Royal Institute of Philosophy

The Organic State

Author(s): G. R. G. Mure
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 90 (Jul., 1949), pp. 205-218
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
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 THE ORGANIC STATE'
G. R. G. MURE (NVarden
of MertonCollege,Oxford)

Is the State organic?Does it, or shouldit, in some way transcend

the individualnaturesofits citizens,so as itselfto be an individual
morecompleteand ofhighervalue thanthesingularindividualswho
composeit? Is it thusin somesensean organism, and are its citizens
in somesenseorgansof it whichgain forthemselves a highervalue
and significance in subserving it?
Or is the singularindividualthe supremerealityand value in
humanaffairs, and is the State, or oughtthe State to be, a mere
device,an instrument or set of instruments, whichmen make and
use forcertainconjointbut not commonpurposes?
This is the oldestcontroversy in politicalphilosophyand, I sup-
pose, the most fundamental. The organictheoryof the State was
maintainedagainstindividualist oppositionby Plato and Aristotle.
In an age of revoltagainstAristotle,Hobbes and Locke in this
countryrejectedit; but the Britishidealistsof the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuryupheldit, basingthemselvesnot only on
Plato and Aristotle,but also on Rousseau,Fichte,and Hegel. In
fact theyarguedit withsuch successthat it mightalmostbe said
to have becomeorthodoxin Britishphilosophy, althoughan under-
currentof individualist oppositionalwayspersisted.
That persisting individualism, descending in Englandmainlyfrom
Locke,was preachedin the nameofliberalismand democracy;but
it signifiesa certainvaguenessin the term"liberalism"thatT. H.
Green,at anyrate,amongtheidealistsproclaimedhimselfa liberal.
In the relativelyhappy and prosperousnineteenthcenturythe
disputewas on thewholecalmlyconducted.Therewasno desperately
acute senseof dividedpoliticalaims,and no overmastering tempta-
tion amongpoliticalthinkersto imputemaliciousmotivesto each
other.It was assumedin mostquartersthat theoreticaldifferences
mightquiteproperlyexistbetweenmenofgood will.
But the relationof politicalphilosophyto practicehas always
been a disputedtheoreticalquestion,and the disputein timesof
stressis alwaysliable to turnintoa violentpracticalquarrel.Oppo-
sitionto the organictheorybecamestrongafterGermany'sbid to
dominateEurope in I9I4. Her morerecentsecondeffort fannedit
to violencein WesternEurope. To the liberalindividualists Musso-
lini's corporate State and Hitler's Third Reich to
appeared damn
the organictheorybeyondredemption. The idealistswereshouted
I Lecture given at the Royal Instituteof Philosophy,February27th, I947.
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 PHILOSOPHY
down. "The organicstate" became a termof abuse to be applied
eitherto what its enemiesregardedas a productof false theory,
or to a certaintype of existentstate whichtheyfeltto be mon-
strouslywicked.The issue was not muchclarifiedby the varying
attitudesof politicalwritersto Sovietpolicyand Marxistdoctrine.
To-day controversy concerning the natureof the State is so near
to commonlife, so closely bound up with cruel memoriesand
agonizinghopes and fears,that thereis dangerof its degenerating
even in Englandintoa mereideologicalbrawl.
There is nothingto be said for a eunuchtheoryof political
thinking.No man can reach true political conclusionsby cold
intellectualinsightaftersettingall emotionaside; by self-mutilation
the mind achieves nothing.But straightpolitical thinkingdoes
a
demand normal, balanced stateof the emotionalself,and thatin
modernpoliticalwriting is oftenconspicuously absent.In consequence
thehistory ofphilosophy is oftenneglectedordistorted intheinterest
of prejudice,and philosophicalanalysis perverted becomethe
is to
instrument ofpropaganda.For example,manygoodmen,I suppose,
willsympathize withtheliberalsentiments expressedin Dr. Popper's
book,TheOpenSociety anditsEnemies,butnobodywhohas seriously
studiedthe worksof the moreimportantof thoseallegedenemies
couldthinkDr. Poppera reliablehistorian ofphilosophy. One would
say, indeed, that he had flungscholarship to thewinds in thepursuit
of his thesis,could one be sure that he had had any to fling;but
his accountsof Aristotelianand Hegeliandoctrinecould only be
defendedfromthe chargeof deliberatecaricatureon the plea that
theyare foundedon an almostcompleteignoranceoftheoriginals.
