax is no
longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given
direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges.” Nevertheless, such
authority is “subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide.” In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and
fiscal matters. Relevant provisions of Book II of the LGC establish the
parameters of the taxing powers of LGUS found below. First, Section 130
provides for the following fundamental principles governing the taxing
powers of LGUs: 1. Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU. 2. Taxes, fees,
charges and other impositions shall: a. be equitable and based as far as
practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay; b. be levied and collected only
for public purposes; c. not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
d. not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in the
restraint of trade. 3. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other
impositions shall in no case be let to any private person. 4. The revenue
collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall inure solely to the
benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee,
charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided by the LGC.
5. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
8. Same; The power of a province to tax is limited to the extent that such
power is delegated to it either by the Constitution or by statute.-
—The power of a province to tax is limited to the extent that such power is
delegated to it either by the Constitution or by statute. Section 5, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution is clear on this point: Section 5. Each local
government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues
and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the
local governments.

Division: THIRD DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 183137

Counsel: Oracion, Barlis & Associates

Ponente: LEONEN, J.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The second
paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of
2005, in so far as it imposes amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots, is declared null
and void. Respondent Province of Benguet is permanently enjoined from
enforcing the second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Benguet
Provincial Revenue Code of 2005 with respect to resorts, swimming pools,
bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.

San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Phil. Transport and General

Workers Org. vs. San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union-
Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino 533 SCRA 125 ,
September 12, 2007
Case Title : SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION– PHILIPPINE
TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (SMCEU–PTGWO),
petitioner, vs. SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION–
PAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SMPPEU–PDMP),
respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Labor Law|Labor Unions|Federations|Locals or
Chapters|Words and Phrases|Trade Union Center|Statutes|Statutory
Construction
Division: THIRD DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 171153

Counsel: Arnel Z. Dolendo, Raymundo G. Hipolito III

Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 09 March
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 66200 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Certificate of Registration of San Miguel Packaging Products
Employees Union–Pambansang Diwa ng Ma nggagawang Pilipino is
ORDERED CANCELLED, and SMPPEU-PDMP DROPPED from the rolls of
legitimate labor organizations.

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue 492 SCRA 192 , June 22, 2006
Case Title : SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.Case Nature :
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Pleadings and Practice|Taxation|Verification|Corporation
Law|Procedural Rules and Technicalities|Tax Exemptions|Statutory
Construction|Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
Syllabi:
1. Pleadings and Practice; Verification; A pleading required to be verified
which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.-
Under Rule 43, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals should
be verified. A pleading required to be verified which lacks proper verification
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Moreover, a petition for review
under Rule 43 requires a sworn certification against forum shopping. Failure
of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements of a petition for
review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
2. Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Corporation Law; Physical acts
for a corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by
natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by
specific act of the board of directors.-
A corporation may exercise the powers expressly conferred upon it by the
Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its
existence through its board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and
agents. Hence, physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be
performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by
corporate by-laws or by specific act of the board of directors. In the absence
of authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the officers of
the corporation, can bind the corporation.
3. Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Corporation Law; Procedural
Rules and Technicalities;Substantial compliance will not suffice in a
matter involving strict observance such as the requirement on non-forum
shopping, as well as verification.-
Neither can the Court subscribe to SPMC’s claim of substantial compliance or
to its plea for a liberal application of the rules. Save for the most persuasive
of reasons, strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate
the orderly administration of justice. Substantial compliance will not suffice
in a matter involving strict observance such as the requirement on non-
forum shopping, as well as verification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.
4. Taxation; Tax Exemptions; Nowhere in the language of the exempting
clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code did it provide that the
exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated therein or
the manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the
exemption.-
The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code
was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope,
coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in
their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or
products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller
himself. The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the
interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the
exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the
exempting clause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials
was covered by the exemption. Since SPMC’s situation was not within the
ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% miller’s tax imposed under
Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
5. Taxation; Tax Exemptions; Statutory Construction; Expressio
Unius Est Exclusio Alterius; The rule is that the exemption must not be so
enlarged by construction since the reasonable presumption is that the State
has granted in express terms all it intended to grant and that, unless the
privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute, the favor would be
intended beyond what was meant—expressio unius est exclusio alterius.-
SPMC’s proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the scope of the exemption
clause. The rule is that the exemption must not be so enlarged by
construction since the reasonable presumption is that the State has granted
in express terms all it intended to grant and that, unless the privilege is
limited to the very terms of the statute, the favor would be intended beyond
what was meant. Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon
which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those
not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that
is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that
does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the
statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that
the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it
had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.

Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 147749

Counsel: Catapang, Tiongco, Torres and Martin, The Solicitor General

Ponente: CORONA

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner.