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People vs Vera

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions
for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the
he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act
of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein
that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1
Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be
an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.


1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws


1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose
upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission”
which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the
legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal
protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must
be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class.

1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no
set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and
the doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the
constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation

2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the
denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every
case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer,
while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation
in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview
of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person
similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary
funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality
would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the
affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.

Cruz vs Youngberg

This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a
writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau
of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the
petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155,
which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine
Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into
the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate
Bill No. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as follows:

SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for
the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly
prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign
countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with
the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely
or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign
cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands.

SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 8, 1924.

The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No.
3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief
demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the
respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and,
therefore, valid.

The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the
petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.

The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by
the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for
the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would
automatically become effective. Act No. 3052 reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven

hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is hereby amended to read as

"SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine
Islands. — It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or
introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director
of Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first had,
authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred
cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these
Islands, and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to
exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director of
Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft
cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided, further, That all live
cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or introduction of which into the
Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the
Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior to
authorizing its transfer to other provinces.
"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue regulations
and others to provide against a raising of the price of both fresh and refrigerated
meat. The Governor-General also may, by executive order, suspend, this prohibition
for a fixed period in case local conditions require it."

SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.

Approved, March 14, 1922.

The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show its nullity or
unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former act would
make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit
for the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department.

An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by
implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with such former laws. (I Lewis
Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. 458, citing McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361;
23 Pac., 357; Orange Country vs. Harris, 97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind.,
204; 11 L.R.A., 370, etc.)

This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless
it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E. Olsen &
Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the
validity of the statute attacked by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the
petitioner would not be entitled to relief inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue.

But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely
valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to
protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through
importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting
the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope
of the police power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. Colorado,
187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connection it is said in the case of
Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine
Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare
and the public interest. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the
time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be
said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court
to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the
measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted. (6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions cited

In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in not holding that
the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the
prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We do
not think that such is the case; as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati,
Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88)
said in such case:

The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the
Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of
cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the
Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law.
It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is
not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the
Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law. (See
MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for distinction between `supplemental' and
`amendatory' and O'Pry vs. U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between `addition'
and `amendment.')"

Abakada Guro Partylist vs Executive secretary

n this case, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 or the RVAT Law (Revitalized Value Added Tax
Law) was put into issue. It was alleged, among others, that said law was not duly enacted.
R.A. 9337 originated as House Bill No. 3705. After 3rd reading in the lower house, it was
transmitted to the Senate where it was lodged as Senate Bill No. 1950. In the Senate, several
provisions, which were not found in the H.B. 3705, were inserted.
After 3rd reading in the Senate, the lower house found that the House version and the Senate
version have disagreeing provisions. And pursuant to Congress Rules, both Houses agreed to
form a Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) where representatives from both Houses were
sent to settle the disagreeing provisions.
Apparently however, the BCC further inserted several provisions to S.B. 1950, i.e., stand by power
was granted to the President to raise the valued-added tax rate. Further still, the “No pass”
provision was deleted – this provision prohibited the passing of value-added tax to consumers.
Nevertheless, said version was passed into law hence the promulgation of R.A. No. 9337.
In 2005, ABAKADA GURO Party List, headed by its officers Attys. Samson Alcantara and Ed
Vincent Albano, as well as co-petitioner [then] Congressman Francis Escudero, questioned the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337
Respondents in this case invoked the ruling in the case of Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance or the
Enrolled Bill Doctrine. Said case relied upon by respondents state that the signing of a bill by
the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. As such, R.A.
No. 9337 enjoys the conclusive presumption of constitutionality and that the courts cannot go
behind the enrolled bill.
ABAKADA GURO et al insists that the Tolentino ruling should be abandoned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case.
HELD: Yes. There is no reason to abandon the ruling in Tolentino. The Supreme Court ruled that
the Supreme Court is not the proper venue to raise concerns regarding parliamentary
procedures. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have
no concern. Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own business expeditiously
and in the most orderly manner.
If a change is desired in the practice of the Bicameral Conference Committee it must be sought
in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an
internal rule of each house. To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted
to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference
committee to be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.