The presentconfusionof the issue is my onlyexcuse fortrying
to re-examine calmlysomeold arguments whichseemto me to have
becomeobscured.I shall tryonlyto defendthe organictheoryin
a verygeneralform,and in a formless extremethanthatin which
some of its supporters have held it, againstwhat appearsto meto
be prejudicemagnified and sharpenedby the bittertimesin which
we live. Moreover,I shall tryto defendit onlyagainstthe liberal-
individualisticdoctrine,whichdoesstillbase theStateon theconsent
of its members.I shall say littleof theorieswhichbase the State
on force.
To fulfileven this limitedtask requiresmoreassumptionsthan
I can here justify.The organictheoryimpliesand dependson a
metaphysical contextcommonin its generalnatureto mostof its
main advocates.That contextdiffers in Plato and Aristotle;it is
notthesamein HegelandinBradleyandBosanquet.But thepolitical
theoriesof all thesethinkers have certainmetaphysical presupposi-
tionsin common,and I cannotwhollyignorethem.If I weredefend-
ingtheoppositetheoryI shouldbe inlessdifficulty. The individualist
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 THE ORGANIC STATE
politicalthinkers, amongwhomcountmostof the liberals,have on
the wholebeen empiricists, and the empiricistsits loose to meta-
physicaltheory.He believesthat to findsuch truthas the human
mindcan reachone has not to go farafieldbeyondthe factscon-
fronting one in observationor introspection; or he nowadaysdenies
metaphysics, holdingthat,save perhapsin mathematicsand logic
-if he distinguishes them-thereis no further fieldbeyondpresented
fact,and thatmetaphysics is nonsense.
If I wereto startby tryingto state a metaphysical background
in detail,I shouldneverbe done. RatherI shalllet it developitself
as the argumentseemsto require;and I shall get whathelp I can
fromAristotle.He, I think,makes plainerthan anybodyelse the
minimummetaphysicwhichthe organictheorydemands,and the
historyof philosophydoes not suggestthat his political theory
has grownobsolete with his detailed conceptionof the physical
universe.
Thereis firsta veryold metaphysical problemwhichariseswhen
we ask what we mean by the term"individual."The individualist
empiricalphilosophercommonlygives it the roughcommon-sense
meaningwhichwe all attachto it in everydaylife,and is not over-
anxiousto submitthismeaningto criticism. That is whyin politics
he so oftentakes forgranteda veryfacileequalitarianism. But we
mustprobea littledeeper.In a philosophical courttheproperplace
forcommonsenseis thedock,or on occasionthewitnessbox, never
thebench.
I take it that to whateveris individualwe attributeon reflection
two characteristics: (a) We thinkofit as one and not many;i.e. as
one amongmany,an exclusiveunit.But (b) we further thinkof it
as one qua a unityofdifferences, a concreteunity;a characterwhich
in a sensegivesthe individualthe natureof a universal.
It may at firstlook to us as if the moreimportant characteristic
were (a), the individual'snegativeexclusionof otherindividuals.
But reflection suggestsratherthat (b) is theessentialcharacteristic.
For surelywhat makesa man (or anythingelse) individualis that
he is a unique synthesisof certainelementsor characteristics, not
so mucha unit as a unity.Yet as soon as one calls hima unique
synthesisone findsthat one is basing his individuality on (a) as
wellas on (b). Althoughconcreteunityofdifferences, a notionwhich
seemsto blendindividualand universal,appearsto be the essential
significance of individuality,yet it is hardto conceivethisunityas
uniqueexceptqua negativelyexcludingotherindividualunities.
This old puzzle may continueto troubleus. Suffice it hereto say
thaton thewholewhenempirical talkaboutindividuals
individualists
theyare thinking of themas units;whereaswhendefenders of the
organictheorytalkofindividualstheyare thinking ratherofunities,
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 PHILOSOPHY
and thatis to be remembered whenthe questionis raisedwhether
the State is a higherindividualthanthecitizen.
Thereis a secondpointwithmetaphysical implicationswhichmust
be raised before we can advance. In Shakespeare'sCoriolanus
MeneniusAgrippacalls his fableof the bellyand the members"a
prettytale." It was an allegory.I take it to be plain,despiteocca-
sional misrepresentation of the organictheoryby its opponents,
firstthat the State can intelligibly be called an organismonlyby
analogy;and secondly that "by analogy"impliesthata certainset
of terms at one level is analogicallyrelatedto a certainset ofterms
at anotherlevel of what is regardedas somesortofdeveloping series
A
of levels. developingseriesmay be provisionally described as a
series in which the second term presupposes the firstand is a
development, a higherpower,so to say, of the first,and the third
and subsequenttermsrelateeach in thesamewayto itspredecessor.
