CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT
Section 5 - Powers of the Supreme Court (Rule-
making power)
BUSTOS VS LUCERO
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule-making power of the Supreme Court
can step on substantive rights. (regarding criminal cases)
RULING:
It is difficult to draw a line in any case beyond which egislature
power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching
upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is
impossible to fix that boundary by general condition.
It is inevitable that the Supreme Court, in making rules, should
step on substantive rights. The Constitution must be presumed
to tolerate, if not expect such incursion, as it does not affect the
accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a
defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial
manner to his disadvantage.
The Court’s power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the
rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution’s
approval.
The power is to ‘promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure to adopt a general, complete and
comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different
rules without regard to their source and discarding old ones.
Section 7 - Qualifications
JARDELEZA VS SERENO
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issues raised against Jardeleza befit
questions or challenges on “integrity” as contemplated under
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.
(Supplied)
RULE 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS
FOR APPOINTMENT
Section 1. Qualifications applicable to all members of the
Judiciary and the Ombudsman and his Deputies. – (a) No
person may be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court or as Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman he is natural-born citizen of the Philippines
(CONST., Art. VIII, Sec.7, par.1; Id., Art. XI, Sec 8).
(b) No person may be appointed judge of any lower than a
collegiate court unless he is a citizen of the Philippines
(CONST. Id., Art. VIII, Sec.7, par.2).
(a) A member of the Judiciary must be proven competence,
integrity, probity and independence (id.id.par.2).
RULING:
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of
qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related
to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good
reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct,
and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That is why
proof of an applicant’s reputation may be shown in certifications
or testimonials from reputable government officials and non-
governmental organizations and clearances from the courts,
National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others.
In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check
and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation
and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be
verified and checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer (However, the Court had ruled that the two latter grounds are
to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of person’s categorized as "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of
character." JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of "questions on integrity.")

Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting (Jardeleza was decidedly put on the nomination list because the
requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial Court found that the JBC did not follow suit with its internal rules
post becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" and procedures in handling Jardeleza’s case.)
required in the preceding section. Considering that JBC-009
employs the term "integrity" as an essential qualification for
appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a
higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the
members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that
"integrity" as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly.
Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation
where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then
that the "unanimity rule" only comes into operation when the
moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application
where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral
uprightness.

(Jardeleza had three instances to which Sereno had questioned

his integrity; (a) his handling of an international arbitration case
for the government (b) supposed extra-marital affair and (c )
alleged acts of insider trading.)

(The Supreme Court ruled that Jardeleza’s handling of the

international case was not within the ambit of question of
integrity as it was simply a ‘disagreement’ in legal strategy with a
group of international lawyers. A lawyer has complete discretion
on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him
provided that he lives up to his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to
protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the law.
Stripped of a clear showing of gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral
purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic
acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct
bearing on his moral choices.)
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Section 1 - The Commissions
FUNA VS CSC
ISSUE:
Does the designation of CSC Chairman Duque as member of
the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC, and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the
independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional
prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple officers for
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?
RULING:
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their
respective charters with various powers and functions to carry
out the purposes for which they were created. While powers
and functions associated with appointments, compensation
and benefits affect the career development, employment
status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials
and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are
also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions
that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and
functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out
and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC
Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these
powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his
position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing intereston unpaid
or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the
accreditation of health care providers, or approving
restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan
amortizations. The Court also notes that Duque’s designation
as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per
diem,41 a form of additional compensation that is disallowed
by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear
contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the
principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be
held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple
offices, Duque’s designation as member of the governing
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs
the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President exercises control over all
government offices in the Executive Branch.
The Court has aptly explained in Rufino v. Endriga:
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the
Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to
one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a
quasi-judicial body or local government unit. Otherwise, such
government office, entity, or agency has no legal and
constitutional basis for its existence.
Since the President exercises control over "all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily
exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the
Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have
control of all executive . . . offices," x x x Section 17, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office
— one performing executive functions outside of the
independent constitutional bodies — from the President’s
power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs
executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial
functions.
The President’s power of control applies to the acts or
decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true
whether such officers are appointed by the President or by
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The
power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts
or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of
discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch,
and exercises "control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices."
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and
ECC have the status of a government corporation and are
deemed attached to the Department of Health45 and the
Department of Labor,46 respectively. On the other hand, the
GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President.47 The
corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
are exercised through their governing Boards, members of
which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and
the members of their respective governing Boards are under
the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman
cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the
control of the President without impairing the independence
vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
Therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Duque as
a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was
the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This
clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and
integrity of the dealings by the public with persons whose
ostensible authority emanates from the State.
B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Section 2 - Scope (Competitive and non-competitive
positions)
NASECO VS NLRC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to handle the illegal
dismissal of an employee of a subsidiary government
corporation.
RULING:
The NLRC has jurisdiction.
The Constitutional Commission clarified that Article IX-B
Section 2 (1), indicating that government corporations with
charters fall within the ambit of the Civil Service.
They defined ‘original charter’ as “created by law, by an act of
Congress, or by special law and not under the general
corporation law.”
On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the
instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time
of decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief
to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a
subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or
controlled corporation without original charter.
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 2 - Powers and functions of COMELEC
KILOSBAYAN VS COMELEC
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC has the authority to prosecute
election offenses upon information of alleged commission of
such offenses.
RULING:
The task of the the COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor,
acting upon any election offense complaint, is not the physical
searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for
an alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant,
who in effect accuses another person of having committed an
act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his
responsibility, to follow through his accusation and to prove
his complaint.
The COMELEC, in acting upon an election offense complaint
in the course of preliminary investigation, initially facilitates
the confrontation process between the complainant and the
respondents by requiring the submission of and interfacing
their respective evidence.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
D. Commission on Audit
Section 2 - Powers and functions

