Strategic Political

Communication

It is argued that political communication has gone through a

process of transformation. The transformation is depicted
in Figure 1.1, but the chapter contextualises the
transformation within current literature and practices of
political communication. Political communication is argued
to have simultaneously passed through three interconnected
processes: professionalisation, mediatisation and
marketisation. These processes are argued to have shaped
the strategies and tactics of political commu- nicators and
have had a profound impact upon the publics’ levels of
trust, engagement and participation. The professionalisation
of political communication describes the way that politics
has adapted to new forms and styles of communication and
new means of transmission in order to reach their
audience. It is argued that professionalisation is driven by
media, and adapting to the communication forms of media;
we find ourselves today in the hypermedia age, with the
Internet competing against television as the prime vehicle
for political communication. Whether this changes the
substance of political communication, the content of the
message or just the presentation style will be explored
further in this chapter. Secondly, and related to
professionalisation, we turn to mediatisation. Mediatisation
describes the process by which political communicators
adapt to the working practices and patterns of journalists
and editors in order to gain coverage. The adaptation to the
demands of the media is linked to, as well as in some cases
competes with, the notion of marketisation. Scholars within
the field of political marketing literature argue that, in terms
of design of policy, messages and slogans, and the means of
communicating, it is the market, the consumers or audience
that hold the power. All communication is thus highly
strategic, designed with impact in mind, and these broad
theo- ries that help to explain the development of political
communication
will be used to contextualise cognition and the processes by which
we receive political communication and what impact it has upon
us.

The professionalisation of political communication

Colin Seymour-Ure (1977) suggested that political

organisations adapt their communication to suit the
dominant media of the day. This process of adaptation can
lead to a simple re-orientation of communication or to
significant changes to the organisation itself. Media is not
the only imperative, however. The importance of the media
is driven by soci- etal changes and the relationships
between society and political organi- sations. Since the
1960s there has been a decrease in partisan loyalty, referred
to as dealignment, with an attendant increase in voters
willing to change their allegiances, and so voting
behaviour, between election
contests (Lilleker, 2002; Clarke et al., 2004). More recently,
electoral political organisations find themselves competing
with a range of single issue pressure groups that, enjoying
celebrity support and tapping into highly emotive local,
national or global issues, are able to drain support and
activism away from electoral political organisations
constrained by realpolitik (Rodgers, 2005; Micheletti,
2003). The 21st century commu- nication environment is
highly cluttered with multiple sources of information,
catering for every niche interest. The plethora of televi-
sion stations, newspapers, magazines, websites, Facebook
accounts and Twitter feeds all constantly add to the clutter.
To be heard is a challenge. This section maps academic
works on the evolution of political commu- nication,
campaigning and electioneering in order to provide an over-
view of how we now understand these as professionalised
activities.
In terms of the adaptations of political communication
across the last half century, Norris’ (2000) typology is in
this context a useful heuristic. While the terminology is
much contested, in particular the characterisa- tion of eras
as pre-modern, modern and post-modern (Negrine, 2008),
her schematic reinforces a shared conceptualisation of
change within a historical timeframe that elides with studies
that introduce campaigning ages (Blumler, 1990), campaign
styles (Gibson & Rommele, 2001), market orientations
(Lees-Marshment, 2001) or organisational styles (Katz &
Mair, 2002).
The first or pre-modern age, prominent until the 1950s,
was a time of easy access to a largely deferent media; voters
held fairly stable partisan attachments and so parties could
stand largely on a consistent prod- uct-oriented platform.
The platform was designed around clear ideo- logical
precepts and presented to citizens as the ‘right’ choice for
the country. Campaigns were local affairs, run by
decentralised volunteer groups. This was the era of mass
membership and so a labour-intensive campaign was both
tenable and appropriate. Core to the pre-modern campaign
were the face-to-face elements, public meetings, street
rallies and doorstep campaigning. While these remain
visible (Nielsen, 2012), they have become peripheral
elements. It is important to note the pre- modern age was
not simply a time of amateurism: Wring’s (2005) history of
the UK Labour Party, and observations from the US at the
turn of the century (Scammell, 1995) show clear evidence
of strategic thinking and professionalism. However,
arguably cognition was a much more simple process. The
strong relationship between the voter and a party led to
internal negotiations based on the belief that the party or
leader knew best. While it is true that not all voters were
lifelong partisans, there were no cases where the voter felt
that the party had moved away
from its core principles, so abandoning their vote. The
stability of voter allegiance did not necessitate highly
persuasive environments; rather, election campaigns were
built around statements of key aims reinforced with strong
local face-to-face communication.
Television is argued to have ushered in the modern era or
second age of political communication (Blumler &
Kavanagh, 1999). This led to campaigns developing a more
national character, and the beginning of a centralisation
of strategy and a professionalisation of communica- tion.
With partisan loyalty noticeably declining (Manza et al.,
1995), campaigning became more sales-oriented, focused
upon converting and persuading voters while also getting
the loyalists out to vote on election day (Lees-Marshment,
2001). Rather than focusing on the partisan press, radio,
posters and interpersonal communication, television became
the key medium, supported by targeted direct mail.
Television gave politics a more visual dimension. In
particular the image of leaders became more important for
voters when evaluating who to support (Keeter, 1987).
Voters had to be convinced that a leader was trustworthy
and possessed the abilities to lead the nation (Bean &
Mughan, 1989; Pillai et al., 2003). Thus persuasion became
predominant within political communication, and
advertising and public relations specialists were given key
roles in designing both the strategy and tactics for
campaigning (Wring, 1999).
The 1990s saw a further ramping up of
professionalisation, ushering in the post-modern campaign
era. Political organisations adopted a market orientation to
their communication, as well as to some extent the design
of key political messages and policy priorities (Lees-
Marshment, 2001). Citizens became likened to consumers,
demanding in their expectations but fickle with loyalty; so
requiring that parties tailor their programme for the delivery
of satisfaction to a core demographic. In multi-party
systems this may not be problematic, but in the UK and
the US particularly this leads to the production of very
broad delivera- bles that match the preferences of a majority
of citizens. Post-modern campaigns also became more
targeted, narrowcasted via direct channels of
communication; these channels incorporated the mass
media as well as direct communication via email, online
forums and intranets (Norris, 2000). Targeting aids the
delivery of specific messages about promises to specific
voter groups. In addition, political organisations adopted
a more bifurcated strategy for their campaigning; while the
central campaign command set out the core messages,
communication was also the responsibility of local
organisations, in particular the use of local email lists,
intranets for party members, and localised member forums
(Gibson & Rommele, 2001; Katz & Mair, 2002; Norris,
2000). Over time,
local organisations would also be partially responsible
for using social networking and microblogging tools to
reinforce and make locally rele- vant the national
campaign strategy (Southern & Ward, 2011).
The extent to which the third or post-modern age is
becoming the age of the Internet, as previous eras were
interpersonal or television ages, is a moot point. Campaigns
have clearly been adapted to a digital media landscape
characterised by ‘abundance, ubiquity, reach and celerity’
(Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999: 213). However, it is argued
that even in 2011, it is the 24/7 mass media that remains
dominant for campaigns across Europe (Lusoli, 2005), as
well as in the US during the most recent presidential
campaigns (Smith, 2011). Yet we find new ways of char-
acterising campaigning that are designed specifically for the
integra- tion of the online environment. Howard (2006)
defines the adaption of political communication to the
social uses of digital communica- tion technologies as
ushering in the era of the hypermedia campaign. Howard
argues that political communication is now relayed across a
wide range of outlets simultaneously, thereby meeting the
demands of a 24/7 news, and a global online audience
(Davis, 2010). Any single item of content will be tailored
for multiple forms of consumption and disseminated in
ways that can be collected by journalists, supporters or web
browsers alike at multiple communication junctions. While
there will be an informational component, retaining the
persuasive emphasis to messages, a range of interactive
actions are also facilitated. Items are created to allow ease
of sharing to facilitate messages going viral across the
Internet (Boynton, 2009), and political organisations may
find value in permitting the online audience to comment on
and adapt messages. We therefore find political
communication now existing not within a broadcasting
environment, involving dissemination, but within an
ecosystem. Media feed media, from YouTube to main news
channels, from newspapers to Twitter and back (Chadwick,
2011). This hybrid- ised media environment may be
converting passive audiences into active participants,
although it is suggested that this occurs only among a
minority (Norris, 2003; Norris & Curtice, 2008; Hindman,
2009). Regardless it provides a more complex agora, where
multiple voices compete for attention, where multiple
messages can be read, adapted and further disseminated,
where official and unofficial communication may be
blurring, and where persuasion is harder to achieve.
Howard argues that the hypermedia campaign must
allow for and expect the ‘decomposition and
recomposition of messages’ (Howard, 2006: 2). These
communicative processes permit co-ownership of
communication across a wider agora and for reach of
messages to be
multiplied across networks. While this appears to be
beneficial for partic- ipatory democracy (Briscoe et al.,
2006), there are also threats associated with the use of
technologies within the hypermedia campaign (Stromer-
Galley, 2006). Howard argues that while it enables greater
public communication, technologies also permit greater
targeting of commu- nication. The extensive use of data-
mining and targeting can lead to a communicative divide.
As noted in other critiques of political marketing and
campaigning (Lilleker, 2005a; Savigny, 2008), only a
privileged few voters may be positioned at the heart of the
campaign, having messages constructed for their
consumption and being invited to offer their input. The
use of interactive communication platforms thus creates a
paradox. On the one hand, the creation of an integrated
communica- tional ecosystem offers greater
democratisation of political communi- cation and a
flattening of hierarchies, at least in theory (for opposing
perspectives, see the utopian Rheingold, 1993; and for a
more realistic perspective, see Hindman, 2009). Yet, the
imperatives of electioneering suggest the maximisation of
votes by mobilising your supporters and depressing the
support for rivals will remain a priority within official
partisan sites. The messages and their channels can be
directed at voters with a high propensity to vote and who
are most susceptible to persua- sion. Therefore we may
simultaneously be witnessing a rich communi- cation
environment alongside a weak participatory culture
(Morozov, 2011). How individuals are targeted will impact
upon their sense of self- efficacy and their tendency to be
politically active in any significant sense.
This reductionist strategy of targeting those voters whose
partici- pation may swing the result leads to what Howard
refers to as a thin democracy, with engagement being
managed through the process of targeted communication
using email. This contrasts with perspectives that suggest
that the broadening out of the ability to produce content
can lead to a fatter, if no less unequal, form of democratic
participation. The ability to wield political power and exert
influence will depend on the size and reach of
communication within social and communica- tive
networks (Davis, 2010: 98). Basically, in the online
environment communication moves between individuals
but is also visible within their networks; the larger the
network, the greater the number of people that can
potentially be reached; the reach attained is referred to as a
network effect. Measurement of a network effect has been
discussed widely, its value linked to the number of people
within a network (Van Dijk, 2007: 78), with the equation of
the number of members squared referenced as one method
of evaluation (Anderson, 2007: 21); thus the
more connected members of the emergent polyarchy are,
and the more they are able to disseminate and/or amplify a
message, the wider their reach through the network.
However, real value is also related to the social capital of
the network effect. The amplification of messages via a
network does not simply increase reach but also credibility
as individ- uals act as information hubs to their networks of
contacts and friends. These constitute a new information
elite (Van Dijk, 2007: 185), which can include established
elites such as politicians and journalists as well as
individual weblog authors (bloggers) or users deemed
credible because of their propensity to share items among
their friends and followers. Political communicators seek to
maximise their reach, harnessing the power of active
members of online networks. There is significant debate,
however, around the extent that this practice is empowering
and so beneficial for broader political engagement, a point
that is returned to in Chapter 8 (see also Lilleker, 2013).
Thus the latest layer of professionalisation suggests the
rise of a hyper- media campaign strategist who must
harness the online and offline information elite
simultaneously. Identifying key information conduits, be
they professional journalists, independent weblog authors or
Twitter users, strategists must create a synergistic
communicative process between nodes within the network.
Online actions by political actors (a post to Twitter, for
example) feed into communication by online and offline
communicators (journalists and bloggers) and these draw
hits to other online features such as a campaign website,
which generates further sharing or other forms of
interaction. Interaction, in turn, can create broader offline
and online attention, or resources in the shape of volunteers
of donations. The hypermedia campaign is thus the
response to the 21st century campaign communication
environment; it recognises that to be successful one must
join the communication ecosystem.

The mediatisation of political communication

Reflecting on his time as an event organiser in UK politics,

Harvey Thomas argues, ‘The first and most powerful image
projector today is television. Everybody has access to it and
politicians ignore it only if they are thick or arrogant’
(Thomas, 1989: 135). Although written three decades ago,
there is much to Thomas’ statement that rings true today.
Image is central, and, as a medium for image, television
remains ubiqui- tous. Reaching out to the masses in the 21st
century is of course harder than it was in the 1980s or
indeed 1990s. The plethora of channels, the competition
from online sources of viewable entertainment, new
entertainment alternatives to watching television, games for
example, mean there is no such thing as a means for
communicating to the masses. Yet media, and in particular
the mainstream media, remain very important for political
communication, and mediatisation as a theory explaining
the evolution of political communication reflects this
importance.
Mediatisation, as conceptualised and problematised by
Mazzoleni and Shultz (1999) has a largely negative
influence on politics. They argue that it entails a ‘politics
that has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its
central functions on mass media, and is continuously
shaped by interactions with the media’ (1999: 250). They
argue that the process of mediatisation sees politics
transformed in five ways. Firstly, political reality
becomes a media construct. Through the process of
defining news values, media editors define how the
masses view poli- tics, to which aspects of political life
they pay attention and so what is important. This
perspective on the role of the media links to agenda
setting theory (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007), where
media do not tell the masses how to think but what to
think about. Secondly, the media construct notions of
political actors and political audiences and ascribe roles
to each. Actors are identified through media attention,
their role is defined within the mediatised political reality
and news values determine those who are newsworthy.
Media audiences are then presented with a pastiche of
news of events, interspersed with inputs from or pictures
of key actors, within a format that is both informative and
entertaining, what is referred to by Blumler (1990) as
infotainment. Audience members are seldom given the
role of participant and feature rarely as political actors
(Lewis et al., 2005). Thirdly, political reporting becomes
constrained by the commercial logic of media
organisations; this can relate to how news values are
determined, the way political news is packaged and
presented, and the extent to which political news features
within an overall package of news items (Franklin, 2004).
Fourthly, in response to a commercial logic that leads to
the reduction of political news coverage and the
packaging of political news, polit- ical actors develop a
communicational media logic (Slayden & Willock,
1999). In other words, they learn what sort of images and
phrases the news editors find attractive and embed them
into their communication (David, 2004). At a local level
this may be no more than a member of a parliament
ensuring there is a gallery of photographs showing them
active within the region they represent (Lilleker & Koc-
Michalska, 2013). Such images would be emailed
directly to journalists as well as made available on their
websites or via Facebook, Twitter or other online
filesharing portals. At the more national and strategic level
it means ensuring all media impressions contribute
positively to the individu- al’s, party’s or government’s
image, it means building soundbites into speeches or
interviews to be transmitted by the media, and it means
working to the schedule of the editor in order to maximise
coverage. Finally, returning to the role of the media, there
will be less objective coverage and news may be packaged
to match the predilections of the actual or imagined
audience, or politics will be portrayed negatively to play on
existing prejudices (De Vreese et al., 2001).
Mediatisation is thus an influential force, one that
Schrott describes as ‘the mechanism of the
institutionalization of media logic in other societal
subsystems. In these subsystems, media logic competes
with established guidelines and influences the actions of
individualsʼ (Schrott, 2009: 42). The process at the heart
of a mediatised political system becomes one that equates
to a game. As Davis (2010) observes, based on interviews
with journalists and elected representatives in the UK, the
politician seeks coverage and the journalist seeks copy.
Both parties need the other and so, as the analogy goes,
there is a tango at the heart of political communication.
Depending on the context, within each dance episode
there is a leader and a follower. Based upon a study of
elections in Belgian, Van Aelst and colleagues speculate
that under election conditions the parties are best
equipped to lead (Van Aelst et al., 2008a); at other points
the relationship is more ambig- uous and dependent on
context. The dancing does not lead to mutual
understanding or reciprocity. Perhaps that is largely
positive, as many argue that there needs to be a distance
between media and political actors in order to achieve
objective reporting. However, studies often find that the
relationship is built around so many negatives that it
leads to a wholly anti-politics bias in reporting (Jackson,
2011) and consequent mistrust of journalists among
political actors (for perspec- tives on this latter point, see
Goot, 2002; Brants et al., 2010). One study of the
attitudes of politicians and journalists found members of
parliament largely possessed a negative image of
political journalists, especially those who work on
television, arguing they have too much power over the
political agenda and can make or break politicians. On
the flip side, journalists suggest political actors are prone
to distort the picture and will do anything to obtain
positive media attention (Van Aelst et al., 2008b). The
debate over who dominates in the media- politics dance
partnership continues, and studies can demonstrate clear
unidirectional influence within certain contexts or
nations but not in others (Stromback, 2010).
 Mediatisation is underpinned with two strands of logic.
Journalists do not necessarily want to persuade their
audiences to think in a certain way, support one party over
another or participate in civic life to pursue an
organisation’s objectives; they simply want them to buy
their prod- ucts. Even state broadcasters such as the UK’s
BBC have to justify their existence through attracting an
audience, but for commercial media organisations
audiences equate to advertising revenue and so are crucial
for survival. Political actors, however, do want to persuade
media audi- ences; ideally they would like a direct feed of
information to the public, explaining why they have the best
ideas and are making the right deci- sions, or for opposition
parties or candidates that they would if elected to
government. Direct mail, advertising where permitted and a
range of online outlets do facilitate direct communication;
the problem is that most of that is ignored or visited by a
dedicated hardcore of activists (Norris, 2003). The mass
media remain crucial for most political actors when aiming
to reach a mass audience. The media however largely
refuse to act as mouthpieces for any specific group. While
there may be some elements of press-party parallelism
(Negrine, 1997) at play at times and in certain countries,
these are rare and becoming rarer because of the
commercial logic. Appearing on the media confers
legitimacy upon the political actor, allowing them to build a
public image as both an expert and a representative. The
media however limit such possibilities to specific hard news
programmes that tend to have minority appeal. Equally,
when the politician does gain air time, it is likely they will
be subject to some extremely hostile questioning from the
type of jour- nalist that Barnett (1998) gave the moniker of
Rottweiler. Rottweiler journalists take the political actor to
task, adopting an accusatory style, characterised by BBC
Newsnight anchor Jeremy Paxman as one that starts with
the premise, ‘Why is this lying bastard lying to me?’
(quoted in Gaber, 2009: 88).
Mediatisation explains that the mass media can be
unhelpful for the reception of political communication.
The theory shows the media adding an additional layer of
confusion for the audience member, a layer of
interpretation and bias added within the process of
mediation. One way of considering the impact of
mediatisation is using the concept of noise. The original
model developed by Shannon and Weaver (1963) argued
that there were various steps between the sender and
receiver where noise could interfere with the message.
While it is often used to describe distractions that can
undermine the power of television advertising – for
example, conversations within the room where the
television is being viewed – the more important aspects
of noise are
psychological. Imagine this scenario. Having absorbed a
diet of polit- ical news that questioned the motives of
politicians, focusing on the process of spinning that is
involved in political communication, and suggesting
political actors use spin for both personal and party/govern-
ment advancement, audience members then view a piece of
political communication directly from that same political
actor. Although the political actor may appear sincere, the
media had provided an alterna- tive impression, that
actually this person may not be trustworthy. The competing
thoughts are firstly based on the impression of the political
actor, but secondly on the narrative presented by the
political editor, which is to be believed. We do not suggest
that political communica- tion should not be viewed with
some scepticism; scepticism is healthy, but cynicism is
corrosive. Experiments have found that news which focuses
on the process of politics, the in-fighting and behind-the-
scenes party politics, leads to lower levels of trust in
politicians (Jackson, 2011), disempowerment and apathy
(De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006). Thus while watching
the dance between politicians and journalists may be
entertaining for the audience member, it is not positive for
the citizen who may be keen to participate in civic life. The
media are not solely to blame, but the more that political
actors follow the media logic the more the journalists fight
back and hence the dance becomes more of a wres- tling
match; one where politicians and journalists compete for
public support. This hypothesis is at the heart of the vicious
circle and media malaise theses (Stanyer, 2001; Noelle-
Neuman, 1974). These theses are contested – for example,
Norris (2000) argues that this is both informa- tive and
entertaining for the most politically engaged; but, as we
shall explore further later in the book, there are reasons why
the antagonism at the heart of political communication can
be unattractive to those citizens who simply want to know
what is really happening, why and how they might be
affected.

The marketisation of political communication

Professionalisation and mediatisation explain how political

commu- nication is driven partially or wholly by media,
either developments in media technologies or shifts in the
practice of political reporting. However one key aspect of
the professionalisation of political commu- nication is a
result of consumerisation. As opposed to technologically
determinist perspectives, political marketing offers a wholly
socially constructed interpretation of the evolution of
political communication. The argument in political
marketing literature is that we can no longer
delineate the citizen from the consumer, that members of
advanced societies no longer bracket off their behaviour
when interfacing with commercial brands from their
interactions with political organisations or arms of the
state. Indeed this is often encouraged. The development of
charters and contracts by state health providers, the police
as well as myriad other public sector service industries
encourage patients, students and residents to think as
consumers. The process of consumerisation is both an
outcome and a driver of the marketisation of politics (Lees-
Marshment, 2011b), and the study of political marketing.
This field of academic study and practice focuses on the
way in which marketing tools, concepts and philosophies
are utilised within the fields of policy development,
campaigning and internal relations by political parties,
organisations and governments (Lilleker, 2006: 151).
The study of political marketing emerged in 1969 with the
observa- tion by Kotler and Levy that ‘political candidates
could be marketed as well as soap’ (Kotler & Levy, 1969:
10). Theoretical concepts have, over the last four decades,
been slowly borrowed and applied to politics as the study of
marketing has evolved. Critiques of political marketing
have often concentrated on the translation barriers, how the
basic concepts of marketing are difficult to apply to
politics (Lock & Harris, 1996). At a basic level the core
principles of the four Ps of marketing – product, price,
promotion and place – only partially apply. The products in
terms of an election campaign are described as the
combination of the organi- sation and personnel, the leader
or key candidate and the policy plat- forms; the products of
a government, however, are less tangible. Price is even
more contested. Whether the vote be equated to an
exchange is an interesting philosophical question, and
while it can be seen as an exchange for service (O’Cass,
2001) it has also been described as the investment of hope
(Dermody & Scullion, 2001). While promotion is as
fundamental to politics as to any commercial context, and
indeed is at the heart of this study, place may also have a
range of connotations as the physical locations where
politics has impacts are multifarious. Beyond these
fundamentals, one can also question whether politics is a
marketplace, whether this marketplace is one of ideas is an
equally moot point, as is whether the politics-electorate
relationship consists of a market of supply and demand
with a range of economic forces at play. Marketing, thus,
has uses as a range of conceptual tools; yet polit- ical
marketing equally entails concept stretching in terms of
both the concepts of marketing as well as the fundamental
principles of politics: namely democracy and
representation. These principles are argued to be
particularly threatened by the neo-liberal logic, which
states market
forces are all-powerful, a logic that underpins thinking
within the field of political marketing (Savigny, 2008).
What the early work on political marketing established
was that marketing strategies and tactics were being
applied to aspects of politics as well as that politics could
be understood using the conceptual tools developed
within the academic study of marketing. Synergies in
practice between political campaigning and marketing are
recognised and high- lighted (Baines et al., 2002), but
equally criticised for advocating poll- driven politics
(Scammell, 1999). Political marketing suggests that ‘the
very essence of a candidate and political party’s interface
with the elec- torate is a marketing one’ (O’Cass, 1996:
47). Such works reinforce the notion that voting is an
exchange, a purchase even, on which value can be placed.
There are significant problems with this notion. Firstly,
no single voter can guarantee that the product chosen is
attained; equally the multifaceted product may not be
consumed equally; opponents can benefit more than
supporters. More interestingly, one can also not guar-
antee the product will satisfy; certainly you cannot expel
an incompe- tent government as easily as you can return
a faulty product. Secondly the construct of the voter, a
logic-driven citizen seeking to make a wise choice, is
replaced by the construct of the political consumer, a
selfish and more emotional being. The perceived
bipolarity of the citizen is founded on a false dichotomy,
with logic and emotion treated as competing rather than
complementary cognitive states, therefore much political
marketing may not give the citizen the respect they
deserve in terms of communicating appropriately for their
cognitive sophistication. Introducing the consumer into
politics also draws in notions of political consumption,
buying a political product, value for money (in taxation)
and returns on investment (the investment of hope in a
party or candi- date); these are all cognitive constructs
some citizens might experience. Political marketing also
suggests a consumer centricity emerging at the heart of
the delivery of political products, government services
and representation (Matsuno & Mentzer, 2000).
Newman encapsulates well the shift between what many
authors have referred to as strategic orientations (see also
Shama, 1976; Lees- Marshment, 2001; Lees-Marshment et
al., 2009; Ormrod et al., 2013). Parties, they argue, progress
from a product orientation where they present their
manifesto and personnel to the electorate to a sales orien-
tation. Sales-oriented parties or candidates are involved in
significant amounts of persuasive communication,
mirroring the promotional world of commerce. More
controversial is the shift from sales to market orientation.
Newman (1999: 16) describes this process thus: ‘Our
electoral system was set up to give candidates the
opportunity to let voters know who they are and what they
stand for ... candidates now use marketing research to do
just the opposite, that is, to find out who the voters are and
what they want the candidates to stand for. Candidates then
feed back to the voters the ideas that they know will sell.’
What is suggested here is a threefold process. Firstly
organisations seeking elec- tion must identify which voters
need to be targeted; these will be voters with a high
propensity to vote, may be undecided and need persuading,
and who reside in geographic areas crucial for victory; this
factor is particularly important where first-past-the-post
voting systems are in operation, such as Canada, the UK
and the US. Targeting is argued to disenfranchise swathes
of the electorate (Lilleker, 2005a; Savigny, 2008). Secondly,
market research will be conducted to discover the political
priorities of these voters, their so-called needs and wants, in
order that the ‘product’ appeals to them. Thirdly the
packaging, which can include core messages, the use of
spokespersons, imagery and channel use, will be
determined through further market research. The leading
exponent of the introduction of the concept of the market
orientation to poli- tics is Jennifer Lees-Marshment
(2001). Through a case study of the UK Labour Party,
rebranded as New Labour following Tony Blair becoming
leader in 1994, Lees-Marshment argues that the leader
image, key policy platform (the Manifesto) and
communication were all designed to have maximum appeal
to a section of the electorate who wanted an alter- native to
the Conservatives but needed convincing that Labour could
be trusted (for an insider account, see Gould, 1998). Blair’s
election victory in 1997, Lees-Marshment argues, is the
result of him aligning New Labour with the needs, wants
and hopes of this section of the UK electorate.
 The concept of market orientation is highly contested.
There is debate regarding whether political parties, and in
particular governments, do or should actually follow the
market and to what extent. Research suggests that a political
organisation can blend together strategic orientations to lead
in some areas while follow in others (Ormrod & Henneberg,
2006; Lees-Marshment et al., 2009); for example, a party
seeking election may design its manifesto around public
priorities but the solutions to solve problems relating to
those priorities will be developed by the party and then sold
back to the public. The extent to which voters become part
of the process of policy development is hotly debated.
Contestation arises around the level of citizen participation
that is optimal in a democratic political system. Theorists
such as Schumpeter (1957) and more recently Riker (1989)
have argued participation has to be limited because of the
 Strategic Political Communication
33

scale of the modern nation state, and the lack of political

knowledge of much of the citizenry. Democracy is argued
to operate best as an open system of competition for
selecting representatives; citizen participation is limited to
voting in periodic ballots. Yet others suggest this limited
participatory role is contrary to the democratic ideal of
collective deci- sion-making, where all individuals subject
to collective decisions should be equal participants in the
decision-making process (for example, see Pettit, 2006;
Hyland, 2011). Extending participation has been long
considered a utopian ideal (Sartori, 1976), with networks
suggested as the only means of widening participation
(Bang, 2003). The theory of the political market
orientation intersects these debates, suggesting that optimal
levels of participation need to be reconsidered by parties
wishing to engage with voters as well as reinvigorating
democracy. Gidengil (2012: 54) expresses well the
argument for moving towards a market orientation thus:
‘If the parties simply use [marketing] tech- niques to hard-
sell their “product,” the relationship between voters and
parties is unlikely to improve. If on the other hand, parties
put voters’ needs and wants at the centre of their activities,
the prognosis may be more positive’ (emphasis added). The
mechanisms by which voters’ needs and wants are
identified, interpreted and then developed into policy is
unclear, and certainly less than transparent for the observer,
but the argument is that marketing rhetoric is insufficient;
what is needed is a marketing approach to politics based
around more deliberative models of democracy (Lees-
Marshment, 2011a: 233–6). Market orientation is also used
as a synonym for professionalisation. Marland (2012: 59–
61) argues that within the context of voter volatility, parties
or candidates seeking election need to align themselves with
specific voter groups, produce targeted communication and
have a strategy for interacting with their target voter groups
to maintain a synergy with their needs and wants.
However, on the whole, if parties do adopt a market orien-
tation it would appear that this focuses on the design and
targeting of communication, not on the design of the
product. One study argues that organisations seeking
election act as magpies seeking any new gimmick that
appears to offer persuasive potential (Lilleker et al., 2006).
For the purposes of this study we can identify two elements
introduced by political marketing that have had a
fundamental influence over the conduct of political
communication. Firstly, and this is the most conten- tious
premise, messages attempt to suggest a market orientation,
though studies suggest that voters seek leadership rather
than a party or govern- ment that follows opinion polls
(Johns & Brandenburg, 2012). Despite the evidence that
the market orientation has flaws (see Lilleker, 2005a;
34 Political Communication and Cognition

Dufresne & Marland, 2012), the idea that policies are

developed based on the needs and wants of society has
become a key premise of any election campaign. The
challenge for political marketing scholarship is to untangle
the rhetoric of being ‘in touch,’ ‘connected’ and so ‘market
oriented’ from the reality. The use of opinion polls is
argued to have the potential to connect parties to voters
(Carballo & Hjelmar, 2008). Yet some argue that political
communicators, adopting the metaphor of sportscaster Vin
Scully, use polls as a drunk uses a lamppost: more for
support than illumination. Thus a core question is whether
marketing is about enhancing the connection between
citizen and political parties or a new form of voter
manipulation. Political communication attempts to
demonstrate responsiveness, based on evidence that
‘responsiveness wins seats’ (Marland, 2005: 74), but the
nature of the responsiveness needs in-depth investigation.
Independent of adherence to a market orientation, the
second core premise is that political communication follows
key trends in marketing communication. Not simply in the
use of tools derived from advertising or public relations but
also in terms of mirroring the style of commercial
promotion as well as communication that can be classified
as popular culture.
The marketisation of political communication goes
beyond profes- sionalism, creating rich communication
designed to be highly persua- sive. Yet, marketisation is
often viewed as enhancing democracy; advocates of a
market orientation argue that governments and those
seeking election should focus attention on the issues that
most concern voters. Birch (2012: 153) offers a three-stage
perspective of a market orientation: firstly policies or
promises are set, which are sensitive to citizen preferences;
secondly the policies and promises are communi- cated
demonstrating understanding of public preferences while
also showing leadership; thirdly policies are implemented
within a ‘permis- sive consensus.’ The question is: where
do governments, parties or candidates gain their
understanding of public preferences? Opinion polls offer
fleeting glimpses into the public consciousness; the media
repackage polling data and interactions with the ‘person in
the street’; and some bespoke research can be conducted.
But is this research suffi- cient or does it just result in
adherence to nationally agreed most impor- tant problems
(Lilleker & Negrine, 2006)? Polls can detect a consensus on
the issues but not the solutions; this is where the policy
makers must lead the news agenda in order to convince the
public that their solution is correct. The realities of
government suggest that political marketing is largely
viable only for opposition groups, who can promise what
the public want (Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005: 212–
13). But the gap
 Strategic Political Communication
35

between the offering and what is delivered can fatally

undermine any political project, particularly when
marketing is applied simplistically. For example, political
slogans mirror, though can often be vaguer than, those that
sell toothpaste (gets your teeth whiter) or washing powder
(keeps the colour locked in), such as Barry Goldwater’s
slogan for the 1964 presidential race, ‘In Your Heart, You
Know He’s Right,’ or the Turkish Nationalist Parties ‘Full
speed ahead’ adopted for the 2011 contest. Marketing can
be aspirational and inspirational but there has to be a ring
of truth to the offering, as we will see when we pick up this
point in Chapter 4.

Political campaign communication in the 21st century

The professionalised, mediatised and marketised political

commu- nication drives a number of strategies, has many
forms and employs all the tools of communication
available. We exist within the era of hypermedia
campaigning and hypermedia political communication.
The hypermedia era extends the notion of Norris’ post-
modern era in one very important way. Norris suggests that
in the post-modern era political communication used every
available channel to both broad- cast (to the masses) and
narrowcast (to specific target groups). The hypermedia era
sees that these practices continue; however, there is also a
range of means by which communication can be fed back
into a political communication ecosystem. An
ecosystem is, as in nature, a system where the elements are
interdependent and feed one another in order to sustain that
system. A political communication ecosystem is one of
multiple participants, all contributing to a narrative around
an issue. Online users, including political actors, journalists,
professional commentators (such as weblog authors) as well
as a range of non-elite communicators, come together as an
assemblage, a semi-co-ordinated group with an interest and
a desire to have their say on an issue. The assemblage may
contribute across a wide range of media but collectively this
forms an interdependent communication system, a network
built around contributing, commenting, hyperlinking and
sharing.
Notions of old media, newspapers and television, and new
media, websites or social networking platforms, are now
simply media. The hypermedia age is characterised by
media convergence; what Jenkins (2008: 2) argues to be the
‘flow of content across multiple media plat- forms, the
cooperation between multiple media industries, and the
migratory behaviour of media audiences who will go almost
anywhere in search of the kinds of entertainment
experiences they want.’ Jenkins
36 Political Communication and Cognition

largely talks of fan culture; however, the basic premise can

be extended to include any communicative culture.
Contributing to a political communication ecosystem may
not be done purely for entertainment value but there are a
variety of uses and gratifications that users gain from being
politically active online (Jackson & Lilleker, 2007). The
participatory culture, however, is not purely a feature of
online-only media and peer-to-peer platforms. Traditional
media outlets have online components, and participation
that takes place offline can be mediated (interpreted by
journalists) and then re-mediated (inter- preted by other
online actors), which then may feed back into offline media.
This granularity of communication flow, which involves
inter- pretation across platforms, creates what Chadwick
(2011) describes as a hybrid news or hybrid media
(Chadwick, 2013) system. Chadwick articulates on the
working of media hybridity as follows: ‘News organ-
izations increasingly capitalize on new media as a resource
by tapping into the viral circulation of online content and
weaving it into their news genres and production
techniques. The “new” news media outlets are in the
process of being integrated into what is becoming a
mainstream digital political news system’ (2011: 5). This is
not simply a process that involves news organisations.
There is a blurring between established and public news
makers – for example, the concept of the citizen
journalist (Allan, 2007). Equally, the hybrid news system
incorporates a mixture of elite and non-elite actors, an
issue-specific assemblage of voices, who contribute to the
political communication ecosystem.
Political communication thus works within a hybrid
media system where individual media forms can be
transmitted across media shared (re-mediated) or adapted
(mediated). The hypermedia age is all about data; the
collection of data on citizens, based on browsing habits,
consumption patterns, their stated political partisanship
or voting history. But citizens are also creators of data. In
exchange for leaving a trail of data that can be harvested,
they are also contributing to the political communication
ecosystem themselves. The humble campaign poster can
be far more than one piece of street architecture. It can be
photographed and photoshopped, and the finished product
can become viral across the Internet in a matter of
minutes. Equally it can have no lifespan at all and be
noticed by no more than ten or twenty people. The same
can be true of any item of news, in the local or national
media; or any item of political communication. It is
therefore useful to consider what forms of
communication can (or indeed may not) contribute to this
ecosystem and what styles of communication they
facilitate as
 Strategic Political Communication
37

a prelude to considering how they might be received and

what their impact will be on the receiver.

The contexts of political communication

Political communication occurs within two contexts, both

of which now take the form of a campaign. Election
campaigns are the most popular area of study; these are
intense periods of political communica- tion with a variety
of parties or candidates, both at a local and national level,
attempting to garner support through highly persuasive
forms of communication. Election campaigns also provide
examples of some of the worst excesses of political
communication. What is termed the permanent campaign is
ongoing and takes place alongside periods of governance.
Within the permanent campaign periods, which sit outside
of any period of election campaigning, the individual, party
or coalition in power competes against opposition forces for
public awareness and acknowledgement. Permanent
campaigning largely focuses on receiving favourable
coverage in the mainstream media but, while this remains
a key priority, it is now supplemented with a range of
activities using a all available online platforms.
Governing groups tend to have the advantage within any
permanent campaign; they are inherently more newsworthy
than an opposition and so may be granted greater levels
of coverage while also generating publicity through public
information campaigns funded by the state (Young, 2004).
However, the coverage comes at the cost of receiving
scrutiny. Therefore it is not simply a case of gaining
coverage but being seen to win the argument against often
hostile, or at least interrogative, journalists and any political
opponents. Within the permanent campaign context, there is
also competition from non-electoral groups, charities,
pressure groups and NGOs, all of whom are able to seize
media attention and challenge the established political
elites.
Political communication falls largely into two
categories, direct and mediated. Direct political
communication is usually paid for (such as posters,
television advertising or direct mail), but also free when
placed upon official online channels (such as the party
website). Mediated polit- ical communication follows the
two-step flow model; it passes through a third party prior
to reaching the intended receiver. Most work within the
field of media management, such as press conferences or
press releases, are interpreted by journalists prior to being
read by the wider audience. Of course there is now a
blurring between direct and mediated political
communication. Direct channels can be mediated in a
number of ways.
38 Political Communication and Cognition

Posters can be talked about on weblogs or become

features of online or offline news; direct mail can be
treated in similar ways. Often activists acts as unpaid
mediators of partisan political communication, working
for the campaign extending the communication reach of
‘their’ party (Norris & Curtice, 2008). Online political
communication, which is often argued to be direct, can
also have accompanying mediation or be medi- ated in
itself. For example, a party can produce a video and
upload it to YouTube, the popular video sharing website
where organisations can create their own channels. This
may be shared online, with comments from the individual
or individuals sharing the video. Comments may be added
within the original channel to which it was uploaded.
Equally, a video produced for online consumption can be
featured on main news bulletins and so be interpreted by
professional journalists as well as online users who may
range from being highly supportive to completely
antagonistic to the content. In contrast, websites can also
become direct channels where material designed for
mediation, such as a press release, can be repackaged into
an online news item, released via Twitter or Facebook, or
via an e-newsletter. Thus campaigning within an era of
hypermedia, hybrid media or media convergence is
highly complex, with boundaries between forms and
styles of communication becoming increasingly blurred.
Political communication can be divided into five
reasonably distinct campaign styles, reflecting activities that
take place both during elec- tion campaigns and the
permanent campaign undertaken by govern- ments, parties
within coalitions and opposition groups. The first style
focuses on gaining earned media. Earned media is seen as
important because if a journalist reinforces the argument of
the politician or party it can act as reinforcement for that
message. Hence there is a constant battle to gain coverage
within newspapers and on main television news bulletins. In
particular, parties fight over the news agenda, attempting to
seize control of the front page or main news item and
having their message pushed out by the journalist. The
problem with earned media is that it is hard to control the
way that the message is interpreted by a journalist; therefore
political communicators seek alternative means for getting
the message to their target voters. The second style is that of
paid media, advertising which buys space within the media.
Political adver- tising is most common in the US where it
will be alongside commercial messages between primetime
television programming. Elsewhere legisla- tion imposes
restrictions that limit the amount of advertising, and if not
financial resources certainly act as a brake. Governments
are often criti- cised for blurring the line between
informing and persuading in their
 Strategic Political Communication
39

use of ‘public information campaigns,’ which are often

seen as a form of political advertising (Franklin, 2004;
Young, 2004). The third style is direct communication,
usually taking the form of mailshots. Direct mail is very
popular during election campaigns and is particularly useful
for targeting specific voter groups. Targeting is, however,
only as good as the database used and therefore significant
levels of resources are required to buy up-to-date, accurate and
stratified data that is useful for the political campaigner. The
fourth style focuses at the local level and may be undertaken
by individual parliamentarians, or other local repre- sentatives.
In the context of an election, fusing the local and national
campaign is argued to be crucial, although there is also
currency for local MPs to self-promote long-term and then
focus on themselves as the brand during an election
(Lilleker, 2006), although this does depend upon the electoral
system. First-past-the-post systems such as those in Canada,
the UK or the US, where a local candidate only needs to
win one vote more than opponents to be elected, encourages
more localised campaigning. Nations using proportional
representation systems often use party lists, where votes cast
for a party determine how many candi- dates are elected – for
example, most EU member states apart from the UK.
Proportion representation election systems lead to strongly
central- ised campaigns. The final communication style
focuses on the use of social media. It is argued that social
media returns to a more pre-modern style of political
communication, one that is peer-to-peer and replicates face-to-
face. The extent to which this is true is determined by the way
in which social media is used. Studies show that political
parties and candi- dates have focused largely on using social
media platforms to broadcast information as opposed to
investing in more interactive communica- tional styles
(Kluver et al., 2007; Jackson & Lilleker, 2009). However,
influenced by the 2004 and 2008 US presidential campaigns of
Howard Dean and Barack Obama more interactive political
communication para- digms are emerging (Lilleker &
Jackson, 2011b). The extent to which this interactive style
will become embedded is debatable, although, as we shall
see, there may well be dividends from doing so.
Independent of the type of media utilised or the style of
communi- cation, any single piece of communication or,
more importantly, the accumulation of a range of pieces
of communication, should create a meaningful
experience that excites the senses. Kim et al. (2009)
argue that the integrated brand experience, brand
communication ranging from the website to the in-store
environment, should appeal to the sight, hearing, smell,
touch or taste. Political communication may well focus
mostly on blending positive experiences for sight and
hearing, but the
40 Political Communication and Cognition

tools of promotions, events, advertising, public relations

and publicity, and direct marketing and personal selling all
will have a sensory dimen- sion. Importantly, all these tools
and their content are likely to have some influence on the
cognitive processes of the citizen when exposed to them.

Strategic political communication

Within this final section it is appropriate to provide an

overview of the common techniques used within political
campaigning. The focus is devoted to five techniques:
message framing, the personalisation of targeted
messages, the repeat-remind tactic that seeks to maximise
message exposure, media management strategies and the
use of negativity.
Framing is a technique normally applied to media
reporting, and as a theory of media effects (Scheufele,
1999), but can equally be used as a tool for analysis of
political messages. Framing involves the selection of a
context that enables a given understanding of a political
issue. The frame placed around a political issue leads, in
theory, the audience to share with the communicator a
causal interpretation, a moral evaluation and a
recommended strategy for the future (Entman, 1993).
Framing of a political issue will often involve real life
case studies that weave a persuasive narrative in order to
make not only the issue but the interpre- tive and evaluative
elements relevant to the receiver and gain agreement over
the proposed solution. In the many debates that have raged
across the European Union (EU) over economic strategy
one can observe the use of frames; frames that suggest why
market forces offer the solution and alternative frames that
focus on a more interventionist line. Framing, because of
the process of making an abstract political issue relevant to
an audience, also makes the issue memorable (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991). The information packaged within a frame
leads to a neural binding of the various pieces of
information into a narrative that is bound in to the lifeworld
of the receiver (Lakoff, 2008: 25). What is meant here is
that the association in the communication becomes accepted
by the receiver and forms part of their understanding of the
world around them. One can here consider the potency of
the American Dream as a frame of reference for economic
success; elsewhere the association between the EU and
over-bureaucratisation leads to negative perceptions of
regula- tions across member states. Hence the use of
framing and the presenta- tion of a narrative of a political
issue is a commonly used tool of political communication.
 Strategic Political Communication
41

Personalisation and targeting have been used widely in

corporate communication for some time and have slowly
become a staple of polit- ical communication.
Personalisation relates to the framing, but uses more
sophisticated techniques for persuading key groups of
citizens with messages tailored specifically for them.
Personalisation has taken on a much stronger role because
of the ability to target citizen groups using a process
known as narrowcasting (Carty et al., 2007). Narrowcasting
refers to attempts by political organisations to target
information to specialised groups; these groups can be
broad demographics such as mothers, the elderly; minority
groups such as ethnic groups or non- heterosexuals; or very
specific interest groups whose interests also shape their
political beliefs. Mass media fragmentation and the rise of
online media are argued to better facilitate narrowcasting
(Nelson-Field & Riebe, 2011). Areas of party, candidate or
campaign websites can be devoted to specific groups;
across the elections in France, the US, Germany and the
UK, 2007–11, the parties/candidates offered content for up
to 74 different named voter groups. However, with audience
segmentation growing in sophistication (see, for example,
Maibach et al., 2009), and demographic information being
combined with media consumption, data on buying and
online browsing habits (Howard & Kreiss, 2009),
advertising is used mainly to deliver targeted messages via
mass and specialist offline and online media.
In order for the frames to be accepted, independent of
the extent of narrowcasting occurring, it is argued that they
have to be repeated. Repeat-remind is a well-established
public relations tactic (Mulholland, 1993) that works on the
principle that ‘When you are absolutely sick to death of
repeating the same line over and over again, that is the
point at which it is beginning to penetrate the public’s
consciousness’ (Lilleker & Negrine, 2003: 61). The
embedding of the notion of repeat- remind means that
political communication has to have an intense quality,
constantly bombarding citizens with short, easily
memorable key messages. Secondly, in the most intense
campaigning periods, all forms of communication will be
used simultaneously to deliver a single message and
longitudinally each message will build on the last, rein-
forcing the core message – often the most simplistic
message of them all. On the day a television advertisement
is aired it is likely to be posted to YouTube and the main
websites, a link with commentary emailed to supporters
and, if resources allow, reinforced with direct mail. The
challenge is to ensure that recall is achieved, but that the
tactic is not noticed and the message does not become stale
and rejected due to over- repetition.
42 Political Communication and Cognition

Media management is not new to political

communication; it is as old as media itself. Media
management is also crucial to achieving one aspect of
repeat-remind, which is getting the message of the party or
candidate reinforced by media coverage. The rise in the
power and influence of the spin doctor has offered a new
layer of intensity and sophistication to media management
(Plasser, 2000), though the prac- tice of spin and its impact
are not analysed without criticism (Jones, 1995). Political
communication can often be criticised for being a series
of pseudo-events, designed purely to capture media
attention (Boorstin, 2012). Senior politicians must deliver
announcements with the right backdrop, preferably one
relevant to the announcement, be seen to connect with
ordinary citizens, and so frame the announce- ment with a
favourable image in order to connect with the news audi-
ence. With myriad news outlets, including mediators of
existing media content such as bloggers, political
communicators must manage and feed content to all outlets
that they feel are important in reaching their intended
audiences. Given this was observed as problematic for
polit- ical communication and democratic engagement some
20 years ago (Bennett, 1992), one can only observe the
challenges worsening in the 21st century media
environment.
The final technique may be argued to fit better under
framing; however, its ubiquity and celerity across all forms
of communication make negativity a core aspect of
modern political communication (Lau & Pomper, 2004).
Negativity is perhaps the one technique that is virtually
unique to the context of political communication.
Negativity relates to any form of attack on the politics,
ideology, performance, record or personality of a political
opponent. Negativity can be framed as a comparative
message, comparing the opponent with the messenger
directly or indirectly; however, many attacks, normally
delivered in television advertisements, online videos or
election broadcasts, tend to be one-sided attacks (Lilleker &
Scullion, 2009). There is much debate over the efficacy of
‘going negative.’ Some studies find that negative
advertisements have a positive effect for mobilising
supporters, but a depressing turnout among undecided
voters when the contest is highly negative (Ansolabehere &
Iyengar, 1997). Others question whether nega- tivity is
damaging to democracy by undermining public trust in all
sides (Kamber, 2003). Largely, academic opinion on the
impacts is mixed and studies show highly divergent
findings (Sigelman & Kugler, 2003); the reasons for this
will be revisited later in the book. That campaigning in
the US is becoming increasingly negative seems without
question (Buell & Sigelman, 2008; Mark, 2009), Obama’s
2008 campaign being
 Strategic Political Communication
43

something of an exception (Lilleker & Scullion, 2009),

and it appears that negativity is growing as a global
phenomenon (Plasser & Plasser, 2002).

Political communication in the 21st century

All of these communication techniques can be found to

be used across a wide range of media, including Internet-
based spaces for communi- cation. The outlets and
governing factors are described in Figure 1.2. The
structure, state involvement and party-media parallelism
govern the communication environment to an extent; for
example, if there is high party-media parallelism this may
lead to less paid-for advertising, though this is not always
the case. Regulation of the media and media use for
political communication also restrict some activities.
Equally the extent that citizens have access to a wide
variety of media, now including broadband, will
determine the media that can be used for political
communication. Party organisation will also affect the
way in which politics is communicated and how
campaigns are conducted, in
 Framing; Personalisation and Ta
Repeat-Remind; Media manag
Party organisation
Broadcasting
Regulation channels/mass media

Negativity
of media Newspapers
and media Magazines Persuasion
use Television
Radio
Paid ads
Social uses
of media,
media
literacy and Internet channels Mobilisation
political News websites and
interest Party websites interactions
Group e-mail
Social media

Feedback loop

Figure 1.2 Channels for political communication

44 Political Communication and Cognition

particular the extent of centralisation of the party, the

number of activ- ists a party can depend on and the extent to
which there is a network of local associations. Equally,
ideology or traditions of communication have been seen to
restrict party communication; for example, the far left seem
to fail to embrace most aspects of professionalism.
The various means of dissemination available have
various potential functions. Political communication tends
to have three major objectives: to inform, persuade or
mobilise. However, it is unlikely that any single piece of
communication will have a single function. Information
will be presented, with added spin, to make it persuasive
(Esser et al., 2000; Plasser, 2000). Much communication
may also have dual functions to different receivers;
informing an undecided voter while also mobilising
supporters. We therefore can see modern political
communication as attempting to achieve as many goals as
possible, and using as many media as available and
appropriate.
Political communication is also likely to appear within
online sidebar advertising, pop-up advertisements, Google
adwords and Google promote (to enable being seen).
Political communicators will also use filesharing sites, to
post pictures, audio files or videos, and social networking
sites, microblogs or weblogs as means to deliver their
message to an audience. The difference within online
environments is that the audiences are able to answer back,
privately by email or publicly through commenting. For
McLuhan (1967) the media was the message; Castells
(2001) argues that now it is the network. Perhaps, however,
this is not a signal of disagreement but indicative of the
evolution of communication. The Internet is a network and
members of the network act as mediators and messengers.
The members of a network push messages around; like the
forces that control the tides, they determine the way in
which commu- nication flows from and between nodes
(individuals and sites) on the network. Within a network
there are many powerful nodes, such as major media
organisations, and there are smaller nodes, each of which
are at the centre of their own network. Every individual
who contributes something to the online environment,
probably everyone who regularly accesses the Internet, is a
node. The communication each individual receives, and
whom they communicate to and with, depends on how they
operate within the network.
All this suggests that the way communication is
disseminated has changed but not the nature of political
communication, a point evidenced by various studies of
the way in which the Internet is employed within the
context of election campaigns (Kluver et al., 2007; Lilleker
& Jackson, 2011b). The point applies, however, to
politics broadly: ‘New media do
 Strategic Political Communication
45

not create new issues, but rather exacerbate and accelerate

existing ones’ (Meikle & Young, 2010: 194). The issues
exacerbated and accelerated include those that are directly
affected because of the way in which the Internet is used,
such as matters relating to privacy and censorship. The
Internet also impacts upon core concepts of politics, such as
democ- racy, representation and participation. The Internet
complements older media forms as well as displaces them;
it can augment, enhance and add complexity. The question
is whether the way in which political commu- nication in
online environments facilitates new forms of participation,
or whether online browsing amounts to little more than
hanging out, messing around and geeking out’ (Ito et al.,
2010).
The network acts as both an enabler, by giving access to a
range of ideas and messages, and a filter. Or rather, in the
way we link into networks we are able to select what we
see and what we do not see. A browser, by their own
choosing, may only see celebrity gossip, pornography or
indeed the politics of the extreme right when accessing the
network. It is their choice. However, they can also pretend
that material that appeals to their more salacious,
voyeuristic or prejudiced natures do not exist, simply by
ensuring that the bounds of their networks are closed to
such materials. Of course it is hard to restrict what we
access and completely screen out messages we find
offensive, unimportant or antithetical. But we can access
the network through a series of searches, feeds and plat-
forms that allow us to construct what Sunstein (2001)
describes as our ‘Daily Me.’ Popular platforms enable this
to a greater extent than search engines, such as Google,
which act intuitively based on our and others’ search
history. As Crawford argues, ‘The selection of people one
follows on Twitter [or subscribe to on YouTube, Flickr or
“Friends” on Facebook etc] function collectively as a
highly subjective filter that prioritises and re-orders the
news agenda as it is understood by a newspaper or a TV
network, influencing what is heard and when’ (Crawford,
2011: 116). Therefore we see the Internet as an enabler of
political communication but also as a potential danger to
democratic engagement. Strategically it is of high value
for any political communicator to have lots of followers,
friends or subscribers; equally they will seek to direct
their followings to repeat, build upon, extend or
reproduce their message. Yet they may well be speaking
only to the already converted (Norris, 2003), and many
may screen out all things political.
The online environment may offer myriad forms of media
for reaching citizens, but it does not represent a magic
bullet for political communi- cation. The humble flyer, the
mailshot, the poster, the advertisement, the news feature,
the interview or the appearance on a chat show are all
 46 Political Communication and Cognition

important tools for reaching citizens. Politicians will appear on radio, television, in
newspapers and magazines, or online; and will attempt to appear on all media in order to
get the maximum reach possible. Such is the complex context of political
communication in the early decades of the 21st century, and it is likely to only become
more complex. The ways it makes citizens think, or if it makes citizens think, are
governed by equally complex processes. The context is set; we now shift focus to how
political communication