But the relationof termto termis asymmetrical, forthe firstterm
does not presupposethe secondterm,nor does the secondnor any
subsequenttermpresupposeits successor.So, forexample,chemical
compositiondoes not presupposelife,and lifedoes not presuppose
sentience;butsentience doespresuppose life,andlifedoespresuppose
chemically compounded elements. I call the description provisional
not because I hope laterto improveon it, but because I thinkwe
shalldiscoverthatthe termsofcertainimportant developingseries
do not afterall stand in a perfectly asymmetrical relationto one
another.Thereis perhapssomething in the verynatureof develop-
mentwhichdefiesourinsight.
Howeverthat may be, Plato was clearlyregardingthe State as
notliterallybut by analogyan organism, whenhe distinguished the
the
appetitive, spirited, and therational elements in the human soul,
and gave to his ideal State a class structure analogousto whathe
believedto be man's psychologicalmake-up;and again whenhe
desideratedthat the wholeState shouldfeelthe joys and sorrows
of its severalmembersin a manneranalogousto thatin whichthe
sentienthumanorganismfeelsas its own the pains and pleasures
also feltin and by its variousparts.
The importanceof analogyto the organictheoryof the State
becomesveryclear in Aristotle.In holdingman to be by nature
a socialanimal,and theStateto be priorto theindividualby nature
(where"by nature" means in an orderof being or reality),and
again in treatingthe structureof the State as analogousto the
structure of thehumansoul,AristotlefollowsPlato. But Aristotle's
developingseries,his scale of degreesand phases,is a good deal
moreelaboratethanhis master's.As we all know,he chargesPlato
withskippingintervening levels of humanassociation.The State,
he says,is not just a community of individuals:it is a community
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 THE ORGANIC STATE
of communities. In the familyand the villagegroupman enters,or
findshimselfin, progressively different stagesof association,which
culminatein theState,thesovereign and inclusiveassociation.Plato,
by cuttingout the family,or ratherby attemptingto make his
guardiansand auxiliariesintoa singlefamily, had ignoredthenatural
progressive difference of human association; had violatedthetrue
he
of
nature man and the humancommunity.
Thisconfronts us witha thirdmetaphysical difficulty, one adum-
bratedin the opening words of this article.What is the meaning
here of the term"nature?" What is it that Plato and Aristotle-
indeed,politicaltheoristsin general-are tryingto discover?Is it
thenatureofStatesas theyare,or thenatureofStatesas theyought
to be? That again is an old familiarpuzzle,but infiniteconfusion
followsif it is not faced.We mustdigressto considerit, but if we
examinethe outlineofAristotle'sanswerwe shallfindthatwe have
not strayedfarfromthe mainroad.
Analogical relation and developingseries pervade the entire
Aristoteliansystem.Aristotlesees the universeas a hierarchy
descendingfromGod throughmen,brutes,and plantsdownto the
physicalelementsand even belowthem,in stagesof whatforwant
of a betterword I must call "developedness."These stages form
a developingseriessuch that thereis analogicalrelationbetween
one stageand another;but one stagedoes not temporally pass into
another.On the otherhand,withineach stage of "developedness"
in thishierarchy thereis temporaldevelopment. For,withexceptions
hereirrelevant, each suchstagebetweenGod and theindeterminate
matterwhichfallsbelowthephysicalelements, is a genusofspecies;
and althougheach genusis articulatedinto specieswhichAristotle
again on the wholeregardsas fallinginto an orderof "developed-
ness,"yetthesingularspecimensofeach speciesdo developin time.
They developthrougha cycleof phases up to the phase in which
theyexhibitfullytheirspecific form,whichin thecase ofan organism
is its specificfunction, and thendowntowardstheirdissolution. The
development of an organismthrough its several stages fromembryo
up to adult, and thendown to old age and death,is the obvious
biologicalinspiration ofthistheory,and in it liesAristotle's solution
of theproblemof "is" and "ought-to-be."
The truenatureof the developingspecimenis the specificform
whichit willnot exhibituntilit is mature,and whichit willcease
fullyto exhibitwhenit decays.Thus thespecificformis nota mere
class label but a norm,and the truenatureof the sproutingseed
or thenewbornbabe, thatin termsaloneofwhichit can be defined,
is not whatit is now,but what,providedits development proceeds
normally, it willbe whenit matures.Beforeand afterits climaxof
maturity it is real onlyin a degreeand approximately.
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 PHI LOSOPHY
Specimenswhosedevelopment is arrestedso thattheyneverfully
embodythe specificform,are also in that degreeunreal; and at
a certainlevel evil, which is not meredefect,can emerge.The
specimen,i.e. can develop and yet so embodythe formas to be
a perversionof it. Such specimensare unrealcomparedwith the
normal,thoughas comparedwiththe defectivetheyhave a quasi-
positivecharacter.
