SECOND DIVISION The Bank moved for the reconsideration of the assessment, but Director

Callangan denied the motion in SEC-CFD Order No. 085, Series of 2005 dated
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, G.R. No. 191995 July 26, 2005.[4] When the SEC En Banc also dismissed the Banks appeal for lack
Petitioner, of merit in its Order dated August 31, 2006, prompting the Bank to file a
Present: petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA).[5]

- versus - CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
JUSTINA CALLANGAN, in her capacity as Director of BRION,
the Corporation Finance Department of the Securities PEREZ, and
and Exchange Commission and/or the SECURITIES SERENO, JJ.
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 3, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration[1] filed by petitioner Philippine
Veterans Bank (the Bank) dated August 5, 2010, addressing our June 16, 2010
Resolution that denied the Banks petition for review on certiorari.
Factual Antecedents
On March 17, 2004, respondent Justina F. Callangan, the Director of the
Corporation Finance Department of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), sent the Bank a letter, informing it that it qualifies as a public company
under Section 17.2 of the Securities Regulation Code (SRC) in relation with Rule
3(1)(m) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the SRC. The
Bank is thus required to comply with the reportorial requirements set forth in
Section 17.1 of the SRC.[2]
The Bank responded by explaining that it should not be considered a
public company because it is a private company whose shares of stock are
available only to a limited class or sector, i.e., to World War II veterans, and not
to the general public.[3]
In a letter dated April 20, 2004, Director Callangan rejected the Banks
explanation and assessed it a total penalty of One Million Nine Hundred Thirty-
Seven Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Two and 80/100 Pesos (P1,937,262.80)
for failing to comply with the SRC reportorial requirements from 2001 to 2003.
On March 6, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
assailed SEC ruling, with the modification that the assessment of the penalty be
recomputed from May 31, 2004.[6]
The CA also denied the Banks motion for reconsideration, [7] opening the way for
the Banks petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court.[8]
On June 16, 2010, the Court denied the Banks petition for failure to show any
reversible error in the assailed CA decision and resolution.[9]
The Motion for Reconsideration
The Bank reiterates that it is not a public company subject to the
reportorial requirements under Section 17.1 of the SRC because its shares can
be owned only by a specific group of people, namely, World War II veterans and
their widows, orphans and compulsory heirs, and is not open to the investing
public in general. The Bank also asks the Court to take into consideration the
financial impact to the cause of veteranism; compliance with the reportorial
requirements under the SRC, if the Bank would be considered a public company,
would compel the Bank to spend approximately P40 million just to reproduce
and mail the Information Statement to its 400,000 shareholders nationwide.
The Courts Ruling
We DENY the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
To determine whether the Bank is a public company burdened with the
reportorial requirements ordered by the SEC, we look to Subsections 17.1 and
17.2 of the SRC, which provide:
Section 17. Periodic and Other Reports of Issuers.
17.1. Every issuer satisfying the requirements in
Subsection 17.2 hereof shall file with the Commission:
a) Within one hundred thirty-five (135) days, after the
end of the issuers fiscal year, or such other time as the
Commission may prescribe, an annual report which shall
include, among others, a balance sheet, profit and loss
statement and statement of cash flows, for such last fiscal year,
 certified by an independent certified public accountant, and a
management discussion and analysis of results of operations;
and
b) Such other periodical reports for interim fiscal periods and current
reports on significant developments of the issuer as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary to keep current information on the
operation of the business and financial condition of the issuer.
17.2. The reportorial requirements of Subsection 17.1 shall apply to the
following:
xxxx
c) An issuer with assets of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) or such other amount as the Commission shall
prescribe, and having two hundred (200) or more holders each
holding at least one hundred (100) shares of a class of its equity
securities: Provided, however, That the obligation of such issuer to file
reports shall be terminated ninety (90) days after notification to the
Commission by the issuer that the number of its holders holding at
least one hundred (100) shares is reduced to less than one hundred
(100). (emphases supplied)
We also cite Rule 3(1)(m) of the Amended Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the SRC, which defines a public company as any corporation with
a class of equity securities listed on an Exchange or with assets in excess of
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) and having two hundred (200) or
more holders, at least two hundred (200) of which are holding at least one
hundred (100) shares of a class of its equity securities.
From these provisions, it is clear that a public company, as
contemplated by the SRC, is not limited to a company whose shares of stock are
publicly listed; even companies like the Bank, whose shares are offered only to a
specific group of people, are considered a public company, provided they meet
the requirements enumerated above.
The records establish, and the Bank does not dispute, that the Bank has
assets exceeding P50,000,000.00 and has 395,998 shareholders.[10] It is thus
considered a public company that must comply with the reportorial
requirements set forth in Section 17.1 of the SRC.
The Bank also argues that even assuming it is considered a public
company pursuant to Section 17 of the SRC, the Court should interpret the
pertinent SRC provisions in such a way that no financial prejudice is done to the
thousands of veterans who are stockholders of the Bank. Given that the
legislature intended the SRC to apply only to publicly traded companies, the
Court should exempt the Bank from complying with the reportorial
requirements.
On this point, the Bank is apparently referring to the obligation set
forth in Subsections 17.5 and 17.6 of the SRC, which provide:
Section 17.5. Every issuer which has a class of equity securities
satisfying any of the requirements in Subsection 17.2 shall furnish to
each holder of such equity security an annual report in such form
and containing such information as the Commission shall prescribe.
Section 17.6. Within such period as the Commission may prescribe
preceding the annual meeting of the holders of any equity security of a
class entitled to vote at such meeting, the issuer shall transmit to such
holders an annual report in conformity with Subsection
17.5. (emphases supplied)
In making this argument, the Bank ignores the fact that the first and
fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law.[11]Construction and
interpretation come only after a demonstration that the application of the law is
impossible or inadequate unless interpretation is resorted to.[12] In this case, we
see the law to be very clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity; thus, no room
exists for construction or interpretation.
Additionally, and contrary to the Banks claim, the Banks obligation to
provide its stockholders with copies of its annual report is actually for the
benefit of the veterans-stockholders, as it gives these stockholders access to
information on the Banks financial status and operations, resulting in greater
transparency on the part of the Bank. While compliance with this requirement
will undoubtedly cost the Bank money, the benefit provided to the shareholders
clearly outweighs the expense. For many stockholders, these annual reports are
the only means of keeping in touch with the state of health of their investments;
to them, these are invaluable and continuing links with the Bank that
immeasurably contribute to the transparency in public companies that the law
envisions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner Philippine Veterans
Banks motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIEDwith finality.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179408, March 05, 2014
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ABIGAIL
R. RAZON ALVAREZ AND VERNON R. RAZON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179408, March 05, 2014 - PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ABIGAIL R. RAZON ALVAREZ AND
VERNON R. RAZON, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
decision2 dated August 11, 2006 and the resolution3 dated August 22, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA�G.R. SP No. 89213 on the validity of the four
search warrants issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
115.
The CA rulings (i) quashed the first two search warrants, similarly docketed as
Search Warrant No. 03�063, issued for violation of Article 308, in relation to
Article 309, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and (ii) declared void paragraphs
7, 8 and 9 of the other two search warrants, also similarly docketed as Search
Warrant No. 03�064, issued for violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 401.4
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) is the grantee of a
legislative franchise5 which authorizes it to carry on the business of providing
basic and enhanced telecommunications services in and between areas in the
Philippines and between the Philippines and other countries and
territories,6and, accordingly, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and
purchase telecommunications system for both domestic and international
calls.7 Pursuant to its franchise, PLDT offers to the public wide range of services
duly authorized by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
PLDT�s network is principally composed of the Public Switch Telephone
Network, telephone handsets and/or telecommunications equipment used by
its subscribers, the wires and cables linking these handsets and/or equipment,
antennae, transmission facilities, the international gateway facility (IGF) and
other telecommunications equipment providing interconnections.8 To
safeguard the integrity of its network, PLDT regularly conducts investigations
on various prepaid cards marketed and sold abroad to determine alternative
calling patterns (ACP) and network fraud that are being perpetrated against it.
To prevent or stop network fraud, PLDT�s ACP Detection Division (ACPDD)
regularly visits foreign countries to conduct market research on various prepaid
phone cards offered abroad that allow their users to make overseas calls to
PLDT subscribers in the Philippines at a cheaper rate.
The ACPDD bought The Number One prepaid card � a card principally
marketed to Filipinos residing in the United Kingdom for calls to the Philippines
� to make test calls using two telephone lines: the dialing phone � an
IDD�capable9 telephone line which makes the call and through which the
access number and the PIN number printed at the back of the card are entered;
and the receiving phone � a caller identification (caller id) unit�equipped
telephone line which would receive the call and reflect the incoming caller�s
telephone number.
During a test call placed at the PLDT�ACPDD office, the receiving phone
reflected a PLDT telephone number (2�8243285) as the calling number
used, as if the call was originating from a local telephone in Metro Manila. Upon
verification with the PLDT�s Integrated Customer Management (billing)
System, the ACPDD learned that the subscriber of the reflected telephone
number is Abigail R. Razon Alvarez, with address at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio
Compound, Barangay Don Bosco, Para�aque City. It further learned that
several lines are installed at this address with Abigail and Vernon R. Razon
(respondents), among others, as subscribers.10
To validate its findings, the ACPDD conducted the same test calls on November
5, 2003 at the premises of the NTC in Quezon City (and in the presence of an
NTC representative11) using the same prepaid card (validation test). The
receiving phone at the NTC premises reflected the telephone numbers
registered in the name of Abigail as the calling number from the United
Kingdom.12
Similar test calls subsequently conducted using the prepaid cards Unity
Card and IDT Supercalling Cardrevealed the same results. The
caller�id�equipped receiving phone reflected telephone numbers13 that are in
the names of Experto Enterprises and Experto Phils, as subscribers, with a
common address at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay
Don Bosco, Para�aque City. It turned out that the actual occupant of these
premises is also Abigail. Subsequently, a validation test was also conducted,
yielding several telephone numbers registered in the name of Experto
Phils./Experto Enterprises as the calling numbers supposedly from the United
Kingdom.14
According to PLDT, had an ordinary and legitimate call been made, the screen of
the caller�id�equipped receiving phone would not reflect a local number or
any number at all. In the cards they tested, however, once the caller enters the
access and pin numbers, the respondents would route the call via the internet to
a local telephone number (in this case, a PLDT telephone number) which would
connect the call to the receiving phone. Since calls through the internet never
pass the toll center of the PLDT�s IGF, users of these prepaid cards can place a
call to any point in the Philippines (provided the local line is NDD�capable)
without the call appearing as coming from abroad.15
On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003, Mr. Lawrence Narciso of the
PLDT�s Quality Control Division, together with the operatives of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), conducted an ocular inspection at 17 Dominic Savio St.,
Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision � both
in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City � and discovered that PLDT telephone
lines were connected to several pieces of equipment.16 Mr. Narciso narrated the
results of the inspection, thus �
10. During [the] ocular inspection [at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound],
Ms. Abigail Razon Alvarez allowed us to gain entry and check the telephone
installations within their premises. First, we checked the location of the
telephone protectors that are commonly installed at a concrete wall boundary
inside the compound. Some of these protectors are covered with a fabricated
wooden cabinet. Other protectors are installed beside the said wooden cabinet,
xxx. The inside wiring installations from telephone protectors to connecting
block were routed to the said adjacent room passing through the house ceiling.
11. xxx. Upon entering the so�called adjacent room, we immediately noticed
that the PLDT telephone lines were connected to the equipment situated at
multi�layered rack. The equipment room contains the following:
a. 6 Quintum router;
b. 13 Com router;
c. 1 Cisco 800 router;
d. 1 Nokia Modem for PLDT DSL;
e. 1 Meridian Subscriber�s Unit[;]
f. 5 Personal Computers[;]
g. 1 Computer Printer[; and]
h. 1 Flat�bed Scanner[.]
12.� We also noticed that these routers are connected to the Meridian�s
subscriber unit ("SU� ) that has an outdoor antenna installed on the top of the
roof. Meridian�s SU and outdoor antenna are service components used to
connect with wireless broadband internet access service of Meridian Telekoms.
xxxx
18. During the site inspection [at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living
Subdivision], we noticed that the protector of each telephone line/number xxx
were enclosed in a fabricated wooden cabinet with safety padlock. Said wooden
cabinet was situated on the concrete wall inside the compound near the garage
entrance gate. The telephone inside the wiring installations from the protector
to the connecting blocks were placed in a plastic electrical conduit routed to the
adjacent room at the second floor.17
On December 3, 2003, Police Superintendent Gilbert C. Cruz filed a consolidated
application for a search warrant18 before Judge Francisco G. Mendiola of the
RTC, for the crimes of theft and violation of PD No. 401. According to PLDT, the
respondents are engaged in a form of network fraud known as International
Simple Resale (ISR) which amounts to theft under the RPC.
ISR is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using
lines, cables, antennae and/or wave frequencies which are connected directly to
the domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined
(terminating country); and, in the process, bypassing the IGF at the terminating
country.19
Judge Mendiola found probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants
applied for. Accordingly, four search warrants20 were issued for violations of
Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of the RPC (SW A�1 and SW A�2) and of
PD No. 401, as amended (SW B�1 and SW B�2) for the ISR activities being
conducted at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St.,
Better Living Subdivision, both in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City. The
four search warrants enumerated the objects to be searched and seized as
follows:
1. MERIDIAN SUBSCRIBERS UNIT AND PLDT DSL LINES and/or CABLES AND
ANTENNAS and/or similar equipment or device capable of transmitting air
waves or frequency, such as a Meridian Subscriber�s Unit, Broadband DSL and
telephone lines;
2. PERSONAL COMPUTERS or any similar equipment or device capable of
accepting information applying the prescribed process of the information and
supplying the result of this process;
3. NOKIA MODEM or any similar equipment or device that enables data terminal
equipment such as computers to communicate with other data terminal
equipment via a telephone line;
4. QUINTUM Equipment or any similar equipment capable of receiving digital
signals from the internet and converting those signals to voice;
5. QUINTUM, 3COM AND CISCO Routers or any similar equipment capable of
switching packets of data to their assigned destination or addresses;
6. LINKS DSL SWITCH or any similar equipment capable of switching data;
7. COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any similar equipment or device
used for copying and/or printing data and/or information;
8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar equipment or device used for
recording or storing information; and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts,
checks, orders, communications and documents, lease and/or subscription
agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating to securing
and using telephone lines and/or equipment[.]21
On the same date, the PNP searched the premises indicated in the warrants. On
December 10, 2003, a return was made with a complete inventory of the items
seized.22 On January 14, 2004, the PLDT and the PNP filed with the Department
of Justice a joint complaint�affidavit for theft and for violation of PD No. 401
against the respondents.23
On February 18, 2004, the respondents filed with the RTC a motion to
quash24 the search warrants essentially on the following grounds: first, the RTC
had no authority to issue search warrants which were enforced in Para�aque
City; second, the enumeration of the items to be searched and seized lacked
particularity; and third, there was no probable cause for the crime of theft.
On March 12, 2004, PLDT opposed the respondents' motion.25
In a July 6, 2004 order,26 the RTC denied the respondents' motion to quash.
Having been rebuffed27 in their motion for reconsideration,28 the respondents
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.� 29
RULING OF THE CA
On August 11, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed decision and resolution,
granting the respondents' petition for certiorari. The CA quashed SW A�l and
SW A�2 (for theft) on the ground that they were issued for �non�existent
crimes.� 30 According to the CA, inherent in the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of search warrant is the accompanying determination
that an offense has been committed. Relying on this Court�s decision in Laurel
v. Judge Abrogar,31 the CA ruled that the respondents could not have possibly
committed the crime of theft because PLDT�s business of providing
telecommunication services and these services themselves are not personal
properties contemplated under Article 308 of the RPC.
With respect to SW B�l and SW B�2 (for violation of PD No. 401), the CA
upheld paragraphs one to six of the enumeration of items subject of the search.
The CA held that the stock phrase �or similar equipment or device� found in
paragraphs one to six of the search warrants did not make it suffer from
generality since each paragraph�s enumeration of items was sufficiently
qualified by the citation of the specific objects to be seized and by its functions
which are inherently connected with the crime allegedly committed.
The CA, however, nullified the ensuing paragraphs, 7, 8 and 9, for lack of
particularity and ordered the return of the items seized under these provisions.
While the same stock phrase appears in paragraphs 7 and 8, the properties
described therein � i.e., printer and scanner, software, diskette and tapes �
include even those for the respondents' personal use, making the description of
the things to be seized too general in nature.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,32 PLDT went to this
Court via this Rule 45 petition.
THE PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS
PLDT faults the CA for relying on Laurel on three grounds: first, Laurel cannot be
cited yet as an authority under the principle of stare decisis because Laurel is
not yet final and executory; in fact, it is the subject of a pending motion for
reconsideration filed by PLDT itself; second, even assuming that Laurel is
already final, the facts in Laurel vary from the present case. Laurel involves the
quashal of an information on the ground that the information does not charge
any offense; hence, the determination of the existence of the elements of the
crime of theft is indispensable in resolving the motion to quash. In contrast, the
present case involves the quashal of a search warrant. Third, accordingly, in
resolving the motion, the issuing court only has to be convinced that there is
probable cause to hold that: (i) the items to be seized are connected to a
criminal activity; and (ii) these items are found in the place to be searched.
Since the matter of quashing a search warrant may be rooted on matters
�extrinsic of the search warrant,� 33 the issuing court does not need to look
into the elements of the crime allegedly committed in the same manner that the
CA did in Laurel.