Garcia vs Executive secretary

n November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in
addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the
Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across
the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was
passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued
to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress,
the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which
are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue
and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than
the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be
exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject
to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff
rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which
authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

EDU vs Ericta

Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as Admin Order No. 2 implementing
it, as an invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. Galo followed
with a manifestation that in the event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of
the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise
of legislative power.

Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.

Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and order.

Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a
group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative
Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such
administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect
reproducing what was set forth in the Act.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that
local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness
of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine
whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope
and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic
Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public
safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical
affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and
regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There
has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable,
launched against it by respondent Galo.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1

Rafael vs embroidery

In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law created the Embroidery and Apparel Control
and Inspection Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also provided that the Board shall be composed
(1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act as Chairman, to be designated by the
Secretary of Finance;
(2) a representative from the Central Bank to be designated by its Governor;
(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be designated by the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry;
(4) a representative from the National Economic Council to be designated by its Chairman; and
(5) a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of Embroidery and
Apparel Exporters of the Philippines.
Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made certain assessments against Cecilio
Rafael but the latter refused to comply. Rafael sued EACIB and he averred that RA 3137 is
unconstitutional for while Congress may create an office it cannot specify who shall be
appointed therein; that the members of the EACIB can only be appointed by the President in
accordance with Article 7, Sec. 10 2 of the Constitution; that since the Act prescribes that the
chairman and members of the EACIB should come from specified offices, it is equivalent to a
declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed, thereby infringing the constitutional
power of the President to make appointments.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3137 bypassed the appointing power of the president.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that indeed “the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative
of the President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by Congress, except those resulting from
the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of
the limited power to prescribe the qualifications to the given appointive office.”
In the case at bar, the representatives in the EACIB are not appointed by the Department Heads.
They are merely going to be designated hence whoever was designated was merely sitting as
an ex officio member. It must also be noted that Congress took care to specify that the
representatives should come from the Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Department of
Commerce and Industry and the National Economic Council. The obvious reason must be
because these departments and/or bureaus perform functions which have a direct relation to
the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof into embroidery and apparel products
and their subsequent exportation abroad. There is no attempt in RA 3137 to deprive the
President of his power to make appointments. The law is not unconstitutional.
Pineda vs Pena

This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or encroachment between two
mining claims.

The relevant facts are as follows:

The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in January, 1932. After Sibayan's death, his
heirs Miguela and Aleja Sibayan executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement wherein they waived
their rights and interest over the "Ped" claim, among others, in favor of co-heir Feliza Sibayan. Feliza
then transferred said claims to Sofia Reyes.

The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo in February, 1932, and was subsequently
transferred to Joseph Palengaoan.

In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed the KM. 21 Mining Association, later
converted into the KM. 21 Exploration Corporation, to which the members conveyed their respective
mining claims, including the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims were assigned to the
Baguio Gold Mining Company for operation.

During this time, an amended declaration of location for the "Ullmann" claim was registered.

On November 23, 1972, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. Q-17136 against Feliza Sibayan, Sofia
Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Exploration Corporation, et. al., with the Court of First Instance, Quezon City,
Branch IX. Petitioners claimed that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement from which private
respondents derived their ownership and possession over the "Ped" claim was maliciously falsified
[Annex "I" to the Petition; Rollo, pp. 78-79] and prayed for annulment of all subsequent transfers
involving the mining claims.

During the pre-trial of Civil Case No. Q-17136, the parties entered into an amicable settlement,
agreeing that: (1) private respondents win return to petitioners the disputed mining claims, including
the "Ped" claim; (2) petitioners will reimburse private respondents all expenses, like assessment
taxes, incurred in the preservation of the claims; and (3) private respondents shall execute the
necessary documents to reconvey the mining claims to petitioners (Annex "I" to the Petition, pp. 4-
5; Rollo, p. 78-79].