Thusthecontrastof"is" and "will-be"in thedeveloping specimen
is a fairlyclose loweranalogueof the contrastbetween"is" and
"ought-to-be;"and the contrastbetweenwhat the permanently
defectivespecimenis, and whatit wouldbe ifit couldfullyembody
thespecificform,isa yetmoreobviousanalogue.The specificform is,as I
havesaid,a norm,an ideal.In Aristotle's terminology,it is notmerely
the specimen'sformalcause,thatin termsaloneof whichit can be
defined;it is also the specimen'sfinalcause, that forthe sake of
whichit develops.The contrastof"is" and "will-be"in theimmature
specimen,and the contrastof "is" and "would-be"in the defective
specimen,of coursediffer fromthe contrastof "is" and "ought-to-
be," because the growth and decay of the livingorganismand the
permanent defect of some organismsare not due to volition;for
mostorganismshave no will,and even in man his organicgrowth
and decayand his physicaldefectsare independent ofhis will,save
to the limitedextentto whichhe can deliberately assistor hinder
the naturalprocessin him,actingwhenhe does so in largemeasure
externally upon it.
Here, then,is Aristotle'sanswerto the questionof the State's
truenature,to the problemwhetherthe politicalphilosopher tries
to discoverwhat States are or what theyoughtto be. He denies
thedisjunction:Onlyby reference to an idealto whichtheyapproxi-
matecan youunderstand and judgeactual States; onlyby studying
actual States can you elicitthat ideal criterionin termsof which
alone you can understandand judge them.And again, since man
is by nature,i.e. ideallyand in his truenature,a social animal,it
is onlyby reference to the State,ultimatelyto an ideal State,that
you can understandthe natureof actual man; but it is only by
studyingactual humannaturethat you can elicitthe truenature
of the State.
So we returnto the mainroad. For thegroundon whichAristotle
baseshissolutionoftheproblemof"is" and "ought-to-be" turnsout
to be preciselythe groundon whichhe holds that the State is
organic,is the higherdevelopment of meresingularindividualman
intopossessionofhis truenature.
We have discoveredalso more than Aristotle'ssolutionof a
problemin politicalphilosophy.We have stumbledon his answer
to thedoubleproblemofthe a prioriand theempiricalin logic,and
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 THE ORGANIC STATE
offactand value in any concretephilosophy;and we have seenthis
answerto be boundup witha conceptionoftheuniverseas a certain
sortofhierarchy, a certainsortofscale ofreality.
We can now perhapssum up the minimumof metaphysical pre-
supposition whichthe organictheoryofthe State entails.
It mustfirstof all assume that we can only understandphilo-
sophicallythe realitywe experiencein so faras we can gradeit in
termsofdevelopment or "developedness," and thatthesedegreesof
development or "developedness"are,at anyrateoutsidethe sphere
of mathematicsand naturalscience,in a broad sense degreesof
value.
Secondly,it mustassumethatthe philosopher, or at any ratethe
politicalphilosopher, can nowherereasoneitherpurelya priorior
purelyempirically. He cannotdividehis subject-matter rigidlyinto
two spheres,the one in whichhe intuitsor thinksout a priori
principlesand criteriaofvalue,theotherinwhichhe justinvestigates
thefacts.Everywhere he is somehowdoingboththosethingsin one
act of thought.He can vary the emphasisa good deal, but if he
comes to believethat his resultsin eitherof theseonlyrelatively
separatesphereshave been reachedwithoutthe aid of any insight
into the other,thenhe is deceived.He has forgotten that thereis
a
always tinge of the empirical in his ideal criterionand alwaysa
touchof ideal interpretation in his facts.In otherwords,although
Aristotle'ssolutionof the problemof "is" and "ought-to-be" is in
some sense a circle,nevertheless the circlecannotbe brokenby
impalingoneselffirmly on one hornof the dilemma,norby sitting
alternately on each. Yet thereremainsa residueof paradox in
Aristotle'scircularsolutionoftheproblem.So muchindeedI hinted
by suggesting thatthereis perhapssomething in the verynatureof
development which defies human insight.
It is timethat we attackedthe centreof our subject.The main
argumentin favourof the organictheorylies, I suppose,in the
State's attributeof sovereignty. Equally on a liberaland on an
organictheory,any act of State claims the consent,and where
necessarytheactiveobedience,ofall citizensas such.Yet whenthe
State acts the agent cannot,I think,be any fractionor even the
sum total of the adult singularindividualcitizensas such. For no
claim to obediencewould logicallyfollow.Take firstthe extreme
case: assumeuniversalsuffrage, and a unanimousreferendum, with
no abstentions,infavourofuniversalconscription. Herethesovereign
agent mightbe said to have been the sum total of citizens.But if
thevotersvotedas singularindividuals, theplebiscitewouldamount
to no morethan a merestatementthat at the momentof voting
everybodyfavouredconscription. If any voter changedhis mind
next day, thereis no reasonbut fearof force,whichwe are not
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 PHILOSOPHY
considering, whyhe shouldnot refuseto serve.If a man is in his
real naturejust a singularindividualand no more,he cannotbind
his ownwilland accepta moralclaimon his obediencewhichshall
be valid even if he shouldchangehis mindand regrethis previous
decision.Onlyif his will is in its truenaturean activitycommon
to himselfand others,thoughdifferentiated in himselfand others,
can a man even bind himselfby a promiseto his neighbour, much
less accept obligationto obey a law or decreeof the State. But if
therebe a real will commonto, but differentiated in, men acting
politically,that is
surely something individual a in sense morereal
is
thanthesenseinwhichthesingularman individual: individual it is
not qua a unitbut qua a unity.And what can sovereignty be but
this? For sovereignty assuredlyimpliesunity,and the sum total
of citizens,happeningall to vote the same way,is not a unitybut
a mereaggregatewhichcannotbe exercisingsovereignpower.
In the case of a majorityvote the argumentfromsovereignty
is stronger, or at least moreobvious.Unlesssome real community
of willlinksall who vote,whatpossibleclaimhas the majorityon
the obedienceof the dissentingminority?If the act of State is
allegedto be the sovereignact of one or of a few,of an absolute
autocrator of an oligarchy, thereis again no claimto obedience-
thereis indeedno trueState-unless thereis realcommunity ofwill
betweenrulersand ruled; i.e. unlessin beingruledas opposedto
beingmerelycompelleda man is in some measurerulinghimself.
The mostrudimentary self-control is notpossibleifmenare singular
individualspossessingno universalnaturebeyondcertaincommon
characteristics whichserveas marksto classifythem.
The argumenthere reallyturnson the natureof freedom.The
liberal individualist,regardingindividualfreedomas the highest
value,sees all governmental institutions as instruments forsecuring
and preserving it, and feels that by the organictheoryit is most
dangerously threatened. He takes the "Don't fenceme in" view of
freedom.He will concede,as J. S. Mill concedesin the Essay on
Liberty, thatgovernment entailssomerestriction ofliberty, but that,
he willallege,is onlybecause menlivingcheekby jowl may tread
on each other'stoes, and if theyexercisedno self-restraint there
might in the end be less liberty for all.
One mightreplythat althoughgovernmental institutions, legis-
lative, executive,and judicial, and government services,military
and civil,do in different waysserveeach one of us as instruments
-as, e.g., when we obtain a passportorcallina policemantoprotect
us-yet (a) we are governedas wellas servedby theseinstitutions,
and (b) to thosewho are actual operativemembersof themthese
institutions are notmeansand instruments exceptaccidentally:they
are the special formsof social lifewhichtheirmemberslive. But
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 THE ORGANIC STATE
that replywill perhapsnot convinceuntilwe raise again the old
questionoffreedom.
It has alwaysproveddifficult fora liberalto definefreedom with-
out introducing the idea of caprice; difficult even thougha liberal
thinksof freedomas freedomof conscience.Freedom,so in general
runstheliberal-individualist line ofthought, is theoppositeofcom-
pulsion,and an act is freein so faras it proceedsfromuncompelled
choice.But hereliesthedifficulty whichtheliberal,in thatsympathy
withtheoppressedwhichis themostattractivepartofhismake-up,
so oftenshirks.If ex hypothesi nothingalien,whetheranotherman's
conflicting willor an accidentalevent,compelsthe freeagent,what
does in fact determinehis choice betweenthe alternativeswhich
choiceimplies?Clearlysomething in himself.But what? A passing
impulseto whichhe choosescapriciously to yield? If so, his act is
still almost accidentallycompelled,thoughnot quite, since some-
thingofhimselfis expressedin it. If,however,whatdetermines the
choiceof the freeagentis something in him,or of him,morethan
a passingimpulse,ifit is an habitualattitudeofmindand character,
thena paradoxarises.In thislattercase his act is verymuchmore
his own than was his yieldingto an impulse,because it expresses
muchmoreofhimself.But the moreofhimselfit expressestheless,
surely,is it an act of choice.Choice,it wouldseem,is excludednot
onlyby externalcompulsionbut also by the internalnecessityof
a man's own nature.Yet whenis an act freeif not whenit flows
fromthe wholenatureof theagent?