PLDT adds that a finding of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of search
warrant may be justified only when there is �disregard of the requirements for
the issuance of a search warrant[.]� 34 In the present case, the CA did not find
(and could not have found) any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
because at the time the RTC issued the search warrants in 2003, Laurel had not
yet been promulgated.
In defending the validity of the nullified provisions of SW B�l and SW B�2,
PLDT argues that PD No. 401 also punishes unauthorized installation of
telephone connections. Since the enumerated items are connected to the
computers that are illegally connected to PLDT telephone lines, then these items
bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of PD No. 401, justifying their
seizure.
The enumeration in paragraph 8 is likewise a proper subject of seizure because
they are the fruits of the offense as they contain information on PLDT�s
business profit and other information relating to the commission of violation of
PD No. 401. Similarly, paragraph 9 specifies the fruits and evidence of violation
of PD No. 401 since it supports PLDT�s claim that the respondents have made a
business out of their illegal connections to PLDT lines.
THE RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS
The respondents counter that while Laurel may not yet be final, at least it has a
persuasive effect as the current jurisprudence on the matter. Even
without Laurel, the CA�s nullification of SW A�l and SW A�2 can withstand
scrutiny because of the novelty of the issue presented before it. The nullification
of paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SW B�l and SW B�2 must be upheld not only on
the ground of broadness but for lack of any relation whatsoever with PD No.
401 which punishes the theft of electricity.
OUR RULING
We partially grant the petition.
Laurel and its reversal by the Court En Banc
Before proceeding with the case, a review of Laurel is in order as it involves
substantially similar facts as in the present case.
Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) sells prepaid cards, �Bay Super Orient Card,� that
allow their users to place a call to the Philippines from Japan. PLDT asserted
that Baynet is engaged in ISR activities by using an international private leased
line (IPL) to course Baynet�s incoming international long distance calls. The
IPL is linked to a switching equipment, which is then connected to PLDT
telephone lines/numbers and equipment, with Baynet as subscriber.
To establish its case, PLDT obtained a search warrant. On the strength of the
items seized during the search of Baynet�s premises, the prosecutor found
probable cause for theft against Luis Marcos Laurel (Laurel) and other Baynet
officials. Accordingly, an information was filed, alleging that the Baynet officials
�take, steal and use the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by
[ISR activities] xxx effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its
facilities in the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and
prejudice of PLDT[.]� 35
Laurel moved to quash the information on the bold assertion that ISR activities
do not constitute a crime under Philippine law. Laurel argued that an ISR
activity cannot entail taking of personal property because the international long
distance telephone calls using PLDT telephone lines belong to the caller himself;
the amount stated in the information, if at all, represents the rentals due PLDT
for the caller�s usage of its facilities. Laurel argued that the business of
providing international long distance calls, i.e., PLDT�s service, and the
revenue derived therefrom are not personal property that can be appropriated.
Laurel went to the Court after failing to secure the desired relief from the trial
and appellate courts,36raising the core issue of whether PLDT�s business of
providing telecommunication services for international long distance calls is a
proper subject of theft under Article 308 of the RPC. The Court�s First Division
granted Laurel�s petition and ordered the quashal of the information.
Taking off from the basic rule that penal laws are construed strictly against the
State, the Court ruled that international long distance calls and the business of
providing telecommunication or telephone services by PLDT are not personal
properties that can be the subject of theft.
One is apt to conclude that �personal property� standing alone, covers both
tangible and intangible properties and are subject of theft under the Revised
Penal Code. But the words �Personal property� under the Revised Penal Code
must be considered in tandem with the word �take� in the law. The statutory
definition of �taking� and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all
personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that,
only movable properties which have physical or material existence and
susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of theft, xxx.
xxxx
xxx. Business, like services in business, although are properties, are not proper
subjects of theft under the Revised Penal Code because the same cannot be
�taken� or �occupied.� If it were otherwise, xxx there would be no juridical
difference between the taking of the business of a person or the services
provided by him for gain, vis�a�vis, the taking of goods, wares or
merchandise, or equipment comprising his business. If it was its intention to
include �business� as personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, the Philippine Legislature should have spoken in language that is
clear and definite: that business is personal property under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.
xxxx
The petitioner is not charged, under the Amended Information, for theft of
telecommunication or telephone services offered by PLDT. Even if he is, the
term �personal property� under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code cannot
be interpreted beyond its seams so as to include �telecommunication or
telephone services� or computer services for that matter. xxx. Even at common
law, neither time nor services may be taken and occupied or appropriated. A
service is generally not considered property and a theft of service would not,
therefore, constitute theft since there can be no caption or asportation. Neither
is the unauthorized use of the equipment and facilities of PLDT by [Laurel] theft
under [Article 308].
If it was the intent of the Philippine Legislature, in 1930, to include services to
be the subject of theft, it should have incorporated the same in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Legislature did not. In fact, the Revised Penal Code
does not even contain a definition of services.37
PLDT38 moved for reconsideration and referral of the case to the Court En Banc.
The Court�s First Division granted the referral.
On January 13, 2009 (or while the present petition was pending in court), the
Court En Bancunanimously granted PLDT�s motion for reconsideration.39 The
Court ruled that even prior to the passage of the RPC, jurisprudence is settled
that �any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal,
capable of appropriation can be the object of theft.� 40 This jurisprudence, in
turn, applied the prevailing legal meaning of the term �personal property�
under the old Civil Code as �anything susceptible of appropriation and not
included in the foregoing chapter (not real property).� 41PLDT�s telephone
service or its business of providing this was appropriable personal property and
was, in fact, the subject of appropriation in an ISR operation, facilitated by
means of the unlawful use of PLDT�s facilities.
In this regard, the Amended Information inaccurately describes the offense by
making it appear that what [Laurel] took were the international long distance
telephone calls, rather than respondent PLDT�s business.
xxxx
Indeed, while it may be conceded that �international long distance calls,� the
matter alleged to be stolen xxx, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be
said that such international long distance calls were personal properties
belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such
calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said
calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not
being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such
telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these
communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the
crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and
business.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone
service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of �subtraction� penalized under said
article.42
The Court En Banc�s reversal of its Laurel Division ruling during the pendency
of this petition significantly impacts on how the Court should resolve the
present case for two reasons:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the Laurel En Banc ruling categorically equated an ISR activity to theft
under the RPC. In so doing, whatever alleged factual variance there may be
between Laurel and the present case cannot render Laurel inapplicable.
Second, and more importantly, in a Rule 45 petition, the Court basically
determines whether the CA was legally correct in determining whether the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion. Under this premise, the CA ordinarily
gauges the grave abuse of discretion at the time the RTC rendered its assailed
resolution. In quashing SW A�l and SW A�2, note that the CA relied on
the Laurel Division ruling at the time when it was still subject of a pending
motion for reconsideration. The CA, in fact, did not expressly impute grave
abuse of discretion on the RTC when the RTC issued the search warrants and
later refused to quash these. Understandably, the CA could not have really found
the presence of grave abuse of discretion for there was no Laurel ruling to speak
of at the time the RTC issued the search warrants.
These peculiar facts require us to more carefully analyze our prism of review
under Rule 45.
Requisites for the issuance of search warrant; probable cause requires the
probable existence of an offense�
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of persons to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purposes of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and
seizures are to: (i) prevent the officers of the law from violating private security
in person and property and illegally invading the sanctity of the home; and (ii)
give remedy against such usurpations when attempted or committed.43
The constitutional requirement for the issuance of a search warrant is
reiterated under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. These sections lay down the following requirements for the issuance
of a search warrant: (1) the existence of probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.44 Should any of these requisites be
absent, the party aggrieved by the issuance and enforcement of the search
warrant may file a motion to quash the search warrant with the issuing court or
with the court where the action is subsequently instituted.45
A search warrant proceeding is a special criminal and judicial process akin to a
writ of discovery. It is designed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure to respond
only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in
anticipation thereof. Since it is at most incidental to the main criminal case, an
order granting or denying a motion to quash a search warrant may be
questioned only via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.46
When confronted with this petition, the higher court must necessarily
determine the validity of the lower court�s action from the prism of whether it
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion,
jurisprudence refers to the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or to the exercise of power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility or in a manner so
patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to the virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of the
law.47
In a certiorari proceeding, the determination translates to an inquiry on
whether the requirements and limitations provided under the Constitution and
the Rules of Court were properly complied with, from the issuance of the
warrant up to its implementation. In view of the constitutional objective of
preventing stealthy encroachment upon or the gradual depreciation of the
rights secured by the Constitution, strict compliance with the constitutional and
procedural requirements is required. A judge who issues a search warrant
without complying with these requirements commits grave abuse of
discretion.48
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is
that it must be issued based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must
be in connection with one specific offense. In search warrant proceedings,
probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.49
In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily determine
whether an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search
warrant50 because the personal properties that may be subject of the search
warrant are very much intertwined with the �one specific offense�
requirement of probable cause.51 Contrary to PLDT�s claim, the only way to
determine whether a warrant should issue in connection with one specific
offense is to juxtapose the facts and circumstances presented by the applicant
with the elements of the offense that are alleged to support the search warrant.
