The Oct.

11 Petition and Political Reform in China

October 14, 2010 | 1227 GMT

A group of 23 notable Chinese public figures sent a petition to the Communist Party calling
for greater political freedoms. The development comes as talk of political reform in China
is on the rise. However, Beijing is not mobbing toward substantial changes, but is rather
using the discussion to promote its interests.

Analysis
Twenty-three prominent Chinese public figures signed a letter to the Standing Committee,
or sitting leadership, of the National People¶s Congress on Oct. 11, calling for the
relaxation of censorship policies, reassertion of a free press and for reform of the
Communist Party of China¶s (CPC) propaganda department. The petition had 500
signatories, about 90 percent of whom reportedly belonged to the Party.

Political reform has re-emerged as a topic of hot debate in China in recent months, as it
does from time to time. Beijing is not on the cusp of making substantial changes to its
political system, however. Instead, the topic serves as a political tool furthering the interests
of a number of individuals and institutions, not limited to the media establishment but also
including those who resist recent trends of power centralization.

A Politically Significant Time

The Oct. 11 petition comes just days before the CPC convenes for the Fifth Plenary Session
of the 17th Central Committee. This is an important annual meeting, but it is especially
important this year because President Hu Jintao will appoint Vice President Xi Jinping to
an important military post, thereby securing Xi¶s position as China¶s next president when
the current generation of leaders step down in 2012. At a time of global uncertainty and a
deepening sense that China is transitioning into a fundamentally new economic phase, the
CPC is also set to announce details of the country¶s economic plans for the coming five
years. The petitioners likely deliberately timed the letter ahead of this meeting, perhaps
with the hope of forcing free speech concerns into discussions during the Central
Committee¶s meeting.

Apparently coincidentally, the Oct. 11 petition comes shortly after Chinese political
dissident Liu Xiaobo received the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. Beijing vociferously protested
the award, which has spawned criticisms between Beijing and Western states.
The Oct. 11 petitioners called on Beijing to adhere to the promise of political freedoms set
forth in the 1982 Chinese Constitution and compared China¶s press freedoms unfavorably
to those enjoyed in Hong Kong and Macau. The 23 major signatories cannot be dismissed;
they are mostly retirees from high-ranking positions in media, law, academia, bureaucracy
and the military. Many of them are elderly, reflecting the cultural feature in China in which
old people, particularly those with money, power or prestige, have tacit permission to
comment on otherwise taboo subjects. Li Rui, formerly a high-ranking official in the CPC¶s
powerful organization department and a former personal secretary for Mao Zedong, helped
spearhead the petition. The group argued that rather than increasing along with China¶s
surging economic growth, freedom of speech had worsened in recent decades. One signer
also argued that stifling speech risked causing Chinese people to seek support from
foreigners in spreading their ideas, which they said would prove troublesome for the
country.

So far, the Hong Kong press has most actively disseminated the story. Hong Kong has an
interest in doing so, primarily to assert its autonomy vis-a-vis Beijing. Hong Kong has a
tradition of relative press freedom dating back to the British colonial period, and its
newspapers report far more extensively on topics censored in mainland China. For instance,
in August it carried statements by People¶s Liberation Army Air Force Lt. Gen. Liu Yazhou
to the effect that China must embrace democratic reforms ³or perish.´ Recent trouble
between mainland authorities and Hong Kong journalists has increased fears that Beijing
may be attempting to strengthen its grip on the city¶s media outlets. Thus, the Hong Kong
media may have called attention to the Oct. 11 petition to highlight its own grievances in
addition to maintaining its standard of reporting independently on mainland Chinese affairs.

Criticism for Ignoring Wen

The petition stands out in its own right in that it denounced the propaganda wing of the
CPC for censoring Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao¶s recent explicit calls for political reform
at speeches in Shenzhen in August and at the U.N. General Assembly in late September.
The Oct. 13 statement asked how the propaganda officials had the right to censor the
country¶s second most powerful leader. Wen did not give any specific proposals for reform,
and Hu painted over his speech in Shenzhen by giving an oration the following day that
downplayed political reform. But Wen¶s statements inspired a flurry of debate, and in mid-
September the influential Central Party School made statements supporting him against
criticisms in much of the state-run press.

As usual, no concrete reform initiatives followed Wen¶s latest optimistic comments. In fact,
Beijing officially has held ever since Deng Xiaoping that political reform was a necessary
complement to the economic liberalization it embraced in the late 1970s that paved the way
for its explosive growth. But changes to China¶s political system have lagged behind
economic reforms, and aside from a few notable developments (such as allowing voting in
villages and some towns) the concept of political reform remains little more than a vague
promise.

The fundamental challenges to the rule of law in China are corruption among government
or Party officials, arbitrary or draconian law enforcement, and a lack of governmental
accountability. But these problems cannot be resolved without drastic changes. China does
not have a strong tradition of civil society that asserts economic and political freedoms
against the government. Power over critical institutions is so densely concentrated in the
hands of the CPC that institutional checks and balances remain informal and insecure.
While gradual political adjustments are possible, such as increasing rural representation in
the people¶s congresses at various governmental levels, Beijing is not prepared to embrace
any new means of distributing power that could be used against the current regime.

Õconomic, Not Political Reform

Beijing is, however, gradually moving along with economic reforms. The chief causes of
social aggravation are socio-economic, such as wages, pensions, rising housing and food
prices, unemployment concerns, and access to public services. Beijing recognizes the
particular need to expand real estate regulations and property tax trials to slow rising prices,
invest more in regional development and social services, and raise wages and liberalize the
financial sector, at least theoretically to put more money in Chinese people¶s pockets.
Beijing also has suggested potential reforms to the constrictive household registration
system to give rise to social mobility. And such economic reforms have ramifications for
social and political life as well.

While Beijing will continue these economically centered initiatives to mitigate the deepest
social stress points, even here the movement is extremely cautious, and potentially
reversible, since more economic power for consumers will inherently pressure the political
system. (In recent decades, almost every other East Asian economic power experienced a
change in political system at a certain point in its economic development.) Beijing¶s
greatest fear is to invite the fate of the Soviet Union, which collapsed when it attempted
sudden and deep restructuring of its system.

China is approaching generational leadership change in 2012, and the current

administration has no reason to take bold measures now that would have unintended, and
possibly deeply disruptive, consequences for the power transition and afterward. If today¶s
leaders can perpetuate the status quo and avoid a deep economic slowdown or explosion of
social resentment, they will do so ² and let their successors take on the burden of dealing
with what the state recognizes to be systemic flaws dangerous in the long run.

In the context of leadership change amid a shifting global economic and security
environment and domestic economic model, talk of political reform is mostly geared
toward bringing political benefits to various players in the existing system rather than
toward concrete action (and thus delaying real reform that could undermine this existing
benefit). As always, there is a social function in promoting visions of China¶s eventual
transformation into a freer society. Doing so gives people hope and undercuts critics who
call the regime uncompromising. This process essentially is part of managing public
expectations by promising various public goods always ³just around the corner,´ such as
talk of direct elections. While China is not about to adopt deep reforms, it eventually may
float trial balloons in key regions, such as Shenzhen, and as the economic experience has
 shown, such reforms can take on a life of their own. For the time being, it is beneficial to
broach the issue carefully so as to give vent to social frustrations and, especially for
Beijing¶s strengthening security apparatus, to identify where those frustrations are hottest.
This tactic of repeated deferral may not work forever, but it at least buys time for a regime
that is not yet ready to change.
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