CASES & OTHER ISSUES THAT MADE IT INTO THE HEADLINES
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Vivares vs. St. Theresa's College;
The right to privacy is not violated when a third party
downloads images from an individual’s Facebook page
that are accessible by “friends” of the individual or by the
public at large.
Political Law; Right to Privacy
The primary issue was “whether or not there was indeed an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in the case.” A writ of
habeas data protects an individual’s right against invasion of
informational privacy, and a nexus between the right to privacy
and the right to life, liberty or security must be proven.
In this case, the core issue was the right to informational privacy,
defined as “the right of individuals to control information about
them.” To what extent should the right to privacy be protected in
online social networks whose sole purpose is sharing
information over the web? The petitioners argued that the
privacy settings on Facebook limit who can see what
information. This gives users a subjective expectation of privacy.
The Court agreed. However, the Court also ruled that before one
can have an expectation of privacy in her Facebook information,
he or she must manifest an intention to keep that information
private by utilizing privacy tools. If someone posts something on
Facebook and does not limit who can see that information, there
is no expectation of privacy. The photos in the case at hand were
all viewable by the friends of the girls or by the general public.
Therefore, the Court ruled that the Defendants did not violate the
minors’ privacy rights by viewing and copying the pictures on
the minors’ Facebook pages.
Balag vs. Senate of the Philippines
Persons cited by the Senate in contempt during legislative
inquiries could only be imprisoned “until the
Civil Law; Annulment of Marriage
termination” of the probe.
Political Law; Senate’s power of contempt
The SC laid down this precedent in the case of Aegis Juris
fraternity leader Arvin Balag, who had questioned his detention
during the Senate’s inquiry into the Horacio Castillo III hazing
case.
Prior to Balag’s case, previous SC rulings allowed the indefinite
imprisonment of persons cited in contempt—they could even
spend life behind bars in theory. This was because the Senate is a
continuing body (half of the members are replaced alternately
every election cycle), unlike the House of Representatives that
adjourns every three years. The SC said it found the need to
“strike a balance between the interest of the Senate and the
rights of persons cited in contempt during legislative inquiries.”
It noted that the Senate could exercise its power to cite persons
in contempt “as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry,”
since the purpose is to ensure respect and cooperation for such
proceedings. “Once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the
exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is
no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness,”
At the same time, the SC said Balag’s petition seeking its
intervention in his detention by the Senate was already “moot
and academic.”
This was because the SC already ordered Balag’s release from
detention way back on December 12, 2017.
At the same time, the Senate public order and justice committees
already terminated their legislative inquiries on January 23,
2018 and the Senate even passed on February 12, 2018 its
version of what was now Republic Act Number 11053.
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Belo-Henares vs. Guevarra
Vicky Bello – Facebook Privacy
Political Law; Right to privacy
The main issue for the Court was whether or not the Respondent
was administratively liable based on the Complainant’s
allegations. It first ruled that the Respondent’s defense of privacy
in sharing his derogatory remarks on Facebook was “untenable.”
The Court explained that in order to claim a reasonable
expectation of privacy on social media, and in this case,
Facebook, “it is first necessary that said user manifests the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment
of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.”
And such intention “can materialize in cyberspace through the
utilization of Facebook’s privacy tools.” Here, the Court did not
find any direct evidence that the Respondent had utilized any of
the privacy tools or features of Facebook that would ensure his
remarks were only visible to himself and his circle of friends. The
Court further reasoned that even if the posts were only viewable
by the Respondent’s friends, there was no assurance that they
would be safeguarded within the confines of privacy, in part
because any Facebook friend of the Respondent could
independently share the posts on their page. “Restricting the
privacy of one’s Facebook posts to “Friends” does not guarantee
absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who
does not belong to one’s circle of friends,” the Court concluded.
The Court also rejected the Respondent’s claim that the
impugned remarks were within the exercise of his right to
freedom of expression. It reiterated that the constitutional
freedom is not “absolute” and every person exercising the right
is “obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.” The Court also noted that the
constitutional protection of the right “may not be availed of to
broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or
reputation or bring them into disrepute” In this case, the Court
found that the Facebook remarks “were ostensibly made with
malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of
complainant and her company.”
The Court further dismissed the Respondent’s justification that
his remarks amounted to fair criticism of the Complainant as a
public figure. The Court said, “it is the cardinal condition of all
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety,” and in this case, the
Respondent’s remarks breached the said walls.”
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Supreme Court of the
Philippines found the Respondent “in complete and utter
violation” of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
accordingly imposed the original one-year suspension and
“sternly warned” the Respondent that he would face more severe
consequences if he repeated the same or similar acts.
GMA Network, et. al vs. COMELEC
Campaign Ads Air time limit
Political Law; Freedom of Expression, of speech & of
the press.
The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based”
airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts
and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to
reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits –
leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state
interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on
the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs
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of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-
cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the
aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when
we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so
many islands. There are also a lot of languages
and dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out
to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be
necessary that he conveys his message through his
advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may
more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these
airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of
such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his
political speech.
Arigo vs. Swift
Compensation for Tubataha Reef
Political Law; Locus Standi, State Immunity
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and
“calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the
rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the
“public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioner
minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary
citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights; they can do so in representation of their
own and future generations.
State Immunity
The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the
present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can
be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal
case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or
non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to
US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of
the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province
of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine
whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the
same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from
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the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the
recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative
fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed
instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of
an environmental law.
Araullo vs. Aquino
Partial reversal Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP)
Political Law; The Court’s power of judicial review
The respondents argue that the Executive has not violated the
GAA because savings as a concept is an ordinary species of
interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial,
determination.
The interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a
foremost judicial function. This is because the power of judicial
review vested in the Court is exclusive.
The interpretation and application of said laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to
interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before
the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not,
it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of
said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in
order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two,
because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to
be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Political Law; Appropriation – Power of the purse
The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed
by virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the
funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress
for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their
management will also be strictly construed against expanding
the scope of the power to augment.15 Such a strict interpretation
is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget
implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during
budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly
transgressing Congress’ power of the purse.
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Political Law; The power to augment cannot be used to fund
non-existent provisions in the GAA
The respondents assert, however, that there is no constitutional
requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an
item. What is required is for Congress to create items to comply
with the line-item veto of the President.
The Court reversed its ruling.
Indeed, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the
term item that may be the object of augmentation by the
President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the
Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In
Belgica v. Ochoa, we said that an item that is the distinct and
several part of the appropriation bill, in line with the item veto
power of the President, must contain “specific appropriations of
money” and not be only general provisions.
Item, definition: the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. An item of
appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
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correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular
amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a
“line-item.” This treatment not only allows the item to be
consistent with its definition as a “specific appropriation of
money” but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto
the same.
Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the
Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in
the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense
category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either
in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of
augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class.
In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power
over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which
that expense category belongs to.
Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be an
existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of
expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be
transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so
long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set
aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be
transferred thereto for augmentation purposes.
Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the
caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may
be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings.
Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects had appropriation
cover and were validly augmented require factual determination
that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions
under Rule 65.
Political Law; Cross-border transfers are constitutionally
impermissible
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution prohibits only the
transfer of appropriation, not savings.
Kabataan Party-list vs. COMELEC
No Bio, No Boto Policy
Political law; Election Law
The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification”
to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate.
The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that
registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is
not a qualification for such right. The process of registration is a
procedural limitation on the right to vote.
Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must
nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in order
to vote.
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to
the level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement
as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution -that is, one
which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of
any rational basis to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his
vote and to further the public good -the same cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional, as in this case.
Political Law; Strict Scrutiny Test
In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and
on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
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Presence of compelling state interest
Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation
requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state
interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of
orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing -if not
eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as
well as dead and multiple registrants. The foregoing
consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.
Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving
the above-said interest
Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure
for biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only
required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the
Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity;
and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded.
Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate
registered voters to submit themselves to validation every time
there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo
the validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective
in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an active voter.
Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters
from exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To
rectify such status, they could still apply for reactivation.
Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC
Team Buhay – Team Patay Tarpaulins
Political Law; Freedom of expression
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment
of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a
non-candidate in this case.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is
election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those
who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties,
this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration”
by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
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Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering
informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand,
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no
more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely
political speech.
Political Law; Content-based regulation/censorship
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions
“based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In
contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on
the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-
based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size
of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger
rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed
to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial
state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to
justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is
no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional
rights.
Political Law; Right to Property
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by
the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it
is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and
equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates
where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently,
it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law.
Political Law; Religious Speech
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by
petitioners is not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does
not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes
any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences
and not religious speech.
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Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not
hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to
promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take
religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from
generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere
in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
*Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC
Pardon of Estrada
Political Law; Pardon
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that
fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy.
Political Law; Disqualification to run for public office
The LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any
elective local position, to wit: (a) This sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence. However, the
Omnibus Election Code provides a legal escape from the
prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, it
allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or
amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any
public office, whether local or national position. The
disqualification of former President Estrada was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
*Carpio Morales vs. CA
Dismissal of Junjun Binay
Political Law. Abandoning the Condonation doctrine
The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent
with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be
wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no
constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support
the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense
done during a prior term.
*from Atty. Morilla’s notes
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It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of
the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application
for the reason that judicial decision applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
*Saguisag vs. Ochoa
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
Political Law; Executive Agreements
The Constitution prohibits the entry of foreign military bases,
troops or facilities, except by way of a treaty concurred in by the
Senate – a clear limitation on the President’s dual role as
defender of the State and as sole authority in foreign relations.
However, the President may enter into an executive agreement
on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the
instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an
existing law or treaty (Mutual Defense Treaty & Visiting Forces
Agreement)
Impeachment
Impeachment complaints against PDU30,
Commissioner Bautista and SC Justices
Political Law; Initiating Impeachment Complaint
Impeachment shall be initiated by the filing and subsequent
referral to the Committee of Justice of: (a) a verified complaint
for impeachment filed by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof; or (c)
a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all Members of the House.
Political Law; Vote required for approval
A vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all Members of the House is
necessary for the approval of the resolution setting forth the
Articles of Impeachment. If the resolution is approved by the
required vote, it shall then be endorsed to the Senate for its trial.
On the other hand, should the resolution fail to secure the
approval by the required vote, the same result in the dismissal of
the complaint for impeachment.
Political Law; Dismissal
When the report of the Committee on Justice dismisses the
complaint, it shall submit to the House a resolution for the
dismissal of the verified complaint and/or resolution of
impeachment. A vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary to override such
resolution, in which cases the Committee on Justice shall
forthwith prepare the Articles of Impeachment.
Political Law; Bar on impeachment
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one (1) year.
*from Atty. Morilla’s notes
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Appointment of Cabinet Members
Rejection of Appointments
Political Law; Power to Appoint
The power of appointment is vested in the President by the
Constitution. Under this provision, there are two kinds of
presidential appointments: (1) appointments made during the
session of Congress or the so-called regular appointments, and
(2) appointments made during the recess of Congress referred as
Ad interim appointments.
Political Law; Appointment process
The regular appointments go through the following stages: (1)
nomination (2) consent (3) appointment (4) acceptance by the
nominee. What the president sends to the Commission is just a
nomination. After the Commission has given its consent, the
President issues the appointment. It is only when the last stage
has been completed may the officer concerned take his oath of
office.
The Constitution also empowers the President to issue
appointments while Congress is not in session. Such
appointments are called Ad interim appointments, and it goes
through the following stages: (1) Appointment and (2)
confirmation.
Political Law; Ad interim appointments
An ad interim appointment is permanent in nature and takes
effect immediately. Thus, one who was issued an ad interim
appointment may immediately enter upon the discharge of this
functions. An ad interim appointment ceases to be valid upon
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or, if not
confirmed, until the next adjournment of Congress.
*Complaint before the ICC
Complaint against PDU30
Political Law; Principle of Complementary
The ICC does not replace national criminal justice systems;
rather it complements them. It can investigate and where
warranted, prosecute and try individuals only if the State
concerned does not, cannot or is unwilling genuinely to do so.
This might occur where proceedings are unduly delayed or are
intended to shield individuals from their criminal responsibility.
This is known as the principle of complementary, under which
priority is given to national systems, States retain primary
responsibility for trying the perpetrators of the most serious of
crimes.
Political Law; Jurisdiction of ICC
When a State becomes a party to the Rome Statute, it agrees to
submit itself to the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to the
crimes enumerated in the Statute. The Court may exercise its
jurisdiction in situations where the alleged perpetrator is a
national of State party or where the crime was committed in the
territory of a State Party. Also, a State not party to the Statute
may decide to accept the jurisdiction of ICC.
Political Law; Who may be prosecuted
The ICC prosecutes individuals, not groups or States. Any
individual who is alleged to have committed crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC may be brought before the ICC. In fact, the
Office of the Prosecutor’s prosecutorial policy is to focus on those
who, having regard to the evidence gathered, bear the greatest
responsibility for the crimes, and does not take into account any
official position that may be held by the alleged perpetrators.
*from Atty. Morilla’s notes
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Withdrawal from ICC
PH withdrawal
Political Law; Withdrawal from Rome Statute
A State Party may by written notification addressed to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from this
Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date
of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a
later date.
A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from
the obligation arising from this Statute while it was a Party to the
Statute, including any financial obligations which may have
accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the
Court in connection with criminal investigations and
proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a
duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date
on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice
in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was
already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on
which the withdrawal became effective.
Republic vs. Sereno
Quo Warranto against CJ Sereno
(Dissenting opinion of Justice Del Castillo)
Political Law; Removal of Impeachable Officers
The only “exclusivity” that may be reasonably read from the
wording of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution is the list of
impeachable officers and the grounds for which they may be
impeached. This “exclusivity” is deducible, not from the use of
the word “may”, but from the enumeration of the officers and the
grounds following the rule of expression unius est exclusion
alterius.
Had the framers intended to restrict the mode of removal from
the office of the enumerated public officers only to impeachment
in the first sentence of Section 2, they would have adopted a
similar categorical and unequivocal language as they did in the
second sentence of Section 2 and in Section 3. I believe that their
deliberative omission to do so is a strong indication that the
framers recognized other modes by which impeachable public
officers may be removed from office.
Quo Warranto against Appointive Impeachable Officers
With particular regard to appointive impeachable officers, it is
my humble submission that quo warranto petitions against them
threaten the constitutionally-decreed independence of their
offices. While the Constitution has granted this Court general
jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, this jurisdiction may
not be asserted against appointive impeachable officers without
compromising institutional independence which is intended to
uphold core constitutional principles and values.
Grounds for Impeachment; Ineligible for office
It is neither improbable nor illogical to suppose that a public
officer’s ineligibility for office (whether for lack of qualification
of possession of grounds for disqualification) can be considered
an act which constitutes an impeachable offense. Although
Culpable violation of the Constitution, other high crimes, and
betrayal of public trust escape precise definitions, their common
denominator is that they obviously pertain to fitness for public
office. Thus, it can be said that a public officer who does not
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possess the minimum constitutional qualifications for the office
commits a violation of the Constitution that he/she sworn to
uphold or, at the very least, betrays public trust when he/she
assumes the position without the requisite eligibility.
Impeachment then becomes the mode by which we exact
accountability from the public officer who assumes a
constitutional office notwithstanding his/her ineligibility.
*Amnesty
Revocation of Trillanes’ amnesty coverage
Political Law; Criminal Law; Amnesty
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their
treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which
one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself;
it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Admission of Guilt
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime and when an
accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot
have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation
imposes certain conditions, it is incumbent upon the accused to
prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of
amnesty is in the nature of plea of confession and avoidance,
which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him
but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts
which, if proved, would being the crime charged within the scope
of amnesty proclamation.
Amnesty and Pardon
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
Amnesty by proclamation of the Chief executive with the
concurrence of the Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons, or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment.
While Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.
Visitorial and Enforcement Power
Labor Law; Security of Tenure
Security of Tenure refers to the right of employees not to be
dismissed or removed without just or authorized causes and
observance of procedural due process consistent with the
Constitution, Labor Code, and prevailing jurisprudence.
Visitorial Powers
The visitorial power of the DOLE Secretary or his duly
authorized representatives described inArticle 37 of the Labor
Code should be distinguished from the other visitorial powers
granted to him by other provisions of the Labor Code such as the
ones provided for under Article 128 and Article 274 thereof.
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Here, the visitorial power pertains to the inspection of the
premises, books of accounts and records of persons and entities
engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers for local or
overseas employment. It also includes the power to require the
submission of reports regularly on certain prescribed forms and
to act on any violation of Title I, Book I of the Labor Code.
The visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE Secretary or
the DOLE Regional Directors, his duly authorized
representatives, treated in Article 128 pertains to the inspection
of premises, books of accounts and records of local employers to
determine violations of the Labor Code and any labor laws, wage
orders or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
Article 274 dwells on the visitorial power of the DOLE Secretary
to inquire into the financial activities of legitimate labor
organizations.
Effect of obstruction of exercise of visitorial power.
The act of any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder,
licensee or holder of authority, in obstructing or attempting to
obstruct inspection by the DOLE Secretary or by his duly
authorized representative under Article 37 of the Labor Code is
one of the prohibited practices and unlawful acts which
constitutes “illegal recruitment.”
Republic vs. Manalo
In a mixed marriage, the Filipino spouse can already file
a divorce decree
Civil Law; Marriage
A foreign divorce secured by a Filipino against a foreign spouse
is also considered valid in the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino
spouse who files for divorce abroad."
Prior to the ruling, a divorce abroad is only considered valid in
the Philippines when it is initiated by the foreign spouse,
With the amended Family Code, Filipinos who obtain divorce in
the country of their foreign spouse get to remarry without fear of
a bigamy suit. However, if the one who obtained the divorce was
the Filipino spouse, the state still did not recognize it divorce
because of the absence of absolute divorce in the country.
With this ruling, the state now recognizes the divorce obtained
by the Filipino, and couples of the same circumstances of mixed-
marriage will be considered not married to each other under
Philippine law." The Court remanded the case to the trial court
for further reception of evidence as to the relevant laws of Japan
on divorce,"
Jimenez vs. Cañizares
Female impotency
Civil Law; Annulment of Marriage
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question
may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the
husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is
impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent
during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical
examination.
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The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be

proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In
the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the
wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of
the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained
from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or
failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from
such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of
this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would
not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to
by competent authority. This the Court may do without
doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-
incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not
being compelled to be a witness against herself." Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the
husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.