Thus, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on November 11, 1974 ordering the parties to
comply with the above settlement [Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, p. 4; Annex "E" to
the Petition; Rollo, p. 52].

On July 20, 1974, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter-complaint (Mines Administrative
Case No. V-784) against private respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the
"Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim.

On January 10, 1977, the Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict
between the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims, the dispositive portion of which reads:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the protest and complaint-in-

intervention should be, as hereby they are DISMISSED. Accordingly, respondents
are hereby given the preferential right to possess, explore, develop, exploit and
operate the area covered by their "Ullmann" claim. [Decision of the Director of Mines,
p. 4; Rollo, p. 32].

Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources Development
Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the law were made applicable to
petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates compliance with certain requirements in order for
subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree.
Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost. The requirements are embodied in Sections 100
and 101, and Section 180 of the implementing regulations, quoted as follows:

Sec. 100. Old Valid Mining Rights May Come Under This Decree. — Holders of valid
and subsisting mining locations and other rights under other laws, irrespective of the
areas covered, may avail of the rights and privileges granted under this Decree by
making the necessary application therefor and approval thereof by the Director within
a period of two (2) years from the date of approval of this Decree.

Sec. 101. Recognition and Survey of Old Subsisting Mining Claims. — All mining
grants, patents, locations, leases and permits subsisting at the time of the approval
of this Decree shall be recognized if registered pursuant to Section 100
hereof. Provided, that Spanish Royal Grants and unpatented mining claims located
and registered under the Act of the United States Congress of July 1, 1902, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Philippine Bill", shall be surveyed within one (1)
year from the approval of this Decree: Provided, further, That no such mining rights
shall be recognized if there is failure to comply with the fundamental requirements of
the respective grants: And provided, finally, That such grants, patents, locations,
leases or permits as may be recognized by the Director after proper investigation,
shall comply with the applicable provisions of this Decree, more particularly with
the annual work obligations, submittal of reports, fiscal provisions and other
obligations. [Emphasis supplied].

Sec. 180. Failure to File Application to Avail of the Rights and Privileges Under the
Decree — Mining grants, patents, locations, leases, permits and other mining rights
subsisting at the time of the approval of the Decree for which no corresponding
application under Section 100 and 101 of the Decree has been filed with the period
provided in Section 176 hereof shall be considered to have lapsed, and the area
covered thereby, shall be open to relocation as if no grant, patent, location, lease,
permit and other mining rights have been made or granted thereon.

Finding that petitioners failed to comply with the above-cited provisions, respondent director
declared in the impugned portion of the decision that:

The records of this case show that respondents submitted in evidence (Exhibit 16) a
certification dated August 24, 1976 issued by our Mines Regional Officer in Baguio
City to the effect that protestants[petitioners] failed to file the required application to
avail for "Ped" mineral claim. Under the circumstances, and considering that the
period for the filing of said application has already expired as of May 17,
1976, protestants [petitioners] have lost whatever rights they have over their mining
claim involved in this case. Moreover, protestants [petitioners] failed to perform the
required annual assessment work since 1952 as evidenced by the certification
issued by the Mining Recorder of Benguet (Exh. 17). Needless to state that failure to
perform the required annual assessment work constitutes abandonment of the
mining claim [Emphasis supplied; Decision of the Director of Mines, pp. 3-4; Annex
"C" to the Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-32].

On appeal to the Minister of Natural Resources, petitioners argued that respondent Director was
without jurisdiction or exceeded his jurisdiction in ruling that they have lost their rights over the "Ped"
mining claim, since the case was only for overlapping or encroachment and the question of whether
they complied with the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463 was never placed at issue in the

On November 19, 1980, then Minister of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido disposed of the appeal

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed and the decision,
dated January 10, 1977, of the Director of Mines affirmed.


[Decision of Secretary of Natural Resources, p. 10; Annex "E" to the Petition; Rollo,
p. 58].