Here, then,is the dilemma: (a) A freeact appears to involve
choice,but (b) acts are freein so faras theyexpressa man'snature,
i.e. so far as in themhe is self-determining and not capricious.I
These two characteristics seembothto be essentialto freedom, but
appear to be presentin an action in inverseproportion.
It seemsimpossibleto abandon (b): we mustsay that an act is
freein so faras it flowsfromthe natureofthe agent.But we must
abandon(b)unlesswe insistthat,as Aristotle saw,theagent'snature
is not something whichhe unambiguously possessesin himselfqua
singularindividual. If we deny man's natureto be an ideal lying
ahead of him,ifwe denythathe is in any senseorganicto a unity
beyondhis singularnature,thenwe reducehimto a rigidunit,an
atomto whommembership ofanygroupfromtheStateto thefamily
is merelyaccidental;we reducehimto something simplynotrecog-
nizableas a man.
Yet theliberalindividualist, restinghis case on (a), willprobably
retortthat on the view that true freedomconsistsin a self-deter-
mininguniversalwill the individualhas just disappearedwithout
trace.He willsay thattheobviousfactsofconflict havebeensimply
of the individualdistinguishedon p. 207 above.
Cp. thetwo characteristics
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 PHILOSOPHY
ignored.He willask, as has been vainlyasked of Rousseau,how,if
therebe this universalreal will,can a man's particularwill clash
withit or withtheparticularwillsofothermen?Whyis thereever
any disputein politicaltheoryor practice?Is notthisuniversalwill,
ifit is allegedto be a good will,just an illusion?Is it not ratherin
fact,whenit does exist,a will forevil? And he will pointin illus-
trationto the tyrannies, to the Fascist State of Mussolini,the Nazi
State of Hitler,the Communist State of Stalin.
I will try to re-state-perhapseven in a sense to modify-the
organictheoryin orderto meetthisobjection,but I will firstcon-
sidertheappeal to thedictatorState,whichis notdifficult to answer.
Nazi Germanywas not an organicState.I It mustnot be forgotten
that the State can be termedorganiconlyby analogy.Withinthe
Nazi community, strivingafterworldconquestin the spiritof a
Niiremberg rally,individual Germansbore no real resemblanceto
organs of a unityhigherand more developedthan the singular
individual.Blind,undifferentiated massloyaltyto a dictator-mass
loyalty,moreover,consciouslyfeltand gloriedin as such-is not
any sortof synthesisgivingthe individualfullerscope at a higher
level. It merelydepresseshim to a level below his everydayindi-
viduality.The intensity of an emotionis no testof its quality,and
this is just the mass emotionof a crowd.The workingof such a
community is nothingbut the personalwill of the dictatorusing
individualsas mereinstruments. The instrumental functions which
they performare based not on rationalconsentbut on a sort of
hypnotically inducedfanaticism;and if the patientwakes up and
questionshis orders,swiftremovalto a concentration camp makes
it evidentthatas soonas thissubrational consentfailsthedictator's
government restson nakedforce.
Yet if the illustrationfailsthe objectionremains.I would still
maintainthattheideal ofa higherunityoperatesconsciously in the
social and politicallifeof man. It is certainlynot a mereregulative
ideal: just becauseit does operatein conductit is so farreal. On the
otherhand,it mustbe concededthatthereneverhas beenand never
will be fullconsciousness of such a politicalunityin the mindsof
men.For even the State as suchis notfullyreal: it is an ideal,like
everyotherhumanideal,tingedwiththeempirical.Its unitydepends
stillalwayson its beinga unit.In otherwords,it maybe conceded
thattheliberal,althoughhe has holdofthewrongend ofthestick,
at least holds an end of it. Human affairsmake no sense unless
politicalstructure is a developingseriesoflevelsanalogically related.
Every level in principle,ideally,transcends and its
explains pre-
decessor;is the higherdevelopment of its predecessor and "ought"
to supersedeit, as maturity"ought"to supersedeadolescence.But
' Nor,incidentally,
did the Nazis ever officially
claim the authorityof Hegel.
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 THE ORGANIC STATE
as men actuallyexperiencetheselevels,the higherdoes not fully
transcendand supersedethe lower.We live somehowon two-or,
indeed,morethan two-levels at once. Moreover,and the pointis
crucial,the lowerstage survivesnot just as a residuebetokening
failureeitheroftheoretical insightor ofwill,but as theindispensable
complement subserving stagewhich"ought"to have superseded
the
it. Thus,ifI am right,it looks,as I suggestedbefore,as iftherelation
betweentermsof the developingserieswereafterall not perfectly
asymmetrical. Thereseemsto be a not fullysolubleproblemin the
natureofdevelopment.