Reviewing the RTC�s denial of the motion to quash SWA�l and SW A�2�
a. From the prism of Rule 65�
The facts of the present case easily call to mind the case of Columbia Pictures,
Inc. v. CA52 involving copyright infringement. In that case, the CA likewise voided
the search warrant issued by the trial court by applying a doctrine that added a
new requirement (i.e., the production of the master tape for comparison with
the allegedly pirate copies) in determining the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of search warrant in copyright infringement cases. The doctrine
referred to was laid down in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of
Appeals. 20th Century Fox, however, was promulgated more than eight months
after the search warrants were issued by the RTC. In reversing the CA, the Court
ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the
rudiments of fair play, it is our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling
cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of
Search Warrant No. 87�053. [The] petitioners' consistent position that the
order of the lower court[,] xxx [which denied the respondents'] motion to lift
the order of search warrant^] was properly issued, [because there was]
satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing standards under the law for
determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court could
not possibly have expected more evidence from petitioners in their application
for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing
and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable cause. 53

Columbia could easily be cited in favor of PLDT to sustain the RTC�s refusal to
quash the search warrant. Indeed, in quashing SW A�l and SW A�2, the CA
never intimated that the RTC disregarded any of the requisites for the issuance
of a search warrant as these requirements were interpreted and observed
under the then prevailing jurisprudence. The CA could not have done so
because precisely the issue of whether telephone services or the business of
providing these services could be the subject of theft under the RPC had not yet
reached the Court when the search warrants were applied for and issued.
However, what distinguishes Columbia from the present case is the focus
of Columbia�s legal rationale. Columbia�s focus was not on whether the facts
and circumstances would reasonably lead to the conclusion that an offense has
been or is being committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense were in the place to be searched � the primary points of focus of the
present case. Columbia�s focus was on whether the evidence presented at
the time the search warrant was applied for was sufficient to establish the
facts and circumstances required for establishing probable cause to issue a
search warrant.
Nonetheless, Columbia serves as a neat guide for the CA to decide the
respondents' certiorari petition. In Columbia, the Court applied the principle of
non�retroactivity of its ruling in 20th Century Fox, whose finality was not an
issue, in reversing a CA ruling. The Court�s attitude in that case should have
been adopted by the CA in the present case a fortiori since the ruling that the CA
relied upon was not yet final at the time the CA resolved to quash the search
warrants.
b. Supervening events justifying a broader review under Rule 65
Ordinarily, the CA�s determination under Rule 65 is limited to whether the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting or denying the motion to
quash based on facts then existing. Nonetheless, the Court recognizes that
supervening facts may transpire after the issuance and implementation of the
search warrant that may provide justification for the quashal of the search
warrant via a petition for certiorari.
For one, if the offense for which the warrant is issued is subsequently
decriminalized during the pendency of the petition for certiorari, then the
warrant may be quashed.54 For another, a subsequent ruling from the Court that
a similar set of facts and circumstances does not constitute an offense, as
alleged in the search warrant application, may be used as a ground to quash a
warrant.55 In both instances, the underlying reason for quashing the search
warrant is the absence of probable cause which can only possibly exist when
the combination of facts and circumstances points to the possible commission of
an offense that may be evidenced by the personal properties sought to be
seized. To the CA, the second instance mentioned justified the quashal of the
search warrants.
We would have readily agreed with the CA if the Laurel Division ruling had not
been subsequently reversed. As things turned out, however, the Court granted
PLDT�s motion for reconsideration of the Court First Division�s ruling
in Laurel and ruled that �the act of engaging in ISR is xxx penalized under xxx
article [308 of the RPC].� 56 As the RTC itself found, PLDT successfully
established in its application for a search warrant a probable cause for theft by
evidence that Laurel�s ISR activities deprived PLDT of its telephone services
and of its business of providing these services without its consent.
b1. the stare decisis aspect�
With the Court En Banc�s reversal of the earlier Laurel ruling, then the CA�s
quashal of these warrants would have no leg to stand on. This is the dire
consequence of failing to appreciate the full import of the doctrine of stare
decisis that the CA ignored.
Under Article 8 of the Civil Code, the decisions of this Court form part of the
country�s legal system. While these decisions are not laws pursuant to the
doctrine of separation of powers, they evidence the laws' meaning, breadth, and
scope and, therefore, have the same binding force as the laws
themselves.57 Hence, the Court�s interpretation of a statute forms part of the
law as of the date it was originally passed because the Court�s construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted
law carries into effect.58
Article 8 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle of stare decisis et non
quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle established matters)
that enjoins adherence to judicial precedents embodied in the decision of the
Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis, in turn,
is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.59 The
doctrine of (horizontal) stare decisis is one of policy, grounded on the necessity
of securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions.60
In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire the status of a �decided�
case that is �deemed settled and closed to further argument� if the Court�s
decision is still the subject of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed by
the moving party. Under the Rules of Court, a party is expressly allowed to file a
motion for reconsideration of the Court�s decision within 15 days from
notice.61 Since the doctrine of stare decisis is founded on the necessity of
securing certainty and stability in law, then these attributes will spring only
once the Court�s ruling has lapsed to finality in accordance with law. In Ting v.
Velez�Ting,62 we ruled that:
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal
rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle
that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument.
In applying Laurel despite PLDT�s statement that the case is still subject of a
pending motion for reconsideration,63 the CA legally erred in refusing to
reconsider its ruling that largely relied on a non�fmal ruling of the Court. While
the CA�s dutiful desire to apply the latest pronouncement of the Court
in Laurel is expected, it should have acted with caution, instead of excitement,
on being informed by PLDT of its pending motion for reconsideration; it should
have then followed the principle of stare decisis. The appellate court�s
application of an exceptional circumstance when it may order the quashal of the
search warrant on grounds not existing at the time the warrant was issued or
implemented must still rest on prudential grounds if only to maintain the
limitation of the scope of the remedy of certiorarias a writ to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment.
Still, the respondents attempt to justify the CA�s action by arguing that the CA
would still rule in the way it did64 even without Laurel. As PLDT correctly
pointed out, there is simply nothing in the CA�s decision that would support its
quashal of the search warrant independently of Laurel. We must bear in mind
that the CA�s quashal of SW A�l and SW A�2 operated under the strictures of
a certioraripetition, where the presence of grave abuse of discretion is
necessary for the corrective writ to issue since the appellate court exercises its
supervisory jurisdiction in this case. We simply cannot second�guess what the
CA�s action could have been.
Lastly, the CA�s reliance on Savage v. Judge Taypin65 can neither sustain the
quashal of SW A�l and SW A�2. In Savage, the Court granted
the certiorari petition and quashed the search warrant because the alleged
crime (unfair competition involving design patents) that supported the search
warrant had already been repealed, and the act complained of, if at all, gave rise
only to civil liability (for patent infringement). Having been decriminalized,
probable cause for the crime alleged could not possibly exist.
In the present case, the issue is whether the commission of an ISR activity, in the
manner that PLDT�s evidence shows, sufficiently establishes probable cause
for the issuance of search warrants for the crime of theft. Unlike in Savage,
the Court in Laurel was not confronted with the issue of decriminalization
(which is a legislative prerogative) but whether the commission of an ISR
activity meets the elements of the offense of theft for purposes of quashing an
information. Since the Court, in Laurel, ultimately ruled then an ISR activity
justifies the elements of theft that must necessarily be alleged in the information
a fortiori, the RTC�s determination should be sustained on certiorari.
The requirement of particularity in SWB�1 and SWB�2�
On the issue of particularity in SW B�l and SW B�2, we note that the
respondents have not appealed to us the CA ruling that sustained paragraphs 1
to 6 of the search warrants. Hence, we shall limit our discussion to the question
of whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion
insofar as it refused to quash paragraphs 7 to 9 of SW B�l and SWB�2.
Aside from the requirement of probable cause, the Constitution also requires
that the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. This requirement of particularity in the description,
especially of the things to be seized, is meant to enable the law enforcers to
readily identify the properties to be seized and, thus, prevent the seizure of the
wrong items. It seeks to leave the law enforcers with no discretion at all
regarding these articles and to give life to the constitutional provision against
unreasonable searches and seizures.66 In other words, the requisite sufficient
particularity is aimed at preventing the law enforcer from exercising unlimited
discretion as to what things are to be taken under the warrant and ensure that
only those connected with the offense for which the warrant was issued shall be
seized.67
The requirement of specificity, however, does not require technical accuracy in
the description of the property to be seized. Specificity is satisfied if the
personal properties' description is as far as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow it to be so described. The nature of the description should vary according
to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of
concern.68 One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of
objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued.69
Additionally, the Rules require that a search warrant should be issued �in
connection with one specific offense� to prevent the issuance of a
scatter�shot warrant.70 The one�specific�offense requirement reinforces the
constitutional requirement that a search warrant should issue only on the basis
of probable cause.71 Since the primary objective of applying for a search
warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for an
offense for which the search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular
warrant must satisfy himself that the evidence presented by the applicant
establishes the facts and circumstances relating to this specific offense for
which the warrant is sought and issued.72Accordingly, in a subsequent challenge
against the validity of the warrant, the applicant cannot be allowed to maintain
its validity based on facts and circumstances that may be related to other search
warrants but are extrinsic to the warrant in question.