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent Minister in an Order dated
July 10, 1981 [Order, p. 2; Annex "L" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 110]. Hence, this petition
for certiorari and prohibition.

Petitioners pray for an order to (1) annul that portion of the decision which declared them to have
abandoned and lost their rights on their "Ped" claim; (2) require public respondents to recognize
petitioners' vested rights on their "Ped" mining claim; (3) enjoin private respondents to confine
themselves within the boundaries of their "Ullmann" claim; and (4) require private respondents to
return to petitioners' possession the "Ped" mineral claim [Petition, p. 18; Rollo, p. 19].

Private respondents and the Solicitor General filed their respective Comments, the Solicitor General
adopting petitioners' position. Private respondents then filed their Comment to the Solicitor General's
Comment. Thereafter, the Solicitor General submitted his Reply. Whereupon, the case was deemed
submitted for decision.

Petitioners reiterate that the portion of the decision which declared petitioners to have lost and/or
abandoned their rights to the "Ped" mining claim was issued without jurisdiction, in violation of due
process and in grave abuse of discretion.

As counter-argument, private respondents assert that under Section 49 of Pres. Decree No. 463,
when petitioners filed their protest case for overlapping of mining claims, they automatically
subjected their "Ped" claim to questions on the validity of its location and on the locator's having
complied with all the requirements of the Decree.

The issues to be resolved in this case are (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims; and (2)
should public respondents have such jurisdiction, whether or not they committed grave abuse of
discretion or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioners to have abandoned their mining claim.
On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that public respondents may not validly and legally
take cognizance of an issue not raised in the complaint, i.e., the issue of the validity of the "Ped"
mining claim.

This assertion is mistaken. Petitioners had filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463
which vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims [Section 48,
Pres. Decree No. 463].

Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural Resources, upon
recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to issue rules, regulations and orders
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Decree. In accordance with the statutory
grant of rule-making power, the Department Secretary on May 17, 1975 issued the Consolidated
Mines Administrative Order Implementing Pres. Decree No. 463, which was published in the Official
Gazette on June 16, 1975.

One such implementing rule is Section 128, which respondent Minister of Natural Resources relied
upon in his decision to dispose of the jurisdictional issue raise d by petitioners. Section 128 provides:

Sec. 128. Issues Joined . . .

The Director, or the Secretary, in case of appeals, may motu proprio look into the
validity of mining claims, whether raised as an issue or not.

It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies [People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957); Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796,
June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183]. In order to be valid, the administrative regulation must be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law, conform to the standards that the law prescribes [People v.
Exconde, supra, citing Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 727 (1940); Pangasinan Transportation v.
Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221 (1940)], and must relate solely to carrying into effect the
general provisions of the law [U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119 (1914)].

With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis
for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department Head
pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not contravene the provisions of
Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely
prescribes a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It does not
amend or extend the provisions of the statute [People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18,
1977, 79 SCRA 450, citing University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376 (1953)].

Neither can it be maintained that such an implementing rule results in a denial of procedural due
process, for it is axiomatic in administrative law that what the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard [Catura v.
Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-27392, January 30,1971, 37 SCRA 303, citing De Borja v.
Tan, 93 Phil. 167 (1953)]. In this case, petitioners were afforded the opportunity to be heard on the
validity of the "Ped" mining claim when they submitted rebuttal evidence on appeal.

Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and effect of law. Thus, public
respondents were duly empowered to inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in the
protest case, even if not raised in issue.
Having resolved the question of jurisdiction, the Court shall next determine if public respondents
acted within their jurisdiction, or if they committed grave abuse of discretion which would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed for.

As a rule, the courts will not interfere with purely administrative matters involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, and findings of fact, of the administrative agency. The exception is when
there is a clear showing that the agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when it
acted in a capricious manner such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction
[Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture, G.R. No. L-21167. March
31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988,
157 SCRA 481].

The petition is impressed with merit.

Public respondents found that petitioners failed to comply with the requirements set by law, and thus
declared petitioners to have abandoned and lost their rights over the "Ped" claim.

