1. Republic v. "G" Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 141241, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 608.

FACTS

Committee on Privatization approved the proposal of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for the negotiated sale of 90% of
the shares of stock of the government-owned Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC).

Learning of the government's intention to sell MMC, the respondent "G" Holdings, Inc. signified its interest to purchase MMC
and submitted the best bid

"G" Holdings culminated in the execution of a purchase and sale agreement on October 2, 1992. A disagreement on the
matter of when the installment payments should commence arose between the parties.

"G" Holdings filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with the RTC against the Republic to compel it to close
the sale in accordance with the purchase and sale agreement.

RTC: ruled in favor of "G" Holdings. The Purchase and Sale Agreement is indeed subject to the final closing conditions
prescribed by Stipulation No. 5.02 and conformably to Rule 39, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, accordingly orders that the
Asset Privatization Trust execute the corresponding Document of Transfer of the subject shares and financial notes and
cause the actual delivery of subject shares and notes to "G" Holdings, Inc.

The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the Republic however, contrary to the rules of procedure the notice
of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals (CA), not with the trial court which rendered the judgment appealed from.

PET: The Republic, through the APT, filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. It claimed that the decision
should be annulled on the ground of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court
because the court a quo promulgated its decision prior to the submission of the Republic's formal offer of evidence and
without ruling on the admissibility of the evidence offered by "G" Holdings. The Republic also asserted that the failure of the
Solicitor General to file the notice of appeal with the proper forum amounted to extrinsic fraud which prevented it from
appealing the case.

CA: Dismissed the petition. No extrinsic fraud because "G" Holdings had no participation in the failure of the Solicitor
General to properly appeal the decision of the trial court. Neither was there any connivance between "G" Holdings' and the
Republic's counsels in the commission of the error. RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as well as over
the person of the parties. Hence, whatever error the trial court committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction was merely an
error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. As an error of judgment, it was correctable by appeal. Unfortunately, appeal
could no longer be availed of by the Republic.

Republic assails judgment to the SC.

ISSUES

WON The RTC was void of jurisdiction and thus the decision must be annulled.

RULING

 A petition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary action. By virtue of its exceptional character, the action is
restricted exclusively to the grounds specified in the rules, namely, (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction. In a
petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul
a judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion.

 Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. Where the court has jurisdiction over the defendant and over
the subject matter of the case, its decision will not be voided on the ground of absence of jurisdiction

 The Republic does not deny that the trial court had jurisdiction over it as well as over the subject matter of the case.
What the Republic questions is the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the court a quo in rendering the
 decision.

 First, the interpretation of the Republic contravenes the very rationale of the restrictive application of annulment of
judgment. By seeking to include acts committed with grave abuse of discretion, it tends to enlarge the concept of lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for the availment of the remedy.

 Second, by claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the Republic actually concedes and
presupposes the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case.

 Hence, the Republic effectively admits that the two grounds for which lack of jurisdiction may be validly invoked to seek
the annulment of a judgment — want of jurisdiction over the parties and want of jurisdiction over the subject matter —
do not exist. It only assails the manner in which the trial court formulated its judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction

 Jurisdiction is distinct from the exercise thereof. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on
all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

 We have held that where the court has jurisdiction and, having all the facts necessary for a judgment, it renders a
decision without holding any trial or hearing (where the parties are allowed to present their respective evidence in
support of their cause of action and defense), such judgment cannot be assailed as having been rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction nor rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

 In the matter of extrinsic fraud, the circumstances of this case do not establish its existence. Extrinsic fraud refers to
any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the unsuccessful party is prevented from fully proving his case, by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent.

 The Republic has not proven, or even alleged, that "G" Holdings practiced deceit or employed subterfuge on it,
precluding it from fully and completely presenting its case to the court. Since the prevailing party did not commit or
participate in the commission of fraud which prevented the other party from having his day in court, there was no
reason for the appellate court to annul the decision of the trial court.We have consistently ruled that, to render a
judgment void, the fraud must be committed by the adverse party and not by one's own counsel.

2. Tolentino v. Leviste, G.R. No. 156118, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 274.

FACTS

Respondents Spouses Gerardo Cinco, Jr. and Pamela Cinco filed a complaint for specific performance with damages
against petitioners Tempus Place Realty Management Corporation and Pablo T. Tolentino.

The complaint alleged that respondents purchased from petitioners a condominium unit. Despite, however, the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the delivery of the owner's copy of the condominium certificate of title,
petitioners failed to deliver possession of the unit because they have allegedly leased it to a third party. The complaint
further alleged that petitioners refused to pay the corresponding capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax on the
transaction, and execute the necessary board resolution for the transfer of the property, thus preventing respondents
from registering the Deed of Absolute Sale and transferring the title to the unit in their names.

As petitioners failed to file their answer to the complaint, Hon. Oscar Leviste, the Presiding Judge of RTC issued an
order on January 17, 1997 granting respondents' motion to declare petitioners in default.

RTC: After considering the evidences presented by the plaintiff finds that the allegation are all true and are entitled to
the reliefs including:

Moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;

Exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;

Attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000,000.00.

Petitioners thereafter filed a motion for new trial. They contended that their right to fair and impartial trial had been
impaired by reason of accident, mistake or excusable negligence of their former counsel, a certain Atty. Villamor. RTC
denied the motion for new trial for lack of merit.

Petitioners through their new counsel, Atty. Ricardo A. Santos, filed a notice of appeal to the CA.

CA: Dismissed the appeal on the ground of abandonment as petitioners failed to submit the required appeal brief. The
RTC decision became final and executory.

PET: Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment based on the grounds among others: the RTC has no
jurisdiction and/or authority and has committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding amounts in excess of what is
prayed for in the complaint nor proved by the evidence as well as in palpable violation of the mandatory provisions of
the Civil Code and the Rules of Court and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. Consequently, the challenged
judgment in default is an absolute nullity.

CA: Modified RTC decision--- The annulment of judgment may be based on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, and it is important that petitioner failed to move for new trial, or appeal, or file a petition for relief, or take
other appropriate remedies assailing the questioned judgment, final order or resolution through no fault attributable to
him. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court decision may not be annulled on the ground of extrinsic fraud. It
stated that the failure of petitioners' counsel to file an appellant's brief in the Court of Appeals did not amount to
extrinsic fraud as to justify annulment of judgment, as it was not shown that their former counsel's omission was
tainted with fraud and/or deception tantamount to extrinsic or collateral fraud. Neither may it be annulled on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction as the action for specific performance and damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.It held
that the moral damages in the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) was excessive and lowered to
P100,000.00. It also reduced the exemplary damages to P100,000.00, and the attorney's fees to P100,000.00.

Petitioners filed the instant petition for review of the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals.

PET: The petitioners can avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment to annul the decision of the RTC as Hon.
Judge Leviste had no jurisdiction and/or acted without jurisdiction

ISSUES

WON the RTC had no jurisdiction and/or acted without jurisdiction

RULING

 Under the Rule, an action for annulment of judgments may only be availed of on the following grounds: (1)
extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.

 Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully
his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court.

 Petitioners in this case did not allege nor present evidence of fraud or deception employed on them by the
respondents to deprive them of opportunity to present their case to the court. They, however, assert that the
negligence of their former counsel in failing to file the appeal brief amounts to extrinsic fraud which would serve
as basis for their petition for annulment of judgment. We disagree. The Court has held that when a party retains
 the services of a lawyer, he is bound by his counsel's actions and decisions regarding the conduct of the case.

 We reiterate the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel except when the negligence of his
counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. Only when the
application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should the exception apply. We find no reason to
apply the exception in this case.

 We are also not persuaded by petitioners' assertion that the trial court judge lacked jurisdiction so as to justify the
annulment of the RC decision. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.

 Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance or
submission by the defendant or respondent to the court, or by coercive process issued by the court to
him, generally by the service of summons. The trial court clearly had jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party, the petitioners herein, when the latter received the summons from the court.

 On the other hand, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is conferred by law and is determined
from the allegations in the complaint. Under the law, the action for specific performance and damages is within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.

 We note that petitioners' arguments to support their stand that the trial court did not have jurisdiction actually
pertain to the substance of the decision. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision
rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in
the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

3. Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Cheng, G.R. Nos. 170232 & 170301, December 5, 2006, 509 SCRA 532, 543.

FACTS

Sui Soan S. Cheng a.k.a. Cheng Sui Soan alleged that he executed a Deed of Assignment, where he transferred his
40,000 shares in the Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc.in favor of Kenneth Tan, Vevette Cheng, Felesavette Cheng, and
Yvette Tan.

To implement the Deed of Assignment, the company acknowledged in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), that it
owed Cheng P6.8 million pesos, plus insurance proceeds amounting to P760,000.00 and a signing bonus of
P300,000.00.

Thereafter, he was issued 48 postdated checks but after the 11th check, the remaining checks were dishonored by
the bank. Sui also claimed that petitioners did not remit to him the insurance proceeds, thus breaching their obligation
under the MOA prompting him to file a complaint for specific performance and damages filed against Vette Industrial
Sales Company, Inc., et al.

