DE YSASI VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

231 SCRA 173
FACTS:
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The private respondent (father) owns a hacienda in
Negros Occidental while petitioner (son) is employed in the hacienda as the farm administrator. After marriage, the petitioner
moved abode yet still continue to work in the farm. Sometime June and August 1982, De Ysasi III had acquired various
ailments and was hospitalized such that later November 1982, underwent surgery and so he missed work. While under
recovery, several instances also that the petitioner had acquired other illness like acute gastroenteritis and thereafter,
infectious hepatitis. During the entire periods of petitioner’s illnesses the respondent took care of his medical expenses while
the petitioner continued to receive compensation. De Ysasi III was confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was
terminated, without due process, by his father thus filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the National Labor
Relations Commission. His father invoked that his son actually abandoned his work.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner De Ysasi III abandoned his work.

HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute abandonment, there must be:
a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
b.) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.
With the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. No such intent was
proven in this case.

In relation to abrupt termination of petitioner from his employment, its clearly unquestionable that his right to due process was
denied since there was no prior notice given of such dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard
thereby respondent contravene 1987 Constituion Article III Sec.1 “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws”.

Further, the Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the lawyers for both camps failed to exert all reasonable efforts
to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients especially considering that the parties involved are father and son. This case may
have never reached the courts had there been an earnest effort by the lawyers to have both parties find an off court
settlement but records show that no such effort was made. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but
to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic
exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation pursuant to Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it
will admit of a fair settlement.” Both counsels fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as
officers of the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the
letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter “shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement
of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction.” If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the
proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

In the light of the case, the court acclaimed that legal dispute has been adjudicated base on law and jurisprudence yet
saddened by the fact that it did not merit reconciliation of familial bonds between the father and son and hope that parties
may find way to an ultimate resolution of their differences. The court held decision ordering respondent to pay the petitioner.