However, respondent director's finding that petitioners failed to file the availment-application was
based solely on evidence submitted by private respondents. This consisted of a certification issued
by the Mines Regional Officer in Baguio City dated August 24, 1976 stating that petitioners failed to
file the availment-application for the "Ped" claim within the period provided by law. The finding is
effectively contradicted by the rebuttal evidence submitted by petitioners on appeal consisting of an
"Affidavit to Avail of Benefits" and an "Application for Order of Survey of Mining Claim" (Appeal-
Annex "B" and "B-1", Rollo, pp. 47-48) filed by petitioners with the Bureau of Mines office in Manila
on May 12, 1975.

The certification issued by the Mines Regional Officer of Baguio City cannot prevail over the
documents clearly evidencing the petitioners' filing the application. Not only was the application filed
within the prescriptive period, it was also duly filed with the Bureau of Mines Office in Manila, the
venue specified under Section 176 of the implementing rules.

Private respondents argue that the documents were not filed at the proper time since they were not
formally offered in evidence when the case was still before the respondent Director, and were only
submitted on appeal.

The contention is clearly untenable. Petitioners precisely were unaware that the validity of the "Ped"
claim would be passed upon in the protest case since such was not raised as an issue. Hence it was
only after the decision in the protest case was rendered that petitioners found the need to present
evidence on appeal relating to the validity of the "Ped" claim.

Clearly, respondent Minister gravely abused his discretion when he disregarded the rebuttal
evidence submitted by petitioners which otherwise would have had the effect of reversing
respondent Director's finding.

As to petitioners' supposed failure to perform annual work obligations on the "Ped" claim since 1952,
the conclusion is only partly correct. Annual work obligations, consisting of payment of assessment
and taxes, had in fact been paid up to the year 1975, although not by petitioners. The record shows
that the payor was the Baguio Gold Mining Company, to which the "Ped" claim, among others, had
been assigned by private respondents for operation (Rollo, pp. 93-98.) And subsequent to 1975,
petitioners paid the taxes due up to 1981, in compliance with the law's mandate (Rollo, pp. 100-101.)
All the documents showing these decisive facts were annexed to petitioners' "Rejoinder to Motion to
Strike Out Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration" dated February 25, 1981, and submitted to
respondent Minister [Annex "I" to the Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 81-82].

That petitioners were not the actual payors of the assessment due up to 1975 can be attributed to
the fact that possession of the subject claim, even up to the date when the present petition was
submitted for decision, remained with private respondents, and its ownership had been in dispute in
Civil Case No. Q-17136. By the terms of the amicable settlement contained in the November 11,
1974 decision in said civil case, which had long attained finality, private respondent promised to
return possession of the "Ped" claim to petitioners, subject to reimbursement by petitioners of all
assessments and necessary expenses paid for by private respondents. Petitioners therefore cannot
be faulted with non-payment of the assessment works, since such payment was in fact made, at
least until 1975, by the party to which such payment pertained. Consequently, such payment inures
to the benefit of petitioners.

Respondent Minister evidently knew of the existence of the amicable settlement, since he discussed
the terms thereof in his decision [Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, p. 4; Annex "E" to
the Petition; Rollo, p. 52]. Nevertheless, respondent Minister overlooked the fact that from the terms
of the settlement, petitioners clearly were not liable to pay the assessment works for the years in
question, and that consequently there was no basis for a finding of abandonment of the "Ped" claim
by petitioners.

Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that public respondents had the authority to ascertain the
validity of the "Ped" claim. Nevertheless, in affirming that portion of the decision of the Director of
Mines declaring petitioners to have "abandoned and lost their rights" over the "Ped" claim,
respondent Minister committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. That part of the decision of the Director of Mines dated
January 10, 1977 in Mines Administrative Case No. V-784 declaring petitioners to have "abandoned
and lost their rights" over the "Ped" mineral claim is hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET

US vs Ang Tang Ho

During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary
circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the
price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the
price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was
charged in violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.

Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact
laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine
Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at
which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without
the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law
must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future,if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Pelaez vs Auditor general

15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this
was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change
the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit
the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez
claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly
repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from
being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality
can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC,
Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of
the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration
of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine,
with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” –
which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require
– is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power.
In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which
immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.”
Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires
and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

People vs Rosenthal

acob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company.
Later, Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without
actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is
in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581.
Section 2 provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer
to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under
obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers
enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.
Section 5, on the other hand, provides that “whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands
is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership,
association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and
provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association
or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or
corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership,
association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in
said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when
ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit”, and that “an
appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to
the Secretary of Finance.”
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the
Act which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought
to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the
result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular
Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate
or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person,
partnership, association or corporation applying therefor “has complied with the provisions of
this Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means
that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act
No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer
to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation
“is in the public interest.”
In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to protect the public against “speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock
in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent
exploitations”, — the SC held that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide
the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or
cancellation of certificates or permits.
Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the
stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that
this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations.
The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question
show the contrary. . . ”

Cervantes vs Auditor general

• This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioner’s claim for quarters
allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).
• Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00
• NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to
P1,650 for 1949.
• This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise
council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by
the Auditor general on two grounds:
o a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting manager’s salary to P15,000/year.
o b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.

DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive
as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCC’s operation. Executive
Order 93 is valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for review
DISMISSED with costs

petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for
certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent
(15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was
issued without prior notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on
June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that
although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant
to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative
character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It,
however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to
the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While
respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such
rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of
notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In
the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

Ynot vs IAC

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos
from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A.
Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due
process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO
is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated
a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one
area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should
be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can
be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Atung Paglaum vs comelec

Quinto vs Comelec

The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec
4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of
sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional.
Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in GOCCs shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his certificate of
Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution
8679, violate the equal protection clause of the constitution.
The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in
the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service
officers and employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privelege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.
It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not enfringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class,
if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable ground exists
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive
officials. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by
an appointing authority.

Aquino vs COMELEC

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of
Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995)
day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate
of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that
dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with
38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter
acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue.
On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective
office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the
sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only
under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times
as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile,
is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through
assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a
candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a
domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the
elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that
election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed
him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as
well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims
to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other
residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is
not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of
the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion
which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year
residence in the district.
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate
garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of
Makati City made permanent.
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional
candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of
representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections
and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal
consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its
questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be
judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the
petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year
residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were
only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of
petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board
of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after
the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place
candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as
substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political
districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine
residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year
residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement
date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of
choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.

Ceniza vs COmelec

Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which
effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly
urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit
them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a
component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added
Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the
other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the
constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction
of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that
political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96
of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and
historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the
province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for
the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue
never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies
cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to
vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which
in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such
unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government
units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State shall
guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no
merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should
be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental
unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution.
It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue
which came into existence on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their
regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show
whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social,
economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or
industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government
thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in
some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the
law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The
contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for
provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a
matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of

Veterans federation party vs Comelec

COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition
for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives
although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the
ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the
party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the
party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in

Ang bagong bayani vs Comelec

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 which approved the participation of
154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners
sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized
or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated
the issue to the Supreme Court.

1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.

1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies
"where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." Tha facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to
the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law
pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-
list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representative may “be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is
however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of
the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was
beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution,
to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the
Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

Atung Paglaum case digest

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in
the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as
the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles
established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-
list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,”
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-
fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice,
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional
prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-
list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of
the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the
party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major
political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire
the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they
are ideologically marginalized.

Philconsa vs Comelec case digest

Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim
Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973
Constitution which provides:
In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election,
the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the
vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant
petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies
in the legislature.
HELD: No. The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s
decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New
Constitution which reads:
Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed
by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which
is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies
exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the
necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to
mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of
appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to
appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter
must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular
not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body,
the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more,
the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies
in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.