Petitioners alleged that Sui sold his shares for only P1.00 per share which they already paid; that the MOA was
unenforceable because it was executed without authorization from the board of directors; that the MOA was void for
want of consideration; and that petitioner Kenneth Tan executed the MOA after Sui issued threats and refused to sign
the waiver and quitclaim.

The trial court reset the pre-trial on January 15, 2004 but it was postponed and moved to May 21, 2004. On said date,
Sui and his counsel, Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer), failed to appear. Consequently, the trial court ordered the
dismissal of the case without prejudice on the part of petitioners to present and prove their counterclaim and set the
hearing for reception of evidence on June 22, 2004.

Atty. Ferrer filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court required petitioners to file their
Comment on the Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration. In their Opposition, petitioners asserted that the
motion for reconsideration be denied outright and presented several reasons.
Sui averred that the motion complied with Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules 17 and that the setting of the hearing of
the motion on May 28, 2004 was within the three day period for it was filed on May 25, 2004.

RTC granted Sui's motion for reconsideration and set aside the dismissal of the complaint.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which granted the petition and ruled that Sec. 5 of Rule 18
mentions only the effect of the failure to appear on the part of "the plaintiff" but is silent on the effect of failure of the
party's counsel to appear at the pre-trial; that the Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration mentioned only the
reasons why Atty. Ferrer was absent without stating that he was fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, or to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, or to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts
and of documents; and that there was no explanation for Sui's nonappearance. Thus, based on these circumstances,
the Court of Appeals held that dismissal of the case is proper but without prejudice to the filing of a new action.

Both parties moved for reconsideration but the same were jointly denied by CA.

ISSUES

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint without prejudice and in ruling that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted Sui's motion for reconsideration to set aside the order of
dismissal of the complaint

RULING

 A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.

 Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same
as "grave abuse of discretion." An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised
arbitrarily and despotically.

 As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy thereto such as when an
error of judgment as well as of procedure are involved. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does
not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special civil
action of certiorari.

 Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent acts without jurisdiction
if he does not have the legal power to determine the case; where the respondent, being clothed with the power
to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of
his jurisdiction.

 When the Court of Appeals held that the case is dismissible because Sui did not attend the pre-trial conference, it failed
to consider the explanation of Atty. Ferrer that Sui executed a "Special Power of Attorney" in his behalf and that he was
not absent on the scheduled pre-trial but was only late.

 Although Sui was absent during the pre-trial, Atty. Ferrer alleged that he was fully authorized to represent Sui.
Moreover, it is not entirely accurate to state that Atty. Ferrer was absent during the pre-trial because he was only late.
The circumstances attendant in the instant case compel this Court to relax the rules of procedure in the interest of
substantial justice.

 It is the policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly
determined, free from the constraints of technicalities. It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.
4. Cuenca vs PCGG, G.R. Nos. 159104-05, October 5, 2007 535 SCRA 102

FACTS

Respondent UHC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Independent Realty Corporation (IRC)

Petitioner Rodolfo M. Cuenca and his family's holding company, petitioner CIC, negotiated and reached an agreement with
respondents IRC and UHC, whereby Cuenca and CIC would purchase all the shares of stock and subscription rights of IRC
in UHC for PhP10,000,000 and assume IRC's unpaid subscription of PhP30,000,000.

Petitioners Cuenca and CIC were then the controlling stockholders of the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP)

In order to build up UHC as his flagship company, petitioner Cuenca transferred to UHC the shares of stocks in CDCP, Sta.
Ines, and Resort Hotels worth PhP67,233,405, with UHC assuming Cuenca's various bank obligations, some or all of which
were secured by pledges or liens on the stocks.

Cuenca was elected Chairperson and President of UHC

Cuenca and CIC transferred their shares of stock in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels to UHC, which in turn paid
PhP10,000,000 to IRC and assumed IRC's unpaid subscription of PhP30,000,000 in UHC. The only remaining matter to be
accomplished was the transfer of the stocks and subscription rights of IRC in UHC to petitioners, but despite demand, IRC
did not comply.

In 1986, the instant controversy between petitioners and respondent IRC was overtaken by dramatic political events
because of Marcos nominee Jose Yao Campos' sworn statement, respondent PCGG directed Santos Luis Diego,
President of IRC, to dissolve all the boards of directors of IRC's fully-owned subsidiaries. A year later, it turned over
IRC and its subsidiary, UHC, to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for rehabilitation, conservation, or disposition,
enabling APT to assign one share of stock in IRC and in each of its 25 subsidiaries, including UHC, to Paterno Bacani,
Jr.

Petitioners filed the a Complaint against IRC, UHC, APT, and Bacani before the RTC to compel IRC to transfer all its
stock and subscription rights in UHC to them or order IRC and UHC to return and re-convey to them all the assets and
shares of stock in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels that they had transferred to UHC.

Respondents IRC and UHC filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the
exclusive jurisdiction was lodged in the Sandiganbayan and not in the RTC. Respondents IRC and UHC, represented
by respondent PCGG, filed another Motion to Dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia as petitioner Cuenca had a
pending case filed by respondent PCGG before the Sandiganbayan.

RTC: dismissed the Complaint against APT and Bacani, and dropped them as defendants. It, however, denied both
motions to dismiss on the ground that respondent PCGG was not impleaded in the instant case and that the
transaction involved specific performance of a contract entered into in 1978 before the PCGG came into existence. It
rendered decision in favor of petitioners and as against defendants IRC and UHC, who are hereby ordered to
immediately return and reconvey to plaintiffs all of the shares of stocks and stock subscriptions.

CA: Reversed the Makati City RTC's Decision and ruled that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the
instant case involving petitioners and the sequestered respondents corporations. It held that the recourse of parties,
who wish to challenge respondent PCGG's acts or orders, would be to the Sandiganbayan which ordained that as the
body alone had the original jurisdiction over all of respondent PCGG's cases, civil or criminal.

It applied the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment that any rule which had already been authoritatively
established in a previous litigation should be deemed the law of the case between the same parties. The CA did not
find merit in petitioners' contention that sequestration did not affect their transaction with respondents as it arose
before PCGG was created. Even if petitioners had initially a cause of action, the CA ruled that the complaint was
certainly affected by the passage of the law charging respondent PCGG with the performance of certain tasks over the
subject matter of the action; and that the same subject matter had become subject to the new exclusive jurisdiction
vested in the Sandiganbayan at the time petitioners filed the instant case.

Petitioners appeal to the SC.

PET: UHC was not sequestered, and even if it was sequestered, the trial court still has the jurisdiction to hear the
case for rescission of contract or specific performance, and conclude that the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment
does not apply in the instant case. PCGG must be a party to the suit in order that the Sandiganbayan's exclusive
jurisdiction may be correctly invoked. that the instant ordinary civil case for the enforcement or rescission of the 1978
contract between petitioners and respondents UHC and IRC is distinct from and has absolutely no bearing with the
unrelated issue of the sequestration of respondents UHC and IRC. PCGG was not impleaded as a defendant in Civil
Case No. 91-2721, and that the Complaint "does not question the PCGG's alleged sequestration of respondent
UHC . . . or any other act or order of the PCGG."

ISSUES

WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case

 Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law while jurisdiction over the person is
acquired by his/her voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its
coercive processes. Jurisdiction over the res is obtained by actual or constructive seizure placing the
property under the orders of the court.

The shares of stock of UHC and CDCP, the subject matter of Civil Case No. 91-2721 before the Makati City RTC,
were also the subject matter of an ill-gotten wealth case, specifically Civil Case No. 0016 before the Sandiganbayan.

 In the event a final judgment is rendered in RTC case in favor of petitioners, then such adjudication tends to
render moot and academic the judgment to be rendered in Sandiganbayan case considering that the legal
ownership of either the UHC or PNCC shares would now be transferred to petitioners Rodolfo Cuenca and CIC.

 Such adverse judgment would run counter to the rights of ownership of the government over the UHC and PNCC
shares in question. The issue of the latter's right to acquire ownership of UHC shares is inexorably intertwined
with the right of the Republic of the Philippines, through PCGG, to retain ownership of said UHC shares.

 It must be borne in mind that the Sandiganbayan was created in 1978 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1606. Under Sec 2: The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or
criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.

 It is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC that has jurisdiction over the disputed UHC
and PNCC shares, being the alleged "ill-gotten wealth" of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and petitioner
Cuenca. The fact that the RTC civil case involved the performance of contractual obligations relative to the UHC
shares is of no importance.

 The benchmark is whether said UHC shares are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their
perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests of orderly administration of justice dictate that all incidents
affecting the UHC shares and PCGG's right of supervision or control over the UHC must be addressed to and
resolved by the Sandiganbayan.

UHC shares in dispute were sequestered by respondent PCGG. Sequestration is a provisional remedy or freeze order
issued by the PCGG designed to prevent the disposal and dissipation of ill-gotten wealth. (Power to sequester - to
place or cause to be placed under [PCGG's] possession said property wherein any such property or any records
pertaining thereto may be found for the purpose of preventing the destruction of, and otherwise conserving and
preserving the same, until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in
truth ill-gotten)

 Whatever the outcome of Civil Case No. 91-2721, whether from enforcement or rescission of the contract, would
directly militate on PCGG's control and management of IRC and UHC, and consequently hamper or interfere with
its mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth.

Exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the principal causes of
action, that is, recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to
such cases, including a dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs of relative
provisional remedies, and the sequestration of the shares, which may not be made the subject of separate actions or
proceedings in another forum.

UHC had indeed been sequestered by the PCGG in 1986 and 1987. Consequently, CA properly applied Republic as
basis for its finding that UHC was a sequestered company. Since the issue of sequestration has been resolved,
we see no need to delve into the issue of conclusiveness of judgment. Suffice it to say that with the
unequivocal finding that UHC was indeed sequestered, then it is the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, that has
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of case.

5. Arranza v. B.F. Homes, G.R. No. 131683, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 799.

FACTS

Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI), is a domestic corporation engaged in developing subdivisions and selling
residential lots.

When the Central Bank ordered the closure of Banco Filipino, which had substantial investments in respondent BFHI,
respondent filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation and a declaration that it was in a state of suspension of
payments and SEC appointed Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as a Receiver

Orendain instituted a central security system and homeowners' association called Home Insurance and Guaranty
Corporation (HIGC). Respondent, through Orendain, turned over to UBFHAI control and administration of security in
the subdivision, the Clubhouse and the open spaces along Concha Cruz Drive.

Respondent entered into an agreement with UBFHAI for the annual collection of community assessment fund and for
the purchase of eight new pumps to replace the over-capacitated pumps in the old wells

Orendain was relieved by the SEC of his duties as a Receiver, and a new Board of Receivers consisting of eleven
members of respondent's Board of Directors was appointed

The new Board, through its Chairman, Albert C. Aguirre, revoked the authority given by Orendain to use the open
spaces at Concha Cruz Drive and to collect community assessment funds; deferred the purchase of new pumps;
recognized BF Parañaque Homeowners' Association, Inc., (BFPHAI) as the representative of all homeowners in the
subdivision

Petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit "for and in behalf of the more than 7,000 homeowners in the subdivision"
against respondent BFHI, BF Citiland Corporation, PWCC and A.C. Aguirre Management Corporation "to enforce the
rights of purchasers of lots" in BF Homes Parañaque consisting of basic homeowners' needs such as water, security
and open spaces, etc.

Respondent claimed that it had complied with its contractual obligations relative to the subdivision's development and
interposed counterclaims and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

HLURB: granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining respondent BF Homes,
Incorporated

Respondent thus filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition and contended in the main that
the HLURB acted "completely without jurisdiction" in issuing the Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction
considering that inasmuch as respondent is under receivership, the "subject matter of the case is one exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the SEC."

CA: anulled and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the HLURB. It ruled that private respondents'
action may properly be regarded as a "claim" within the contemplation of PD No. 902-A which should be placed on
equal footing with those of petitioners' other creditor or creditors and which should be filed with the Committee of
Receivers. In any event, pursuant to Section 6(c) of P.D. No. 902-A and SEC's Order of 18 March 1985, petitioners'
action against respondent, which is under receivership, should be suspended.

Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari

ISSUES

Whether it is the SEC or the HLURB that has jurisdiction over a complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against a
subdivision developer that is under receivership for specific performance.

RULING

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause — the right to act in a case. It is conferred by law
and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal. It is determined by the averments of the
complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer.

Under Executive Order No. 648, NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between
the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its
contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.

In the case at bar, petitioners' complaint is for specific performance to enforce their rights as purchasers of
subdivision lots as regards rights of way, water, open spaces, road and perimeter wall repairs, and security.
Indisputably then, the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint.

The appointment of a receiver does not dissolve a corporation, nor does it interfere with the exercise of its corporate
rights. In this case where there appears to be no restraints imposed upon respondent as it undergoes rehabilitation
receivership, respondent continues to exist as a corporation and hence, continues or should continue to perform its
contractual and statutory responsibilities to petitioners as homeowners.

No violation of the SEC order suspending payments to creditors would result as far as petitioners' complaint before the
HLURB is concerned. To reiterate, what petitioners seek to enforce are respondent's obligations as a subdivision
developer. Such claims are basically not pecuniary in nature although it could incidentally involve monetary
considerations. All that petitioners' claims entail is the exercise of proper subdivision management on the part of the
SEC-appointed Board of Receivers towards the end that homeowners shall enjoy the ideal community living that
respondent portrayed they would have when they bought real estate from it.

Neither may petitioners be considered as having "claims" against respondent within the context of the following
proviso of Section 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A.

The use of the public respondent of the word "claim" as used in Sec. 6 (c) of P.D. 902-A, as amended, refers to debts
or demands of a pecuniary nature. It means "the assertion of a right to have money paid. It is used in special
proceedings like those before administrative court, on insolvency."

In this case, under the complaint for specific performance before the HLURB, petitioners do not aim to enforce a
pecuniary demand. Their claim for reimbursement should be viewed in the light of respondent's alleged failure to
observe its statutory and contractual obligations to provide petitioners a "decent human settlement" and "ample
opportunities for improving their quality of life." The HLURB, not the SEC, is equipped with the expertise to deal with
that matter.

P. D. No. 902-A, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the SEC; while P.D. No. 957, as amended, delineates that of
the HLURB. These two quasi-judicial agencies exercise functions that are distinct from each other. The SEC has
authority over the operation of all kinds of corporations, partnerships or associations with the end in view of protecting
the interests of the investing public and creditors. On the other hand, the HLURB has jurisdiction over matters relating
to observance of laws governing corporations engaged in the specific business of development of subdivisions and
condominiums.

P.D. No. 957 was promulgated to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. It is aimed at
providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of
its provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse.
Nonetheless, the powers of the HLURB may not in any way be deemed as in derogation of the SEC's authority. P.D.
Nos. 902-A and 957, as far as both are concerned with corporations, are laws in pari materia. P.D. No. 902-A relates
to all corporations, while P.D. No. 957 pertains to corporations engaged in the particular business of developing
subdivisions and condominiums.

The HLURB should take jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint because it pertains to matters within the HLURB's
competence and expertise. The HLURB should view the issue of whether the Board of Receivers correctly revoked
the agreements entered into between the previous receiver and the petitioners from the perspective of the
homeowners' interests, which P.D. No. 957 aims to protect.

Thus, the proceedings at the HLURB should not be suspended notwithstanding that respondent is still under
receivership.

The case is REMANDED to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for continuation of proceedings with
dispatch as the Securities and Exchange Commission proceeds with the rehabilitation of respondent BF Homes, Inc.,
through the Board of Receivers.

6. Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 278, 299.

FACTS

Petitioner Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles. His office and display room for
cars were located along Panganiban Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil Azotea as his sales manager.

Guinhawa purchased a brand new Mitsubishi L-300 Van. Guinhawa's driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove the van from Manila to
Naga City. However, while the van was traveling along the highway in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a
heart attack. The van went out of control, traversed the highway onto the opposite lane, and was ditched into the canal
parallel to the highway.The van was damaged, and the left front tire had to be replaced.

The van was repaired and later offered for sale in Guinhawa's showroom.

The spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo wanted to buy a new van. They went to Guinhawa's office, and were shown the L-
300 Versa Van which was on display. The couple inspected its interior portion and found it beautiful. They no longer
inspected the under chassis since they presumed that the vehicle was brand new. Unaware that the van had been damaged
and repaired on account of the accident in Daet, the couple decided to purchase the van.

Thereafter Josephine Silo, accompanied by Glenda Pingol, went to Manila on board the L-300 Versa Van, with Glenda's
husband, Bayani Pingol III, as the driver. Their trip to Manila was uneventful. However, on the return trip to Naga from
Manila on October 15 or 16, 1995, Bayani Pingol heard a squeaking sound which seemed to be coming from underneath the
van. They were in Calauag, Quezon, where there were no humps along the road. Pingol stopped the van in Daet,
Camarines Norte, and examined the van underneath, but found no abnormalities or defects. But as he drove the van to
Naga City, the squeaking sound persisted. Believing that the van merely needed grease, Pingol stopped at a Shell gasoline
station where it was examined.

The mechanic discovered that some parts underneath the van had been welded. When Pingol complained to Guinhawa, the
latter told him that the defects were mere factory defects. As the defects persisted, the spouses Silo requested that
Guinhawa change the van with two Charade-Daihatsu vehicles within a week or two, with the additional costs to be taken
from their downpayment.

Meanwhile, the couple stopped paying the monthly amortization on their loan, pending the replacement of the van.
Guinhawa initially agreed to the couple's proposal, but later changed his mind and told them that he had to sell the van first.
The spouses then brought the vehicle to the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for examination.

Jesus Rex Raquitico, Jr., the mechanic, examined the van and discovered that it was the left front stabilizer that was
producing the annoying sound, and that it had been repaired.

Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refund of their money before the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI). During the confrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned that Guinhawa had bought the
van before it was sold to them, and after it was damaged in Daet. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint
from the DTI.

Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for the crime of OTHER DECEITS or violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the
RPC against Guinhawa in the MTC of Naga City.
MTC rendered judgment convicting Guinhawa. Guinhawa appealed the decision to the RTC.

RTC affirmed the appealed judgment.

Guinhawa filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals CA.

CA ruled that the Silo had the right to assume that the van was brand new because Guinhawa held himself out as a dealer
of brand new vans. According to CA, the act of displaying the van in the showroom without notice to any would-be buyer that
it was not a brand new unit was tantamount to deceit. Thus, in concealing the van's true condition from the buyer, Guinhawa
committed deceit.

Guinhawa filed a petition for review with the SC.

Guinhawa asserts that based on the allegations in the Information, he was charged with estafa through false pretenses
under paragraph 2, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the allegation that the private complainant was
defrauded of P591,000.00, it is the RTC, not the MTC, which has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

He also maintains that he is not estopped from assailing this matter because the trial court's lack of jurisdiction can be
assailed at any time, even on appeal, which defect cannot even be cured by the evidence adduced during the trial. The
petitioner further avers that he was convicted of other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, a
crime for which he was not charged; hence, he was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the
charge against him.

Guinhawa asserts that based on the allegations in the Information, he was charged with estafa through false pretenses
under paragraph 2, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the allegation that the private complainant was
defrauded of P591,000.00, it is the RTC, not the MTC, which has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

The petitioner maintains that he is not estopped from assailing this matter because the trial court's lack of jurisdiction can be
assailed at any time, even on appeal, which defect cannot even be cured by the evidence adduced during the trial.

The Solicitor General avers that, as gleaned from the material averments of the Information, the petitioner was charged with
other deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
MTC. The petitioner's concealment of the fact that the van sustained serious damages constituted deceit within the meaning
of paragraph 1 of Article 318.

ISSUES

WON the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: YES

As can be gleaned from its averments, the Information alleged the essential elements of the crime under paragraph 1,
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new (when, in fact, it is not) is one of
those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

For one to be liable for "other deceits" under the law, it is required that the prosecution must prove the following essential
elements:

(a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding articles;

(b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; and

(c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.

It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the
private complainant to part with her property.

The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised
Penal Code. It is intended as the catch all provision for that purpose with its broad scope and intendment.

Thus, the petitioner's reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is misplaced. The said provision
reads:

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

The fraudulent representation of the seller, in this case, that the van to be sold is brand new, is not the deceit contemplated
in the law. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statement ascribes things of a particular class or kind
accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with
those particularly enumerated unless there be something in the context to the contrary.

Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be conferred by the will of the parties, nor
diminished or waived by them. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or
Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the criminal complaint or Information, and the
penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission.

Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides that the MTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of the fine:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases. — Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of
the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

Since the felony of other deceits is punishable by arresto mayor, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the offense lodged
against the petitioner.

7. Dela Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 103, 115.

FACTS

The Reyes family owned the lot.

Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz was one of their lessees, and she religiously paid rent.

A fire struck the premises and destroyed petitioner's dwelling. After the fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to
the said lot and rebuilt her houses; simultaneously, the Reyes family made several verbal demands to petitioner, to
vacate the lot but the latter did not comply.

The lot was sold by the Reyeses to respondent Melba Tan Te. Despite the sale, petitioner Dela Cruz did not give up
the lot.

Petitioner was sent a written demand to relinquish the premises which she ignored, prompting respondent Tan Te to
initiate conciliation proceedings at the barangay level. While respondent attempted to settle the dispute by offering
financial assistance, petitioner countered by asking PhP 500,000.00 for her house. Respondent rejected the counter
offer which she considered unconscionable. As a result, a certificate to file action was issued to Tan Te.

Respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages before the MeTC. The complaint averred that:

(1) the previous owners, the Reyeses were in possession and control of the contested lot;

(2) the lot was sold to Tan Te;

(3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property with strategy and/or stealth;

(4) the petitioner unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical possession of the property and continues to
do so; and,

(5) the respondent sent several written demands to petitioner to vacate the premises but refused to do so.

Petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one year had elapsed from petitioner's forcible entry;

MeTC decided in favor of the Tan Te

Petitioner Dela Cruz appealed to the RTC.

RTC rendered its judgment setting aside MeTC decision and dismissed respondent Tan Te's Complaint on the ground
that it was the RTC and not the MeTC which had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

The RTC believed that since Tan Te's predecessor-in-interest learned of petitioner's intrusion into the lot as early as
February 21, 1994, the ejectment suit should have been filed within the one-year prescriptive period which expired on
February 21, 1995. Since the Reyes did not file the ejectment suit and respondent Tan Te filed the action only on
September 8, 1997, then the suit had become an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.

Respondent Tan Te appealed to the CA.

CA rendered decision in favor of respondent Tan Te.

Petitioner Dela Cruz now seeks legal remedy through the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court.

ISSUES

Which court, the Manila RTC or the MeTC, has jurisdiction over the Tan Te ejectment suit.

RULING: The nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer and the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.

Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certain
controversies. 5 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.

Section 33 of Chapter III of B. P. No. 129 6 provides:

Section 33. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such
cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession.

Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged with the first level courts.
This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that embraces an action for forcible entry
(detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth.

In actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction.
 (1) the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property.

(2) they must also assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth.

(3) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their
deprivation of physical possession of the land or building.

The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one unlawfully withholds possession
of the subject property after the expiration or termination of the right to possess. Here, the issue of rightful possession
is the one decisive; for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action
is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.

The essential requisites of unlawful detainer are:

(1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied;

(2) the expiration or termination of the possessor's right to hold possession;

(3) withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the
right to possession;

(4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the
premises; and

(5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received by the defendant.

On the other hand, Section 19, of Chapter II of B.P. No. 129 on Regional Trial Courts provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of real property which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC are:

(1) the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession (accion publiciana) when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year or when the action was filed more than one (1) year from
date of the last demand received by the lessee or defendant; and

(2) an action for the recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria) which includes the recovery of
possession.

These actions are governed by the regular rules of procedure and adjudication takes a longer period than the
summary ejectment suit.

To determine whether a complaint for recovery of possession falls under the jurisdiction of the MeTC (first level court)
or the RTC (second level court), we are compelled to go over the allegations of the complaint.

The general rule is that what determines the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the
case are the allegations in the complaint. These cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the
answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.

This general rule however admits exceptions. In Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan, it was held "that while the
allegations in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by way of defense
and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the case should
properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian Relations."

The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but what the
allegations in the body of the complaint define and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling,
more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the
complaint.

The allegations in the complaint show that prior to the sale by Lino Reyes, representing the estate of his wife
Emerlinda Reyes, he was in possession and control of the subject lot but were deprived of said possession when
petitioner, by means of stealth and strategy, entered and occupied the same lot. These circumstances imply that he
had prior physical possession of the subject lot and can make up a forcible entry complaint.

Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te ejectment complaint is after all a complaint for
unlawful detainer.

It was admitted that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4) decades. Thus, initially
petitioner as lessee is the legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of lease. When fire destroyed her
house, the Reyeses considered the lease terminated; but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in returning to the lot and
occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of the owners. The Reyeses however tolerated the continued
occupancy of the lot by petitioner. Thus, when the lot was sold to respondent Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses, with
respect to the lot, were transferred to their subrogee, respondent Tan Te, who for a time also tolerated the stay of
petitioner until she decided to eject the latter by sending several demands, the last being the January 14, 1997 letter
of demand.

Since the action was filed with the MeTC on September 8, 1997, the action was instituted well within the one (1) year
period reckoned from January 14, 1997. Hence, the nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer and the Manila
MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.

It is unequivocal that petitioner's possession after she intruded into the lot after the fire — was by tolerance or leniency
of the Reyeses and hence, the action is properly an unlawful detainer case falling under the jurisdiction of the Manila
MeTC.

8. Borra, et al. vs CA, Hawaiian Philippine Co., G.R. No. 167484, September 9, 2013

FACTS

Petitioners filed 2 cases with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

In Case 1, petitioners impleaded Hawaiian asking that they be recognized and confirmed as regular employees of it
and they be awarded various benefits three years prior to the filing of the complaint.

In Case 2, impleaded Hawaiian and a certain Fela Contractor as respondent and sought for payment of unpaid wages,
holiday pay, allowances, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages also during the
three (3) years preceding the filing of the complaint.

For Case 1, Hawaiian filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata. It cited an earlier decided case (PEREZ
Case) which has already become final and executory, as no appeal was taken therefrom, serves as a bar to the
litigation because it was ruled therein that petitioners are not employees of private respondent but of Castillon.

The Labor Arbiter granted private respondent's Motion to Dismiss

Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which set aside the Order of the Labor Arbiter, reinstated the complaint.

Private respondent appealed to the CA. The CA rendered judgment, affirming the Decision of the NLRC

Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC. SC denied the petition and
affirmed the Decision of the CA which ruled that:

Perez Case pertains to private respondents' employment from 1987 to 1995, while the instant case covers a different
(subsequent) period. Moreover, in Perez, the finding that no employer-employee relationship existed between
petitioner and private respondents. Consequently, Perez and the instant case involve different subject matters and
causes of action.

For Case 2, Labor Arbiter held that there is no employer-employee relations between private respondent and
petitioners and resolved dismiss the complaint.

No appeal was taken for Case 2 and the same became final and executory

So Hawaiian again filed a Motion to Dismiss Case 1 on the ground, among others, of res judicata. It contended that
the final and executory Decision of the Labor Arbiter in Case 2, which found no employer-employee relations between
private respondent and petitioners, serves as a bar to the further litigation of Case 1.

Labor Arbiter denied private respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which the CA granted leading to the
dismissal of the complaint.

Petitioners filed petition for certiorari to the SC.

Petitioners argue that the CA has no jurisdiction over private respondent's petition for certiorari because the SC in
deciding the PEREZ Case lodged jurisdiction in the Labor Arbiter by remanding the case thereto for further
proceedings.

ISSUES

WON the CA has jurisdiction over private respondent's petition for certiorari

RULING: DISMISSED

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and it is not within the courts, let
alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.

In this regard, it should be reiterated that what has been filed by private respondent with the CA is a special civil action
for certiorari assailing the Labor Arbiter's Order which denied its motion to dismiss.

Section 3, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, which was then prevailing at the time of the filing of private
respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA, clearly provides:

SECTION 3. MOTION TO DISMISS. — On or before the date set for the conference, the respondent may file a
motion to dismiss. Any motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or that the cause of
action is barred by prior judgment, prescription or forum shopping, shall be immediately resolved by the Labor Arbiter
by a written order. An order denying the motion to dismiss or suspending its resolution until the final determination of
the case is not appealable.

Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which is applied in a suppletory character to cases covered by the NLRC Rules,
provides that in all the instances enumerated under the said Rule, where the judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65

The NLRC rule proscribing appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss is similar to the general rule observed in civil
procedure that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and, hence, not appealable until final judgment or
order is rendered.

Thus, this Court has held that when the denial of a motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the
grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified. On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that the CA
has jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari filed by private respondent as the latter was able to allege and
establish that the denial of its motion to dismiss was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioners are wrong to argue that this Court's directive in Perez Case to remand Case 1 to the Labor Arbiter for
further proceedings deprives the CA of its jurisdiction over private respondent's petition for certiorari. The essence of
this Court's ruling in Perez Case is simply to require resolution of the factual issue of whether or not Fela Contractor
has stepped into the shoes of Castillon and, thus, has taken petitioners in its employ. In other words, this Court called
for a prior determination as to who is the real employer of petitioners.

According to the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters
determined in the former suit.

The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) "bar by prior judgment" and (2) "conclusiveness of
judgment."

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case
that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment or
decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their
privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.

"Conclusiveness of judgment" finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed
upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or
order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind
them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the
conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their
privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a
different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.

Hence, there is no point in determining the main issue raised in Case 1, i.e., whether petitioners may be considered regular
employees of private respondent, because, in the first place, they are not even employees of the latter. As such, the CA
correctly held that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in denying private respondent's motion to dismiss
in Case 1.

9. BF Homes vs Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) 636 SCRA 495

FACTS

Petitioner MERALCO is a corporation engaged in the distribution and sale of electric power in Metro Manila.

Respondent BF Homes and PWCC are owners and operators of waterworks systems delivering water to households
and commercial buildings in BF Homes subdivisions.

The water distributed in the waterworks systems owned and operated by BF Homes and PWCC is drawn from deep
wells using pumps run by electricity supplied by MERALCO.

BF Homes and PWCC filed a Petition (Civil Case No. 03-0151) invoking their right to refund based on the ruling of this
Court in Republic v. Manila Electric Company against MERALCO before the RTC. In this case, SC ordered
MERALCO to refund its customers, which shall be credited against the customer's future consumption, the excess
average amount of P0.167 per kilowatt hour starting with the customer's billing cycles beginning February 1998 or
P11,834,570.91

BF Homes and PWCC additionally prayed that the RTC issue a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order.

MERALCO filed before the RTC its Answer with Counterclaims and Opposition to the Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction contending that the service contracts between MERALCO and BF Homes and PWCC provide
that MERALCO reserves the right to discontinue service in case the customer is in arrears in the payment of bills or
for failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases where the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of
energy consumed, or for failure to comply with any of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud
upon the Company. It also averred instead of paying unpaid electric bills and before MERALCO could effect its right to
disconnect BF Homes and PWCC's electric services, the latter filed the instant petition to avoid payment

Hence, MERALCO sought the dismissal of the RTC Petition of BF Homes and PWCC. Its major defense is that the
RTC has no jurisdiction to award the relief prayed for by BF Homes and PWCC because the petition is in effect
preempting or defeating the power of the ERC to implement the decision of the SC and MERALCO is a utility
company regulated by the ERC. The latter, being the regulatory agency of the government having the authority over
the respondent, is the one tasked to approve the refund.

RTC granted the application of BF Homes and PWCC for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC
recognized the right of the public to the usage and enjoyment of waters in their community and as to prevent social
unrest in the community for having been deprived of the use and enjoyment of waters. It also ruled that it has
jurisdiction to delve into the case and by giving both parties the opportunity to be heard as they introduced evidence
on the propriety of the issuance of the injunctive writ, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed where a party
was not deprived of its day in court as it was heard and had exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses.

MERALCO filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. MERALCO asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the application of BF Homes and PWCC for issuance of such a writ.

CA agreed with MERALCO that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction as said trial court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case to begin with. CA cited the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
declaring that the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case under R.A. No. 9136, or the "Electric
Power Industry Reform Act."

BF Homes and PWCC came before the SC via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUES

Whether jurisdiction over the subject matter lies with the RTC or the ERC. If it is with the RTC then it also has
jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction against MERALCO. If it is with the ERC, then the RTC also has
no jurisdiction to act on any incidents in the case, including the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction .

RULING: Denied

Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It is also enunciated that only a statute can confer
jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies.

Rule is that the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof, as well as which court or agency of the government
has jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of the complaint in relation to the law
involved and the character of the reliefs prayed for, whether or not the complainant/plaintiff is entitled to any or all of
such reliefs.

A prayer or demand for relief is not part of the petition of the cause of action; nor does it enlarge the cause of action
stated or change the legal effect of what is alleged. In determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, the better
policy is to consider not only the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the action that is the subject
of their controversy.

A careful review of the material allegations of BF Homes and PWCC in their Petition before the RTC reveals that the
very subject matter thereof is the off-setting of the amount of refund they are supposed to receive from MERALCO
against the electric bills they are to pay to the same company. This is squarely within the primary jurisdiction of the
ERC.

In the MERALCO Refund cases, this Court only affirmed the decision of the ERC fixing the just and reasonable rate
for the electric services of MERALCO and granting refund to MERALCO consumers of the amount they overpaid. Said
Decision was rendered by the ERB in the exercise of its jurisdiction to determine and fix the just and reasonable rate
of power utilities such as MERALCO.

Presently, the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 43 (u) of the EPIRA over all cases contesting
rates, fees, fines, and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exercise of its powers, functions and responsibilities, and
over all cases involving disputes between and among participants or players in the energy sector.

Indubitably, the ERC is the regulatory agency of the government having the authority and supervision over
MERALCO. Thus, the task to approve the guidelines, schedules, and details of the refund by MERALCO to its
consumers, to implement the judgment of this Court in the MERALCO Refund cases, also falls upon the ERC. By filing
their Petition before the RTC, BF Homes and PWCC intend to collect their refund without submitting to the approved
schedule of the ERC, and in effect, enjoy preferential right over the other equally situated MERALCO consumers.

Administrative agencies, like the ERC, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are
specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. In relation thereto is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in which
the court cannot arrogate into itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction of which is initially lodged
with the administrative body of special competence.

Court declared that the RTC not only lacked the jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction against
MERALCO, but that it actually had no jurisdiction at all over the subject matter of the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC
in the case.

Therefore, in addition to the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, the Court also deems it
appropriate to already order the dismissal of the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC in Civil Case No. 03-0151 for lack
of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the same.

Although only the matter of the writ of preliminary injunction was brought before this Court in the instant Petition, the
Court is already taking cognizance of the issue on the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the Petition.
The Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction.

The Court has discretion to determine whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 03-
0151 since, to reiterate, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither would
the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer jurisdiction on the RTC where the latter
has none over a cause of action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only
power it has is to dismiss the action.

10. Republic v. Estipular, 336 SCRA 333 (2000)

FACTS

Respondent Pilar Estipular filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Title fbefore the RTC in which she declared that she
was the only surviving legal heir of the late Fermin Estipular, who died intestate. During his lifetime, Fermin was
issued Certificate of Title covering a parcel of land. The said Certificate of Title was either destroyed or burned as a
result of the burning of the Register of Deeds during the last World War. As the land was already declared and
distributed to ten persons who have succeeded him, the Estipular prayed that the said Certificate of Title be
reconstituted in accordance with law.

Republic Act No. 26 requires that a petition for reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title must be published
in the Official Gazette and posted at the main entrance of the provincial and the municipal buildings of the place where
the property is situated.

RTC ordered that a Notice of Hearing be published for two successive issues of the Official Gazette and be posted at
the main entrance of the Municipal Building at least thirty (30) days from the initial hearing set. A Certificate of Posting
was submitted by Branch Sheriff proving that copies of the Petition and Notice of Hearing were posted. However, the
National Printing Office advised to reschedule its original date of hearing as it could not meet the schedule of
publication. Another Notice of Hearing was issued by RTC, resetting the initial hearing. In view thereof, a second
Certificate of Posting was issued by Branch Sheriff. In the same manner, the National Printing Office issued a
Certificate of Publication showing that the said petition for reconstitution was published in the Official Gazette for two
successive weeks. However the RTC which failed to include a directive that the Notice of Hearing be posted at the
main entrance of the provincial building.

There was an initial hearing but nobody registered their opposition.

The OSG entered its appearance as counsel for the respondent Republic together with the Public Prosecutor. When
the Exhibits were offered in evidence, the Public Prosecutor never interposed any objection, hence, all the exhibits
were admitted.

RTC granted the petition. Republic appealed to the CA.

CA ruled that although the Notice of Hearing had not been posted at the main entrance of the provincial building, the
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Since there was a valid publication of the Notice of
Hearing in the Official Gazette, then it is sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the court to hear and determine the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to post the Notice of Hearing at the main entrance of the provincial capitol building does
not detract from the fact that there was a substantial compliance with the provisions of the law (Calalang v. Register of
Deeds). It must be noted that the Branch Sheriff issued two (2) Certificates of Posting at the main entrance of the
municipal building where the land lay. Coupled with the successive publications in the Official Gazette, it was more
than enough to serve the purpose of notifying all the parties concerned that a petition had been filed. As it was, no
private parties opposed the petition. On the other hand, the government was ably represented by the Public
Prosecutor so the appellant Republic was not in any manner deprived of the opportunity to protect its rights or
interests over the land subject of the petition.

Republic sought recourse to the SC.

ISSUES

Whether or not supposed substantial compliance with the requirements of Republic Act No. 26 is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the trial court over the case

RULING

Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It
cannot be

(1) granted by the agreement of the parties;

(2) acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or

(3) conferred by the acquiescence of the courts.

Republic Act No. 26 (AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED) lays down the special requirements and procedure that must be
followed before jurisdiction may be acquired over a petition for reconstitution of title. These requirements are
mandatory and compliance with them is jurisdictional.

Thus, before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction to hear and decide a reconstitution case, compliance with the
requisites is imperative that the notice of the petition be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive
issues of the Official Gazette, and posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building
of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing

In the present case, it is undisputed that the Notice of Hearing of respondent's Petition for Reconstitution was not
posted at the main entrance of the provincial building. Clearly, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

CA erred citing Calalang v. Register of Deeds that the publication of the Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette was
"sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the court to hear and determine the Petition." The Court in Calalang did not rule on
whether the posting requirement was mandatory. It merely held that the absence of personal notice to a person
purporting to have a legitimate claim on the property was not a sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.

It must be emphasized that under the law, the publication of a notice of hearing in the Official Gazette is not enough.
The posting of said notice at the main entrances of both the municipal and the provincial building is another equally
vital requisite. The purposes of the stringent and mandatory character of the legal requirements of publication, posting
and mailing are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land ownership claims, to apprise all interested parties
of the existence of such action, and to give them enough time to intervene in the proceeding.

The principle of substantial compliance cannot be applied to the present case, as the trial court's acquisition
of jurisdiction over the Petition hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law.

Once a procedural rule is labeled "jurisdictional," the court has no power even to consider granting relief, for any
reason, from a failure to comply strictly with the rule's requirements. (Supplied by writer)
11. Tolentino v. Social Security Commission, No. L-28870, September 6, 1985, 138 SCRA 428

FACTS

This involved 2 cases.

CASE 1

Petitioner Tolentino was employed as an Editorial Assistant in the SSS. His appointment as such was duly approved
by the Civil Service Commission.

Petitioner was given a promotion in salary subsequently petitioner's designation was changed from 'Editorial Assistant'
to 'Credit Analyst.'

Petitioner was given an appointment reinstating him to his former position as 'Credit Analyst.' This reappointment was
extended to petitioner following his resignation from the SSS to run for a municipal position in his municipality in the
1961 elections.

Petitioner took his Oath of Office. The copy of the Oath of Office appearing in C.S. Form No. 32 of the Philippine Civil
Service.

Petitioner's designation was changed from 'Credit Analyst' to 'Technical Assistant' with an increase in salary

Respondent Administrator Teodoro filed charges against petitioner for dishonesty and electioneering.

Petitioner answered and denied the charges against him.

Petitioner received a copy of a memorandum informing him that his answer was not satisfactory and therefore, the
charges against him would be formally investigated.

Respondent Social Security Commission (SSS) passed Resolution No. 1003 affirming the decision of respondent
Administrator Gilberto Teodoro 'finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, as charged, and imposing upon him the penalty
of dismissal from the service with prejudice to reinstatement.'

Petitioner received a letter from respondent Administrator informing him, among others, of his dismissal from the
service by virtue of Resolution No. 1003 of respondent Commission.

Petitioner filed with the CFI a petition for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction questioning the validity of
Resolution No. 1003. His theory was "that Resolution No. 1003 of respondent Commission and the decision of
respondent Administrator which it affirmed, is null and void and of no effect whatever, for lack of jurisdiction because
the power, nay, jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against civil service employees like him is vested by the
Civil Service Act of 1959 and the Civil Service Rules exclusively in the Civil Service Commissioner"

Respondents filed their answer raising, among others, the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of the lower court
over respondent Social Security Commission (Commission, for short), the latter being of the same rank as the former.

CFI dismissed petitioner's petition for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Commission because the latter ranks with
the CFI in the exercise of the quasi-judicial powers granted to it by the Social Security Act of 1954

Petitioner-appellant Tolentino elevated the case to this Court.

CASE 2

The Prosecution Division of the CIR (Court of Industrial Relations) filed with said court a complaint on motion of the
SSS Employees Labor Union — NLU and Amado Tolentino charging the SSS and Gilberto Teodoro with commission
of unfair labor practices.

SSS denied the charges of unfair labor practices and asserted that Amado Tolentino was dismissed from the service
after being charged and found guilty of Dishonesty
CIR rendered a decision declaring the SSS and Gilberto Teodoro guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering the
reinstatement of herein respondent-appellee Tolentino with back wages.

SC ordered for the consolidation of the two appeal cases as both involve the same parties and substantially the same
issues.

ISSUES

Whether or not the Social Security Commission has jurisdiction over administrative actions filed before it against its
own erring employees.

RULING: Resolution No. 1003 may be treated as the recommendation of SSS which may be submitted to the Civil
Service Commission for decision and or appropriate action. CIR ruling was set aside as null and void for having been
issued without jurisdiction. CSC has jurisdiction over Tolentino’s complaint for unfair labor practices.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law. It is not acquired by the consent or acquiescence of the
parties, nor the unilateral assumption thereof by any tribunal. The settled rule is that jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. And once
acquired, jurisdiction continues, regardless of "subsequent happenings", until the case is finally terminated.

The petition originated from administrative charges of dishonesty and electioneering filed by the Administrator of the
Social Security Commission before the same office on May 23 and 24, 1966. The Commission's Resolution No. 1003,
the validity of which is questioned here in Case 1 for jurisdictional reasons, was promulgated on September 15, 1966.
Case 1 was submitted for decision on January 21, 1969.

The pertinent laws under the circumstances are the Social Security Act of 1954 (R.A. 1161), as amended by R.A.
2658 (which took effect June 18, 1960) and the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. 2260).

Civil Service Law of 1962 (Republic Act 2260) provides:

Sec. 23. Administrative Jurisdiction for Disciplining Officers and Employees. — The Commissioner may, for
dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, neglect of duty, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, notoriously
disgraceful or immoral conduct, improper or unauthorized solicitation of contributions from subordinate employees and
by teachers or school officials from school children, violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules of reasonable
office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service,
demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six
months' salary.

'In meting out punishment, like penalties shall be imposed for like offenses and only one penalty shall be imposed in
each case.

It is clear that under section 33 of the Civil Service Act (Republic Act 2260), before the amendments introduced
therein by Republic Act No. 6040, the sole power to impose disciplinary sanctions on civil service employees was
vested exclusively in the Commissioner of Civil Service.

By Republic Act No. 6040 amended section 33 of the Civil Service Act by adding at the end of the original section the
following provisos:

'Provided, however, that heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and chartered cities, shall
have original jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action. Provided further, that when
the penalty imposed is a reprimand or a fine not exceeding one month salary or suspension without pay for a period
not exceeding one month the decision of the aforementioned heads shall be final; but if the penalty imposed is heavier
the decision shall be appealable to the Commission as provided in this Act: Provided finally, that a decision imposing
removal shall always be subject to review by the Commission.'

Clearly at the time the questioned Resolution No. 1003 was promulgated and implemented dismissing petitioner-
appellant Amado Tolentino, the respondents-appellees Social Security Commission, Gilberto Teodoro and Angel
Penano did not have the power to hear and decide administrative and disciplinary charges filed against erring
employees of the Commission.

SC however did not to dismiss Resolution No. 1003 as inutile. The SSS, as an agency of the government, may be
considered a department and respondent Gilberto Teodoro, its department head. Resolution No. 1003 may be treated
as the recommendation of the department head which may be submitted to the Civil Service Commission for decision
and or appropriate action.

However, Section 1(1), Article XII (B) of the 1973 Constitution reads —

"The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government, including
every government-owned or controlled corporation . . .."

Clearly, insofar as Republic Act No. 6040 insulates government-owned or controlled-corporations with collective
bargaining agreements with their employees from the embrace of the Civil Service Commission, said statute is
inconsistent with the fundamental law of the land. As such, it is void (Article 7, New Civil Code).

At the time Amado Tolentino was charged with and convicted of dishonesty in 1966 up to the time the Prosecution
Division of the Court of Industrial Relations filed with said court the unfair labor suit (Case 2) on May 7, 1968, the
power to impose disciplinary sanctions on erring employees of the Social Security Commission was vested exclusively
in the Commissioner of Civil Service, without prejudice to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals (sections 18
and 36, R.A. 2260). Consequently, the Court of Industrial Relations, created under Commonwealth Act No. 103, a
statute of earlier vintage, had no jurisdiction over Case 2. Again, jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.

12. Gustilo vs Gustilo 659 SCRA 428, G.R. No. 175497, October 19, 2011.

FACTS

Petitioner Mary Joy Anne Gustilo and respondent Jose Vicente Gustilo III are heirs of their natural father, the late Atty.
Armando Gustilo who was the president of A.G. Agro-Industrial Corporation (A.G. Agro). Petitioner Bonifacio Peña is
Mary Joy's attorney-in-fact whom she authorized to exercise general control and supervision of her real properties.

Following their father's death, Mary Joy and Jose Vicente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),
adjudicating between themselves their father's properties. One of these was Hacienda Imelda which the MOA
assigned to Mary Joy. As it happened, however, the hacienda's title remained in the name of A.G. Agro.

Mary Joy immediately took possession of the land through Mila Barco, her mother and natural guardian.

Over three years later Jose Vicente, as president of A.G. Agro, leased Hacienda Imelda and its farm implements to
respondent Tita Sy Young. Being financially hard up, Mary Joy and her mother were pained to watch Young take over
the land.

When the lease contract was about to expire, however, Mary Joy had her lawyer advise Young to surrender the land
to her. But the latter refused to yield possession.

This prompted Mary Joy to file an action against Jose Vicente and Young for recovery of possession of the hacienda,
cancellation of the lease contract, and damages before the RTC.

Jose Vicente filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-
corporate disputes, the proper forum being a specially designated commercial court.

RTC granted Jose Vicente's motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,

The CA affirmed the RTC decision, prompting Mary Joy to file the petition to SC.

ISSUES

Whether or not Mary Joy's action presents an intra-corporate dispute that belongs to the jurisdiction of a specially
designated commercial court
RULING: GRANTED

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint.

It can be gleaned from Mary Joy's allegations in her complaint that her case is principally one for recovery of
possession.

Mary Joy took possession of the property. Young, with the use of force, took over the property. Despite several
demands to vacate, Young continued to be on the property and even entered into a new lease contract with Jose
Vicente.

Jose Vicente and Young mainly argued in their Motion to Dismiss that inasmuch as the subject property is in the name
of A.G. Agro, the nature of the claim or controversy is one of intra-corporate.

The Court has ruled in the past that an action to recover possession is a plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title. But where the parties
raise the issue of ownership, as in this case, the courts may pass upon such issue to determine who between
the parties has the right to possess the property.

The adjudication on the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. Also, any intra-corporate issues that may be involved in determining the real owner of
the property may be threshed out in a separate proceeding in the proper commercial court.

13. Delos Reyes v. Odones, G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011, 646 SCRA 328

FACTS

Petitioner Rosa delos Reyes filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Injunction against respondents
spouses Arwenia and Francisco Odones, Noemi Otales, and Gregorio Ramirez before the MTC involvong a parcel of
land owned by petitioner who previously demanded upon respondents]to vacate which they refused

In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they are the owners of the lot, having purchased the
same by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale, executed by the heirs of Donata Lardizabal, the
land's original owner.

MTC ruled in favor of petitioner, and ordered respondents to vacate the property

Respondents appealed to the RTC, arguing that since the complaint failed to allege how respondents entered the
property or when they erected their houses thereon, it is an improper action for unlawful detainer, and the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the same.

RTC set aside the MTC's judgment and dismissed the complaint. The RTC held that the complaint failed to aver acts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer since it did not state how entry was effected or how and when the
dispossession started. Hence, the remedy should either be accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper
RTC.

Petitioner sought recourse with the CA, asserting that the RTC misappreciated the allegations in the complaint and
that respondents were estopped from assailing the MTC's jurisdiction because they did not raise such issue in the
proceedings before that court.

CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC

The case was elevated to the SC via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUES
WON the nature of the action of the complaint is within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

RULING: GRANTED

What determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the
allegations in the complaint.

In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class
of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must
show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.

The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial
court. The action must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case
must be the right to physical possession.

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter's right of possession;

3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and

4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.

Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, petitioner's allegations in the complaint clearly makes out a case
for unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction over the subject matter on the MTC.

Petitioner alleges that she is the owner of the lot, that respondents are occupying the lot by virtue of petitioner's
tolerance; and that petitioner sent a letter to respondents on June 17, 2005, demanding that they vacate the property,
but they failed and refused to do so. The complaint was filed on July 12, 2005, or within one year from the time the last
demand to vacate was made.

Firm is the rule that as long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.

14. Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 502, 509 (1999)

FACTS

Private respondents Castros filed an action for Partition before the RTC. They alleged that their father, Juan De
Castro, died intestate and they are his only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also alleged that their father Juan
owned a parcel of land. They further claim that in 1979, without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their
brother Mariano to petitioner Tomas Claudio Memorial College.

The sale was made possible when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property. It is the contention of
private respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected only his undivided share to the lot in question but not the
shares of the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special defense, lack of jurisdiction and prescription and/or
laches.

RTC, initially dismissed the complaint but and set aside its previous order.

Petitioner filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

a) the RTC has no jurisdiction to try and take cognizance of the case as the causes of actions have been
decided with finality by the Supreme Court, and

b) the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion and authority in taking cognizance of the case.

CA found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC and dismissed the petition.

Petitioner elevated the case to SC via special civil action for certiorari. Petitioner invokes Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and asserts that the CA has no jurisdiction over the case as causes of action have been finally decided by CFI and
sustained finality by SC .

ISSUES

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court and/or the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the case, and if so, whether
or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the RTC.

RULING: There is no showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent. CA has jurisdiction
and cannot be denied by petitioner when they made appeal to it.

For a petition for certiorari to be granted, it must be shown that the respondent court committed grave abuse
of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment, for certiorari is not
a remedy for errors of judgment, which are correctible by appeal.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough — it must be grave.

In the case at hand, there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent. As correctly
pointed out by the RTC, when it took cognizance of the action for partition filed by the private respondents, it acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case does not necessarily mean that the lower court meant to
reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in the land registration case mentioned by the petitioner.

Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, hence the court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up
in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. This has to be so, for were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice
would be frustrated by making the sufficiency of this kind of action dependent upon the defendant in all cases.

As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction any alleged errors committed in the exercise thereof will amount
to nothing more than errors of judgment which are revisable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action
of certiorari.

Based on the foregoing, even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellate court erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court, which earlier denied petitioner's motion to dismiss, such actuation on the part of the
appellate court cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion, hence not correctible by certiorari, because
certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.

In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to question the jurisdiction of the CA. It was petitioner who elevated the
instant controversy to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. In effect, petitioner submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by seeking affirmative relief therefrom. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a
court, he cannot thereafter challenge that court's jurisdiction in the same case. To do otherwise would
amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.

15. Javellana v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Manila, G.R. No. 139067, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 497,
506.

FACTS

Private respondent Benito Legarda filed before the RTC a complaint for Accion Publiciana and sum of money against
petitioners Sps Javellana, originating from a a Contract To Sell whereby Legarda agreed to sell to Sps Javellana his
property.

Upon the execution of the Contract To Sell, Sps Javellana were placed in possession of the aforementioned lot.

However, defendants spouses have defaulted in the payment of the monthly installments.

Prompting Legarda to exerciseits right to cancel the contract by executing a "RESCISSION OF CONTRACT" of which
Formal notice was duly received by Sps.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

RTC denied petitioners' motion to dismiss. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA
raising the sole issue of

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 30) HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

CA dismissed the case for being filed out of time.

Petitioners elevated the case via petition for certiorari.

Petitioners submit hat the subject property is a subdivision lot as expressly stipulated in their Contract to Sell; that the
dispute between petitioners and respondent involves a subdivision project as defined under Section 2 of P.D. No. 957,
hence it is cognizable by the National Housing Authority, now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
which has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business

Private respondent alleges that respondent being the lot owner seeking to enforce the terms and conditions of the
Contract To Sell with petitioners is not one of those instances that would fall within the jurisdiction of the HLURB.

ISSUES

WON the subject matter of this case falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, which is a question of law.

RULING: RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.

A reading of the complaint does not show that the subject lot was a subdivision lot which would fall under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB. It only included a description which was used when referring to the subject lot. What
appears from the complaint was the fact that the subject lot was sold to petitioners in an ordinary sale of a lot on
installment basis; that petitioners allegedly defaulted in the payment of their monthly installments for which reason
respondent seeks to recover possession thereof. Thus, the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioners' insistence that the subject lot is a subdivision lot, thus cognizable by HLURB is anchored on paragraph 6
of their Contract To Sell. However, both petitioners and respondent failed to attach in their pleadings filed before the
trial court, a copy of the Contract To Sell to show the terms and conditions embodied therein. Moreover, the use of the
phrase "regular subdivision project" does not automatically make the instant case fall under the jurisdiction of the
HLURB.

Jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer.
Hence, the jurisdictional issue involved here shall be determined on the basis of the allegations of petitioner's
complaint before the HLURB. Petitioners simply alleged therein that the subject lot is "a subdivision lot" in "a
subdivision project."

There is no allegation in the complaint that the lot purchased by petitioners is part of a tract of land partitioned
primarily for residential purposes into individual lots and offered to the public for sale. There is likewise no allegation
that the tract of land includes recreational areas and open spaces. Nor does the "Contract to Sell", which forms part of
the complaint, describe the subject property as a subdivision lot. What the contract strongly suggests is that the
property is simply a lot offered by respondents, as vendors, to the petitioners, as vendees, for sale on installment.

What is plain is that the parties are acting only as ordinary sellers and buyers of a specific lot, a portion of a big tract of
land co-owned by the heirs of Mariano Faraon.

16. Hilado v. Chavez, 438 SCRA 623, 641 (2004)

FACTS

Celso "Nene" Zayco was the owner of a large parcel of agricultural land. The property was occupied and cultivated by
tenants. Zayco mortgaged the property to a bank as security for a loan; however, the bank foreclosed the mortgage
upon Zayco's failure to pay his account. When the property was sold at public auction and Zayco failed to redeem the
property.

The bank sold the property to Julieta C. Salgado, the Chairman of the Board of the respondent, Perpetual Help
Development and Realty Corporation (PHDRC). No liens or encumbrances whatsoever or any notice that the property
had been placed under the agrarian reform laws were annotated at the dorsal portion thereof of the issued TCT.

Subsequently, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted Emancipation Patents to the twenty (20) tenants on
the property. The foregoing notwithstanding, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Kabankalan reclassified the property partly
as property for light industry, and the rest as residential.

Respondent Salgado filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the twenty (20) petitioners, who were all
occupants-farmers on the property, with the MTCC. The respondent alleged, inter alia, in its complaint that she
discovered that of the twenty (20) petitioners, seven (7) had been issued Emancipation Patents. Nevertheless,
according to the respondent, the petitioners were not agricultural tenants under the agrarian reform laws because
they entered the property without its consent and did not pay any consideration for the use of the land they occupied;
and the property was, as resolved by the Sangguniang Bayan as partly for light industry and partly residential.

Petitioners in their answer alleged that the landholding had long been placed under Operation Land Transfer, and that
they became the owners thereof under Presidential Decree No. 27 and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent and rejected the petitioners' contention that the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) had exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action,
ruling that the action was one for unlawful detainer over which it had exclusive original jurisdiction.

Petitioners filed a notice of appeal on the ground that grave errors were committed by the court a quo in its findings of
facts and conclusions of law in its decision.

MTCC granted the motion of the respondent to disapprove the notice of appeal filed by the petitioners. It also ordered
the issuance of a writ of execution on its finding that its decision had become final and executory, following the failure
of the petitioners to perfect their appeal to the RTC. Writs of execution were issued by the MTCC.

The petitioners did not assail the order of the MTCC. Instead, the petitioners filed a petition with the RTC against the
respondent for the annulment of the decision of the MTC. The petitioners asserted that the MTC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action, it being an agrarian dispute between the petitioners, as patentees, and the
respondent; hence, the MTCC’s decision was null and void. They contended that the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicatory Board (PARAD) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action.

RTC issued an Order declaring that the case involved only questions of law and not of facts, and ordered the parties
to file their respective memoranda. RTC rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that the MTCC had
exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the plaintiff and over the persons of the defendants therein. The RTC also held
that the petitioners failed to file a motion to dismiss the complaint in the MTCC and even participated in the
proceedings therein; hence, they were estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MTCC.

Instead of appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals by writ of error, the petitioners filed their petition with SC
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the decision of the RTC on questions of law.

ISSUES

WON the MTCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent

RULING

Section 33, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7691 provides that
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court and Metropolitan Trial Court, have exclusive original jurisdiction
over cases for unlawful detainer. The proceedings in ejectment cases are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
and the Rules on Summary Procedure. However, such courts have no original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian disputes under Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended, and the Rules of Procedure issued by the DARAB
implementing said laws, which are within the exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction of the DARAB, thus:

Section 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Board shall have primary and
exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive
Order Nos. 228, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No.
27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include
but not be limited to cases involving the following:

a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and
use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;

xxx xxx xxx

f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and
Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;

g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian
Relations under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, except sub-paragraph (Q) thereof and Presidential Decree
No. 1815. CHEDAc

It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29,
1987.

Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (sic) (CARP) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules
shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.

The DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform programs. The rule is that the
DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. 24 In Tirona v. Alejo, 25 we held that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over an
ejectment case where the issue of possession is inextricably interwoven with an agrarian dispute.

The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 26 In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing
Corporation, 27 we ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. 28 Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is
retained up to the end of the litigation. We also held in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals 29 that in American jurisprudence,
the nullity of a decision arising from lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily
from the face of the judgment only. IDcHCS

The MTCC does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a
defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. 30 But it is the duty of the court to
receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. 31 If after hearing, tenancy had in fact been shown to be the
real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 32

Earlier in Bayog v. Natino, 33 we held that if a defendant in an action for ejectment interposed the defense of being
the agricultural tenant in the property subject of the complaint, the MTCC should hear and receive the evidence for the
purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case, and if, upon such hearing, tenancy is
shown to be the issue, the MTCC should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Our ruling in said case is a
reiteration of our rulings in Ignacio v. CFI, 34 and in Concepcion v. Presiding Judge of CFI, Bulacan, Br. V . 35

In this case, even on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint, more so if the answer with motion to
dismiss the petition and position papers of the parties are considered, the DARAB, and not the MTCC, had primary
and original jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. The latter alleged, in its complaint, that seven (7) of the
petitioners were issued Emancipation Patents which were annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 133298, a copy
of which is appended to the complaint. Indeed, the title contains the following annotations:

ENTRY NO. EP LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M NAME OF FARMER

EP-1539 343-30 8,597 Melchor T. Hilado

The property described in this Title has been partially cancelled Emancipation Patent Issued By Department of
Agrarian Reform, containing an Area as stated to above.

Date of Instrument July 1, 1988.

Date of Inscription March 21, 1990.

(Sgd.) Illegible

Register of Deeds

ENTRY NO. EP LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M NAME OF FARMERS

EP-5414 343-20 7,232 Antonio D. Solito

EP-5415 343-7 7,518 Salvador J. de Guzman

EP-5416 343-3 6,531 Nestor P. Billeran

EP-5417 343-6 14,529 Edgardo D. Cabra

The property described in this Transfer Certificate of Title has been PARTIALLY CANCELLED by Emancipation
Patent issued by Department of Agrarian Reform containing an area of 35,810 SQ/M. as stated above.

Date of Instrument July 1, 1988. Date of Inscription July 12, 1990.

(Sgd.) Illegible

Register of Deeds
ENTRY NO. EP LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M NAME OF FARMERS

EP-5656 343-1 14,916 Maria Yolanda S. Lestino

EP-5657 343-26 9,558 Adela O. Aral

The property described in this Transfer Certificate of Title has been PARTIALLY CANCELLED by Emancipation
Patent issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform containing an area of TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR (24,474) SQ. METERS as stated to above. DHESca

Date of Instrument July 1, 1988.

Date of Inscription August 24, 1990.

(Sgd.) Illegible

Register of Deeds 36

The foregoing annotation confirmed the claim of the petitioners in their answer with motion to dismiss that the entirety
of the landholding had been placed under the Operation Land Transfer program under P.D. No. 27 and that the
petitioners to whom the said patents were granted by the government became the owners of the property covered by
the said patents. In fact, TCT No. 133298 had been partially cancelled by the said patents. Consequently, the
petitioners who were the beneficiaries under the Emancipation Patents are entitled to possess the property covered by
said patents.

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