That willsoundobscure.I willtryto illustratemy thesis,starting
outsidethepoliticalsphereand graduallyapproaching it.
We perceivea physicalobject,and we understand it. WhenI say,
"That is a house,"thehearerknowsthatat leasttwodistinguishable
activitiesare goingon in me. I am perceiving withmysenses,and
I am judgingthat an object, whichis at least in some measure
identicalwith my perceivedobject, is a house, a thingwhichis
obviouslynot a merecontentof sense-perception but an object of
thought.The hearerwillfurther realizethatI lookedand perceived
in orderto judge; forthe immediatepurposeof judgingone's per-
ceived worldis to develop it into an intellectual,an understood,
world.But in thisno mancan everfullysucceed.Onecannotexhaust
sensuouscontentin thought,fullyintellectualize it and understand
it. A sensuousresidueremains,and remainsnotas a meremonument
to failure,but as an indispensableauxiliaryto eke out and com-
plementthinking.
Considernowtheproblemofthoughtand itslinguistic expression,
whichis perhapsin the end the same problem.Languageis always
eithermoreor less sensuous.It developsin us as imagination deve-
lops. Thus it precedesand is pre-supposed we
by thought: develop
throughspeakingto thinking. But as in the case of perceptionand
judgment,the relationis not just asymmetrical. For languagesur-
vives modifiedas the indispensableexpressionof thought,indis-
pensablenotmerelyforcommunication, butfortheactualcompletion
ofour thought.We do not thinkcompletethoughtsand thenclothe
themin wordsin orderto pass themon. Untilwe have expressed
our thoughtin wordswe do not knowwhat it is, because untilit
is expressedit is notcomplete.
Take nexttherelationbetweenmereimpulseand will,theproblem
on whichwe touchedin discussing freedom.Willdevelopson a basis
ofimpulse,or ratherperhapsfroma germofimpulse.Simpleminded
thinkershave triedto reducean act of will to the victoryof the
strongestamongconflicting impulses.Not quite so simpleminded
thinkers have regarded the essenceof will as a powerof choice
between conflicting impulses.But even the second explanation
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 PHILOSOPHY
ignoresthe factthatthe willis a development ofimpulse:it is not
the act ofa subjectcominguponthesceneas a deusex machinaand
choosingexternallywhichimpulseit will sanction,whichit will
repress.The impulsiveselfof conflicting desiresis the undeveloped
will,and it is the will whichexplainsthe impulsiveself,not vice
versa.But againtherelationis notquiteasymmetrical. The develop-
mentof the impulsiveselfintowillis nevercomplete,and as sense
on the cognitiveside survivesto complement understanding, so the
impulsiveself persistsindispensably to complementand subserve
thewill.No doubtthepersisting impulsiveselfis modified;it differs
beforeand afterthewillemerges,just as thehalfarticulatelanguage
in whichwe struggletowardsthoughtdiffers fromthe motjuste in
whichwe successfully completeourthought.But it persistsas a self
ofimpulse.
That perhapslets somelightin on the socialand politicalpuzzles
whichvex us intoconflict boththeoretical and practical.If inpursuit
of the ideal you tryto forcedevelopmentto the higherlevel quite
intransigently, you defeatyourown ends. You reach a lowerand
not a higherunityof individuals,a lowerunitywhichis not even
like that of a healthybiologicalorganism.You get not a harmless
community ofantsorbeesbuttheperverted, pseudo-organic dictator
State. You mustnot trywhollyto sweep away the lowerlevels,
because in human affairstheynecessarilysurviveto complement
and subservethe higher.To devoteall one's energiesand loyalties
to the serviceof the State is a glitteringideal besidewhichprivate
the
enterprise, profitmotive, indeed most othermotives,can be
made to look everso meanand ugly.But thetruthwhichthatideal
embodiesis a half-truth only.If in theoryor practiceyou pursue
this half-truth as the whole truth,it will develop into disastrous
perversion.In theoryyou will findthat by cuttingout the lesser
intervening loyaltiesyou have cruellycaricaturedhumannature.
In practice, you succeedin persuadinga sufficient
if numberofyour
fellowsto act withyou,you willfindyourself a slave in thepseudo-
organicState-or, whichmaybe morallyworseforyou,its tyrant.
