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the questions – which have never yet troubled the English courts – have been
answered by the authors on a purely speculative basis. However, Green and
Randall were surely wise not to adopt an ostrich approach to these as-yet-
unresolved matters. Despite its considerable antiquity, conversion remains an
important modern-day tort as OBG and the protracted Kuwait Airways v. Iraqi
Airways litigation amply demonstrate. Their book is, therefore, all the stronger
for its provision of a carefully crafted set of answers to these seemingly inevi-
table questions for the future.
Like the authors of all the best pioneering books, Green and Randall will
not have had the final word on conversion’s nature and domain; and this is a
good thing. For too long and by too many, conversion has been largely over-
looked. But now there is a book to reckon with. For all that it may be a fairly
slender volume, The Tort of Conversion is packed with learning, containing as it
does mini-theses on the true gist of conversion, the nature of property and the
legal meaning of possession. Throughout – though slightly less so in relation to
the nature of property – the arguments are supported by a wealth of references
to primary and secondary legal sources, both ancient and modern, domestic
and comparative. There are, in consequence, very few criticisms that one may
fairly make of this book without transgressing the fine line between providing
an objective review of this book, and suggesting the contents of a rather dif-
ferent book that one would have written oneself. That said, there was one
striking oddity that should perhaps be noted. It was that, although the book
contained specific discussion of the overwhelmingly irrelevant partial defence
of contributory negligence to which there is only one very minor exception
(p. 206), there was no equivalent detailed guide to the complex rules on limi-
tation of actions in cases of conversion set out in sections 3, 4 and (in the case of
concealed fraud) 32 of the Limitation Act 1980. But this was just one blip in an
otherwise comprehensive and eminently readable account of the law of con-
version.
It may be a very long time before we can disagree conclusively with Sir John
Salmond’s famous observation that “conversion is a region still darkened with
the mists of legal formalism, through which no man will find his way” or Baron
Bramwell’s quip that “no one can undertake to define what a conversion is”.
But if a way out of this juridical quagmire is ever to be forged, Green and
Randall, in this superb volume, must be acknowledged to have taken the
critical first steps.
JOHN MURPHY
constrain the ability to legislate economic affairs in smaller states), nor is legal
sovereignty guaranteed when many legislative powers have been delegated to
supranational bodies (posing a problem for the unified, “Kelsenian” model of a
legal system), nor is the democratic legitimacy to be taken for granted in the
face of challenges by various minority and subaltern groups in society.
The main achievement of these volumes is to illuminate and highlight the
problem of a conceptual mismatch between legal theory and legal practice. Part
of this strength derives from the fact that few authors talk about any specific
author’s understanding of legal theory, but tend to resort to a generalized view
of “Western” legal theory or tend to rely on certain archetypal classifications,
e.g. “Kelsenian” legal theory. Although this definitely contributes to the clarity
of the argument, one might at the same time justly object that the objections
against “traditional” legal theory are somewhat misguided. Jurisprudence
(particularly contemporary legal positivism) has been aware of the issues raised
here for many years and many of the positions defended within legal positivism
are considerably more sophisticated than a simple will-theory of law. In fact,
authors such as William Twining, Brian Tamanaha and Boaventura de Sousa
Santos are conspicuously absent in both volumes. Yet all three authors have
published volume length monographs on the topic of globalisation and legal
theory, and their respective positions are currently the most fruitful answers
to the central problems of both volumes: how do we ensure that our juris-
prudential concepts are fit for a globalised world? A similar remark can be
made with regard to work being done in the field of “transnational” and
“cosmopolitan” democracy within political theory by authors such as David
Held, James Bohman, Nancy Fraser and Seyla Benhabib.
A significant limitation of both volumes is thus a failure to engage critically
with the body of existing and current literature on the matter, and to take
seriously the complex nature and state of the art of contemporary legal theory
and jurisprudence. In this vein, the contributors in these volumes are necess-
arily limited by the limitations and constraints provided for in an edited vol-
ume. Although a clear articulation of the central issues is undeniably a virtue,
concepts such as “multicentrism” and “postmodernist legal theory” tend to
have the character of meta-theory rather than a fully fledged substantive
theory. If it is indeed the case that new conceptual frameworks are needed, it is
the question whether network and system theories are fit replacements without
further refinement and development.
Nevertheless, these volumes provide a challenging and comprehensive
overview of the various issues currently at stake within legal and political
theory. They are impressive in their scope and breadth – highlighting the rel-
evance of globalisation in areas not typically troubled by the phenomenon, e.g.
criminal and constitutional law – if occasionally lacking in comprehensiveness
of treatment. These books are a recommended read for those who are inter-
ested in exploring the conceptual and foundational limits of their discipline in
light of globalisation and internationalisation.
SIDNEY RICHARDS