OF THE OBSERVER

I}RAIN, MIND AND THE PERSPECTIVE

DALIA TERHESIU, GABRIEL VACARIU

(UniversitYof Bucharest)

S i n c e D e s c a r t e s t h em i n d .b r a i n r e l a ti o n h a sb e e n co n ce i ve dourdays'
w i th i n tw higher
o m a i n and
approaches:id""t,ty;";;;;;J"" u"o non-identityperspective'In
are.considered' The main
lower analysislo,gu'ii'ution levels of cognitive'syslem
lÃ,els are ihe searching for an inte'nediary
theoretical toor, to, uã:oining Oifr"."n, way
level and tt em"rg";JË;;.;;il In the followings' we try-to.offer an alternative
subject as an
" on the role of the human
of grasping trre mtnJ-úrãin problem based thus, the finding of
are the same and
observer.w" ct*mìtuì the mind and the brain
a n i n t e r m e d i a r y u " t * ""n th e m e n ta l |e ve l sto n e u r a l o n e sa swjYtj
e l l a sth e e m e r gissue'
e n ce
systemt:
from a lower f"ua toã f igf'er level of the cognitive T^:"ttost
we provide
p"rrpe"tiu".in the first section,
They have ,.n." oni! rroritrr" observer,s
considered for the mind-brain problem. In the
a short review t#;;;-;;rspecrive
"f
s e c o n d a n d t t r i r o s e cti o n s'w e d i scu ssth e sp |i tti n g o fth e co g n ìti ve syste m levels'l n to
ior coinecting the considered
different t"u"ts ano tte main routes taken
perspectiveofthe observer'
Finally, we try to off., nnt* perspective'i'e' the

I. MIND.BRAIN DISTINCTION

is configured out in
In our days the old problem of the mind-braindistinction
threemain waYs:
of the brain but is not identical
1. the non-identityperspective:mind is the product
with the brain;
the brain or, leSSmisleading,
2. rhe identity theory: mind is nothing more than
phenomena;
mentalphenomenaare nothing more than physical
3. beyond mind-braindistinction'
was pointed out by
1. In its very oid form, the non-identity perspecrive
..a dualisi for a p,orteriorireasoni" ÌO.b. Mitchell and F' Jackson'
Descartes-
explainedby referring to any
p. 93, 1996) *to ttougtt thai no menJalstatecan be
òf science,the old dualism
physical state.In our íays, becauseof the presentstate
as an immaterial substance-
- with its assumptionoith" existenceof an elan vital
is completely unacceptable.
However,anewkindofdualism,themoderatedualism,cameintheformof
qualia, philosopherssuch as
thequaliadebate. In the relatively recentdebateson
ways for the ineducibility
Nagel, Block, Jackson,chalmers, have pleadedin different
2002
Bucureçti'
Rev.Roum.dePhilos.,46,1-2,p. 195-208,
 of the mental qualitative phenomena- seeing a red object in the Mary's thought (Searfe,lgg2;p.14,90,105'll2)'OnNagelandJackson'sline'heintroducesthc idea'
int"tiãì objects.starting with Nagel's
,
experiment.orhaving pain - to physicalor even to functional states.Describingihe role of rhe observerfÀi external and and the
mental qualitative state in causal terms leaves out the specialproblem of qúlia: searle sustains rhat ;; ;;J picrure the link between our subjectivity
p' 102-3)' The
what it meansto be in such a state?(for instance,Nageí, újsj. The ontology in t"Uj""tiuit' (Searle' 1992
of brain sratesbecause*" ã" "ft.iady person featuresare
thesephenomena"is essentiallya first personontology;(Searle,92). irreducibility or ir du" ,o thá fact úat the first
"onr"iãuúrt
2. Within the identity theory, materialists,ru"Èâr place or Smart, considered different from the third-person features'
that mental phenomena are nothing more than physical phenomena: EvenifDennettthoughtabouthimselfasaneliminativematerialist,hismain
phenomenaare nothing but brain statei; for instance,ìnápain stateis identical
mental
u"rtu"ilr be explainedand predicted
with idea is rhat the rutiorui'i"iianbeing's "ould stances' A
not ittto"gtt physical õr, design
the firing of C-fibers. Of course,this is the old standaràexample for identifying only througtr intentionat stance unã
.u-pã-p'tyri"is cfPafle of understanding
mental stateswith,.neuralstates.Today, it is known that the corresponding
braiã super-intelligent Martian or a Laplac"un level could not seeus as
statesof pain are different areasof the brain and different typesof aions, everything,in"fuaing fï"*un-úú through^micìophysics
nãt only behavior
are missing"'Ííe patterns in human
C fibers. intentionalsystems.in this case,túey stance (" ')"' i'e' the
u"J í"fV frôm that
. Having in mind the way in which scientists expressmanyof their discoveries that are describablefrom intentionalstance, of strength for the