If,on theotherhand,youintransigently pursuetheoppositehalf-
truth,you willmeetthe same disasterby anotherroute.The ironic
paradoxof our timeis thecontrastbetweenthe actual SovietState
and the Marxianideal of a classlesssocietyin whichgovernment
has withered away.It is scarcelycrediblethata rationalbeingshould
nowsupposetheformerto be a stage on the way to the latter,but
to see how the paradoxoccursis nothard.The Marxianmillennium
is a reductioad absurdum It assumesthe supremevalue
ofliberalism.
of the singularindividualas such, conceivinglibertyin purely
negativetermsas freedomfrominterference. It ignoresthe lesson
of all historythat the primaryproblem humanlifeis the dis-
of
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 THE ORGANIC STATE
tributionof powerand not of wealth,and regardsgovernment as
a temporary deviceto be discardedwhenwealthhas been equalized
through theso-calleddictatorshipoftheproletariate.But itis literally
preposterous to alloweconomicsto dominatepolitics.The economic
level is lowerthan the political,even thoughtheirrelationis not
completelyasymmetrical. The attemptby a community to discard
government is as fatal as the abandonmentof self-control by an
individual.Power,if the problemof distributing it is neglected,
inevitablyconcentrates in the wrongplace. That is the originof
tyranny,and tyranny,even if you label it "dictatorshipof the
proletariate,"is not a step towardsa societywithoutclass or
government; two factswhichPlato veryclearlyand simplydemon-
stratedin theRepublic.
Thus equal ruin threatenswhetherthe problemof distributing
powerbe solved brutallyand crudelyby State worshipor shirked
by upholdingthe equal rightsof all singularindividualsas such.
Yet, thoughhierarchybe the solutionwhichhumannatureitself
demands,the claimof the lesserloyalties,it mustbe admitted,is
particularly urgentin the modernworld.Of courseit is clear that
these lesserloyaltiesand interests-privateproperty,familycon-
cerns,and so on-may mostevillyconflict withloyaltyto theState.
It is clear,too, as Plato feltso strongly,that the directserviceof
the State maygivea mana blessednegativefreedom fromthepetty
cramping strifesand jealousiesof the lowerand narrower levelsof
association;everygoodpublic servanthas probably at some time felt
that. But even so the serviceof the State is not a perfectfreedom
whichcan stand alone,howeverloyallyand intelligently men per-
formit. The lesserloyaltiesmay conflict withthe greater,but they
have theirown peculiarvalues which,as Aristotleretortedupon
Plato, cannotbe absorbedwithoutresiduein the greaterwithout
a grossviolationof humannature.The lowerlevels of association
affordmore latitude for mere arbitrarychoice,but withoutthe
survivalfroma lowerlevel of a primafacie irrelevantelementof
choice,and evencaprice,themorerealfreedom ofself-determination
its
willinevitablyturninto opposite. Without an underlying balance
ofactuallyoperantconflicting interests
government becomestyranny.
I thinkthereis nothingcynicalin thisview. The lesserloyalties
arenotpurelyselfish, becausein thedecentcitizentheyare modified;
just as impulsecomplementing and subserving the developedwillis
modifiedand differs fromraw impulse.
If we extendthe politicalproblemfromthe nation-stateto the
world-and thereseemsto be no goodreasonwhytheorganictheory
mustassumethe nation-stateto be in principlethe upper limitof
politicalassociation-thesameholdstrue.That a worldstatecannot
be createdas a deviceseemsnowto havebecomesufficiently obvious.
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 PH ILOSOPHY
If it ever comes to be, it will springfroma universalwill as a
realizationof man's naturefullerthanthe nation-state, and it will
then claim a higherloyalty than the nation-state.But it will not
abolish all lesserloyalties.Conceiveit as annihilating patriotism,
and it becomesas impracticableas Plato's ideal State afterthe
abolitionofthe familynot merelybecauseloyaltyto a nation-state
wouldbe a necessarystageon the way to loyaltyto a world-state,
but because withoutsome survivingbalance of actuallyconflicting
nationalinterestsa world-state wouldhave no stability.
I have done littlemorethan repeata fewold argumentswhich
seemto me nowadaystoo oftenforgotten or misrepresented.I hope
at least to have removedany excuse forbelievingthat if a man
holds this sort of doctrinehe must necessarilybe a reactionary
desiringthe returnof mankindto closedtribalsociety,or a servile
worshipper of a Prussianstate,or indeedany sortofState idolator.
If theStatebe organicin themodified senseI have giventheterm-
I am notin factparticularly enamouredoftheword-it followsthat
the State is muchmorethan a device createdby an aggregateof
individuals;but it does not followthat any actual shape of it is
final,northatideallyit is a closedsociety.Even less does it follow
thatthe State,whichis concernedwiththepracticallife,can claim
any considerabledegreeof controlover the non-practical activities
of its citizens.But the functionof the artistand the thinkerin
relationto theStateraisesproblemswhich,thoughsoluble,I believe,
alongthesame lines,are beyondthescopeofthisarticle.

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