Under the Rules, the following personal property may be subject of search
warrant: (i) the subject of the offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those
used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. In the
present case, we sustain the CA�s ruling nullifying paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SW
B�l and SW B�2 for failing the test of particularity. More specifically, these
provisions do not show how the enumerated items could have possibly been
connected with the crime for which the warrant was issued, i.e., P.D. No. 401.
For clarity, PD No. 401 punishes:
Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped
gas connection without previous authority from xxx the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, xxx, tampers and/or uses tampered water,
electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or
piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or water,
electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly
possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well as stolen or
pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and
conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or
both.73
Paragraphs 7 to 8 of SW B�l and SW B�2 read as follows:
7. COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any similar equipment or device
used for copying and/or printing data and/or information;
8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar equipment or device used for
recording or storing information; and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts,
checks, orders, communications and documents, lease and/or subscription
agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating to securing
and using telephone lines and/or equipment[.]74
According to PLDT, the items in paragraph 7 have a direct relation to violation
of PD No. 401 because the items are connected to computers that, in turn, are
linked to the unauthorized connections to PLDT telephone lines. With regard to
the software, diskette and tapes in paragraph 8, and the items in paragraph 9,
PLDT argues that these items are �fruits of the offense� and that the
information it contains �constitutes the business profit� of PLDT. According
to PLDT, it corroborates the fact that the respondents have made a business out
of their illegal connections to its telephone lines.
We disagree with PLDT. The fact that the printers and scanners are or may be
connected to the other illegal connections to the PLDT telephone lines does not
make them the subject of the offense or fruits of the offense, much less could
they become a means of committing an offense.
It is clear from PLDT�s submission that it confuses the crime for which SW
B�l and SW B�2 were issued with the crime for which SW A�l and
SWA�2 were issued: SW B�l and SW B�2 were issued for violation of PD No.
401, to be enforced in two different places as identified in the warrants. The
crime for which these search warrants were issued does not pertain to the
crime of theft � where matters of personal property and the taking thereof
with intent to gain become significant � but to PD No. 401.
These items could not be the subject of a violation of PD No. 401 since PLDT
itself does not claim that these items themselves comprise the unauthorized
installations. For emphasis, what PD No. 401 punishes is the unauthorized
installation of telephone connection without the previous consent of PLDT. In
the present case, PLDT has not shown that connecting printers, scanners,
diskettes or tapes to a computer, even if connected to a PLDT telephone line,
would or should require its prior authorization.
Neither could these items be a means of committing a violation of PD No. 401
since these copying, printing and storage devices in no way aided the
respondents in making the unauthorized connections. While these items may be
accessory to the computers and other equipment linked to telephone lines, PD
No. 401 does not cover this kind of items within the scope of the prohibition. To
allow the seizure of items under the PLDT�s interpretation would, as the CA
correctly observed, allow the seizure under the warrant of properties for
personal use of the respondents.
If PLDT seeks the seizure of these items to prove that these installations contain
the respondents' financial gain and the corresponding business loss to PLDT,
then that purpose is served by SW A�l and SW A�2 since this is what PLDT
essentially complained of in charging the respondents with theft. However, the
same reasoning does not justify its seizure under a warrant for violation of PD
No. 401 since these items are not directly connected to the PLDT telephone lines
and PLDT has not even claimed that the installation of these items requires
prior authorization from it.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA�G.R. SP No. 89213 are
hereby MODIFIED in that SW A�l and SW A�2 are hereby declared valid and
constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 191890 December 04, 2012
EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, Petitioners,
MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR., Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order, 1 seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Commission on
Elections (Co melee) Resolution No. 8808 issued on March 30, 2010.2 Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 1568, as amended,3 extends a five-year lump sum gratuity to the
chairman or any member of the Comelec upon retirement, after completion of
the term of office; incapacity; death; and resignation after reaching 60 years of
age but before expiration of the term of office. The Comelec en banc determined
that former Comelec Commissioners Evalyn I. Fetalino 4 and Amado M.
Calderon5 (petitioners) - whose ad interim appointments were not acted upon by
the Commission on Appointments (CA) and, who were subsequently, not
reappointed — are not entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity because they
did not complete in full the seven year term of office.
The Antecedent Facts
On February 10, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim
appointment to the petitioners as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of
seven (7) years, pursuant to Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution.6Eleven days later (or on February 21, 1998), Pres. Ramos renewed
the petitioners’ ad interim appointments for the same position. Congress,
however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act on their appointments.
The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and the
petitioners were no longer re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners.7 Thus, the
petitioners merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four
months, or from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998.8
Subsequently, on March 15, 2005, the petitioners applied for their retirement
benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568.9 The
Comelec initially approved the petitioners’ claims pursuant to its Resolution No.
06-136910 dated December 11, 2006 whose dispositive portion reads:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the
recommendation of Director Alioden D. Dalaig, Law Department, to grant the
request of former Comelec Commissioners Evalyn Fetalino and Amado Calderon
for the payment of their retirement benefits, subject to release of funds for the
purpose by the Department of Budget and Management.11
On February 6, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting the
petitioners a pro-rated gratuity and pension.12 Subsequently, on October 5,
2007, the petitioners asked for a re-computation of their retirement pay on the
principal ground that R.A. No. 1568,13 does not cover a pro-rated computation of
retirement pay. In response, the Comelec issued a resolution referring the
matter to its Finance Services Department for comment and
recommendation.14 On July 14, 2009, the Comelec issued another resolution
referring the same matter to its Law Department for study and
recommendation.15
In the presently assailed Resolution No. 880816 dated March 30, 2010, the
Comelec, on the basis of the Law Department’s study, completely disapproved
the petitioners’ claim for a lump sum benefit under R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec
reasoned out that:
Of these four (4) modes by which the Chairman or a Commissioner shall be
entitled to lump sum benefit, only the first instance (completion of term) is
pertinent to the issue we have formulated above. It is clear that the non-
confirmation and non-renewal of appointment is not a case of resignation or
incapacity or death. The question rather is: Can it be considered as retirement
from service for having completed one’s term of office?
xxxx
The full term of the Chairman and the Commissioners is seven (7) years. When
there has been a partial service, what remains is called the "unexpired term."
The partial service is usually called tenure. There is no doubt in the distinction
between a term and tenure. Tenure is necessarily variable while term is always
fixed. When the law, in this case, RA 1568 refers to completion of term of office,
it can only mean finishing up to the end of the seven year term. By completion of
term, the law could not have meant partial service or a variable tenure that does
not reach the end. It could not have meant, the "expiration of term" of the
Commissioner whose appointment lapses by reason of non-confirmation of
appointment by the Commission on Appointments and non-renewal thereof by
the President. It is rightly called expiration of term but note: it is not completion
of term. RA 1568 requires ‘having completed his term of office’ for the
Commissioner to be entitled to the benefits.
Therefore, one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. later joined the petitioners in questioning the assailed
completed his term of office so as to fall under the provisions of Section 1 of RA resolution. Like the petitioners, Barcelona did not complete the full seven-year
1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five (5) years term as Comelec Commissioner since he served only from February 12, 2004 to
salary.17 (emphasis, italics and underscores ours) July 10, 2005. The petitioners and Barcelona commonly argue that:

On this basis, the Comelec ruled on the matter, as follows:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to APPROVE and ADOPT the study of the Law Department on the payment of
retirement benefits to members of the Commission.
Consequently, the following former Chairman and Commissioners of this
Commission whose appointments expired by reason of nonapproval by
Commission on Appointments and non-renewal by the President are not
entitled to a lump sum benefit under Republic Act 1528 (sic):
(1) the non-renewal of their ad interim appointments by the CA until
Congress already adjourned qualifies as retirement under the law and
entitles them to the full five-year lump sum gratuity;
(2) Resolution No. 06-1369 that initially granted the five-year lump
sum gratuity is already final and executory and cannot be modified by
the Comelec; and
(3) they now have a vested right over the full retirement benefits
provided by RA No. 1568 in view of the finality of Resolution No. 06-
1369.19

Name Position Date of Service

1. Alfredo Benipayo, Jr.
2. Evalyn Fetalino
3. Amado Calderon
4. Virgilio Garciliano
In the main, both the petitioners and Barcelona pray for a liberal interpretation
of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568. They submit that the involuntary termination of
Chairman Feb. 16, 2001 to June 5, 2002
their ad interim appointments as Comelec Commissioners should be deemed by
Commissioner Feb. 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998this Court as a retirement from the service. Barcelona, in support of20his plea for
liberal construction, specifically cites the case of Ortiz v. COMELEC. The Court
Commissioner Feb. 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998ruled in this cited case that equity and justice demand that the involuntary
curtailment of Mario D. Ortiz’s term be deemed a completion of his term of
Commissioner Feb. 12, 2004 to June 10, 2005office so that he should be considered retired from the service.