by meansof identity, the identity theoristsadvanceclan empiricaìhypothesis patterns that have reality. Anothei soufce
aboui 'limits
""' "úi"",ive of thè human being to predict fine-grained
the natureof the mind. As a responseto the objection intentional stance r, ìn"
baseãon Lei-úiz,s law (see Dennett
pp'158-9)' In Háugeland's words'
Mittchell and Jackson 1996,p. Õ5) identity theàristsmade rhe distinction
between description of actions (Dennett 1981' 1998)' and
oï'ftá beholder-"(Haugeland
mental propertiesand mental objects:the distinction betweenmy belief
that snow considersthat intentionalityis in "the "V"t person'
is. white and the property of úelieving that snow thus, in contrast *ith s;;;i;, he talks about mental statesin terms of third
is white. By means of this .languageãithought', Fodor puts the explanation
distinction a differencecan be stressedbãtweena strong under the umbrella of the
one' The strong identity theoristsare sustainingthat
identity theory and a weak
pïv"torãglfarieys, *:l:t' beliefs'shortlv'
toth móntat piopertl"s anJ of cognitivept"no.ãnl;;-;*"
mental objects are identical with neural ,tut"rl The mentalrepresentationswithsemanticandsyntactic.constituentStructures.He
weak materialisti deny the because
existenceof mental objects but they have an ambiguous cannot bé reducedto the neural ones
position r"ga.arng tt e considersthat the mental phenomena (Fodor 1975)' The
mentalproperties. of the representati;;ï'il;;;"* or ,rt" Ã"ntal symbols
are neuronal patterns of
Even if the po"sitionof eliminativism materialistis little bit diffèrent, at the neural ievel
a their counterpartsof symbolic representations level and thoseof
perspectivecan be regardedas an offshootof materialism.
The eerly eliminativists. activation,but the corresponden"ebet*e"n'frirni,iu"r :1.T":rul a system
Feyerabendor Rorty sustainedthat suchthingsas desires, the neural one is "...[T]he sìructuresof 'higher levels' of
beliefs,hopes,etc.,do not "";;ú;úu". of 'lo*"r levels' of a
actually,this is what was labeledby rhe latter eliminarivisrasìhe rejecting are rarely i.o-orphi", o. similar, io ih" ,,."*r",
91pt; of "u"n 63)'
folk psychology.According to them, folË psychology
is viewedas a ser of dubious system."lFodor and Pylyshyn, 1988' p'
opinions failing to take into account thé áevelof-"nt. Turning back to the first perspectiveãf the non-identity theory, and considering
of (neuro) science.For -- of the
moderate dualism -, wê can think
instance,epilepsycan be explainedby certain
disturbances of thebrain statesand not only the second case of dualism the
following two very simple reasons:
by demonic possession. By meansoi strongargumentsfrom neuroscience the later existenceof only onl perspective,due to the
do not reject the idea that the very
eliminativists,as Churchlánd'sor stictr, oifeú
a better image of this framework a) the sustainoi orìn" moderatedualism
evenifthe full neuralevidenceofthis approach of some very complex processesof
is not available. mental phenomenaare (somehow!)the result of this kind
. .3:
Ilthe third perspective the explìcitdiscussion of the mind-brainrelarionis rhe brain; *t ut tt J.ú;ì,lt ,";á"t i. ir," possibility of explanation
avoided'Some of the philosophersof mind "/
and of CognitiveSciencefrom this of phenomenain terms of any physical state;
framework- as Fodor, benneti, and Searle b)thephilosophersofthirdcategoryexplicitly.recognizethatthemental
amongothers- assumethat the mind is possibility of
the productof the brain. But in their explanation
of cognitivebehavior,they engage phenomenaare th;;;;ãu"ì of the braiin;tur, ìn"y àlso reject the
cxclusivelypsychologicalnotions as desires, of neural states'
beliefi or more generallymental explanation of mental phenomena.l.nter.ms
s(ates,without any referenceto brain states. wayl oi consideringthe mind-brain
Thus, we ur"-"onrronted with onrf-t*o
r""ond, let's call it' the non-identity
Searle's position is ambiguous: he denies
both dualism and monism. relation: first, the identity perspectiveând
(.Ìtnsciousness(and generaily, stateof affairs of the mind-brain
ihe mind) is the product of the brain, but he pcrspecrive.Or, in ge"htát's wãrds, tft" plt"nt
tlisitgreeswith the identity theo.y. psychologyas an autonomousdisciplinc
His main thesis is that consciousness is a rclation is picturedby the debatebet*een
ltttperty of the brain, it is a physicalpropertybut it is nor idenricalwith thc hrairr iurdcliminativemateriatism(Bechtel,1995)'
 Dulia' l' c r lr c s iu.
G lhr ic l V a c a r r u
l l r:rrrr. Mttttl atttl tl tc l )c rs l tc c ti v c ol tl l c ()trs c l v c l
TI.DIF'FERENT
LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION
It is ve III. I . THE IN'IERMEDIARY PROBLEM
science';
;n,íuiïÏ:ff,u]ïJf arr.thephirosophers
Even though Smolensky was not concerned with consciousnessor
phenomenaar

,'* ,ffi ,,,ï"jilïff

,ïï:ïï,:",";i"::.^::f'{'ïïïf{i!:j,i;=j,,ffi intentionality problems, in his famous paper On the proper treatment 0l
csnnectionism(Smolensky,1988),he broughtinto discussionthe problem of levels
of analysis. He stressedthe distinction between the symbolic level proper to

Lï,Ï:5:
;ï:',ÉJi":iiiÏï:l
neurarour. roj1Tork
"ouu
fllJ;;:íill' "' nlíui
of non-identity,
,nàonì"ühers agree
"ï.,,
"
lìodor's approachand the sub-symboliclevel properto the connectionistapproach.
He iúggestsan interestingview on the relationshipbetweenthe sub-symbolic
lncl the symbolic levels: the relationship is similar to the relationship between
,r,u,
,r,"y s,tau aboutthe.._-
.âhn'r
tr-^underrving
r
rnicro- and macrophysics.If we wish to explain conceptualphenomenawe need to
u,.;"ni:J,,X'rrffinr
unoerlying "i;Ã;ì";rree rnaintain the discussionat a concepÍual (symbolic) level, that is, to provide a
brain processes "'" neural processes;,;;;,1'":'_ d'o.ner,
phenomena
rh::,1,"*,",i'"ï'ï#fl
-;gthev
thinkauout
ïyïíÍïï'*ïfï*' F,ffïfflï'*"
.-^ïï,i"-
th: verl cognitive
rnu<:ro-description of cognition. But if we wish to explain the sub-conceptual
plrenomena,we need to maintain the discussionin terms of the sub-conceptuaÌ
phenomena il,emr?,""rï,
u, ,"' ff.ïr}'|^:f- (sub-symbolic)Ievel, in other words, we need to provide a micro-descriptionoÏ
"'"',,"Ji.lJ:ffi ï'#xïi:f*ï;
j::il:'*Ì:ïÏJ::tr"*'x'ïï":ï:'ffi cognition.
Actually, the sub-symbolic level representsan intermediary between the
ever lower level (neural level) and the higher level (conceptuallevel) of the cognitive
;:dÍ:,'.i;ïH.:?::Ëï' ï.f.ï' ïïi il:"ï;i',l r*n, prope.v
re system.The relationshipbetweenthe sub-conceptualand the neural levels may be
refarion makesan analogy fevel approachedfrom a semanticpoint of view, but also from a syntacticpoint of view.
unatioul'YuYs berween tt
con
sciousne'; sne
.onrll..micro-macro
ss(min
d)-brain Semctntic:which is the relationship between sub-symbolic representationsand
i:' ï1ï' :' # ïi,iiï ;;" ;;';ì" "u
[fï J df isanemerg"";;;;ïrï;'ri,Tffiiï:: neural representations(patternsof neurons)2Syntactic: which is the relationship
betweenthe connectionistnetwork architectureand the neural architecture?As our
on the side' in a relativ knowledgeabout neural representations regardingsomecomplex cognitive tasksis
",;,'"::.*]l't"t:ttt
recognizes ,nu, 'ïl
not very precise, it seems plausible for us to assert that the semanticsof the

il;i*",".ïH:;'Ïtü.+[;I*ï:?ï":,':'^#ï:Ër1iip1'#',Jf:"?
revers
capac,,,", .''iãïi"ì
.l.ilÍlv'i''"""Jiu;'ïíi'',""ï|"::il'|"ïYporhesis
connectionistnetworks is closer to the conceptuallevel approach,that is, it is
closerto the computationalistsemanticscomparedwith the semanticsproper to any
neural attempt.But if we take a look at the processingmechanism,the computation

:ffi1.r'*,ï:if i:iil;'';ï'"ïil;'"1"""'i'ï,;ïïi type involved in the neuralnetworksseemsto be closerto thosein the brain.
]lï'ffJ'*'"ïl'"^ï''-f
$_.i ,'":,bï:iL,:,ï;lï:üïr;ïtr
J*jï:ïÍ"*_giï
However, the searchfor an intermediarylevel between the neural and the
mental levels, and generally between micro and macro levels raises the ad
infinitum regressionproblem. We shall not mention here the problemsfor the sub-
ortr,.n 'J?l#ï:ï
JJï';fr #J,",r,ïlisi conceptuallevel thought of as an intermediarybetweenthe neural and the mental
"u?offi ":4 sthe.;;;;
ï",; * levels. But definitely, it does not solve the problem of the connection between
levels.In this sense,it might be that other intermediarylevels among levels already
consideredare necessary;for instance,one between the conceptualand the sub-
III. THELINK.S conceptualand one betweenthe sub-conceptualand the neural levels, and so on.
AMON(;I,EVI]I,.S
Very roughly,, Besides,why should researchers considerthe neurallevel as primitive? Why not go
the two pcrspccriv, further in consideringthe quanticlevel of the cognitive system?
raisctwotvpesor probrems:
;"11','"ïïi"ï1:ffi"'i;jffj"i::Ï' ïïttvcs i) a
at the samelevel PROBLEM
III.2.THEEMERGENCE
a"r*"."',"ïutorÌìpoÍìorì.s
In considerin*l:'u"on ""Jìil'í" I . The caseof emergencein the qualia debate
.'
:::l:n elnergence.
Pt.lrlcttt of "" '*.,ï"dfii:iliïli'fl; :-o mainroures
-)etweenmicro and
canbedete*ed:
the At'cordirrgto lhc wcak emergentism, the propertiesof a systemare emergent
macro levels and
the rl llrcy bclottp'lo lltt' syslerlÌìas a whole, but not to the parts of the system.For
('lnr'rl'('nlrsrn
\lr()lrli llrt'rt'ru(' lw() c:rses:syrtcltronic
emergentism and diachronic
 çrrrçrgen'sm
to synchronic
l"":rojnt
impredictabilitv
arebothãvailabr". .emergentismirreducib'ity and Inthisscnse,theconnectionistapproachisanexampleofweakemergcntlsln.
ïi" propertiesanãthedispositions o! a connectionistnetwork and
the behaviotor th" tyr,"-
â"pã"i norotogi"u[y oo-iìrà tharconrror lf we analyze the relation betweenthè propertie,s
connectionistnetworks show
sysrem,i'e. they depend
on th" propertiesir ,rí" ;;r;;,,
,rri"ror,*cture of rhe the network,s parts,we can observethat oniy trained
parts and on their recognition' rule following'
organization.gút frá- il;;;"ilr" some macroscopic properties such as iattern-
or tne.sys.tem,sparrs just the disposition to i"t,11t^1,^11:
constellations
simplerthan s rtmiíuu" a s in isorarionor in generalization, etc. uãt uin"a nerworks havã
simpler,*i*." themselves. These macroscoplc
deducethat s hasp. tvtor"ou".ì rhans) we can not
;; ; not describetr,ol"r,uuior iru".or"opi" properties, but not the properties
of the system,s propertiessuperveneuponthehardstructureofnet'uponthenumberoftheunits'
i,:ïï',|"ï:l1Jil#i,:"il:ffi ãll"tthecomp;;;1"
frï;:r,,:-*'ffi nodes and ttre conneci'ús among them. These
properties are^deducible from the
of the net's units and
.
In arguing the irreducioiïity organization of a certain networÉ i.e. from the-prõperties
oi-quutiu to neurophysiorogicar on the contrary, they are
moderareduaristsoffer the
arguméntofrï;;J;nã;"Ëi srares,rhe connections. But these are not ineducible properties.
the properties of its parts and
berweenexpranation deducible from the structure of the network and from
ï:ï;'; roreorpaini
una-tli
rirlinsorpâinrr,"y connections.Thus, the connectionistapproachcan be
thought of as a good example
"1lJ,ïill
meansofnaturar f
":,'H' l*1*ì,
ru*,ir,ui"ï;r;
;;"ï:i,i:":[Jïi;ilJlxJr*# of weak emergentism(Stephan,1998)'
can be viewed as an
phenomenar stateshave l;ln"li Baas,s notion of deducible or computable emergence
(stephan,r99g,p. 6ag). arr r"Àr"ï"o. characteristi"r'or phenomenar states,, offshoot of weak (Baas, 13pAy For Baás, in order to observe that
Thus,-ir," ,r "-"ri"ntit- to observe the new
debateis a strong one "ïri"" iâ""rru.y in the quaria something new has into existence,we need mechanisms
"n.,".g*l"
such as that of synchroíi.' "orri" but they have to be called
synchronicemergentism
becauseoi'iro reasons:i) "r".g"",ism. It is about entities. The emergeni-pìop"ni", huu" to be observable,
level entities, and not
properryis expranatory
if andonryiiti" rearizarion
the reductionof a systemic emergent because of ihe-interactions among the lower
ú;;;;*s
:iifr",t"#ï *"'t, r,'v'e,u.pJr
