CHAPTER 2 CASES Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go shall remain valid and

binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the

The Land Registration Commission and its Registries
of Deeds
1) ABRIGO V. DE VERA, JUNE 21, 2004
(Panganiban, J.)
 FACTS
GloriaVillafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan
to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The
house and lot was covered by a tax declaration.
Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar and a Cave-Go,
Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land
involved. The said free patent was later on cancelled by
a TCT.
Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to
the Spouses Abrigo.
Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de
Vera. De Vera registered the sale and as a consequence a
TCT was issued in her name.
premises without need of any demand. Villafania failed
to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared
the lot in their name The RTC rendered the assailed
Decision awarding the properties to Spouses Abrigo as
well as damages. Moreover, Villafania was ordered to
pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and
attorney’s fees. Not contented with the assailed
Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].
In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title
could not give rise to a valid one and hence dismissed
the appeal of Private Respondent de Vera. Since
Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda
Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale
to De Vera was deemed void.The CA also dismissed the
appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no
sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. On reconsideration found
Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and
for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in

De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must

against Spouses Abrigo before the MTC. Spouses thus be protected.

Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of

 ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and
documents, injunction, preliminary injunction,
respondent has a better right to the property
restraining order and damages Villafania. The parties
submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their
 RULING
agreement in the instant (RTC) case that neither of them
can physically take possession of the property in The present case involves what in legal contemplation
question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the was a double sale. Gloria Villafania first sold the
ejectment case was dismissed. The RTC rendered disputed property to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, from
judgment approving the Compromise Agreement whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right.
submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Villafania Subsequently a second sale was executed by Villafania
was given one year from the date of the Compromise with Respondent de Vera. Article 1544 of the Civil Code
Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to states the law on double sale thus:
do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of
1
“Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to
the person who may have first taken possession thereof
in good faith, if it should be movable property.
“Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
“Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.”
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with
respect to lands registered under the Torrens system. In
the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent
registered the sale of the property. Since neither
petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the
Torrens system, they registered their respective sales
under Act 3344 For her part, respondent registered the
transaction under the Torrens system because, during the
sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of
title (TCT) covering the property. Soriano v. Heirs of
Magali23 held that registration must be done in the
proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the
property in dispute in the present case was already
registered under the Torrens system, petitioners’
registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective
for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v.
Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the right of a party
who had registered the sale of land under the Property
Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had
registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344.
2
In that case, the “priority in time” principle was not
applied, because the land was already covered by the
Torrens system at the time the conveyance was
registered under Act 3344. For the same reason,
inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent
De Vera under the Torrens system was done in good
faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered
under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
2) GUARANTEED HOMES V. VALDEZ (Tinga,
J.)
 FACTS
CA reversed the order of RTC-Olongapo, which granted
the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Guaranteed
Homes.
Respondents, descendants of Pablo Pascua, filed a
complaint seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land in
Cabitaugan, Subic Zambales and covered by OCT No.
404 in the name of Pablo. They are praying for damages.
From the annexes attached in the complaint, it was
ascertained that the OCT contained several annotations
which showed that the property had been sold by Pablo
to Alejandria Marquinez and Resituto Morales.
Also attached in the complaint, and averred by the
respondents:
o Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and
Confirmation of Sales executed by Cipriano
Pascua, Sr., declaring himself as the only heir of
Pablo and confirming the sales made by Pablo to
spouses Rodolfo;
o TCT Nos. T-8241 – issued in the name of Cipriano
without cancellation of OCT No. 404 & not signed
by Register of Deeds;
 o TCT No. T-8242 – issued in the name of  RULING
spouses Rodolfo, which canceled T-8241;
Yes (there is no need for petitioner to go beyond the
o TCT No. T-10863 – issued in the name of
clean title presented to them).
petitioner when spouses Rodolfo sold the
property to petitioner, which canceled T-8242; Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside.
o Deed of Sale with Mortgage between spouses
The Court held that it is basic that a person dealing with
Albino Rodolfo and Fabia Rodolfo and
registered property need not go beyond, but only has to
Guaranteed Homes;
rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Since “the
Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano filed a petition with
act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect
RTC-Olongapo for the issuance of a new owner’s
the land insofar as third persons are concerned,” it
duplicate of OCT No. 404, which was denied. The trial
follows that where there is nothing in the certificate of
court held that petitioner was already the owner of the
title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
subject property, noting that the failure to annotate the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is
subsequent property to it at the back of said OCT did not
not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title
affect its title to the property.
upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
following grounds: thereto.

o Action is barred by the Statute of Limitations

(since more than 28 years have passed since
the issuance from T-10863 to the filing of the
complaint);
o No cause of action, since petitioner is an
innocent purchaser for value relying on the
clean title of spouses Rodolfo.
RTC granted the motion.
CA reversed and held that the respondents’ complaint
for quieting of title had not yet prescribed.
Hence, the petition.
 ISSUE: Whether petitioner is an innocent purchaser
for value, i.e. there is no need to go beyond the
registered title of spouses Rodolfo.
In the present case, it is enough that petitioner examined
the latest certificate of title issued in the name of spouses
Rodolfo. The petitioner as purchaser is not bound by the
original certificate but only by the certificate of title of
the person from whom he had purchased the property.
Furthermore, registration in the public registry is
considered a notice to the whole world. Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land
shall be, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land
to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such registering, filing or
entering.

3
3) BARANDA V. GUSTILO (Gutierrez, Jr., J.)
 FACTS
A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by
original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of
the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria
Gotera and Susan Silao).
Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the
said land. However during the trial, it was found that the
transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title
was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners.
In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting
Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order
declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the
same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of
petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case
pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens
was annotated in the new certificate of title.
This prompted the petitioners to move for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new
certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting
Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion
for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
 ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the
Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?
 RULING
Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the
Acting Register of Deed’s stand that the notice of lis
4
pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency
of the case in the Court of Appeals. The function of the
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of
deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is
ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did not
have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him to
cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529
states that: “It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites
for registration.
If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith
deny registration thereof and in form the presentor or
such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons
therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by
consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.”
On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When
the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument
presented to him for registration or where any party in
interest does not agree with the action taken by the
Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument,
the question shall be submitted to the Commission of
Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the
party in interest through the Register of Deeds.”
4) DE LEON V. DE LEON (Velasco, Jr., J.)
 FACTS
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and
the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for
the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon
City. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de
Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On
June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in
favor of Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the
lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of
Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio
sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix
Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the written
consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996,
Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed
of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance
suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the
lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio
sold to them was his exclusive property because he was
still single when he acquired it from PHHC. They
further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution
of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating
that the lot in question was the conjugal property of
Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC. Hence, this petition.
 ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has
purchased on installment before the marriage
although some installments were paid during the
marriage would be considered conjugal property
 RULING
Petitioners assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot
from PHHC on installment before he married Anita, the
land was Bonifacios exclusive property and not
conjugal, even though some installments were paid and
5
the title was issued to Bonifacio during the marriage. In
support of their position, petitioners cite Lorenzo v.
Nicolas and Alvarez v. Espiritu.
We disagree.
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing
provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita
contracted marriage, provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise,
it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals teaches, even
necessary to prove that the property was acquired with
funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition
during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption
that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the
manner in which the properties were acquired does not
appear, the presumption will still apply, and the
properties will still be considered conjugal.
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a
PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during
the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled
that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a
contract to sell. In both types of contract, the efficacy or
obligatory force of the vendors obligation to transfer title
is subordinated to the happening of a future and
uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase
price, so that if the suspensive condition does not take
place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed. In other words, in a
contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is
not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price,
unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon
delivery of the thing sold.
Such is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The
conditional contract to sell executed by and between
Bonifacio and PHHC on July 20, 1965 provided that
ownership over and title to the property will vest on
Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale
which, in turn, will be effected upon payment of the full
purchase price.
Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to
Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on
June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made
more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on
April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was acquired
during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership
to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership.
Such presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear,
categorical, and convincing evidence. There must be
clear evidence of the exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.
Petitioners argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacios
exclusive property, since it was registered solely in his
name, is untenable. The mere registration of a property
in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal
nature. What is material is the time when the property
was acquired.
Also, it cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil
Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband
alienating or encumbering any real property of the
6
conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. To a
specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the
husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the
wife’s consent. Else, the sale is not valid or if done, is
void ab initio (absent any showing that the latter is
incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes).
The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact
that sale is in contravention of the mandatory
requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art. 166 of
the Code requires the consent of the wife before the
husband may alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or
transactions executed against this mandatory provision
are void except when the law itself authorized their
validity.
Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12,
1974 between Bonifacio and the Tarrosas covering the
PHHC lot is void.
5) ALFONSO V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
(Carpio Morales, J.) – Full text*
6) NAAWAN COMMUNITY RURAL BANK V.
CA (Corona, J.)
 FACTS
On April 30, 1988, a certain Guillermo Comayas offered
to sell to private respondent-spouses Alfredo and
Annabelle Lumo, a house and lot measuring 340 square
meters located at Pinikitan, Camaman-an, Cagayan de
Oro City.
Wanting to buy said house and lot, private respondents
made inquiries at the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City where the property is located and
the Bureau of Lands on the legal status of the vendors
title. They found out that the property was mortgaged
for P8,000 to a certain Mrs. Galupo and that the owners
copy of the Certificate of Title to said property was in
her possession.
Private respondents directed Guillermo Comayas to
redeem the property from Galupo at their expense,
giving the amount of P10,000 to Comayas for that
purpose.
On May 30, 1988, a release of the adverse claim of
Galupo was annotated on TCT No. T-41499 which
covered the subject property.
In the meantime, on May 17, 1988, even before the
release of Galupos adverse claim, private respondents
and Guillermo Comayas, executed a deed of absolute
sale. The subject property was allegedly sold
for P125,000 but the deed of sale reflected the amount of
only P30,000 which was the amount private respondents
were ready to pay at the time of the execution of said
deed, the balance payable by installment.
On June 9, 1988, the deed of absolute sale was registered
and inscribed on TCT No. T-41499 and, on even date,
TCT No. T-50134 was issued in favor of private
respondents.
After obtaining their TCT, private respondents requested
the issuance of a new tax declaration certificate in their
names. However, they were surprised to learn from the
City Assessors Office that the property was also declared
for tax purposes in the name of petitioner Naawan
Community Rural Bank Inc. Records in the City
Assessors Office revealed that, for the lot covered by
TCT No. T-50134, Alfredo Lumos T/D # 83324 bore the
note: This lot is also declared in the name of Naawan
Community Rural Bank Inc. under T/D # 71210.
7
Apparently, on February 7, 1983, Guillermo Comayas
obtained a P15,000 loan from petitioner Bank using the
subject property as security. At the time said contract of
mortgage was entered into, the subject property was
then an unregistered parcel of residential land, tax-
declared in the name of a certain Sergio A. Balibay
while the residential one-storey house was tax-declared
in the name of Comayas.
Balibay executed a special power of attorney authorizing
Comayas to borrow money and use the subject lot as
security. But the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and the
Special Power of Attorney were recorded in the
registration book of the Province of Misamis Oriental,
not in the registration book of Cagayan de Oro City. It
appears that, when the registration was made, there was
only one Register of Deeds for the entire province of
Misamis Oriental, including Cagayan de Oro City. It was
only in 1985 when the Office of the Register of Deeds
for Cagayan de Oro City was established separately from
the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Misamis Oriental.
For failure of Comayas to pay, the real estate mortgage
was foreclosed and the subject property sold at a public
auction to the mortgagee Naawan Community Rural
Bank as the highest bidder in the amount
of P16,031.35. Thereafter, the sheriffs certificate of sale
was issued and registered under Act 3344 in the Register
of Deeds of the Province of Misamis Oriental.
On April 17, 1984, the subject property was registered
in original proceedings under the Land Registration Act.
Title was entered in the registration book of the Register
of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City as Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-820, pursuant to Decree No. N-189413.
On July 23, 1984, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
41499 in the name of Guillermo P. Comayas was entered
in the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
Meanwhile, on September 5, 1986, the period for
redemption of the foreclosed subject property lapsed and
the MTCC Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan de Oro City
issued and delivered to petitioner bank the sheriffs deed
of final conveyance. This time, the deed was registered
under Act 3344 and recorded in the registration book of
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
By virtue of said deed, petitioner Bank obtained a tax
declaration for the subject house and lot.
Thereafter, petitioner Bank instituted an action for
ejectment against Comayas before the MTCC which
decided in its favor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court
affirmed the decision of the MTCC in a decision dated
April 13, 1988.
On January 27, 1989, the Regional Trial Court issued an