RAMOS VS AQUINO

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Auditor-General has the authority to
determine the criminal liability for malversation through
falsification of public, official and commercial documents. (If
Auditor-General can determine or prosecute the criminal
liability of a public official or government employee)

RULING:
The Auditor General is vested with the power to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and
receipts from whatever source and to audit, in accordance with
law and administrative regulations, all expenditures of funds
or property pertaining to or held in trust by the government as
well as the provinces and municipalities thereof.

The purpose and the end-calling for the creation of such office
are to exact obedience to any law that allows the expenditure
of public funds. It serves as the necessary check to make
certain that no department of the government exceeds the
statutory limit of the appropriations to which it is entitled, and
is certainly not the enforcement of criminal statutes.
The Auditor General cannot determine who will be persecuted
in the event that a crime is committed. Their decision relates
solely to the administrative aspect of the matter.
Broad and comprehensive as it is, it does not include a
participation in the investigation of charges to determine
whether or not a criminal prosecution should be instituted.
ARTICLE X - LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Section 6 - Share in national taxes
PIMENTEL VS AGUIRRE
ISSUE:
Whether (a) Section 1 of Administrative Order 372, insofar as
it ‘directs’ LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent;
and (b) Section 4 of the same order, are valid exercises of the
President’s power of general supervision over local
governments.
RULING:
Scope of power of the president’s supervision over LGUs
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the
President’s power over local governments to one of general
supervision.
Mondano vs Silvosa, the Court contrasted the President’s
power of supervision over LGUs with that of his power of
control over executive officials.
“In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or the authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Contol,
on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.”
The heads of the political subdivisions are elected by the
people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to
whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they
are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers.
Nature of Administrative Order 372
Due to the looming financial crisis, the president deemed it
necessary to ‘direct all government agencies, state universities
and colleges, GOCCs as well as local governments to reduce
their total expenditures by at least 25 percent.
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to
having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their
functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy
means that local governments have the power to create their
own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in
the national taxes released by the national government, as well
as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with
their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their
budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the
constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national
level and imposed on local governments, whether they are
relevant to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the
necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization
of proposals from both local and national officials, who in any
case are partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner
of national government intervention by way of supervision, in
order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by
constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning
agency of the government,[25] primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and
integrated social and economic policies, plans and
programs[26] for the entire country. However, under the
Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such
policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the
appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local
government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:[27]
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an
unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of
[the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and
subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the
necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of
local government units but in no case shall the allotment be
less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may
interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public
sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations
with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the
secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
We are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that
the directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that
will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of
authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in
character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding
order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used,
while authoritative, does not amount to a command that
emanates from a boss to a subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon
local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a
period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do
well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and
teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood,
however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs
and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this
light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard
to Section 1.
Withholding a part of the LGU’s IRA
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic
feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution.
As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be
given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore,
imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective
January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in
the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the
Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent
to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld,
often temporarily."[32] Hence, the "temporary" nature of the
retention by the national government does not matter. Any
retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an
advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof
has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively
encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his
Order to withhold the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law requires
that even the best intentions must be carried out within the
parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable
purposes must be carried out by legal methods.
ARTICLE XI - ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS
Section 5 - The Ombudsman
OMBUDSMAN VS QUIMBO
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to directly
impose administrative penalties against erring public officials
or employees.

RULING:
The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose
administrative penalties against public officials or employees.

In Ombudsman vs Apolonio, the Supreme Court held that the

Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution of a public
officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority.

Among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute

cases involving public officers and employees.

Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)

provided for the structural and functional organization of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

It mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act

promptly on complaints but also to enforce the administrative,
civil, and criminal liability of the government officers and
employees in every case where the evidence warrants to
promote efficient service by the Government to the people.