rhecausarroreof becauseoftheobservation.Hedoesnotspecifywhat.themechanisms.of
l;"XÏi.ïà
iliJr"ff ãÇ'r " r"ut",",.rï# observation are, but he emits some formal stipulations for
the emergencenotlon'
Theemergenceoft,ign"'levelpropertiesisaresultofaseriesofabstract
S1 a set of first
2. The case of emergence
in
connectionism constructionp.o""rr"r,"rimilar to úot" from mathematics.Given
can be observed or measuredby
weak emergentism is order structures,the piop".ti"t of these structures
contpatible with weak (Sl). Using the properties extracted
emergentstructuresare reductronism because the means of an obseruuìionutmechanismobsl
exprainauteano compretery - determined by the
theparrsarreadv o"rinaúr" üy the cooperationof from the observation, we can consider the set of interactions
defined.il; ii,ilïì labeled Íer' Thus, a new
organization or the u ,r,or"'is rhe."Ã thepartsprusthe componentsof sl orby the outsidefactgrs - within s1,
cooperation of these parts. is the result of the
"r to
According kind of structure SZ I n (S1, Obsl(Sl), Int), where R
addsnorhinsto rhe:; Stephan, the of 52 can be
,ïl-rïff::- rhesysrem,;
;;;.;;, just exptains constructionprocess.s2 is a secondorder structure;the properties (S2);
"; what observedo,. *"urur"Jby means of another observationalmechanism
Obs2
In addition,we think that too' Thus' a
propertiesof the system in order to tark about the obviously, Obs2 can be ánoughfor the observationof Sl's properties
new structuresand not belong to
we just tau"-to-switch ou.
oiiànrionfrom the rocar properry of 32 is emergent iíf P belongsto Obs2 (S2), but P does
behaviorof the components 'OUJZ pro^cess.D such that P can be
structure
to the resurtedstructureas-ì-*ïo,". tóf l. If rhereis a deductionalor computational
is the resurt-or"oÁ"r.'rú'ãiï..".r"s But this finar or computable
amongthc simprccomponenÍc. determinedby D plus Obsl (Sl), then we huu" u caseof deducible
Thus,we thinkit is nor have a case of observational emergence'
abouranynewi"ï,"t thut.""ii;;;;ì emergence.Ii sucÈa D doesnot exist, we
roughly'we canr* iì,r,, Vcry of as an observational one, but
reverisjusr . rrcw"*irr"n.c. Of course, any deducible emergencecan be thought
theanarysis :li:rh:T;*"r*il;surted
of thesvstem- rr:vc:r
rakcn for
This rever ú"th*ght of not vice versa.
a; ;;;; orìc:,[111
"'- onryfrom we considerthat the connectionistapproachmakesa good casefor deducible
ll",i:'ï'"i;'"ï0,"lïg 1b'ü;:;? ,i,1üirl,nJ"","",. uiJ*,rr rerer
cr,unsngïìï'##;,:""J'"ï;jillïlli"ü,ï
j":ïï,iJ;,,tli:lj:""",1,:tï 'n|y here emergence:the macroproperties(patternìècognition, rule-following,
etc') of tle
(formula for
connectionist system u" deãuced by means of different D
newlevel'But this it,lnl{ "un rules, etc.)' A
m" o"ro"*ït a betteranarysis changing the activation values and changing the weights,-learning
t or cxpranation theorems
o"ii iii" ïnd exprainabre of the real ãximple for observational emergence is constituted by Godel's
iifiï;,ï: by
"#;;,[i:. ry;:*,liJïï'or ","rv " statements which are true but which
becausethãy point out the existenceof certain
can not be deducedas such.
 3' The caseof emergencein self-organizationanrJ str tl cl i l l ( 'o l ( 'A tl ttt l x'
Cellutar Autrtrtuttt orrt' , rttttl l ht' l i nir l sta tc ( ) l 'ca ch l r SA i tttcl th u s th c l i r r i r l
( hc p l u s th e r u l c ta b l c) w i l l r r r l ti g l r tl t'g r t't','l
The main characteristicsof diach-ronicemergentism prcrl i ctctl( l ' r' ol rt i n i ti a l co r r fi g u r a ti o l t
are the novelty and
unpredictabilityof s's structures.In the developmenior ccrli ri rtl y.
evolution of a ,yrr"á n"*
structuresand propertiesappearand in their
turn they produceother new structures
with new propertiesand new behaviors(Stephan, qóg).
f
Th: synergy uld seÌf-organization theories
are exampres of weak
emergentismbecausetheir main point is the
observationof the different system,s
regularities'The main aspectof thì sef-organization
is that the novel structuresare
explainableby meansof the cooperationoi
the system,sp*r. rn"." structuresare
emergent,but not in a strongsense,i.e. they
areïot unpi"Ji"iuule and ineducible.
The core notions of such alheory u." the-
order p*urn"r. introduced by Haken.
These quantities have a double task;
first, ,ri" p.o."rr", of serf_
organizationcan be describedby meansof ""ÃpÈ^
them and secorid, it ey t etp to the causal
explanationof the continuousprocesses
of self-organization.Thus, insteadof the
specificationof each system's part in isoration,
thã behavior of the whore system
can be described by the adequite specification
of some relevant order parameters
(Stephan,1998).
cellular automata (cA) are formal systems Figure I
constituted by networks of cells
in which each ceil is a finite stateautomaton
(FSA), r.e. a simpre formar machine
with a finite number of discreresrares
tnut À*g; ;;;J;; ro a rure tabre or
transitionfunction' A rule table is a mapping
the set of cell states.The state_
statesof the FSA (Langhton, r99l). Fú
from lhe set of neighborhoodstatesto
of a neig^h'úrloodis ..tt
" "Ã,
instance,the evorution
froduct,, of the other
or a cA systemcan
ffi W-WWJ
be illustrated by meansof ten celrs that
changetheir states(on andofi) accordingto
a very simple rule table'_Theneighborhood
ór each cell inòtua", the cell itself and
one cell on each side. Moreover, the left
and right ce[s count as neighborhoodto
each other. An exampre.ofa very simpre
rure table is the foilowing: the or ceils
that are flanked by off.:e[s at step t, inìh"t
time stept+l becomeoff; and each
off cell that is flanked by on neighborhood "*t
at time t, bào-", on at thenext time
stept+l' In Figure 1, where the shaded
boxesrepresentthe cells that are offandthe Figure 2
white ones representthe on ceils,
are oisplayeã the first th."e t,,,.," steps of
abovediscussedcA system.More complex the
resurtsare obtaincciusing thc samerure Class III CA manifestsboth local and global chaoticbehavior(Figure 3 is an
table,but 200 çells at200 time steps;
th"-'r"ur" exposedin Figurc 2 and Figure3. example for this cA), Even though the cells of cA III never show periodic
It has to be mentionedthaicA are viewcà
u, ,, u"ry'firyri.at matter,and in behavior,their final dynamicscan be predictedwith a high degreeof certainty;that
this way informationdynamicsin
cA can "(cll us s,rrrctlrirrg about informationin is, from the initial ionfiguration of cells, the behavior of the whole is easily
thephysicalworld" (Langhton,lggt: p.ael
predictableas a chaotic one. V/e think that in Baas's terms this kind of behavior
Escapinga lot of technicaldctails, wc
poirrr oul that there arc four mirin òan be viewed as an indefinitecasebetweendeducibleand observationalemergent.
classesof cA consideredupon their
shown bt:hrrvior. 'l'hc l'irsttw<lclasscs
cxhibe Class fV CA is seen as exhibiting the most complex behavior and in this
both local a-ndglobal ordàr ancl In
thcir behuvior is c:asilyclassil'i'blc.s weak sensethey can be understoodas performing computationor self-organization'
cmergentin Stephan'sterms,or deduciblc seems an
crncrgcrìrin rhrsc oí' lìrr1s.llr íhc caseof this case, the predictability of the behavior and of the final dynamics
classcA I and cA II (Figure.l and
Figure2 ar-cex.nrplc Íìrr ricsc cl.ssesof
cA) impossible turk. F.o* ttre initiat configuration of the cells, nothing can be said
thcreis an alghoritmicdeãuction
fromïhe-inlÍialcorrÍ'igur;rrion r. rhc final ordered abòutthe final structure,i.e. if it is an orderedor a totally disorderedone' It is very
 uotr a r çr ilEslu, uaDnel v ac anu tl llr,iln Ì\'lllrl,tlÌ(l lll(' l'('l \l)('( llVt' (ll lll(' ( rlr\('l vt'l

lhc cpis(cttttllogicirl
orrt'.Vt'ry rrrrrgltly,
t,l't.\'tt,t,,()l(),qir'rrl PcrsPcclivr.'isgivettby llrt'
rolt.ol tlrc hrrrrlrrrsrrbjt'ctirs irn obset'ver, perspccttvc
whilc tlrc tln(olttgicitl ts
rrrrk.pt.ntkrrrl oÍ tlrc lrunran observer.In the l-irst part, wc will strcss tlrt'
pcrspcctive
r.prstt'rrlrlogicirl andin thelastpartwe will figureout thc ontologicalortc.

PERSPECTIVE
I . THEEPISTEMOLOGICAL
Wc consider that within the conceptual framework of the approaches
n.garding the rnind-brain relation - mentioned in the first part - an important
r'rroldinatcis missed.We proposean alternativewith a new dimension:the role of
tltt, ob.scrr.,ar tttrtl!he t'rnrlitions of the observation.Thls, we consider three very
sirrrplc:cferncrrls:lltc :;ub.ject as an observer,the observedobject and the conditions
ol'!ltr olt.rt'rvrttion.lìor a subject,the identificationof a certainobjectat one time is
givcn by thc conditionsof the observationavailableat that particularmoment.The
charrgcol' thc observationalconditionsinvolves an epistemologicalshift of the
Figure3 subjcct-oh.jcct relation.In this sensein the following, we presenttwo principles
l .'t'hc complementarity principle:
possiblethat the final statewill be an orderedone, but this is something
that can lJecauseof the seriality of attention,a human subjectcan not observe/can
not be predictedfrom the initial configuration.That is, there is no alghoiitm
or D rrcÍ form simultaneously dffirent levels of/representations of a certain
processin Baas's terms,which can do the job of a deducibletransition.
In contrast .substance.The grasping of an object at a ceftain level of analysis depends
to chaos,some researcherslabel this statetf affairs as complex. Figure on the observationalconditions.
4 exposes
an exampleof CA [V that finally exhibits an orderedstructure. Let us take the exampleof a human subjectthat observesa table.The table as
fr0 t:'l f=l
a whole is static and discretein relation with the surroundingenvironment.If the
r*Í-i-a-T*rrm
t-3 Í-{

ffi ffiffi
subjectchangesthe observationalconditionsthrough an electronicmicroscope,he
#i-t
H-f*{-}{{
+.f*l-.*,{
ffi detectsa small part of the network of micro-particles.He switches the attention
ffiHfr
ffiFHTH ffi from the whole object to local interactionamong components.In the image-world
createdby the microscopethe table doesn't exist as a whole. In the sameway the
rr.r?ffl-1.ïfl ffi network of particlesdoesn't exist from the perspectiveof a table as a whole; the
perspectiveof the whole is given to the observerpurely becauseof the human
Figure4 ecological niche. The examples of Necker's cube and Julezs' figure are more
relevantfor the role of the observer.In both examplesit is about the existenceof a
we think that this i1a g9o-dexampleof diachronicemergentismin bidimensional picture that is transformedinto a tridimensional one only by the
stephan's
terms and anotherexlnr]e gf the real case of observationar humansubject.
ãmergencein buur'.
terms.If it is about a final oidered structure,then in passingfrom Thus, we think that the "intermediary" betweenthe neural level (brain) and
chaosto order, a
ttcw level of observationis created.It can be about some psychologicallevel (mind), and generally the " intermediary" between the micro
iinal orderedstructures,
but they can not be deducedas suchfrom the initial configuration. ;rnd macro levels, is the subject as an observer.In fact, the intermediary,i.e. the
Irrrrnan subject as an observer is an epistemological intermediary, not atr
orrtologicalone. This is because,as we mentionedearlier, the search for an
IV. THE PERSPECTIVE
OF "TIIE OBSERVER,,.
THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEWCOORDINATE irrtcrrnediarylevel as an ontologicallink betweenthe micro and macro levels lca<ls
l<t tltc ad infinitum regressionproblem.On the other hand, as we have also poin(t'tl
since Descartestill the present,the debatesregardingthe mind-brain out, the problemof real emergence is directlyconnectedwith the observet''sstitttts
(body)
K'lrttion have been bewildering. V/e think that all lhe Thus, we think the observer's perspectiveconfers the right wiìy Íìtr llrt'
coífusions are due to the
rrrixirrg ol' the ontological perspective for grasping comprehensionof the mind-brainrelation.
this problem with the
 ol :t totttt'ltt
on a very known line of thought (Fodor, searle, Dennett,etc.),
we agreethat lrr llsyclrologrcitl tcrrlls,w('eitttlilttl tllc slttltciclcit:lhc lÌlclttìlllll
it is completely wrong to try to fúa tfre bridge laws ()l ()lltct-col'Ìctpts(Keil, l9tì9)"I'hcrc.ilrL: s()lÌìcirtrplrcrt
between the neuronal and tlt.pr'rrrls ()p llrc trtcittrittg
conceptuallevels.But for us the main argumentagainst a concept and othcr concc'ts'
the bridge laws is basedon 1,,,k*{grr.,r"trtcd aboveiir .cural terms)between
the.above principle. on the one side, wìthin the conceptual
perspectivegiven by OBSERVER pERSpECI-rVE
folk-psychology,the observergraspsthe mental states
in terms of desires,believes, .) .I.ilr:oNl.Or_oGrcAL PERSPECTM ORTHEEXTENDED
etc' Moreover, if the naturallanguãgeis usedas a tool
for the analysisof cognitive |rrthcfollowing,wewillfigurehowanyentity..observes''otherentities,j.e
behavior, then the finding of the LaÀguageof rhought structure;the human subject
as the paradigm of cognition rr is irrtcractingwith other entitleãthat have tire same
arisesas something as very narural. Èy À"un, of ps-ychorogicì that the entitiesinteractor
tooË are seizïa ;uìi is orrly a particularcase.By the samestructurewe mean
the semantical and logical relations among content membrane bound proteins
sentencesthat are identified I0llow thc same ru*.r. "...Flhe single cell with its (other
with mental states. environment
crrrrstitr.rtc an ohservu- of same aspectsof its immediate
on the other side, if the observationalconditions are as slgnals or nutrition),. and multicellular
changedby means of nurlcculcsthat can bc rccogniz.ccl
technology proper to neuroscience(fMRI, pET, plus
dissection,etc.), then the .rgrr.isrrrdc'rc.rl cririt'irlly .rì intcr-ccll signaling."(Baasand Emmeche'1997)
discussionabout mental statesis replacedwith (orrrettt;tltitsis)
one in terms of the
a specific structu.re
neural states,i.e. the neural patterni of activation.