5. Manuel Barcelona, Jr. Commissioner Feb. 12, 2004 to June 10, 2005In addition, the petitioners also bewail the lack of notice and hearing in the
issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8808. Barcelona also assails the
6. Moslemen Macarambon Commissioner discontinuance of his monthly pension on the basis of the assailed Comelec
Nov[.] 05, 2007 to Oct. 10, 2008
issuance.21
7. Leonardo Leonida Commissioner July 03, 2008 to June 26, 2009
The Case for the Respondents
This resolution shall also apply to all requests of former COMELEC Chairmen
and Commissioners similarly situated. All previous resolutions which are On July 22, 2010, the Comelec filed its Comment22 through the Office of the
inconsistent herewith are hereby AMENDED or REVOKED accordingly. Solicitor General. The Comelec prays for the dismissal of the petition on the
grounds outlined below:
Let the Finance Services and Personnel Departments implement this
resolution.18 (emphasis ours) First, it submits that the petitioners’ reliance on Section 13, Rule 18 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure to show that Resolution No. 06-1369 has attained
finality is misplaced as this resolution is not the final decision contemplated by
The Petitions
the Rules. It also argues that estoppel does not lie against the Comelec since the
erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not
The petitioners sought the nullification of Comelec Resolution No. 8808 via a estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of its errors.23
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner intervenor
Second, the Comelec reiterates that the petitioners are not entitled to the lump
sum gratuity, considering that they cannot be considered as officials who
retired after completing their term of office. It emphasizes that R.A. No. 1568
refers to the completion of the term of office, not to partial service or to a
variable tenure that does not reach its end, as in the case of the petitioners. The
Comelec also draws the Court’s attention to the case of Matibag v.
Benipayo24 where the Court categorically ruled that an ad interim appointment
that lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute
a term of office.25
Third, it argues that the petitioners do not have any vested right on their
retirement benefits considering that the retirements benefits afforded by R.A.
No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; they are not similar to pension plans
where employee participation is mandatory so that they acquire vested rights in
the pension as part of their compensation. Without such vested rights, the
Comelec concludes that the petitioners were not deprived of their property
without due process of law.26
The Court’s Ruling
We DISMISS the petition and DENY Barcelona’s petition for intervention.
Preliminary Considerations
R.A. No. 1568 provides two types of retirement benefits for a Comelec
Chairperson or Member: a gratuity or five-year lump sum, and an annuity or a
lifetime monthly pension.27 Our review of the petitions, in particular,
Barcelona’s petition for intervention, indicates that he merely questions the
discontinuance of his monthly pension on the basis of Comelec Resolution No.
8808.28 As the assailed resolution, by its plain terms (cited above), only pertains
to the lump sum benefit afforded by R.A. No. 1568, it appears that Barcelona’s
petition for intervention is misdirected. We note, too, that Barcelona has not
substantiated his bare claim that the Comelec discontinued the payment of his
monthly pension on the basis of the assailed Resolution.
To put the case in its proper perspective, the task now before us is to determine
whether the petitioners are entitled to the full five-year lump sum gratuity
provided for by R.A. No. 1568. We conclude under our discussion below that
they are not so entitled as they did not comply with the conditions required by
law.
The petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of
R.A. No. 1568, as amended
That the petitioners failed to meet conditions of the applicable retirement law
— Section 1 of R.A. No. 156829 — is beyond dispute. The law provides:
Sec. 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the
Commission on Elections retires from the service for having completed his term
of office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, or
dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty
years but before the expiration of his term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid
in lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of
service based upon the last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of
retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be: Provided, That
in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in
the government; And, provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity
payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount
of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or
resignation. [italics supplied]
To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No.
1568, any of the following events must transpire:
(1) Retirement from the service for having completed the term of
office;
(2) Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office;
(3) Death while in the service; and
(4) Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the
expiration of the term of office. In addition, the officer should have
rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government at the
time of retirement.
Death during the service obviously does not need to be considered in the
present case, thus leaving retirement, incapacity and resignation as the event
that must transpire in order to be entitled to the lump sum gratuity.
We note that the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments could
hardly be considered as incapacity since it was not the result of any disability
that rendered them incapable of performing the duties of a Commissioner. Thus,
incapacity is likewise effectively removed from active consideration.
"Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he
declines his office and renounces the further right to it. To constitute a complete
and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear
intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of
relinquishment."30 In this sense, resignation likewise does not appear applicable
as a ground because the petitioners did not voluntarily relinquish their position
as Commissioners; their termination was merely a consequence of the
adjournment of Congress without action by the CA on their ad
interim appointments.
This eliminative process only leaves the question of whether the termination of
the petitioners’ ad interim appointments amounted to retirement from the
service after completion of the term of office. We emphasize at this point that
the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are
met: first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable law – in this case, R.A.
No. 1568 — are fulfilled; and second, when an actual retirement takes
place.31 This Court has repeatedly emphasized that retirement entails
compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and
jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law.32
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the
Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who has retired from the service after
having completed his term of office. The petitioners obviously did not retire
under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-
year term of office prescribed by Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution; they served as Comelec Commissioners for barely four
months, i.e., from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998. In the recent case of Re:
Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act
No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946,33 where the Court did not allow
Judge Macarambon to retire under R.A. No. 910 because he did not comply with
the age and service requirements of the law, the Court emphasized:
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is
the rule and the grant of exception remains to be on a case to case
basis. We have ruled that the Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed
rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons
to grant such exception. (emphasis ours; citations omitted)
More importantly, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioners’
service, if any, could only amount to tenure in office and not to the term of
office contemplated by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568. Tenure and term of office have
well-defined meanings in law and jurisprudence. As early as 1946, the Court,
in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles,34provided clear distinctions between these
concepts in this wise:
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which
the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by
the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by
which the term of an office may be extended by reason of war. [emphasis ours]
This is the ruling that has been followed since then and is the settled
jurisprudence on these concepts.35
While we characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo36 "as
a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office," we
have also positively ruled in that case that "an ad interim appointment that has
lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a
term of office."37 We consequently ruled:
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the
Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period
from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is
neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean
that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running
of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the
Commission on Appointments.38 (emphasis ours; italics supplied)
Based on these considerations, we conclude that the petitioners can never be
considered to have retired from the service not only because they did not
complete the full term, but, more importantly, because they did not serve a
"term of office" as required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended.
Ortiz v. COMELEC cannot be applied to the present case
We are not unmindful of the Court’s ruling in Ortiz v. COMELEC39 which
Barcelona cites as basis for his claim of retirement benefits despite the fact that
— like the petitioners — he did not complete the full term of his office.
In that case, the petitioner was appointed as Comelec Commissioner, for a term
expiring on May 17, 1992, by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and took his
oath of office on July 30, 1985. When President Corazon Aquino assumed the
Presidency and following the lead of the Justices of the Supreme Court, Ortiz —
together with the other Comelec Commissioners — tendered his courtesy
resignation on March 5, 1986. On July 21, 1986, President Aquino accepted their
resignations effective immediately. Thereafter, Ortiz applied for retirement
benefits under R.A. No. 1568, which application the Comelec denied. The Court,
however, reversed the Comelec and held that "[t]he curtailment of [Ortiz’s] term
not being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the petitioner, equity
and justice demand that he should be deemed to have completed his term xxx.
[That he] should be placed in the same category as that of an official holding a
primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon his superior’s loss of
confidence in him." Thus, as "he is deemed to have completed his term of office,
[Ortiz] should be considered retired from the service."40
A close reading of Ortiz reveals that it does not have the same fact situation as
the present case and is thus not decisive of the present controversy. We note
that the impact of the principle of stare decisis that Barcelona cited as basis is
limited; specific judicial decisions are binding only on the parties to the
case and on future parties with similar or identical factual
situations.41 Significantly, the factual situation in Ortiz is totally different so that
its ruling cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied arbitrarily to the present
case.
First, in Ortiz, Ortiz’s appointment was a regular appointment made by then
President Marcos, while the petitioners were appointed by President Ramos ad
interim or during the recess of Congress.
Second, Ortiz’s appointment was made under the 1973 Constitution which did
not require the concurrence of the CA. Notably, the 1973 Constitution abolished
the CA and did not provide for an executive limit on the appointing authority of
the President. In the present case, the petitioners’ ad interim appointment was
made under the 1987 Constitution which mandated that an appointment shall
be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of
Congress.
Third, in Ortiz, the Court addressed the issue of whether a constitutional official,
whose "courtesy resignation" had been accepted by the President of the
Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution, may be entitled
to retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1568. In the present case, the issue is
whether the termination of the petitioners’ ad interim appointments entitles
them to the full five-year lump sum gratuity provided for by R.A. No. 1568.
