No Problem for Actualism

Michael Losonsky

The Philosophical Review, Vol. 95, No. 1. (Jan., 1986), pp. 95-97.

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 The Philosophical Review, XCV, No. 1 (January 1986)

DISCUSSION

NO PROBLEM FOR ACTUALISM

Michael Losonsky

A certain problem has been posed for actualism, the view that
there are no non-actual, merely possible individuals. The
problem, posed by Alan McMichael in this Journal,' is that it ap-
pears an actualist cannot handle iterated modalities as contained in
the following sort of statement:

(I) Jill does not have a daughter, but it is possible there is an x that is
Jill's daughter and is snubnosed although possibly x is not
snubnosed.

This doesn't merely say that Jill, who in fact never had a daughter, might
have had a snubnosed daughter and she might have had a daughter with-
out a snubnose. (I) makes the stronger claim that the snubnosed daughter
Jill might have had is such that she might not have been snubnosed.
T h e problem is that in the absence of a possible individual, as well as an
actual individual, it is difficult to see in virtue of what a snubnosed
daughter Jill might have had can be the same individual as a non-snub-
nosed daughter Jill might have had.
The solution that readily comes to mind is in terms of individual es-
sences. An individual essence is a property that can be exemplified by
exactly one object, which necessarily exemplifies it if the object exists, and
no other object could exemplify it. Assuming that individual essences actu-
ally exist for all individuals that exist or might have existed, an actualist can
handle (I) without non-actual, merely possible objects.
Consider the individual essence being Zeta, which is not exemplified but
could have been exemplified by a snubnosed daughter of Jill. A snubnosed
daughter Jill might have had can be identified with a non-snubnosed
daughter Jill might have had with the individual essence being Zeta. They
can be identical (or counterparts) in virtue of exemplifying being Zeta. We
can now say that even if there is nothing which is Zeta (that is, being Zeta is
not exemplified), it is possible some x is Zeta, Jill's daughter and snub-

1"A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds," The Philosophical

Review 92 (1983), pp. 49-66.
 MICHAEL LOSONSKY

nosed although it is also possible some x is Zeta but not snubnosed. What
remains identical from possibility to possibility is the property being Zeta.
Thus we are not committed to possible individuals, only possibly ex-
emplified properties.
McMichael objects to this solution. He claims that individual essences are
either purely qualitative (that is, reducible to general properties) or they
are haecceities, that is, "properties which necessarily characterize single in-
dividuals but which are not reducible to general properties" (p. 59). He
then argues that qualitative essences won't do because there can be "sym-
metrical worlds" in which distinct individuals have exactly the same gener-
al properties, and that haecceities won't do because there are no unex-
emplified haecceities.
I will ignore the argument against qualitative essences, although I find it
difficult to accept that there could be symmetrical worlds. For the sake of
argument, let's grant that qualitative essences do not necessarily charac-
terize single individuals and turn to the argument against haecceities.
McMichael conflates two types of essences that are not reducible to
general properties. One kind are haecceities in the strict sense, that is, what
Robert M. Adams calls "thisnesses."* We can say that a thisness of an object
0 is a property whose expressions always involve reference to 0, either
with a proper name or an indexical. T h e other kind of individual essence
not reducible to general properties are relational essences. A relational
individual essence of an object 0 is a property whose expressions always
involve reference to objects other than 0, either with proper names or
indexicals. For the sake of simplicity we assume that relational essences are
distinct from thisnesses. So the expressions of relational essences of some
object x do not involve reference with names or indexicals to x. If the
objects named or 'indexed' in a relational essence are in the actual world,
then we have what Adams calls alpha-relational essences (p. 5).
McMichael's argument works against thisnesses, not alpha-relational es-
sences. He argues as follows:
Since Haecceities are not reducible to general properties, expressions for
Haecceities of individuals always involve proper names of individuals (or inde-
xical~).. . . O n e can't help thinking. . . none of them [Haecceities] would exist
if the individuals named in their expressions did not exist. Thus since Haec-
ceities can't be cashed out in general terms, and since their expressions involve
the names of individuals they supposedly characterize, Haecceities d o not exist
in worlds where their corresponding individuals d o not exist. Consequently,
there are no unexemplified Haecceities (p. 60).

2"Actualism and Thisness," Synthese 49 (1981), pp. 3-41.

 DISCUSSION

The first two statements may well be true of alpha-relational essences as

well as thisnesses, but the conclusion (given the premises) holds only of
thisnesses. If 0 does not exist, it follows from McMichael's premises that
0's thisness does not exist because the expressions of 0 ' s thisness always
involve proper names or indexicals of 0 . But if 0 does not exist, it does not
follow that 0 ' s alpha-relational essence does not exist. T h e objects named
or 'indexed' in the expressions of 0 ' s alpha-relational essence may all exist
although 0 does not exist.
Consider the alpha-relational essence being the sole person that grows from
this egg (of Jill's) and that sperm under such and such circumtances. (The men-
tioned circumstances may be purely qualitative or, as is more likely, involve
haecceities.) In either case, let this property be the essence being Zeta. If the
mentioned egg, sperm, and circumstances (if they involve haecceities) ex-
ist, being Zeta may exist even though it is unexemplified.
Now, maybe the above sort of property is not an example of an indi-
vidual essence. I think it is, although the circumstances are more signifi-
cant than the sperm and egg. However, as long as there are alpha-rela-
tional essences and all possible individuals can be accounted for in terms of
alpha-relational essences, the problem McMichael poses is no problem for
the actualist. The problem can be handled without abandoning possible
world semantics (as suggested by McMichael) or rendering actualism
harmless (as suggested by M. J. White).Wf course, the task for the actu-
alist is to provide plausible candidates for alpha-relational essences and
show that all possible individuals can be accounted for in terms of those
essences. One consequence of this sort of actualism is already clear. It is
impossible that there be objects that are wholly unrelated to objects that
also actually exist. Everything that could have existed is necessarily related
to some actual objects.4

State University of New York at Oswego

"'Harmless Actualism," Philosophical Studies 47 (1985), pp. 183-190.

4The type of apparatus needed for this sort of actualism will be found in
Adam Norton, "The Possible in the Actual," No& 7 (1973), pp. 394-407;
and F. Mondadori and A. Morton, "The Extension of Might," in prepara-
tion. Also see "Modal Realism: T h e Poisoned Pawn," The Philosophical
Review 85 (1976), pp. 3-20, on "The Extension of Might."