The human subject "or,"rponaing
deals with l)itttcrlìsol'activation have
Itt ttcrttltll('t'lìls,llttr ttclttt'ltl
causal relations amgng the neuronalpatternsof
activation (that are identical with lìorrrllurl,,1lr sirlglc,,"r,r,r,,
rlil'lì.rt.rrf andalsofrom the neuralnetwOrkaSa whOle'
mental states).The humansubjectivity(in terms .1.0 wc will strcssthe problemonly in.connectionist terms'
-n,"ntui of Searle)and semanticalrelations srrrrplrlytlrt.Pr-oblcrrr,
of vectorial
(in terms of Fodor) among states can not be captured out of these
,l,frt.
1r:rilt.rnsol lrctrvity intcracteach other, i.e. they obey the laws
"interacts"with a patternof
observational conditions. ;rtltlrtiorr:rrrrlprrrtlttcl.lt is not about a node that
contributesto the
Human subjectivity invorvesnot only a certainarea
of the brain given by the ;rt.tivity.()Í c()rrrsc,thc activation value of a certain node
most neural activated pattern, but also a considerable irctivirrionclc:grcc ol'the corresponding patternwhich in its turn contributesto the
number of /ess activated and thus to the final stablestate
neuralpatternssituatedin other areasofthe brain.
In this sense,thoselessactivated st'rc ol'r5c whole n"i*ort at a particú*
areascan be thought of as constitutingthe physical ol'rharnetwork.nut tftit it iutt t^hetype of -o-"nt causalrelationsabovementioned'In this
counterpartfor the subjectivity "observer" only for other
problem, unavailableout of the obseriationãt
tondition, p.*"0 by pET and fMRI. srÌlìsc,an activation pu,t"* can bó^thought of as an
Beside,becausethe sensorysystemsare the l)attcrns.
extendedparts of the nervoussystems, an "observer" only
the body has to be addedto the mentionedcounterpart. ln the sameway, in psychologicalterms,a mental stateis
is replaced with what are
II. The part-counterpart principle: lor other mental ,tu,ár. weitrlnt úat if the discussion
senseof the.observation is lost'
In neural terms, the part-counterpart reration gives consideredto be the correspondingneuralparts,the
the human subjectivity. with other entities that
Llinas and Parreclaim that-theperteption at a given Generally speaking,an entity exists becauseof its relation
moment is ,,represented by a have the samestructure.Bui that entity doesn't exist in relations with entities that
percentage of coherently ôscillating celrilar the entities, only
:nr111
thalamocorticalsystem.The rest of the thalaíocortical
element, over the whore have other structuresanJoú"y different laws. However, among
to anotherone'
coherence,may in fact representthe necessary
.yroÃ, u"*g silent to such the human subjectcan shift from one set of observationalcondition
for the mind-brain
neuronalactivity that we recognizeindividually
counterpartto the temporal pattem of Thus, only the humzrnsubjectcan be thought of as an-observer
ascognition". @lìnasand pane, 1996) purely because of the
In neural terms, the most activated pattern relarion. Mind and brain âre perceivedas"different things
the observational
considerableimplicit links with the otherpatterns
òf n"u.onr, at one moment, has tliÍ,ferenceamong tlrc observational conditions. Thus, from
claiming that in
of neuronsthat are lessactivated. condition given by psychologytools, Searle seemsto be right in
By this way, a pyramid of neutonalpatterns seemingness
of activationis formed. In this sense, thc probleãrof ,ubil.iiuity we can not make the distinctionbetween
l-linas and Perresustainthat: "The fact that is given by seemingness itself'
all frequenciesare not equaly probable andìeality,purelyú"rn,,r" subjectivity
determines that certain resonant frequencies
*itt u" observed preferentialry.,,
Moreover,the kind of pyramid of activation
patternsis involved in other cognitive
processeslike attention...^Th"selective
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