No occasion for liberal construction since Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as
amended, is clear and unambiguous
The petitioners’ appeal to liberal construction of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 is
misplaced since the law is clear and unambiguous. We emphasize that the
primary modality of addressing the present case is to look into the provisions of
the retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of statutory construction in this
consideration, we find that the language of the retirement law is clear and
unequivocal; no room for construction or interpretation exists, only the
application of the letter of the law.
The application of the clear letter of the retirement law in this case is supported
by jurisprudence. As early as 1981, in the case of In Re: Claim of CAR Judge
Noel,42 the Court strictly adhered to the provisions of R.A. No. 910 and did not
allow the judge’s claim of monthly pension and annuity under the
aforementioned law, considering that his length of government service fell short
of the minimum requirements.
Similarly, in Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes,43 the Court dismissed CTA Judge Reyes’
invocation of the doctrine of liberal construction of retirement laws to justify his
request that the last step increment of his salary grade be used in the
computation of his retirement pay and terminal leave benefits, and held:
In Borromeo, the court had occasion to say: "It is axiomatic that retirement laws
are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be
benefited. All doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of
the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes." Such interpretation in favor
of the retiree is unfortunately not called for nor warranted, where the
clear intent of the applicable law and rules are demonstrably against the
petitioner's claim. (Paredes v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 88879, March 21, 1991).
Section 4 is explicit and categorical in its prohibition and, unfortunately for
Judge Reyes, applies squarely to the instant case.44 (emphasis ours; italics
supplied)
Finally, in Gov’t Service Insurance System v. Civil Service Commission, 45 the Court
was asked to resolve whether government service rendered on a per diem basis
is creditable for computing the length of service for retirement purposes. In
disregarding the petitioners’ plea for liberal construction, the Court held:
The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the definition of
"compensation." Originally, per diem was not among those excluded in the
definition of compensation (See Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186), not until the
passage of the amending laws which redefined it to exclude per diem.
The law not only defines the word "compensation," but it also distinguishes it
from other forms of remunerations. Such distinction is significant not only for
purposes of computing the contribution of the employers and employees to the
GSIS but also for computing the employees' service record and benefits.
xxxx
Private respondents both claim that retirement laws must be liberally
interpreted in favor of the retirees. However, the doctrine of liberal
construction cannot be applied in the instant petitions, where the law
invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or
construction. Moreover, to accommodate private respondents' plea will
contravene the purpose for which the law was enacted, and will defeat the ends
which it sought to attain (cf. Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes, 216 SCRA 720
[1992]).46 [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
No compelling reasons exist to warrant the liberal application of Section 1
of R.A. No. 1568, as amended, to the present case
We find no compelling legal or factual reasons for the application of the Court’s
liberality in the interpretation of retirement laws to the present case. The
discretionary power of the Court to exercise the liberal application of
retirement laws is not limitless; its exercise of liberality is on a case-to-case
basis and only after a consideration of the factual circumstances that justify the
grant of an exception. The recent case of Re: Application for Retirement of Judge
Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic
Act No. 994647 fully explained how a liberal approach in the application of
retirement laws should be construed, viz:
The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring
employee. However, when in the interest of liberal construction the Court
allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or
Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The
crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or length of
service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on a case to case basis.
In some instances, the lacking element—such as the time to reach an age limit
or comply with length of service is de minimis. It could be that the amount of
accumulated leave credits is tremendous in comparison to the lacking period of
time.
More important, there must be present an essential factor before an
application under the Plana or Britanico rulings may be granted. The Court
allows a making up or compensating for lack of required age or service only if
satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and
dedication to the public service; it was only a bowing to policy considerations
and an acceptance of the realities of political will which brought him or her to
premature retirement. (emphases and italics ours; citation omitted)
In the present case, as previously mentioned, Ortiz cannot be used as authority
to justify a liberal application of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended not only
because it is not on all fours with the present case; more importantly, the Court
in Ortiz had ample reasons, based on the unique factual circumstances of the
case, to grant an exception to the service requirements of the law. In Ortiz, the
Court took note of the involuntariness of Ortiz’s "courtesy resignation," as well
as the peculiar circumstances obtaining at that time President Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 calling for the courtesy resignation of all appointive
officials, viz:
From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element
of clear intention to surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention
from his statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he was placing his position
at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state therein that he
was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that said
letter was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino
issued on February 25, 1986 when she called on all appointive public officials to
tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore confidence in
public administration."48
In stark contrast, no such peculiar circumstances obtain in the present case.
Finally, in the absence of any basis for liberal interpretation, the Court would be
engaged in judicial legislation if we grant the petitioners’ plea. We cannot
overemphasize that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be
to the point of engaging in judicial legislation — an act that the Constitution
absolutely forbids this Court to do. In the oft-cited case of Tanada v.
Yulo,49 Justice George A. Malcolm cautioned against judicial legislation and
warned against liberal construction being used as a license to legislate and not
to simply interpret,50 thus:
Counsel in effect urges us to adopt a liberal construction of the statute. That in
this instance, as in the past, we aim to do. But counsel in his memorandum
concedes "that the language of the proviso in question is somewhat defective
and does not clearly convey the legislative intent", and at the hearing in
response to questions was finally forced to admit that what the Government
desired was for the court to insert words and phrases in the law in order to
supply an intention for the legislature. That we cannot do. By liberal
construction of statutes, courts from the language used, the subject matter, and
the purposes of those framing them are able to find out their true meaning.
There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and
the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted
which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal
construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial
legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three
departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.51
In the present case, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, by its plain terms, is clear that
retirement entails the completion of the term of office. To construe the term
"retirement" in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 to include termination of an ad
interim appointment is to read into the clear words of the law exemptions that
its literal wording does not support; to depart from the meaning expressed by
the words of R.A. No. 1568 is to alter the law and to legislate, and not to
interpret. We would thereby violate the timehonored rule on the constitutional
separation of powers. The words of Justice E. Finley Johnson in the early case
of Nicolas v. Alberto52 still ring true today, viz.:
The courts have no legislative powers. In the interpretation and construction of
statutes their sole function is to determine, and, within the constitutional limits
of the legislative power, to give effect to the intention of the legislature. The
courts cannot read into a statute something which is not within the manifest
intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself. To depart from
the meaning expressed by the words of a statute, is to alter the statute, to
legislate and not to interpret. The responsibility for the justice or wisdom of
legislation rests with the legislature, and it is the province of the courts to
construe, not to make the laws.
To reiterate, in light of the express and clear terms of the law, the basic rule of
statutory construction should therefore apply: "legislative intent is to be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in
the words, there is no room for construction."53
The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 06-1369, which initially granted them a
five-year lump sum gratuity, attained finality thirty (30) days after its
promulgation, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, and, thus, can no longer be modified by the Comelec.
We cannot agree with this position. Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure reads:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. –
a. In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and
special reliefs a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become
final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions,
special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs. Under Section 5,
Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedures, ordinary actions refer to election
protests, quo warranto, and appeals from decisions of courts in election protest
cases; special proceedings refer to annulment of permanent list of voters,
registration of political parties and accreditation of citizens’ arms of the
Commission; provisional remedies refer to injunction and/or restraining
order; and special reliefs refer to certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
contempt. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of
Resolution No. 06-1369 do not fall within the coverage of the actions and
proceedings under Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus,
the Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of judgments.1âwphi1
No denial of due process
We also find no merit in the petitioners’ contention that that they were denied
due process of law when the Comelec issued Resolution No. 8808 without
affording them the benefit of a notice and hearing. We have held in the past that
"[t]he essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
[Thus, a] formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are given fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing." 54 In Bautista v.
Commission on Elections,55 we emphasized:
In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), we held that the right to
be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court. A
party may also be heard through his pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard
is accorded either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of
procedural due process. As reiterated in National Semiconductor (HK)
Distribution, Ltd. vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998), the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. Hence, in Navarro III vs.
Damaso (246 SCRA 260 1995), we held that a formal or trial-type hearing is not
at all times and not in all instances essential.56 (italics supplied)
Thus, "a party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was
accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or
pleadings. There is no denial of due process when a party is given an
opportunity through his pleadings."57 In the present case, the petitioners cannot
claim deprivation of due process because they actively participated in the
Comelec proceedings that sought for payment of their retirement benefits
under R.A. No. 1568. The records clearly show that the issuance of the assailed
Comelec resolution was precipitated by the petitioners’ application for
retirement benefits with the Comelec. Significantly, the petitioners were given
ample opportunity to present and explain their respective positions when they
sought a re-computation of the initial pro-rated retirement benefits that were
granted to them by the Comelec. Under these facts, no violation of the right to
due process of law took place.