order for the issuance of a writ of execution of its
judgment. The MTCC, being the court of origin,
promptly issued said writ.
However, when the writ was served, the property was no
longer occupied by Comayas but herein private
respondents, the spouses Lumo who had, as earlier
mentioned, bought it from Comayas on May 17, 1988
Alarmed by the prospect of being ejected from their
home, private respondents filed an action for quieting of
title which was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-138. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision
declaring private respondents as purchasers for value and
in good faith, and consequently declaring them as the
absolute owners and possessors of the subject house and
lot.
8
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which in
turn affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, this petition.
 ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the sheriff’s Deed of Final
Conveyance was duly executed and registered in
the register of deeds of Cagayan de Oro City on
December 2, 1986;
2. Whether or not registration of sheriff’s Deed of
Final Conveyance in the proper Registry of
Deeds could be effective as against spouses
Lumo.
 RULING
Both parties cite Article 1544 of the Civil Code which
governs the double sale of immovable property.
Article 1544 provides:
x x x. Should it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Petitioner bank contends that the earlier registration of
the sheriffs deed of final conveyance in the day book
under Act 3344 should prevail over the later registration
of private respondents deed of absolute sale under Act
496, as amended by the Property Registration Decree,
PD 1529.
This contention has no leg to stand on. It has been held
that, where a person claims to have superior proprietary
rights over another on the ground that he derived his title
from a sheriffs sale registered in the Registry of
Property, Article 1473 (now Article 1544) of the Civil
Code will apply only if said execution sale of real estate
is registered under Act 496.
Unfortunately, the subject property was still untitled
when it was acquired by petitioner bank by virtue of a
final deed of conveyance. On the other hand, when
private respondents purchased the same property, it was
already covered by the Torrens System.
Petitioner also relies on the case of Bautista vs.
Fule where the Court ruled that the registration of an
instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of
Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person
who may subsequently deal with the same property.
However, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that, at
the time of the execution and delivery of the sheriffs
deed of final conveyance on September 5, 1986, the
disputed property was already covered by the Land
Registration Act and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-
820 pursuant to Decree No. N189413 was likewise
already entered in the registration book of the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan De Oro City as of April 17, 1984.
Thus, from April 17, 1984, the subject property was
already under the operation of the Torrens
System. Under the said system, registration is the
operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates
a lien upon the land.
Moreover, the issuance of a certificate of title had the
effect of relieving the land of all claims except those
noted thereon. Accordingly, private respondents, in
dealing with the subject registered land, were not
required by law to go beyond the register to determine
the legal condition of the property. They were only
charged with notice of such burdens on the property as
were noted on the register or the certificate of title. To
have required them to do more would have been to
defeat the primary object of the Torrens System which is
to make the Torrens Title indefeasible and valid against
the whole world.
9
Private respondents posit that, even assuming that the
sheriffs deed of final conveyance in favor of petitioner
bank was duly recorded in the day book of the Register
of Deeds under Act 3344, ownership of the subject real
property would still be theirs as purchasers in good faith
because they registered the sale first under the Property
Registration Decree.
The rights created by the above-stated statute of course
do not and cannot accrue under an inscription in bad
faith. Mere registration of title in case of double sale is
not enough; good faith must concur with the registration.
Petitioner contends that the due and proper registration
of the sheriffs deed of final conveyance on December 2,
1986 amounted to constructive notice to private
respondents. Thus, when private respondents bought the
subject property on May 17, 1988, they were deemed to
have purchased the said property with the knowledge
that it was already registered in the name of petitioner
bank.
Thus, the only issue left to be resolved is whether or not
private respondents could be considered as buyers in
good faith.
The priority in time principle being invoked by
petitioner bank is misplaced because its registration
referred to land not within the Torrens System but under
Act 3344. On the other hand, when private respondents
bought the subject property, the same was already
registered under the Torrens System. It is a well-known
rule in this jurisdiction that persons dealing with
registered land have the legal right to rely on the face of
the Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the
need to inquire further, except when the party concerned
has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry.
Did private respondents exercise the required diligence
in ascertaining the legal condition of the title to the
subject property so as to be considered as innocent
purchasers for value and in good faith?

We answer in the affirmative.

Before private respondents bought the subject property

from Guillermo Comayas, inquiries were made with the
Registry of Deeds and the Bureau of Lands regarding the
status of the vendors title. No liens or encumbrances
were found to have been annotated on the certificate of
title. Neither were private respondents aware of any
adverse claim or lien on the property other than the
adverse claim of a certain Geneva Galupo to whom
Guillermo Comayas had mortgaged the subject
property. But, as already mentioned, the claim of Galupo
was eventually settled and the adverse claim previously
annotated on the title cancelled. Thus, having made the
necessary inquiries, private respondents did not have to
go beyond the certificate of title.Otherwise, the efficacy
and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of Title
would be rendered futile and nugatory.

Considering therefore that private respondents exercised

the diligence required by law in ascertaining the legal
status of the Torrens title of Guillermo Comayas over
the subject property and found no flaws therein, they
should be considered as innocent purchasers for value
and in good faith.

Accordingly, the appealed judgment of the appellate

court upholding private respondents Alfredo and
Annabelle Lumo as the true and rightful owners of the
disputed property is affirmed.

Petition is hereby DENIED.

10