No vested rights over retirement benefits
As a last point, we agree with the Solicitor General that the retirement benefits
granted to the petitioners under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous
in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. 58Retirement
benefits as provided under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension
which is a form of deferred compensation for services performed; in a pension,
employee participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire contractual or
vested rights over the pension as part of their compensation. 59 In the absence of
any vested right to the R.A. No. 1568 retirement benefits, the petitioners' due
process argument must perforce fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioners Evalyn I. Fetalino and Amado M. Calderon for
lack of merit. We likewise DENY Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr.'s petition for
intervention for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 February 15, 2011
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST
GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by
DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA
CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH
JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,Respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The Resolution contains the proposed directives of the Manila Bay Advisory
Committee to the concerned agencies1and local government units (LGUs) for
the implementation of the 18 December 2008 Decision of the Court in this case.
Among the directives stated in the Resolution is for the affected agencies to
submit to the Court their plans of action and status reports, thus:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency
in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal
Strategy (OPMBCS);2
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain
measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes;3
The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas
in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater
treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the
MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the construction of
wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the
completion period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2020;4
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) shall submit to the Court on or
before June 30, 2011 the list of cities and towns in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan that do not have sewerage and sanitation
facilities. LWUA is further ordered to submit on or before September 30,
2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and
sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for
said works which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020;5
The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR), shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011
a report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or
improved and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and
aquatic resources in Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on
the marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-
year plan to restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future
activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the
completion period for said undertakings;6
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports
the list of violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is
further ordered to include in its report the names, make and capacity of the
ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its
compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA
Decision and the completion dates of such measures;7
The Philippine National Police (PNP) – Maritime Group shall submit on or
before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and
activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of RA 8550
or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances
and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the
successful prosecution of violators;8
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) shall likewise submit on or before June 30,
2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend
to undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree (PD) 979 or
the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard
Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine
pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators; 9
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the
Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal
settlers in Metro Manila who own and occupy houses, structures,
constructions and other encroachments established or built in violation of
RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,
the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros as of December 31,
2010. On or before the same date, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the
removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid
houses, structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the
completion dates for said activities which shall be fully implemented not
later than December 31, 2015;10
[T]he DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit its plan for the
removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid
structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion
dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than
December 31, 2012;11
[T]he DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies
have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of compliance;12
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to
ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to
the integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula
which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012;13 (Emphasis supplied)
What is the purpose of requiring these agencies to submit to the Court their
plans of action and status reports? Are these plans to be approved or
disapproved by the Court? The Court does not have the competence or even the
jurisdiction to evaluate these plans which involves technical matters 14 best left
to the expertise of the concerned agencies.
The Resolution also requires that the concerned agencies shall "submit [to the
Court] their quarterly reports electronically x x x."15 Thus, the directive for
the concerned agencies to submit to the Court their quarterly reports is a
continuing obligation which extends even beyond the year 2011.16
The Court is now arrogating unto itself two constitutional powers exclusively
vested in the President. First, the Constitution provides that "executive power
shall be vested in the President."17 This means that neither the Judiciary nor
the Legislature can exercise executive power for executive power is the
exclusive domain of the President. Second, the Constitution provides that the
President shall "have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices."18 Neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature can exercise control or even
supervision over executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
Clearly, the Resolution constitutes an intrusion of the Judiciary into the
exclusive domain of the Executive. In the guise of implementing the 18
December 2008 Decision through the Resolution, the Court is in effect
supervising and directing the different government agencies and LGUs
concerned.
In Noblejas v. Teehankee,19 it was held that the Court cannot be required to
exercise administrative functions such as supervision over executive officials.
The issue in that case was whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may
only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him
by law (Republic Act No. 1151) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court
of First Instance. The Court, answering in the negative, stated:
To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme
Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials whose
functions are plainly executive and the consequent curtailment by mere
implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and
remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the
Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision and control.
xxx
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if
the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges"
or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be
investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privilege would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative
function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over
such officials.20 (Boldfacing supplied)
Likewise, in this case, the directives in the Resolution are administrative in
nature and circumvent the constitutional provision which prohibits Supreme
Court members from performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 12. The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
Thus, in the case of In Re: Designation of Judge Manzano as Member of the Ilocos
Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,21 the Court invalidated the designation of
a judge as member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which
was tasked to receive complaints and to make recommendations for the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees. The Court held that the committee performs
administrative functions22 which are prohibited under Section 12, Article VIII of
the Constitution.
As early as the 1932 case of Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.,23 this
Court has already emphasized that the Supreme Court should only exercise
judicial power and should not assume any duty which does not pertain to the
administering of judicial functions. In that case, a petition was filed requesting
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the
terms and the compensation to be paid to Manila Electric Company for the use
of right of way. The Court held that it would be improper and illegal for the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, whose decision
of a majority shall be final, to act on the petition of Manila Electric Company.
The Court explained:
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or as members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise administrative
or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the
jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would
presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any
other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the
award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the
anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the
Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its
members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed
by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be
considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the
performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not
lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes
an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court
asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of
arbitrators, which is not a court at all.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three
divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power
only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of
influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the
Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty
not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. 24
Furthermore, the Resolution orders some LGU officials to inspect the
establishments and houses along major river banks and to "take appropriate
action to ensure compliance by non-complying factories, commercial
establishments and private homes with said law, rules and regulations
requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks."25 The LGU officials are also directed to
"submit to the DILG on or before December 31, 2011 their respective
compliance reports which shall contain the names and addresses or offices of
the owners of all the non-complying factories, commercial establishments and
private homes."26 Furthermore, the Resolution mandates that on or before 30
June 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila should
"consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad
and Manila Water Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions." 27 The Court is in
effect ordering these LGU officials how to do their job and even gives a
deadline for their compliance. Again, this is a usurpation of the power of the
President to supervise LGUs under the Constitution and existing laws.
Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "The President of
the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments x x x."28 Under the Local Government Code of 1991,29 the
President exercises general supervision over LGUs, thus:
SECTION 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. ‒ (a) Consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general
supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces,
highly urbanized cities and independent component cities; through the province
with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through the city and
municipality with respect to barangays. (Emphasis supplied)
The Resolution constitutes judicial overreach by usurping and performing
executive functions. The Court must refrain from overstepping its boundaries
by taking over the functions of an equal branch of the government – the
Executive. The Court should abstain from exercising any function which is not
strictly judicial in character and is not clearly conferred on it by the
Constitution.30 Indeed, as stated by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Noblejas v.
Teehankee,31 "the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not
and can not be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of
judicial functions."32
The directives in the Resolution constitute a judicial encroachment of an
executive function which clearly violates the system of separation of powers
that inheres in our democratic republican government. The principle of
separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches
of government is part of the basic structure of the Philippine Constitution. Thus,
the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines;33 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines;34 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established.35
Since the Supreme Court is only granted judicial power, it should not attempt to
assume or be compelled to perform non-judicial functions.36 Judicial power is
defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution as that which
"includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."
The Resolution contains directives which are outside the ambit of the Court's
judicial functions.
The principle of separation of powers is explained by the Court in the leading
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission:37
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it
does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other department in its
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.38
Even the ponente is passionate about according respect to the system of
separation of powers between the three equal branches of the government. In
his dissenting opinion in the 2008 case of Province of North Cotabato v.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
(GRP),39 Justice Velasco emphatically stated:
Separation of Powers to be Guarded

Over and above the foregoing considerations, however, is the matter of

separation of powers which would likely be disturbed should the Court
meander into alien territory of the executive and dictate how the final shape of
the peace agreement with the MILF should look like. The system of separation
of powers contemplates the division of the functions of government into
its three (3) branches: the legislative which is empowered to make laws;
the executive which is required to carry out the law; and the judiciary
which is charged with interpreting the law. Consequent to actual
delineation of power, each branch of government is entitled to be left
alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Being one such branch, the
judiciary, as Justice Laurel asserted in Planas v. Gil, "will neither direct nor
restrain executive [or legislative action]." Expressed in another
perspective, the system of separated powers is designed to restrain one
branch from inappropriate interference in the business, or intruding upon
the central prerogatives, of another branch; it is a blend of courtesy and
caution, "a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." x x x

Under our constitutional set up, there cannot be any serious dispute that the
maintenance of the peace, insuring domestic tranquility and the suppression of
violence are the domain and responsibility of the executive. Now then, if it be
important to restrict the great departments of government to the exercise
of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical corollary, equally
important, that one branch should be left completely independent of the
others, independent not in the sense that the three shall not cooperate in
the common end of carrying into effect the purposes of the constitution,
but in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by or
subjected to the influence of either of the branches.40 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, adherence to the principle of separation of powers which is enshrined

in our Constitution is essential to prevent tyranny by prohibiting the
concentration of the sovereign powers of state in one body. 41 Considering that
executive power is exclusively vested in the President of the Philippines, the
Judiciary should neither undermine such exercise of executive power by the
President nor arrogate executive power unto itself. The Judiciary must confine
itself to the exercise of judicial functions and not encroach upon the functions of
the other branches of the government.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote against the approval of the Resolution.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice