Timofey Agarin Malte Brosig Minority Integrati

Minority Integration in
Central Eastern Europe

Between Ethnic Diversity
and Equality
On the Boundary of Two Worlds:
Identity, Freedom, and Moral Imagination
in the Baltics
18
Editor
Leonidas Donskis, Member of the European Parliament, and previously

Professor and Dean of Vytautas Magnus University School of Political
Science and Diplomacy in Kaunas, Lithuania.
Editorial and Advisory Board
Timo Airaksinen, University of Helsinki, Finland

Egidijus Aleksandravicius, Lithuanian Emigration Institute, Vytautas
Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania
Stefano Bianchini, University of Bologna, Forlì Campus, Italy
Endre Bojtar, Institute of Literary Studies, Budapest, Hungary
Kristian Gerner, University of Lund, Sweden
John Hiden, University of Glasgow, UK
Mikko Lagerspetz, Åbo Academy, Finland
Andreas Lawaty, Nordost-Institute, Lüneburg, Germany
Olli Loukola, University of Helsinki, Finland
Hannu Niemi, University of Helsinki, Finland
Alvydas Nikzentaitis, Lithuanian History Institute, Lithuania
Yves Plasseraud, Paris, France
Rein Raud, Rector of Tallinn University, Estonia
Alfred Erich Senn, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA, and
Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania
David Smith, University of Glasgow, UK
Saulius Suziedelis, Millersville University, USA
Joachim Tauber, Nordost-Institut, Lüneburg, Germany
Tomas Venclova, Yale University, USA
Minority Integration in
Central Eastern Europe
Between Ethnic Diversity
and Equality
Edited and introduced by

Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009

Cover photo: Lúnik 9, a Roma borough in the city of Košice, Slovakia.
© Sylvia Allen
The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of

“ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for
documents - Requirements for permanence”.
ISBN: 978-90-420-2733-6
E-Book ISBN: 978-90-420-2734-3
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Printed in the Netherlands
Table of Contents
Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe:
An Introduction
Timofei Agarin and Malte Brosig 7
Section I
International Organizations and Minority
Integration in Europe
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights?
Manuela Riedel 27
The Special Consideration Standard as a Modern Tool for

Advancing the Rights of Minorities
Alexander H. E. Morawa 53
The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for

the Protection of National Minorities and Equality Promotion
Malte Brosig 79
Beyond Conflict Prevention: HCNM and Minority

Integration
Natalie Sabanadze 103
Section II
Political Integration of Minority Communities
Comparing European Institutional and Hungarian
Approaches to Roma (Gypsy) Minorities
Annabel Tremlett 129
The Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania:

Legal Framework for Social Inclusion
Michaela Salamun 151
Political Community, Political Institutions
and Minority Politics in Slovakia 1998–2006
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann 175
Cooptation as Integration? National Programme

“Integration of Society in Latvia” on Minority Participation
Timofey Agarin 199
Social Cohesion Estonian Style: Minority Integration

Through Constitutionalized Hegemony and Fictive Pluralism
Tove H. Malloy 225
Section III
The Interface of Minority and Majority Communities
Round Pegs in Square Holes: Integrating the Romani
Community in Hungary
Aidan McGarry 257
Empowerment as a two-way Process: The Role of

Romani NGOs in Integration of Macedonian Society
Sara Nikolić 279
Romani Teaching Assistants in the Czech Education

System: An Opportunity to Address Barriers to the
Labour Market?
Laura Cashman 305
Multicultural Solutions for Central and Eastern Europe?

Concluding Observations
Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig 331
Contributors 357
Minority Integration in Central Eastern Europe:
An Introduction

The accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the Euro-
pean Union (EU) was anticipated with great expectations. The aspiring mem-
ber states expected the EU to guarantee economic prosperity and political
recognition, while Western countries saw political integration of the conti-
nent as a way to secure peace and stability throughout the region. Both sides
viewed EU-accession as a tool providing an opportunity to overcome ethnic
tensions and irredentism, as well as promoting social cohesion through the
process of European integration. However, the optimistic predictions that
ethnic conflicts would disappear following economic development and re-
gional integration into the EU, NATO and other organizations did not materi-
alize as had been hoped.
Prior to and following EU accession, CEE countries had to develop
their own strategies to accommodate large minority populations on their
territories. Today these states provide models of their own to address minor-
ity protection and find local interpretations of what integration entails. In
spite of the relatively short experience in devising policies relevant (and suit-
able) to minorities, most of the CEE countries precipitated the change in
relations between the state institutions and the societies they govern, that
result from development of an ever closer European Union. Interstate treaties,
trans-border cooperation and regional initiatives considerably improved the
status of minority groups across CEE. All new EU member states have found
ways to address political, economic, and social inequalities between their
majority and minority residents
Still, many issues remain contested. It appears that every country in
CEE provides a plethora of questions to debate inequalities between the ma-
jority and minority population. For the members of minority groups across
the region there is much more at stake than the majority groups of their coun-
tries of residence are prepared to accept in the course of social integration.
However, considerable local knowledge is required to develop minority inte-
gration in practice. None of the programmes developed by the state aiming at
minority integration across the region show overlap in goals, practices or
incentives. That is not to say that these approaches to integration are incom-
parable. Arguably, broad scale generalizations are insensitive to details of
local implementation and case-studies provide too much detail at the expense
of an overall elegance of narrative. In this volume we sought to strike a bal-
ance between the two extremes by providing a detailed narrative underlying
8 Introduction
______________________________________________________________
policy-making, but also pointing to potential issues of contention between

local, national and European policies.
This volume provides the reader with a detailed account of current
challenges in integrating ethnic minority groups in CEE countries. We
thereby took great care not to slide into one-sided modes of analysis privileg-
ing either the international, national or societal dimension of integration but
aim at covering the most important aspects of minority integration across
disciplines as different as anthropology, political science, sociology and law.
This multi-dimensional and interdisciplinary approach to minority integra-
tion, in our view, best covers the complex reality on the ground. We have
deliberately decided not to promote a certain theory of integration or concept
of multiculturalism which would only account for certain aspects of minority
integration but hardly cover the existing complexity of the issue. The volume
clearly privileges theoretical, analytical and disciplinary pluralism over de-
ductive monism. Thus the contributions to this volume do not aim at further
developing or testing theoretical models of integration in the first place but
deliver analytically informed rich empirical examinations of current chal-
lenges in ethnic minority integration in CEE. Consequently, the volume fol-
lows an inherently inductive orientation uncovering those challenges that
international organizations, nation-states, minority groups and mainstream
society encounter in the 21st century demarcating a long path to effective
equality and integration.
In this volume we bring together the contributions discussing minority
integration in countries as diverse as Albania, Slovakia, Czech Republic,
Macedonia, Estonia, and Hungary. Our contributors analyze the concepts and
interpretations related to minority integration, more frequently than not ques-
tioning the outcome of integration efforts in countries under review. In order
to provide a comprehensive overview on these issues and debates, we analyze
different approaches, advocated by various actors in the field. Throughout the
volume our contributors argue that particular ways of accommodating minor-
ity groups in CEEC have been developed. Minority integration, as we argue
in the volume, reflects on particular histories of minority settlement, relations
with external states, engagement of international actors, and decisively, the
majorities’ perception of “their” nation-states. By and large, where “national
citizenship” became more open and embraced, social differences, alongside
cultural and linguistic diversity within political community prevailed in de-
veloping models more effective than those already in place across Western
European EU states.
1. The European Dimension of Minority Integration

Minority integration issues are currently gaining attention across Europe,
particularly since the last two rounds in EU enlargement. Since 2004 the EU
has become more diverse than ever: 23 official languages have been regis-
______________________________________________________________
tered in Brussels, 60 indigenous languages are actively spoken in the EU

comprising not less than 40 million people and 190 different ethnic minority
groups (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 2). The diversity of ethnic belonging almost
naturally raises the question of equal opportunity for all members of societies
affected, especially when considering disparities between the dominant and
non-dominant ethnic groups in most EU member states. The EU’s focus on
non-discrimination dominates the current discourse on minority rights across
the member and non-member states alike. The contributions of our volume
suggest that growing attention to social inclusion across the European conti-
nent is the outcome of a general shift in the international perception of minor-
ity rights issues.
Minority rights in the early 1990s had for a considerable time, been
constructed through the prism of security. It was primarily the trepidation of
Western European countries towards the potential of ethnic violence and war
in the Balkan region which led the EU, Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE), and Council of Europe (COE) to (re)-discover the
discourse on minority rights. The war in the former Yugoslavia was per-
ceived to be a threat to security in South-Eastern Europe, potentially spread-
ing beyond the Balkans. The demise of the Soviet Union could also have had
unprecedented geopolitical consequences for CEE states. Lasting political
and economic transition across CEE countries could destabilize societies,
revealing ethnic tensions, previously suppressed by the socialist leadership.
It was in this light that in 1992 the OSCE set up a special body re-
sponsible for monitoring and prevention of ethnic conflicts, the High Com-
missioner on National Minorities (HCNM). In addition, in 1994 the COE
drafted the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
(FCNM) which became the first international legally binding agreement for-
mulating specific minority rights norms. Finally, the so-called Copenhagen
EU-accession criteria, elaborated in 1993, made EU-membership conditional
on the respect for and protection of minorities. Twenty years on, there is no
evidence of ethnic warfare occurring outside of the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. Across CEE countries it appears political, economic and social
transition has been at least successful enough to prevent ethnic conflict, while
continuously improving majority-minority relations.
These achievements give evidence of the positive impact of interna-
tional engagement in CEE states and societies. The COE’s legally binding
instruments for minority rights protection, the HCNM’s quiet diplomacy, EU
membership conditionality and financial support to the states, are essential
for the successful promotion of minority integration standards throughout
CEE. In this context international institutions establish benchmarks for equal
treatment of minority groups throughout the region. Classical state monitor-
ing on the implementation of human rights treaties - such as FCNM, juris-
prudence of the European Court for Human Rights, new governance instru-
10 Introduction
______________________________________________________________
ments in the case of the EU and social inclusion initiatives advanced by the
OSCE in the course of its conflict prevention approach – were all fundamen-
tal to securing the interethnic accord across the region.
Indeed, one of the most important functions international organiza-
tions can fulfil is the setting of standards which has at least two advantages
over individual national standard setting. First, it ensures comparability be-
tween cases and avoids bias to a certain group of people or the unique actor
constellation in one country. Second, international institutions engage in
norm setting as a non-partisan actor who does not pursue its own ethnic inter-
ests.
Although international support for integrative measures is often es-
sential for their lasting success, international institutions contribute far less
towards enforcement and implementation of these standards on the ground.
Generally, international institutions depend on their member states’ willing-
ness to implement commonly agreed conventions, declarations, jurisdictions
and policy targets. None of the international organizations has its local ad-
ministrative bodies, which could facilitate, not even to mention, implement
integration policies. Even the EU which is by far the world’s most active and
successful international regulator does not implement any of its regulations
and directives, spelt out in well beyond 100,000 pages of the acquis com-
munautaire. However, the EU has certainly the most general influence on
social inclusion policies in its member states, not least because of its legisla-
tive and financial capacities.
The same also holds for the COE and OSCE, which in contrast with
the EU, have very limited financial means to support nation-states’ integra-
tion programmes. These organizations’ role is limited to monitoring the im-
plementation of legal standards, giving advice, and providing organizational
support for the setting up of integration measures. Despite these limitations
the COE and OSCE have much to contribute. Their most valuable role is in
the distribution of knowledge on European best-practices and the develop-
ment of benchmark legislation for sustainable and successful integration
measures. This becomes particularly important because of the general lack of
experience in setting up minority integration concepts and strategies in CEE.
Taking the situation of different minority groups into account, international
institutions collect data and provide information on a wide range of situations
to its nation-states. They are then expected to devise specific policy-solutions
to the problems on the ground that would correspond to European-wide ac-
tion plans and comply with European legal standards.
The promotion of equal rights and effective equality throughout CEE
comprises social, economic, and political integration measures. In this re-
spect, European institutions engage in a multi-level and multi-actor game.
While no single international institution dominates the scene, horizontal co-
operation provides the greatest potential for cooperation and converges into a
______________________________________________________________
broader European approach to minority rights. The fact that the COE is de-
veloping legal standards for minority integration through the FCNM and the
jurisprudence of its human rights court is complemented by the EU’s policy
initiatives on social inclusion and non-discrimination.
Cooperation between the EU, COE and OSCE has been intensifying
over the past decade. Since 2001 the EU and COE have been institutionaliz-
ing their cooperation in a joint programme line, addressing issues of multicul-
turalism and social inclusion. At the same time significant differences remain
in the activities of the EU and the COE. The EU has not developed a com-
prehensive set of minority rights but is very active in the field of non-
discrimination and social inclusion. The COE, on the other hand, additionally
seeks to guarantee minorities’ linguistic, cultural and political rights. The
relationship between the EU and the COE should thus be seen as that of
complementary cooperation on the issues relevant to the legal status of a
minority with an overlapping interest in minority integration.
At the vertical axis international organizations seek interaction with
both the states and a multitude of domestic actors. This spectrum reaches
from multi-national non-governmental organizations to central, regional and
local administrative bodies, from local civic initiatives to nearly all sorts of
minority pressure groups. Here international institutions create conditions in
support of minorities’ integration into society by benchmarking, monitoring,
mediating, and funding of integration programmes. Admittedly the EU,
OSCE, and COE only have limited experience and competence in the area of
minority integration, which poses a number of new challenges to the exper-
tise of international organizations in that area. This raises the question of
whether the EU, or any other international organization, is capable of gener-
ating some base-line for inter-ethnic cooperation across the region? While
our contributors do not underestimate the complexity of the question, they
argue that only a concerted action at both the international and national levels
can guarantee equal opportunity for participation of minorities across the
CEE.
2. The National Dimension of Minority Integration

International organizations involved with supporting social inclusion and
promoting equality of minorities play an important role in reducing tensions
between the ethnic communities on the domestic level across CEE. Espe-
cially noteworthy is the international organizations’ effort in setting parame-
ters for good practice towards minority populations. Needless to say, fulfill-
ing this task is not easy at all. The notion of equality can be stretched widely
to encompass interpretations as diverse as entitlement for participation in
decision-making to prohibition of unequal treatment in the public sphere,
from individual-centred affirmative action to group-oriented support of self-
government in areas of compact settlement.
12 Introduction
______________________________________________________________
Not surprisingly, the lack of normative guidelines at the international

level towards minority integration results in deficient practical application of
integration at the state level. How divergent approaches to integration should,
and how they should not be applied creates real problems in justifying the
promotion of specific instruments for minority protection (Patten and Kym-
licka, 2003, pp. 32-37). Most of the international organizations involved in
minority integration projects have previously advised nation-states to apply
pragmatic rules and support policies that have measurable positive impacts
on integration. General indicators for minority integration, such as unem-
ployment and literacy rates, proportional representation in private and public
sectors of economy, as well as participation and visibility in political institu-
tions were used for this purpose. Parekh summarizes the outcome of equal
treatment policies, following which “All citizens should enjoy equal opportu-
nities to acquire the capacities and skills needed to function in society and to
pursue their self-chosen goals equally effectually” (2000, p. 211). In this
sense, the role of the nation-state in fostering equitable treatment of minori-
ties and majorities is not limited to the distribution of material resources and
to provisions of fair access to public goods. Recognition of minority groups
as equal partners in policy-making and implementation relies heavily on the
equal treatment of individuals, irrespective of their group membership, and
their linguistic, cultural or ethnic specificity.
Clearly, the concept of equality is determined by the social environ-
ment and relational attitudes of groups engaged in establishing what “ equal
treatment” means. Being an intersubjectively and relatively defined social
good, equality is embedded in the general social and, crucially, political con-
text. It is operationalized and endowed with meanings which make sense to
individuals and groups, engaged in the effort of negotiating the terms of co-
operation and finally, integration. Therefore the discussion on social justice is
central for debating the processes of intergroup relations generally, and inte-
gration processes particularly. Minority opinions play an important part in
these deliberations, because they allow a more elaborate definition of justice,
and oppose perpetuation of institutional equilibria, maintaining the majority’s
monopoly of power resources.
The problem of equality between the minority and majority is not lim-
ited to countries we investigate in the volume. Like the majority of EU states,
the polities across CEE are defined in terms of nation-states. From within this
context, every state in the region “belongs” to one particular ethnic group,
whose name it bears; to the group, whose special relation with “its” state is
rarely questioned. At the same time, various European and international or-
ganizations sought to initiate institutional changes which would facilitate
minority participation in decision-making processes. The EU, COE, HCNM
all questioned the monopoly of states’ majorities over political resources in
“their” countries, suggesting a potential security dilemma should minority
______________________________________________________________
grievances be continuously neglected. On the flip side, even though political

actors across CEE were reluctant to question the dominant status of majority
groups over minorities in their societies, formal equality between the groups
provides the starting point for deliberation on further concessions.
The contributions of the book address this relationship head-on. Most
of them conclude that no regulations prescribing equal access of minority
groups to political resources are effective in their own right. Instead, financial
support and affirmative action are among the resources that make some dif-
ference over time, resulting in – possibly, but not necessarily – a multicul-
tural outlook of a given society. Along the lines suggested in the current
multiculturalism debate, our authors observe that common civic identity of
state citizens, where “constitutional patriotism” dominates over ethnic par-
ticularism are not devoid of ethnic criteria (Kymlicka, 2000; Soysal, 1994;
Parekh, 2000).
Most definitely, no state which nurtures the civic identity of its citi-
zens over ethnically defined group-memberships is entirely free of bias in
favour of its constituent culture. All multicultural societies establish some
form of cultural hierarchies in the public sphere, leaving unquestioned the
relation between the official state language and minority languages, the core
state culture/s and non-core cultures, the state’s dominant group and non-
dominant communities. In this sense, our contributors observe that unless the
states in CEE define their societies in cultural, linguistic, racial and any other
exclusive terms, one can hardly speak of accomplished integration.
This does not mean the end of appreciation for cultural differences in
societies, but requires challenging the assumption that all individuals have
equal resources, irrespective of their personal cultural endowments. As
Malloy rightly points out, “the value of culture must be appreciated as a valu-
able contribution to the individual’s development and capability to function
in society, especially the individual’s capability to act in the economic sphere
without risking exclusion” (2005, p. 12). This point is of particular salience
throughout the region we study in the book. Here, the cultural markers domi-
nate the design of political institutions and thus require particular attention to
minority opinions while addressing the issue of integration.
The debate of unequal resource distribution between the majorities
and minorities across CEE states would be incomplete without addressing the
role of state-building in creating the basic provisions for the understanding of
multiculturalism in the given societies. Where some scholars see institutional
design to be of crucial importance for equal access to state resources from
minority groups (Linz and Stepan, 1996), others tend to disagree. Political
participation, they argue, is crucial to establish the rules of the game and is
central for broad-scale democratization in societies (Rueschmeyer et al.,
1998). In this context, structural mechanisms available to the members of a
minority to improve their position within political settings across CEE is
14 Introduction
______________________________________________________________
always defined by the members of the majority, who are – most obviously –
reluctant to render some of their structural advantage to other groups. Need-
less to say, this leaves plenty of room for improving mutual perceptions of
majorities and minorities across the region.
However, potential for improvement is most frequently mistaken for
deficits of existing institutional design, a point that need not be reproduced
here. Instead, additional attention should be granted to analyses of relations
between the state- and nation-building, which went hand in hand since the
inception of democratic movements against the socialist regimes in all coun-
tries across CEE (Brubaker, 1996; Brubaker, 2004; Jenne, 2006; Galbreath,
2005). If state- and nation-building are so closely interlinked, should one treat
the challenge of minority integration as a by-product of (post-socialist) de-
mocratic transition? Possibly this is the case, but it is not necessarily so. The
state approaches to minority integration in all CEE states address many issues
which are relevant to minority. And in many cases, even the nationalizing
states invite minority groups to cooperate with the existing institutions and
majority publics. However, the issues are more likely than not to be defined
by majority policy-makers, and the terms of cooperation are also dictated by
the dominant group. What we observe throughout CEE is ethnic and cultural
diversity that presents a challenge to the current debate of multi-culturalism.
The contributions in this volume suggest, among others that the state-
bearing nations continue to perceive themselves to be locked in position,
where active steps of protection of the national language, culture and ethno-
centric education are necessary. On the other hand, however, our authors
demonstrate that there is an anticipation of change in the relations between
the core and non-core ethnic communities across CEE countries. The major-
ity and minority are involved in shaping state policies, but the core ethnic
community plays a role far more decisive than does a minority. In this con-
text, the members of the minority are expected to adapt to the dominance of
the state-bearing ethnic group, its language, and importantly, its visions of
political community. The chapters addressing state-policies aimed at integra-
tion suggest that non-core groups are expected to accept the position assigned
to them by the majority in their state of residence.
The case-studies presented in the second section of our book make
clear that issues on which minority communities are invited to deliberate are
framed by majorities. In this, minority groups do not feature as equal partners
engaged in the process of institutional change. It is in this section of the book
that the limits of the state-led approach to societal integration become clearly
visible. As our contributors argue, intergroup relations remain tense due to a
tight connection between the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic interests of state-
bearing group, embedded in design of state institutions. Although the ethno-
centric agenda of many CEE states is to a degree balanced by international
leverage, state institutions tend to prefer homogeneous societies to be dealt
______________________________________________________________
with, over multicultural ones. This is where, as our contributors suggest, one
should look for multicultural solutions in the day-to-day interactions between
the individuals of various cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. Analy-
ses of relations between the members of majority and minority groups pro-
vide some insight into expected outcomes of integration on both sides as well
as strategies applicable on case to case basis.
3. The Role of Society in Minority Integration

To be effective, social integration requires a bottom-line consensus on what
individuals involved see as a desirable and necessary outcome. The terms and
the expected effects of integration need to be negotiated among and across
broad segments of both the majority and minority communities. However, as
our contributors observe, majority and minority groups seem to pursue differ-
ent goals and thus favour different, partially excluding means to achieve
societal integration. While the members of the majority regard integration as
a tool with which to increase social cohesion and improve institutional per-
formance, the members of minority usually seek to augment group integrity
and stability by securing the status of their group.
Scholarly investigations of the claims advanced by the members of
majority groups in the course of negotiating the terms of integrations are
usually regarded as instruments of nation- and state-building under the condi-
tions of uncertainty (Brubaker, 2004; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999). Particu-
larly, earlier discussions of majority claims emphasize the importance of the
legal framework of the state, historical experiences and international legal
standards of state sovereignty if formulated for the international consumer
(Vachudova, 2005). At the same time, others investigating the rhetoric of
majorities’ political entrepreneurs produced for a home audience argue that
the primary aim of this rhetoric rests with legitimizing majorities’ dominance
over local minorities (Pridham and Vanhanen, 1994; Nic Craith, 2006). Irre-
spective of the interpretation sought, majority populations throughout CEE
constitute the state-bearing nations and thus exhort significant pressures on
members of other groups, who happen to reside on the territory of “their”
state.
Therefore most students of post-socialist ethnic relations argue that the
emphasis on “special relation” of majority communities with “their” state
requires interpretations from a rational choice perspective (Laitin 1998;
Wimmer, 2002; Hale, 2008). The interpretations of the policies differ consid-
erably, depending on the strategies majority and minority groups deploy to
achieve the best possible outcomes from their interactions. Some claim that
nationalizing policies are nothing less than a thinly veiled effort to secure the
redistribution of available resources among the members of an in-group
(Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983; Hechter 2000). Others argue that the majori-
ties opt for nationalizing policies to circumvent ethnic tensions during the
16 Introduction
______________________________________________________________
period of institutional change (Connor, 1993; Pridham and Gallagher, 2000).

Yet another camp of rational choice interpretations suggests that ethnona-
tional mobilization of the majority is resulting from perceptions of immanent
external threat to the state and its constituent group (Fearon and Laitin 2003;
Laitin 2007; Saidemann, 2001). All these interpretations can be (and have
been) applied to all of the cases studied in this volume. Our contributors,
however, claim that it is impossible to understand political rationale behind
integration approaches throughout the region without taking seriously the
minority/majority relations outside of the formal institutional political arena.
The extent of political, social and economic changes across the region
had an immediate impact on the legal status of state-languages, opportunities
for minority education, political participation and representation of minority
populations. The policy-measures alone, however, fail to account for particu-
lar strategies of adaptation favoured by the members of non-dominant groups.
Where the members of majority groups were taking the upper hand in deter-
mining political reforms and path development of state institutions, many
members of minority populations were left estranged from political proc-
esses. However, day-to-day interactions, be it in public institutions, at work-
place, or in educational facilities remain an integral part of minorities’ inter-
action with the members of majority and improvement of intergroup rela-
tions. In a way, the members of minority communities tacitly confirm to the
structural limitations on their activities, when they interact with the members
of the majority on “their” terms and in “their” language, in institutions de-
signed to serve primarily the majorities’ interests. But how far do they accept
the terms of interaction? How do minorities address their grievances with
institutions in place, when they interact with one another?
The contributions in the section three of the volume suggest that even
despite being designed to the disadvantage of minorities, minority groups
have considerable leverage to participate in political decision making. The
section points out that throughout the region minorities have little say on
policy development in their states of residence, despite the fact that some
steps have been undertaken during the past decade across CEE to provide
additional opportunities for minority participation in public life. Throughout
the region states addressed some minority grievances, prompting minority’s
adaptation to the changing social reality, but there is only a limited frame-
work for non-dominant groups’ political participation. Mainly their activities
are confined to social cooperation envisaged by the state integration pro-
grammes, majority political actors and local initiatives.
This once again indicates that minority participation is not treasured
for its intrinsic value, i.e. as positively affecting institutional performance and
increasing diversity, but rather as symbolic engagement in affirming deci-
sions, previously made by the members of the majority. Here, the contribu-
tions underline that social participation is essential to support minority inte-
______________________________________________________________
gration effectively. However, the contributions also conclude that the major-
ity population continues to see the democratic transition as largely “their”
responsibility. So, what does minority integration entail? Is it integration for
participation, or integration through participation?
Effectively, the presence of minority groups requires the renegotiation
of institutionalized mechanisms for providing social services and ensuring the
base-line of economic equality through the lens of social justice. Across CEE
majorities, while not directly discouraging minority participation, engage in
dialogue with members of minority communities when they cannot address
the issues tangent on minority interests because of inadequate institutional
capacity. This aspect of majority/minority relations falls increasingly into the
EU focus on effective equality, non-discrimination and social justice which
represent the corner-stones of minority integration. Indeed, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU dedicates a whole chapter to equality, among
other things banning racial discrimination and calling for respect to cultural,
linguistic and religious diversity. In this document, the EU acknowledges that
the project of European integration can only be successful if membership of
an ethnic group does not legitimize social, economic and political marginali-
zation.
This suggests that the individual approach to minority integration,
which has been developing throughout the CEE region for the two past dec-
ades, finds some correspondence in national policies. Being primarily devised
as a positive response to the potential burdening of European external rela-
tions, especially security and stability on its Eastern borders, it revolutionized
majority/minority relations throughout Europe considerably. The multina-
tional nature of the EU, diversity of its resident population and increasing
diversity resulting from incoming migration all require reconsideration of
states’ relations with their minorities.
While some citizens could blend in and accommodate more effec-
tively under these conditions, those left behind and/or disenfranchised may
gradually alienate from society and the democratic political organization of
state affairs (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 151). Where some groups of citizens are
deprived of effective political participation because of their ethnic belonging,
the future of social relations would be particularly uncertain. In many cases
involving the status of minorities without a “kin state” international organiza-
tions were particularly engaged in drawing the attention of national policy-
makers to issues of minority needs and living conditions. While the well-
being and the status of minority was easily disconnected from security con-
cerns of their states of residence as was the case with Roma, the improvement
of status of minorities living of the “wrong side” of a nation-state border was
more difficult to negotiate. In this sense, EU enlargement has been conducive
for diminishing the fears of minority secession and irredentism, which could
undermine state integrity. Persisting social, economic and political cleavages
18 Introduction
______________________________________________________________
between ethnic minority communities and majority groups in CEE societies

have raised questions related to social justice, economic exclusion and politi-
cal marginalization.
The contributions in the second section of our volume address the dif-
ficulties of ‘stranded’ minorities in their states of residence such as Magyars
in Slovakia, as well as Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia. However, the
situation of Roma communities across CEE, as is particularly discussed in the
section three, fits well into this framework. Both, international institutions
and nation-states across CEE have undertaken measures to remedy the persis-
tent exclusion of many Roma communities. It remains to be seen, however,
which role each international organization and state agencies can assume in
fostering integration of this particular ethnic group. The development of mul-
tiple applicable international standards and benchmarks for integration poli-
cies are already in place. Nonetheless, Roma exclusion persists across the
region with the legal basis for equalizing measures not being fully exploited.
The EU Racial Equality Directive and Article 4 of the FCNM enable states to
apply affirmative action but it remains largely unclear under which condi-
tions the implementation of such action is compelling.
The notion of effective equality, however, requires interpretation and
agreement on its minimal meaning. In some cases, equal treatment of all
members of citizenry might adequately sustain differences in society; on
other occasions the lack of affirmative action is likely to perpetuate inequality
between ethnic groups, rather than induce their equal treatment. Because
ethnic minorities across the region differ greatly in their status as well as in
their access to political and social resources, only differentiated treatment of
groups can ensure individual equality of minority individuals with the mem-
bers of majority populations (Parekh, 2000, p. 240; Kymlicka, 2003, p. 153).
Not only does this apply to day-to-day interaction between the members of
the majority and minority populations, but also to state-led approaches to
integration and engagement of international organizations with the issues
tangent to minority equality.
In this context, sensitivity to cultural differences is decisive in negoti-
ating strategies of accommodation and integration of multicultural societies.
Where institutional intervention seeks to provide guidelines and benchmarks
for minority integration, international experience in devising instruments for
culturally neutral approaches is essential. This holds for international as well
as domestic approaches to treatment of minority groups. This requires inter-
national actors to justify attempts towards minority inclusion on a normative
basis, opening inroads for the inclusion of minorities of various kinds: racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic etc. In the absence of a ubiquitously ap-
plicable normative approach guiding international involvement with minority
integration at the local or national levels, policies cannot prefer any model of
integration once and for all. Instead, approaches to integration must be con-
______________________________________________________________
stantly updated to changing expectations of groups involved and re-adjusted

to preliminary results achieved. In this sense, while there is no European
master-plan for minority integration in place, room should be made available
for developing and implementing innovative approaches applicable outside of
each nation-state context.
4. The Structure of the Book

The volume is analyzing different levels of minority integration in three sepa-
rate sections. International organizations, such as the EU, OSCE, and COE
are playing an important role in the promotion of ideas and norms on ethnic
diversity and will be examined in the first place. Nation-states doubtlessly
play a crucial role in interpreting international norms and putting them into
policies. States can impose preferred concepts of inter-ethnic relations, but
they also provide fora for minority/majority conciliation to renegotiate the
terms of relations. The contributions also address the role local societies play
in accommodating ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity by engaging with
the abstract concept of integration practically.
The first part of the book reflects on the role international organiza-
tions and international law plays in promoting minority integration policies
throughout the region. The involvement of the EU (Riedel), the COE
(Morawa and Brosig) and the OSCE (Sabanadze) is scrutinized while dis-
cussing particular norms and standards set out by each of these organizations.
Especially during EU enlargement international organizations had first to
address protection of minorities and develop a legal framework for minority
integration. While the three organizations are active in the promotion of lib-
eral norms regulating minority integration standards, relations between the
nation-states, the resident minority groups, they pursue different, although
not incompatible goals. This section explores the concepts of minority inte-
gration, guiding their engagement with minority integration. Furthermore,
this section also highlights the very different instruments organizations apply
for the promotion of their concept of integration. While the OSCE relies on
quiet diplomacy for conflict prevention, the COE uses socialization through
monitoring. Finally the EU provides funding for integration projects and
makes membership conditional upon the respect of minority protection
norms.
The second part of the book discusses steps undertaken in different
countries across CEE to facilitate minority integration. The contributors of
this part of the book address the political steps initiated by both minority
political entrepreneurs, as well as those emanating from the majority domi-
nated political establishment. Here we observe a difference in narratives from
majority and minority political representatives in the process of negotiating
the terms of minority integration in the framework of the nation-state. The
contributions addressing the majority views on minority accommodation
20 Introduction
______________________________________________________________
suggest that the dominant groups endeavour to guarantee the central role of
their cultures for the state-community. In doing so, the majorities in CEE
countries appeal to the principles of multicultural social community empha-
sizing the importance of a common cultural core, to be accepted by all of the
ethnic and linguistic communities resident in the country and willing to inte-
grate. While the debates on multicultural citizenship are common place in
CEE today, the contributors indicate that frequently these have been instru-
mentalized by the state-bearing community to legitimize and perpetuate the
hierarchical relations between the resident ethnic groups.
However, policy steps initiated by the minority groups suggest that
their representatives act largely in pursuit of greater accountability by the
state of their residence. The chapters discussing the involvement of minority
political entrepreneurs in Hungary (Tremlett), Albania (Salamun), Estonia
(Malloy), Latvia (Agarin) and Slovakia (Regelmann) suggest that the needs
of social groups vary according to the history of their presence in the given
state. Unfortunately, the contributors to this volume conclude, that cultural
and linguistic needs of minorities are rarely met by their states of residence, if
they are made with reference to cultural pluralism. As is demonstrated in the
contributions, representatives of minority groups which highlight the persis-
tence of social exclusion and segregation are more likely to be marginalized
in the national politics, than achieve a notable concession for the group they
represent.
The third section of the volume examines social involvement in de-
veloping minority integration strategies. The authors in this section suggest
that the successful implementation of integration policies and their constant
development is highly dependent on the role taken by the majority popula-
tion. These views are supported by the studies of the Czech Republic (Cash-
man), Hungary (McGarry) and Macedonia (Nikolic). Furthermore, contribu-
tors in this section find that the integration initiatives stall when the state
majority is unprepared to take part in the process. Thereby inter-communal
dialogue advanced by NGOs or community groups is essential for effective
implementation of the national integration programmes and rapprochement
between minority and majority groups.
Despite the many challenges minority integration is facing at the ana-
lytical level we are investigating in this book, CEE states currently enjoy
favourable conditions to achieve this ambitious goal. No doubt, ethnic mi-
norities in today’s CEE have more opportunities to participate in political
processes and engage in social interaction on terms more favourable to them
as ever before. What our contributors see as decisive for guaranteeing equal-
ity between the majority and minority partners in the process, however, is the
engagement of all actors from the field. The international community, nation-
states, society, as well as the minority groups would need to further engage in
negotiating the terms of equal treatment for all members of societies affected.
______________________________________________________________
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22 Introduction
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Section I
International Organizations and Minority

Integration in Europe
The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights?
Manuela Riedel
The article presents various aspects of minority integration in

the EU’s internal and external dimension, discussing the main
legal texts and elements of equality and diversity as well as
recent developments in the field. The text discusses three
central questions: Did Brussels react to calls for common
European standards on minority issues, developing a legal and
political framework securing a uniform level of minority
protection? In this regard, does the EU initiate measures that go
beyond anti-discrimination? If so, are there any practical
consequences of the EU’s approach? The author finds that to
date, in the EU’s internal dimension, various programmes and
initiative exist but that there seems to be a lack of coordination
and interconnection. In this regard, the situation in the EU
might reflect ad hoc mechanisms learned from enlargement
preparations.
Introduction
In the early 1990s minority protection became an essential element of the
EU’s democracy promotion in post-communist states. In the light of the
breakdown of the Communist block and the war in former Yugoslavia, the
EU discovered minority protection as a means of maintaining security and
stability in the region and the EU, as a whole. As regards accession negotia-
tions, the European Commission was the main driver of minority protection,
using instruments such as conditionality.
Generally speaking, the EU’s attempts to create a diverse, tolerant and
multicultural society, and particularly the preparations for the ‘big bang’
enlargement of 2004, have introduced minority rights into European political
debate. To date, this has not been substantially reflected in legal texts and the
focus remained on non-discrimination rather than on the promotion of special
rights relevant for minorities. Nevertheless, several policy programmes, ini-
tiatives and statements by the European Commission hint at the fact that an
EU system of minority integration going beyond formal equality is evolving.
For example, over the last years the European Commission has developed
several action plans in order to promote equal opportunities for various
groups in danger of discrimination (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Ser-
vices, 2007, p. 7). Overall, in the internal dimension the European Parliament
was a driving force on minority-related issues such as racism and xenophobia
and adopted several resolutions on countering these phenomena in the mem-
28 The EU as a Promoter of Minority Rights
______________________________________________________________
ber states and on promoting linguistic and cultural rights (European Agency
for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 11). The relationship between minority
protection and non-discrimination is an ongoing debate, with a central ques-
tion being whether anti-discrimination provisions are sufficient to ensure
respect for minorities (see e.g. Tsilevich, 2001; Wiener and Schwellnus,
2004; Toggenburg, 2006). The debate has been heated in the context of the
EU directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (the so called Racial Equality Directive
(2000/43/EC)).
In my paper I present various aspects of minority integration in the
EU’s internal and external dimension, discussing the main legal texts and
elements of equality and diversity as well as recent developments in the field.
In order to outline the position of the EU on the matter, statements and initia-
tives of the European Commission will be taken as an example, due to the
Commission’s central role in this regard in both the EU’s external and inter-
nal affairs. Throughout the EU accession processes, the EU asked candidate
countries to comply with a number of more or less clearly defined conditions
regarding the living standard of minorities. Due to a lack of EU member
states’ obligation to fulfil the same criteria, discussion about so called “dou-
ble standards” evolved, calling for common European standards, applicable
to all members and candidates. The text discusses three central questions: Did
Brussels react to such claims, developing a legal and political framework
securing a uniform level of minority protection? In this regard, does the EU
initiate measures that go beyond anti-discrimination? If so, are there any
practical consequences of the EU’s approach? I find that to date, in the EU’s
internal dimension, various programmes and initiative exist but that there
seems to be a lack of coordination and interconnection. In this regard, the
situation in the EU might reflect ad hoc mechanisms learned from enlarge-
ment preparations.
1. Minority Integration in the EU’s External Relations

Only recently did minority protection become an issue in the EU’s external
relations. Generally, for the promotion of democratic principles, including
minority protection, the EU draws on definitions, instruments and experi-
ences from other European institutions that ‘traditionally’ deal with these
issues. This is due, among other reasons, to the fact that until the 1990s the
EU was almost exclusively focused on economic questions, with single initia-
tives of the European Parliament or formal declarations by other EU institu-
tions being exceptional. This is why since 1993, in the light of the new chal-
lenges Europe faced in the early 1990s, the Council of Europe (COE)1 and
the European Commission have developed a wide-ranging cooperation on,
amongst others, minority protection issues.
Manuela Riedel 29
______________________________________________________________
In the European Commission, the OSCE and COE Unit of the “Multi-
lateral Relations and Human Rights Directorate” of DG External Relations
(RELEX) is responsible for coordinating relations with the COE. Several
Directorate Generals do have direct relations with the COE on specific sub-
jects. One major event was the signing on 3 April 2001 of a Joint Declaration
on Co-operation and Partnership by Secretary General Walter Schwimmer for
the COE and Chris Patten for the European Commission, setting out the
framework and principles guiding the co-operation. Following decisions
taken at the COE Third Summit in May 2005, a Memorandum of Under-
standing was signed between the EU and the COE in May 2007, providing a
new framework for enhanced cooperation and political dialogue and
strengthened relations in areas of common interest such as human rights,
fundamental freedoms and social cohesion. Furthermore, the COE and the
EU decided to co-finance joint programmes, including initiatives supporting
national minorities. An example of a joint project is ‘Roma under the Stabil-
ity Pact’, aimed at promoting the status of the Roma population. In the course
of the past years, the European Commission frequently used documents of
the COE to justify its democratic conditions towards applicant states.
In the EU’s Agenda 2000, the COE’s Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities (1995) as well as Recommendation 1201
adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE in 1993 were described
as terms of reference for an effective protection of minorities (European
Commission, 1997b, p. 44). Since then, both texts can be found in many
Commission documents (e.g. European Commission, 2002, p. 10). Addition-
ally, at the judicial level there are some similarities between the two organi-
zations concerning protection against discrimination. With respect to Art. 14
ECHR and Art. 1 of Protocol n°12 to the ECHR, it is established case law of
the European Court of Human Rights that a difference of treatment is dis-
criminatory within the meaning of Article 14 ECHR if it has no objective and
reasonable justification, e.g. a legitimate aim (de Schutter, 2005, p. 14). As de
Schutter notes, the adoption of the EU anti-discrimination Directives in 2000
have influenced the European Court of Human Rights in its interpretation of
Article 14 ECHR; the court also referred to the EC Directives in Nachova (de
Schutter, 2005, p. 38). Not least, it is interesting to see that when describing
its cooperation with the EU, the COE outlines four areas of Brussels’ activi-
ties (see COE, 2008): firstly, measures of a mainly political character, devel-
oped by the European Parliament, in promotion of cultural diversity and
preservation of the cultural heritage; secondly, measures taken by the Euro-
pean Commission, the Council of Ministers (and the Parliament), character-
ized by a functional approach; thirdly, measures taken in the framework of
the EU foreign policy, without touching the internal sphere of the EU; and
fourthly, policies not oriented toward minorities which are nonetheless rele-
______________________________________________________________
vant to minority issues. The COE further stated that although at least 30 mil-
lion EU citizens speak a regional or “lesser used” language as their mother
tongue, EU efforts regarding the protection of minorities are often observed
as being “rather scarce and limited to controlling whether national law aimed
to protect minorities is compatible with EU principles and laws” (see e.g.
COE, 2008).
When it comes to cooperation with the OSCE, the most relevant
documents adopted within the framework of the OSCE2 concerning national
minorities in Europe are the Copenhagen Document of 1990 and the “Charter
of Paris for a New Europe”, signed on 21 November 1990, reiterating the
determination of the participant states to promote the rights of minorities. In
the follow-up-meeting in Helsinki in 1992 an OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities (HCNM) was appointed with the main task to provide
early warning and, if necessary, to activate mediation procedures when ten-
sions involving national minorities seem likely to develop in such a way as to
threaten peace and stability in the continent. Over the past years, the High
Commissioner has developed close links with the European Commission
concerning ethnic relations and minorities, in particular with the Directorate-
General for Enlargement. Generally, when evaluating the EU candidate coun-
tries’ performance with regard to minority protection, the European Commis-
sion has drawn on the expertise of the High Commissioner in the area of
minority standards and minority rights.
In this context, two observations might be of importance and do also
hint to the reach of an EU minority rights policy: First of all, cooperation
with other institutions dealing with various aspects of minority rights first and
foremost concerns the EU’s relations with countries hopeful of joining the
EU. Secondly, although minority protection is dealt with by various Euro-
pean organizations, there is no generally accepted legal definition of the term
‘minority,’ and the problem of whether minority protection should include
group rights also remains unsolved, leaving a lot of space of manoeuvre for
states to define their relations with minority groups. Problems relating to a
missing definition of what constitutes a minority and which rights should be
granted to minorities, importantly impacted on conditionality, the EU’s core
instrument for promoting the protection of minorities in the context of the
association and accession preparations of Central and Eastern European
countries. Therefore, despite the EU’s stronger power relating to its financial
capacity and strong incentives for EU membership, the actual impact of EU
conditionality on the situation of minorities living in Central and Eastern
European countries has been controversially discussed throughout past and
current association and accession processes.
In broad terms, conditionality was about the Copenhagen criteria of
1993, requiring amongst other things the rule of law and stable democratic
Manuela Riedel 31
______________________________________________________________
institutions as well as human rights and respect for minorities. With the
Maastricht Treaty, the protection of human rights was introduced into Euro-
pean primary law, with Art. 6 I TEU highlighting the importance of democ-
racy and human rights for the EU, but not mentioning minority protection.
Therefore, for countries in Central and Eastern Europe, criticism also related
to discrepancies between the lack of commitment to minority protection in
the internal affairs of existing EU member states and the prominent role the
issue played in the EU’s external relations. Moreover, the EU’s requirements
described in progress reports and other documents on minority protection
were vague, creating uncertainty among the candidates – for example, priori-
ties changed over time and different conditions were imposed on different
countries.
The effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality was hampered by confus-
ing nature of the regulation. The so-called double standards on minority pro-
tection requirements - between member and candidate countries and among
the candidates themselves - faced criticism within EU institutions, namely the
European Parliament. For example, the Intergroup for Traditional Minorities
of the European Parliament criticized the fact that minority standards that are
to be fulfilled by EU candidates are not adhered to by the ‘old European
states’, namely France and Greece, and that these double standards have
further led to the new EU members threatening to move away from already
achieved minority standards.3 Such concerns were already voiced at the very
beginning of the EU accession processes of Central and Eastern European
countries. For example, already in 1998, the Reflection Group on Long-Term
Implications of EU Enlargement under the chairmanship of Giuliano Amato
found that “the EU will find it hard to maintain its agnostic stance on minor-
ity rights vis-à-vis its Member States”. The group identified three main chal-
lenges the EU had to face (Mirga, 2005): firstly, new member states would
bring minority problems of direct concern to the EU; secondly, increased
migration both from new and poorer member states and from third countries
would accentuate the differentiation between these two groups and would
necessitate regulation of the status of non-EU minority groups; and thirdly
the special situation of Roma.
Nevertheless, the prominent place of minority protection in the course
of the pre–accession process leading to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements did
not result in the elaboration of any rigorous minority protection standard that
could be used by the EU both internally and externally, especially during the
preparation of the enlargements to come (Kochenov, 2007, p. 10). Once post-
communist countries joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, an approach to minor-
ity protection in those countries based on conditionality had to be abandoned,
and European attempts to stimulate ethno-cultural diversity in the new mem-
ber states have instead emphasized the themes of social inclusion, anti-
______________________________________________________________
discrimination and equal opportunities (Vermeersch, 2007, p. 2). Not least,
there were fears that due to the fact that there is no EU minority protection
system, the reforms conducted during accession preparations that led to a
certain degree of minority protection in the sense of promoting special lin-
guistic or cultural rights could be threatened by the principle of equal treat-
ment or non-discrimination which is fundamental to the functioning of the
EU internal market.
The European Commission and other institutions might therefore face
the question whether special rights for minorities that were demanded during
accession processes can go together with fundamental market rules the EU is
based on. Nonetheless, as regards the EU’s commitment to minority protec-
tion in third countries, the European Commission recently emphasized that it
will continue to promote the values of non-discrimination and equal opportu-
nities in its enlargement policy, with special attention to be paid to the rights
of persons belonging to linguistic or cultural minorities (European Commis-
sion, 2008, p. 7).
2. Minority Integration in the EU – Promoting Equality

while Respecting Diversity
The EU approach to protection of minorities does evolve around several
critical issues. Non-discrimination is at the core of the EU’s strategy to com-
bat inequalities and is one of the basic principles of the internal market. In
this sense, the European Commission frequently highlights that the EU is
founded on the shared principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and that all kinds of discrimination under-
mine these shared values (see e.g. European Commission, 2008, p. 2). In
1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam gave new powers for European action against
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disabil-
ity, age or sexual orientation. Discrimination in employment and occupa-
tional matters has been prohibited on all these grounds. These powers apply
to all, irrespective of whether they belong to minorities or not. The frame-
work on non-discrimination was significantly extended by Art. 13 of the
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, which established a legal basis at EU level to
adopt measures to combat discrimination on the grounds of sex, race or eth-
nic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Resulting
from the adoption of Art. 13 EC, two new Framework Directives were
adopted in 2000, being the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment
Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services,
2007, p. 5). As will be further outlined, both Directives recognize positive
action with a view to ensuring full equality in practice. In the meantime, the
term ‘shall not prevent’ implies that positive action provisions as such do not
make positive action compulsory (European Commission, 2007a, p. 28).
Manuela Riedel 33
______________________________________________________________
In addition, the Racial Equality Directive was designed “to lay down a
framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic
origin, with a view to putting into effect in the member states the principle of
equal treatment” (Art. 1). The Directive itself does not contain a definition of
what is meant by racial or ethnic origin. The preamble indicates that the Un-
ion rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate hu-
man races. However, due to the term ‘ethnic origin’ the directive is relevant
for ethnic groups, including ethnic minorities. The Directive defines direct
and indirect discrimination (Art. 2) and determines the scope as applying to
all persons of the public and private sector regarding amongst others access
to employment, occupation, training, social protection, social advantages,
education and housing (Art. 3). Positive action, meaning that the member
states are allowed to take special measures for certain groups in order to
achieve the groups’ access to equality, shall help the member states to pre-
vent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin (Art.
5).4 The agenda of positive duties is closely aligned with the mainstreaming
approach. This seeks the integration of equality objectives across all areas
and into all stages of policy formulation, implementation and evaluation
(European Commission, 2004a, p. 32, see below the section on new govern-
ance). The Directive also urged member states to ensure equal opportunities
for minorities’ access to judicial and administrative procedures (Art. 7).
Importantly, the Directive asks member states to introduce into their
national legal systems measures that are necessary to protect individuals from
adverse treatment or adverse consequences as a reaction to a complaint or a
proceeding aimed at enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treat-
ment (Art. 9 on victimization). In the case of discriminatory dismissal, the
remedy granted must include either reinstatement or compensation (Bell,
Chopin, Palmer, 2006, p. 83). In Art. 13 of the Directive, the EU required all
member states to establish ‘bodies’ that assist victims of racial and ethnic
discrimination, to conduct surveys about the forms and prevalence of dis-
crimination and to issue reports and recommendations (Art. 17). In 2006, the
European Commission reported that most member states have implemented
Art. 13 either by designating existing institutions or by setting up new institu-
tions carrying out the competences mentioned in the Directive (European
Commission, 2006, p. 20). The legal anti-discrimination framework is ac-
companied and supported by a set of other arrangements such as the EU Ac-
tion programme against discrimination or Raxen.
Criticism of the Racial Equality Directive relates amongst other areas
to a missing definition of what constitutes a minority, with some authors
claiming that this would play into the hands of member states denying the
existence of minorities (Brennan, 2004, p. 321). In 2007, the European
Commission itself stated that there might be a certain degree of tension be-
______________________________________________________________
tween the limited competence base of the Community (Art. 3 (1) Race Equal-
ity Directive) and some areas enumerated in the Directive, namely education,
health care and housing and furthermore, the exact scope of other areas, like
social advantages and access to and supply of goods and services, which are
available to the public, including housing is “everything but clear” (European
Commission, 2007, p. 24). It is important to note that in light of the EU’s
limited competences, it is primarily the responsibility of the member states to
take care of many areas crucial for the integration of minorities, including
education, employment and social inclusion. In these fields, the EU is limited
to coordinating member states’ policies, and supporting their implementation,
e.g. through the Structural Funds.
As regards the situation at national level, at the time when the anti-
discrimination directives were set up, most EU member states already had in
place some legal provisions addressing the issue of discrimination on the
grounds of race or ethnic origin, but there were big differences regarding the
scope and systematic application of legislation. However, for some of the
member states and most of the countries then hoping to join the EU in 2004,
anti-discrimination legislation was factually non-existent (European Agency
for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 17). In any case, a legal framework address-
ing discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic origin was described to
be an important development across the EU (ibid.).
Besides the EU’s non-discrimination legislation, EU member states
are required to adopt National Action Plans (NAPs) addressing exclusion at
all levels of society. The plans are funded via the European Social Fund, the
EQUAL Programme and the European Structural and Cohesion Fund, with
the main objective being the reduction of disparities in development among
member states and regions in order to strengthen the economy and social
cohesion. In order to be eligible for structural funds, member states must
prepare National Development Plans (NDPs) (EC Council Regulation
1260/1999), detailing how they will pursue their development objectives and
priorities (European Agency For Reconstruction, 2006, p. 56). The Lisbon
European Council of March 2000 asked member states and the European
Commission to make a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and in
its 2005 revision, which finally resulted in the Integrated Guidelines for Em-
ployment (2005–2008), the European Council accentuated the need to focus
on growth and employment and a better integration of “vulnerable groups” in
the labour market (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 13). These
legal and political developments of recent years have led to the EU having
one of the worlds most advanced legal frameworks relating to non-
discrimination.
Nonetheless, there are some areas in which the EU devotes special at-
tention to minorities, therefore leading to the question to what extent the EU
Manuela Riedel 35
______________________________________________________________
is taking and willing to take measures which go beyond non-discrimination.
An obvious example of this development is the mentioning of respect for the
rights of persons belonging to minorities in the text of the EU constitution
draft and the to-be-into-force EU treaty (Art. 2).5 Another example is the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights laying down the equality before law of all
people (Art. 20) and prohibiting discrimination on any ground (Art. 21). In
the meantime, it requests the Union to protect cultural, religious and linguis-
tic diversity (Art. 22).
In so far as it explicitly addresses minorities in its internal policy, e.g.
regarding the European Employment Strategy and the Process of Social In-
clusion, the EU tends to focus on ‘ethnic minorities’ (European Commission,
2007, p. 6). Though the European Commission from time to time talks about
minorities as being groups, it seems that the EU’s approach is rather focused
on granting rights of relevance for individual people who are members of a
minority group, with Roma and the EU’s position vis-à-vis candidate coun-
tries being an exception to this rule. The European Commission defines a
minority group as having stable ethnic, linguistic or religious characteristics
which are different from the rest of the population, as well as a numerical
minority position and the wish to preserve its own, separate cultural identity
(European Commission, 2007, p. 12). As concerns racial or ethnic origin, in
the view of the European Commission, the prohibition of discrimination goes
beyond employment, serving the diversity of European societies which in
Brussels-speak is one of Europe’s strengths and needs to be protected (Euro-
pean Commission, 2008, p. 5). One year after the big enlargement of 2004
the European Commission emphasized that there was a need to go beyond
anti-discrimination and that “the EU should reinforce its efforts to promote
equal opportunities for all, in order to tackle the structural barriers faced by
migrants, ethnic minorities, the disabled, older and younger workers and
other vulnerable groups” (European Commission, 2005, point 2 and 10). The
European Commission concluded that one of the major challenges the
enlarged EU is facing was to “develop a coherent and effective approach to
the social and labour market integration of ethnic minorities” (ibid.).
Apart from social and labour market integration, the European Com-
mission frequently outlines that issues of special relevance for minorities
concern language rights in the field of education, media, and communications
with authorities, and rights relating to culture as well as to political participa-
tion (European Commission, 2007, p. 12). Not least, preservation of linguistic
diversity is one of the issues frequently addressed by the European Union
(see European Commission, 2003a).
The increasing emphasis on minority protection within the EU partly
relates to the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which to date is
one of the main promoters of human rights within the EU. As regards minori-
______________________________________________________________
ties, meaning both traditional minorities and migrants, residing in the EU
member states, the ECJ in several cases dealt with the use of language before
national courts (see e.g. Mutsch C-137/84, Bickel & Franz C-274/96) or in
the field of labour (see e.g. Groener C-379/87). In its rulings, the ECJ empha-
sized that linguistic requirement generally must be applied in a proportionate
and non-discriminatory manner and that in certain circumstances policies
promoting language protection can go together with internal market rules
(Angonese C-281/98; for a detailed discussion of the ECJ’s rulings see van
Bossuyt, 2007, p. 9).
Nevertheless, due to a lack of competences defined in the EU’s pri-
mary law, the ECJ in these cases did not address the issue of minority protec-
tion but focused instead on the importance of the protection of linguistic
rights in the context of the free movement of workers in the EU. In other
cases, the ECJ dismissed regional language arrangements in the interest of
community law (van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 9). The above mentioned Groener
case showed that a general application of language requirements (affecting
the free movement of workers) can be a form of indirect discrimination on
the basis of nationality, should there not be a legitimate objective (European
Commission, 2007, p. 28). In this regard, the European Commission refers to
de Schutter who found that “a similar obligation to treat differently situations
which are substantively different may be derived from the definition of indi-
rect discrimination in article 2(2)(b) of the Racial Equality Directive” (ibid.).
As regards positive action, the European Commission noted that while the
case law of the ECJ is developing in relation to positive action, and increas-
ingly seems to acknowledge the substantive equality goal, it remains rather
restrictive towards forms of positive action aimed at equality of results
(European Commission, 2007, p. 7). Some authors found that the ECJ has
been very reluctant in accepting positive discrimination (van Bossuyt, 2007,
p. 3). However, judgments concerning language rights, for example, could
favour ‘new minorities’ (such as Turkish immigrants in Germany) that have
the nationality of a member state while exercising rights granted in the TEC
(van Bossuyt, 2007, p. 9).
All in all, in the field of linguistic rights and internal market provi-
sions, the EU’s initiatives and legal texts as well as the case law of the ECJ
can be understood as favouring ‘new minorities’ while questions of tradi-
tional national minorities seem to remain an issue of EU enlargements proc-
esses and accession negotiations. Therefore, it is justifiable to argue that vis-
à-vis its member states, the European Commission and the ECJ first of all eye
compliance with internal market rules, allowing and advancing measures that
go beyond anti-discrimination under these restrictions. In this regard, a 2005
resolution of the European Parliament illustrates that the EU institutions at
some point diverged over the success and reach of Commission statements
Manuela Riedel 37
______________________________________________________________
and policies: The MEPs found that there was a difference between the protec-
tion of minorities and anti-discrimination policies, as equal treatment “is a
basic right, not a privilege, of all citizens” and that being part of a minority
can never justify or explain either exclusion or discrimination (European
Parliament, 2005, p. 2). In its resolution, the European Parliament further
pointed out that EU enlargements led and will lead to greater cultural and
linguistic diversity and that the European Commission should therefore estab-
lish a policy standard for the protection of national minorities, also in light of
the COE Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
(European Parliament, 2005, p. 3).
Access to participation in all aspects of daily life and promotion of
their values and interests in a pluralist society are said to be of special rele-
vance for minorities. The following section describes instruments and meas-
ures applied by the EU that shall help in achieving minority integration in
Europe.
3. Formal Equality versus Substantive Equality

A much-discussed issue has been whether the protection and integration of
persons belonging to minorities would require ‘equal’ rights or ‘special’
rights (European Commission, 2007, p. 5, for a summary of the debate, see
European Commission, 2004). In 2007, the European Commission pointed to
the fact that ‘special’ rights are not necessarily the opposite of ‘equal’ rights,
depending on what conception of equality one embraces (ibid.). The Euro-
pean Commission highlighted that there is an important distinction between
formal equality (which sets out to treat everybody in the same way) and sub-
stantive, or full equality: Full equality might necessitate differential treatment
or special rights, which according to the European Commission are not meant
to be privileges. In the view of the European Commission, it is widely ac-
cepted that an adequate system of minority protection is based on non-
discrimination in combination with individual human rights of special rele-
vance for minorities and secondly on minority-specific standards aimed at
protecting and promoting the right to identity of minorities (European Com-
mission, 2007, p. 6). With regard to all forms of discrimination in the context
of Art. 13 EC, the European Commission announced that in its 2008 legisla-
tive and work programme, it would propose new initiatives to complete the
legal framework, building on the results of an extensive public consultation
process. The European Commission emphasized that this commitment re-
sponded to the Council’s calls to the Commission to examine any gaps that
may exist in the current Community anti-discrimination legislative frame-
work, and the European Parliament’s repeated requests for the framework to
be extended (European Commission, 2008, p. 4).
______________________________________________________________
Against this background, this section asks which measures the EU
takes to tackle its goal of promoting anti-discrimination and the granting of
special rights to minorities at the same time. In the following, some instru-
ments of new governance that help promoting the integration of minorities
are outlined. New governance mechanisms are central to the European Com-
mission’s strategy to address discrimination matters (European Commission,
2008, p. 9). The 2001 White Paper on European Governance defines govern-
ance as a measure of better combining different policy tools such as legisla-
tion and action programmes. This would contribute to strengthening the
Community method, guaranteeing both the diversity and effectiveness of the
Union (European Commission, 2001, p. 8). Central to the concept are open-
ness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. These princi-
ples shall help to demonstrate how member states, by acting together within
the Union, are able to tackle their concerns more effectively (ibid., p. 3). One
intention of the European Commission in developing new governance
mechanisms is to build on established practice in some member states, in-
cluding providing for a single legal procedure for victims of discrimination to
submit complaints and treating evidence that discrimination has occurred on
more than one ground as an aggravating factor. Furthermore, the European
Commission wants to raise awareness regarding multiple discriminations by
financing activities and providing funding for smaller networks of NGOs
representing intersectional groups (European Commission, 2008, p. 9).
In its July 2008 communication on the EU’s renewed commitment to
non-discrimination and equal opportunities, the European Commission high-
lighted that legislative protection against discrimination must be accompa-
nied by an active strategy to promote non-discrimination and equal opportu-
nities, adding that dialogue on non-discrimination policy must be fostered
and more effective use must be made of the instruments available, both in
general and with particular emphasis on promoting the social inclusion of
Roma (European Commission, 2008, p. 2). The European Commission
pointed to the fact that the national equality bodies played a particularly im-
portant role in combating discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic ori-
gins in the member states and that the Commission supports the development
of cooperation between, and capacity-building of, equality bodies via the
Equinet network (European Commission, 2008, p. 3).
A European network of Equality Bodies, Equinet, was set up to facili-
tate exchange of information between Equality Bodies across Europe, and to
support the uniform implementation of EU anti-discrimination law and the
levelling-up of legal protection for victims (EU Agency for Fundamental
Rights, 2007, p. 12). In the meantime, Brussels highlighted that still there is
no uniform minimum level of protection within the EU for people who suf-
fered discrimination (European Commission, 2008, p. 4). As the European
Manuela Riedel 39
______________________________________________________________
Commission has pointed out, advancing non-discrimination and equal oppor-
tunities for rely both on a sound legislative basis and on a range of policy
tools, including awareness-raising, mainstreaming, data collection and posi-
tive action (European Commission, 2008, p. 6).
Positive action was acknowledged by the EU in the Treaty of Amster-
dam, with Art. 141 EC allowing the member states to take special measures
in order to promote equal employment chances in terms of gender equality.
Identical treatment may result in formal equality, but cannot suffice to bring
about equality in practice. This is why the EU non-discrimination legislation
does not prevent any member state from maintaining or adopting specific
measures to prevent, or compensate for, disadvantages linked to discrimina-
tion on grounds where there is provision for protection (European Commis-
sion, 2008, p. 7). Positive action might be taken regarding (i) conditions for
access to employment, to self-employment and to occupations, including
selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity
and at all levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion; (ii) ac-
cess to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training,
advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experi-
ence and (iii) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and
pay (Art. 3 Racial Equality Directive). According to Art. 4 of the Race Equal-
ity Directive, differential treatment shall not constitute discrimination if pur-
suing a legitimate objective. As of January 2007, positive action was pro-
vided for in the national legislation of at least 20 EU member states including
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Euro-
pean Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2008, p. 7).
Regarding another element of new governance discussed in this con-
tribution, the European Commission is of the opinion that mainstreaming
principles should apply across all grounds covered by Article 13 EC “if the
inequality and discrimination suffered by all groups are to be reduced”
(European Commission, 2008, p. 6). Non-discrimination mainstreaming is
broadly about ensuring the integration of an equality perspective into all
stages of the policy-making process – from design through to implementa-
tion, monitoring and evaluation (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services,
2007, p. 1). The aim is to reduce levels of discrimination suffered by particu-
lar social groups and to improve equality outcomes for individuals (ibid.).
Mainstreaming has an important function in reinforcing anti-discrimination
and in achieving the Lisbon objectives, namely increasing labour market
participation of disadvantaged groups.
The third main tool, impact assessment, is potentially one of the most
important instruments through which non-discrimination and equal opportu-
nity principles can be taken into account in the formulation of EU policies,
______________________________________________________________
legislation and programmes (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services,
2007, p. 7). In 2001, the European Commission introduced an obligation to
scrutinize all new legislative proposals to ensure respect for fundamental
rights (ibid.). In 2005, the revised Impact Assessment Guidelines (SEC
(2005) 791 of 15 June 2005) formulated a single instrument through which
the economic, social and environmental impacts of proposed policies and
legislation could be assessed. The guidelines include checklists of the types
of impacts to be considered in carrying out impact assessment work, includ-
ing some in relation to fundamental rights (ibid.).
Furthermore, the Lisbon strategy introduced the Open Method of Co-
ordination (OMC) as a means of governance using soft law mechanisms
(guidelines, indicators, benchmarking and best practices) and including
amongst others the development of National Action Plans (Schmidt, 2007, p.
2). Due to the fact that some member states included cultural policies in their
National Action Plans without mentioning how these will enhance social
inclusion of ethnic minorities, the European Commission identified culture as
an area of interest leading to fostering of identity (see European Commission,
2005a). Already in a 2003 report, the European Commission emphasized
cultural policies as a central part of any approach to addressing social exclu-
sion, presenting access to culture, problems of culture in remote areas, crea-
tive activities and cultural activities to promote the social inclusion of ethnic
minorities as main areas of interest (Schmidt, 2007, p. 3, see European
Commission, 2003).
All the measures discussed so far do not exhaust the situation and
therefore there are other measures underlining the EU’s aim to combat dis-
crimination: The Community Action Programme to combat discrimination
(2001–2006), adopted by Council Decision of 27 November 2001, put for-
ward a broader action programme aimed at combating all forms of discrimi-
nation referred to in the Amsterdam Treaty, other than discrimination based
on gender (European Agency of Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 11). The pro-
gramme was established to support the effective implementation of new EU
anti-discrimination legislation and targeted various stakeholders to develop
appropriate and effective anti-discrimination legislation and policies, across
the EU, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and EU candidate countries
(European Commission, 2004a, p. 32). It aimed at improving the understand-
ing of issues related to discrimination, developing the capacity to tackle dis-
crimination effectively and promoting the values underlying the fight against
discrimination. Not least, the adoption of the Community Action Programme
provided a financial framework through which measures to combat and pre-
vent discrimination in support of the implementation of the two Directives
could be undertaken by the member states (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation
Services, 2007, p. 5).
Manuela Riedel 41
______________________________________________________________
Furthermore, the European Year against Racism (1997) and the 2007
European Year of Equal Opportunities for all were designed to further en-
courage non-discrimination mainstreaming in policy-making (Centre for
Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 5). The European Year of Equal
Opportunities was set up to show that “all people are entitled to equal treat-
ment, irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability,
age or sexual orientation” (European Parliament and European Council Deci-
sion No. 771/2006/EC). It served to explain to groups that are at risk of dis-
crimination their rights and the European legislation in the field of non-
discrimination (Decision 771/2006/EC, Art. 2). Previously,, as a follow-up to
the Green Paper on equality and non-discrimination in an enlarged Europe
(2004), the European Commission in 2005 set out a framework strategy for
the positive and active promotion of non-discrimination and equal opportuni-
ties for all in order to ensure effective legal protection against discrimination
(European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007, p. 12). At the community
level, Inter-service Working Groups have been set up on equality-related
issues, such as disability, gender, racism and xenophobia (Centre for Strategy
& Evaluation Services, 2007, p. 8). Further, in the 2007-13 financial perspec-
tive, non-discrimination is playing a greater role (ibid.).
As regards Roma, the European Commission recently highlighted that
the problem of widespread persisting individual and institutional discrimina-
tion and unemployment as well as poverty is unacceptable from a human
rights perspective but also from the perspective of social cohesion (European
Commission, 2008, p. 9). Furthermore, while generally the EU’s legislative
measures and policy proposals with respect to minority integration are ad-
dressed to the member states alone, the situation of Roma was described as
being a joint responsibility of the EU and its member states (ibid.). In this
regard, the European Commission plans to step up its work with national
equality bodies and to promote the involvement of Roma in policy develop-
ment and implementation (ibid.). For now, within the European Commission,
an Inter-Service Group – chaired by the Directorate General for Employment,
Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities – coordinates the EU’s programmes
and policies with regard to Roma issues. (For further reading on the EU’s
strategy towards Roma, see Tremlett in this volume.) Not least, in 2008 the
European Parliament issued a resolution on a European strategy on Roma,
pointing to the need to find a comprehensive approach at EU level whilst
acknowledging that crucial competences and resources fall within the respon-
sibilities of member states (European Parliament, 2008, point 5 and 6).
Over the last years, besides programmes and initiatives, several insti-
tutions have been created or further developed in order to strengthen the EU’s
aim to fight discrimination, including with regard to minorities. For example,
in 2007 the EU High Level Group of Experts on the Social and Labour Mar-
______________________________________________________________
ket Inclusion of Ethnic Minorities was nominated (Commission Decision No.
2006/33/EC, p. 1). The group’s task is to draft reports and to provide recom-
mendations on “how Europe can enhance the inclusion of minorities in the
labour market” (Commission Decision No. 2006/33/EC, p. 1).
Next to the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental
Rights and the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), the European
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and RAXEN are central to Brussels’
strategy. The FRA6 is an independent body of the EU, established in 2007
and based in Vienna. The agency builds on the former European Monitoring
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). EUMC was tasked to support
policy responses and supplementary measures to combat racism and xeno-
phobia in the EU by providing the community and its member states with
evidence-based analyses, conclusions and opinions on the situation of racism,
xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the Union (EU Agency for Fundamental
Rights, 2007, p. 10). FRA assists member states, candidate countries and EU
institutions on human rights matters within in the meaning of Art. 6(2) of the
Treaty of the EU, including the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, and as reflected in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. FRA works on racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and related intoler-
ance, applying tools such as data collection mechanisms, analysis of informa-
tion on the development of fundamental rights in the EU and cooperation
with governments and international organizations. Each member state has a
National Liaison Officer. A cooperation agreement with the COE (namely
with the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Commis-
sioner for Human Rights and the COE’s department for social cohesion) has
been concluded in order to avoid duplication, ensure complementarities and
mutually reinforce each other’s work.
FRA also cooperates with the OSCE, namely the Office for Democ-
ratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Office of the High Commissioner
on National Minorities. Another important aspect of FRA’s work is coopera-
tion with civil society. Art. 2 of the Council decision on the FRA’s multi-
annual framework for 2007–2012 identified discrimination against persons
belonging to minorities as one of the agency’s thematic areas (Council Deci-
sion 2008). The agency’s budget will increase from 14 million Euros in 2008
to 22 million Euros in 2012, pointing to the importance the EU devotes to
issues dealt with by the agency. Since 2000, FRA has collected data on issues
regarding racism, xenophobia and related intolerances through its RAXEN
National Focal Points (NFPs) covering all EU member states. The focal
points provide reporting on legislation, racist violence and crime, employ-
ment, education, housing and health and are primarily used to develop com-
parative analyses as well as policies and initiatives promoting equality and
diversity.
Manuela Riedel 43
______________________________________________________________
Data collection for improved monitoring in the development of minor-
ity protection within the EU has additionally provided for a lively debate over
the last years (see e.g. Minority Rights Group International, 2006, Negrin,
2003). Despite the fact that member states are not obliged by the anti-
discrimination directives to collect data on discrimination, data collection and
use is relevant in respect of several key aspects of the directives (Bell, Cho-
pin, Palmer, 2006, p. 74). The EU Network of Independent Experts on Fun-
damental Rights (CFR-CDF) stressed that monitoring is required to combat
forms of indirect discrimination as well as social exclusion of vulnerable
groups on the employment market. (CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 15). In the mean-
time, the network further pointed out difficulties related to monitoring with
respect to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, namely fear of certain
states that improved monitoring mechanisms could lead to a certain recogni-
tion of the existence of such groups by these states and open the way to vin-
dication of ‘special rights’ of minorities (ibid.).
In addition, the network hinted to the fact that members of the groups
concerned, on the other hand, may fear that data relating to the ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic membership will be misused, and may lead to discrimina-
tion (ibid.). Ethnic, religious or linguistic monitoring should not be equated
with the recognition of certain rights to minorities, rather it should be seen as
a tool in an anti-discrimination strategy, the network further argued (ibid.),
adding that amongst others language proficiency requirements as well as
access to citizenship and the prohibition on the grounds of ethnic origin con-
tinue to be major forms of discrimination against minorities in the region
(CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 19). In the meantime, the network emphasized that in
the light of the European Employment Strategy it was not necessary for the
EU member states to adopt positive action schemes, except for certain groups
such as Roma who are facing a situation of structural disadvantage in all
areas of social life (CFR-CDF, 2005, p. 25). Apart from employment, the
promotion of policies favouring the integration of certain underprivileged
minorities requires the collection of information on access to health care,
education or adequate housing, the network highlighted (CFR-CDF, 2005, p.
26).
The aspects discussed above relating to EU policies, programmes and
institutions that might impact on the situation of minorities living in member
states and in states with close relations to the EU illustrate that the EU’s main
concern is social and labour market integration, based on non-discrimination
and mainstreaming. The work of FRA, fostering amongst others the dialogue
on non-discrimination, is an example for this. Therefore, single statements of
the EU, like the 2007 announcement that next to non-discrimination minor-
ity-specific standards must be promoted (European Commission, 2007, p. 6)
seem to be less effective and rarely advanced, hence being without substan-
______________________________________________________________
tive effects in practice. An exception might be the elaboration of a Roma
strategy, but still, it seems that programmes and initiatives do lack some
coordination and interconnection. In this regard, there might be a case for
arguing that indeed, there has been a spill-back from enlargement prepara-
tions towards EU member states, meaning that measures going beyond non-
discrimination and promoting e.g. cultural rights are ad hoc and somehow
inconsistent.
Conclusion and Summary of Academic Discussion

Finally, as a round-up, what does the academic world say about successes
and shortcomings of the EU’s instruments in the field of minority protection
and the actual impact on the life of minorities?
As regards the Racial Equality Directive, many authors criticize that
the exception for difference of treatment is based on nationality, arguing that
difference of treatment on grounds of racial or ethnic origin will often coin-
cide with differences in nationality and that this exception may make it diffi-
cult in practice for third country nationals to enforce successfully the Direc-
tive and could amount to indirect discrimination (for a summary of academic
discussion, see European Commission, 2004a, p. 16; in its conclusion about
the main findings of academic literature the Commission points out that due
to the fact that many authors focus on shortcomings of EU anti-
discrimination legislation with regard to human rights, this dimension must
be strengthened in the future, see p. 32).
The scope for positive action under the directives based on Art. 13 EC
and the question of whether this should be classified as an exception of the
principle of equal treatment are discussed in the literature (ibid.). The Euro-
pean Commission further highlights that some authors note that the directives
do build a bridge between non-discrimination and human rights (ibid., see
e.g. Mahlmann, 2003; Dollat, 2002).
This interpretation by the European Commission seems to reflect the
academic debate on the issue. Many authors draw a distinction between ‘for-
mal equal treatment’ and ‘substantive equality’. The first concept refers to
situations where two categories of persons whose factual and legal circum-
stances disclose no essential difference are treated differently or where situa-
tions which are different they are treated in an identical manner. For the sec-
ond concept, equal treatment may not be sufficient to achieve full equality in
practice and positive action is needed to compensate for inequalities caused
e.g. by different education or housing situations (European Commission,
2004a, p. 17). Therefore, some authors find that positive action is an excep-
tion to the principle of formal equal treatment or a vital component of achiev-
ing substantive equality, while some are critical of this approach as it may
limit the subsequent scope for such initiatives (European Commission, 2004a,
Manuela Riedel 45
______________________________________________________________
p. 27). Others emphasize that positive action is not an exception to the princi-
ple of equal treatment rather, it is necessary to ensure full equality (Bell,
Chopin, Palmer, 2006, p. 52).
Apart from this non-discrimination literature, several authors devoted
work to the question of double standards in enlargement processes and their
impacts on the EU as a whole: Although the EU does not provide a ‘minority
rights policy,’ some scholars have observed a stronger EU focus on minori-
ties not least as a consequence of the latest enlargement preparations describ-
ing an “internalization of the protection of minorities in the EU system”
(Toggenburg, 2000, p. 25). In the words of Toggenburg, in the context of
European integration minority protection should not be regarded as a ‘her-
metic’ legal competence matter but as an overall policy aim that is best ful-
filled by a variety of legal and political instruments (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 8).
He continues to describe several dimensions of the integration of minorities,
including the integration of persons belonging to a minority group into the
state while these persons’ group identities remain to be guaranteed to a cer-
tain degree. Secondly, minority protection has to be integrated as a policy
aim in all public policies by means of legislative impact assessment and
mainstreaming (Toggenburg, 2007, p. 8). Further, Wheatley identified nine
factors that are responsible for the success of inclusion of minorities in EU
member states (Wheatley, 2007, pp. 6 et seq.). The EU’s regional policy as
well as the indirect influence of the EU on the institutional design of the
member states, the educational system and the introduction of proportionality
and ethnic quotas in employment are named as factors promoting minority
inclusion that derive from the EU level (ibid.). With regard to general aspects
of EU minority protection, Toggenburg pointed out that the EU level is, in
the area of minority protection, (still) characterized by a “politics versus law”
situation, with for instance the European Parliament claiming that while pro-
tection of minorities is a part of the Copenhagen criteria, there is no standard
for minority rights in Community policy nor is there a Community under-
standing of who can be considered a member of a minority (Toggenburg,
2007, p. 8). Toggenburg however hints to the fact that the EU has to respect
limits in the area of law (ibid.).
This short insight in the academic discussion surrounding EU minority
issues shows that substantive criticism was made concerning ‘hard facts’,
meaning the relevant EU Directives, while for other issues such as cultural
and linguistic rights statements are more general, which also points to the fact
that in these areas, the EU still has limited power and member states play a
greater role.
However, the relevance of minority integration has been constantly
growing over the last 15 years. Preparations to the enlargement process of
2004 had a special impact on discussions of minority-related issues and on
______________________________________________________________
the further development of EU policies and institutional arrangements which
were not in the first place designed to serve minority integration, but de facto
attempt do so, e.g. by promoting equal opportunities when it comes to inte-
gration issues, there is a strong interaction between member states imple-
menting EU legislation and acknowledgement at the EU level of best prac-
tices in areas such as employment, social inclusion or language policies.
Generally speaking, there seems to be a situation of ‘old minorities’
vs. ‘new minorities’, with the former being covered by the EU’s enlargement
processes and single initiatives of the European Parliament and the latter
being central to Brussels’ employment and social cohesion strategy as they
represent important migrant groups in the member states. Furthermore, due to
the EU’s limited competences, for the time-being the outcome of Brussels’
attempts to promote the integration of minorities in Europe come to an end
when there is a lack of political will and of resources at national level. In this
light, if the European Commission wants to commit to its aim to protect both
equality and diversity in its member states, it remains questionable whether
the EU’s strategy to focus on national minorities during enlargement proc-
esses, while internally new minorities such as migrants are at stake (with the
exception of Roma) will succeed in the long-term. This is particularly impor-
tant when it comes to further enlargement rounds, as the issue of double-
standards seems to remain.
Endnotes
1 All information is taken from website of the European Commission’s DG

External relations, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/
coe/index.htm (accessed 18 October 2008).
2 See the OSCE website, available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm /23618.html
(accessed 20 September 2008).
3 See http://www.living-diversity.eu/News/Eintrage/2007/12/6_Eintrag_1.
html (accessed 10 March 2008) During the accession processes the Parlia-
ment was also critical about the progresses in candidate states as regards
minority protection that had been described by the Commission, see e.g. for
the case of Romania Pridham, 2007, p. 354.
4 The Employment Equality Directive provides similar goals than the Racial
Equality directive, e.g. as regards positive action (Art. 7). The employment
directive will not be further discussed in this text.
5 “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance,
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (emphasis
Manuela Riedel 47
______________________________________________________________
added). The provision was agreed upon not in the drafting stage for the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe but at the Intergovernmental
Conference under the Italian Presidency at the end of 2003 and has been
criticized for remaining ambiguous and rather modest, despite the actual
success of being mentioned in the EU’s primary law, see von Toggenburg,
2006, p. 7, who amongst others criticises the fact that the provision is not
followed by any policy provision or competence base in the text.
6 All information is taken from the agency’s website, available at
http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/index.php?fuseaction=content.dsp_cat_content&cati
d=45f1665036644 (accessed 5 October 2008).
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The Special Consideration Standard as a Modern Tool for
Advancing the Rights of Minorities
Alexander H. E. Morawa
The article discusses the “special consideration” standard in fa-

vour of ethnic minorities developed by the European Court of
Human Rights in its 2001 judgment in Chapman v. the United
Kingdom. It explores what has become of this standard in sub-
sequent years and suggests that, subject to proper interpretation
and application, it can become a workable tool for minority
rights advocates and litigators.
“[I]n certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through

different treatment may, without an objective and reasonable justification,
give rise to a breach of [the right to equality].”1
“Discrimination on account of … a person’s ethnic origin is a form of racial

discrimination. Racial discrimination is a particularly invidious kind of
discrimination and, in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the
authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. It is for this reason
that the authorities must use all available means to combat racism, thereby
reinforcing democracy’s vision of a society in which diversity is not per-
ceived as a threat but as a source of enrichment.”2
Introduction
In 2003, I have examined the very beginnings of a line of jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights in the field of minority rights that has be-
come known as the “special consideration” standard (Morawa, 2003, p. 97).
A concept of legal thought aiming at what one might call affirmative equal-
ity,3 it has been applauded as very promising initially. This essay seeks to
explore what became of the standard in subsequent years, and whether the
promise has been fulfilled. It then argues that special consideration can serve
as a useful tool for advancing the rights of minorities today and suggests
possible ways of revitalizing it in practice to accomplish that goal.
After acknowledging in 1996 in Buckley4 that the “traditional life-
style” of minorities falls within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention, the
Court established in January 2001 in its Chapman judgment5 its special con-
sideration standard in the field of minority protection under the Convention
in the following terms:
54 The Special Consideration Standard
___________________________________________________________
“[A]lthough the fact of being a member of a minority with a
traditional lifestyle different from that of the majority of a soci-
ety does not confer an immunity from general laws intended to
safeguard assets common to the whole society such as the envi-
ronment, it may have an incidence on the manner in which
such laws are to be implemented. … [T]he vulnerable position
of gypsies as a minority means that some special consideration
should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both
in the relevant regulatory planning framework and in arriving
at the decisions in particular cases.[6] To this extent there is
thus a positive obligation imposed on the Contracting States by
virtue of Article 8 to facilitate the gypsy way of life[7].”8
Human rights advocates had urged the court in this and several paral-
lel cases to judicially recognize and enforce the “growing consensus amongst
international organizations about the need to take specific measures to ad-
dress the position of the Roma in relation to a number of issues, including
their accommodation and general living conditions.”9 Indeed, the limited
legal scholarship on the issue of vulnerability in human rights law (Morawa,
2003a, p. 139) suggests that minority rights are one sub-field of the discipline
where the nexus between a vulnerable position in society and affirmative
measures to improve that status are most obvious. It should be noted, how-
ever, that in the Chapman decision, the majority of the Court found that Arti-
cle 8 had not been violated where a Gypsy family had been evicted from land
it owned in a green belt area, referring to the general duty no to discriminate
– here: against non-Roma – under Article 14 ECHR. A minority of seven
judges voiced a strong dissent explaining, inter alia, the relationship of Arti-
cles 8 and 14:
“[W]e cannot agree with the view expressed by the majority

that to accord protection under Article 8 to a gypsy in unlawful
residence in a caravan on her land would raise problems under
Article 14 where planning laws continued to prevent individu-
als from setting up houses on their land in the same area. …
This approach ignores the factor … that in this case the appli-
cant’s lifestyle as a gypsy gives a wider scope to Article 8,
which would not necessarily be the case for a person who lives
in conventional housing, the supply of which is subject to
fewer constraints. The situations would not be likely to be
analogous. On the contrary, discrimination may arise where
States, without objective and reasonable justification, fail to
treat differently persons whose situations are significantly dif-
ferent.”10
______________________________________________________________
1. The Concrete Meaning of the Chapman Standard

Does “special consideration” amount to affirmative action? Or is it merely
one of the Court’s so frequent intra-right differentiations? Although the
Court remains largely silent as to the concrete meaning of its standard – even
if it speaks of a positive obligation to “facilitate” the Gypsy way of life, and
the split amongst the judges when it came to applying it requires further
analysis in light of subsequent practice – it may be assumed that what was
intended was in fact to create a basis for granting somewhat different levels
of the right at issue (i.e. higher levels of rights to privacy and home in cases
of people belonging to minority groups). This is not as unique as it may
seem. In fact, human rights jurisprudence is full of express differentiations of
the level of protection – that is, non-interference, but also affirmative duties
of the state – depending on a particular attribute or characteristic of the per-
son or group affected. This can include findings that national law is lacking
adequate remedies, thus requiring legislative action in order to comply with
Convention requirements. Consider an earlier landmark case of the Court, X
and Y v. the Netherlands (1985), where a mentally handicapped girl had been
sexually assaulted but both she and her parents were barred, for formal rea-
sons, from bringing a criminal complaint against the perpetrator. The Court
ruled “that the protection afforded by the civil law in the case of wrongdoing
of the kind inflicted on Miss Y is insufficient. This is a case where fundamen-
tal values and essential aspects of private life are at stake. Effective deter-
rence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal-law
provisions […].”11 The failure, here of both the legislature and law enforce-
ment, to act with ‘due diligence’, as the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has said in Velasquez-Rodriguez,12 triggered state responsibility (see
Hofstötter, 2004). Several Convention rights have thus been interpreted as
requiring positive state action “in order to make them more operate effec-
tively or meaningfully, hence implying a positive obligation into the primar-
ily negative wording of the Convention” (de Than, 2003, p. 169).
An example of the “levels” or “degrees” of protection warranting cor-
responding state duties is free speech under Article 10 ECHR in the political
context: while everyone enjoys the right to voice his or her opinions, for
instance by demonstrating,13 some people, such as journalists14 and elected
representatives in democratic states,15 may go further in their criticism and
any restrictions placed upon them by the authorities “call for the closest scru-
tiny on the part of the Court.”16 Also, who is being verbally attacked makes a
difference: politicians, while allowed broader free speech, must also tolerate
more17 and may, in particular in times of transition, be liable not only for
their actions, but also for their failures to dissociate themselves from the
previous regime in time. The state here is under a positive duty to develop a
system of media regulation (or: non-regulation, which is also not a merely
___________________________________________________________
negative obligation) that takes these varying degrees of negative and positive
duties into account and fosters media pluralism and an effective public dis-
course in political matters.
The Chapman standard at first sight seems to fall into the same cate-
gory: While everyone enjoys the rights under Article 8 ECHR, and Gypsies
or other minorities must in principle also abide by a country’s laws in force,
when it comes to appraising the conformity of a certain measure with the
Convention, one must attach more significance to their particular status and
must more closely scrutinize the justifications advanced for a particular re-
striction. In essence, that is the Chapman standard’s underlying methodology.
Yet a process of “special consideration” entails an additional element: it may
be described as a three-step approach to affirmative duties of states in favour
or ethnic groups or, if you will, a test to be followed: First, such groups do
not enjoy immunity from general laws as long these laws survive the general
test of sufficient precision, legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality18 the
Court would apply in any given case. Second, the group’s traditional lifestyle
may “have an incidence on the manner in which such laws are to be imple-
mented” or, in other words, the Court will scrutinize the concrete circum-
stances of such cases with some higher level of scrutiny. Third – and that is
the true affirmative statement here – there is a “positive obligation imposed
on the Contracting States […] to facilitate the […] way of life of minority
groups.” The test questions for national authorities when adopting or judi-
cially reviewing measures, and for the Court when reassessing them ex post
facto, would then be:
1. Is the law at issue pursuing a legitimate aim, necessary in a democ-

ratic society, and proportionate to the goal it seeks to achieve?
2. What is the effect of the measure on the minority compared to the
general public or any other appropriate ‘test group’ it can be com-
pared to?
3. Does the way the national authorities apply the law in concreto in a
situation affecting or involving (members of) ethnic, religious, racial
or comparable groups indicate that they intend to facilitate the
group’s way of life?
The third question is of the essence. Impermissible under the special

consideration standard would be all those concrete measures that either deny,
neglect or ignore the needs of minority groups – that is still the test applied
under general standards of European human rights law – or such measures
that fail to show an intent and effort of the decision maker to actively facili-
tate, or promote the lifestyle of those concerned. In other words, a decision
maker who does not discriminate, and can prove so, could still trigger state
responsibility under Chapman of he or she cannot show convincingly that the
______________________________________________________________
facilitation of a minority lifestyle was part of the consideration, and became
part of the ultimate decision. Merely considering the minority’s interests, but
then opting for the – usually simpler, cheaper, and more popular – measure
that treats everyone alike, does not suffice.
What is crucial for the further analysis of the special consideration
standard is the duty to facilitate. Innocent sounding as it may be, the term “to
facilitate” has a certain fairly clear meaning in international human rights
law. By using the term, the Court – and we can be sure it did not do so by
coincidence – incorporated terminology commonly uses in the discussion of
economic, social, and cultural rights into its reasoning: the CESCR (Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) Committee has stipulated that
“economic, social and cultural rights, like all human rights, impose […] three
levels of obligations on States parties – the obligation to respect, to protect
and to fulfill. The obligation to fulfill further contains duties to provide, pro-
mote and facilitate,”19 which the International Commission of Jurists has
handily summarized as follows:
“The obligation to fulfil-facilitate requires States parties to pro-

actively engage in activities that strengthen access to and the
utilisation of resources and the means to ensure the realisation
of Covenant rights. The obligation to fulfil-provide requires
States parties to take measures necessary to ensure that each
person within its jurisdiction may obtain basic economic, social
and cultural rights satisfaction whenever they, for reasons be-
yond their control, are unable to realise these rights through the
means at their disposal. For example, with regard to the right to
food, the obligation to fulfil-facilitate suggests State party as-
sistance to provide informational and other opportunities for
persons to obtain food whereas the obligation to fulfil-provide
implies the direct provision of food or resources when no other
alternatives exist due to unemployment, disadvantage, age,
sudden crisis/disaster, marginalisation, etc.”20
Thus, also in the words of the CESCR Committee, the “obligation to

fulfil (facilitate) requires States to take positive measures that enable and
assist individuals and communities”21 in the realization of their rights. The
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, for instance, has empha-
sized that “the obligation to fulfil incorporates both an obligation to facilitate
and an obligation to provide.”22 But do we need the element “provide” for our
task at hand, namely interpreting the special consideration standard as a pur-
poseful tool for (first generation) rights implementation? One should bear in
mind that we are talking about core civil and political rights here (such as the
right to privacy) that are interpreted to include elements of social and eco-
___________________________________________________________
nomic rights but are, as the Court makes clear, Convention rights with all
their might. For those, fulfill-facilitate with its positive measures will suffice
to come up with a meaningful standard, as we shall see.
Any facilitation of the way of life of a minority will many times clash
with a majority’s views, attitudes, or prejudices. We can draw some inspira-
tion for answering the question whether national authorities should give in to
such prevailing popular emotions from what the Court has said in the context
of free political speech in the majority-minority context: In Ouranio Toxo it
emphasized that “mention of the consciousness of belonging to a minority
and the preservation and development of a minority’s culture cannot be said
to constitute a threat to “democratic society”, even though it may provoke
tensions.”23 Of course, one might say, it is not in line with maintaining and
strengthening a democratic Europe if states curtail the democratic right of
non-majorities to be visible and outspoken, to live their identity, and to inter-
act with others without having to shed their characteristics. But that en-
croaches upon certain comfort zones humans build for themselves amongst
which, truth be told, a bit of racial intolerance and prejudice sometimes lurks.
With its demand that states comply with their obligation to foster tolerance
amongst ethnic groups,24 the Court has quite clearly reigned in permissible
recourse to anti-minority sentiments flowing into official government deci-
sions. In the special consideration context, that implies an elevated duty of
decision makers to firmly advance the interests of minorities, if necessary
against popular demands, when seeking to facilitate their way of life.
2. Chapman and Beyond

It is noteworthy that governments have, it seems, not only opted for a selec-
tive reading of the Court’s rulings in Buckley and Chapman, but have at least
occasionally picked their own kind of raisins from the cake. In the Moldovan
et al. case (second judgment of 2005), for instance, the only reference to
these two cases is by the Romanian government. The complainant claimed,
and the Court ultimately agreed, that after a bar fight that had left a non-
Roma dead, not only had the population of a village, joined by local law
enforcement, opted for killing the three alleged murderers of Roma origin –
two by beating them to death, one by setting his house on fire; rather, the
mob had then proceeded to destroying a number of Romani dwellings. The
investigations led nowhere, and the courts found it suitable to include insult-
ing and racist language in their judgments. The houses that were constructed
as reparation for the victims by the government subsequently were almost
uninhabitable. Before the Court, the government denied that the State au-
thorities “bore any responsibility for the destruction of the applicants’ houses
[… and] had only positive obligations under Article 8, obligations which had
been fulfilled in this case by granting aid to the applicants to rebuild their
homes. In any event, the Government considered that there was no obligation
______________________________________________________________
under the Convention to provide a home to persons who were in difficulties.
They relied in this connection on the cases of Buckley […] and Chapman
[…].”25 Nothing in these cases suggests that a government is under no obliga-
tion to repair the damage done through either its agents’ actions (police offi-
cers inciting violence or cheering on a mob) or omissions (officers standing
idly by) whilst a riot is in progress, be it in the context of racial and ethnic
tensions, or not. The question may legitimately be asked whether and under
what circumstances there is a duty of states to provide housing to persons
within their jurisdiction in general. The Court’s jurisprudence has clarified
that the meaning of any language indicating that no state obligation exists in
Buckley and Chapman is narrow in that respect, for instance that “no right
can be derived from Article 8 that they provide housing, or conditions for
housing, that meet particular environmental standards or in any particular
location.”26
In Collins v. the United Kingdom (2002), for instance, the Court had to
assess the complaints of a severely handicapped woman who had been prom-
ised a “home for life” in a certain public care facility, but was subsequently
transferred to a different social care facility. The domestic authorities had
argued that “home for life” does not necessarily mean a “home for life” at a
particular hospital or place of residence; rather a “home for life” by reference
to the needs of those individuals being met appropriately.”27 The Court ulti-
mately agreed, but only after a careful assessment of the entitlements in-
volved and the effects of the move. In Volkova v. Russia (2003), the Court,
after ominously stating that “neither Article 8 nor any other provision of the
Convention guarantees housing of a particular standard or at all”,28 continued
to assess the complaint similarly as in Collins, namely by assessing valid
promises and entitlements to a residence in a particular type of ‘dorm’ and
applying a proportionality test.
In O’Rourke v. the United Kingdom (2001) the Court adopted different
language, holding that the “scope of any positive obligation to house the
homeless must be limited”,29 but is not non-existent. Referring to its earlier
case of Mazari v. Italy (1999),30 it said that, for instance, a refusal to provide
housing assistance to a person suffering from a serious disease might raise
issues under Article 8 ECHR.31 It is impossible to conclude from this prac-
tice32 that aspects of a person’s residence, and a state’s obligation to safe-
guard or even provide for it under certain circumstances, if properly linked to
for instance Article 8 of the Convention, fall outside the scope of review of
the Court. Romania’s claim indicates that one can extract a meaning from the
judgments establishing the special consideration standard that is not only
contrary to said standard, but contrary to the very essence of European human
rights law.
The immediate post-Chapman jurisprudence followed the majority’s
line of reasoning to the letter, rejecting a series of similar cases in late Janu-
___________________________________________________________
ary 2001. In Eatson33 and Porter v. the United Kingdom,34 for instance, the
Court began with the obscure statement that the Gypsy way of life was to be
considered “traditional” and therefore falling within the special consideration
standard proper only if the persons concerned were in fact itinerant travel-
ers.35 The Court then followed the standard test weighing, in line with the
national authorities, the “not very special circumstances” of the applicants
against the “strong, environmental reasons for the refusal of the planning
permission.”36 What is of concern, however, is that the Court added language
that there might have been “humanitarian considerations which might have
supported another outcome at the national level,”37 thus suggesting that the
states enjoyed an overly wide margin of appreciation – a holding which has
no basis in Chapman, irrespective of whether one reads the majority opinion
alone or, as is suggested, together with the dissent. A reference to “humani-
tarian” considerations also suggests that states were free to take the situation
of minorities into account or not, rather than facing a legal obligation not
only to consider it, but to give it priority consideration. That, too, finds no
support in Chapman.
In the case of the Gypsy Council (2002)38 restrictions on a Gypsy
event were at issue: The local police decided to prohibit any assemblies
“within a 5 mile radius of Horsmonden Village Green”39 on the weekend that
the traditional Horsmonden Horse Fair in Kent was scheduled to take place.
According to the applicants, the planned assembly was to be a significant
cultural and social event in the life of Romani Gypsy community in the
United Kingdom, and was to be attended primarily by Gypsies. The prohibi-
tion was explained by various breaches of public order and anti-social behav-
ior by participants in previous years, but also by “fear expressed by residents”
of the village and by “the normal social interactions between villagers being
suspended as a consequence of the sheer volume of visiting travelers.”40 The
applicants challenged the decision, but the High Court affirmed it, “con-
sider[ing] that the fact that the Romany Gypsy Community could go to an
alternative site some 20 miles away […] which was approved by the local
authority and the police, served to limit the impact upon the Romany Gypsy
community.”41 The High Court’s original judgment contains the following
more detailed or additional considerations:
“The plain reality is that both the Borough Council and the
Secretary of State considered, in the light of the policing con-
cerns, that the disruption to the life of the local community was
of paramount concern and the need to avoid such disruption
should take priority over the interests of the Romany commu-
nity. In any event […] it is not the case that the Romany com-
munity will not be able to gather at all this weekend anywhere
in the area […] albeit [the alternative venue] does not provide a
______________________________________________________________
complete answer to their concern or indeed any answer which
is satisfactory to them.”42
The High Court finally “noted that Articles 8 and 11 of the Convention rec-
ognized that balance had to be struck between the interests of the individual,
in this case, the interests of the gypsy community and the interests of society
generally, but found no reason on that basis to interfere on public law
grounds with the assessment reached” by the authorities.43
The Strasbourg Court was seized by the applicants with the principal
complaint that the prohibition order violated their rights under Articles 8, 11,
and 14 ECHR. They pointed out that it “had a disproportionate effect on the
gypsy Romany community and that the authorities could have accommodated
the fair by imposing reasonable conditions on its conduct, e.g. by regulating
car parking, limiting the number of stall holders, ensuring sufficient policing,
ensuring that there were sufficient stewards provided by the organizers and
ensuring that the village was cleaned afterwards by liaising with the gypsy
representatives.”44 The Court assessed the necessity of the interference in a
democratic society and its proportionality as follows:
“The Court notes that the Horsmonden fair was a traditional

gathering of longstanding and as such of considerable cultural
and social importance to the gypsy community. However, the
exercise of the right to freedom of assembly is not absolute and
where large gatherings are concerned the impact of the event
on the community as a whole may legitimately be taken into
consideration.[45] The horse fair had been growing in size over
the years and in 2000 the police had identified concerns about
the disruption to the local community caused inter alia by the
‘sheer volume’ of visitors, indiscriminate parking, littering, a
background level of increased crime and road closures. The
Court observes that the authorities made available a site some
20 miles from Horsmonden, where large numbers of persons
could assemble without causing disruption. … While the appli-
cants argue that it would have been possible to allow the fair to
take place as usual subject to reasonable conditions regulating
car parking, ensuring sufficient stewards, policing and litter
collection, the Court is not persuaded that this would have nec-
essarily prevented the disorder and disruption which was an-
ticipated. In the circumstances, the response of the authorities
was proportionate, striking a fair balance between the rights of
the applicants and those of the community generally.”46
With respect to Article 14 of the Convention, the Court added:

___________________________________________________________
“The Court has found above that the measure pursued the le-
gitimate aim of preventing disorder and protecting the rights of
other. It prevented any persons attending the horse fair irre-
spective of their origin. It is not persuaded that the prohibition
order […] was imposed with any discriminatory intent or ef-
fect.”47
In order to illustrate whether the Court in Gypsy Council applied a

standard that would qualify as special, within the meaning of the Chapman
standard, reference may be made to two – possibly crucial – statements it
made in the context of Article 8: holding that the gathering under a stricter
regime would not “have necessarily prevented the disorder and disruption
which was anticipate”, and Article 14: the measure “prevented any persons
attending the horse fair irrespective of their origin.”
The need to prevent anticipated disorder may justify the prohibition of
assemblies under the general standard if other measures are judged to be
ineffective by the authorities for reasons which the Court, exercising its re-
view powers, finds convincing (see Morawa, 2003, 105 et seq.). That test
extends to both the levels of “anticipation” and of “likelihood of failure” of
alternative, less restrictive means to prevent such disorder. Nowhere even in
the case law concerning non-special situations has a standard been applied
that requires applicants to provide positive proof that other measures will
“necessarily” prevent any trouble.
As for the measure at issue having prevented “any persons attending
the horse fair irrespective of their origin,” it suffices to say that the Hors-
monden Horse Fair traditionally was a Gypsy event with mostly Gypsy atten-
dance in order to foster their culture and tradition. Of course any non-Gypsy
who would have wanted to attend was also deprived of an opportunity to
partake in the event, but it is apparent that the measure not only indirectly,
but quite openly targeted the Gypsies; everyone else may well have walked
away saying: “Oh, well, there will be other events.” It was the Gypsy tradi-
tion and culture, however, that was at stake and would have required the
Court to review the restrictive measures under the special consideration stan-
dard. It may not come as a surprise that Chapman is not mentioned in the
decision.
Connors v. the United Kingdom (2004)48 is interesting not only in that
it held that the eviction of a Gypsy family from land they resided on lawfully,
for a multitude of instances of breaches of the peace and disorderly conduct,
violated Article 8 ECHR because of a lack of proper procedural safeguards
(and, indeed, in light of a flawed regime of managing sites for Gypsies). The
Court here explicitly referred to Buckley and Chapman,49 but then proceeded
to distinguish these cases:
______________________________________________________________
“The present case may also be distinguished from the Chapman

case […], in which there was a wide margin of appreciation, as
in that case, it was undisputed that the applicant had breached
planning law in taking up occupation of land within the Green
Belt in her caravans and claimed, in effect, special exemption
from the rules applying to everyone else. In the present case,
the applicant was lawfully on the site […].”50
By emphasizing that applicant Chapman, other that Connors, was

seeking special treatment, while the latter was merely asking for equal treat-
ment, the Court, despite referring to special consideration as a standard, ren-
ders that standard inapplicable, but instead resorts to the general three-prong
test of permissibility of an interference with the right to family life. Connors,
therefore, is in truth not a special consideration case, but a simple equal
treatment case.
The Chapman follow-up jurisprudence to date culminates in the case
of Codona v. the United Kingdom (2006). There, a Gypsy applicant and her
family were offered so-called brick and mortar accommodation, to which she
had a “cultural aversion”, after she had been removed from an illegal caravan
site. The Court here made the rather unusual choice of initially stating that it
was “far from obvious that Article 8 is engaged” because Mrs. Codona was
allegedly seeking to enforce a non-existent positive obligation of the state to
provide her with housing of her choice, only to proceed to an in-depth
evaluation of the case under its Article 8-jurisprudence. Recalling the Chap-
man standard of a duty to facilitate the Gypsy way of life, the Court acknowl-
edged that an aversion against living in standard housing “can be identified as
forming part of the applicant’s ’gypsy way of life‘.”51 It added that it
“does not rule out that, in principle, Article 8 could impose a

positive obligation on the authorities to provide accommoda-
tion for a homeless gypsy which is such that it facilitates their
’gypsy way of life.’”52
Then, comes the turning point in the Court’s reasoning:
“However, it considers that this obligation could only arise

when the authorities had such accommodation at their disposal
and were making a choice between offering such accommoda-
tion or accommodation which was not ’suitable‘ for the cultural
needs of a gypsy.”53
___________________________________________________________
With that, the Court clings to the narrow majority’s reasoning in
Chapman that the positive duties under the special consideration standard
were subject to a general “as far as possible” reservation, which the dissenters
vehemently opposed. The Court in Codona reiterates this conclusion, borrow-
ing from a pre-Chapman decision by the European Commission of Human
Rights54 and stating that, pursuant to the facts at hand …
“the domestic authorities were alive to, and complied with, any
positive obligation that they owed under Article 8 to facilitate
the applicant’s ’gypsy way of life’, to the extent that such was
possible given the constraints of available accommodation.”55
3. Non-European Practice Informing Special Consideration

Jurisprudence
While a European case-law applying the special consideration standard con-
sistently and convincingly has not, to date, been forthcoming, the practice of
other human rights tribunals offers a few examples that are helpful in further
refining the standard. Consider, for instance, the case of L. R. et al. v. the
Slovak Republic (2005) before the CERD Committee: here, a municipal
council had first adopted a resolution in favour of constructing low-cost hous-
ing for the local Roma community, which had been residing in slum-like
quarters for many years. After public protests and, in particular, a petition
warning against a possible “influx” of Roma from elsewhere once they would
become aware of the availability of inexpensive living space, the municipal-
ity revoked the decision. The Committee held that …
“the council resolutions in question, taking initially an impor-

tant policy and practical step towards realization of the right to
housing followed by its revocation and replacement with a
weaker measure, taken together, do indeed amount to the im-
pairment of the recognition or exercise on an equal basis of the
human right to housing.”56
We may conclude from that, at the very least, that the revocation of an
affirmative measure or, in other words, the deliberate undoing of special
consideration, is suspect and thus may, in circumstance such as those present
in the L. R. case and without other justification, trigger a breach of human
rights. It seems thus that an act of a national authority that is, upon review,
driven by a special consideration in favour of a minority group, will raise the
level of justification if that measure is subsequently revoked. This is in line
with the principle of subsidiarity, since under such circumstances the interna-
tional tribunal will not substitute a state’s assessment with its own, but will
merely reinforce, and reinstitute a decision already arrived at domestically.
______________________________________________________________
4. A Special Consideration Standard for the Future

Letsas (2007, pp. 129–130) asserts that the European Court of Human Rights
“is willing to promote interests that are normally served by social and eco-
nomic human rights (as political goals) but that can textually be read into the
civil rights of the ECHR.” Warbrick (2007, p. 247), in a rather cautious arti-
cle, nevertheless asserts that the Convention protects “collateral aspects of
economic and social interests, where these involve civil and political rights”,
and gives the examples of procedural provisions and the protection against
discrimination. Indeed, the promotion of human rights may well entail a
“liberal” reading of norms that may have been intended to be primarily nega-
tive or defensive, in line with the Court’s general principle of a dynamic
approach to human rights interpretation. As the present author has said else-
where, “[t]he interpretation must be “dynamic” and “evolutive”, taking into
account that the ECHR is “a living instrument which ... must be interpreted in
the light of present day conditions.” Authors have pointed out and it appears
settled today that the Convention has “law-making character” and should be
seen as “a bill of rights that must be interpreted so as to permit its develop-
ment with time” and with changing “social and political attitudes”” (Morawa,
2003b, para. 28).57 Clapham (1993, p. 345), for instance, concluded when
discussing the reach of human rights into the private sphere – something that
minority rights often entail – that the obligation to take “”positive measures”
may mean actual expenditure and the deployment of resources to ensure that
the right can be freely exercised ’without interference from private individu-
als.’”
Special considerations in favour of minorities may be said to have
something in common with the margin of appreciation: for them to truly
govern in any given situation, the right(s) at issue should be of they highest
order, and the circumstances in which the dispute arises should not lend
themselves to be interpreted as falling within the realm of the “institutional
order” of the state, such as elections58 or the maintenance of a legitimate
constitutional principle, such as secularism in Turkey.59 A comparable ap-
proach is taken by the Court when it assigns a “level” to the margin of appre-
ciation it is inclined to grant a respondent state (see van Bossuyt, 2007, p.
15). We can conclude for the purposes of the present analysis, first that the
rights of ethnic minorities fall in the highest category, since there is not only
the Court which in its jurisprudence is outspoken against anything that sug-
gests state-sponsored racial bias, but also the Council of Europe in general
that has committed itself to eradicating racial inequality. Second, it is clear
from practice that race-based preferences in all their manifestations are no
justifications that would ever be accepted as elements of a democratically
legitimate constitutional order in contemporary Europe.
___________________________________________________________
As regards the specific scope of positive duties that arise under the
special consideration standard, the practice is, unfortunately, rather sparse.
The Court, it seems, has backed away from its very promising special consid-
eration standard, and has sought to resolve the cases before it by relying on
general standards and assessment techniques. That approach, regrettably, has
overshadowed the affirmative rights-based approach Chapman promised.
Earlier, we discussed some issues pertaining to the right to housing
and whether state obligations extend to providing accommodations to certain
people under particular circumstances. We found, initially, that an
entitlement to housing could emerge, for instance, if the government itself
had destroyed or made uninhabitable the houses of people, be it through
unlawful action or negligence. Here, the duty to provide is intrinsically linked
to a material breach of human rights obligations, such as Articles 3 or 8
ECHR. In other cases, that duty may be liked to lawful entitlements people
have under domestic law or practice, such as title to housing of a particular
kind, e.g. a bed in a particular care facility for the handicapped,60 or rooms in
a dorm.61 Thirdly, a right to housing may derive from a non-discrimination
claim, be it freestanding (Article 26 CCPR) or accessory to a substantive
right (Article 14 ECHR).
It shall be noted at this point that that the equality-regime is growing
stronger, with the adoption on Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR, but also a
European jurisprudence that is expanding the reach of Article 14. The Human
Rights Committee (HRC) has taken the lead here by consistently holding
when interpreting Article 26 CCPR, that “when … legislation is adopted in
the exercise of a State’s sovereign power, then such legislation must comply
with [A]rticle 26 of the Covenant”62 and has added that the application of the
principle of non-discrimination contained in Article 26 thus “is not limited to
those rights which are provided for in the Covenant.”63 The European Court
of Human Rights, too, has evolved its jurisprudence in recent cases well
beyond the purely accessory character of Article 14 as having “no
independent existence, since it has effect solely in relation to the rights and
freedoms safeguarded by the other substantive provisions of the Convention
and its Protocols.”64 It has early on clarified that “the application of Article
14 does not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substantive
rights guaranteed by the Convention. It is necessary but it is also sufficient
for the facts of the case to fall “within the ambit” of one or more of the
provisions in question.”65 The contemporary interpretation is more open and
resembles – within the limits of the text of the Convention – the universal
standard:
“The prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 … extends

beyond the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms which the
Convention and Protocols require each State to guarantee. It
______________________________________________________________
applies also to those additional rights, falling within the general
scope of any Article of the Convention, for which the State has
voluntarily decided to provide.”66
Apart from these international legal developments, we must not over-

look the significance of a comparative (constitutional) review of relevant
state practice as this can inform the interpretation of international legal obli-
gations. In the field of housing rights that was the topic of the majority of the
Gypsy-related Strasbourg cases following Chapman, for instance, judicial
practice indicates a gradual recognition of a right to adequate housing either
explicitly, for instance in constitutions,67 or implicitly, by judicial practice
interpreting more broad or vague national norms.68
The emerging practice suggests that the third, equality-based argument
in favour of a right to housing outlined supra may, in be the most suitable to
use jointly with the special consideration standard, while also borrowing from
the second, substantive rights-based approach. If entitlements are granted by
the state, these must be granted without unreasonable distinction. Never can
members of a minority group be treated less favourably than the general
population. However, they can or, as we can see, must under certain circum-
stances be treated more favourably if the prescribed – mandatory, not op-
tional – goal of fostering their traditional lifestyle requires it. If the entitle-
ments are substantive-rights based or -related, this argument is reinforced, but
not substantially different.
For Europe, it is crucial to note in this respect the European Court’s
language emphasizing that “Article 14 does not prohibit a member State from
treating groups differently in order to correct “factual inequalities” between
them; indeed, in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequal-
ity through different treatment may, without an objective and reasonable
justification, give rise to a breach of that Article.”69 The Court has provided a
roadmap of sorts for such corrective affirmative action by holding: “[T]he
provisions of the Convention do not prevent Contracting States from intro-
ducing general policy schemes by way of legislative measures whereby a
certain category or group of individuals is treated differently from others,
provided that the interference with the rights of the statutory category or
group as a whole can be justified under the Convention.”70
Interpreted this way, the special consideration standard imposes on
states something similar to what the material equality standard does: it first
prescribes a compulsory goal of fostering the lifestyle of minorities, which is
to be incorporated in government policies. Secondly, it adds the additional
dimension of an equally mandatory pro-minority consideration in any appli-
cation of the policy (or law) by national decision makers which, in turn, is
open to the scrutiny of international human rights tribunals. Whether the state
does pursue the mandatory goal – fostering the lifestyle of minorities – by
___________________________________________________________
appropriate means can be assessed by the Court using fairly common meth-
odology, yet with a twist: fostering is never static, but is by definition pro-
gressive. For the review of whether measures aimed at the progressive reali-
zation of rights are satisfactory we can, once again, seek guidance in the
realm of CESCR rights and obligations. The duties of states there include, in
no uncertain terms stemming not from the Covenant’s implementation ma-
chinery but the wording of the treaty, to use “all appropriate means” to foster
– facilitate – the progressive realization of the rights guaranteed. What means
are appropriate?
“While each State party must decide for itself which means are
the most appropriate under the circumstances with respect to
each of the rights, the ’appropriateness‘ of the means chosen
will not always be self-evident. It is therefore desirable that
States parties’ reports should indicate not only the measures
that have been taken but also the basis on which they are con-
sidered to be the most “appropriate” under the circumstances.
However, the ultimate determination as to whether all appro-
priate measures have been taken remains one for the Commit-
tee to make.”71
While the states parties to the ECHR enjoy a margin of appreciation

when adopting laws, policies, and implementation procedures for fostering
minority rights, their appropriateness to progressively advance these rights
can be tested by the Court under its own special consideration standard. We
must recall that in Chapman, the Court took notice of the “emerging interna-
tional consensus amongst the Contracting States of the Council of Europe
recognising the special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect their
security, identity and lifestyle, not only for the purpose of safeguarding the
interests of the minorities themselves but to preserve a cultural diversity of
value to the whole community.”72 The reiteration of that fact in D H et al. v.
the Czech Republic – a case where the Grand Chamber found breaches of the
Convention in an inflexible system of assessing the special educational needs
of Romani children, while the trial Chamber less than two years earlier had
not found this to amount to a violation of the Convention73 – is in itself an
indication that the concept is by no means static. We have thus managed to
merge the standards of civil and political rights with interpretative tools
stemming from second generation rights into a flexible and adjustable tool for
assessing states’ continuous compliance with an emerging minimum stan-
dard, just as the Court prompted us to do in Chapman.
______________________________________________________________
5. The “Possibility” Exception and Evolving Human Rights
Standards
As we have seen in Codona, the newer jurisprudence of the Court has, on the
one hand, begun embracing positive obligations a bit more wholeheartedly
but, on the other hand, now emphasizes the factual “possibility” of corrective
affirmative action, such as the provision of suitable housing, as a general
threshold for state liability. This begs two questions: first, is such a broad
“possibility” exception justifiable in human rights law and, second, if we
allow it, does it open an avenue for creative lawyering aimed at strengthening
the special consideration duties enunciated in Chapman?
While certain human rights have been identified as inalienable – al-
lowing no exception and derogation and not being susceptible to any implied
limitations – per se and others have been interpreted so as to allow only very
limited restrictions that states need to tailor narrowly and justify by what
amounts to compelling reasons, the rights we are contemplating here fall in a
category that in general lack that quality. Thus, although fulfilling these
rights is not an obligation states can make entirely or predominantly depend-
ent on the availability of resources, the scope of these rights is expanding,
since the treaties and covenants were designed and are applied as living in-
struments. Therefore, a gradually increasing density and depth of human
rights standards is foreseen and intended. The UN bodies, in particular the
CESCR Committee, speak of a progressive realization of rights. The Stras-
bourg Court, for instance, applies the concept of evolving common European
standards to assess the contents of rights at any given time. Both it and the
European Court of Justice “draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions
of the member states”74 and do not hesitate to apply what one would call
internationalized constitutional comparison to find the laws or practices in
one country to be at odds with an identified “common European standard”
(Morawa, 2003b, para. 29 and Morawa, 2007, p. 73). What may have been
acceptable at a point in time in history, may turn into a violation later. Thus,
even in the field of civil and political rights, justifications for non-compliance
based on contemporary circumstances, including the availability of resources,
may be tolerated in certain limited circumstances by the supervisory bodies.
We cannot, therefore, categorically reject the “possibility” exception. If we
bear in mind that we are operating in an evolving system – and nothing illus-
trates that better than the area of positive obligations – it seems consequential
to make creative use of the issue of resource availability by incorporating it
into the special consideration standard. The progressive realization of rights
has been interpreted as follows:
“[T]he phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective,

indeed the raison d’être, of the Covenant which is to establish
clear obligations for States parties in respect of the full realiza-
___________________________________________________________
tion of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to
move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that
goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures in that
regard would require the most careful consideration and would
need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the
rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the
full use of the maximum available resources.”75
The gradual realization of human rights, even in the social and eco-
nomic field, requires adherence to standards of expedience and effectiveness.
Both are reviewable by judicial and quasi-judicial international bodies. Both
correspond to what the European Court of human rights has done, for exam-
ple by requiring states to remain “in sync” with the common European ap-
proach to dealing with a particular matter. The Court here has applied a prac-
tice of what one can non-technically call ‘warnings’, that is rulings that find
no breach of a Convention right, but indicate that there nevertheless is a defi-
ciency that can, over time, develop into non-compliance. To ensure that no
such step-by-step violation is established, the state concerned has a de-facto
duty, which can be translated into a legal obligation at least ex post facto, to
take positive measures to ensure compliance. That includes adjustments to
their policies (at the law and implementation levels) and the making available
of economic resources so that individual decisions can facilitate the minority
way of life. What is needed for such facilitation is many times in limited
supply – such as housing and land for Roma who live a traditional lifestyle in
the United Kingdom – and, as the dissenters in Chapman made clear,76 there
would be no issue of unjustified different treatment if the government would
adopt a policy to either remedy the scarcity of such resources or allow devia-
tions from planning and zoning regulations in favour of minority members,
even if it would not adopt the same policies in the (housing) sector in general.
In other words, the special consideration standard demands affirmative ac-
tion, but then also protects the government from suits by non-minority mem-
bers who are not treated favourably. Access to housing her is a highly rele-
vant example, but the same principle applies to a variety of other sectors and
public policies.
From the recent case of Andrejeva v. Latvia we can extrapolate an-
other quite compelling reason for a positive duty along the lines outlined
supra: Minorities tend to reside on the territory of states not by choice, but
because of factors beyond their control. Since forced population movements
are fortunately outlawed by ius cogens, the existence of such minorities is a
fact and the obligations of the ‘host’ or multiethnic state are continuing. Ex-
ternal influences that seek to positively affect these minorities, such as meas-
ures adopted by kin states, notwithstanding, the multiethnic state is and will
remain the only state “with which [group members have] any stable legal ties
______________________________________________________________
and thus the only State which, objectively, can assume responsibility for
[them] … .”77 The stability of the ties may well be the key word. Stable
multiethnic societies will flourish only if there is a proper give and take be-
tween the majority and minorities of affirmative approval of the latter’s right
to existence as a distinct group, which requires positive measures, and in turn
affirmative acceptance of the duties of loyalty and common purpose that
statehood rightfully demands.
Conclusions
It would seem that the special consideration standard pursuant to Chapman is
a workable tool for minority rights advocates and litigators. It does need
some renewal, and some thinking out of the box. The above considerations
point in a direction which, if consequently followed, would lead to a practi-
cally relevant standard that is also compatible with its host, the European
human rights system, and modest and flexible enough to find the support of
those in governments who subscribe to inter-ethnic harmony and the progres-
sive advancement of the European citizenry unblemished by the discontent of
minorities.
Endnotes
1 European Court of Human Rights [hereafter: Eur.Ct.H.R.], Appl. 55707/00,

Andrejeva v. Latvia, judgment (GC) of February 18, 2009, para. 82. See also
“Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in edu-
cation in Belgium” v. Belgium (Merits), judgment of July 23, 1968, Series A,
No. 6, para. 10.
2 Eur.Ct.H.R., D H et al. v. the Czech Republic, judgment (GC) of November
13, 2007, para. 176.
3 For a comprehensive discussion of the various manifestations of equality in
international human rights law, see Morawa 2001/2.
4 Eur.Ct.H.R., Buckley v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 September
1996, Reports 1996–IV.
5 Eur.Ct.H.R., Chapman v. the United Kingdom, judgment (GC) of 18 Janu-
ary 2001, Reports 2001-I. For a discussion of this case see Mowbrey 2004,
176 et seq.
6 Reference is made to Buckley, paras. 76, 80, and 84.
7 With reference, mutatis mutandis, to the Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13
June 1979, Series A, No. 31, para. 31, the Keegan v. Ireland judgment of 26
May 1994, Series A, No. 290, para. 49, and the Kroon and Others v. the
Netherlands judgment of 27 October 1994, Series A. No. 297–C, para. 31.
8 Chapman, at para. 96.
___________________________________________________________
9 European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), Written Comments in cases Chap-

man and others, undated, available at www.errc.org, accessed on 29 April
2009.
10 Chapman, joint dissenting opinion of judges Pastor Ridruejo, Bonello,
Tulkens, Strážnická, Lorenzen, Fischbach and Casadevall, at para. 8, with
reference to Thlimmenos v. Greece, judgment of 6 April 2000, Reports 2000–
IV.
11 Eur.Ct.H.R., X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of March 26, 1985,
Series A., No. 91, para. 27. The Court has subsequently held that “the Con-
vention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obli-
gation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an
individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.”
Eur.Ct.H.R., Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of October 28, 1998,
Reports 1998-VIII.
12 Inter-Am.Ct.H.R., Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988,
Series C, No. 4 (1988).
13 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Chorherr v. Austria, judgment of August 25, 1993, Se-
ries A, No. 266–B, for a case exploring the limits of that right.
14 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Lingens v. Austria, judgment of June 24, 1986, Series A,
No. 103.
15 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Castells v. Spain, judgment of April 23, 1992, Series A,
No. 236.
16 Ibid., at para. 42 (emphasis added).
17 See, for instance, Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 42409/98, Wolfgang Schüssel v.
Austria, decision on the admissibility of February 21, 2002.
18 The Court has, in its more recent jurisprudence, adopted a “duty to pro-
mote tolerance” standard in matters involving ethnic and other tensions
within a society: “Although the Court recognises that it is possible that ten-
sion is created in situations where a community becomes divided, it considers
that this is one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The role of the
authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by
eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each
other.” Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 74651/01, Association of Citizens Radko &
Paunkovski v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, judgment of
January 15, 2009, at para. 65, with reference to Ouranio Toxo et al. v.
Greece, judgment of October 20, 2005, Reports 2005-X, para. 40, and Serif v.
Greece, judgment of December 14, 1999, Reports 1999-IX, para. 53.
19 For a recent statement see: CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 16
(2005) Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, para. 17 (emphasis added).
______________________________________________________________
20 ICJ, The State Obligation to Respect, Protect and Fulfill ICESCR Rights,
undated, http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/7.pdf, accessed on 29 April 2009
21 CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 13 (1999) on the Right to
Education, E/C.12/1999/10, para. 47.
22 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/education/rapporteur/index.htm,
accessed on 29 April 2009.
23 Ouranio Toxo et al. v. Greece, at para. 40.
24 Association of Citizens Radko & Paunkovski, at para. 65, and others.
25 Eur.Ct.H.R., Moldovan et al. v. Romania, judgment no. 2 of July 12, 2005,
Reports 2005-VII, at para. 91.
26 Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 31888/03, Martin Ward v. the United Kingdom, deci-
sion on the admissibility of November 9, 2004. para. 1 (emphasis added).
27 Appl. 11909/02, Collins v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissi-
bility of October 15, 2002, p. 3.
28 Appl. 48758/99, Volkova v. Russia, decision on the admissibility of No-
vember 18, 2003, at p. 7.
29 Appl. 39022/97, O’Rourke v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admis-
sibility of June 26, 2001, at p. 7.
30 Appl. 36448/97, Mazari v. Italy, decision on the admissibility of May 4,
1999.
31 O’Rourke, at p. 7.
32 The cases described in more detail are not isolated incidences, but are
mirrored in other decisions in comparable cases, such as Appl. 40328/98,
Siebert v. Poland, decision on the admissibility of May 25, 2004 (alleged
breach of Article 8 ECHR by the authorities’ refusal to register the complain-
ant at the address of an apartment he had been granted a tenancy in under the
Communist regime, but which had later on been revoked) and Appl.
69353/01, Bleyová v. Slovakia, decision on the admissibility of October 17,
2006 (concerning a dispute over an apartment where the applicant had re-
sided for 40 years, despite her not being the owner, on the basis of a court
decision granting her a right to reside there until an alternative residence
would be allocated to her).
33 Appl. 39664/98, decision on the admissibility of January 30, 2001.
34 Appl. 47953/99, decision on the admissibility of January 30, 2001.
35 Eatson, at p. 9, Porter, at p. 8.
38 Appl. No. 66336/01, The Gypsy Council et al. v. the United Kingdom,
decision on the admissibility of May 14, 2002. For a more detailed descrip-
tion of the facts see Morawa 2003, 97 et seq.
___________________________________________________________
39 Gypsy Council, at p. 3, referring to the Order of the Turnbridge Wells

Borough Council of 4 September 2000.
40 Gypsy Council, at pp. 2–3.
41 Ibid., at p. 4.
42 High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, case CO/3213/2000,
CO/3230/2000, Regina v. Turnbridge Wells Borough Council et al., ex parte
Gypsy Council, judgment of September 7, 2000, at para. 29.
43 Gypsy Council, at p. 4.
44 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
45 Reference is made, mutatis mutandis, to the European Commission of
Human Rights’ [hereafter: Eur.Comm.H.R.] decisions in Appl. 20490/92,
Iskcon v. the United Kingdom, dated March 8, 1994, 76 Decisions and Re-
ports 90 (1994), and 31416/96, Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, dated
October 19, 1998.
46 Gypsy Council, at p. 7–8.
47 Ibid., at p. 8.
48 Appl. 66746/01, Connors v. the United Kingdom, judgment of May 27,
2004.
49 Ibid., at paras. 83–4.
50 Ibid., at para. 86 (emphasis added).
51 Appl. 485/05, Codona v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibil-
ity of February 7, 2006, at p. 10.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Eur.Comm.H.R., Appl. 31600/96, Burton v. the United Kingdom, decision
on the admissibility of September 10, 1996.
55 Codona, at p. 11. The same reasoning is repeated later in the context of
the applicant’s non-discrimination complaint (Articles 8 and 14 read to-
gether), where the Court says that ‘it was, in fact, not possible to offer any
accommodation other than bricks and mortar accommodation.’ Ibid., at p. 13.
56 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Com-
munication No. 31/2003, L. R. et al. v. the Slovak Republic, opinion of March
7, 2005, CERD/C/66/D/31/2003, at para. 10.7.
57 Internal references omitted.
58 See the Court’s judgment in Ždanoka v. Latvia.
59 See Eur.Ct.H.R., Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) et al. v. Turkey, judg-
ment of February 13, 2003, Reports 2003-II.
60 Collins v. the United Kingdom (2002).
61 Volkova v. Russia (2003).
62 This is a consequent line of jurisprudence beginning with the ground-
breaking social security-related Communications Nos. 172/1984, S.W.M.
______________________________________________________________
Broeks v. the Netherlands, views of April 9, 1987, CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984,

para. 12.4; and 182/1984, F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands, views of
April 9, 1987, CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984, para. 12.4.
63 CCPR General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination, para. 12.
64 Eur.Ct.H.R., Appl. 13378/05, Burden v. the United Kingdom, judgment
[GC] of April 29, 2008, para. 58, and many others.
65 Gaygusuz v. Austria, judgment of September 16, 1996, Reports 1996-IV,
para. 36, amongst others.
66 Stec et al. v. the United Kingdom, decision on the admissibility (GC) of
July 6, 2005, Reports 2005-X, para. 40 and Appl. 55707/00, Andrejeva v.
Latvia, judgment (GC) of February 18, 2009, para. 74.
67 See. e.g. Section 26(2) of the South African Constitution which requires
the state to “devise and implement within its available resources a compre-
hensive and coordinated programme progressively to realise the right of ac-
cess to adequate housing.” This mandate was interpreted by the South Afri-
can Constitutional Court in Government v. Irene Grootboom et al., judgement
of October 4, 2000, 2001 (1) SA 46, para. 36, as follows: “A right of access
to adequate housing also suggests that it is not only the state that is responsi-
ble for the provision of houses, but that other agents within our society, in-
cluding individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other
measures to provide housing. The state must create the conditions for access
to adequate housing for people at all economic levels … . State policy deal-
ing with housing must therefore take account of different economic levels of
our society.”
68 India, Supreme Court, Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame,
Civil Appeal No. 2598/1989, judgment of January 31, 1990, (1990) 1 S.C.C.
520, para. 9: “Basic needs of man have traditionally been accepted to the
three - food, clothing and shelter. The right to life is guaranteed in any civi-
lized society. That would take within its sweep the right to food, the right to
clothing, the right to decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to
live in. The difference between the need of an animal and a human being for
shelter has to be kept in view. For the animal it is the bare protection of the
body; for a human being it has to be a suitable accommodation which would
allow him to grow in every aspect - physical, mental and intellectual. The
Constitution aims at ensuring fuller development of every child. That would
be possible only if the child is in a proper home. It is not necessary that every
citizen must be ensured of living in a well built comfortable house but a rea-
sonable home particularly for people in India can even be mud built thatched
house or a mud-built fire proof accommodation.”
69 Andrejeva v. Latvia, at para. 82 (emphasis added), with reference to
Thlimmenos, para. 44, and Stec et al. v. the United Kingdom , para. 51.
___________________________________________________________
70 Ždanoka v. Latvia, at para. 112.

71 CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 3 (1990) on the Nature of
States Parties’ Obligations, para. 4 (emphasis added).
72 D H. et al. v. the Czech Republic, at para. 181.
73 While D. H. contains a reference to Chapman, the Grand Chamber re-
solved the case exclusively on the basis of a standard non-discrimination
analysis.
74 European Court of Justice, Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land
Rheinland-Pfalz, judgment of December 13, 1979, [1979] ECR 3727.
75 CESCR Committee, General Comment No. 3, para. 9 (emphasis added).
76 Chapman, dissenting opinion, para. 8.
77 Andrejeva v. Latvia, at para. 88.
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The Advisory Committee of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities and Equality Promotion
Malte Brosig
This article examines the promotion of standards for equal

treatment by the Council of Europe’s (COE) Advisory
Committee (AC) to the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). It aims to explore
the distinct character of the AC’s method of norm promotion
on the basis of notoriously vague minority rights standards.
The article focuses on the practice of implementing FCNM
norms by analyzing the AC’s country-specific
recommendations through which the AC seeks to enhance the
wording of the Convention’s text. It is argued that the special
quality of the AC’s norm promotion method lies not only in the
interpretation of the FCNM articles in the context of particular
countries but in the systematic and pervasive recognition of
context-dependent variables of minority living conditions, thus
enhancing the text of the FCNM.
Introduction
At the centre of this chapter’s analysis is Article 4 of the FCNM, which pro-
hibits racial discrimination and allows measures of affirmative action and
“effective equality”. This paper examines the substance of how the AC un-
derstands “effective equality”. While Article 4 provides a clear obligation for
the promotion of equalizing integration programmes, this paper explores
which concrete instruments for integration the AC endorses in its monitoring
reports and which actors are envisioned for the implementation of integration
measures. These questions are of pivotal importance for the European minor-
ity rights regime since the most severe violations against minority rights are
racial discrimination and the persistence of social and economic marginaliza-
tion resulting from it. Minority rights protection and minority integration are
intrinsically linked to each other. As Rainer Hofmann, a former President of
the AC, has pointed out: “The ultimate goal of minority rights protection
consists of achieving the full integration of persons belonging to minorities
into the society of the States in which they live, while at the same time, guar-
anteeing the preservation and promotion of their distinct identity” (Hofmann,
2006b, p. 13). Thus integration policies are directly contributing to the reali-
zation of minority rights and are a prerequisite for full compliance with mi-
nority rights standards.
80 The AC and Equality Promotion
______________________________________________________________
The article is structured in three main sections. The first section dis-
cusses the legal quality of the FCNM. The vague and open wording of the
FCNM poses a particular challenge for the implementation of minority rights
norms including standards for minority integration and non-discrimination.
This leaves considerable leeway for the AC to give meaning to FCNM stan-
dards. In the second section, this paper analyzes the AC’s country opinions
on Article 4 clarifying the meaning of “effective equality” in everyday prac-
tice. The final section concludes with a short analysis of the AC’s concept of
integration and its specific character of norm promotion.
1. The Legal Quality of Minority Rights Norms

The FCNM entered into force in February 1998. It is the first and only legally
binding human rights convention on minority rights. Its norms are legally
binding for all contracting parties but, with the exception of Article 3, these
norms are only “programme-type” provisions which are not directly applica-
ble (Explanatory Report to the FCNM, para. 11). Consequently states are
under a legal obligation to follow the principles and provisions of the FCNM
through the application of domestic legislation and the implementation of
policy programmes. In this process states enjoy a high degree of discretion
because FCNM norms cannot be applied directly and their substance is not
necessarily to be found in the Convention itself. The FCNM does not provide
its contracting parties with ready-made solutions for the settling of minority
issues or unique instruments for setting up minority integration programmes
(Steketee, 2001, p. 4). However, it provides states with principles and objec-
tives which include the application of integration measures.
The implementation of the FCNM is monitored by an Advisory
Committee (AC) comprised of 18 independent experts who are nominated by
the contracting state parties of the FCNM. The AC monitors the implementa-
tion of FCNM norms on the basis of reports periodically submitted by each of
the state parties. An initial report is due within one year after ratifying the
FCNM and every fifth year thereafter. The recommendations of the AC need
to be approved by the Committee of Ministers (CM), an intergovernmental
body of COE member states. The fact that states can block unwelcome rec-
ommendations of the AC in the CM has given rise to strong criticism by
some scholars (Alfredsson, 2000, pp. 291–304; Troebst, 1999, p. 20). How-
ever, day-to-day practice has developed a “constructive” and “trusting” rela-
tionship between the two bodies, as former members of the AC have noted
(Phillips, 2004, p. 118; Hoffmann, 2004, pp. 3–16).
Due to the soft wording of the FCNM, leaving a considerable degree
of discretion for member states, the most important sources of reference are
AC country opinions. The substance of FCNM norms very much lies in the
practice of the AC’s recommendations. The reason for the lack of substance
and the specific character of the FCNM programme-type provisions is not
Malte Brosig 81
______________________________________________________________
only to be found in the inability of the COE member states to agree on stricter
norms for minority protection. It also reflects on the very different living
conditions of national minorities throughout Europe, which makes it difficult
to develop single standards for the needs of all minority groups (Steketee,
2001, p. 4). Thus the often criticized soft and vague wording of the FCNM
(Pentassuglia, 1999, p. 419) allows for the much needed flexibility of minor-
ity rights norms to account for the very diverse realities in which minorities
are living.
What distinguishes the FCNM from the European fundamental rights
regime is the absence of directly litigable human rights norms and the exis-
tence of an independent court to which individuals might take their com-
plaints under certain conditions. The AC is not a court nor can it coerce states
and oblige them to revise domestic laws. Minorities cannot appeal to the AC
nor is the AC a completely independent body. Its opinions still need to be
approved by the CM which makes its decisions behind closed doors. The
committee then seeks the cooperation of its contracting parties and issues
opinions of legal quality. The language of its opinions is moderate and dip-
lomatic. It tries to support and advise states in the process of norm implemen-
tation, but the AC does not exert judicial control which would result in clear
decisions such as those of a jury or judge (Hofmann, 2006a, p. 6). Instead it
partly abandons the judicial arena by commenting on policy developments.
Thereby a certain norm is interpreted not only on the basis of legal provisions
such as the FCNM but also flexible standards which are promoted on the
basis of context-dependent conditions. As the empirical analysis will show,
the choice of integration instruments promoted by the AC for accomplishing
“effective equality” is highly dependent on the specific living environment of
ethnic minorities as well as the capacity of states to carry out equalizing
measures and the political history of inter-ethnic relations.
The AC relies exclusively on soft mechanisms for norm enforcement.
Unlike the case of EU enlargement, external incentives and conditionality
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005) do not play a prominent role. Like-
wise the COE cannot provide extensive funding for minority integration
programmes as the EU can afford them (see contribution by Riedel in this
volume). In the concert of European organizations, the AC compliance
mechanism distinguishes itself from the policy of preventive diplomacy exer-
cised by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. It can hardly
be compared with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,
since its norms are not litigable and the AC is only a monitoring body and not
a court. Thus the role the AC can play in order to bring states into compliance
has narrow boundaries. The AC very much relies on its persuasive power and
must try to socialize states into compliance.
Socialization as a form of non-coercive norm enforcement relies on
long-term communication as a vehicle for norm compliance. Deliberation,
______________________________________________________________
rhetorical commitment and persuasion are key elements of the socialization
mechanism (Risse, 2000; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Checkel, 2002). Its incre-
mental impact on state compliance has been analyzed by Risse, Ropp and
Sikkink at length in their seminal volume, The Power of Human Rights Inter-
national Norms and Domestic Change (1999). The AC uses socialization
through its standard monitoring procedure within the framework of the
FCNM. Pursuant to Article 25 the contracting parties to the FCNM have to
submit regular reports on the progress of the implementation of FCNM
norms. The AC replies to these state reports by compiling country-specific
opinions to which the state parties usually send their statement responding to
the AC’s opinion and criticism.
A monitoring cycle is completed by a follow-up seminar. These fol-
low-up seminars bring together members of the AC and state representatives
in a joint conference evaluating the state of minority rights implementation in
the respective country. Frequently minority representatives and members of
civil society are invited too. A full monitoring cycle lasts two to three years
before the whole machinery starts all over again. In this period state represen-
tatives are immersed in a communication process that is steered by the AC
with the aim of explaining and teaching countries how to properly implement
minority standards. Following the logic of socialization, the density and fre-
quency of contacts exerts an incremental influence on countries. When coun-
tries are involved in this communication process, which does not terminate at
any given point, they commit themselves to the goals of the FCNM. With
every further contact the AC manifests its roles as a promoter of minority
rights norms and reinforces these norms. However, the socialization process
does not describe a gradual progress towards norm compliance. Patterns of
non-compliance are frequently encountered.
In the case of minority rights norms, the monitoring cycle is not only
important because of its socializing effects on participating states, it is also a
form of standard setting, benchmarking, and interpretation. A standard which
on paper gives leeway for its application is given meaning primarily through
its application. A monitoring cycle starts with the contracting parties, not the
AC, interpreting the norms set forth in the FCNM. Each member state makes
the initial decisions on how to implement and apply minority rights norms
before the AC starts its review activities on state practice. Thus, at the begin-
ning, the AC is reactive towards state practice. Norm adherence is not a sim-
ple reaction to prescriptive standards, rather vague norms acquire their mean-
ing through application and supervision by monitoring bodies like the AC
(Wiener, 2004). The AC monitors the application of FCNM norms by setting
them in context to national and local conditions. This in the end may lead the
AC to promote a certain measure like positive discrimination in one situation
in order to reach substantive equality while it may reject this practice in an-
other situation. This flexibility is seen as the most appropriate approach for
Malte Brosig 83
______________________________________________________________
minority rights protection because it is able to consider the very different
living conditions of ethnic minorities in Europe. Thus the opinions are tailor-
made for each country. Through the state reporting and monitoring process,
the AC refines existing standards which need further refinement because they
are vaguely formulated and often entail escape clauses.
2. The Legal Basis of Minority Integration and Equal Treatment

Minority integration is not new to the COE. As early as 1969 the Parliamen-
tary Assembly called for a better integration of Roma in Western Europe
(PACE, Rec. 563, 1969). Six years later the CM, for the first time, considered
the application of “special measures” for integration (CM Res. 75(13) para.
5). With the Eastern enlargement of the COE in the 1990s the question of
integration, primarily of Roma, triggered the issuance of a number of official
COE recommendations and resolutions. Between 1993 and 2006 the COE
authored six recommendations on the integration of Roma people and many
more on general minority issues. Nonetheless, the FCNM does not provide
minorities with a right to integration nor even the right to enforce a certain
method or practice.
There are, however, a few provisions of the FCNM which, combined,
cover the most important aspects of standard minority integration pro-
grammes in Europe. Article 15 calls upon countries to create those conditions
necessary “for the effective participation of … national minorities in cultural,
social and economic life and in public affairs”. It raises the issue of the par-
ticipation of minority groups in society in order to remedy their often mar-
ginalized position and underrepresentation in decision and policy making.
Article 5 requires states to promote minority cultures and prohibits any form
of assimilation in state integration programmes. The promotion of intercul-
tural dialogue and tolerance is covered by Article 6. Finally, core integration
goals are promoted primarily by Article 4 (see Table 1) demanding “effective
equality” and prevention from discrimination. Racial discrimination is the
most severe violation of minority rights and the issue of equal treatment and
equal opportunities is pivotal to achieve equality and to ameliorate the exist-
ing marginalization and social and economic cleavages between ethnic mi-
norities and the majority society, hence the empirical part of this paper will
focus only on the AC’s promotion of Article 4.
Article 4(1) first guarantees minorities equality before the law and the
equal enjoyment of rights. Any discrimination based on belonging to an eth-
nic minority is prohibited. However, this protection against discrimination
and the formal admission of equality before the law does not always lead to
substantive equality and the equal enjoyment of rights in practice. Therefore
paragraph 2 demands the adoption of “adequate measures” for the promotion
of substantial equality (Alfredsson, 2006, p. 144). The explanatory report to
the FCNM on Article 4(2) makes it clear that special equalizing measures
______________________________________________________________
must adhere to the principle of proportionality: “This principle requires […]
that such measures do not extend, in time or in scope, beyond what is neces-
sary in order to achieve the aim of full and effective equality”. Thus affirma-
tive action, which in some cases is needed in order to reach substantial equal-
ity, should be designed as a temporary instrument as long as the specific
circumstances of marginalization or discrimination need to be overcome.
Inevitably this requires a periodic and systematic assessment of minority
living conditions and needs. Equalizing measures must be underpinned by
statistical data and a socio-economic mapping clearly demonstrating the need
for affirmative action.
The final paragraph of Article 4 legitimizes temporary preferential
treat of ethnic minorities if these measures aim at overcoming marginaliza-
tion and discrimination based on belonging to a minority group. Affirmative
action is not a discriminatory practice and does not contravene the principle
of equality if it conforms to the principle of proportionality.
Table 1. Article 4 of the FCNM

Article 4
1 The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the right of
equality before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect, any discrimination
based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited.
2 The Parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to promote, in all
areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective equality between persons
belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority. In this respect, they shall
take due account of the specific conditions of the persons belonging to national minorities.
3. The measures adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 shall not be considered to be an act of
discrimination.
The comments of the AC in response to state reports clearly show that

there is an obligation to introduce equalizing measures under certain condi-
tions, as the following section will show. However, despite the explanatory
report and its additional explications on Article 4, many questions remain. It
is not clear which specific measures are adequate for the accomplishment of
substantial equality. Not every unequal treatment needs the application of
positive discrimination. The term “effective equality” needs to be explained
in greater detail which can only be done through the process of monitoring
and application of these norms. The efficiency question is very much tied to
the specific conditions in the social, cultural, economic and political envi-
ronment that minorities encounter.
Malte Brosig 85
______________________________________________________________
The Opinion of the Advisory Committee on Article 4
The following section analyzes the opinion of the AC on Article 4. In order to

make the analysis comprehensive, I reviewed all the comments of the AC to
the contracting parties since the FCNM entered into force in 1998. I exam-
ined AC country opinions in the first and second cycle of state reports, which
have been concluded by most countries. The third cycle, which is just begin-
ning at the time of writing, has not been examined. For most states parties,
the first cycle comprises an initial report on which the AC issues its first
opinion. This first opinion comments primarily on the state of transposition
of FCNM norms into legislation and inquires into the degree of legal protec-
tion of minorities with reference to the FCNM. In the second cycle, the AC
proceeds by shifting its main attention away from the formal legal adoption
of norms to the proper application and effective implementation of minority
rights norms. Thereby the AC clarifies the scope and range of application
much more than the explanatory report or legal commentaries in the litera-
ture.
In order to analyze the AC’s comments on Article 4, this section iden-
tifies those factors that are frequently mentioned by the AC. We have deter-
mined 16 such conditions (see Table 2). These conditions are the essence of
Article 4, reflecting on the AC’s interpretation of equal treatment and non-
discrimination. The data sheet in Table 2 documents the frequency of appear-
ance of each factor by each country. As mentioned above, the FCNM norms
are formulated quite vaguely with the intention of covering a variety of cases
and allowing for flexibility in application. Thus the AC does not recommend
the same procedures to every state party, but distinguishes between cases.
The data sheet visualizes how frequently the AC refers to a certain factor and
how systematically this factor is introduced in the AC’s opinions, which
gives us a first hint of when a certain factor is picked up by the AC. The table
also shows which mixture of conditions the AC highlights for each of the 32
countries. However, only a qualitative analysis which also inquires into indi-
vidual conditions can evaluate the importance of these 16 factors in greater
detail.
The AC’s opinions can be grouped into three major categories; formal
requirements, policy organization, and policy instruments (Table 3). At the
beginning is the legal formal transposition of FCNM norms into domestic
legislation which, with regard to Article 4, requires the transposition of com-
prehensive anti-discrimination legislation. If this first hurdle has been
achieved successfully the AC requests the setting up of effective structures
which implement integration programmes systematically and coherently.
Finally the AC issues a number of very specific recommendations advocating
certain policy instruments which aim at remedying the worst cases of mar-
ginalization. The following empirical analysis examines the AC’s country
______________________________________________________________
opinions according to these three categories. It seeks to clarify the actual
meaning of equal treatment in practice and inquires into the context variables
which guide the AC in its selection of minority integration instruments.
Table 2. Article 4 and AC country opinions
legal aid and remedy

insufficient monitor-
local administration
implementation gap
confidence building
deficient legal pro-
adequate resources
institutional set up
positive measures
traditional way of
needs awareness
Roma women
consultation
EC/2000/43
legal status
poor data
Country
ALB X X X X - X - - X X - X X - - X
ARM X X - X X X - - - X - X - - - X
AUT X - - X - - - - - - X - X - - -
AZE X X X X - X - - X X - - - - X X
BH X X X X - - X X X X - X X - X X
CHE X X - - - - - - - - - - X X - -
CRO X X - X X X X X X X - X X - - -
CYP X X - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
CZE X - X X - X - X X X - X X - - X
DEN - - X - - - - - - - X X X - - X
ESP X - X X - X - X X X X X X - - X
EST - X - - - X X - - - - - - - - X
FIN X - X X - X - X X - X - - X - -
GBR - X - - X - - - - X - - - X - X
GER X X - X - X - - - X X - - - - X
HUN X X X X X X - - - X - - X - - X
IRE X - X - X X - X - X X X X X - X
ITA X X X - X - X X X - X X X X - X
KOS - - X X X X X - - - - - - - X X
LIE X - - - - X - - - X - - X - - -
LTU - - X - X X X - - - - X X - - -
MKD X X X - X - X X X - - X - - -
MLD X X - X X - - X X X - X X - - X
NOR X X X X X X - - - X - X X X - X
POL X X X X X - - - - - X X X - - X
ROM X - X X X X X X X X - X X - - -
RUS X X X - - - X X X X - X - X X X
SCG - X X X X X X X - - - - X - - -
SLO X - - - X X X - X - X - - - X X
SVK X X X X X X - X - X - X X - - X
SWE - X - - X - - - X X - X X X - -
UKR X X - - - X - - - - - - - - - -
X = presence of a condition, - = absence of a condition
Formal Legal Requirements
Many of the AC opinions in the first monitoring cycle focus on formal and
legal requirements for the full implementation of Article 4. The AC system-
atically addressed the need for countries to protect minorities against dis-
crimination through comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation providing
victims of discrimination with effective legal remedies. It also collected sta-
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tistical data on the living conditions of ethnic minorities and commented on
problems related to the legal status of minorities.
Table 3. Advisory Committee: Groupings of Country Opinions

Formal requirements Policy organization Policy instruments
Availability of adequate Effective monitoring Tailor-made country recom-

statistical data capabilities mendations
Comprehensive legal pro- Effectively working Om- Variety of preferential meas-

tection against discrimina- budsman (institutional ures depending on living
tion independence, regional conditions
availability)
Availability of effective Affirmative integration
legal remedies against Cross sector coordination measures especially in the
discrimination at the horizontal and verti- employment and education
cal axes sector
Clarification of legal status
questions Special emphasis on local Special measures for Roma
authorities woman
Minority consultation Respect for the traditional

way of life
Incorporation of civil
society when implementing Promotion of best practice
integration programmes solutions
Proper planning, execution,

evaluation of all integration
measures
Availability of adequate
resources and funding
According to the AC, only a comprehensive anti-discrimination law

can guarantee full equality. Although most countries prohibit discrimination
on various grounds in their constitutions, a general discrimination ban does
not suffice to guarantee real equality when confronted with persisting forms
of marginalization, stigmatization and social and economic deprivation. Ac-
cording to the AC country opinions, two-thirds of the analyzed counties did
not provide minorities with sufficiently comprehensive legal protection
against discrimination. Comprehensive legislation must protect minorities
from any form of discrimination, protecting individuals from discrimination
by public and private institutions (Serbia first cycle, para. 31, 17/11/04).
Besides general bans on discrimination, many countries have introduced
additional legislation to prohibit discrimination in employment, which the
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AC actively supports (Croatia, first cycle, para. 23, 06/04/01). However,
greater protection is needed in areas in which minorities and in particular
Roma people frequently suffer discrimination, like housing (Sweden, first
cycle, para. 31, 20/02/03), education (Russia, first cycle, para. 32, 13/09/02),
health care (Lithuania, first cycle, para. 28, 21/02/03 and CM Rec. 2006(10)),
and employment (Italy, first cycle, para. 22, 14/09/01).
The transposition of the EU Racial Equality Directive is also sup-
ported, however, without making comments on whether a state has trans-
posed the directive properly or not. In some cases the AC combines its call
for comprehensive adoption of anti-discrimination legislation with the trans-
position of the EU Racial Equality Directive (Germany, second cycle, para.
28, 01/03/06). In the case of Ireland, the AC used the belated transposition of
the EU directive as a tool to apply pressure to accelerate legislative reforms
from which the AC hopes to bring Irish law into compliance with the FCNM
(Ireland, first cycle, para. 21, 22/05/03). However, the promotion of this EU
directive for some EU member states, but not for non-EU members, poses the
potential threat of establishing differential treatment without having a solid
legal justification for this practice.
As part of a comprehensive legal protection against racial discrimina-
tion which reaches all areas of the life of minority groups, the introduction of
effective remedies is required of all contracting parties. The existence of legal
protection mechanisms against discrimination is a precondition that necessary
but not sufficient to guarantee the promotion of “full and effective equality”
in real life. The effective working of legal provisions depends on a number of
conditions of which the AC is aware in its comments on state reports. Low
numbers of legal trials concerning acts of racial discrimination being brought
before courts, despite NGO reports on widespread discrimination in everyday
life, is very often indicative of a malfunctioning of the national administra-
tion and judicial system which deprives many minority members of access to
effective remedies (Russia, second cycle, para. 46, 11/05/06). Despite the fact
that many Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) have transposed
the Racial Equality Directive punctually does not automatically give their
minority populations the opportunity to seek a remedy before a court. More-
over, the AC attaches great importance to the possibility that victims of dis-
crimination can seek compensation for damages suffered (Cyprus, first cycle,
para 23, 06/04/01). The CM even pledges free legal aid for the very poor
(CM Rec. (2005)4 para. 13).
In addition to the proper transposition of comprehensive non-
discrimination legislation, great importance is attached to the availability of
reliable statistical data. In 25 out of 32 cases the AC criticizes the insufficient
availability of statistical data concerning national minorities. Any effective
integration measure needs a careful evaluation of minority living conditions
based on reliable statistical data before it can be implemented properly. In
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many cases there appear to be significant discrepancies between the data
made available to the COE and the actual ethnic minority populations in a
certain country (Austria, first cycle, para. 22, 16/05/02 or Czech Republic
first cycle para. 28, 06/04/01). This is particularly true for Roma people.
National census data frequently do not provide reliable figures on the Roma
population. In its comments, the AC requests not only exact data on the eth-
nic composition of states but also asks member states to provide details ac-
cording to age, sex, and geographical location (Germany, second cycle para.
33, 01/03/06). It is only possible to judge the effectiveness and appropriate-
ness of national integration measures if reliable data is provided. This data is
also important for countries in order to allow them to develop what the AC
calls “targeted measures” for integration (Slovenia, second cycle, para. 61,
26/05/05). Collecting statistical data is essential not only for the development
of integration strategies but also for the implementation and evaluation of
equalizing measures (Macedonia, first cycle, para. 41, 27/05/04). Guarantee-
ing “full and effective equality” requires states to constantly re-evaluate and
up-date their data on ethnic minorities. Changes in the ethnic composition in
certain territories or changes in the socio-economic conditions of minority
groups have to be recognized within an appropriate time span.
Collecting data based on ethnic characteristics does not always find
support in state administrations and concerns about it can be justified. A
potential danger is the misuse of this data to discriminate against a certain
group. For instance, the gathering of crime-related data according to racial
origin can be politically exploited for populist reasons and might even fuel
resentment against minorities. In countries in which ethnic conflicts have
recently been overcome or continue to exist, this form of data collection can
lead to an unintended division of society into ethnic groups with far-reaching
consequences. Therefore, this data was not explicitly demanded from Kosovo
and Bosnia, which were reminded to comply with personal data protection
provisions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, first cycle, para. 53, 27/05/05).
A further formal requirement for the proper application of FCNM
norms is the question of the legal status of ethnic minorities. This issue is
particularly relevant in the Baltic countries and in the Balkans. In Estonia and
Latvia, for example, around one-third of the population belong to the Rus-
sian-speaking minority, many of whom did not obtain an Estonian or Latvian
passport automatically after the Soviet Union collapsed. The issue of citizen-
ship and of what constitutes an ethnic minority is of the highest importance
for the implementation of FCNM norms. In their explanatory declaration to
the FCNM, both countries declared that only citizens fall under the category
of national minorities and thus can enjoy rights set out in the FCNM. How-
ever, similar declarations have been issued by Austria, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal and Switzerland (Thiele, 2006, p. 126).
______________________________________________________________
In the Balkan region the uncertain legal status of Roma hinders the
implementation of integration programmes in many cases. The unclear legal
status of Roma settlements in Serbia led the authorities to forcefully evict
Roma from their homes (Serbia, first cycle, para. 40, 17/11/04, see also CM
Rec. (2005)4, para. 24). Roma living in non-legalized settlements often be-
long to the most disenfranchised and marginalized group of people. These
settlements often lack basic infrastructure like water supply or waste collec-
tion. There have also been cases in which Roma have been removed from
residence lists, leaving these people with an uncertain residence status (Slo-
venia, second cycle, para. 56, 26/05/05).
Policy Organization
A substantial proportion of the AC country opinions focus on the organiza-

tion and administration of minority integration programmes. Indeed the AC
spends more time and effort on commenting on the correct set-up of state
implementing organs and administrative coordination of minority policy
instruments than on the promotion of specific policy programmes. This sec-
tion presents the AC’s opinion on state policy organization mentioning the
effective working of Ombudsman institutions, the need for proper policy
coordination between state institutions at the central and local level, models
for adequate minority participation and problems of monitoring and imple-
mentation.
According to the AC, the availability of effective remedies depends on
the existence and proper working of a specialized monitoring institution. The
introduction of the office of Ombudsman has become a standard recommen-
dation. States without such a specialized body are advised to establish such
an institution “in a timely manner” (Armenia, first cycle, para. 26, 16/05/02).
The Ombudsman primarily serves the interest of the public including ethnic
minorities but is not a representative for minority interests. In many cases the
duties of this office are narrowly defined. An Ombudsman institution classi-
cally investigates complaints by individuals whose rights have been violated
by state authorities (Cyprus, first cycle, para. 23, 06/04/01). Against this
narrow understanding of the duties and functions of an Ombudsman the AC
wants to expand its competences to the promotion of equal treatment (Czech
Republic, second cycle, para. 20, 24/02/05).
In its country opinions, the AC has expressed the view that the mere
existence of an Ombudsman office may not suffice for guaranteeing effective
remedies against discrimination. It attaches a number of conditions or expec-
tations for this institution to work well. The offices should be accessible to
people in regional areas and in areas in which minorities reside, to increase
the accessibility of the Ombudsman office for ethnic minorities (Azerbaijan,
first cycle, para. 26, 22/05/03). The building of popular confidence between
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state institutions and minorities is a further issue of concern in the cases of
Azerbaijan (ibid., para. 24), Bosnia (first cycle, para. 36, 27/05/05), Russia
(second cycle, para. 46 11/05/06), Kosovo (first cycle, para. 37 25/11/05) and
Slovenia (second cycle, para. 50, 26/05/05), which have shown signs of seri-
ous disruption of public trust in state institutions.
The AC takes a keen interest in the effective working of Ombudsman
institutions within the domestic state structure and considers it as “indispen-
sable for the Ombudsman to be able to rely on cooperation from all authori-
ties” (Slovenia, first cycle, para 27, 12/09/02). This is a particular challenge
since often minority issues do not fall in the competence of only one ministe-
rial office but cut cross many portfolios. The effective working of Ombuds-
man institutions also requires a well-informed minority which knows its
rights and actively uses them. Furthermore, countries are reminded to provide
adequate financial resources and institutional independence when setting up
such an office (Armenia, first cycle, para. 27, 16/05/02).
For guaranteeing effective equality, the AC investigates the domestic
organization of state integration programmes. Questions of the proper im-
plementation of integration instruments and the efficient organization of
integration programmes, including the allocation of adequate funding, super-
vision, administration and evaluation, are important elements of its opinions.
In 19 out of 32 cases, comments on the organizational set-up of integration
programmes were made. Indeed the challenge when setting up national inte-
gration programmes is not only the often low public support for minority
integration projects but also the need for proper planning and cooperation
between national and regional authorities on the vertical level as well as be-
tween different ministries at the horizontal level. Based on comprehensive
non-discrimination legislation, the AC demands that countries develop com-
prehensive integration strategies remedying “at all levels” social and eco-
nomic discrimination and marginalization (Bosnia, first cycle, para. 49,
27/05/05). Such measures need to involve “close coordination” of all relevant
ministries (ibid., para 51). The CM has supported this view in a number of
recommendations on Roma integration issues (CM, Rec. (2001)17; CM Rec.
(2005)4; CM Rec. (2006)10). Problems of coordination between different
ministries are a frequent challenge for the implementation of integration
projects. Repeatedly the AC expresses concern about the varying degrees of
commitment of the state administration bodies involved. Concerns were is-
sued on the full and consistent implementation of integration projects by all
involved actors (Romania, first cycle, para. 25, 06/04/01).
The success and sustainability of minority integration programmes
depends to a large extent on an effectively working regional and local ad-
ministration. It is the local authorities that run integration projects and thus
local governments feature frequently in AC recommendations (see also CM
Rec. (2005)4 para. 9, 35; Croatia, second cycle, para. 74, 01/10/04). Resis-
______________________________________________________________
tance or ignorance against integration projects by local authorities can impact
negatively on national integration programmes and at worst can undermine
the ability of these programmes to promote effective equality (Czech Repub-
lic, second cycle, paras. 52, 59, 24/02/05; Hungary, second cycle, paras. 49,
52, 09/12/04). Coordination with local authorities is important because many
services in which Roma, primarily, suffer discrimination, such as health care,
housing etc. are administered by them (Italy, second cycle, para. 56,
24/02/05). Besides calling for proper coordination of central, regional, and
local administrative institutions, the AC also calls for cooperation with civil
society (Macedonia, first cycle, para. 33, 27/05/04).
Contact with civil society organizations is an important information
source for the AC. Occasionally it refers to NGO opinions or reports on the
state of integration measures and revealed shortcomings in their implementa-
tion (Norway, second cycle, para. 39, 05/10/06). The incorporation of civil
society organizations is particularly valuable in situations in which there is
only a weak or no political representation of minority interests. In these situa-
tions, the AC tries to integrate civil society organizations to represent minor-
ity interests (Poland, first cycle, para. 39, 27/11/03).
Following the country opinions of the AC, it is not fully clear if states
should feel required to set up a special or separate administrative unit which
administers integration projects. However, the AC supports their establish-
ment and proper funding (Spain, first cycle, para. 31, 27/11/03). In many
cases it reminds countries to provide sufficient funding for integration pro-
grammes. In 17 out of 32 cases, the AC finds that countries provide insuffi-
cient resources for the proper implementation of integration programmes, and
12 of these 17 are Eastern European countries. Additionally the CM has high-
lighted the need to “provide long-term budgetary support” especially for
Roma integration projects (CM Rec. (2001)17, para. 28).
Besides the proper coordination of state institutions involved in de-
signing integration programmes, the AC frequently calls for the “active par-
ticipation of Travellers and Traveller organizations in the implementation
structures set up” (Ireland, first cycle, para. 42, 22/05/03). In half the coun-
tries which have ratified the FCNM, proper minority consultation when set-
ting up minority integration programmes has been called for (see Table 2).
Systematic minority consultation primarily seeks to guarantee that minority
integration projects reflect the real needs of minorities and are not developed
without minority input (Russia, second cycle, para. 70, 11/05/06). In some
instances the AC recommends increasing the number of minority employees
in state administrations (Kosovo, para. 37, 25/11/05; Macedonia, first cycle,
para. 36, 27/05/04). Minority consultation has also been mentioned in a vari-
ety of COE recommendations by the CM stressing the importance of minority
participation at the planning, implementation and evaluation of integration
Malte Brosig 93
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projects (CM, Rec. R (2000)4; CM Rec (2001)17; CM Rec. (2005)4; CM
Rec. (2006)10).
As can be seen in Table 2, almost two-thirds of countries inadequately
monitor their non-discrimination legislation or insufficiently supervise their
integration programmes. Governments, according to the AC, need to have
information available on the practical application of non-discrimination legis-
lation in order to guarantee fully that equalizing measures and non-
discrimination legislation work properly (Ukraine first cycle, para. 28,
01/03/02). Only if countries have up-to-date information available are they
able to adjust current programmes to the needs of minority members. Fur-
thermore, the monitoring and evaluation of integration measures should be
conducted by independent institutions (Macedonia, first cycle, para. 33,
27/05/04). Not only states need to monitor the implementation of non-
discrimination and integration programmes, however. This information is
also crucial for the AC, which has to rely on statistical data and survey stud-
ies provided by the state parties, or other independent research institutes or
NGOs, to fulfil its task, the monitoring of the FCNM (Slovakia, first cycle,
para. 21, 22/09/00).
The insufficient monitoring apparatus in many countries also com-
plements the frequently observed problems of implementation. One-third of
country opinions complain about insufficient implementation of non-
discrimination rules or integration, and the majority of such cases are Eastern
European countries. The reasons for this implementation deficit are manifold.
In the case of Bosnia (first cycle, para. 42, 27/05/05) it is a “deeply-rooted
discrimination” in society. In other cases, the AC has attributed the imple-
mentation gap to; lack of statistical data to monitor the progress of implemen-
tation (Croatia, second cycle, para. 43, 01/10/04), lack of commitment of
national governments towards integration goals (ibid., para. 51), insufficient
budget (ibid., para. 72), lack of systematic evaluation of integration projects
(Ireland, second cycle, para. 41, 06/10/06), lack of minority participation
during the implementation of integration programmes (Ireland, first cycle,
para. 42, 22/05/03), misconduct of police officers (Lithuania, first cycle, para.
32, 21/03/03), unclear guidelines for implementing agencies (Romania, first,
cycle, para. 29, 06/04/01), unclear legal status of ethnic minorities (Russia,
first cycle, para. 36, 13/09/02), lack of judicial independence (Serbia, first
cycle, para. 36, 17/11/04), or the unawareness of existing non-discrimination
laws among the broader public and within the judicial system (Romania,
second cycle, para. 47, 24/11/05).
In its comments on the organizational set up of integration pro-
grammes, the AC is primarily reacting to the situation on the ground. Con-
fronted with implementation deficits, inadequate monitoring and widespread
organizational shortcomings, the AC has to devote large parts of its commen-
______________________________________________________________
taries to questions of administrative organization before recommending spe-
cific policy instruments.
Policy Instruments
The promotion of minority integration measures is primarily based on Article

4(2) and thus the AC’s comments on the implementation of this paragraph
are central for our understanding of what equalizing measures are about. The
AC actively encourages states to use minority integration tools for the promo-
tion of effective equality. However, it has not developed objective criteria for
when affirmative action is justified, it only refers to persisting and consider-
able inequalities between national minorities and mainstream society which
justify the introduction of preferential treatment (Romania, first cycle, CM
Conclusions, 06/04/01). In many cases the AC narrows down the area in
which it recommends positive measures for securing full equality; employ-
ment (Serbia, first cycle, para. 38, 17/11/04), housing (Norway, first cycle,
para. 76, 12/09/02), education (Sweden, first cycle, para. 26, 20/02/03), or
Roma woman (Norway, first cycle, para. 76, 12/09/02).
A number of terms are used to express the need for preferential treat-
ment without calling directly for affirmative action. In the country recom-
mendations one can find the terms; “positive measures”, “targeted measures”,
“specific measures”, “decisive measures”, “remedial measures”, “suitable
measures” and “additional measures”. They all, in a polite and diplomatic
manner, point to persistent inequalities between ethnic minorities and main-
stream society that require state intervention and some kind of positive dis-
crimination. However, the AC avoids the naming of specific equalizing
measures and it does not prescribe concrete instruments for any particular
issue. The AC’s approach is to emphasize problems and to make countries
aware of existing inequalities. The measure applied to remedy the situation is
left to the discretion of each state party. There are differences in emphasis,
however; while the term “suitable measure” leaves considerable scope for
interpretation, the wording “positive” or “remedial” measures demands more
direct state intervention. However, it is not clear according to which bench-
marks the AC decides a situation requires “additional” or “targeted” meas-
ures. In some cases the AC’s comments appear as rather non-coercive rec-
ommendations. Phrases like, “The Advisory Committee considers that the
Armenian authorities should step up their efforts in this regard (effective
equality)” without going into the matter of the scope and extent of the gov-
ernment’s efforts can only formulate very vague obligations for Armenia
(Armenia, first cycle para. 93, 16/05/02). Positive measures in the area of
education are seen as vital for success in other fields such as employment and
housing and therefore education forms a special focus for AC comments
(Finland, first cycle, para. 20, 22/09/00). As stated earlier, no specific integra-
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tion measures have been prescribed nor is it inquired why certain instruments
have worked effectively or not. The decision as to which instruments best
apply for the integration of minority people is left for the state parties.
The AC not only criticizes shortcomings in its periodic country opin-
ion, it also encourages states to continue and systematically apply projects
that have a proven positive impact. One case in point is the introduction of
Roma assistant teachers (see the contribution by Cashman in this volume),
which lowered the school drop-out rates of Roma students significantly (Po-
land, first cycle, para. 37, 27/11/03). The Parliamentary Assembly of the
COE, more directly than the AC, calls upon countries to recruit Roma staff in
public services ranging from administrative work in local authorities to
health-care assistants in hospitals (PACE, Rec. 1557 (2002) para. 15c). Ex-
amples of successful “best practice” are promoted which can be developed by
regional authorities or organizations from which a whole country may profit
if applied coherently (Serbia, first cycle, para. 38, 17/11/04).
In its comments on Article 4 the AC, with the exception of Roma
women, rarely singles out a sub-group of any particular ethnic minority.
However, because Roma women frequently encounter double discrimination
based on their ethnic origin and gender, the AC devotes special attention to
the situation of Roma women. In more than 20 country opinions the AC has
made a direct reference to the situation of Roma women, making states aware
of their vulnerable situation. In many cases it uses the standard phrase, “the
Advisory Committee underlines that, when implementing special measures,
particular attention should be paid to the situation of Roma women” (Den-
mark, first cycle, para. 20, 22/09/00) to express the need for special integra-
tion measures. The AC also finds “that the gender dimension needs to be
taken into account in the design and implementation of all minority initia-
tives” (Ireland, second cycle, para. 51, 06/10/06). On some occasions more
specific advice has been found. For Ireland (first cycle, para. 38, 22/05/03)
the AC recommends improving the access to childcare facilities from which
it expects women to have better access to the labour market. Indeed unem-
ployment among Roma women is one of the most worrying and persistent
forms of lack of integration (Norway, second cycle, 05/10/06). In Romania
the AC welcomes the training of Roma women as social workers to improve
the health and living conditions in Roma settlements (Romania, second cycle,
para. 53, 24/11/05). This measure combines efforts to raise health-care stan-
dards among Roma and provides Roma women with job training and em-
ployment. The 2003 Body and Soul Report, which revealed dozens of cases
of forced sterilization of Roma women mostly in Slovakia, has triggered the
AC to focus more intensively on Roma women and their needs in the health-
care system (Slovakia, second cycle, para. 57, 26/05/05).
Lastly the AC makes reference to the traditional way of life of Roma
Travellers, however, only in a small number of cases (5 of 32) does it indi-
______________________________________________________________
cate that their lifestyle needs special consideration. For example, integration
measures should take into account the special needs of Roma and their tradi-
tional way of life (Spain, first cycle, para. 37, 27/11/03). Hereby the AC
highlights especially the needs of Travellers and their nomadic lifestyle to
which integration measures need to be adapted (Norway, second cycle, para.
45, 05/10/06). Respect for the traditional way of life of Roma has also been
acknowledged by the CM (CM Rec. (2005)4) and even by the European
Court of Human Rights based on Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (Morawa, 2004; Gilbert, 2002, pp. 778–780).
The AC and Norm Promotion
This contribution aims to clarify the meaning of “effective equality” of Arti-

cle 4 of the FCNM, which is a central element of many minority integration
programmes in Europe, and thereby analyzed the immanent character of the
AC norm promotion mechanism. Two conditions have shaped the AC norm
promotion process the most; first, the lack of legal power and robust en-
forcement mechanisms, and second, the vague meaning of FCNM norms
giving considerable discretion for its interpretation. The AC has to rely al-
most exclusively on its socialization power. FCNM standards, although they
are legally binding, are not directly litigable. Furthermore, the COE cannot
offer any significant external incentives for norm compliance, like financial
subsidies for what are often costly integration programmes. Thus the AC
mechanism is primarily characterized by a lack of political and legal power
and the absence of material support for the implementation of FCNM stan-
dards. Incrementally, the EU is filling this gap through its non-discrimination
legislation and large-scale funding of minority integration programmes (see
contribution by Riedel to this volume). However, the power of the AC is in
its monitoring process, which immerses states in a communication process on
the proper application of minority rights norms creating commitments states
cannot easily evade. This rather soft norm enforcement mechanism is a logi-
cal reaction to the vague wording of minority rights norms. The open word-
ing of many minority rights standards may, in some cases, be a burden, giv-
ing states the opportunity to circumvent strict norms. However, it also legiti-
mizes the function of the AC as a guardian and interpreter of European mi-
nority rights. Indeed having strict norms but weak enforcement instruments
may be worse than having vague norms but relying on the power of socializa-
tion. Without the open wording of the FCNM the work of the AC would be
seen with much more scepticism. Its current approach, which combines so-
cialization through monitoring and elements of norm-setting, also suits the
COE because it assigns to the AC the role of interpreter and promoter of
European minority rights norms.
Malte Brosig 97
______________________________________________________________
The country-specific recommendations of the AC are indispensable
for a deeper understanding of the principle of equality in Article 4. By refer-
ence to the AC’s opinions, we can more systematically comprehend the
meaning and scope of “effective equality” for minorities in Europe. The AC’s
recommendations give detailed information on the obligations states have
accepted when ratifying the FCNM. For monitoring the implementation of
Article 4 the AC has developed its own “choreography”. In a first step the
AC demands the adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation,
in a second step it comments on the organizational set-up of state integration
efforts, and thirdly the AC recommends more concrete integration measures.
Thus the special value of analyzing the AC’s comments also lies in the crea-
tion of meaning through the monitoring of Article 4. The AC is not only a
monitoring body but also a norm constructor through monitoring.
The above sections could reveal a number of characteristics of this
monitoring process and thereby specify the special character of norm promo-
tion of the AC. Each recommendation is a country-specific comment which
takes into account the specific living environment of ethnic minorities in
Europe. The tailoring of country opinions is guided by implicit context vari-
ables. These variables are rather pragmatic benchmarks reacting to the real-
life situation of minorities. The AC cautiously avoids normative language
that would give preference to any theory of multiculturalism or other ideol-
ogy. The fact that a substantial proportion of the AC opinions deal with ques-
tions of administrative organization of integration measures instead of inte-
gration instruments itself is a reaction to implementation problems on the
ground. The FCNM does not provide any guidelines for how states should
organize their integration programmes, thus the AC’s opinions generally do
not promote a certain type of coordination. The AC’s comments are outcome-
oriented and rather advise than prescribe a certain method of coordination.
However, the AC insists on commonsense elementary conditions, like ade-
quate funding or proper coordination between different levels of state institu-
tions. Thus the AC opinions help states to design their integration pro-
grammes properly, but the choice of instruments is left to the countries. Any
specific instruments are welcome as long as they remedy substantial inequali-
ties.
The AC’s recommendations are very often general in nature, only oc-
casionally recommending specific integration instruments or policies. This
can largely be explained by the open wording of Article 4 which does not
give preference for any specific measure. The AC only requires states to
adopt a certain measure if there is an objective need for it (Hofmann 2006 b,
p. 13). It calls for the adoption of specific, targeted or positive measures
which are country, issue, and minority specific. Recommendations by the AC
are individually tailored for each country and thus measures recommended
for one country may not be adequate for all others. Integration measures in
______________________________________________________________
the area of education and employment are the most frequent ones recom-
mended by the AC, followed by the special protection of Roma woman and
respect for the traditional way of life of Roma Travellers. However, the AC
has not developed transparent criteria according to which it decides which
situation deserves the application of additional or positive integration meas-
ures. The existence of persisting forms of inequality is made on pragmatic
assumptions on the living conditions of minorities.
Conclusion
Of all European international organizations, the AC is the institution that has
developed the most sophisticated and elaborated approach to minority rights
in general and minority integration in particular. Through a process of long-
term monitoring, commenting, and socialization, the AC has further devel-
oped the scope and meaning of full equality and its organizational prerequi-
sites. It has developed flexible and individually tailored benchmarks for mi-
nority integration programmes, setting standards in accordance with and
beyond the legal framework. Yet the AC has been reluctant to prescribe spe-
cific integration tools, its soft law approach leaves considerable space for
multiple ways to reach equality. The choice of instruments for furthering
social inclusion is largely left to the discretion of countries. Furthermore, the
work of the AC aims to reinforce integration efforts by state and non-state
actors. It gives minority activists external (international) legitimacy and po-
litical support for their work.
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Phillips, A. (2004), “The Framework Convention for the Protection of Na-

tional Minorities (FCNM),” in: Mechanisms for the implementation of minor-
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action?,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 8: 1–15.
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Documents of the Advisory Committee
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Armenia, first cycle, 16/05/02.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Austria, first cycle 16/05/02.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Azerbaijan, first cycle, 22/05/03.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina, first cycle,

27/05/05.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Croatia, first and second cycle, 06/04/01

and 01/10/04.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Cyprus, first cycle, 06/04/01.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Czech Republic, first and second cycle,

06/04/01 and 24/02/05.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Denmark, first cycle, 22/09/00.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Germany, second cycle, 01/03/06.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Finland, first cycle, 22/09/00.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Hungary, second cycle, 09/12/04.

______________________________________________________________
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Ireland, first cycle, 22/05/03.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Italy, first and second cycle, 14/09/01 and
24/02/05.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Kosovo, first cycle, 25/11/05.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Lithuania, first cycle, 21/02/03.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Macedonia, first cycle, 27/05/04.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Norway, first and second cycle, 12/09/02

and 05/10/06.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Poland, first cycle, 27/11/03.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Romania, first and second cycle, 06/04/01

and 24/11/05.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Russia, first and second cycle, 13/09/02

and 11/05/06.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Serbia, first cycle, 17/11/01.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Slovakia, first and second cycle, 22/09/00

and 26/05/05.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Slovenia, first and second cycle, 12/09/02

and 26/05/05.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Spain, first cycle, 27/11/03.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Sweden, first cycle, 20/02/03.
Advisory Committee, Opinion on Ukraine, first cycle, 01/03/02.

Beyond Conflict Prevention:
HCNM and Minority Integration
Natalie Sabanadze
Integration of persons belonging to national minorities is an

essential precondition for peaceful and democratic
development of any multiethnic state. It is, however, a
challenging task particularly for those societies that are
undergoing processes of State and nation-building and have in
the past experienced upsurge of radical nationalism and ethnic
conflict. Prevention of conflicts through the integration of
national minorities is the task of the OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities (HCNM). This article describes how the
HCNM, over the course of 15 years, has combined
considerations of justice and security and balanced between
seemingly opposite tendencies of integration on the one hand
and protection and promotion of ethno-cultural diversity on the
other.
Introduction
The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was established by
the participating States of the then Conference for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) at the 1992 Helsinki meeting. It was an institution created
specifically in response to the violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia
and proliferation of ethno-national conflicts throughout the post-communist
space. The international community at a time appeared to be caught by sur-
prise with the seeming resurgence of nationalism and the challenges it posed
to the stability and integrity of multinational states. In the Helsinki Docu-
ment, the participating States acknowledged that aggressive nationalism and
intolerance, coupled with economic decline, social tensions and gross viola-
tions of human, including minority rights, represented a clear threat to the
peaceful development of society, particularly in new democracies. For this
reason, the participating States identified the need for an international instru-
ment which would “mediate between the parties concerned in order to reduce
the tension before it led to open, armed conflict between them” (Zaagman
and Zaal, 1994, pp. 95–113).
Integration with respect for diversity is the basis upon which HCNM’s
conflict prevention strategy is founded. At a more general, philosophical
level this means finding a working balance between minority rights on the
one hand and sovereign rights of states on the other; between ethno-cultural
self-assertion and self-determination of groups and territorial integrity of
104 HCNM and Minority Integration
______________________________________________________________
states; between social cohesion and growing ethno-cultural diversity. At a
more practical policy level this means finding the right balance between
teaching of the state language to persons belonging to national minorities and
providing education in mother tongue; between encouraging minority partici-
pation through regional or ethnic parties as well as through their inclusion
into mainstream party lists; allowing cross border exchanges with so-called
kin-states and accepting their support in the spheres of culture and education
while making sure that this does not lead to the outsourcing of minority pro-
tection from states of residence to kin-states.
The experience of the HCNM shows that balancing between those
trends that seem to be pulling in different directions is not only possible but is
also an essential precondition for achieving sustainable peace and security
both within and between states. The HCNM from 2001–2007 Rolf Ekeus
once noted that “a society at peace with itself will more likely to be at peace
with its neighbours” (Ekeus, 2003).
The emphasis on peace is important to note as it underscores that the
HCNM is first and foremost a conflict prevention instrument designed to
contribute to the preservation of peace and security in the OSCE area. Over
the course of fifteen years, the HCNM has actively pursued conflict preven-
tion at both operational and structural levels and has come to be regarded as
one of the main successes of the OSCE. Nevertheless, today the HCNM faces
a difficult question. The institution was created when wars were waging in
the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union and today, fifteen years later,
the war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia has returned the
violence back in the part of the world that the HCNM has devoted particular
time and attention. The question, therefore, is whether instruments and the
overall approach developed by the HCNM can still be regarded as valid and
relevant or whether they require a significant rethinking. This paper addresses
the above question by first describing and analyzing the integrationist ap-
proach of the HCNM to the question of national minorities and then by iden-
tifying conditions under which such an approach can be and has been suc-
cessful.
The mandate and the background against which the HCNM was estab-
lished are important in understanding both practical and normative founda-
tions of the HCNM activities. The paper, therefore, begins by summarizing
the mandate of the HCNM and highlighting its specific characteristics. It then
moves on to the discussion of nationalist challenges to the democratic devel-
opment of states and normative frameworks on the basis of which the HCNM
has been dealing with these challenges. Integrating diversity is an approach
that the HCNM has pursued through the course of his work. The second part
of the paper devotes special attention to explaining the main rationale behind
such an approach and uses examples to illustrate how the approach has been
translated from theory into practice. The conclusion returns to the question of
______________________________________________________________
whether the HCNM has been a success as a conflict prevention institution or
a failure.
1. The HCNM Mandate: Its Origins and Content

Since the end of the Cold War, intra-state conflicts often linked to ethnicity
and nationalism came to be seen as major threats to international peace and
security. Antagonistic nationalisms of majority and minority groups not only
brought the dissolution of multinational states such as former Yugoslavia and
Soviet Union but were also threatening newly independent successor states
with further disintegration. The threat of secession was particularly acute in
those countries were national minorities were territorially concentrated, often
bordering the so-called kin-states. This has raised fears of irredentism and
secession across Easter Europe as well as fears of mass migration from the
region in Western Europe. It also became clear that existing international
instruments, conceived after the World War II and further developed during
the Cold War, were incapable of dealing with the challenge of identity based,
intra-state conflict. Standards for the protection of minority rights that would
ensure that minorities were respected and accommodated in states of their
residence were largely lacking. Similarly, international organizations in
Europe had very limited operational capacity to deal with the growing need
of conflict prevention (Friberg and Nasic, 2008, p. 13).
Since the problem of national minorities came to the fore in the Euro-
pean politics at precisely the moment when the CSCE was itself undergoing
rapid and far-reaching institutional changes, being transformed from a con-
ference to a fully fledged international organization, it was one of the first to
develop mechanisms for the protection and enforcement of rights of national
minorities (Jackson-Preece, 1998, p. 3). The High Commissioner on National
Minorities was one such mechanism, created specifically to tackle conflicts
between minority and majority groups through providing assistance to the
OSCE participating States in implementing national minority standards (Hel-
sinki Follow-up Meeting 1992)1. As one observer has noted, an instrument
had to be designed to facilitate the role of the OSCE in managing change
resulting from post-Communist transition – essentially to address the rela-
tionship between minorities and majorities as part of the political process in
the broadest sense (Packer, 1996, pp. 279–291).
The HCNM, as described by the Helsinki Document, is an “instrument
of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage” and will, according to the
mandate, provide:
“’early warning’ and, as appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earli-

est possible stage in regard to tensions involving national mi-
nority issues which have not yet developed beyond an early
warning stage, but in the judgement of the High Commissioner,
______________________________________________________________
have the potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE
area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participat-
ing States, requiring the attention of and action by the Council
or the CSO” (The Helsinki Decisions, II.3).
The preventive mandate tasks the HCNM to get involved in situations

of potential conflict at the earliest possible stage. In doing so, the HCNM is
authorized to assess the nature of tensions and the parties involved, making a
direct contact not only with State authorities but also with non-State actors.
The HCNM is to make on-site visits in order to receive first-hand information
from all parties concerned and from a variety of sources “including the media
and non-governmental organisations” and thus make a well-informed judge-
ment “on the potential consequences for peace and stability within the OSCE
area” (11b) of a specific conflict. He is to engage with and promote dialogue
between various actors, in order to facilitate resolution of disputes before
they flare up into violent confrontation. In case the HCNM concludes that the
situation is escalating beyond control and that his preventive efforts have
been exhausted, the mandate specifies that he can issue an early warning to
the Permanent Council via the Chairman in Office (CiO).
Negotiating about such an institution was far from easy. Many states
feared that they had to formally recognize national minorities living in their
territories; invite unwelcome interventions from the so-called ‘kin-states’ and
even go as far as to accept collective rights for ethnic groups. The mandate,
therefore, was finally adopted with some restrictions. It does not allow the
HCNM to “consider national minority issues in situations involving organ-
ised acts of terrorism” (5b) or to establish any contact with organization
linked to or condoning terrorism. It also precludes the HCNM to engage in
any individual cases (5c), which rules out the possibility for individual per-
sons to address the HCNM. Finally, the mandate established that even though
HCNM is by and large an independent institution, it is accountable to the
Chairman in Office (CiO) of the OSCE and is obliged to report to the CiO on
a regular basis and after each country visit. The mandate also stated that the
HCNM should be an eminent person with long-standing international experi-
ence “from whom an impartial performance of the function may be expected”
(8). Max van der Stoel, former Dutch foreign minister, was appointed the first
High Commissioner in 1992 and served in that capacity until 2001. He was
succeeded by the Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus, who was the HCNM until
July 2007. Current HCNM, former Norwegian foreign minister Knut Volle-
baek, took up his post in August, 2007. The HCNM is to serve for a three-
year term with a possibility of extension for another three years.
The Mandate of the HCNM was very much a child of its times. First it
reflected the growing unease about the spread of ethno-national violence and
what appeared as growing tensions between majority and minority communi-
______________________________________________________________
ties within states. There was a real fear, as described above, that the experi-
ence of the Balkans and the Caucasus would spread all over Eastern Europe
and usher a new era of instability and warfare. Second, the mandate reflected
the growing acceptance among states that human rights are a matter of inter-
national concern and not simply a domestic affair of an individual state. The
OSCE participating States made a forceful declaration to this effect in what is
known as Moscow Document, which states that commitments undertaken in
the human dimension “are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all
participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the
State concerned” (Moscow Document, p.29). This was an important political
statement, recognizing the international dimension of human rights and op-
posing the principle of absolute non-intervention (Bloed and Letschert, 2008,
p. 92).
Against this background, the OSCE created an institution of the
HCNM which can be described as an ‘intrusive’ instrument, allowing the
involvement in internal affairs of states. Apart for the formal restrictions
mentioned above, the HCNM is eligible to visit and engage in any state he
deems necessary and expect a degree of cooperation from the host authori-
ties. The mandate of the HCNM, therefore, is based on the understanding that
the violation of human rights, including minority rights is one of the direct
causes of intra-state strife and that these violations need to be addressed as
part of the overall conflict prevention strategy.
This explains the fact that even though the HCNM was conceived as a
purely security instrument, the emphasis on human dimension has been
clearly pronounced in the work of the HCNM from the very start.2 The man-
date established the High Commissioner on National Minorities and not for
National Minorities, underscoring that the HCNM is neither an ombudsman
for minorities not a human rights defender. Nevertheless, it has been accepted
that the objective of preventing conflicts has a direct linkage with the protec-
tion of and respect for the rights of national minorities, which is a clear hu-
man dimension issue. The HCNM makes regular contributions to the Human
Dimension Implementation Meetings and in majority of cases acts for the
advancement and recognition of minority rights. This means that in practice
HCNM is a cross-dimensional institution even though his primary responsi-
bilities lie within the security basket of the OSCE.
The mandate, however, does not define a national minority and neither
does it offer any criteria for the HCNM to follow when selecting the cases
and areas of engagement. Moreover, the mandate explicitly allows the
HCNM to exercise his “judgement” in this matter, leaving much flexibility to
the person occupying the post. All three High Commissioners have followed
a pragmatic approach to the existence of a national minority, treating it as a
matter of fact rather than that of a contested concept. Max van der Stoel, the
first High Commissioner, is often cited as saying “I know a minority when I
______________________________________________________________
see one”. Later he qualified his statement and offered a more objective inter-
pretation of a minority. In his intervention during the 1993 Human Dimen-
sion meeting in Warsaw, van der Stoel stated: “first of all, a minority is a
group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics which distinguish it
from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only
seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to give stronger expression to that
identity” (HDIM Meeting 1993). Avoiding a strict definition of a national
minority has served the HCNM well, allowing his engagement in cases where
minorities were not formally recognized as such by States of their residence.
Finally, given the emphasis in the HCNM’s preventive work on the
field-work, on-site visits and local contacts, HCNM’s solutions and recom-
mendations have been mainly context specific rather than universal. A great
deal of the HCNM’s work depends on a sound knowledge and understanding
of the political context in which his interlocutors are operating and in which
decisions are being made. The HCNM, therefore, has been facing a difficult
task of appearing consistent without practicing uniformity and using univer-
sal standards in extremely diverse places and situations (Kemp, 2001, p. 26).
Balancing between universal norms and their context specific application
without undermining the credibility of the institution is one challenge among
many that the HCNM has been facing. From the very start he had to navigate
between upholding rights of minority communities and showing due respect
and understanding for the national security concerns of sovereign states. In so
doing, the HCNM has been promoting a more inclusive and pluralistic ap-
proach to nation-building in countries with a difficult legacy of communism
and ethnic nationalism.
2 The Nature of Conflict: Nationalist Challenge to Democratic

Transition
One of the defining features of the HCNM’s mandate is that it clearly identi-
fies the nature of conflict that is to prevent. It does not speak about conflict
prevention in general, which would make the institution far less effective. It
speaks of a specific kind of conflict which stems from tensions between
ethno-national communities and majority-minority relations within States that
often spills over across State borders. Majority of such conflicts have a pro-
nounced international dimension with a potential of disrupting regional sta-
bility and undermining friendly inter-State relations. When the HCNM was
established the probability that such conflicts would proliferate across the
entire post-Communist space was very high. Today the danger is much less,
however, some of the challenges that the HCNM faced then are still relevant.
These include the rise of antagonistic nationalisms within States; a tendency
to ethnicize every-day politics and securitize minority demands to the extent
that their resolution through normal democratic politics becomes very diffi-
cult. This section explores some of these challenges that the HCNM has been
______________________________________________________________
facing both in the past and present and against this background discusses the
normative frameworks within which the institution operates.
The conflicts that came to the fore after the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion were a result of a complex mix of factors. Among them I would single
out two: one is the communist legacy with its institutionalization of ethnicity
and another is rapid transition from authoritarianism to market democracy.
One of the characteristic features of the Soviet system was a complex hierar-
chy of ethnically based territorial units with a varying degree of formal
autonomy. The result was the institutionalization of ethnicity and concomi-
tant establishment of what can be described ethno-communist elites. As
Rogers Brubaker argued, Soviet republics were expressly defined by and for
the nations for whom they were named (Brubaker, 1996, p. 46). However,
expression of their national identity was to be limited to culture while politi-
cally Moscow required complete subordination. In other words, nations at the
level of republics as well as ethnic groups at the level of autonomous units
were institutionalized as ethno-national entities and were given a sense of
ownership of their territory without the right to rule it (ibid., p. 46). This had
a number of important consequences for the nation-building processes that
followed the fall of communism. These included the development of non-
political, quasi-nationalism in parallel to the official communist ideology; the
presence of ethnically defined elites that were ready to step in after the col-
lapse, exchanging communist ideals for the nationalist ones; the spread of the
predominantly primordialist conception of nation; and devaluation of the
concept of autonomy.3
In some post-communist countries depending on their prior historic
development, nationalist mobilisation occurred faster than in others. How-
ever, in all cases conditions conducive to the rise of ethno-centric nationalism
were already put in place by the Soviet system. In this context, it is notewor-
thy that the Soviet historiography favoured a specifically ethno-centric con-
ception of nation with primordialism being an unchallenged paradigm. Post-
communist successor states followed the same approach, treating nationhood
as the most natural social association, a kind of extended family. As Magda
Opalski points out, “primordialism which has been in decline in the West for
some time, continues to dominate post-Soviet social and political sciences,
and is deeply ingrained in the political culture” (Opalski, 2001, p. 312). It
was, therefore, not surprising that the nation was largely defined as an or-
ganic community closed for outsiders and nationality came to be divorced
from citizenship. Such an exclusive conception of nationhood significantly
complicated majority-minority relations in the post-Communist newly inde-
pendent states, creating a sense of alienation among minority communities
and a sense of mistrust of minorities among titular majorities.
It should also be noted that concepts such as autonomy and power-
sharing that have been regarded and implemented as part of the solution to
______________________________________________________________
ethno-territorial disputes in the West came to be seen as part of the problem
in the post-Communist context (Kymlicka, 2008, pp. 11–42). Under the So-
viet system, ethnic groups were given a chance to develop national self-
awareness and identity without exercising effective control over their destiny.
For majorities in newly independent states this meant that autonomies created
structures around which ethnic mobilization could occur and which subse-
quently could challenge territorial integrity of a state (Cornell, 1999, p. 192).4
For minorities, autonomy came to mean very little in practice and those who
experienced Soviet style autonomy tend to favour secession. Especially since
many autonomous minority communities saw their status revoked after inde-
pendence of their states of residence, as in the case of Kosovo or South Os-
setia, letting credence to their worst fears. The concept of autonomy in other
words has become devalued to the extent that it is very difficult to be ac-
cepted as part of the negotiated solution.
Coupled with the Communist legacy a rapid pace of democratization
was one of the factors contributing to bringing the tensions to the fore. After
the long years of political repression and accumulation of grievances, democ-
ratization created space for these grievances to be voiced openly. It also gave
a possibility for nationalist political leaders from both majority and minority
communities to articulate their programmes, leading to open confrontation
between competing nationalist projects. It has been noted, therefore, that
there exists a correlation between the rise of ethno-national disputes and
democratization (MacFarlane, 1997, pp. 399–420). This is particularly true
for the early stages of democratic transition when space is open for making
competing claims but institutions are still under-developed for accommodat-
ing these claims. In the long run, however, effective democratization remains
the only solution for settling internal disputes and restoring faith in negotiated
agreements and mechanisms of power-sharing. An example of Spain and
accommodation of Basque and Catalan demands after the transition to de-
mocracy is instructive in this respect.
Democratization, it should be noted, was one factor triggering rising
tensions. The collapse of centrally planned economies and a rising sense of
fear and insecurity further exacerbated divisions along ethnic lines, resulting
in the growing ethnicization of every-day politics in many post-Communist
states. It was common for persons belonging to national minorities to per-
ceive economic hardship, lack of employment opportunities or regional un-
der-developments as targeted specifically at them and resulting from deliber-
ate discrimination on ethnic grounds. Even the most benign, daily issues such
as access to water or electricity can be seen as contingent on ethnic identity
and belonging, making even simple issues extremely difficult to resolve.
Under the circumstances of hardship and state failure, it is common for peo-
ple to rely on family and kin for the basic survival (Kupchan, 1995). For
many minorities in Eastern Europe, kin happened to reside and form a major-
______________________________________________________________
ity in a neighbouring States. This rose fears of irredentism and fragmentation,
leading to the widespread perception of minorities as a disloyal, fifth column.
The question of minorities, therefore, became an essential national security
issue for many newly independent States and as Kymlicka has argued, re-
sulted in the widespread securitization of the minority problematique (Kym-
licka, 2001, pp. 13–107).
Under these challenging circumstances that characterised the early
1990s, the HCNM was to develop its conflict prevention strategy. The man-
date provided a very general framework. However, the actual policy, ap-
proach and normative frameworks under which to operate had to be devel-
oped by the first High Commissioner himself and later his successors. In
general terms, the key challenge was and still remains the need to reconcile
tensions between justice and security; between the need to create an inte-
grated, socially cohesive society and the ability to practice the politics of
difference.
In fulfilling his task, the HCNM has followed a human rights in-
formed approach, based on the belief that the road to sustainable security lies
through the respect for and protection of human, including minority rights. At
the same time, he has relied on principles of good governance and on inclu-
sive, pluralistic approaches to nation-building as part of his overall conflict
prevention strategy. In practice this meant devoting special attention to the
spheres of education and political participation. It is only through a rigorous
yet pluralistic system of education, which is open to different ideas, cultures,
languages and approaches, both in terms of its content and process, which
societies learn to question long-established stereotypes, challenge national
myths and create responsible, tolerant citizenry. The HCNM took this view
from the very beginning, identifying education as area that can make the most
difference in preventing inter-group conflict in the long run. All three High
Commissioners have promoted teaching in different languages, including
providing teaching in the mother tongue for minorities and teaching of the
state language for persons belonging to national minorities. Often bilingual
and multilingual models have been favoured as the best way to create condi-
tions under which children of different ethno-cultural background would not
only share the classrooms but also share each other’s languages and cultures.
For the adult minority population, the HCNM has supported training courses
in the state language in order to enhance their opportunities to integrate and
participate in public life of their respective states.
The question of language has been particularly acute in the context of
the former Soviet Union. Many minority communities of different ethnic
origin spoke Russian as their mother-tongue. Under the Soviet system, this
was certainly the language of official communication and the most useful one
for personal advancement. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however,
Russian speaking minorities found themselves at a disadvantaged position
______________________________________________________________
when newly independent states began actively promoting their respective
state languages often accompanied by the official discourse of “undoing
previous injustice”. While strengthening of the state language is a legitimate
aim for any newly independent state, it takes great political maturity and
caution to do it in a way that does not strain inter-ethnic relations. Too often,
as a result of clumsy and confrontational approach taken by national elites,
the language has become a source of inter-ethnic conflict. In many instances,
the HCNM has worked hard with individual governments to show how states
can organize themselves around, and protect, an official state language while
at the same time respecting the linguistic rights of minorities. The question of
language has been at the heart of the post-communist nation-building and the
HCNM has contributed to making it a more open and inclusive process that
would create foundations for the future peace and prosperity.
For example, in 2004 the HCNM visited Latvia to assess the situation
following the adoption of the Latvian Education Law, which allowed up to 40
per cent of subjects being taught in languages other than Latvian and required
that the remaining 60 per cent of the curriculum being taught in the state
language, i.e. Latvian. The reform was met with opposition from some mem-
bers of the Russian minority who saw their right to receive education in
mother tongue curtained by the new legislation. The HCNM’s assessment of
the situation, however, reflected his emphasis on the need to promote integra-
tion of persons belonging to national minorities, making it clear that a state
has the right, and indeed duty, to promote national integration, in particular
by supporting the acquisition of proficiency in the state language. On the
whole, he did not object to the bilingual model adopted by the Latvian au-
thorities. However, the HCNM did recommend that Latvian authorities make
greater effort in promoting dialogue between the authorities and minority
communities in order to better explain the aims of the reform and engage
minority representatives in its successful implementation. The underlying
assumption of the HCNM’s approach is that establishing an inter-communal
dialogue between majority and minority communities is an essential precon-
dition for effective implementation of the national integration programmes
and policies.
Political participation is another area which holds key to building a
pluralist nation, described by one commentator as “an imagined community
of the twenty-first century” (Inder Singh, 2002). The HCNM has been pro-
moting effective participation of minorities as the basis for good and democ-
ratic governance in multiethnic societies. It means that governments should
not only consider the opinions of the peoples affected by its decisions but
also allow them to influence and shape these decisions. According to the
1999 Lund Recommendations on Minority Participation in Public Life, which
has been commissioned and endorsed by the HCNM, effective participations
has two main dimensions.5 One is to create political space and opportunities
______________________________________________________________
for persons belonging to national minorities to have a say on matters that
affect them directly and another is to have a degree of control over these
matters (Packer, 2007, pp. 69–85). In addition, participation is to take place at
both the local and national levels. While it is crucial that minorities have both
a say and a degree of control over decisions at the local level where they
reside in great numbers, it is equally and perhaps symbolically even more
important that they take part and influence decisions at the national level and
on matters of general interest. Participation within the democratic framework
of decision-making is what gives minorities a sense of belonging to and a
stake in their respective societies. This in turn is the best way to ensure that
inter-group disagreements are dealt with through normal democratic political
processes and do not flare up into open confrontation let alone violence.
The Lund Recommendations specifically and most of the HCNM’s
country specific recommendations more generally, aim at addressing one
fundamental question: “How can one create the politico-legal space in which
differing groups of people with differing interests, needs and aspirations can
live together?” (ibid., p. 81). With the risk of being criticized for inconsis-
tency, the approach adopted by the HCNM to address this question has been
varied, context-specific and ranged from territorial to non-territorial solu-
tions. For example, in Crimea the HCNM was of the opinion that territorial
autonomy was essential for maintaining peace and stability both within pen-
insula and between Crimea and central authorities in Kyiv. However, in other
cases such as Slovakia he has opposed the choice for territorial autonomy
given its potential to generate dangerous tensions. He believed that in Slova-
kia, under a democratic leadership a system of minority rights could be estab-
lished which would provide all the necessary safeguards for the protection of
national minorities, particularly for the Hungarian minority.6
Human rights, good governance and pluralistic nation-building are,
therefore, the main normative frameworks within which the HCNM operates.
All three are important and mutually complementary, allowing the HCNM to
better address both the causes and symptoms of ethno-national conflict under
a variety of different circumstances. Some scholars such as Will Kymlicka
have criticized the HCNM for being less concerned with rights of minorities,
either as groups or individuals and being more preoccupied with greater geo-
political and security implications of minority-majority relations. In this
view, such an approach reinforces the securitization of the minority question,
which has negative consequences for the cause of minority protection. Ac-
cording to Kymlicka, the security approach to the minority question erodes
the democratic space for voicing minority demands and reduces the likeli-
hood that those demands will be accepted and treated as a matter of normal
democratic politics (Kymlicka, 2008, pp. 11–42). Violation of minority rights
becomes easy to justify in terms of protecting vital national security interests
and such justifications tend to be largely acceptable by the broader public.
______________________________________________________________
Most importantly, securitization of minority issues may generate the wrong
kind of responses, often heavy handed, on the part of the state authorities that
in the long run may end up undermining the very security they are trying to
uphold.
All these concerns with regard to the securitization of the minority is-
sues, which is particularly characteristic of post-Communist States, are valid.
However, the work of the HCNM reveals a more complex interconnection
between security and human rights. His approach demonstrates that the rela-
tionship between the two is neither that of opposition nor of a choice. The
two are connected in a way that complement and reinforce each other. Sus-
tainable peace and security can only be achieved through the respect of hu-
man, including minority rights. Peaceful and secure societies in turn are much
less prone to securitizing rights and are more open to the recognition and
acceptance of legitimate concerns of both groups and individuals.
In countries that are undergoing a difficult transition, securitization
can first of all, serve a useful purpose of attracting attention to and prioritiz-
ing minority issues and concerns. It so happens that attaching a ‘security’
label to something often leads to that ‘something’ receiving more attention,
more resources and a greater commitment from relevant authorities
(MacFarlane and Foong Khong, 2006). This is particularly important in coun-
tries that are either developing or going through the stage of transition, when
resources are scarce and problems numerous. Under such circumstances there
should be good reasons for the governments to commit money and resources
to minority schools, for example, than to all other, equally burning issues.
Secondly, it follows that the security approach gives a valuable leverage to
the HCNM in his dealings with governments. He can appeal to the self-
interest of states, defined in national security terms, and by doing so persuade
them to tackle minority issues. What would be the effectiveness of the
HCNM, which has neither enforcement power nor material incentives to
generate compliance, if he was only to speak about the promotion of rights
especially in countries that are openly indifferent to the rights discourse? The
effectiveness and consequently the value of the HCNM’s involvement are
significantly enhanced when he manages to speak directly to the national
security concerns of states.
The HCNM, therefore, uses the security approach for instrumental
purposes but the main objective of his engagement is normalization of inter-
ethnic relations within a given state, which ultimately leads to the desecuriti-
zation of the minority question. A good example, in this context is the
HCNM’s Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-
State Relations issued in October of 2008. The key factor contributing to the
securitization of the minority question, particularly in Eastern Europe and
former Soviet Union, is the so-called kin-state factor. The presence of kin-
states is associated with threats of irredentism, justified or not, and with fears
______________________________________________________________
of potential political and even military intervention from often neighbouring
states claiming protection of ‘their people’ abroad. Historic legacies also
exacerbate the problem, particularly when a kin-state in question is a former
imperial power. Through the Bolzano Recommendations, the HCNM tackled
this very sensitive issue and tried to show states how they can support minori-
ties abroad in a way that benefits minorities and at the same time respects
friendly, good neighbourly relations. Benign, friendly kin-states on the border
are crucial for reassuring states of residence and consequently, allowing for
the normalization and de-securitization of majority-minorities relations in
their territories.
The main and consistent message of all HCNM’s recommendations in
assisting States to tackle minority problems is that this can only be done
through the respect and protection of human, including minority rights and
good governance. In other words, his fundamental approach is security
through justice not security vs. justice. Despite his sensitivity to the contexts
and appreciation of case specific differences, he has consistently argued that
the way to reduce tensions and avoid conflict along the lines of identity is
through the creation of a just society for everybody. This means a society in
which the national minority culture can not only be expressed but also safe-
guarded and promoted; in which any disadvantage stemming from being a
person belonging to national or ethnic minority has been removed; and in
which minorities have a say in all spheres of public life, especially but not
exclusively in matters that directly affect them (Skovgaard, 2007).
3. Integrating Minorities
The HCNM does not favour one particular model of the organization of a
multiethnic state over others. Partly because there are no ideal models that
can be universally applicable. There are simply ways of negotiating accept-
able solutions and such solutions as a rule are context specific. Moreover, the
HCNM’s goal is not to advocate one specific end-result, be it federation,
consociational power-sharing or simply unitary state with the minimum stan-
dards of minority protection. His efforts aim at promoting an inclusive and
democratic process which could eventually lead states and minorities to find-
ing arrangements that suit them best. In other words, his efforts are about
establishing channels of effective communication between various groups
and more importantly, about keeping these channels open. This is how I
would interpret the HCNM’s favoured approach, which is integration with
respect for diversity. It is not so much a model to be prescribed but rather a
process which is dynamic, flexible and which could lead to sustainable, nego-
tiated solutions.
Rolf Ekeus, High Commissioner from 2003–2007, identified several
elements that define this approach of integrating diversity in his 2006 address
to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. First, he noted that integration is about
______________________________________________________________
interaction and not simply about tolerating a plurality of cultures. It requires
special efforts both from governments and minority communities to find
shared values and develop an over-arching common identity, no matter how
“thin”, to ensure that respect for and recognition of difference does not lead
to the separation or to the establishment of parallel societies. Of course the
right of minorities to maintain their identity including their culture and relig-
ion must be respected. However, in the words of Ekeus, “this should not, if
possible, be achieved in a way which prevents the deepening of participation
in the wider society. Policies which lead to increasingly separate communi-
ties risk making society vulnerable to tensions and strife” (Ekeus, 2006).
Second, respect for diversity is not only about celebration of cultural
differences. It requires governments to develop specialized approaches aimed
at helping people to accommodate and negotiate their differences in ways that
allow for genuine equality and help to minimize the risk of conflict (ibid.). It
also requires a political space to practice the politics of difference, while
ensuring that policies that sustain diversity do not result in entrenching dif-
ferences as insurmountable and solidify inequalities (ibid.). Thirdly, there are
some fundamentals such as respect for human dignity, the rule of law and
human rights that can and should form the basis for shared values and even
common identity. For the rest, according to Ekeus, we need to respect differ-
ences and to learn to see the diversification of our societies as enrichment
(ibid.).
It should also be noted that integration is a two way process, which is
contingent upon minorities exercising not only their rights but also responsi-
bilities. Minorities, therefore, should also try and avoid isolationism and join
in with a majority in a common effort to build a better future. It may take
time before minorities feel reassured enough that their rights, their culture
and identity are adequately respected and promoted especially if past taught
them a different lesson. However, drive towards building ethnically pure
communities is dangerous both from the side of majority and from that of a
minority. In today’s world ethno-cultural and state boundaries rarely coin-
cide, which means that people are bound to learn how to live together in
peace and understanding. After the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, there
has been a growing scepticism about chances for survival of multi-ethnic
states. Integration with respect for diversity, however, is the HCNM’s answer
to such scepticism. It aims at creating the kind of foundations that would not
allow the repetition of previous mistakes and would create the solid basis for
peace and prosperity.
Such an approach is much easier to preach than to implement. The
HCNM has consistently offered advice to governments in this respect both
through policy recommendations and through tension-reducing projects. His
country-specific recommendations are confidential and thus cannot be repro-
duced here for an analysis and assessment. However, from the limited infor-
______________________________________________________________
mation that is publically available some examples can be invoked. They
demonstrate that the HCNM has been using a combination of operational and
structural prevention depending on circumstances and for better ensuring
sustainable, long-lasting conflict prevention.7 On the operational side, the
HCNM has relied on quiet diplomacy to address sides involved in the dis-
pute. He has paid frequent visits to countries of his engagement, offering
impartial advice to the parties concerned and facilitating dialogue and media-
tion. He has worked with governments to refine legislation affecting persons
belonging to national minorities and supported projects that showed how his
policy advice can be implemented in practice. Through developing projects in
areas of education, language teaching, media, participation, management of
inter-ethnic relations and policing, the HCNM has assisted states to address
the root causes of conflict and put in place necessary structures that would
sustain peace in the long run.
For example, Van der Stoel and Ekeus have contributed to the nor-
malization of relations between Hungary and neighbouring states over the
treatment of sizable Hungarian minorities, particularly in Romania and Slo-
vakia and to a lesser extent in Serbia. Both High Commissioners stressed the
importance of creating a legal framework for the protection of minority rights
and the inclusion of minority communities into the governing structures of
the state, as an essential part of the overall process of democratization. At the
same time, they have worked closely with Hungary, urging the Hungarian
government to modify its controversial legislation, known as the Status Law,
with regard to the protection of ethnic kin abroad. The HCNM has acknowl-
edged that the so-called kin-states may have an interest in the well-being of a
minority community abroad. However, this interest does not translate into the
right under international law to exercise jurisdiction over people residing on
the territory of another state (Ekeus, 2001). Moreover, states may pursue this
interest in a way that does not undermine the integration of minorities in
states where they reside and does not fuel separatist tendencies (Vollebaek,
2007).
The triadic relationship between minorities, kin-states and states of
residence has been at the heart of the HCNM activities in many regions, in-
cluding the Baltic States, South Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia.
Beginning from the 1992, successive High Commissioners have been in-
volved in promoting integration of Russian minorities in the three Baltic
States, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The tensions between Russian minori-
ties and newly independent Baltic States have flared up in numerous occa-
sions in the early 1990s, displaying a high probability of open conflict with
the potential involvement of the Russian Federation. The main concern with
regard to the Russian minority in the Baltic States centred upon various citi-
zenship criteria and stringent language and residency requirements that
threatened to leave large segments of Russian minorities without citizenship.
______________________________________________________________
This would have not only limited their rights to political participation but
would have also had denied them access to pensions and other social security
benefits. A significant complicating factor in this situation was Russia’s de-
clared interest in the fate of Russian minorities all over former Soviet Union
and in the Baltic States in particular. In September 1992, Russia wished to
activate the Moscow Mechanism8 with regard to Estonia’s proposed citizen-
ship law, which required a degree of proficiency in the Estonian language
which few Russian were capable of satisfying.
The fear that Russia would instrumentalize the issue of its kin-
minorities and use it as a pretext for interference gave the three Baltic States
reasons to fear that granting citizenship to their substantial Russian minorities
would compromise their independence. As summarized by Jennifer-Jackson
Preece, “granting citizenship to an ethnic Russian community that was relo-
cated to the Baltic states by Stalin in order to ensure Soviet political control
and who received privileges during the Soviet era would be a threat to na-
tional identities and independence of these states.” (Jackson-Preece, 1998, p.
6). The first High Commissioner, Max van der Stoel, dedicated much atten-
tion and efforts at improving majority-minority relations in the Baltic states.
Upon his advice, all three states made significant amendments to their legis-
lation on citizenship and language. The HCNM has been paying particular
attention to those members of the Russian community that were born in Bal-
tic states and who were married to citizens of those states. At the same time,
however, both van der Stoel and Ekeus advocated a gradual approach to re-
ducing the problem of non-citizens in these states, showing understanding to
concerns of national minorities as well as to those of continued independence
and stability of newly independent Baltic States. The HCNM, therefore, ac-
cepted the necessity of reasonable requirements for the knowledge of official
language and urged the governments to create adequate opportunities for
learning the state language.
The Baltic States have made a significant progress in this respect and
have become exporters of expertise in teaching official language to both
adults and school children. Rolf Ekeus has often used Latvian and Estonian
experts to promote state language education for minorities in other countries,
including Moldova. The main concern of the HCNM in Moldova has been
the lack of integration of minority communities into Moldovan society due
to, inter alia, lack of proficiency in the state language. In order to encourage
the government take a proactive role in promoting linguistic integration, the
HCNM has been supporting the language teaching project for civil servants
in Southern Moldova. The project benefited several hundred civil servants of
Gagauz, Russian and Bulgarian origin. The project activities have been con-
centrating in the autonomous region of Gagauzia, where the level of state
language proficiency is particularly poor among the population. This has
become a matter of concern to the HCNM since Moldova adopted legislation
______________________________________________________________
requiring all public sector employees to have a working knowledge of the
state language, which would effectively curtail minority participation in pub-
lic life unless special efforts are made to improve teaching of the state lan-
guage.
The most extensive conflict prevention and integration programme of
the HCNM has been carried out in Georgia since 2003. The programme tar-
gets Armenian and Azeri minorities who are the largest national minorities in
Georgia residing in Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli respectively. It
includes activities aimed at teaching the state language to civil servants from
minority communities; retraining minority language teachers as well as
teachers of Georgian as a second language in latest language teaching meth-
odologies; building capacity of local media and rebroadcasting of Georgian
news in minority languages; training civil servants in management of inter-
ethnic relations and providing free legal advice to the population of the re-
gion through the established legal centres. All these activities aimed at re-
dressing effective isolation of the two minority-populated regions from the
rest of the country, which was exacerbated by poor road infrastructure, in-
formation vacuum, insufficient knowledge of the state language and persis-
tence of ethnic stereotypes among Georgia’s civil servants. With the help of
the HCNM, the question of minority integration has become one of the top
priorities for the Georgian authorities. Most of the projects supported by the
HCNM under conflict prevention and integration programme have been taken
over by the Georgian government and should be continued in the future with
the local funding.
Despite these efforts there are many more challenges facing Georgia
today. It should be noted that the HCNM has not been active in the break-
away region of South Ossetia, which became the main scene of hostilities in
August 2008. The main reason behind the HCNM’s non-involvement was the
presence of the OSCE mission in Georgia which was tasked specifically with
the prevention and settlement of the South Ossetia conflict. The current
HCNM, Knut Vollebaek, however, issued a statement on August 25, 2008
regarding the situation in Georgia, pointing out that history has shown how
dangerous and destabilizing it is for states to take unilateral action to defend,
protect or support their citizens or “ethnic kin” abroad, and warned against
using this as a justification for undermining the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of other states. Whether the HCNM would have been able to prevent
the eruption of violence in South Ossetia had he been more involved is a
hypothetical question to which I am inclined to give a negative answer. Suc-
cess and effectiveness of the HCNM’s initiatives ultimately depend on two
main factors: compliance to his recommendations by governments and lead-
ers of the groups involved and existence of the right kind of conditions as
part of the overall international environment that encourage and value such
compliance.
______________________________________________________________
Conclusion: Success or Failure?

How can one measure or even identify success of an institution such as the
HCNM? As a rule, conflicts that do not erupt are less known and causes of
their non-eruption are rarely investigated. Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate
the effectiveness of diplomatic and other measures that are taking place be-
hind closed doors. It is also difficult to attribute a successful prevention of
conflict to one single factor. There is always a combination of factors and an
alignment of forces that reduce tensions and lead to the eventual avoidance of
conflict. When describing the HCNM’s success, therefore, it is worth keeping
in mind that as a rule this success is shared; it is shared with states and other
international actors. Nevertheless, there is evidence of certain success defined
in terms of armed conflict prevention for the HCNM due to his efforts to
diffuse tensions between national minority and majority communities in
places such as the Baltic States, Central Europe, Ukraine’s Crimea, and
Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakheti.
Most importantly, however, it should be noted that despite initial fears
that ethno-national conflicts would escalate beyond any reasonable control,
cases of violent ethno-national disputes remained confined only to certain
areas and fortunately, became an exception rather than a norm. In addition,
since the mid-1990s no new cases of ethnic warfare have been recorded in
wider Europe. According to the study conducted by Ted Robert Gurr, by the
mid-1990s, the most common strategy among ethnic groups was not armed
conflict but prosaic politics. Therefore, based on counterfactual reasoning it
is possible to conclude that most potential conflicts have been successfully
prevented.
Another element of success is the growing acceptance of and compli-
ance with international norms and standards of human, including minority
rights protection. It is worth remembering that East European states of today
that have undertaken significant commitments to protect persons belonging to
national minorities and to ensure effective integration of their societies, were
highly nationalistic, divided and exclusive polities merely fifteen years ago.
Most of these states experienced not only successful democratisation but also
a successful de-radicalization and devaluation of extreme ethno-nationalism
as a political force. In many parts of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Un-
ion, the political power of nationalism expressed in support of radical nation-
alist parties and leaders diminished significantly over time. In general, the
appeal of ethno-nationalism by the late 1990s was much weaker than that in
the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse.
In those cases where armed conflicts did take place, resolution and
prevention efforts have been far less successful as in the case of South Os-
setia. However, as Adam Roberts pointed out, “the historical record suggests
that the management of communal conflicts is inherently difficult, whether it
______________________________________________________________
is attempted by states, empires, regional or global institutions. The UN (and
by extension also the OSCE and COE) should not be judged too harshly
merely for running into difficulties similar to those encountered by other
bodies” (Roberts, 1995, pp. 389–410). Nevertheless, it is possible to identify
conditions when international institutions such as the HCNM tend to be more
successful and when less so.
The effectiveness of the HCNM is limited when states and groups
have no incentives to comply and when his efforts confront alternative inter-
ests of the major powers. The case of South Ossetia represented a combina-
tion of the above two factors, which leads to the conclusion that chances of
success for the HCNM’s involvement would have been at best limited. When
states, however, sought out international legitimacy, striving for eventual
membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures, the leverage of the HCNM had
been much greater. In this context, states and groups operate in an environ-
ment that values compliance and rewards it with the benefit of ‘membership’,
which creates significant incentive to seek compromise and develop good
human and minority rights record. It should be noted, however, that the EU
membership alone does not have a magical effect. Inter-ethnic tensions will
persist, as it is happening in the case of Slovakia and Hungary, also after
accession unless states continue their efforts aimed at national integration
based on the protection of minority rights and respect for diversity. Ulti-
mately, it is local actors that determine the success of international institu-
tions. As Jennifer Jackson-Preece points out, nobody can ‘force’ a nation to
be democratic or to respect human rights. “Final responsibility for success or
failure in the protection of national minorities rests with domestic rather than
international actors” (Jackson-Preece, 1998).
Endnotes
1 The HCNM's mandate is contained in the part entitled “The Helsinki Deci-
sions”. For a detailed exposition of how the post of the High Commissioner
on National Minorities was established, see Zaagman, R. and Zaal. H. (1994),
“The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: prehistory and ne-
gotiations”: in A. Bloed (ed.), The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Sum-
mit of the CSCE and its Aftermath, Dodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
95–111.
2 In OSCE terminology, the term “human dimension” is used to describe the
set of norms and activities related to human rights and democracy, which are
regarded within the OSCE as one of three dimensions of security, together
with the politico-military and the economic and environmental dimensions.
These three dimensions add up to the comprehensive approach to security
______________________________________________________________
adopted by the OSCE (See OSCE Human Dimension Commitments: A Refer-

ence Guide (Warsaw, 2001).
3 It can be added that authoritarianism of communist regimes in Eastern
Europe and former Soviet Union also contributed to the rise of nationalism,
creating a political culture that favours communities over individuals and
fosters suspicion for difference and dissent. See Michnik. A. (1991), “Na-
tionalism”, Social Research, 58(4), 757–764. For a broader discussion of
causes and consequences of post-communist nationalism, see Mungiu-
Pippidi, A. and Krastev. I. (ed.), (2004) Nationalism After Communism: Les-
sons Learned, Budapest: CEU Press.
4 Svante Cornell noted on the example of Caucasus and Central Asia that
even though both regions harbour numerous minorities, only those with
autonomous status had revolted. These include Chechens in Russia, Armeni-
ans in Azerbaijan, Abkhaz and South Ossetians in Georgia and also Transnis-
trians in Moldova. Central Asia, by contrast, where there were fewer
autonomous regions, has had a lower propensity to conflict than the Caucasus
(Cornell 1999:192).
5 See Drzewicki, K. (2005), “The Lund Recommendations on the Effective
Participation of National Minorities in Public Life – Five Years After and
More Years Ahead,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights,
12, 123–131.
6 See the interview with Max van der Stoel, in: Zellner. W. and Lange, F.
(eds.) (2001), Peace and Stability Through Human and Minority Rights:
Speeches of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Baden-
Baden: Nomos.
7 For the discussion of different approaches to conflict prevention, see Mi-
chael Lund (1996), Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive
Diplomacy, US Institute of Peace Press.
8 The Moscow Mechanism provides for a variety of OSCE mission to look
into human dimension issues such as human rights.
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Brubaker, R. (1996), Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge: Cambridge

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Cornell, S. (1999), “The devaluation of the concept of autonomy: national

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Drzewicki, K. (2005), “The Lund Recommendations on Effective

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131.
Friberg, E. and H. Nasic (2008), “The OSCE High Commissioner on

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Pluralism be Exported?: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in
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— (2008), “The evolving basis of European norms of minority rights: Rights

to culture, participation and autonomy,” in: M. Weller, D. Blacklock and K.
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Lund, M. (1996), Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive

Diplomacy. Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press.
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MacFarlane, N. (1997), “Democratization, nationalism and regional security

in Southern Caucasus,” Government and Opposition, 32(3): 399–420.
MacFarlane, N. and K. Yuen Foong (2006), Human Security and UN: A

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Communism. Budapest: CEU Press.
Opalski, M. (2001) “Can Will Kymlicka be exported to Russia?” in: W.

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Challenge of Change: the Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath.
Dodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 95–111.
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and Minority Rights: Speeches by the OSCE High Commissioner on National
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Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations,” Bolzano.
Section II
Political Integration of
Minority Communities
Comparing European Institutional and Hungarian
Approaches to Roma (Gypsy) Minorities
Annabel Tremlett
The chapter analyses how Roma (Gypsy) minorities are
discursively represented in documents from European
institutions which are currently forming the most influential
‘public level’ arena for Roma politics. A comparison is made
between the way social inclusion of Roma minorities is
conceptualized in key European institutional documents, and
the discourses from accession countries, such as Hungary, in
the monitoring process. The ‘intercultural’ or ‘recognition’
approach taken by European institutions is criticized as failing
to take into account and engage with the complex interface of
differing discourses on ethnicity prevalent in post-socialist
countries.
Introduction
The expansion of the European Union (EU) to include post-socialist states
can be seen as a turning point in the history of the EU. The process of EU
expansion has highlighted Roma as the largest and poorest minority group in
Central and Eastern Europe.1 Despite the potential of the EU to form a “truly
historic role” as an influential arena for Roma politics (Kovats, 2001, p. 111),
European institutions have been accused of not going far enough to make any
real changes.2 Whilst European institutions have drawn up seemingly pro-
gressive documents for minorities, there has not been an obvious result for
the majority of Roma living in poverty. Criticisms were particularly gener-
ated after the first European Roma Forum in Brussels in 2008. The outcomes
did not match the high hopes placed on the Forum as an event that would
shake up the apparent inertia of European institutional activity. European
institutions were accused of having a “passive” stance towards Roma (EU
Roma coalition), a lack of creative ideas (Lívia Járóka, Hungarian Roma
MEP), along with missing the opportunity to create a pan-European strategy
(Minority Rights Group).
This chapter focuses on the apparent impasse through examining a
part of the process of implementing European institutional recommendations
at a state level, using Hungary as an example. Some key differences are re-
vealed in the way Roma minorities are discussed in the European institutional
documents compared to the Hungarian state monitoring reports. These key
differences may help explain why seemingly progressive European-level
documents do not affect the lives of many Roma people. Two such docu-
130 Comparing Approaches to Roma
______________________________________________________________
ments are the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 1992
(henceforth the ECRML), and the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities 1995 (henceforth the FCNM). Both documents are
considered to be the most influential moves to securing Roma minority rights
at a pan-European level to date. I examine the approach to Roma minorities
in these documents before comparing the reaction at Hungarian level through
state monitoring reports. The monitoring reports form the feedback process,
showing how states have adapted these documents into their legislation and
promoted the ideas to the public.
The approach to analysis is informed by Nancy Fraser’s writing on
“recognition” and “redistributive” paradigms that she says have formed the
basis of the dilemma of the “postsocialist” age (1997). These paradigms were
found to be useful in examining the different approaches to the Roma. It is
through this analysis that a tension between the European institutional and the
Hungarian state approach to Roma is revealed. The chapter argues that the
European institutional commitment to a multicultural or recognition approach
is markedly different to the Hungarian state’s approach to Roma minorities.
The Hungarian approach is ambivalent in its commitment to multicultural-
ism, and can be said to be more inclined towards the “redistribution” para-
digm, yet with some use of deficit discourse about Roma minorities. The
tension between the two approaches is highlighted as a reason behind the
apparent stalemate of European institutional action. Considering the situation
of Roma in Hungary as firmly rooted in problems related to poverty, this
chapter suggests that the imbalance of the importance placed on recognition
politics may impede European institutional efforts in helping Roma minori-
ties.
1. Approach to Analysis: Fraser’s Recognition and

Redistribution Paradigms
In her work on the “postsocialist” condition, Fraser describes two broad ap-
proaches to notions of injustice: a “redistribution” paradigm and a “recogni-
tion” paradigm. The paradigm of “redistribution” is described as based on the
understanding of injustice as socio-economic: for example exploitation in the
workplace or denial or access to a decent job and wage (Fraser, 1997, p.13).
On the other hand, the “recognition” paradigm includes an understanding of
injustice as “rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and
communication” – for example cultural domination, non-recognition and
disrespect (ibid., p.14).
Despite both types of injustice being intertwined in practice (“far from
occupying two airtight separate spheres, economic injustice and cultural
injustice are usually interimbricated so as to reinforce each other dialecti-
cally” ibid., p.15), Fraser maintains that discursively, the redistribu-
tive/recognition paradigms still appear distinct from each other, producing
______________________________________________________________
different and often contradictory claims for the people they want social jus-
tice for. These claims are summarised in Table 1 below:
Table 1. Summary of “Redistribution” and “Recognition” Paradigms

“Redistribution” paradigm “Recognition” paradigm
Injustice seen Exploitation in/marginalisation Cultural misrecognition

in terms of... from labour force
Justice seen in Socio-economic equality Representational equality

terms of...
Mode of People’s existence is rooted in the People are “differentiated as a

collectivity political economy, therefore any collectivity by virtue of the reigning
(how people injustices suffered by members will social patterns of interpretations and
are seen) be traceable to the political econ- evaluation, not by virtue of the
omy (Fraser, 1997, p. 14) division of labor” (ibid., p.18)
Remedy “Redistribution”: restructuring the “Recognition”: recognise the value

political economy so as to alter the of all cultures and change the
class distribution of social burdens cultural variations that privilege a
and social benefits (ibid., p.17) certain group (ibid., p.19)
Whilst recognition claims “tend to promote group differentiation”, re-

distribution claims “often call for abolishing economic arrangements that
underpin group specificity […] they tend to promote group dedifferentiation”
(ibid., p.16). This leads to tensions,
“whereas the first tends to promote group differentiation, the

second tends to undermine it. Thus, the two kinds of claim
stand in tension with each other; they can interfere with, or
even work against, each other” (ibid., p.16).
Fraser describes a constitutive feature of the “postsocialist” condition

as a shift away from political claims of redistributing wealth to an emphasis
on the recognition of different groups and their value in society (Fraser, 1997,
p. 2). However, rather than signifying a positive shift towards a multicultural,
tolerant society, Fraser sees the so-called “identity politics” favoured by the
“recognition” paradigm as decentring class, leading to a “decoupling of cul-
tural politics from social politics, and the relative eclipse of the latter by the
former” (ibid.). As we will go on to see, these two types of claims can be
related to discourses about Roma from European institutional and recently
acceded “postsocialist” states. We now turn to how European institutions
increasingly use the “recognition” paradigm.
______________________________________________________________
2. European Institutions: Use of the “Recognition” Paradigm
Here I will first outline the general approach of European institutions to
Roma minorities, both from the Council of Europe and the European Union. I
then go onto look specifically at two documents: the ECRML (European
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages) and the FCNM (Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities). I will show how the
“recognition” paradigm is used in these documents to produce a certain way
of looking at Roma which leads to a specific view on how to raise their social
status.
The Council of Europe (COE), describes Roma people as a distinct
minority with a unique and rich language and culture. In a 1993 recommen-
dation that was said to have “paved the way towards a new phase in the activ-
ity of the Council of Europe” (Legal Situation of the Roma in Europe 2002:
paras I/1, II/1), this approach was clearly set out:
“A special place among the minorities is reserved for Gypsies.

Living scattered all over Europe, not having a country to call
their own, they are a true European minority, but one that does
not fit into the definitions of national or linguistic minorities.
As a non-territorial minority, Gypsies greatly contribute to the
cultural diversity of Europe. In different parts of Europe they
contribute in different ways, be it by language and music or by
their trades and crafts.” (Gypsies in Europe 1993, Recommen-
dation 1203: paras. 2 and 3).
The above paragraphs clearly show the tendency of the COE’s cultural
approach to Roma minorities (also observed by Kovats, 2001, p. 102). In
rather romantic terms, the COE describes Roma as a “scattered” minority
who contribute to European culture through their specific language, music
and trade.
A similar approach can be seen in EU documents. The resolution Dis-
crimination against the Roma from the European Council (an EU institution),
called for an “international level” approach to Roma, describing Roma mi-
norities themselves as a “transnational people”, which appears to fit into the
COE’s “cultural” approach:
“The European Parliament,

A. recognizing that the Roma as a transnational people face
special social problems,
B. recognizing that there is widespread discrimination against
the Roma in practically every country where they are settled,
but that their numbers in central and eastern Europe make the
problem particularly acute,
______________________________________________________________
C. recognizing that, potentially, the conditions of life of the
Roma people are a problem which can only be tackled at the
international level,
D. understanding that the Roma have a special culture that
should be respected; recognizing, however, that their way of
life in some cases causes frictions with their social environ-
ment,
E. recognizing that the education of future generations is a key
element in the integration of Roma into the societies where
they are living and that particular attention should be paid to
this.” (From Discrimination against the Roma Resolution
1995).
In the above extract, “the Roma” are said to face “special social prob-
lems” (point A) as well as having “a special culture” (point D). The word
“special” indicates the Roma are a unique minority, and it seems that their
“special-ness” may contribute to their problems, “their way of life in some
cases causes frictions with their social environment” (point D). Roma are
thus not portrayed as a part of the societies in which they live, as the follow-
ing examples from the above extract show:
• “a transnational people” (point A) - therefore not “of” a nation

state;
• “[…] in practically every country where they are settled” (point B)
– “settled” in a country, therefore not “of” the country;
• “their way of life in some cases causes frictions with their social
environment” (point D) - therefore different or opposing a “way of
life” that other people have.
“The Roma” are thus represented as a particular minority living

across Europe, yet in each place where they live they are set apart from the
main society and their disadvantaged position can be attributed, at least in
part, to their distinctive way of living. This is an important point, as we will
see later that the notion of Roma as “different” from their social environment
forms the basis of approaches designed to solve their marginalized position in
society.
Both the COE and the EU document describe Roma in terms of “dif-
ference”. The similarities between the two documents’ descriptions can be
seen in direct comparison below:
______________________________________________________________
Gypsies in Europe 1993 Discrimination against the Roma
(CoE) 1995 (EU)
(i) “a non-territorial minority” “a transnational people” (point A).

(para. 2).
(ii) “Living scattered all over “[…] in practically every country
Europe, not having a country where they are settled” (point B).
to call their own” (para. 2).
(iii) “they are a true European “their way of life in some cases
minority, but one that does causes frictions with their social
not fit into the definitions of environment” (point D).
national or linguistic minori-
ties” (para. 3).
The outcome of both descriptions is an emphasis on the Roma minor-

ity as a unique minority. “Transnational” or “non-territorial” refers to them as
living across Europe, but not “of” the countries where they reside (points i
and ii). Their difference from the societies where they live is further estab-
lished as their culture is seen as separate: a different “way of life”, and a
minority that “does not fit into the definitions of national or linguistic minori-
ties” (point iii). Roma culture and language is seen as unique, and key to their
integration.
The COE and EU’s converging approach can be termed an “intercul-
tural” approach in what Fraser terms a “recognition paradigm” that “is cele-
bratory and positive; it sees all identities as deserving of recognition and all
differences as meriting affirmation” (Fraser, 1997, pp. 181–182). The two
European institutional legal documents focused on in this article also fit into
this paradigm – indeed, can be seen as a product of it. The ECRML (Euro-
pean Charter for Regional or Minority Languages) entered into force in 1998
(as of 2009, signed and ratified by 24 states) has been referred to as a key
instrument in the European institutional emerging approach to Roma minori-
ties3 and is also noted as a key instrument for the implementation of minority
rights (see Morawa and Weller, 2005). The ECRML is concerned with the
protection and promotion of minority languages, seeing their revival and
institutionalisation as paramount to the successful integration of minority
groups into mainstream society,
“[the Charter is] a system of positive protection for minority

languages and the communities using them[…] in order to
safeguard the rights of minorities to enjoy their own culture, to
______________________________________________________________
use their own language, to establish their schools and so on.”
(Explanatory Report to the Charter, paras.1,2 p.1) [my addi-
tion]
The message is that discrimination debilitates the chances of minori-

ties to fully partake in society, and discrimination can be tackled through
official recognition and support of minority culture and language. The prohi-
bition of discrimination and the support of the expression of minority lan-
guage and culture are said to impact on the social and economic position of
minority groups.
Following the ECRML, the FCNM (Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities) was adopted in 1994 and entered into force
in 1998 (as of 2008 had been signed and ratified by 39 states). Like the Char-
ter, the FCNM is seen as breaking new ground, the “first comprehensive
treaty addressing minority rights anywhere” (Weller, 2005, p. 7). The FCNM
consists of a Preamble and 32 articles that are grouped into five sections. In
terms of Fraser’s redistributive/recognition paradigms, the FCNM can be said
to follow the recognition paradigm as its articles focus on minorities as a
collectivity whose coherence is based on cultural differentiation rather than
division in type of labour or socio-economic class:
“The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for

persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and de-
velop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of
their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and
cultural heritage” (Section I, Article 5 para. 1).
The stress is on “intercultural dialogue” (Article 6, para. 1; Article 12

para. 71) that aims to promote and protect the culture of minorities in order to
raise their status in societies and therefore advance their integration. So, for
examples:
• In education: better achievements in education are envisaged

through fostering “knowledge of the culture, history, language and
religion of their national minorities and of the majority” (Section II
Article 12 para. 1).
• In anti-discrimination: the development of text books for schools,
media outlets and separate religious and education institutions (Sec-
tion II Articles 5, 6, 12 and 13).
• In freedom of speech: seen as the right to “hold opinions and to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas in the minority language”
(Section II Article 9, para. 1, see also Article 10, 14).
______________________________________________________________
All the above refer to what Fraser terms as the “recognition” para-
digm, “changing the cultural variations that privilege a certain group” (1997,
p. 19). The idea is that by allowing and encouraging minority culture in insti-
tutional life, the minorities will have greater access to these institutions and
thereby become more integrated. There is no mention of what Fraser calls the
“redistribution” paradigm: political involvement, labour division, poverty,
unemployment are not mentioned, apart from in the phrase that Parties should
adopt measures to promote equality in “all areas of economic, social, political
and cultural life” (Section I, Article 4 para. 2, similar phrase used in Article
15).
Thus both documents take the approach that the preservation and
promotion of minority culture has the potential to help these groups out of a
disadvantaged social and economic position. This closely follows the
COE/EU approach to Roma outlined earlier, in which Roma culture was
emphasised as a means through which Roma people can alleviate their mar-
ginalised and deprived circumstances.
As we have seen, the overall approach to Roma minorities falls into
what Fraser terms the “recognition” paradigm. Through recognising the indi-
vidual qualities of the minority groups, and making sure they are present in
all types of institutional life (social, economic, cultural), the members of
minority groups will feel they have a presence in (and thus easier access to)
these institutions, which will improve their living standards. People are seen
in cultural groups that need to understand, respect and interact with each
other’s differences in order to get along and have equal status in society, the
“building blocks for a liberal approach to minority rights” (Kymlicka, 1995,
p. 2). This approach is not unique to European institutions, and has been
elsewhere referred to as “multiculturalism” and “cultural diversity”, an ap-
proach that is said to be an “effective intervention on a social and local
level”, yet which attracts many critics (Verkuyten, 2004, p.53).4 Whilst aware
of general criticisms of the multicultural approach, this chapter does not ad-
vocate a “for or against” argument for multicultural philosophy per se, but
instead turns to look at how this approach progresses when put into practice.
I now turn to see how these documents have been dealt with in the
monitoring reports produced by Hungary. The aim is to determine how the
recognition approach taken by European institutions in these two legal docu-
ments is dealt with in terms of the Roma minority in Hungary.
Hungary and the European Charter for Regional or

Minority Languages (ECRML)
The Republic of Hungary was among the first states to sign the ECRML in
1992, which then came into force in 1998.5 The application of the ECRML in
______________________________________________________________
Hungary undergoes various monitoring procedures that take place in 3-yearly
cycles, and up to 2008 there have been three monitoring procedures: in 1999,
2002, and 2005. The procedures include the production of three reports: a
submission of a periodical report by the State Party; a monitoring exercise
carried out by a Committee of Experts; and the Committee of Ministers’
(from the COE) recommendations to the States Parties6. The latter two re-
ports are published within two years of the first periodical report by the State
Party. This section focuses on the monitoring reports carried out by a Com-
mittee of Experts in Hungary (published in 2001, 2004 and 2007). These
reports, through their descriptions of the implementation of the ECRML,
show how the ECRML is perceived as relevant (or not) to the Roma minority
in Hungary. In this analysis we see not only how the Hungarian reports differ
in their approach to the ECRML’s descriptions of Roma, but also, over the
years, differ from each other in an apparently uneasy attempt to become bet-
ter aligned with the ECRML’s approach. Table 2 below summarizes the three
reports:
Table 2. Summary of the Hungarian monitoring reports for the ECRML

2001 2004 2007
Approach to Little evidence of Little evidence of Evidence of Roma
Roma culture in Roma culture: onus on Roma culture: onus culture: onus on
Hungarian Roma minorities losing on historical situa- “authorities” as not
society their language and their tion - state-forced recognising Roma
culture. integration of Roma culture in their
minorities caused legislation, and
subsequent loss of society as not galva-
language and cul- nised enough to raise
ture. the profile of Roma
language and cul-
ture.
Approach to Social exclusion Social exclusion Social exclusion can
social exclusion caused by poor socio- should be seen as be tackled mainly
economic situation of socio-economic through educational
Roma, rather than lack along with linguis- desegregation via
of linguistic or cultural tic and cultural identity politics.
recognition. recognition.
Recognition or Redistribution, but Redistribution Recognition, with

redistribution with disadvantage seen alongside some the state and general
paradigm as a deficit of Roma. recognition, with society blamed as
disadvantage seen failing to recognise
as a deficit of state Roma language and
action. culture.
Table 2 above shows how the stance of the monitoring reports modulates
over the years from a focus on redistribution measures to recognition politics,
and with that a shift in blame from the minorities themselves to state defi-
______________________________________________________________
ciencies. The recognition of the existence of Roma culture increases with
each report. The 2001 report was mostly concerned with the problems it
found in applying the ECRML to Hungary’s Roma minority.7 Roma were the
only minority group that was said to be problematic for the implementation
of the ECRML. The main problem cited was the fact that most Roma in Hun-
gary do not speak a Romany language and rather than focusing on language,
social exclusion and discrimination should be tackled:
“The majority of Roma/Gypsies have lost their native lan-

guage, speaking only Hungarian as mother tongue (although
often with severe deficiencies in linguistic skills). […] For the
purpose of the Charter, only these some 30% of minority-
language-speaking Roma/Gypsies are relevant, not the large
majority of Hungarian-speaking Roma/Gypsies whose main
problems are social exclusion and discrimination” (2001 report,
section 1.2, para. 13, p.9).
The above extract reveals a number of differences from the European

institutional “recognition” approach. Most striking is the difference in the
way Roma are viewed as a minority group: whereas the “recognition” ap-
proach in the ECRML sees minority language as fundamental to a minority
community such as the Roma, the 2001 report from Hungary says that only
30 percent of Roma in Hungary actually speak a Romany language. This
would therefore make the ECRML irrelevant to the majority of Roma in
Hungary, and so a strategy in which Romany language is focused on would
not improve their poor economic and social situation. Furthermore, the above
extract refutes the “recognition” approach by saying that in fact, the main
problems faced by Roma minorities are “social exclusion and discrimination”
(see also section 2.1, para. 30 pp.15–16). This suggests the Hungarian view-
point is more in a “redistributive” paradigm, which Fraser says is about injus-
tice in the political economy rather than cultural misrecognition (Fraser,
1997, p.14).
It then follows that the approaches to anti-discrimination differ –
whereas the ECRML, following the general European institutional approach
of seeing Romany language and culture as the “essential common denomina-
tor” to Roma identity8 and therefore fundamental to anti-discriminatory ap-
proaches, the 2001 report from Hungary does not, saying in its conclusions,
“it is not always easy to reconcile classical goals of anti-discrimination policy
and modern approaches directed towards the preservation of linguistic iden-
tity” (Findings, para. D, p.35). The report states that in Hungary, Romany
languages have not been regarded in a celebratory cultural way (i.e. the lan-
guages have not been held in high regard and have been discriminated
______________________________________________________________
against), and therefore encouraging their revival in this climate may actually
exacerbate prejudice,
“the Republic of Hungary should pay primary attention to the

problem and should take measures to preserve the languages of
the Roma/Gypsy population, without endangering the impor-
tant goal of putting an end to the marginalisation and social
discrimination that have traditionally plagued members of this
community” (2001 report, section 2.1 para. 34).
Whilst the ECRML conceptualizes the promotion and protection of

minority languages as helping to combat discrimination, the above extract
shows how the 2001 report says the exact opposite. The 2001 report sees any
moves to integrate Romani languages into public life as something that needs
to be carried out carefully and strategically, so as not to endanger the path to
social integration.
Moreover, if we go back to the previous extract, we can see a use of
deficit language when describing the Roma minority: the Roma have “lost”
their native language, and even when talking Hungarian have “severe defi-
ciencies” in linguistic skills. The image produced is of a minority who are
lacking the cultural tools of the majority population, and it is this lack that
causes their exclusion from society. We will see later how this tendency to-
wards deficit language can also be seen in the monitoring reports for the
FCNM (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities).
The subsequent monitoring reports for the ECRML in 2004 and 2007
reveal a moderation of ideas to better suit the ECRML’s multicultural recog-
nition approach. In the 2004 report there seems to be an acceptance that the
2001 report was at odds with the Charter’s approach and the report aims to
address this:
“The Committee of Experts considers it necessary to take the

assessment it started in its first evaluation report a step forward
and start including elements of a social and cultural nature in
its evaluation” (2004 report, section 3.2.4, para. 45, p.11).
Note here that the way of aligning the 2004 report more to the
ECRML’s aim is to “start including elements of a social and cultural nature”
[my emphasis]. This is further established as the 2004 report still posits redis-
tribution as the important goal with recognition as an additional factor:
“The Committee of Experts underlines that integration in line

with the principles set out in the Charter, is one which allows
for a full participation in economic, social and political life,
______________________________________________________________
combined with the preservation of one’s linguistic and cultural
identity” (2004 report, section 3.2.4, para. 43, p.11).
The “recognition” paradigm of the ECRML that sees socio-economic

participation through linguistic and cultural recognition is not fully endorsed
– it is not seen as the means, but rather an addition, “combined with”. The
aim is to increase the presence of Romany languages in institutional life
which even mono-Hungarian speaking Roma can access, “recovering their
language if they so wish” (section 3.2.4, para. 49). On an ideological level,
the 2004 report from Hungary appears to view culture in terms of blocks that
can be accessed and fitted in when required, rather than the ECRML’s ap-
proach which presents cultural and language in a much more holistic manner.
Nevertheless the cultural element of the ECRML is endorsed here, much
more than in earlier documents. However it is seen as supplementary rather
than fundamental, something that can be accessed as and when needed.
The 2007 report from Hungary then goes one step further to align it-
self fully with the ECRML’s approach, and criticism becomes more directed
at the Hungarian government itself. The 2007 report admonishes the Hungar-
ian government for not including Romany language and culture into its strat-
egy for raising the status of Roma minorities,
“the authorities have introduced a wide-ranging government pro-

gramme aiming at the further economic, social and political integra-
tion of the Roma. However, this programme has no specific compo-
nent aimed at the preservation or promotion of Romany and Beás”
(2007 report, section 3.1, conclusion rec. no.1, p.35).
Here the report distances itself the Hungarian government, thus align-
ing itself more to the “recognition” paradigm of the ECRML in which Rom-
any and Beás languages would be specifically referred to. The recommenda-
tions in the report all focus on the recognition of these languages in educa-
tion, media and other public spaces. Education is particularly focused on,
with the term “desegregation” used. This is the first time the term is used in
the reports, and links to a wider movement in Hungary and beyond to stop the
ongoing discriminatory practice of wrongly placing Roma children into spe-
cial needs schools.9 Whilst other discourses on the desegregation of Roma
children regularly talk of problems of socio-economic disparity in the “redis-
tribution” sense of injustice, the 2007 report focuses on language, criticising
the Hungarian authorities of not recognising Romany and Beás languages in
their strategies.
The monitoring feedback, over the years, changes from questioning
the ECRML’s stance on Roma language and culture to fully endorsing the
view that recognition is the route to promoting anti-discriminatory measures.
______________________________________________________________
As Table 2 shows, the monitoring reports thus move to distance themselves
from the Hungarian authorities. The initial disquiet surrounding the potential
effectiveness of the ECRML for Roma in Hungary is lost in the reports, along
with mention of redistribution-type measures and, indeed, deficit type of
discourses about Roma language and culture. However, this does not mean
these approaches have disappeared – as the reports tell us, the Hungarian
authorities are still involved in these types of measures, and are thus still
prevalent. The monitoring process, I argue, could have held an important
position in discussing the differences between European and Hungarian state
level approaches to Roma. Instead, the monitoring reports move to reject the
state’s approach in favour of the European institutional approach. Perhaps
this succeeds in reducing some deficit discourses around Roma culture and
language, but at the same time, issues of effectiveness for the majority of
Roma in Hungary, and socio-economic redistributive measures that might be
useful alongside cultural recognition are not addressed.
Hungary and the Framework Convention for the Protection of

National Minorities (FCNM)
Moving onto the FCNM, we can see similar problems in the way the moni-
toring reports attempt to discuss different cultural elements in the framework.
Since Hungary has ratified the FCNM there have been two monitoring re-
ports, one in 1999 and the second in 2004. Similar to the ECRML, the earlier
report focuses much more on redistribution than then latter which is more
concerned with recognition.
In the 1999 report, unfair housing treatment suffered by Roma minori-
ties is mentioned twice (with regards to Articles 1 and 6), whilst problems in
the labour market particularly around lack of job opportunities are empha-
sised (Articles 1 and 4). Poverty and educational segregation are also referred
to. However, there is no direct solution given to these problem – all recom-
mendations refer to cultural phenomena such as: the setting up of museums
(Article 4); Gypsy cultural centres (Article 5); separate places of worship
(Article 8) and minority broadcasting (Article 9). Therefore whilst flagging
up injustice in the redistribution terms of the labour market and socio-
economic inequality, the measures are all based on recognition-type solu-
tions.
The 2004 report continues in a similar vein, but now with even less
mention of any redistribution phenomena: only school scholarships and
measures to reduce segregation in schools are mentioned in Articles 5 and 6.
Recognition phenomena are far more emphasized, with minority media pro-
grammes on the agenda (Articles 9 and 10), and more Romany language
development in schools and institutions (Articles 12, 14). We might conclude
that the “recognition” paradigm has eclipsed any particularly redistributive-
______________________________________________________________
focused recommendations, and the monitoring reports have fully endorsed
the European institutional pathway of celebratory recognition-type solutions.
However, an interesting aspect of the 2004 report is in Part III of the report
which deals with “Further evolvements affecting the situation of the Roma
minority” (para.6, pp.102–113). In this section, economic and social integra-
tion and employment problems of Roma minorities are emphasized beyond
any recognition measures. The Roma are referred to here as a “disadvan-
taged” minority, a phrase that up until this point has barely been used in the
FCNM or monitoring process. Whilst measures in a “recognition” paradigm
might be flagged up in the main body of the report, disadvantage and poverty
in “redistribution” terms are still an area the report wants to acknowledge.
Furthermore, in Annex XII (pp.159–161) two “case studies” are de-
scribed which are said to have “created a stir and were hotly discussed re-
cently in the media” (p.159). In both case studies, despite their written ap-
pearance as official reports (both are said to be from the Minister of the Inte-
rior, and are in keeping with the layout of a factual report e.g. the first begins
“On 1 November 2002 at 13.16...”), both use deficit discourses in describing
the Roma people in the incident, drawing on recognizable negative represen-
tations of Gypsies. This suggests the “recognition” paradigm is not one that is
fully embraced.
The two cases describe tensions between police and Roma people in
which the Roma are presented as an unruly, uncontrollable mob. The first
‘case’ reports on an incident at a hospital where the family of a deceased
woman has gathered and subsequently cause a disturbance. We first learn that
the security service at the hospital were alerted to an incident,
“the security service of the Bugát Pál Hospital in Gyöngyös re-

ceived a notification that at the surgery class of the hospital, on
the third floor, a mass of some 40 to 50 people had gathered
and annoyed the calm of patients with their loudness.” (FCNM
state report 2004, p.159).
From the above extract we can see the types of bias against Roma.
First of all, instead of presenting us with a simple number of people involved
in the incident, (which could have been presented as a “fact” in a similar way
to the date, time, location at the opening), we get the phrase “mass of some
40 to 50 people”. The words “mass...” and “have gathered” suggests some-
thing aligned to a demonstration, a large quantity of people brought together
for a specific purpose (thereby suggesting it could be premeditated), with
connotations to being anti-establishment and of lower class (the word
“tömeg” is used in the Hungarian version that has similar connotations to
“mass” in English). The next phrase describes what this “mass” of people
did: they “annoyed the calm of patients with their loudness”. So the hint at
______________________________________________________________
the meaning of “mass” as something anti-establishment is confirmed – the
crowd are differentiated from the “calm of patients”, the ordinary people who
are justified as being there because they are members of the hospital, “calm
patients” - unlike this “mass” who are “annoying” and “loud”.
We then learn that these “some 40 to 50 people” had come to the hos-
pital because of a death of a relative: “They came together because one of the
members of their family, the mother of the family of 82 years of age had
died.” The deceased relative is described as “the mother of the family”. Thus
the sentence groups the crowd together as one huge unit, drawing on the
strong – often pejoratively used – representation of Roma people as overly
fertile with large and unruly families (see Durst 2002). The next few sen-
tences confirms this unruliness of the Roma:
“The relatives, a lot of them in a drunken condition, rushed into

the room and stroked and pulled the deceased. The patients and
nurses took fright and there was a just operated patient who left
the room with fear, even in a reduced condition, barefoot […].
The policemen arriving called upon the blustering relatives to
leave the building. Some of the company tried to comply with
this notice, though reluctantly, but the lift could not start due to
its overload. The policemen tried to direct the mass through the
staircase when temper got out of hand […]. One of the fighters
took a jack out of his pocket while the mass was scanning that
they would beat the policemen to death” (ibid., p. 159).
The Roma are described as a dangerous, unruly mob who are some-
what uncivilized in their behaviour: they “stroke” and “pull” the dead
woman, they “try” to comply with the policemen’s orders but their “temper”
gets the better of them, even leading to the suggestion of intent to kill. The
reporting of this incident shows that even in what is presented as a factual
report, deficit stereotypical descriptions of Roma minorities as a rowdy, un-
controllable family mob prevail.
In a similar style, the second incident also reports Roma as a tempes-
tuous, hostile mob against the state order. In brief, the report describes a
traffic incident that turned into a more serious confrontation. We learn that
whilst police were carrying out road traffic control in a town not far from
Budapest (“Valkó”), one van did not respond to their “stop” arm signal and
carried on driving. After a car chase and attempted arrest in which the driver
threatens the police with a crowbar and a policeman drew his gun, “30–40
people” are reported to come out onto the streets “shouting and aggressively
threatening” the policemen. The policemen ended up fleeing without arrest-
ing anyone:
______________________________________________________________
“Due to the aggressive action of the ever increasing group
equipped with various devices (hoes, scythes, forks) and the
lynch feeling evolved, the policemen gave up their further ac-
tion in order to protect their own safety, left the site with the
service car, and then notified the duty of the Police Headquar-
ters of Gödöllı” (ibid., p.160).
Here the Roma are an “ever increasing group” equipped with weap-
ons, again the image of a growing mob, and in a comparable vein to the last
story, the police flee the scene – the Roma are lawless, even the police cannot
deal with them.
Neither stories are elaborated on, nor shown as to where they might fit
in to the FCNM framework. Without any further contextualization, these
incidents work to show the Roma in a stereotypical, deficit light as an uncon-
trollable mass. This way of talking about Roma clearly does not fit into the
‘anti-discriminatory’ approach of the FCNM that is cultural and celebratory,
and does not fit into the increasingly cultural view of Roma taken by the
main body of the FCNM monitoring reports themselves. Here, I suggest that
the negative representations of Roma both here and in other documents re-
lates to a culture in Hungary in which deficit discourse about Roma is wide-
spread and regularly circulated. Discriminatory discourses towards Roma in
Hungary are well-recognized as a problem and commented on in both aca-
demic literature and different media sources (see Kende, 2000, p. 200; Cse-
peli and Simon, 2004, p. 129; Stewart, 1997, p. 4) and as we have seen in this
article, can even surface in reports that purport to be pro- celebrating Roma
culture.
Conclusions
The European instruments for minorities rely on the existence of a specific
identity for a specific minority, and the idea that people (should) want to
celebrate distinct identities. European institutional approaches to Roma
strongly emphasize cultural recognition that sees Roma culture as celebra-
tory, and sees this celebration as a means to encourage and facilitate their
social and economic inclusion into mainstream society. This approach has
been taken to newly acceded post-socialist countries who have high numbers
of Roma, such as Hungary. The Hungarian response (at least as shown in the
monitoring processes) is ambivalent in endorsing the celebratory stance as
the central answer to Roma exclusion.
In Hungary’s monitoring reports, there appears a struggle to fully em-
brace the recognition paradigm. In the monitoring process for the ECRML,
for example, early reports emphasise redistribution first and foremost, with
only the later reports moving to endorse recognition politics. The later reports
stand rather uneasily vis-à-vis the “Hungarian authorities” onto whom the
______________________________________________________________
blame is laid for not taking up the recognition baton, whilst the earlier align-
ment to this stance is left unquestioned. In the same process for the FCNM,
recognition solutions are flagged up, which could appear to suggest the re-
ports fully embrace the European institutional approach. However, redistribu-
tion-type discourses on poverty and disadvantage do appear, but are pushed
into the latter sections or annexes of the reports.
It appears that in the attempt to integrate Hungarian discourses into
European discourses on Roma, an uneasy position is struck in which “anti-
discrimination” is separated from the redistributive measures of dealing with
poverty and disadvantage. Redistributive measures could possibly be much
more effective then attempting to celebrate a certain culture and language that
is not necessarily practiced by most members of the minority. The European
institutional response thus appears inadequate to deal with the severe ine-
qualities suffered by Roma communities. However, this is not to say that the
Hungarian response would therefore be wholly effective in solving problems
faced by Roma minorities. Both monitoring processes have shown moments
of the use of deficit discourses about Roma – the most striking example is in
the FCNM monitoring process, in which descriptions of incidents involving
Roma are highly discriminatory. These, however, are limited to the end of the
report, and therefore are not properly aired or dealt with.
Here we come to the main tension between the two approaches to the
Roma minority. This chapter has shown how the ‘Hungarian voice’ has been
modified through the monitoring processes to distance itself from state-
measures towards Roma, whilst still including elements of these measures in
various guises, mixed with occasions of deficit discourse that tap into wider
negative representations of Roma “without culture”; “unruly, dangerous,
violent” and “opposing mainstream norms”. These deficit discourses run the
risk of seriously impeding any redistribution or recognition integratory meas-
ures, yet the monitoring process does not help debate these issues, but rather
forces them into the corners of reports, closing down any possibilities for
discussions.
If the European institutions do want to play a role in helping Roma
minorities, then they will have to deal with redistributive issues alongside
identity politics, and open up dialogues with “postsocialist” countries in order
to help identify and engage with discriminatory discourses about Roma as not
only a potentially cultural minority in need of recognition, but also as a mi-
nority that suffers from extreme poverty. Setting up a binary division be-
tween celebrating positive cultural aspects, and the hard struggle of enduring
poverty, only reduces the opportunity for effective intervention.
A multiculturalist or “recognition” approach needs to progress along
two lines: firstly, it needs to take into account the idea that ‘a’ minority might
not always neatly link to ‘a’ culture and ‘a’ language. This might mean
measures to promote and encourage cultural difference may need to take
______________________________________________________________
plurality, hybridity and even aspects of nationality into account - for example
whilst Romany languages are of the utmost importance for Romany speakers,
in Hungary the majority of Roma do not speak a Romany language and there-
fore documents such as the ECRML will not be directly useful in improving
their access to services (e.g. the schooling system). Secondly, a “recognition”
approach also needs to integrate redistribution measures to deal with certain
aspects of inequality in order to really tackle disadvantage at a structural
level. As Fraser puts it, “in other words, to reconnect the problematic of cul-
tural difference with the problematic of social equality” (Fraser, 1997, p.
187).
Finally, any recognition approach also needs to be careful in its pursu-
ance of the need to identify and celebrate “difference”. Whilst acknowledging
the advantages of diverse cultures in a society, this chapter has shown how a
commitment to “difference as best” can limit the potential for dynamic de-
bates with other standpoints, and prevent the progress of anti-discriminatory
developments that can tackle inequality.
Endnotes
1 The EU accepted ten new countries in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Bulgaria and Romania then joined in 2007, and Croatia and Turkey began
membership negotiations in 2005.
Numbers of Roma in the recent post-socialist accession countries range from
approximately 8,000 in Latvia, to 600,000 in Hungary and about 2 million in
Romania (Source: European Union support for Roma communities in Central
and Eastern Europe, 2003 (Brussels: European Commission) p. 4).
2 The term “European institutions” here refers both to institutions affiliated to
the Council of Europe and those affiliated to the European Union.
3 See Gypsies in Europe 1992 (COE/Parliamentary Assembly Recommenda-
tion 1203, para. 11.iv), Legal Situation of the Roma in Europe 2002
(COE/Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights report, paras. I/2, 6,
15.a.v; IIB/54).
4 Verkuyten neatly sums up the critics of multiculturalism by saying, it has
been suggested that multiculturalism can lead to reified group distinctions
that become fault lines for conflict and separatism. Similarly, others have
argued that multiculturalism endangers social unity and cohesion, and is also
contradictory to the notion of equality and the ideal of meritocracy.
(Verkuyten, 2004, p. 54; See also contribution of Malloy, this volume).
5 The significance of the ECRML for the Central and Eastern European re-
gion is shown in the increase of interest in the charter since the fall of com-
munism 1989/90: “The CLRAE [Congress of Local and Regional Authori-
______________________________________________________________
ties] conceived and presented its draft charter before the dramatic changes in
Central and Eastern Europe and in the light of the needs of the countries
which at that time were already members of the Council of Europe. Neverthe-
less, the relevance of the charter and its approach to the situation of the coun-
tries of central and eastern Europe has since been confirmed by the consider-
able interest expressed by the representatives of a number of these countries
in the establishment of European standards on this topic” (Explanatory Re-
port: para. 12 p.3) [my insertion]. Although the Explanatory Report does not
expand on exactly who the “representatives” were who displayed interest in
the charter, we can speculate that this does, in part, point to parties interested
in languages spoken by Roma people. Subsequent calls for standardising
Romani languages have referred to the ECRML as the legal background for
this process. For example, a version of the Romani alphabet was devised and
written by Marcel Courtiade, with EU funding, and was adopted by the Inter-
national Romani Union at its Fourth World Congress, held in Warsaw 1990
(Acton and Klimová, 2001, p. 162).
6 For the full monitoring process plus all the reports, a useful website is from
the Budapest-based Public Foundation for European Comparative Minority
Research (“EÖKIK”), see webpage http://languagecharter.eokik.hu (accessed
20 December 2008).
7 Minority languages pertinent to the ECRML’s application in Hungary are
listed as follows: Croatian (17,577 speakers), German (37,511 speakers),
Romanian (8,730 speakers), Serbian (2,953 speakers), Slovak (12,745 speak-
ers), Roma/Gypsies (48,072 speakers), (figures according to the Population
Census 1990, probably conservative).
8 “The Roma culture being an essentially oral culture, the language is not
highly codified; and incessant travels and exchanges with the populations of
the places they passed through have transformed Romani into a multitude of
languages: a Rom from Romania, for example, will not be understood by a
Spanish or Portuguese Kalo. But even if it is not used by all groups, the lan-
guage remains an essential common denominator of this people scattered all
over the continent” (The Situation of Gypsies (Roma and Sinti) in Europe
1995: Introduction, p. 8).
9 Hungary was the first country in the region to adopt and implement a gov-
ernment initiated and supported school integration programme. It was
launched in 2003, and provides financial incentives to schools that commit to
integrating Roma students into the mainstream classrooms. In an outline of
the government initiated and support school integration programme (Mohácsi
2005). Implementing integration and desegregation has become one of the
priorities to be dealt with in the pan-European programme Decade for Roma
______________________________________________________________
Inclusion 2005-2015, see webpage www.romadecade.org (accessed 2. March

2009).
References
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European answer to West European questions? Shifts in the focus of World
Romani Congresses 1971-2000,” in: Guy, W. (ed.) (2001), Between past and
future: the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe. Hertfordshire: University of
Hertfordshire Press, 157–219.
Csepeli, G. and D. Simon (2004), “Construction of Roma Identity in Eastern

and Central Europe: Perception and Self-identification,” Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies, 30(1): 129–150.
Discrimination against the Roma Resolution 1995 B4-0974/95, 13th July

1995, Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 249/156, 25th
September 1995.
Durst, J. (2002), “Fertility and childbearing practices among poor Gypsy

women in Hungary: the intersections of class, race and gender,” Communist
and Post-Communist Studies, 35: 457–474.
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 1992. (entered into

force 1.March 1998) Strasbourg, Council of Europe.
European Union Support for Roma Communities in Central and Eastern

Europe, Brussels, European Commission, 2003.
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Fraser, N. (1997), Justice Interruptus. Critical reflections on the

‘Postsocialist’ condition London: Routledge.
Kende, Á. (2000), “The Hungary of Otherness: The Roma (Gypsies) of

Hungary,” Journal of European Area Studies, 8(2): 187–201.
Kovats, M. (2001), “The emergence of European Roma policy,” in: W. Guy

(ed.), Between past and future, the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe.
Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, 93–116.
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Kymlicka, W. (2005), Multicultural Citizenship. Gloucestershire: Clarendon

Press.
Legal Situation of the Roma in Europe. (2002), Parliamentary Assembly,

Council of Europe.
Morawa, A. and M. Weller (2005), Mechanisms for the implementation of

minority rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
Mohácsi, V. and L. Járóka (2005), “The only hope for the European Roma is
the European Union”, Equal voices: Targeting and mainstreaming the
integration of Roma at the EU and European level, Issue 16, June 2005.
Stewart, M. (1997), The Time of the Gypsies. Oxford: Westview Press.
Verkuyten, M. (2004), “Everyday ways of thinking about multiculturalism,”

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The Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania:
Legal Framework for Social Inclusion
Michaela Salamun
The Strategy Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma

Minority of 2003 as well as other sublegal acts have
complemented the existing legal framework for minority
protection in Albania. They are set in the context of
(international) soft law, such as Opinions of the Advisory
Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities of the Council of Europe and the annual
reports of the European Commission relating to Albania. The
sublegal acts have effected changes in the definition of the
Roma and Egyptian minorities and in their position in the areas
of education, employment and social affairs. Despite such
changes, however, implementation needs to be improved,
mainly in terms of providing sufficient funding and increasing
local government activities.
Introduction
This chapter discusses in what ways the legal framework in Albania accounts
for the social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian minorities.1 This is impor-
tant, as legal frameworks in different countries tend to provide different
measures of social inclusion. Moreover, – inter alia due to more recent proc-
esses of identity formation (Marushiakova, Popov, 2001; Trubeta, 2005) – the
Egyptian community may not be treated as a distinct minority by the state,
but regarded as a subgroup within the Roma minority that generally have
seen a more longstanding process of identity building in Central and Eastern
European countries (CEE) (Vermeersch, 2006, pp. 13; Friedman, 2007).
Social inclusion has been defined mainly via its antonym, social exclusion,
which consists in “deprivation and barriers, which […] prevent the full par-
ticipation in areas such as employment, education, health, environment, hous-
ing, culture, access to rights or family support, as well as training and job
opportunities” (European Commission, 2000, p. 6). Social inclusion therefore
can be defined as the overcoming, minimizing or non-existence of such dep-
rivation and barriers. Consequently, a legal framework which creates the
prerequisites for social inclusion needs to provide for measures of positive
discrimination or affirmative action that try to level out existing inequalities
in cases where barriers affect only a certain group of the population and so
152 Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania
______________________________________________________________
indirectly discriminate against it. In addition, the framework needs to be
effectively implemented.
In a first step I discuss the definition of the Roma and Egyptian mi-
norities or communities in Albania and what constitutional provisions and
sublegal acts on minority protection apply to them (e.g. the Strategy Improv-
ing the Living Conditions of the Roma Minority of 2003; hereinafter National
Strategy). In a second step, my paper examines legal instruments that account
for the inclusion of the Roma minority in the fields of education, employment
and social affairs. It shows how these instruments either explicitly or implic-
itly refer to the minority, explicit reference showing a higher degree of politi-
cal priority by the legislator. In addition, the higher the legal act in the hierar-
chy of normative acts, starting from sublegal acts (instructions, decisions,
orders) through laws up to constitutional laws, the higher is its political prior-
ity. In a third step, institutions monitoring the implementation of the National
Strategy are described.
1. Definition of the Roma and Egyptian Minorities

In contrast to the Slovenian Constitution, which – in a unique way refers to
the status and special rights of the Romani community in Art. 65, the Alba-
nian Constitution (Law No. 8417, dated 21/10/1998, as amended) does not
refer explicitly to the Roma or Egyptian minorities or communities. Rather, it
relates to “minorities” in general; “coexistence with, and understanding of
Albanians for, minorities” is regarded as “one of the bases of the state, which
has to respect and protect them” (Art. 3). In addition, the Constitution men-
tions “national minorities”, which are granted special rights mainly in the
cultural and linguistic area, such as mother-tongue education2 (Art. 20, para.
2). The Constitution also contains a principle of equality (Art. 18, para.s 1
and 2), which allows for the execution of positive discrimination, when there
is reasonable and objective legitimacy (Art. 18, para. 3 of the Constitution;
Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 28). Considering that – though
subject to certain restrictions – legally it is in principle upon the States to
define the concept of minority, the question arises which of these constitu-
tional provisions apply to the Roma and Egyptian communities.
Firstly, the Roma community has been recognized in official docu-
ments, like state reports, as an ethno-linguistic minority,3 as opposed to a
national minority (e.g. the Greek or Macedonian minority) that has a mother-
land (UN, ICCPR, HRC, 2004, para. 9). Because the special rights provided
in Art. 20, para. 2 of the Constitution are granted exclusively to national
minorities, only the principle of equality set out in Art. 18 of the Constitution
applies to members of the Roma and Egyptian community, just like to any
other Albanian citizens. However, this is limited by the standard-setting func-
tion of the Opinions issued by the Advisory Committee of the Council of
______________________________________________________________
Europe Framework Convention for National Minorities (AC) (Lantschner,
2008), which made clear that:
“[i]t understands that, according to the Albanian government,

the Framework Convention is also to be applied without dis-
tinction or discriminating effect to the linguistic minorities.
Nevertheless, it encourages the government, in consultation
with those concerned, to re-examine the question of the possi-
ble designation of the Roma and Aromanians/Vlachs as na-
tional minorities” (AC, 2002, para.s 20, 84; similar AC, 2008,
para. 9).4
Thus the AC argues for a recognition of the Roma minority as a “na-

tional” minority (which then might potentially come also within the wider
constitutional protection, including mother-tongue education), whereas the
government programme refers to it merely as “ethnic minorities” and “com-
munities”.5
Secondly, the Egyptian community was not officially recognized as a
minority until 2005. The government gave as a reason in a state report of
2003 that unlike the nomadic Roma, who have their own language and ethnic
characteristics, Egyptians were settled, did not have their own language,
culture or religion and were fully integrated into Albanian society (UN,
CERD, 2003b, para. 8; similar Government of Albania, 2008, para. 23).
However, according to the Advisory Committee such non-recognition a pri-
ori excluded the minority from the protection of the Framework Convention
and, therefore, was not compatible with it (AC, 2002, para. 22). Following
the national elections of July 2005, the Egyptian community was mentioned
in the government programme 2005–2009 of 8 September 2005. In my opin-
ion such explicit reference could be seen as a first official acknowledgment
of the minority. The government programme states:
“The Government commits itself to abide by and achieve the

highest standards in respecting the rights of all the ethnic mi-
norities: Greek, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Roma, Egyptian
and Aromanian ... Priority treatment will be offered to the
Roma and Egyptian communities through a special education
and housing program, in order to overcome the consequences
of their long-term discrimination.” (Government of Albania,
2005)
While the first state report to the Advisory Committee in 2001 had not
mentioned the Egyptian community,6 the second state report in 2007 referred
______________________________________________________________
explicitly to this community (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p.
34).
The first sublegal act mentioning the Egyptian minority is Council of
Ministers’ (CoM) Decision No. 751, dated 07/11/2007 “For the adoption of
the sectoral strategy of employment and professional training and the action
plan for its implementation.” It states that awareness of the employees of the
employment offices will be raised relating to “women of the Roma and Egyp-
tian community,” so as to implement existing employment promotion pro-
grammes (CoM Decision No. 632, see below) as well as measures of the
National Strategy. However, unlike the Roma minority, the Egyptian minor-
ity does not have a representative in the State Committee for Minorities
(AHC, 2007, point 3). Therefore, one can speak about a partial recognition of
the Egyptian community so far. The Advisory Committee recognizes that
further dialogue is needed between the authorities and the Egyptian commu-
nity in order to decide on measures aimed at preserving and developing their
identity and culture (AC, 2008, para.s 10, 46).
There is no current official data on the number of minority members,
as the 2001 census did not include a question on nationality or language used
at home.7 A study of the World Bank indicates that the Roma minority com-
prises 79,000 members, i.e. 2.4 per cent of the population (de Soto et al.,
2002, p. 90).8 The Roma assess their number as twice as many (120–
150,000), the Egyptian minority gives its number as high as 200–250,000
persons (Center for Ethnic Studies, 2002; de Soto et al., 2004, pp. 67). Dis-
tricts with large Roma populations can be found in Korça, Elbasan, Tirana,
Fier, Berat and Durrës, where Roma live mainly in separate quarters, in out-
skirts or in villages close to towns. Rural communities can e.g. be found in
the villages of Bilisht, Maliq, Pojan and Zvezde around the southeastern town
of Korça (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, p. xxiv).
2. Legal Instruments for Social Inclusion

Legal instruments that account for social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian
minorities exist mainly as sublegal acts, such as decisions of the CoM and
orders or instructions of individual ministries in the fields of education, em-
ployment and social affairs. The perhaps most prominent one is the Strategy
for Improving the Living Conditions of the Roma Minority, adopted by CoM
Decision No. 633, dated 18/09/2003. It provides for measures of positive
discrimination or affirmative action in the areas of education, cultural heri-
tage and family, economics, employment, poverty reduction and social wel-
fare, health and infrastructure as well as public order, justice and public ad-
ministration and has been concretised through the issuance of further sublegal
acts relating to the Roma and Egyptian minorities. I address these separately
in the following.
______________________________________________________________
Instruments Relating to Education
Roma children in Albania face a low enrolment rate (48 cer cent primary, 12
per cent secondary, 2 per cent tertiary education), low attendance (Roma 4.02
and Egyptians 5.06 years of school in average) and a high drop-out rate with
as much as 94 per cent of Roma pupils starting grade 1 not reaching grade 5
as a share of all pupils aged 12 (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, pp. 54).9
Thus the members of the Roma and Egyptian minorities generally face high
figures of illiteracy (64 per cent of Roma and 24 per cent of Egyptians, ages
7–20, 40 per cent of Roma and 11.3per cent of Egyptians, ages 20–40) (ibid.,
p. xxviii).10 Access to education may be obstructed by factors, such as high
cost of school supplies (ibid., pp. 61), or internal and international migration
of Roma parents during the school year (ibid., pp. 57), who frequently take
their children with them.11 Other prohibitive factors may include large dis-
tance to education facilities, lack of child care facilities for younger children,
security risks (parents fear especially that girls are trafficked into prostitution,
ODIHR, 2003), perceived teacher discrimination, traditional gender roles,
lack of Albanian language skills, hunger, malnourishment and poor diet (de
Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2005, p. 57). A disproportionate number of Roma
children are not registered in the Civil Registry which restricts their access to
education and public services in general. Recent amendments of the Law on
civil status reward the mother by payment of lek 5,000 (approx. € 38) for
registering the child within a certain time period, i.e. 60 days from birth
within Albania and 90 days from birth abroad or 60 days from the entry into
force of the law for all births that are not declared until present (Art 34/1,
para.s 4 and 5 of No. 8950, dated 10/10/2002, most recently amended by Law
No. 9929, dated 09/06/2008). There is a fine of lek 50,000 (approx. € 384) for
units of local government that do not implement the law or pay the reward
sum (Art 69.1b). The amendments were advertised on informational pro-
grammes in national television, publicity spots, posters, and leaflets with
sufficient information on the manner of declaration for children’s registration
and a meeting has been held at the national level with registry offices and
responsible personnel in hospital centers (Government of Albania, 2008,
para. 15).
In the field of education Chapter I of the National Strategy aims to
strengthen preschool education for Roma children.12 This is done through
measures to overcome language difficulties, to ensure that all Roma children
complete mandatory education and many continue with secondary and even
higher education, and to establish quotas at the universities for Roma students
to study programmes, such as public administration, social sciences, law,
economics, engineering, etc. Several instructions of the Ministry of Educa-
tion and Science concretize and implement the National Strategy.13 Instruc-
______________________________________________________________
tion No. 34, dated 08/12/2004, “For the implementation of the project “Sec-
ond Chance” for the schooling of pupils who abandoned school and those
who are immobilized because of the blood feud phenomena,” Instruction No.
18, dated 30/08/2005, which requires the regional Education Directorates to
report in writing twice a year on the implementation of the National Strategy
(Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 59), and Instruction No. 6,
dated 29/03/2006, “For the registration in schools of the Roma pupils who are
not provided with a birth certificate” (ibid., p. 97). The AC notes that this
instruction has alerted teachers to the problem and improved the situation to
some extent; moreover, 50 per cent of the 469 pupils involved in the project
“Second Chance” belong to the Roma community (AC, 2008, para.s 169 f).
Moreover, the Ministry of Education and Science in cooperation with
the Institute for Pedagogical Research, AEDP (Albanian Educational Devel-
opment Programme) of the Soros Foundation and the Roma Union of Albania
conducted a pilot programme in the nine-year school “Bajram Curri” in Ti-
rana, in which the teaching of Romani language, history and culture is in-
cluded in the school curriculum and in which several Roma assistant teachers
were employed (Save the Children, 2001, p. 41; ETF, 2000, p. 39). Other
activities have been the collection of data about the situation of Roma in
education, such as a study on attendance of Roma children in preschool and
pre-university education institutions (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and
Equal Opportunities, 2007, p. 12), the reconstruction of schools in areas with
a high concentration of Roma children, such as in Tirana, Shkodra, Korça,
Elbasan, Fier, Gjirokastra, Lushnja and Berat (Report submitted by Albania,
2001, para. 5.1), awareness raising and support of parents in cooperation with
NGOs providing economic assistance to Roma families to enable regular
school education of their children (IHF Report, 2003, p. 10), projects for
teaching Romanes in schools, organization of additional classes to fight illit-
eracy (Report submitted by Albania, 2001, para. 5.1) and the distribution of
free textbooks to the poorest segments of society, including the Roma (ECRI,
2004, para. 59).14 In particular, based on the National Strategy for the Devel-
opment of the Pre-university Education 2004–2005 (approved by CoM Deci-
sion No. 538, dated 12/08/2004), new syllabuses containing optional subjects
chosen by parent boards allow pupils who belong to minorities to study in
their schools their history, customs and the culture of their nation as well as
subjects in their mother tongue (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007,
p. 60). The adoption of concrete measures to this respect has been requested
(AHC, 2007).
While activities promoting the education of Roma children already
took place before the adoption of the National Strategy, after its adoption
such activities through the issuing of instructions, some of which explicitly
mention the Roma minority, were accorded higher priority and a more solid
or “permanent” basis. In other words, the formal recognition of the minority
______________________________________________________________
has been increased through the adoption of sublegal acts for the promotion of
their education, which have paved the ground for further integration of the
minority.
Instruments Relating to Employment
Roma and Egyptian household incomes in Albania are less than half of the
majority urban household incomes at the national level (de Soto, Beddies,
Gëdeshi, 2005, p. xxv). The unemployment rate is estimated at 90per cent in
some communities and close to 100 per cent in the towns of Gjirokastra and
Delvina, many lacking a full-time job since the state-owned enterprises were
closed down in 1990/1 (ibid., p. 66). Only 2 per cent of the Roma and 3.3 per
cent of Egyptians receive unemployment benefits and 95 per cent of Roma
and 91 per cent of Egyptians who are unemployed or work informally do not
contribute to social security plans (ibid., p. 67).
Those with work face an ethnic hierarchy of jobs, as members of the
Roma minority tend to work as street sweepers and to trade with used clothes
on the streets (ibid., p. 68). They also do casual work, mainly in basic con-
struction and public works projects, agriculture or work as porters or dockers
(ibid., p. 70). Moreover, some Roma still work in more traditional jobs, such
as basket makers, horse breeders, blacksmiths, cart-drivers, peddlers, animal
tamers, musicians and dancers (UN, CERD, 2003a, para. 106). Romani chil-
dren frequently work with their parents in agriculture, collect metal and used
clothes and beg in the streets of big cities (de Soto, Gëdeshi, 2002, pp. 22).
However, in Korça there are several Roma doctors and some minority mem-
bers have completed university education (Children’s Human Rights Center
of Albania, 2000, p. 18). Egyptians may work as blacksmiths, ironworkers,
coppersmiths, tinsmiths, shoemakers and butchers (de Soto, Beddies, Gëde-
shi, 2005, p. 71). In contrast to the Roma, they may have reached a higher
education level and be more integrated in society; some are engineers, doc-
tors, teachers, economists, military officers and state employees. In addition,
Egyptian musicians have contributed to musical development in Albania and
many are part of bands and orchestras (ibid., p. 65).
As regards the fields of economy and employment, Chapter III of the
National Strategy provides for measures regarding business development,
such as provision of consulting services, market surveys and access to credit
for Roma communities. In addition, it foresees implementation of special
programmes to increase employment opportunities for Roma, enactment of
advantageous policies for companies employing Roma, integration in the
mainstream educational and vocational training system, as well as assistance
to communes and municipalities to attract Roma to the labour market. To
improve labour conditions, the National Strategy provides for enactment of
______________________________________________________________
measures to eliminate violation of labour code provisions by employers and
to strengthen controls by the State Labour Inspectorate in businesses employ-
ing Roma.
There are several government programmes for employment promo-
tion,15 some of which promote employment of certain groups: CoM Decision
No. 632, dated 18/09/2003, on a programme to promote the employment of
female jobseekers gave priority, inter alia, to Roma women distinguishing
them among their major focus group of women aged over 35 and young
mothers. An employer who provides a job for a female jobseeker from the
lists of the Employment Office, on a regular contract and at least for one
year, receives financial support: a) in the first year of contract 70 per cent of
obligatory social insurance and 4 minimum-wage salaries based on the coun-
try scale; b) in the second year of contract 85 per cent of obligatory social
insurance and 6 minimum-wage salaries; c) in the third year of the contract’s
execution 100 per cent of obligatory insurance and 8 minimum-wage salaries.
Under this programme 86 Roma were employed in 2004 (Ministria e Punës
dhe Cështjeve Sociale, 2005, p. 27).
To implement the decision, Instruction No. 76, dated 14/01/2004, pro-
vides that the Employment Offices should cooperate with Roma associations
registered by court decision regarding Roma women who are registered as
unemployed (Point 15). Instruction No. 647, dated 20/03/2006, as amended
by Instruction No. 647/1, dated 15/05/2006, sets out the conditions the em-
ployer must fulfil, documents he or she must submit as well as the procedure
to be followed.16 Since 2007 employment offices are to include disaggregated
statistics on unemployed Roma jobseekers in periodical statistical reports
(Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2007, p. 44).
Moreover, Order No. 645, dated 20/03/2006, “For the priorities of the em-
ployment promotion programme for the year 2006” stresses that the partici-
pation of special groups, which tend to include Roma, in the employment
promotion programmes is to consist of at least 20 per cent of all employees in
these programmes and that 50 per cent of their funds will be used only for the
implementation of Decision No. 632 of 2003 (Second Report submitted by
Albania, 2007, p. 90). However, the Court of Auditors concluded that in 2006
funds were not distributed according to this order (Kontrolli i Lartë i Shtetit,
2007, p. 7).
In the field of vocational training, CoM Decision No. 616, dated
04/12/2002, determined additional special groups, such as trafficked women
and girls, however, without mentioning explicitly the Roma minority, who
benefit from Law No. 8872, dated 29/03/2002, “On education and vocational
training in the Republic of Albania”17. By contrast, Order No. 394, dated
23/02/2004, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs “For the fees in the
vocational training system” explicitly mentions the Roma community: Voca-
tional training was to be given free of charge in the vocational public training
______________________________________________________________
centres to unemployed jobseekers registered with the Employment Offices,
including the Roma community (Point 6). This is repeated in Order No. 782,
dated 04/04/2006, “For the fees in the vocational training systems” (Point 4).
In 2004 about 50, in 2005 67 and in 2006 98 persons benefitted from these
courses (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2007,
pp. 45).
Furthermore, CoM Decision No. 751, dated 07/11/2007, on the adop-
tion of the sectoral strategy of employment and professional training and the
action plan for its implementation, which includes the Sectoral Employment
Strategy 2007–2013, inter alia states that public works can be used to employ
unemployed jobseekers of the Roma community, as foreseen in the National
Strategy (Objective 8).18 However, the Sectoral Employment Strategy merely
repeats many of the goals and activities already mentioned in the National
Strategy. While certainly constituting an important step in reinforcing the
government priorities regarding the Roma community, such repetition may
show at the same time that the programmes and measures provided for in the
National Strategy have been implemented only in part.
The State Inspectorate of Labour inspected and identified all natural
and legal subjects that employ Roma, but so far no cases of violations of their
rights regarding working conditions, wage and working hours have been
identified. Also, the Social Security Institute in cooperation with the Inspec-
torate and the Directorate of Taxes inspected private subjects that employed
Roma to include them in the social security scheme (Ministry of Work and
Social Services, 2004).
Following the adoption of the National Strategy several sublegal acts
regarding employment promotion of the Roma community have been
adopted, which shows the political priority accorded by the government to
this issue. The measures, some of which provide for positive discrimination
inter alia for Roma women, improve the legal bases for minority protection;
however, they appear to have reached only a small number of minority mem-
bers and therefore seem to be of limited practical effect.
Instruments Relating to Social Affairs
Regarding social affairs, the National Strategy envisages integrating Roma

street children, providing economic aid for poor families, as well as support
for Roma civil society organizations to improve interaction with and service
to their constituents. Moreover, it foresees putting the Roma workforce on the
mandatory social security scheme as the greatest part of Roma is engaged in
informal activities as well as registration of the Roma population in the Civil
Registrar’s Office.
______________________________________________________________
The integration of the Roma minority is also related to the Strategy of
Social Services (adopted by Decision No. 265, dated 28/04/2005). In support
of this strategy the project “Distribution of Social Services in Albania” fi-
nanced by the World Bank has been implemented, which created 43 new
community social services, out of which a considerable number address prob-
lems of Roma women and children (Second Report submitted by Albania,
2007, pp. 93). Social service officials in municipalities/ communes were
requested to give information and assistance to help Roma families to take
advantage of economic assistance and to identify their needs for social ser-
vices (based on Law No. 9355, dated 10/03/2005, “On assistance and social
services” as amended by Law No. 9602, dated 28/07/2006). As a result,
Roma minority families have been included in the economic assistance pro-
gramme, disability payment and public social services (Second Report sub-
mitted by Albania, 2007, pp. 93).19
In addition, CoM Decision No. 913, dated 19/12/2007, “On the adop-
tion of the National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence
2007–2010 and the action plan for its implementation” lists Roma girls and
women among those who are at the greatest risk to be the victims of domestic
violence.20 This strategy mentions that in the field of social protection the
state is to take care inter alia of Roma and Egyptian families (Point 3.5)
mainly through cash transfers in the form of economic assistance, or public or
private services for persons in need. In addition, in the elaboration of the
criteria of families below the absolute poverty line, inter alia, Roma and
Egyptian families are to be treated with priority (Point 5.1.1). The network of
community services is extended through pilot projects in three zones for
women and girls in need.. This comprises female heads of family, victims of
domestic violence, trafficked women, Roma and Egyptian women, handi-
capped women, women with many children etc (Point 5.2.1).
In the field of social affairs the National Strategy for Gender Equality
and Domestic Violence 2007–2010 mentions explicitly the Roma and Egyp-
tian community, for which it foresees measures of positive discrimination,
while at the same time according these measures also to other groups in need.
This should be seen in the context of the fact that in many regions of Albania
there is poverty in general and the majority population could hardly under-
stand a favourable treatment of minority members in terms of economic as-
sistance.
3. Monitoring Institutions
A Sector for the Monitoring of the Implementation of the National Strategy
was created in 2004 near the Institute for State Social Services of the Minis-
try of Labour and Social Affairs.21 However, it was staffed only with three
officials, though its capacities are to be reinforced over the following years
(CoM, 2004, p. 130; Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p. 62). Never-
______________________________________________________________
theless, the monitoring sector has played a very active role in the implemen-
tation of the National Strategy (Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p.
59). There is also an interministerial working group dealing with issues re-
lated to the Roma minority, which is headed by the Deputy Minister of La-
bour and Social Affairs and supported by the Office for Minorities within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UN, CERD, 2003a, para. 128; Commission
Report, 2003, p. 10). Moreover, the State Committee of Minorities includes a
representative of the Roma minority (established in CoM Decision No. 127,
dated 11/03/2004, as amended).
In 2004 it was announced that the total budget to be made available
for the implementation of the National Strategy was € 7 million over a period
of 15 years (Equal. Të barabarta, 2004, pp. 4).22 However, discrepancies have
been found in the allocation of the funds, with some activities, such as data
collection, not funded at all, while others appeared oversubscribed. In addi-
tion, it has been argued, since many sources of funding refer to “donors”, a
commitment to ensure the long-term financial sustainability is questionable
(Abdikeeva, 2005, p. 5). Government funding comes from the budgets of
ministries which have an allocation either for vulnerable groups in general or
for Roma in particular. In practice the funding provided by authorities re-
mains minimal, since most projects to implement the National Strategy have
been initiated by civil society with assistance from international organisations
as one-off projects confined to certain municipalities (AC, 2008, para. 77).
Similarly, it has been noted that information on the existence and the content
of the National Strategy is weak in the regions, where the Roma community
suffers from a lack of acknowledgement by local authorities and a lack of
civil society organizations to represent their interests (Commission Report,
2006, p. 15).
The annual reports of the European Commission in the framework of
the Stabilisation and Association process continue to note the adverse socio-
economic situation of the Roma minority.23 The report of 2006 suggested that
Albania further develop practical measures under the National Strategy and
plan financial resources for its full implementation (Commission Report,
2006, pp. 14). Reporting on implementation of the National Strategy in 2007,
the Commission acknowledges steps taken to improve housing, employment
and business opportunities for Roma and to organize vaccination campaigns.
However, the implementation is described as slow and fragmented with little
progress made in improving the situation of the Roma. The group continues
to face very difficult living conditions and discrimination, especially in the
areas of education, social protection, health care, housing and employment
(Commission Report, 2007, pp. 17). This is repeated in the Commission
report of 2008, which, however, also recognises some limited progress in
terms of measures taken by the government. Upon joining the Decade of
Roma Inclusion 2005–2015 in April 2008 Albania’s monitoring sector has
______________________________________________________________
been up-graded to a technical secretariat. Employing a member of the Roma
community among its staff will improve its capacity to monitor and coordi-
nate measures with other institutions (Commission Report, 2008, p. 17). The
AC notes that the full implementation of this Strategy is still lagging behind
as the authorities have not yet secured adequate funding and resources and
have not adequately involved the local authorities. Action should be taken to
assess more precisely the extent of the problem and develop performance
indicators to measure the progress achieved by the National Strategy (AC,
2008, para. 25).
Recently, a Commission of Assessment of projects proposals in the
Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Telecommunication approved pro-
jects by local units allocating funding to the municipalities/communes of
Tirana, Kuçova, Korça, Pojan, Bilisht, for reconstruction of buildings, im-
provement of services, of infrastructure and construction of new objects for
the Roma community in the value of lek 30 million (approx. € 230,769, Gov-
ernment of Albania, 2008, para. 27).
Conclusion
The adoption of the National Strategy for the Roma in 2003 and the official
acknowledgement of the Egyptian community by the government since 2005
have been among the main developments in Albania. Since the first regular
Commission Report of 2002 and the entry into force of the Framework Con-
vention for the Protection of National Minorities for Albania in 2000 steps
were undertaken towards achieving a higher degree of social inclusion of the
Roma and Egyptian minorities.
The National Strategy is an impressive document, which refers to a
wide range of goals to be achieved, and consequently creates a heavy work-
load for the administrative authorities. However, the National Strategy is
short of funding. Additionally, the National Strategy has been criticized for
lacking a human rights-based approach, anti-discrimination focus and com-
munity empowerment measures as well as for a weak design of the monitor-
ing and evaluation components (UNDP Albania, 2006, p. 7).
In addition to the National Strategy, sublegal acts have been issued by
the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Labour, Social
Affairs and Equal Opportunities to further the integration of the Roma and
Egyptian communities, some of which allow measures of positive discrimina-
tion or affirmative action regarding inter alia members of the Roma and
Egyptian minorities. In the field of education many initiatives have been
taken by the Ministry of Education and Science. However, it has been noted
that Roma communities have not always been adequately involved and for
many families the costs of school materials other than textbooks, which are
given for free, remain prohibitive (ECRI, 2004, para. 57). Furthermore, as the
number of Roma children in schools has not substantially increased and the
______________________________________________________________
literacy rate of the Roma population remains low, barriers, such as poverty,
language difficulties, temporary migration and discrimination, prevail
(Commission, 2007, p. 16).
Similarly, in the area of employment and social affairs many sublegal
acts have been adopted, which, however, seem to have been implemented
only in part. It is certainly an important sign that the recently adopted Sec-
toral Employment Strategy 2007–2013 and the National Strategy for Gender
Equality and Domestic Violence 2007–2010 refer explicitly to the Roma and
Egyptian communities, even though they largely seem to repeat provisions of
existing sublegal acts. Nevertheless, in my view such reference shows the
political priority accorded to this issue by the government and is essential in
terms of further increasing awareness and fostering implementation of the
National Strategy.
The initiatives taken by the ministries and the government certainly
represent an important step and show that the government is active in imple-
menting the National Strategy. At the same time, there is a need of a more
comprehensive and systematic approach, which would cover larger sections
of the Roma and Egyptian communities. Moreover, women certainly repre-
sent the weakest segment of society and therefore must be protected and
promoted most. Nevertheless, employment promotion should be further ex-
tended to cover sizable groups of unemployed male Roma jobseekers, so as
to broaden the concept of positive discrimination or affirmative action to
(ethnic) minority protection in general. To this end, the legislator may even
consider providing explicit reference to the Roma and also the Egyptian
community in the Constitution, like this is done e.g. in the Constitutions of
Slovenia (Art. 65), Kosovo (e.g. Art. 64) and Macedonia (Art. 78, para. 2)
and a minority protection law.
In the context of European integration, the National Plan for the Im-
plementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 2007–2012
considers as a priority the full implementation of the National Strategy, aim-
ing to improve living conditions, education and employment of the Roma
community through programmes of economic assistance as well as public
and private services of social care. It provides as a short and medium-term
priority for the period 2007–2009 the implementation of the National Strat-
egy as part of the government strategy to fight poverty and social exclusion.
To this respect, in the short-term the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and
Equal Opportunities is to conduct a large number of implementing activi-
ties.24 The State Committee for Minorities is likewise to organize a roundta-
ble about the implementation of the measures foreseen in the National Strat-
egy (Ministry of European Integration, 2007, p. 60). Moreover, in the me-
dium-term the adoption of a draft law on the rights and freedoms of the na-
tional minorities and the teaching of the mother tongue of the national mi-
norities entirely is in conformity with the Framework Convention for Na-
______________________________________________________________
tional Minorities is foreseen (ibid.). However, it seems questionable, if this
draft law will include the Roma and Egyptian communities, considering that
the government does not list linguistic minorities among national minorities
so far.
In the long-term 2011–2012, a draft law on census including an ethnic
and linguistic self-declaration of the citizens is to be adopted and a roundta-
ble on the results of the monitoring of the National Strategy to be organized
(ibid.). If the many implementing activities foreseen in the National Plan as
short-term priorities are really carried out, the living conditions of the Roma
minority will certainly be improved. Unless sufficient funding is provided,
social inclusion of the Roma and Egyptian minorities will remain a long-term
issue. Rather than leading to visible results in the near future implementation
might still be a matter of future developments/policymakers. In addition to an
increase in funds, much work still needs to be done at the level of local gov-
ernment. If the National Strategy is to reach a larger number of the Roma and
Egyptian population in Albania implementation needs to take place closer to
these communities.
Endnotes
1 It builds on and expands research conducted for Access to Education,

Training and Employment of Ethnic Minorities in the Western Balkans.
Country Report Albania, Eurac/European Training Foundation, January
2006, 52 pp, unpublished report. Developments were considered up to March
2008 and updated in April 2009.
2 However, implementing legislation exists only with regard to tuition of the
Greek and Macedonian minorities, but not for the Montenegrin minority
(AHC, 2000, p. 61).
3 Reportedly, the recognition followed a consultation with experts and re-
searchers on minority issues from state authorities and the Academy of
Sciencies in 2003 (Second Report submitted by Albania, 2007, p. 81).
4 The FCNM entered into force for Albania on 1. January 2000. Cf.
http://www.coe.int. It has constitutional rank in the Albanian legal system
(see Art. 116, Art. 122, para.s 1 and 2 of the Constitution).
5 As of April 2009 Albania has not ratified the European Charter for Re-
gional or Minority Languages, which includes also non-territorial languages
– though in a limited application of the Charter articles - and explicitly men-
tions Romani in its Explanatory Report (para. 36) (Bakker, Rooker, 2001, p.
14).
6 It dealt only with the Roma, who were distinguished into four main tribes:
Kallbuxhinj (residing predominantly in the townships of Tirana, Elbasani,
Pogradeci, Korça, Bilishti, Gjirokastra, Saranda); Meçkare (with the domicile
______________________________________________________________
in Lushnja, Fieri, Vlora); scattered Kurtofet; and nomadic Cergaret (Report

submitted by Albania, 2001, p. 15).
7 A study by INSTAT of 2003 did not include the Roma minority, because it
was based on the 1989 census, in which the minority had been included in the
category of ‘others’ that numbered 479 members (INSTAT, 2005, ERRC,
1997, p. 89). Censuses from 1961 and 1970 had counted 10,000 and 50,000
Roma (cited in Z. Bárány, 2002, p. 126). Reportedly, the Roma had been first
registered in a census of 1522-23, when about 1270 people were estimated to
live in 374 camp-fires (CEDIME-SE, 2000, p. 7).
8 However, for several reasons, such as a small household survey, the data is
not representative (de Soto, Beddies, Gëdeshi, 2002, p. xi).
9 Cf. http://vulnerability.undp.sk (accessed 26 July 2008).
10 Data by UNDP suggests a higher literacy rate for Roma, i.e. 65 per cent
for ages 15–24 and 75-79 per cent for ages 25–44, with rates for females
about 10 per cent lower than those for males (ibid).
11 Meçkars are an exception: Even though they travel more often, their chil-
dren complete more years of school and have lower illiteracy rates (ibid., p.
59).
12 The National Strategy for Children adopted by CoM Decision No. 368,
dated 31/05/2005, also deals with Roma Children.
13 In contrast to orders, instructions only have explanatory character and
explain in detail all provisions of laws or decisions of the Council of Minis-
ters (Art. 128 (ç) and (d) of Law No. 9000, dated 30.1.2003 on the organisa-
tion and functioning of the Council of Ministers).
14 Besides initiatives of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal
Opportunities (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities,
2007, pp. 27), NGOs (Ministry of Work and Social Services, Directorate of
Social Services, 2004), the community maintains the private schools ‘Vakthi
Sheme’ (Children’s Human Rights Center of Albania, 2000, p. 13).
15 They are based on the Strategy for Employment and Vocational Training,
adopted by CoM Decision No. 67, dated 10/01/2003, which builds on the
National Strategy for Economic and Social Development (Government of
Albania, 2001).
16 Overall, while aiming to prevent illegal employment practices, the re-
quirements seem to demand quite a lot of effort and time from employers.
17 Art. 5 (c) of this law defines inter alia special groups that wish profes-
sional reintegration as persons with disabilities, mothers with many children,
persons under 18 years, long-term unemployed persons, persons from fami-
lies who live below the poverty line and any other category defined in a deci-
sion of the Council of Ministers. In addition, Instruction No. 2222, dated
31/10/2002, of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs “On counselling
______________________________________________________________
and orientation in the vocational training” provides that special attention

should be paid to the vocational training of special groups as defined by law
or sublegal acts (Point 6).
18 The use of promotion policies for companies that employ Roma is fore-
seen, which aims at i) the possibility of financing companies with employers
and employees from the Roma community, ii) fiscal facilitation policies for
those companies that create jobs for Roma, iii) material support, support
relating to work environment, financial support and support regarding human
resources for those businesses that deal with traditional products of the Roma
community.
19 The situation of the Roma and Egyptian population is also dealt with in
the Regional Development Strategies of 2005. See for the strategies at
http://www.undp.org.al (accessed 26 July 2008).
20 Especially women and girls with disabilities, of migrant background or
from rural areas and Roma in the age groups of 18–23 and 37-45 are noted to
be subjected to violence more frequently (National Strategy for Gender
Equality and Domestic Violence 2007-2010, 2007).
21 See Order No. 213/2, dated 22.6.2004, of the Minister of Labour and So-
cial Affairs.
22 Another sum reported is 27 million USD;
http://www.info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/35479/
Prez1%20Albania.ppt (accessed 26 July 2008).
23 The EC report states that the socio-economic situation of the Roma re-
mained clearly below acceptable standards and requested that concrete plans
to support this community be implemented (Commission Report, 2001, p.
11). The 2005 report notes that, despite some measures under the National
Strategy, both, the Roma and the Egyptian communities continue to suffer
prejudice and discrimination in a number of societal settings; especially in
education, professional training and employment (Commission Report, 2005,
p. 21). The report of the following year indicates that 78 per cent of the Roma
population live in poverty and 39 per cent in extreme poverty; only 12 per
cent were enrolled in secondary school, compared to the national average of
81 per cent (Commission Report, 2006, pp. 14).
24 A second cycle of meetings related to implementation in the regions, an
interministerial working group to organize, coordinate, monitor and imple-
ment the National Strategy, a roundtable about its implementation, a project
in 2007 with UNICEF, the Ministry of Education and Science and Save the
Children in three zones with Roma population about registration in school,
pre-school access, parents’ advising, increase of teachers’ capacity to deal
with marginalized children, data collection about Roma children within and
outside the education system, strengthening the capacities of the monitoring
______________________________________________________________
sector, a project to develop monitoring indicators and training of the sector

and the interministerial working group, improvement of the living conditions
of the Roma community and a project in 2007-2009 about the implementa-
tion of the National Strategy with UNDP and many other organisations (Min-
istry of European Integration, 2007, p. 60).
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______________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________
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Political Community, Political Institutions and Minority
Politics in Slovakia 1998–2006
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann
The chapter analyses change and continuity in the concept and

practices of the Slovak political community regarding the
country’s largest ethnic minority, the Magyars. Focusing on
the two subsequent legislative periods between 1998 and 2006
with Magyar participation in government, minority inclusion
into the identity of the political community, minority
representation in the institutional framework and their
consideration in the political decision-making are examined.
As is argued, selective responsiveness to minority demands has
not led to a broadened understanding of community. Instead,
different level political institutions have helped stabilise the
established unequal majority-minority relations regarding
minority participation in politics and society.
Introduction
Ethnic division of the political community has been identified as an important
factor for conflict and instability in ethnically or culturally heterogeneous
societies (Horowitz, 1993). Integrating their political community is therefore
a major challenge for these countries. While formal citizenship and formal
participation in decision-making processes (e.g. via parliamentary representa-
tion) have been identified necessary premises, they are not sufficient for the
inclusion of non-dominant ethnic groups into the political community (ibid.).
For example, full exertion of citizenship rights and obligations is constrained
when it is linked to primordial belonging to a particular group. Participation
can be limited when it is conditioned on criteria set by one group alone. Such
constraints constitute fundamental aspects of ethnically divided societies and
are reflected in their institutional settings. A change of membership criteria or
related political institutions that have been derived from a restrictive concept
of political community thereby provides a possible opportunity to overcome
ethnic division.
As I argue in this paper, such change in fundamental institutions is
embedded in the shift in conflict or power constellations (Thelen and
Steinmo, 1992). Changes in power relations, themselves potentially reflecting
transformation of the underlying conflict, constitute an interesting starting
point to inquire developments in the political community. Slovakia represents
a case in point in this respect. Although ethnicity does not constitute the only
dividing line, the country features aspects of an ethnically divided society:
Politics have been shaped and dominated by the Slovak majority, largely
176 Minority Politics in Slovakia
______________________________________________________________
disregarding the approximately 14 per cent of the citizenry belonging to an
ethnic minority, with the Magyars constituting 9.7 per cent of the population
alone.1 The linkage of citizenship to Slovak language and culture as well as
exclusive political practices constrains minority participation in political
processes (Csergı, 2007).2 In the 1998 elections, the political scenery
changed, when a nationalist government lost its majority in parliament and
was replaced by a politically broad coalition that, besides ethnic Slovak par-
ties also comprised of the Hungarian Coalition Party (MKP). This article
investigates to what extent the inclusion of the MKP into government helped
form a new, more inclusive consensus on political community in Slovakia.
Drawing on theoretical frameworks that examine the structure and role
of institutions, I analyze the regulation and organization of minority politics
in Slovakia 1998–2006. Central to the analysis is the question of reinforce-
ment or reinterpretation of institutions that underlie and constitute the politi-
cal community. Did minority participation in government foster their partici-
pation in the community in general? Has political interaction between major-
ity and minority political actors led to a new understanding of membership in
the political community, integrating both minority and majority demands? To
answer these questions, I will take the following steps: the theoretical section
elaborates on the relation of political community and institutions at three
conceptual levels, including identity, rules and policies. Whereas at the level
of identity the fundamental “we” of a political community is defined, the
level of rules provides for the institutional framework of governance. The
level of policies relates to the responsiveness to minority demands as well as
processes of agenda-setting and decision-making (Juviler and Stroschein,
1999). In the second part I examine the institutionalization of political com-
munity at these analytical levels in the case study. In the final section I return
to the initial question, relating the trajectories of the political community
institutions to their origins, and to the political actors’ preferences as ex-
pressed in their interaction with the institutions.
1. Institutionalizing the Political Community

Central to political integration is the concept of political community that
shapes and reflects the institutions of a political system. In this paper I draw
upon the reformulation of political community by Peter Juviler and Sherill
Stroschein (1999), who claim to integrate into a coherent comparative frame
“aspects of political development, stability, democratic state-building, public
participation, and their relation to the inclusion and exclusion of various
groups regarding the equality of rights and obligations” (p. 436). I briefly
present their argument which aims at analyzing group conflicts within states.
Political community denotes the broad range of people eligible for tak-
ing part in decision-making processes over community issues. This includes
all persons in a given territory “in and out of government who recognize the
______________________________________________________________
government as the legitimate decision maker […], generally comply with its
decisions, and cooperate toward shared purposes” (ibid., p. 438). Accord-
ingly, government, political rules and mechanisms of resource distribution
form only a part of the political community. Political community members
outside government sustain the community through compliance and loyalty,
or act as corrective and supportive elements through engagement in lobbying
or civil society activism (ibid.).
At the core of Juviler and Stroschein’s concept is the link of political
community to its “consensus” on institutions of decision-making and conflict
resolution, rights, obligations and objectives, and to the commitment to these
purposes and rules on the part of its members. Essentially, political commu-
nity exists if there is a consensus among persons or groups on such a com-
munity (ibid.). Moreover, as formal criteria for membership relates to the
consensus of those who are already members, criteria are likely to favour
them over non-members or establish exclusive membership requirements. By
the same token, legitimate participation in (re)formulating the consensus
depends on fulfilling membership criteria (ibid.).
Three preliminary conclusions can be derived from this definition.
First, those who do not share the consensus are not part of the community and
thus do not share an identity with other parts of the community. Second,
exclusion from essential rights or resources determines the position of their
group in relation to the core of the political community. And third, participa-
tion of the excluded and their representation in the institutions of a political
system is limited. Political community defined according to these principles
is based on shared identity, recurrence to regulatory institutions and access to
procedures of democratic governance, and corresponds directly with the
dimensions of Claus Offe’s “triple transition”: identity, institutions and rights
(Offe, 2004). Following his delineation, Juviler and Stroschein deploy three
levels of political institutions in which consensus becomes tangible: the po-
litical community’s fundamental identificational “we”; its institutional
framework; and the procedures of negotiating power and resource distribu-
tion.
At the first level, the most fundamental consensus of a community si-
multaneously constitutes its boundaries. This is formulated most clearly in
the state constitution. Furthermore, requirements for citizenship (based on
political/territorial criteria, primordial, identity/cultural prerequisites or a
mixture of any of these) define who belongs to the nation or political com-
munity (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). These institutions constitute the nor-
mative basis for further debates on membership and consensus of the com-
munity. In multicultural societies they are exclusive when they correspond
with the identity framework of one particular cultural group only, precluding
identity consensus with other groups. As the identity of the political commu-
nity represents the framework of reference for community building, exclusion
______________________________________________________________
from this consensus hence impacts on the chances for full inclusion into the
system of rules and rights, though it does not completely impede it.
The second level comprises the regulatory institutional framework of
rules, rights and obligations, as well as the organizational structure of the
political system. Though fundamental for membership, inclusion into the
identity framework of the community (first level) does not guarantee equal
inclusion into consensus formation on rules and rights. This is the case, for
example, when rules violate a first level multicultural identity agreement by
founding rights on culturally exclusive criteria. Governance, then, does not
represent a consensus of the members anymore, thus lacks legitimacy for
those who do or can not agree. On the other hand, exclusion at the first level
can be partially compensated by introducing institutions that allow for con-
sent of those formally excluded, thus providing for their inclusion into the
consensus-forming community. As rules and rights are important assets for
the future position of political actors in negotiating processes (Giddens,
1984), potentially, inclusion into the regulatory frame allows for redefining
the normative membership criteria over time.
At the third level, in day-to-day policies the distribution of political
power and economic resources is negotiated (Offe, 2004). Representing a
consensus of its members, political community is constituted by responding
to demands. Therefore, responsiveness to claims and criticism of those ex-
cluded constitutes one option for changing political community. In this proc-
ess, non-members can call upon the institutions to redistribute available re-
sources and recast consensus on the community’s identity. In this paper,
however, I do not focus on the institutional patterns of interaction between
political actors, but rather analyze how, if at all, they have used the given
institutionalized structures of Slovak political community for engaging in
majority-minority consensus formation.
Clearly, political community includes all three levels of identity, regu-
lation and procedures. Juviler and Stroschein, however, have not further de-
veloped their concept to explain how the three levels interrelate. For prelimi-
nary usage in this paper I suggest understanding them as different, though
closely related institutions. While membership in the political community
requires inclusion at all levels by definition, exclusion from one or two does
not preclude participation in political processes completely. Interrelation and
interaction of institutions, I argue, make the change of one institution possible
through change in another related institution. This argument will be further
elaborated in the following section.
Juviler and Stroschein provide for a coherent concept of political
community and give some clues to its prerequisites as well as its relationship
to the development of political entities. However, they do not explain how
political community is established in the first place and how it develops.
Understanding political community as multi-layered set of institutions, I draw
______________________________________________________________
upon frameworks that analyze origins and dynamics of institutions. In a nut-
shell, institutions are conceptualised as constituting power constellations and
interests of political actors, as well as shaping the dynamics of political and
social developments (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). In turn, institutions repre-
sent structural features of conflicts and negotiation between social groups.
While these features emphasize the structuring aspects of institutions, this is
not to say that agents only fulfil requirements or purposes of institutions.
Rather, it is in the agents’ institutionalized practices that social conflicts be-
come tangible. These practices, essentially, are based on repeated or modified
interpretations of societal structures through the agents (Emirbayer and
Mische, 1996). I now briefly revisit the relation of institutions, agency, and
change.
In general, social and political institutions structure group relations as
well as political agency (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). They denote sets of
formalized “rules stipulating expected behavior and ‘ruling out’ behavior
deemed to be undesirable” (Streek and Thelen, 2005, pp. 12–13). They are
distinguished from informal rules, such as social conventions, by their legiti-
mate and obligatory character. This is to say that their enforcement can be
claimed by third party actors or society as a whole and non-compliance with
institutions can be sanctioned morally, socially or juridically (ibid.). Like-
wise, the political institutions that are in focus here pose expectations of
obedience, contribution or assimilation to the ruled regarding their behaviour
in interaction with or within the political community. However, institutions
do not reflect one-way relations. Instead, they are understood as ruling or-
ganizations in which rule makers and rule takers interact (ibid.). This notion
of interagency between institutions and social actors is crucial. Origins, dy-
namics and, decisively, change of institutions are embedded in such proc-
esses of interaction.
Emphasizing the origins of institutions as set in particular historical
conflicts, Thelen and Steinmo (1992) stress that institutions are constituted by
agents negotiating their relations. In this respect, social conflicts as well as
power constellations are inherent to institutions. In institutionalizing proc-
esses agents put into practice their social roles and identities. By compliance
with expectations and following rules, they perpetuate the social systems,
which also includes politics (Giddens, 1984). That is to say, social roles and
identities are by no means determining agency, but do so in interplay with the
institutions. Essentially, institutions are embedded in the conflicting experi-
ences, assumptions and interests of agents who are in turn shaped by institu-
tions and power configurations. They are not direct tools for particular indi-
viduals’ uni-dimensional interests or direct functions of structural relations.
On this note, March and Olsen (1996) describe the multiplicity of in-
stitutions and social structures as co-evolving. In this reciprocal development,
at any point in time there is an array of potential directions, involving main-
______________________________________________________________
tenance or shift of the institutional setting. However, alternatives of devel-
opment are not arbitrary, nor do they necessarily reflect environmental de-
mands for change or quick adaptations to functional outcomes. Rather, insti-
tutional analysis requires particular attention to the origins and trajectories of
these “enduring legacies of political struggles” (Thelen, 1999, p. 388). These
struggles are transformed into lasting institutions and path dependent patterns
through what Thelen calls “feedback effects”. Shaped by institutions, actors
adopt strategies that both reflect and solidify the logic of the system, and
thereby confirm the power constellation on the basis of which the institutions
had been established (Thelen, 1999).
The feedback effects provide for the stability of institutions. Change,
then, is possible, when the foundations of a particular institution are shaken,
resulting in shifts of institutional logics that in turn impact on social actors’
choices. Correspondingly, agency is understood as constant interpretation of
their environments by social actors, in order to adjust to institutional expecta-
tions. Agents engage with the institutions in a triadic way, employing habits,
evaluations of present situations and alternatives, as well as aspirations and
projections of future developments. Thus they reflect, reproduce or reshape
the institutions (Emirbayer and Mische, 1996). Decisively, these “historical”
agents have the ability to criticize, reinterpret, or justify and perpetuate pat-
terns of relations as well as the frameworks of interpretation.
Streek and Thelen argue that as rules are never self-evident in their
meaning, they have to be reinterpreted constantly (2005). This facilitates
shifts in emphasis or interpretations, while vagueness can evoke creative
interpretations. New challenges can redirect actors’ preferences towards new
purposes, such as when institutional environments or power relations change.
Feedback effects generate adaptation processes and change within institutions
in the very process of securing institutional stability. For the purpose of this
paper, therefore, the identification of potential shifts in the concept of politi-
cal community requires the examination of trajectories in the community’s
political institutions, their interpretations and re-formulations. Change in
ethnic relations within a section of social system can shake those institutions
that structure society according to ethnic belonging (Thelen, 1999). In what
follows, I interpret the inclusion into government of the Hungarian Coalition
Party as contradicting the ethnically exclusive consensus of the political
community. This, I suggest, caused the need for reformulating the criteria for
political membership and the members’ consensus.
2. Institutionalizing the Nationalist Principle

In the aftermath of the “Velvet Revolution”, Slovakia faced the challenge of
building a new political community. As will be argued in this section, in the
early 1990s a nationalist principle was established and henceforth shaped the
developing institutional frame. By the end of the 1990s the dominant institu-
______________________________________________________________
tionalized logic of Slovak privilege in a multicultural setting and semi-
authoritarian rule, however, came into conflict with latent institutions of civic
governance and aspirations of democratic state-hood. The opportunity win-
dow of parliamentary elections in 1998 opened to change power relations to
the benefit of forces drawing from non-nationalist institutional resources.
This change, I conclude, held the chance for reinterpretation of the political
community under new auspices.
The Slovak political elite had emphasized its perception of relative
exclusion from the Czech-Slovak political community during common state-
hood for decades. In the early 1990s, it strived for more autonomy and sover-
eignty, initially within a common framework with the Czech lands, later as a
separate nation-state (Ramet, 1994). Simultaneously, the democratization of
the late 1980s – early 1990s had led to the creation of an array of cultural
organizations by the different ethnic groups inhabiting Slovakia, including
the Slovaks. The newly formulated demands and identities posed the chal-
lenge of integrating these diverse groups into one community.
In the struggle for a new consensus three strands emerged that since
then have shaped Slovakia’s institutional development. They consist of a
nationalist, a moderate and a pluralist concept of political community. How-
ever, these are not easily assigned to political parties but rather represent
tendencies in politics (Csergı, 2007). The nationalist principle has dominated
political thought far beyond parties that usually count as nationalist. Simulta-
neously, parts of the moderate camp support liberal concepts of Slovakia as a
civic nation. Pluralist concepts, almost exclusively represented by the Magyar
camp, encompass a broad range of ideas, from loose demands for recognition
of minorities as legitimate political actors to concepts of co-nation and equal
status of majority and minority groups (ibid.).
Despite initial common activity in the Public Against Violence
movement that aimed at overcoming Czech-Slovak Communism, main lines
of disagreement arose between representatives of the Slovak and Czech (until
the split), and the Slovak and Magyar groups. While the conflicts were by no
means ethnic in principle, with occurrence and spreading of the Slovak self-
determination myth politics were ethnicized (Nedelsky, 2003). First signs of
institutionalizing the ethnic principle as guiding Slovak state politics ap-
peared in 1990 and 1992 with the adoption of the Official Language Law and
the Slovak Constitution. Both documents were read by observers and politi-
cians as aimed not only against Czech domination, but also against the other
ethnic groups living in Slovakia, particularly the Magyars (Daftary and Gál,
2003). Over the 1990s this perspective was corroborated by the development
of multiple nationalisms against external and internal forces. These national-
isms merged into a coherent view that stressed the privilege of “Slovakness”
in the design of Slovakia’s society and its institutions (Deegan-Krause,
2004). Ex-post justification of the split of the federation and a problematic
______________________________________________________________
historical legacy of conflict fed into this nationalism. This development si-
multaneously fostered the exclusion of “non-Slovaks” from political commu-
nity (Harris, 2002).
The process of institutionalizing the nationalist principle continued in
many fields of politics over the course of the 1990s. Measures implemented
to protect and develop the state language were to the disadvantage of minor-
ity languages and cultural rights of non-dominant groups, causing protests
both on the ground and in parliament by members of the Magyar minority
(Langman, 2002). However, some of the means aimed at securing Slovakness
had an impact not only on ethnic minorities, but also on political opponents
of the Mečiar government. The Protection of the Republic Law in 1996
helped the government label most forms of disagreement with its politics as
anti-Slovak (Nedelsky, 2003). Under the harshening anti-opposition politics
of the Mečiar government the influence of non-governmental organizations
and think tanks promoting liberal ideas on the opposition parties as well as on
society grew (Pridham, 2002). It was these very developments that strength-
ened ties between the opposition parties, and eventually enabled them to
reinforce the latent institutional resources of non-nationalist discourse.
Needless to say, Slovak opposition parties cannot all be labelled lib-
eral regarding their views on ethnic majority-minority-relations. Still, they
had shown inclination to improving these relations and even demonstrated
that (silent) cooperation between Slovak moderates and Magyar pluralists
was possible (Csergı, 2007).3 By revoking a number of minority discriminat-
ing measures of the Mečiar government, during their interim government in
1994 moderate parties supported minority cultural rights in the private
sphere. Despite this, they have not worked actively towards the abrogation of
the emphasis on Slovakness. Instead, they supported it – for example in the
adoption of the 1995 State Language Law, although this was under strong
nationalist pressure (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Political activists who are as-
signed to the moderate camp have in many instances confirmed majority-
minority-relations through their decisions or statements (ibid.). That is to say,
the broad moderate camp was dominated by the idea of Slovak privilege and
favoured the design of political community as civic, though under Slovak
leadership (Nedelsky, 2003).
Apart from the civic principle, opposition forces were able to reinforce
another resource present in Slovak political discourse. Over the 1990s, in
Slovakia the desire grew to join the European Union (EU). This was shared
by the Mečiar government (Csergı, 2007). However, EU accession require-
ments were in conflict with the nationalist and semi-authoritarian logics of
the government. Consequently, the strong opposition parties seemed to be
more apt to fulfil EU criteria and benefited from the rise of formerly subordi-
nate institutions (Pridham, 2008). Moreover, the start of EU negotiations on
Slovakia’s accession was conditioned on significantly improved minority
______________________________________________________________
politics. This was the main reason for the MKP’s inclusion into government
and represented an important step for Slovakia’s integration with Europe
(Pridham, 2002). The incoherence of political institutions and the need to
adjust to challenges from the environment facilitated the strategic opening of
the institutional setting (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).
The momentum of the 1998 parliamentary elections allowed activat-
ing latent institutional resources of political liberalism. During coalition talks,
moderate and pluralist forces mobilized civic-liberal institutions for establish-
ing a multicultural government. This opened the setting for debating, redefin-
ing or reinforcing the concept of political community.
3. Normative Consensus? Identity Institutions of the Slovak State

The identity of a political community is put into record in its fundamental
artefacts, such as a state constitution (Juviler and Stroschein, 1999). It deter-
mines the relationship between citizenry and the state; furthermore it shapes
subsequent institution-building and reflects the results of decision-making
processes. Therefore, the consensus of the political community is the agree-
ment of those who participate in the negotiations that lead to its
(re)formulation. As suggested in the theoretical section, inclusion into the
community is provided, when the citizen is accepted to participate in the
decision-making following her agreement on the rules, regulations, and pur-
poses of the community. As this paper focuses on citizens as belonging to
different ethnic groups, the consensus in question is about group inclusion. A
consensus most inclusive, then, would not privilege one group over the oth-
ers, while a most exclusive consensus would represent the agreement within
one group alone for its single benefit.4
The Slovak constitution is both the identificational foundation of the
Slovak political community and already the outcome of a decision-making
process which is being reinterpreted and potentially reinforced over time. It
defines the relation between state and citizen. The Slovak constitution distin-
guishes between ethnic groups, ascribing different roles to them and accept-
ing an exclusive understanding of political community. Simultaneously, it
guarantees same rights and non-discrimination against any citizen on the
basis of ethnic (or other) affiliation. Furthermore, the constitution recognizes
ethnic minorities as groups with particular status and provides certain consti-
tutional laws to secure their specific rights. These constitutional rights, all to
be determined by law, in general guarantee mother-tongue education, use of
minority language in dealings with authorities, and the “right to participate in
the solution of affairs concerning national minorities and ethnic groups”
(Ùstava, 1992). The partly contradictory and vaguely defined articles referred
to here leave ample space for interpretation. While during the 1990s the na-
tionalist interpretation prevailed, the new government has embarked on form-
ing a new consensus on state-society relations.
______________________________________________________________
The preamble of the constitution defines the state-founding commu-
nity as the Slovak nation based on the idea of self-determination. The nation
is distinguished from other national minorities and ethnic groups. While the
latter are included into the citizenry that is denoted the constitution’s sover-
eign, they are not part of the state-bearing nation. This important difference is
emphasized by Nedelsky (2003). In analyzing Slovak political elite positions
on the terms of nation and nationality she elucidates the relation of the state-
forming nation and the state. The state, in the Slovak interpretation, is the
means of a nation to realise its “right to self-determination”. Nationalities
lack this right, as in this perspective they already “own” a state elsewhere,
where they can realize their sovereignty as a nation (ibid.).
This interpretation of the Slovak constitution defines the citizenry as
divided into two classes of citizens. While the nation as state-owner features
strong relations with the state, nationalities hold weaker ties to it, missing the
right to realize national ambitions through it. Distinguishing the state-founder
and the citizenry, the preamble establishes a power relation between the na-
tion and the citizenry: The former is in the position to grant rights to the latter
which, however, are never secure. As students of minority rights in Slovakia
have observed, the unequal distinction between nation and nationalities has
shaped legislation and policies in the country up until today (e.g. Csergı,
2007).
In order to evaluate the inclusiveness of the Slovak interpretation of
political community the understanding of “nation” needs clarification. The
constitution delineates minority group rights in the fields of language, cul-
ture, and education. Slovak dominance is secured by emphasizing the role of
Slovak as state language. Moreover, the constitution is formulated in the
“spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of the
Great Moravian Empire” (Ùstava, 1992). Constituting salient elements of the
nation’s sovereignty, language and culture are key distinguishing features of
the nation from other nationalities. Slovak language, seen as most important
cultural asset of the nation, is closely linked to Slovak national sovereignty
over the state territory (Csergı, 2007). This reasoning is reinforced in the
body of the constitution which states that minority rights are not to “jeopard-
ise the sovereignty of the Slovak state, the integrity of its territory or of other
inhabitants of Slovakia” (Ùstava, 1992). Purporting to protect the Slovak
nation from its potential “renegade” co-citizens, this passage implies a threat
emendating from ethnic minorities. Considering the linkage between state,
nation and language, in this sense speaking the state language downright
became a citizen’s duty in the rhetoric of nationalist politicians.
While this logic was applied in Slovak politics over the 1990s, it was
not without alternatives. After it had been challenged by the pluralists and
liberals or moderates already in the early and mid-1990s, the new govern-
ment of 1998 re-launched a debate on the sovereign (Csergı, 2007). Two
______________________________________________________________
versions of pluralist argument were put forward in the debate. Parts of the
Magyar representatives favoured the cooperation along political rather than
ethnic lines according to a liberal principle, an argument backed up by Slovak
liberals. Others argued for the unification of Magyar political community and
the recognition of the Magyar minority as a partner-nation (ibid.). Both ar-
guments, however, involved the demand for inclusion into the state-founding
entity. During constitutional debate 2000/2001, the MKP supported a new
interpretation of the constitution, following up the liberal pluralist interpreta-
tion. The party suggested to replace the wording “we, the Slovak nation” by
the more inclusive, and according to its promoters more adequate regarding
Slovakia’s ethnic heterogeneity “we, citizens of the Slovak Republic”.
The implications of the proposal, however, go beyond mere symbolic
recognition. The salience of cultural (including language) self-expression for
the ethnic minorities in the country would solidify demands for a new, multi-
cultural consensus rather than solely express acceptance of multicultural
reality. Recognition of the minorities as co-founding elements of the state,
and thus as its “owners”, requires significant changes in the institutional
setting, which threatens the Slovak’s upper hand in the political community.
It is therefore not surprising that the MKP proposal was not accepted in par-
liament by other than MKP and Democratic Party parliamentarians in 2001
(Dostál, 2002).
To conclude, the relation between state and society is defined by
strong cultural components. The constitution clearly distinguishes the state-
forming cultural nation from other cultural groups, establishing a strong tie
between the state and its “nation”, while rejecting this status for national
minorities on basis of the self-determination argument. This nationalist con-
cept of political community continued to prevail under moderate-pluralist
regime. Despite the preparedness of the Slovak moderates to cooperate with
the MKP in government, their willingness did not include the acceptance of
Magyars and other minorities as equally constituting part of a Slovak civic
nation.
The fundamental identity consensus in Slovakia, hence, neither relies
on the approval of minority fellow citizens, nor does it incorporate minority
demands in order to represent an inclusive consensus that can claim legiti-
macy for minorities. However, inclusion into the state-founding nation and
thus political community is basically possible. Depending on the respective
principle shaping the consensus (ethnic nationalist or civic-nationalist), this
requires a stricter or weaker form of cultural and language assimilation
among the minority groups.
4. Rules of the Game: Regulatory Institutions

Whereas the political community’s boundaries are defined in the identity
consensus, the community is effectuated in the regulatory framework, or
______________________________________________________________
rules of the system. Rules are conceptualized here as the publicly fixed codi-
fications that define how power and economic resources are to be activated.
They include laws and other sets of codification, as well as formal organiza-
tions of the political system and its artefacts. Rules regulate the relations
between state and society, establish, maintain and modify social order.
Though shaped by the normative identity frame, rules are not fixed by it.
They constitute institutions in their own right, representing “imperfect” inter-
pretations of the identity framework through social and political actors. Each
rule, then, reflects a unique development of the environment’s and other
institutions’ influence on actors’ preferences. Consequently, exclusion from
membership at the identity level not necessarily precludes agents from par-
ticipation in constituting the rules of state-society relations (Juviler and Stro-
schein, 1999). That is to say that political integration could be established
through the regulatory system, while exclusion from membership remained
merely symbolic.
Three aspects of minority inclusion into the regulatory framework of
the political community will be analyzed in this section. Institutionalized
regulations that support minority participation represent a means to facilitate
their active inclusion into consensus formation. Hence, first, provisions for
minority involvement into decision-making are examined. Second, formal
inclusion constitutes only one necessary aspect of participation, as citizenship
is cultural-linguistically defined. Therefore, provisions for including minority
cultures and languages into the public framework are analyzed. Third, as
regulations may vary at different levels of political organization the regula-
tory setting is examined with regard to specific minority provisions at the
regional and municipality levels.
Participation through Governmental Representation?
The framework regulating the relations between national minorities and the
state as well as the majority society in Slovakia is ambivalent, as no general
or coherent minority legislation exists. The Slovak constitution guarantees
fundamental human rights in line with international agreements. Addition-
ally, national minorities and ethnic groups have the right for cultural group
development, including association, establishing educational and cultural
institutions, education in their mother tongue, use of minority languages in
dealings with the authorities, and distributing and receiving information in
minority languages. Furthermore, minorities have the constitutional right to
“participate in the solution of affairs concerning national minorities and eth-
nic groups” (Ùstava, 1992). However, most of these rights are not further
defined by law, leaving the situation for minorities vague and open to inter-
pretation by the respective governments. Moreover, as no general minority
law is in place that would define the relation between state and minority
______________________________________________________________
groups more clearly, the situation of minorities in Slovakia is determined by a
number of single laws, institutional and organizational structures. These form
the opportunities for linguistic and cultural group development as well as for
minority participation at the national, regional and local levels.
Minority group advocacy in political processes at the national level
primarily depends on political representation due to high regional concentra-
tion and strong group identity of the Magyars. Due to this strength, the MKP
gained 15 out of 150 parliamentary seats in 1998, and could raise their share
to 20 seats in 2002. As part of government, the MKP received three minis-
tries, including one of the two positions of Deputy Prime Minister. While no
measures of affirmative action have been introduced, the Dzurinda govern-
ment launched several posts with clear responsibility for questions of minor-
ity rights: in 1999 the Deputy Prime Minister for Minorities and Regional
Development, the government committee and cabinet’s section for Human
Rights and Minorities, and in 2002 also the Ombudsman for the Protection of
Human and Civil rights. Furthermore, in the ministries of education and cul-
ture operate sections for minority culture and minority education respec-
tively. Though not provided with portfolio, these institutions were intended to
fulfil advisory and coordinating functions, and they are also assigned the right
to initiate legislation proposals.
However, while the Deputy Prime Minister initiated several draft bills,
his success was limited. The Committee for minority rights, as governmental
institution, has not much space for autonomous activity; furthermore it was
not very active under the Dzurinda government.5 While these institutions
provide for some openness to minority demands, autonomous influence on
decision-making processes is limited by the governmental dominance in
them. Overall, ethnic minorities in Slovakia do not have a secured place for
participating in community building. Political power sharing on basis of
ethnic belonging not only contradicts the nationalist principle, but is also not
in line with the liberal concept of community.
Inclusion by Cultural Integration?
The inclusion into decision-making is an important aspect of minority group

representation. However, it is neither necessarily sufficient, nor the only
means to provide for responsiveness towards minority claims. Consensus can,
in principle, also be established through an institutional structure that is open
to include and represent the different cultural groups’ demands. Taking into
account the nationalist interpretation of political community in Slovakia,
preconditions for a multicultural consensus in relation to the rules of political
community primarily refer to the regulation of the very elements that secure
one group’s privilege. As argued in the previous section, Slovak dominance
is expressed through the privilege of Slovak language, culture and historical
______________________________________________________________
myths. Comprehensive minority legislation in these fields would therefore
enhance the potential to form a practical consensus of minority and majority
groups.
In Slovakia minority cultural group rights are still largely determined
by the 1995 State Language Law (SLL), although parts of it were revoked by
the 1999 Minority Language Law (MLL) (Daftary and Gál, 2003). The SLL
is indebted to the principle of one state – one language, supporting and guar-
anteeing, according to its promoters, Slovak national culture, sovereignty,
societal functionability and social integration.6 The Law, while introduced as
a means to “establish the conditions for every citizen to be able to master the
[Slovak] language”, significantly restricts the use of minority languages in
Slovakia in both the public and the private spheres (Harlig, 1997).
Whilst it could be seen as integrative means to improve minority
members’ chances in the economic and social spheres, it is in conflict with
the claims of minority groups, who regard their language as important factor
to maintain cultural group identity (Langman, 2002). Before the introduction
of the MLL, the law prohibited minority language use in contacts with public
officials also in predominantly Hungarian-inhabited areas and extended even
into the relations between doctor and patient. Being in line with the general
language legislation of the 1990s the law reflects the nationalist attempt to
form Slovakia as a nation-state, by ousting most expressions of Slovakia’s
multicultural reality from public life and visibility (Nedelsky, 2003).7 The
Slovak-only policy has been evaluated both as in-line with, and contradicting
the constitution, given the provision for Slovak as the state language and for
minority language rights (Harlig, 1997).
While many of the measures which had constrained the socio-cultural
development of minority groups for years were revoked by the Dzurinda
government following the deposition of Mečiar, the SLL remained largely
intact (Dostál, 2000–2007). However, the MLL filled the legal vacuum that
had been established by the SLL in the field of minority language usage in
official contacts (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Decisively, with the MLL limited
provisions for multi-language acceptance re-entered the institutional frame-
work. It provides for the right to use minority languages in official contacts in
municipalities with significant minority population. However, the law is
problematic from the perspective of effective minority legislation in several
ways. First, the regulations for minority language usage do not apply to the
whole country, but are limited to municipalities where a respective minority
constitutes at least 20 per cent of the population. Second, the Law exhibits a
number of gaps, loop holes, contradictions and vague formulations which
make it hard to implement the law and are not apt to provide for greater re-
sponsiveness to minority demands (ibid.). Third, the scope of the MLL appli-
cation is limited to the field of communication with public authorities. It does
______________________________________________________________
not regulate the use of minority languages in the fields of education, culture,
broadcasting etc. (Dostál, 2001).8
Overall, the MLL does not provide a coherent strategy for minority
language use. Neither does it distinguish the role minorities can play in rela-
tion with the state and its founding nation. The law did not help define a
consensus between majority and minorities regarding the diverse linguistic
identities of the citizenry (Daftary and Gál, 2003). Also, it does not represent
an attempt to include the minorities’ perspectives into the formulation of the
rules of governance. As such, the MLL was criticized by the MKP, whose
proposals for amending the draft bill have, however, not been taken into
account (ibid.).
Instead, the law confirms the position of Slovak as the sole state lan-
guage. It thereby represents four arguments that have served to back up the
dominance of Slovakness citizenry (Nedelsky, 2003). First, in this reasoning,
Slovak dominance secures national sovereignty. Second, provisions for other
national groups’ rights enhance disintegration of society by fostering these
groups’ strive for national self-determination. Third, the Slovak language is
seen as tool for the smooth functioning of society. Fourth, Slovak language
and culture represent the civic tool for integrating the citizenry. By claiming
both, Slovak language and culture as national asset of the Slovak group as
well as Slovak language as “neutral” tool for integrating majority and minor-
ity groups, these rules reinforce the ambiguity of the identity consensus.
Consequently, they resemble a coalition of liberal and nationalist concepts of
political community, leaving no space for minority participation in society on
their own terms.
Despite these limitations the mere introduction of a Minority Lan-
guage Law should be interpreted in line with steps revoking the repressive
nationalist policies of the previous decade, allowing for more responsiveness
to minority cultural claims in governmental policies. Provisory acceptance of
such claims is underlined with the institutional frame for minority language
education. Mother tongue education is provided to a large share of minority
children in Slovakia (Langman, 2002). Furthermore, the Dzurinda govern-
ment founded a University that functions predominantly in Hungarian. It
offers education at three faculties, the pedagogical, theological and economic,
thus representing means for increasing social competitiveness of the Magyar
group in Slovakia.
The establishment of a “Hungarian University” in the less economi-
cally developed region of Southern Slovakia can be seen as the major success
of the MKP in government. Though some critics doubt the University’s com-
petitiveness, and others fear the isolation of the Magyar students from the
country’s Slovak-speaking academia, the MKP politicians could not see suf-
ficient means for guaranteeing Hungarian higher education in the already
existing, Slovak-dominated academic institutions (Dostál, 2003; 2005).
______________________________________________________________
However, decision-making authority in the field of education remains with
the national government, epitomised by conflicts over contents of the text-
books, historical narratives etc. taught at the Hungarian language schools
(Deets and Stroschein, 2005). Nonetheless, the “Hungarian University” al-
lows the continuous education in Hungarian language from nursery schools
to the highest possible level for Slovak Magyars. Decisively, this suggests the
liberalization of minority politics. Likewise, other initiatives of the govern-
ment in the fields of minority culture do not cause as much unease among
Slovaks today as in the 1990s. Yet, general provisions for responsiveness to
minority demands as well as regarding their participation in society remain
limited (Dostál, 2003) and hence appear to be ambivalent.
The change in power relations in the political system was not reflected
in significant amendments to the regulatory framework at the national level.
Instead, existing institutions were adapted to new requirements through su-
perficial shifts not questioning the overall community consensus. It repre-
sents a nationalist-liberal compromise that allows for some minority self-
expression in spheres where non-members of the political community do not
challenge the overall privilege of Slovakness. This arrangement reflects a
liberal concept of political community to the extent that most expressions of
cultural belonging are limited to the private sphere. However, the liberal
concept accepts minority rights only on the premise of the Slovak national
principle as means of integrating the community.
While no institution supporting minority representation guarantees
minority group inclusion into decision-making processes, the framework
provides for cultural rights on basis of high concentration of minority popula-
tion. However, organizationally these rights are still linked to the national
level. The regional concentration of minorities does not form a basis of any
territorial or cultural decision-making authority. Quite the contrary, the terri-
torial-administrative structure in Slovakia is established in a way to under-
mine the political strength that the Magyars gained from their settlement
patterns (Dostál 2002).
Power-sharing through Devolution?
The new government initiated the reform of public administration aiming at

general democratization and devolution (Bryson, 2008). It touched two major
issues with regard to political community structuring at the regional and
municipality levels and involved aspects of ethno-politics consequently. First,
territorial-administrative reform bore the chance of redrawing the borders of
territorial units and increasing the minorities’ share of the respective regional
population. This could foster their role in regional politics due to numerical
strength. Second, with the introduction of self-government at the regional
______________________________________________________________
level, the competences of institutions at the national, regional and local levels
had to be redefined.
Students of devolution argue that regional self-governments poten-
tially enhance democratic community building, if they are enabled to exercise
policies more accessible to the regional population. This could include eth-
nopolitical democracy (Buček, 2002). At the local level people can engage,
even if they are not part of the overall political community. The limits of the
political community as represented in the institutional setting, therefore do
not fully constrain political agency on side of those excluded from political
community on the whole. In a sense, they can cooperate with the national
political community despite being “outside” of it. Opening the limits of
community then depends on possible alliances or cooperation with those
members of citizenry that favour a more open community.
Following the fall of Mečiar, political power relations at the national
level have changed in 1998. The regulation of control mechanisms and eco-
nomic resource distribution at sub-national levels, however, has not changed,
nor has the majority-minority group relations within the established social
order. Likewise, devolution of competencies to the regional governments in
the course of the reform has not altered the majority-minority consensus over
the institutions of political community locally. Although large parts of the
government coalition attempted to reorganize the administration according to
historical regions in order to increase cooperation between municipalities, the
existing structure of regional administration is being maintained. The aspired
form of organization would have provided for more decision-making auton-
omy of minority groups at the local levels, a scenario that made part of the
coalition government vote against it, together with the opposition parties
(Brusis, 2002). Likewise, the limited transfer of competences to the regional
and local self-governments does not warrant decision-making authority for
minority groups on questions of their particular interest. As responsibilities
lie more in the managerial, implementing and control functions and in con-
crete organization of public services, this does not allow the shaping and
designing of policies (Bryson, 2008). Admittedly, the reluctance of the na-
tional political community to give up competences in these fields to sub-
national communities reserves the opportunity for redistributing resources
between regions and coherent organization of society as a whole. This en-
ables the national government to balance regional differences and potentially
enhance social integration at the sub-national level. From the vantage point of
minority participation, however, the problem lies with the ethnic dimension
of central state institutions.
What does this mean for minority engagement with the regulatory in-
stitutions of the Slovak state? Despite a number of legislative changes, the
Dzurinda government did not initiate significant change in the institutional
setting of minority-related ‘rules’. More so, the government missed the
______________________________________________________________
chance to introduce a coherent and unambiguous frame for changing major-
ity-minority relations. Opening the political sphere for minority participation
on the basis of group belonging would have implied a reorganization of po-
litical power and resources. However, Slovak politicians were disinclined
towards initiating the redistribution of power resources. That is to say, the
administrative reform aimed at undermining regional dynamics, and in this
respect reinforced the ethnic cleavage in the country. Just as the territorial
order had been established with the strong presence of the Magyars in mind,
the reform debate was shaped by the very same cleavage. Despite the inten-
tion to democratize state-society relations by means of devolution, the impli-
cations for simultaneously democratizing state-minority relations became an
obstacle to this aspect of the reform.
5. Policies and Practices of the Multicultural Community

While the regulatory and identity structures of the political community define
how resources are allocated, rules and self-conception of the community are
determined in the interaction of political agents with these structures. In their
practices these agents interpret the given framework in order to adjust their
decision-making and coalition formation. For this reason, frameworks are
open to interpretations that circumvent, modify or confirm the old under-
standing. Actions thus represent currently valid interpretations of the consen-
sus on who is legitimate to act on community issues. In Slovakia, I suggest,
though accepted as member of government, the MKP was not accepted as
legitimate actor when it came to issues that regarded the position of minori-
ties, and therefore the general political community.
Based on their electoral successes and due to the Slovak moderates’
desire for a good standing in the EU accession negotiations, Magyar repre-
sentatives were included into the powerful decision-making body of the Slo-
vak government (Pridham, 2002). However, disagreement on the desired
concept of community frequently led to an unfortunate overlap of political
and ethnic voting and the subsequent exclusion of the MKP from decision-
making. The MKP’s pluralist concept of political community could not mobi-
lize political and normative institutions in its support. Putative aspects of
pluralism in the community consensus turned out as expressions of a liberal-
nationalist idea, granting selected minority rights in the private sphere, where
they would not challenge the dominant group’s privilege. Moreover, as the
Dzurinda government would have had an absolute majority already without
the MKP, the latter’s role in government was weakened; the MKP provided,
however, for the constitutional majority (ibid.).
The dealing with a number of proposals submitted by the MKP illus-
trates the weak position of the Hungarian government actors. These promoted
the inclusion of minorities into the political community by aiming at the
identity consensus, organizational structure of political community at differ-
______________________________________________________________
ent levels, and regulations for minority inclusion in various fields. The MKP
demanded acknowledgement of the whole citizenry as part of the state-
founding nation, supporting a liberal rather than pluralist concept of political
community. In order to compensate for the attributed role of “second-class-
citizens”, the representatives of the Magyar community emphasized their
view that a coherent minority law was needed to clarify the ambiguous word-
ing of the constitution. Likewise, a Law on the Financing of Minority Culture
was drafted by the MKP to make planning in this field possible and grant
more security to the minority groups. In addition, the MKP supported the
recognition of minority rights beyond administrative units with a certain
percentage of minority population. All these demands implied the recognition
of minorities as a substantial part of the citizenry of Slovakia and their lim-
ited inclusion into the political community, at least at the levels of regulation
and resource distribution.
Unsurprisingly, the MKP’s influence on political agenda-setting was
limited. Despite liberal or moderate orientation among the Slovak govern-
ment parties, only one party supported the inclusion into the state founding
community (Dostál, 2002). The process of drafting and debating a Minority
Law was repeatedly postponed, responsibilities shifted among institutions,
before it was finally dropped (Dostál, 2002–2006). Other initiatives were
overthrown by “Slovak coalitions” of government and opposition parties,
which repeatedly mobilized the narrative of periled sovereignty against the
MKP’s proposals. Although the government showed preparedness to fill the
gaps left by the vague wording of the constitution, it did not put much effort
into the question of how to actually ensure minority participation in Slovak
politics. No government strategy revealed signs of a coherent concept of
integrating the political community normatively or regulatory, at any level of
the political system.
The rejection (or disregard?) of the MKP’s proposals does not show a
clear pattern. However, all rebuffed initiatives would have significantly
changed the structural and institutional settings towards a pluralist concep-
tion. Lacking guarantees for participation in decision-making, the Magyars in
government depended on the preparedness of Slovak forces to cooperate with
them by mobilizing liberal or multicultural resources. Instead, however, both
Slovak camps have continuously activated the narratives on national self-
determination and sovereignty, and impeded tendencies of any form of mi-
nority autonomy. They were backed up by the reference to identity and regu-
latory framework of the political community. A pluralist conception of the
nation, if established, would have contradicted this accepted system of norms
and rules of Slovakia’s core-nation.
______________________________________________________________
6. Change or Continuity in Slovakia’s majority-minority

Relations?
Political community denotes the group of people in a political unit or territory
who are perceived as legitimate to make decisions on community issues.
Inclusion into the political community is no necessary prerequisite of mem-
bership in a political unit or territory. Rather, the community is defined
through a consensus, which represents the results of bargaining processes
among its members. It includes the community’s purposes, rules, organiza-
tion and procedures. The agreement on membership in the community is
bound to be exclusive if it is formulated by its members, embedded in par-
ticular power relations and bearing their perceptions of potentially conflicting
interests with the members of other groups. However, the degree of its inclu-
siveness is alterable. Eventually, the consensus of the community members is
the expression of ongoing interaction of political actors with their structural
environment. As such, it is open to reinterpretation, redefinitions and, poten-
tially, to change. Simultaneously, institutions at different levels contribute to
the community’s instantiation and maintenance. These institutions not only
help reinforce the consensus on the whole, but also serve to strengthen each
other, thus stabilising the established group relations when they face chal-
lenges at various levels.
In the multiethnic setting of Slovakia, over the 1990s a system of
normative and legal rules had been established that institutionalised the
dominance of the largest ethnic group. In this process, the political commu-
nity mobilized strong discourses on perceived group disadvantage, historical
cleavages and the problems of current radical social change. With the inclu-
sion of a minority party into government in 1998, the consensus on Slovak
dominance was challenged by a change in power relations between the main
concepts of political community. While this transformation was reflected in a
minor shift in the regulatory framework and practices of resource distribu-
tion, power sharing did not lead to fundamental change of the political com-
munity.
In this process, the different levels of political community served as
inter-institutional feedbacks and adjusting factors for the community’s insti-
tutional setting to remain stable. While the MKP was re-elected into govern-
ment in 2002, thus being confirmed as legitimate actor on community issues,
this did not help integrate the Magyars and Slovaks into one consensus on the
boundaries of the nation. The old normative consensus on political commu-
nity as the agreement of the Slovak group only was stabilized through the
other institutional levels. The rules structuring group relations confirm the
privilege of the linguistically and culturally Slovak nation as single legitimate
actor. The practices in everyday politics simultaneously reflected the old
interpretation of the community consensus and in this sense corrected deviant
______________________________________________________________
developments, such as those challenging the Slovak “ownership” of the state.
Likewise, when at the regulatory level the frame was opened to grant and
broaden cultural rights for minorities, the political actors were able to rein-
force the community consensus to the advantage of Slovak privilege. In the
decision-making on appropriate rights for minorities more pluralist ideas
came into conflict with the identity framework provided by the constitution
and concept of citizenship that supported nationalist and liberal interpreta-
tions. Finally, while the MKP met formal requirements for participating in
agenda-setting and decision-making processes, neither the identity nor the
regulatory framework supply legitimacy or any means of proportionate say in
politics.
The ambiguous community consensus on the relations between Slo-
vaks and Magyars provides resources for nationalist and liberal, but not plu-
ralist conceptions of society. As argued in this paper, the implementation of
the Slovak version of community consensus at various levels of the political
(and social) sphere helped stabilize the accord through inter-institutional
feedback effects somewhat. The inclusion of minority political actors into the
political system, therefore, can be a first step for community integration.
However, significant change in the institutional setting is necessary to make
the inclusion lasting, and ultimately, to guarantee the establishment of a new
consensus.
Endnotes
1. In this article, the group of Slovak citizens who are ascribed Hungarian
nationality or identify themselves with it will be referred to as Magyars in
order to distinguish them from the citizens of Hungary (Hungarians).
2. References to Ondrej Dostál’s annual reports on the situation of ethnic
minorities in Slovakia are listed as one single entry in the list of references
for reasons of space (cf. Dostál, 2000–2003; 2005–2007).
3. Slovak and Magyar parties cooperated during the brief “moderate” interim
government (March – December 1994) between Mečiar’s second and third
terms in office. This cooperation could be revived over the years before the
1998 election, when Slovak and Magyar opposition parties worked together
more closely on selected issues (Csergı, 2007).
4. Various schools of thought have identified pros and cons of different con-
cepts of community for minority participation, such as ethnic or civic nation-
alism, liberal pluralism or illiberal nationalism. For a debate on these con-
cepts in relation to the Slovak case cf. Csergı, 2007; Deets and Stroschein,
2005; Nedelsky, 2003.
5. The Council’s chair and vice-chair are appointed by cabinet; governmental
practice allocated the chair to the Deputy Prime Minister for Minorities, and
______________________________________________________________
the vice-chair to the Minister of Culture. Between 2002 and 2006 the Council
met only once per year (Dostál, 2006).
6. These aspects are mentioned in the justification of the State Language
Law: “[T]he Slovak language is the most important distinctive feature of the
uniqueness of the Slovak nation, the most valuable piece of the cultural heri-
tage and expression of sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and the general
means of communication for its citizens, which guarantees them freedom and
equality in dignity and rights in the territory of the Slovak Republic” (Trans-
lation adopted from Daftary and Gál, 2003, my emphases).
7. Further laws enacted under the Mečiar government restricted among others
the use of names and prohibited geographical designations in minority lan-
guages.
8. Moreover, initiatives of the MKP to extend minority language rights to
municipalities with less than 20 per cent minority population or to the na-
tional parliament have repeatedly been rejected by “Slovak coalitions”. Not
only does this confirm Slovak as the only language of the political commu-
nity; it also constitutes two groups of minority citizens: those residing in
significantly minority-inhabited areas (who can exercise their minority lan-
guage rights), and those who reside elsewhere.
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Cooptation as Integration? National Programme
“Integration of Society in Latvia” on
Minority Participation
Timofey Agarin
Increasing accountability of political institutions to the people

these structures serve is essential for democratising regimes.
However, how can institutions designed to attend to the
interests of the dominant ethnic community account to the
expectations of non-dominant groups? In my paper I
investigate the National Programme “Integration of Society in
Latvia” to assess whether its declared goals – increase political
participation and achieve social integration – were aimed at
accommodating differences between state-bearing Latvians and
minority Russian speakers. In relying on Erin Jenne’s “Theory
of Ethnic Bargaining”, I argue that social integration in Latvia
stood little chance to achieve its declared goals.
Introduction
The accountability of political entrepreneurs to all people affected by their
decisions is essential for democratising regimes. Over the past decades, mul-
ticultural political communities in particular have witnessed difficulties to
stand up to the demands of minority groups affected by the majoritarian deci-
sion-making. While the multiculturalism debate underlines the formal equal-
ity of all affected to participate in political decision-making, tacit acknowl-
edgement that all nation-states formally belong to their majority populations
constrains genuine equality of majority and minority groups engaging in
political processes. Unequal distribution of decision-making powers between
the dominant and non-dominant groups seems to be embedded in the very
understanding of democratic political process, and is at the core of the liberal
democratic project. The difference between the aspiration to accommodate
and the difficulty to address the expectations of non-dominant groups can be
seen largely as a result of differential access to political, economic, cultural
and social resources of the given society. However, the political institutions
designed to serve the interests of a state-bearing group constrain political
participation and social integration of non-dominant groups into one single
community, regulated by state institutions.
Upon the demise of the Soviet Union (USSR) as many as 15 states
faced the task of regulating the relations between their societies and political
institutions. In most cases, ethnic communities whose name these new states
200 Cooptation as Integration?
______________________________________________________________
bore were defined as proprietors of the polity and empowered to design po-
litical institutions and procedures in a way that catered best for their needs.
While in some regions of the former USSR affirmative action had resulted in
violent conflict, Baltic states were spared of ethnic strife between the increas-
ingly marginalised non-dominant groups and growingly powerful titular
populations. Unlike in the neighbouring Lithuania, Latvian political leader-
ship decided not to grant automatic citizenship of the post-Soviet state to its
residents, who arrived in the republic during the Soviet occupation and had
no connection to pre-Soviet Latvian state. Instead, Latvian authorities,
somewhat similarly to those in Estonia, distributed the so-called “passports of
non-citizens” to around 40% of the country’s resident population, who could
not testify of ancestral connection to pre-Soviet polity. Predictably, following
the passing of naturalisation legislation in 1995, the numbers of non-citizens
have been on steady, although far from rapid decline.
Although the Latvian authorities emphasise the continuous decline in
the number of non-citizens, the research on Latvia’s policies underlines mul-
tiple means employed to discourage resident non-Latvian non-citizen popula-
tions from political participation (Galbreath, 2005). Additionally, the state
authorities were pressured by international organizations and the local advo-
cacy groups to acknowledge Latvia’s mainly Russian speaking resident popu-
lation as a legitimate part of political community. Somewhat similarly to
Estonia, Priit Järve argues, Latvian authorities had gone through the full cycle
of effectively denying responsibility for its resident non-citizens (1990–
1998), to accepting these as minorities in the Latvian state (1998–2001 ), and
later to providing them with the means to integrate into the Latvian domi-
nated society (after 2001) (Järve, 2002; Jurado, 2003). However, no signifi-
cant changes were undertaken to allow automatic citizenship for Soviet-time
migrants in Latvia. Instead, the relations between on the one hand state insti-
tutions and political community dominated by ethnic Latvians, and the Rus-
sian speaking resident non-citizens of the country on the other were ad-
dressed in the National Programme “The Integration of Society in Latvia.” In
fact, it was only in 2001 that Latvian authorities encouraged broader partici-
pation of non-titular residents in the dialogue on political and social issues.
As I will argue in this paper, the essence of this policy document demon-
strated to non-titular residents of Latvian state what is expected from them by
the state, as well as by the majority population in order to become accepted
partners in the social and political dialogue.
Essentially, this paper asks whether the expectations of the minority
community have been addressed by the Latvian political leadership.
Throughout the paper, I refer to political leadership from both groups as “po-
litical entrepreneurs.” As I discuss, it appears that in the debate on society
integration, political actors capitalised on agenda for change, and sought to
secure the benefits for their own group at the expense of improving the inter-
Timofey Agarin 201
______________________________________________________________
group relations. In order to do this, I take Erin Jenne’s theory of ethnic bar-
gaining (hereafter TEB) as the starting point for my analyses and conclude
that institutional accommodation alone is likely to fail solutions for minority
integration. As I will argue, while the National Programme (hereafter NP)
signposted the expected ways of cooperation between the minority and ma-
jority in Latvia, it did not make up for the limited resources available to non-
titulars to participate in any decision-making. While demonstrating to the
members of minority community an expectation of their contribution to state-
building, the NP “The Integration of Society in Latvia” failed to address
problems relevant for minority participation. My analyses point out that mi-
nority integration can succeed if adjustments are made in political frame-
works, but they are unlikely to be lasting or effective if the dynamics of the
intergroup relations are neglected.
1. Standing up to Minority Claims: Learning from the

“Triadic Nexus”
Political change in the post-communist Central Eastern Europe (further,
CEE) is in the focus of many scholarly analyses over the past decade. How-
ever, the contribution of Rogers Brubaker drew particular interest in the field.
In his analyses of the CEE states and their relations with minority communi-
ties, Brubaker famously coined the triadic nexus model, inspiring a range of
investigations. In his “Nationalism reframed”, Brubaker observes in particu-
lar, the tensions between the states, national minorities and the minorities’
external homeland define the potential for ethnopolitical conflict during the
period of transition (Brubaker, 1996). Brubaker claims that the relations be-
tween the minorities and the states depend not only on internal actors, but are
closely interwoven with the external forces, such as home-land states and
international organizations. This approach draws attention to the importance
of subjective perceptions of the situation in which policies are pursued and
has enormous epistemic implications.
Brubaker indicates that the dual linkages in the triadic nexus exem-
plify “(1) the close interdependence of relations within and between field; (2)
the responsive and interactive character of the triadic relational interplay
between the fields; and (3) the mediated character of this responsive inter-
play” (Brubaker, 1996, p. 69). However, the complexity of links between
different actors opens the stage for unexpected impacts of various forces.
Still, at the same time, the model establishes that intents behind actions are
unpredictable, even under the assumption of the rational preference forma-
tion.
More recent conceptual developments of Brubaker’s model try to im-
prove the predicting capacity of the “triadic nexus” model and provide sug-
gestions on the identity of actors involved in the process. Unsurprisingly,
political scientists place an emphasis on institutional change and focus on
______________________________________________________________
relations between the states and international organizations in an effort to
determine the outcomes of policy-making (Kelley, 2004b; Smith, 2002;
Tesser, 2003). David Smith, for example, argued that, from the perspective of
analysing Baltic and other CEE states, Brubaker underestimates the impor-
tance of one actor regulating a huge chunk of nation-state policies towards its
minorities, namely, the international organizations (Smith, 2002). Comparing
the “quadruple nexus” in Estonian and Latvian (alongside Slovak and Roma-
nian) cases, Judith Kelley comes to the similar conclusion. She argues that
international conditionality prompts states to reduce nationalising logic in
favour of greater accommodation of local minority communities (Kelley,
2004a). Interestingly, Kelley concludes that the normative pressure as exer-
cised by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High
Commissioner on National Minorities (further, OSCE HCNM) was far less
effective than causal conditions set out prior to accession of CEE states to
international organizations (see also, Galbreath, 2005). Kelley argues that the
OSCE in general, and the HCNM in particular, prompted institutional change
in Latvia and thus facilitated this country’s integration into European security
architecture. Among other things, international organizations provided na-
tion-states (however, nationalising) decisive leverage against the claims of
external states, which claimed special relations with national minorities, as
was the case with the Russian Federation’s stand towards Latvia (Budryte,
2005). These approaches underline the importance of the inter-state relations
for social accord within these states, and draw a link between the interna-
tional, nation-state and intra-state proliferation.
Expanding Brubaker’s model in his “Nation-Building and Minority
Rights,” David Galbreath argues that international organizations such as the
OSCE, COE and EU played a pivotal role in helping Estonia and Latvia to
jointly formulate minority legislation (Galbreath, 2005). Galbreath not only
pays attention to the international conditionality of local policies, but also
pays attention to the rationale behind the national decision-making in the
process of Baltic EU accession. He argues that because Baltic politicians
viewed European membership as the ultimate security guarantee, they were
prepared to adopt suggested practices in exchange for various strategic bene-
fits. In doing so, Galbreath considers conditionality to be effective not be-
cause it improved the position of Estonia and Latvia to face Russian Federa-
tion’s claims, but because it changed political institutions of states and thus
also modified the path development of state-policies making them less na-
tionalising (Galbreath, 2005 and 2006a).
These discussions, however, only marginally address the perspective
of local political actors in shaping the relation between the states and its mi-
nority populations. However, the accommodation of demands by the interna-
tional organizations would be unlikely if membership therein was not consid-
ered a national priority. Indeed, these approaches would need to favour the
Timofey Agarin 203
______________________________________________________________
interpretation of Baltic political elites and Baltic institutional design as single
actors within the institutional learning process.
In reality, however, the discrepancy between the critical responses of
Latvia’s political elites to criticisms from OSCE HCNM and the institutional
changes shambolically implemented indicate that the two should not be col-
lated. By the same token, the friction between ethnic communities would not
have been reduced were there no willingness to shelve tense relations be-
tween the groups, whatever the reason. There remains no doubt that the insti-
tutional arrangements supporting minority participation in political processes
were largely a result of international conditionality. However, institutional
change has only marginally impacted preferences of political actors who
sought to keep state institutions accountable mainly, even if not any more
exclusively to majority groups of their state. Today political actors in Latvia
continue to reiterate long-term international security benefits when consider-
ing additional support to minorities in domestic debates. This clearly indi-
cates that international conditionality did not change attitudes and views,
while changing political institutions (Jubulis, 2001; Zepa and Supule, 2006).
The emphasis on international conditionality and policy-learning,
however, misses one crucial part in the puzzle of politics. Nationalising poli-
cies are implemented to improve performance of the members of one group
versus the members of other groups, in the situation when available resources
are scarce. If political institutions are designed to serve one (ethnic) group
only, the exclusion of potential competitors is most effective and would re-
quire the non-dominant group to demand equality first, before claiming any
further rights. While the members of a minority group can extend very differ-
ent claims, what is particularly telling about them is that they can be com-
pletely ignored by the political majority, i.e. those who profit from the status
quo. Even if minority claims cause great commotion within the political
community and can even call for external political leverage, there is little
reason for majority politicians to change the terms of access to resources.
Minority demands are therefore more important from the perspective of what
they represent than what they really aim at achieving, as Brubaker rightly
suggests.
In her book, Erin Jenne undertakes to advance our understanding of
contributing role of intent in the process of formulating minority claims and
their accommodation by the majority. The framework of ethnic bargaining,
following Jenne, explains claims of non-dominant group on a spectrum from
radicalisation to moderation, as an element of regular politicking in multieth-
nic societies. Jenne addresses the factors that determine minority groups’
decisions to opt for various bargaining strategies, from affirmative action to
secession/irredentism, discussing the position of minority elites, parties, and
party leaders representing rank and file minority populations and enjoying
their great support (Jenne, 2007, pp. 40–41). Given that claims of political
______________________________________________________________
leaders are constantly reformulated and reapplied in the situation, which is
itself determined by structural factors such as the support of external actors
and response of opponents, these demands need not be taken at face value.
Jenne’s framework, which addresses the triangular relation between the ma-
jority, the minority and external actor, bears some resemblance to Brubaker’s
nexus model. By placing greater emphasis on the importance of activities of
the minority in the process of formulating demands, as well as with its focus
on the efforts of majority politicians to respond to minority claims, the TEB
provides an intent-related rational choice explanation of the ethnic conflicts
(Jenne, 2007, p. 49).
In contrast to Brubaker’s nexus, Jenne’s ethnic bargaining allows as-
sessment of the reasons for minority mobilisation in the first instance. These
“[o]n the most basic level, beliefs about minority leverage are a function of
structural characteristics, including group size and territorial compactness”
(Jenne, 2007, p. 41). However, Jenne indicates that structural traits are
unlikely to predict when and even whether minorities will mobilise, leading
to consideration of ethnocentric rhetoric and its mobilising impact on minor-
ity behaviour. Jenne frames ethnic mobilisation within the context of external
support, treating it not as a goal in itself, but as an instrumental action, serv-
ing geopolitical interests or pragmatism (Jenne, 2007, p. 43). The model
suggests that the external players would only have two options to react in the
situation, to either be supportive, or not supportive, of minorities’ claims.
Similarly to the external players, majorities also do not have the right
for the first draw in the bargaining process with minorities, as these are usu-
ally not concerned with minorities in the first instance. The majority actors
involved in bargaining process with minorities usually “make decisions based
on a variety of goals and inputs – which may or may not involve minority.
[…] Rarely do these powerful players consider the likely minority response
to their actions when making their choice” (Jenne, 2007, p. 42). What results
from this conceptualisation of conflict is that the decision to commence the
new round of bargaining lies fully with the minority, based on the expected
response from the two other players, the majorities and the external supporter
(Jenne, 2007, p. 43).
Going on from here, Jenne suggests that, by estimating the response of
the majority, as well as that of external actors, political entrepreneurs of the
minority reach a conclusion about the “state of the world” in which the mi-
nority group finds itself. In the face of a repressive majority, minority leaders
moderate their demands in order to avoid repression, or, under a non-
repressive majority, prefer interethnic cooperation. This leads Jenne to con-
clude that “external actors have a greater impact on minority behaviour than
host governments” (Jenne, 2007, pp. 46–47). The framework of ethnic bar-
gaining also assumes that it depends on the elites whether the interethnic
Timofey Agarin 205
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relations would normalise as a result of a firm commitment to, and policy
steps in favour of the de-ethnicization of conflict.
This model indicates on the one hand that the majority ethnic-group is
either not concerned with the minority demands in the first place, or does not
take these as an invitation to start bargaining. Therefore, it is always the mi-
nority who is initiating the process of bargaining and hence the minority
chooses respective strategies in the face of expected costs/pay-offs from the
majority and/or external actor. On the other hand, however, the model shows
that the claims of the minority group have to stay relatively stable, in order
for it to remain focused on the implementation of its goals. Importantly, there
is always a chance for betterment. “Because [the minority group] is continu-
ally updating its beliefs concerning the state of the world, the group can be
expected to mobilize sporadically so that a society once driven by ethnic
violence becomes a model of ethnic cohabitation, and vice versa” (Jenne,
2007, p. 45). All the more important is the fact that majority can misrepresent
their genuine interests and mislead the minority in its estimation of the oppor-
tunity structure. Nonetheless, minority groups are the ones who constantly
weigh the costs of accommodation against the perspective of ethnic separa-
tion from the majority, opting for the least costly outcome possible.
This is an important qualification of the TEB. It indicates that, while a
non-dominant group might appear radical and call for re-distribution of po-
litical resources, its political entrepreneurs do not expect a full response from
the dominant majority. The ethnic bargaining theory employs various policy-
related documents to assess the perceptions of majority/minority relations,
suggesting that public statements are frequently the least credible expressions
of intent, “they may be little more than empty rhetoric or bluffing devices”
(Jenne, 2007, p. 49). At the same time, policies and actions – while also being
non-binding instruments – are more reliable signs of commitment by a state,
or of organization to a future set of actions. No doubt the elites of the domi-
nant group influence the intensity of minority claims, with the consequence
that “minority radicalization is driven by signals of behavioural intent from
the host government and/or lobby actor” (Jenne, 2007, p. 53). However, from
a policy standpoint, “this means that minority protections on the domestic
level may be insufficient for resolving an internal conflict if external sources
of minority leverage are not first neutralized” (Jenne, 2007, p. 47). Clearly,
this indicates that, while the increase in minority claims is regularly seen as a
result of the centre’s inability to commit to minority protection, the TEB
suggests that, despite the best will of majority, minorities will radicalise if
they perceive outside support to be in place. Rhetoric support from another
state, financial backing for implementation of particular policies by the inter-
national organisations, or both significantly facilitate minorities’ radicalisa-
tion.
______________________________________________________________
Although the TEB is useful, it does have its limitations in its ability to
critically analyse the multi-layered meanings of policy-documents aimed at
society integration. On the one hand, the TEB does not allow one to address
the content of the policies separately from their declared intent. On the other
hand, even the perfunctory efforts by political actors involved in bargaining
negotiations produce effects that TEB needs to take as a serious attempt to
improve the intergroup relations. However, the TEB allows an assessment of
the process of bi-communal negotiations in Latvia as is reflected in the NP
“Integration of Society in Latvia.”
In the following I discuss how accommodation of various interests
featured in the Latvian debate on social integration in order to revisit the
expected outcomes of the integration process. The TEB indicates how the
groups involved in the process of bargaining were accommodating to each
other’s claims and would allow me to envisage the role of intent in the proc-
ess of bargaining. Crucially, applying TEB to the Latvian case study suggests
a wholly different interpretation of perceived group-status by Latvian and
Russian speaking communities, providing for additional insights to under-
stand the resource distributive logic of Latvia’s nationalising policies.
2. What Does TEB tell us about the Framing of Minority?

Far from suggesting that Latvian politics are still following the nationalising
logic which dominated politics in the early years of re-established Independ-
ence – as would result from applying Brubaker’s model strictu sensu –, my
contention here is that Latvia’s policies have become less and less nationalis-
ing since the late 1990s. Needless to say, limited political rights, marginalisa-
tion on the political stage, as well as the social exclusion of Latvia’s Soviet
migrant communities have initially limited the minorities’ opportunities to be
engaged in policy-making. It is generally accepted that local political elites
and the public perceive non-titular, Soviet-time migrants as lacking sufficient
loyalty to Latvian state. Many argue that this perception has pressured local
leadership to fortify the status of the Latvian language and choose a “defen-
sive approach” to ensure the cultural dominance of the majority community
(see Galbreath, 2005; Jubulis, 2001). Some analyses even suggest that certain
rights were provided to non-titulars in the course of the late-1990s as a result
of the “conditioned” accommodation of minority rights by the international
actors (Muižnieks and Brands-Kehris, 2003), while others indicate that the
“conditioned” response undermined the non-titular acceptance of decisions
made by political entrepreneurs (Dorodnova, 2002). Overall, the deficiency
of design in political community was brought up in numerous communica-
tions between the international organizations monitoring the situation on the
ground, NGOs, the Latvian officials, and has been the focus of the local aca-
demic studies (see e.g. Rozenvalds, 2005).
Timofey Agarin 207
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This does not mean to say that the non-titulars viewed the state as
something alien to them. Quite the opposite, the members of minority com-
munities were actively claiming various rights from state institutions, from
citizenship to use of their native tongue when communicating with state offi-
cials. Exemplarily, the electoral success of the party representing mainly the
interests of Latvia’s non-titular populations, For Human Rights in United
Latvia, in the late-90s – early 2000s had put titular population on alert with
regard to the claims of the resident Russian speakers. Also, the galvanization
of the non-titular community, as a result of the reform of minority language
schools and introduction of bilingual education in 2004 made Latvian major-
ity increasingly sensitive to ethnopolitical claims emerging from the local
Russian speaking community (Galbreath, 2006a). Over time, the recurrent
claims by non-titular ethnic groups led Latvians to perceive local non-titulars
as demanding and, hence, lacking in loyalty to the state of residence.
However, the TEB does not distinguish between the real and imagined
consequences of bargaining action and, hence takes social constructivist
stand seriously: if these parties consider the results of an action to be real, in
the given circumstances they are (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The overall
perception of the titular community that it is under increasing pressure from
the non-titular residents, as well as from the international organizations,
could lead policy-makers to grant additional concessions to the members of
the Russian-speaking community. Latvian political entrepreneurs were mak-
ing all efforts to profit from the opportunity structure of the moment, taking
advantage of the unanimous support of their constituency for re-negotiating
the ethnic relations with Latvia’s minority ethnic community. Particularly,
the perceived moral support of international organizations such as EU, COE
and OSCE - all seen as protectors of Latvia against Russia’s verbal attacks –
among the titular political elites indicates that they were acting from an inse-
cure position in the bargaining process.
The TEB assumes that political entrepreneurs reflect the interests of
their constituency. Therefore, support granted by Latvia’s majority to politi-
cal leadership could also be taken as an indication of specific self-perception
within the Latvian community. Thus Latvia’s titular majority was renegotia-
ting the status quo using the opportunity window created by the link between
internal policy-decisions and international support. The same goes for the
development of the national integration programme. The drafting processes
began before the EU accession talks started with Latvia and the programme
was accepted for implementation before Latvia joined the EU. In 2008, how-
ever, it was shelved when the EU was still providing rhetoric and financial
help in support of integration on majorities’ terms, but was unable to exhort
any pressure as to the continuation of the NP. Does this mean that Latvia’s
efforts to proceed with the integration programme were resulting merely from
the European conditionality pressures?
______________________________________________________________
Most of scholars agree that it is extremely difficult to decouple social
integration policies from international support for political elites’ own agenda
in the countries, aspiring the EU membership. However, the TEB predicts
that the dominant group is not interested in minority’s grievances, neither
does it require external support to initiate changes in its relations with non-
dominant community. Were there any reasons besides EU conditionality for
majority political entrepreneurs to launch NP “The Integration of Society in
Latvia”? Although this is an interesting connection to explore, my paper
follows a much narrower approach of the TEB and explores national level
decision-making on the issue of society integration. Firstly, I look at the de-
clared intentions of the policy-makers to address the opportunity structure
available for actors to engage with the programme for society integration.
Secondly, I investigate the set of goals outlined in the programme, addressing
the content of integration as was institutionalised in the programme. I con-
clude by discussing the initial goals envisaged and why these could not be
upheld after the programme’s lifetime expired, leading to its termination in
2008.
Declared Intent of Integration
The Latvian government initiated the programme’s development during the

period of accession talks with the EU, adapting the “Integration of Society in
Latvia: Framework Document” in April 1998 (further, FD).1 At this time,
Latvia was continuously criticised by international organisations for failing to
address the problem of statelessness by officials of various European states.
Their criticisms revolved around the lack of provisions for minority protec-
tion, and most prominently, the Russian Federation criticised the abuse of
human rights of its own “compatriots”. It is in this climate that decision was
made to devise a consolidated policy to address society integration, some-
thing that primarily (if not exclusively) was understood as the reduction of
statelessness, or on other occasions as guaranteeing the fluency in Latvian of
all Russian speakers.2 Public debates were initiated on the content and scope
of the programme in March 1999 to inform the public of the programme’s
goals and to collect feedback on the implementation strategies.
Unsurprisingly, it attracted great interest from the public, but the gov-
ernment effectively considered feedback from the civic initiatives only on the
issues which were outlined in the initial document. Albeit the FD was backed
up by public opinions expressed, only the propositions made to draw the
Latvian language and culture into the foreground of policy were granted
detailed attention. The issues of regional and sectoral differences in the Lat-
vian society, as well as approaches to the role of language and education in
the process were specifically considered. Additionally, the chapter on re-
integration of economically disadvantaged groups, such as residents of rural
Timofey Agarin 209
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areas, homeless and unemployed, was incorporated into the NP, making
additional reference to the hazards of social marginalisation.
Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia, the
Naturalization Board, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Latvia, and the National Programme for Latvian Language Training all par-
ticipated in identifying different causes of societal concern.3 Further progress
in developing efficient steps towards the integration of Latvia’s society was
made with the meeting of Cabinet of Ministers on December 7, 1999, with an
approval of a short version of the programme at the meeting of the secretaries
of state just a month later, on January 13, 2000.
Devised in 1999, the FD reiterated the principles which emphasised
the means of preserving the national language, and therefore appealed very
strongly to the titular group. Emphasis was placed on a certain view of his-
tory and the preservation of the state language. The FD therefore made it
clear that “The current predicament of the Latvian language reflects the com-
plicated political, economic, ethno-demographic and psychological processes,
which have taken place during the course of history in Latvia” (FD, p. 34). It
appears that social integration was perceived as a tool for excluding possibili-
ties of an alternative development, rather than a means to investigate intrinsic
reasons for addressing the issue. As is clear, the FD was devised by the
members of the titular group and passed in the government dominated by the
ethnic Latvians. At the same time, the concept of integration was understood
by members of non-Latvian communities as based upon the values of the
(ethnic) Latvian nation and enforcing the integrity of Latvians’ cultural do-
main in public. How did the programme formulate the cultural claims of the
titular Latvians? Were they embedded in the broader social context?
The elaboration on the basis of the FD took place in two steps, which
(as we will go on to see) might suggest that reactions from public discussion
were originally meant to be considered by the policy-makers. At the first
stage, the framework document of the programme underwent revision, incor-
porating the feedback from social debates and discussions. While the public
discussion on the draft was initiated to “introduce the social integration
document to the society, to foster an exchange of views about the main ideas
of social integration, to listen to opinions, to provide a possibility for every-
body to express themselves who wished to participate in the discussion” (FD,
p. 57), the result was far more ambivalent as it related to the programme’s
core questions. In the second stage, the NP was officially drafted from June
1- August 1, 1999, significantly amending the original draft, doubling its
length. Substantial revisions of parts were made, supplementing the second
document with two new chapters “Civic Participation and Political Integra-
tion” and “Social and Regional Integration of Society.” The programme dis-
tinguished four thematic fields relevant for ethnic policies and social integra-
tion of society, while declaring that:
______________________________________________________________
“The integration of society in Latvia is oriented to mutual un-

derstanding and co-operation among individuals and different
groups in the framework of Latvia’s legal system; it is based on
the Latvian language as the state language and on loyalty to the
state of Latvia.” (NP, p. 4)
Essentially, the four areas where integration has to be implemented

and monitored include: civic participation and political integration (including
NGOs and cooperation with Latvian compatriots abroad); social and regional
integration (including support for the unemployed and for non-Latvians with
poor Latvian-language knowledge); education, language and culture (includ-
ing preparation of the bilingual education programmes for minorities, courses
for teachers of the Latvian language and bilingual education); and informa-
tion policies, which also includes accessibility of information in the minority
languages. Needless to say, these areas, while not explicitly defining the
cultural and linguistic preservation of the Latvian nation and its accommoda-
tion with the cultures of minorities resident in the country, place significant
emphasis on the cultural aspects of the integration of Latvia’s society.
While the first chapter of the programme addresses the issues of indi-
vidual integration strategies for members of communities, its second chapter
puts greater emphasis on collective integration by initiating a debate on spe-
cific approaches to the issue of regional integration (NP, p. 47–48 ). It also
addresses the measures necessary for creating a society of individuals with
equal opportunities. However, it presumes that the leading role will be as-
sumed by the titular people, the Latvians, emphasising the importance of
social cohesion on the basis of the state language. The issues of poverty and
differences in income, unemployment and the impact of limited education as
a factor undermining social integration are also addressed, along with the
shortcomings of the social security system (NP, pp.41–42).
The third chapter of the programme, “Education, Language, and Cul-
ture” underlines the importance of a long-term stability of the interethnic
relations in the country, with a clear commitment to the education system as a
central pillar that ensures the stability of a multicultural society (NP, pp. 56–
59). The chapter begins with cultural development, stating that
“Understanding of all groups of society about cultural values of

the Latvian nation as well as the cultures of minority groups is
an important part of the integration process of society. In order
to promote the development of Latvian culture and minority
cultures, a unified cultural environment must be created and the
cultural dialogue ought to be expanded during the process of in-
tegration” (NP, p. 56).
Timofey Agarin 211
______________________________________________________________
Clearly, the Latvian language is to play an essential role and hence is con-
ceived as an effective tool for the integration of non-Latvians and Latvians of
all generations.
“In implementation of the integration process of society, chil-

dren and young people make up the most important target
group. The educational system must ensure the learning and in-
heritance of human and specifically Latvian values, and the op-
portunities to preserve inter-cultural education and the cultural
identity of minorities” (NP, p. 56).
The ambitious and, hence, more controversial approach of the pro-

gramme to integration aims to safeguard public space, where it is prescribed
that communication should take place in the common language. The FD
stresses that “prejudices and mutual distrust persist in Latvian society,” a fact
that is mentioned in the context of the lack of appropriate language training
for non-Latvians, with “many objective and subjective factors hinder[ing]
learning of Latvian language” (FD, p. 36). But the phrasing of the programme
document states more firmly that the “Legislation on language should help to
establish a balance and to stabilise the relationship between the state and
minority languages” (NP, p. 69).
All this indicates that the FD had outlined the policy steps to be devel-
oped and elaborated upon in the NP with an aim of continuously stressing the
role of the titular culture in the independent state of Latvia. In the NP the
cultural and linguistic dominance of ethnic Latvians in the public space was
reinforced even further by failing to question the “one-culture, one-nation,
one-state” approach already embedded in the legal documents of the Latvian
state. The NP additionally sought to fortify the privileged position of ethnic
Latvians in “their” state in the advantageous situation, when international
support for policy-steps was perceived as available. While pointing out the
importance of cultural and linguistic issues for Latvia’s policy-makers during
the period of writing the NP, this section has shown that the dominant group
was using the external institutional backing to create further privileges in
accessing state institutions for those who are proficient in the language and
values of the Latvian majority.
Institutionalised Content of Integration
The previous discussion of the aspects of NP “Integration of Society in Lat-

via” indicates that titular political entrepreneurs in Latvia outlined the meas-
ures to address the potential threat from the non-titular community, which
was perceived in terms of lacking linguistic accommodation. Although meas-
______________________________________________________________
ures were undertaken to facilitate intercommunal dialogue and interethnic
communication, there is a lack of clarity with respect to the role ascribed to
the Latvian majority in the process. In fact, NP remains largely undecided on
how the dominant community in Latvia should relate to and engage with the
non-dominant groups. While various aspects of the programme reiterate
statements already framed in the constitution and other documents of the
independent Latvian State, it appears to mainly address the non-titular actors,
prescribing, more than advising them to integrate.
The NP states that “[t]he integration of society will not succeed if it is
directed only from ‘the top down’ without active civic participation from the
grass roots level” (NP, p.13). At the same time, the key points of the pro-
gramme reflect a strong patronising logic, particularly when it comes to re-
flections on the relation between the state and society, and the role of the
individual in deliberating and taking part in political decision making.
Chapter One, “Civic Participation and Political Integration” introduces
the discussion of the role individuals play in the political decision-making
process, consistently presenting conformity with the interests of majority as a
penultimate goal: “Active civic participation in social and political life fosters
the irreversibility of integration and conformity with the interests of the ma-
jority” (NP, p. 13). The role of individuals in the political decision-making
process was initially introduced in the context of the long-term experience of
the Latvian state as a home to many minorities, and non-titulars are now
welcome to contribute to the discussion on future strategies for cooperation in
society (FD, pp. 14–15). Interestingly enough, the FD indicated that “the
integration of society in education is inconceivable as a one-sided process […
]. Integration of society in education is a process with two aspects, the Lat-
vian and the non-Latvian, and both sides should be prepared to engage in
intercultural dialogue and show the other side understanding, tolerance and
cooperation” (FD, pp. 29). However, this statement was dropped from the
final text of NP which focused instead on the benefits of rapprochement be-
tween the Latvian state and its residents.
Two of the three subchapters, “Civic Participation” and “Participation
in the Non-governmental Organizations” repeat the strong emphasis on de-
veloping a unified society in Latvia, where individuals of different ethnic
backgrounds mutually accept their differences, as well as the right of the
Latvian people to political self-determination. A general undertone of the
document, however, indicates that the fragmentation of society into segre-
gated ethnic communities is counterproductive for social and political devel-
opments, and has to be dealt with by means of increasing the trust of all in-
habitants in the Latvian state (FD, p. 14). This is clearly indicative of the
state’s intention to extend support for all those members of non-titular com-
munities to integrate into the Latvian society, supporting “a positive orienta-
tion toward naturalization and the integration of society” (FD, p. 15).
Timofey Agarin 213
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A particular role in this process was ascribed to the development of
the networks of civil society through the active political participation of Lat-
via’s residents. “Active civic participation in social and political life fosters
the irreversibility of integration and conformity with the interests of the ma-
jority; […]” (NP, p. 13). The role of civil society organizations in this process
is highly ambivalent as portrayed in the programme, as these are expected to
expand their activities to create a more peaceful society. At the same time,
civil society activity is supposed to support the national and cultural identities
of national minorities, a fact that probably would not diminish the tensions
between the official position on the core ethnic ideals of the state and the
views of minority groups (NP, pp. 34–35).
Nonetheless, major areas of concern relating to civic participation are
outlined in order to address and “overcome alienation of people from gov-
ernmental and local authorities by maintaining a dialogue between the indi-
vidual, the society and the state” (NP, p. 14). The role of the NGOs is also
outlined and made responsible for “individual participation in the life of
society.” Repatriation, migration and cooperation with Latvians abroad are
outlined as important; the goal being the establishment of “a unified system
which would ease the return to his/her homeland for any Latvian or citizen of
Latvia who wishes to do so and would assist in his/her integration in the
society of Latvia” (NP, p. 14). In this sense, this section particularly under-
lines the centrality of Latvianness for the narrative of statehood, as well as for
the bottom-line of the social integration process.
In a similar vein, the reference to the Soviet past of the country is
made in the Introduction, emphasising the dramatic situation of the Latvian
language and the challenge to Latvians’ survival represented by non-titular
residents: “Latvia has inherited more than half a million Soviet era immi-
grants and their descendants, many of whom have not yet become integrated
into the Latvian cultural and linguistic environment, and thus do not feel
connected to the Latvian state” (NP, p. 7). In the normative wording, which
suggests that the Soviet-migrants and foreign observes are not acquainted
with the history of Latvia, it states that “the Latvian people did not voluntar-
ily choose the Soviet regime and life in totalitarian system; this must be un-
derstood” (NP, p. 10). The reference to the Soviet past within the NP sug-
gests that the integration would need to take place not only on the basis of
common linguistic environment, but also requires consent with the “special
relations” between the state and the ethnic Latvians prior, as well as follow-
ing Latvia’s regained independence.
In the sense of the TEB, this aspect of the NP needs to be interpreted
as a signal of preparedness to engage in the bi-communal dialogue in order to
secure the status quo of the interethnic relations achieved at that given point.
However, while the NP makes a considerable concession to non-dominant
groups by inviting them to participate in decision-making, it gravely overes-
______________________________________________________________
timates the readiness of members of both titular and non-titular communities
to engage in collaboration. The policy decision makes sense not only in the
light of the TEB, but also from the rational choice perspective of the policy-
makers, who need to secure their privileged access to resources available
before negotiating additional issues. While the reasons to redress the impor-
tance of Latvianness as central for political community could include profi-
ciency in the Latvian language as a precondition to accessing citizenship, the
implementation of the minority school reform scheduled for 2002 required
additional affirmative steps to precipitate non-dominant groups’ negative
reactions.
However, the TEB suggests that the policy-documents preserving the
ethnic and cultural specificity of one group, while not addressing the expecta-
tions of the other groups, can only be expected to come only from the minor-
ity group. TEB states that the propositions for policy-amendments made by
the entrepreneurs of the minority community hold a significant bias in favour
of their ethnic group, but it is up to the majority to start negotiations and
reconsider the power distribution arrangements. But, how to deal with the
fact that Latvian NP was drafted by political entrepreneurs of the dominant
ethnic community, and largely without engagement of the non-Latvian popu-
lations? Let us now look, how this agenda was envisaged in the NP.
Envisaged Outcomes of Integration
The TEB does not distinguish between the real and perceived effects of group
strategies, when addressing policy decisions and steps undertaken by the
political entrepreneurs. While the non-dominant group constantly produces
the signs of intent for consumption of external actors and the dominant ma-
jority, the TEP does not discriminate between the “real” and “faked” signs. In
doing so, it allows the assessment of the opportunities for change in the rela-
tions between the groups involved in bargaining. As I had indicated in the
preceding section, the Latvian NP invited the members of the non-dominant
ethnic groups to engage in the policy-making by contributing to civic activi-
ties, through engagement in the NGOs and the like. Now I would like to
attend to more obvious signs included in the programme that suggest the
desirability of change to the contemporary resource allocation by calling for
greater cooperation of non-dominant groups with the Latvian state.
The introduction to the programme states that there is considerable
alienation between the members of society and the state tracing back to the
Soviet period of Latvian statehood. In addition, the alienation between ethnic
communities of Latvia can be surmounted when different parts of society
undertake common action, for example in the civil society organizations. The
programme calls for the formation of a democratic civil society in Latvia to
be united by two common beliefs: a commitment to the independence of
Timofey Agarin 215
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Latvia and dedication to the statehood based on the Latvian language. The
NP suggests the reasons why this was not possible to date: its roots lie in the
limited social cohesion of Latvian state.
Specifically, the programme addresses the segregation of information
space into one functioning in the state language, while the other provides
information in Russian. The divisions in the information space and different
interpretations of political events in media operating in two different lan-
guages is, as the NP suggests, determined by continuing existence of parallel
schooling in state and in minority languages. Once again, claiming that the
different schooling streams cater to different socio-cultural groups and rein-
force divisions between ethnic communities, the NP claims that unless this
Soviet inheritance is abolished can there be no effective social cohesion.
The sections of the NP addressing issues of education state that educa-
tion in general, and schooling in particular, are responsible for raising the
value of the Latvia’s statehood with its citizens. Additionally, the NP also
underlines the importance of creating a common information space in Latvia,
emphasising that a “segment of Latvia’s population is still influenced by the
Russian information space, and Russian sources of information play a signifi-
cant role in shaping their opinions” (FD, p.46). However, the final version of
the programme drops the statements on the separateness of the information
spaces in favour of underlining the prospects and possibilities of all Latvia’s
residents. It places greater emphasis on the common issues:
“[Common information space] will foster considerably

achievements in the Latvian language learning. Good command
of the Latvian language will help to overcome a barrier in re-
ceiving information, which exists due to the lack of knowledge
of Latvian and an inability to read the Latvian press, or to listen
to the radio and watch TV programmes” (NP, p. 96).
At the same time, not only the mass media, but also the academic
community is called upon to assist in the process of integration. The final part
of the programme outlines the possible areas where contributions of various
social scientists are expected and are welcome, and how these should assist
social accord in the new situation. The programme reads
“[T]he integration of society requires a large spiritual and moral

capacity […]. The process of integration also requires concen-
tration on self-actualisation so as to better develop and preserve
conviction and mental strength, individual judgement and inde-
pendent behaviour, when in the presence of people who have
different beliefs and values, and with people having another
ethnic identity” (NP, p. 104).
______________________________________________________________
However, it is hard to see who is supposed to coordinate the imple-

mentation of the goals and how The document emphasises the importance of
state policies for drawing the linguistic communities closer together, under-
lining the top-down logic of cohesion. While the programme remains largely
declarative and is ridden with repetition, it demonstrates a discernable diffi-
culty in determining both the role of majority in facilitating social integration
processes and the steps - besides learning the Latvian language of course -
expected from minority populations to create an integrated society. Overall,
the drafting committee has not succeeded in striking a balance between the
insecurities of the titular community regarding its privileged access to state
institutions via the linguistic proficiency on the one hand, and the non-
dominant groups’ growing proficiency in the state language and thus in-
creased pressure to compete with the dominant group “on their terms.”
Overall, the NP “Integration of Society in Latvia” was developed in
accordance with the FD approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and remained a
compromise between hard-line nationalising forces and those convinced of
the importance of symbolic steps to facilitate ethnic cooperation. In the
course of the two years after the initial version was passed by the Cabinet of
Ministers, the development of the final version of the document was continu-
ing and was completed on February 6, 2001, when the Cabinet of Ministers
of Latvia approved the full version of the NP. Preceded by decisions from
different governmental bodies, the Department of Integration of Society was
set up in November 2000 within the Ministry of Justice to coordinate the
implementation of the NP. Additionally, the Secretariat of the Special As-
signments Minister for Society Integration was established and made respon-
sible for the coordination of the programme. Likewise, the Society Integra-
tion Foundation was established in the 2001 to facilitate the implementation
process.
Until 2007 all these institutions were engaged in distribution of gov-
ernmental funds to organizations facilitating state-language acquisition and
supporting minority communities. However, weak institutional links between
the governmental and regional bodies undermined implementation and lim-
ited cooperation on the ground (Zepa et al., 2006a, p. 21). In addition, there
was no clear commitment from the policy-makers to engage with and im-
prove the bi-communal dialogue between the dominant and non-dominant
communities in Latvia. Significantly, there was a lack of criteria for evaluat-
ing the implementation of the NP’s agenda. As a result thereof some “façade”
minority organizations received financial support, while many “working”
projects were declined governmental funds.4 Ultimately, when discussions of
continuation of the integration initiatives ensued in 2007, no agreement could
be reached on the set of indicators to evaluate the impact of the NP during the
period of 2001–2008. Thus, it was argued, there was no reason to continue
Timofey Agarin 217
______________________________________________________________
with the integration initiatives altogether, and no need to devise a follow-up
national programme for society integration. In 2008 the responsibility for the
tasks of integration was moved to the Ministry of Children, Family and Inte-
gration Affairs prompting further cuts in funding and support of activities
facilitating ethnic accord.
Considered from the point of view of TEB, the impact of the NP on
the integration processes on the ground allows interesting conclusions about
the state of interethnic relations in Latvia. The NP opened up opportunities
for engagement of non-dominant communities in political decision-making,
but failed to determine the role of the dominant group in coordinating the
direction of cooperation. My overview of the background from which the
dominant group envisaged cooperation with another group makes clear that
Latvian political entrepreneurs made presumptions about the outcomes of
integration from a position, ascribed by the TEB to minority groups. Was this
really the case?
3. Discussion
The Latvian integration programme reflects a peculiar logic of its drafters. In
effect, the documents testify of a dissonance in their rhetoric and their appli-
cation, demonstrating a stunning difference between what the FD and NP
envisage to do, i.e. integration of multicultural in Latvia, and what these
documents actually end up doing. As I have discussed in the previous section
of the paper, both the FD and NP seek to co-opt the members of non-
dominant communities and to engage them in policy-implementation. How-
ever, the very engagement of non-dominant groups has to take place on the
terms proposed by the majority, discouraging non-dominant minorities’ ac-
tivities that would change the existing intergroup relations in the country. The
discrepancy between the envisaged intent and institutionalised content of the
integration programmes are likely to suggest interpretation of these policy-
documents as merely symbolic steps. The approach to integration, outlined in
the FD and NP was therefore to deflect criticism by complying with affirma-
tive action rules, and thus was highly tokenistic.
On the one hand, the document suggests that the state-bearing domi-
nant group of Latvians perceives itself to be locked in the status of minority.
The role of the titular community is underlined throughout, indicating that
non-titular residents of the state need to accept to the dominance of Latvians’
language and values in “their” state This is particularly expressed in the parts
of the programme indicating the importance of Latvian cultural values and
views of history, the value of linguistic proficiency and the social accommo-
dation on the basis of Latvians’ aspirations.
On the other hand, however, the programme points out the expected
change in the roles of non-titular and titular communities with both the domi-
nant and the non-dominant groups expected to engage in the shaping of the
______________________________________________________________
state policies. Does this suggest that non-dominant groups should come to
terms with their position as a national minority? Or, is the incentive to be
understood as calling on Latvians to assume a more consistent position as the
“masters of their land”? Either way, it appears that integration, as is con-
ceived of in the NP, is defined from the view point of a dominant group,
seeking perpetuation of its privileged access to political institutions and dis-
carding any claims from non-dominant groups to renegotiate the institutional
design in “their” state.
In the context of the Latvian situation, this is no mean feat. From the
point of view of my theoretical discussion, the policy-makers provide a
strong indication of intent to support the development of minority cultures
and the retention of non-core groups’ linguistic identities within the frame-
work of the Latvian state. Decisively, the TEB indicates that, when laying out
the terms of cooperation between communities, one of the groups needs to
define itself as a perceived majority, capable of dealing with the minority
irrespective of claims it extends. In Latvia, this indicates a crucial incentive
for non-titular populations to abandon the discourse of ethnic conflict, which
by the early 2000s had grown to become largely self-referential. As I have
demonstrated, the steps envisaged in the FD were feeding-off the non-
titulars’ rhetoric. In the 2001 version of NP, however, the rhetoric of democ-
ratic state-building, national consolidation and civic cooperation prevailed,
thus guaranteeing the common reference for both the titular as well as non-
titular groups. The TEB would suggest a reading of this “invitation to coop-
erate” as a call to non-titulars to assume the role of minority player and col-
lectively engage in bi-communal learning processes. In this case, one group
needs to assume the role of majority, while the other that of its partner.
Indeed, it seems that while NP outlines the steps to be undertaken by
non-Latvians to integrate, it fails to address the dominant group and calls for
Latvians’ active engagement in the integration process. The NP spells out
that the lack of Latvian citizenship is the reason for Russian speakers’ unwill-
ingness to engage in political processes in Latvia. Negative perceptions of
Latvian citizenship with Russian speakers are also addressed, as are the nega-
tive views of non-citizens about the procedures of naturalisation. However,
the differences in perception of political institutions between the dominant
and non-dominant group are seen as a result of individual differences be-
tween the Latvians and non-Latvians. Throughout the NP there is not a men-
tion of the fact that political institutions of the Latvian state favour Latvian
speaking residents over all other residents of the state. Neither is there any
acknowledgement of structural constraints placed on non-Latvians in the
Latvians’ state: a range of individual-level difficulties is mentioned in the
programme, among them the limited motivation to acquire the state language
and the set of negative collective images about the Latvian state and its citi-
zenship. However, while the ties of resident minorities with the Latvian state
Timofey Agarin 219
______________________________________________________________
are underemphasised, there appears to be neither an awareness of structural
disadvantages placed on minority communities, nor of the fact that these
deter future efforts of bi-communal dialogue.
The impact of institutional design and political structures has been in
the focus of debates on European involvement in the process of minority
integration in Latvia. As I have argued, structural limitations resulting from
the ethnic bias of Latvia’s state institutions significantly limit the opportuni-
ties for engagement of non-dominant groups in negotiations on resource
redistribution. My outline of the Latvia’s NP pays particular attention to the
motives of political entrepreneurs aimed at the accommodation of non-
titulars’ grievances under the conditions of the existing status quo. Deci-
sively, Latvian political entrepreneurs took their structural resourcefulness for
granted, disregarding the limits for political participation of minorities result-
ing from disadvantages they are exposed to in the nation-state of Latvians.
In the advent of the EU eastward enlargement, scholars and practitio-
ners engaged with Latvia’s integration processes were very positive about the
impact of international “epistemic communities” on Latvia’s policies towards
its minorities (Galbreath, 2006a; Galbreath, 2006b). Indeed, European en-
gagement allows predicting the timing of nationalising policies’ relaxation
during the period of external pressure and advocacy for measures alleviating
social exclusion of Latvia’s non-titular communities. Exemplarily, crucial
corrections to Citizenship Law preceded the start of EU-admission talks in
1998 only by few days. Perceived EU backing also explains the drafting of
the national FD for social integration and its development into a full-fledged
programme after Latvia was invited to join the EU. The growing security of
political entrepreneurs from the dominant community after the EU accession
ultimately resulted in the programme’s discontinuation in 2008.
However, it was not the representatives of the Russian speaking com-
munity, but of the Latvian dominant group who have initiated the bargaining
for greater control of resources. Crucially, this points to the evaluation of the
view held by both the dominant and the non-dominant groups of resources
already available during the bargaining for more. It is from this point that the
bargaining initiated by the Latvian political elites from a perspective of the
TEB should be interpreted as re-negotiating the terms of access to additional
political resources. TEB suggests that the representatives of a group in a
position of perceived disadvantage initiate the redistribution of resources.
This strategy, as we have seen has been deployed by the political entrepre-
neurs of Latvian majority. As TEB predicts, they heavily rely on the support
of external actors, in this case of the European institutions, in order to maxi-
mise their outcomes versus the group they perceive to be in a position of
greater resourcefulness, in this case Russian speaking residents of Latvia.
How valid is this interpretation of the roles, assumed by the ethnic
groups in Latvia during the process of NP implementation? Were non-
______________________________________________________________
Latvians really invited to engage with political institutions and advance their
goals within the framework provided by the Latvians’ state? Unfortunately,
the scope of the paper does not allow me to address the long-term effects of
the NP on the integration processes in Latvia. One important observation to
be made considers the institutional opportunity structure after the implemen-
tation of the programme. This needs to investigate whether the representation
of minorities among the political entrepreneurs increased, or whether the
perception of ethnic tensions was reduced, and interethnic cooperation inten-
sified at the institutional level. All this was not the case following the adop-
tion and termination of the programme.
Conclusion
My overview suggests that the Latvian programme was an ambivalent effort
to co-opt non-Latvians willing to improve their access to resources by par-
ticipating in community life on the terms imposed by the dominant group.
Indeed, the analyses of the integration outcomes suggest that this was par-
tially achieved, while large segments of the Russian speaking community in
Latvia were only further alienated from political processes (Zepa and Supule,
2006; Zepa et al. 2006b). Following the inception of the programme the
members of minority communities have even less incentive to engage in
political processes in their country of residence. Particularly those with no
citizenship and no voting rights continue to perceive the set of integration
related measures as Latvians’ tool to establish policies favouring the domi-
nant group at the expense of minority (Karklins and Zepa, 2001). But, how
did Latvia’s Russian speakers profit from the NP Society Integration in Lat-
via? As discussed in the first part of the paper, the approaches (building upon
Brubaker’s triadic nexus model) discuss group options from perspective of
resource distribution. In doing so, as I argue, they tend to conflate the institu-
tional proclivity towards stability and equilibrium with the preferences of
dominant group, seeking the preservation of its privileged access to institu-
tions in place. This was sought for by the titular group in Latvian society,
irrespective of changes in the status of all other groups. In a sense, this is
what happened in Latvia.
The paper provides for a better understanding of the dominant group’s
motivation to develop more intensive ties with the state and its institutions,
while continuing to co-opt the members of non-dominant groups. From the
point of view of the TEB, the NP sets a clear framework in which the bi-
communal cooperation should be pursued. However, it does so out of a posi-
tion of perceived minority that requires cooperation with another group, but
is not prepared to give up any of the structural advantages it had accumu-
lated. The programme also indicates what is does not support: “confrontation
between elements of society, segregation, marginalisation and forced assimi-
lation; tendencies to ethno-federalism that would undermine the formation of
Timofey Agarin 221
______________________________________________________________
a unified Latvian state; extremism, intolerance and national hatred” (NP, p. 9)
Remarkably, “the formation of a two-community state; the model of ‘two
societies in one nation’” (NP, p. 9) is precisely what can result from the em-
phasis on linguistic and cultural markers of individual identity.
The NP “Integration of Society in Latvia” makes clear that the Latvian
political entrepreneurs have set important agenda for local minority popula-
tions. The members of Latvia’s non-dominant communities are called upon to
take advantage of integration opportunities by accepting the relations be-
tween the ethnic groups in the public space. In doing this, non-dominant
groups are not only to accept the privileged status of the titular ethnic group,
but are also to perpetuate inequalities existing in these groups’ access to po-
litical, social and cultural resources provided by the state institutions. The
question remains however, whether this is what can be termed “integration,”
or whether the programme invites the members of non-dominant group to
undergo a voluntary assimilation to achieve equal treatment by the state.
Endnotes
1. Latvian Government (1999). The Integration of Society in Latvia: A

Framework Document. Riga. Full text of the Framework document
http://www.np.gov.lv/en/faili_en/integracija.zip Accessed 14 February 2008.
2. Boris Tsilevich. Personal communication, November 2007.
3. For an overview of debates taking place, see http://www.np.gov.lv/ in-
dex.php?en=fjas_en&saite=integracija.htm Accessed 14 February 2008.
4. Nils Muižnieks. Personal communication, November 2007.
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Social Cohesion Estonian Style:
Minority Integration Through Constitutionalized
Hegemony and Fictive Pluralism
Tove H. Malloy
In 1998 Estonia’s government began designing its social

integration programmes. While theoretically the early
integration programme was based on the Estonian nation
building policy of one Estonia speaking one language, the
Estonian language, subsequent programmes have increasingly
espoused multiculturalist views allowing citizens of minority
origin to practice and pursue minority culture in the private
sphere. This chapter will interrogate the theoretical and
conceptual ideas informing the Estonian Integration
Programme from the early political statements in 1998 through
to the 2008–2013 Programme. This will be done through a
critical examination of its main tenets, such as identity,
democracy and ethics as well as sovereignty and territoriality.
Subjecting these to arguments of pluralization, agonistic ethics
and critical responsiveness, it will be argued that in order to
render the Estonian Integration Programme fit for the 21st
century, it will have to be de-essentialized, de-antagonized and
de-territorialized.
Introduction
The ideal of social cohesion often becomes obscured in ethnically divided
societies after historical upheavals or major socio-economic changes. We
have seen this happen in several of the new democracies that emerged after
the end of Communism in Europe. Power changes hands, ideologies are dis-
carded and new ones adopted or old ones recycled. Societal groupings change
situation; majorities become minorities or vice versa. Pressures mount to
stabilize the state, unite the people and protect the nation. Umpteen models
exist as how to institutionalize the state and mediate the nation. Much less is
known about how to unite the people. The focus of this chapter is the efforts
to unite the people of Estonia after it gained independence from the Soviet
Union.
The moral vocabulary of social cohesion includes loyalty, solidarity,
virtue, common values, patriotism and unity. The normative vocabulary pre-
scribes equality, participation, inclusion, sovereignty and self-determination,
while the ethical vocabulary comprises tolerance, respect, recognition, dia-
logue and co-operation. However, the interpretation of universal concepts is
226 Social Cohesion Estonian Style
______________________________________________________________
often taken for granted, while the social vocabulary of culture, community,
diversity, added value, identity and difference is often neglected. And when
deemed relevant, social situations are often over-interpreted to fit certain
instrumental and ideological ends. As a result social cohesion ideals after
seismic changes may not reflect the actual situation on the ground. The aim
of this chapter is to expose the underlying ideological assumptions informing
Estonian social cohesion through a critical reading of Estonia’s political
strategy towards integration of minorities. This will be attempted by examin-
ing its main theoretical tenets, such as culture, toleration and identity and
relating these to ideologies of multiculturalism.
Social cohesion is of course a contested concept. It has been suggested
that belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition and legitimacy are key
concepts to take into consideration as well as “ties that bind,” such as values,
identity, culture, differences and divisions, inequalities and inequities, cul-
tural diversity and geographical divisions (Jenson, 1998).1 Social glue in
terms of associations, networks and infrastructure must also be in focus. In
fact, social glue is more than institutions; it is communication and the moral
regulation that people create as a result of their inter-dependence (see Scott
and Marshall 2005, p. 173).2 This is why it has been suggested that social
cohesion defines the role that social connectedness plays in people’s ability to
communicate across social, economic, cultural and ethnic groups (Ministry of
Culture 2006).3 But countries are unique, and countries require different
models of social cohesion. Social cohesion need not mean beautiful harmony
and common values only. It may also mean divergence and disagreements, or
what Charles Taylor has termed “constitutive tensions” (Taylor, 2001). In-
deed, the struggle for recognition may be seen as a permanent state of social
cohesion and indeed of democracy (Honneth, 1995). In fact, it is common
knowledge that social policies which do not account for difference and diver-
sification will not secure social cohesion (Delanty and O’Mahony, 2002).
The interpretation of the notion of social cohesion is thus a powerful tool, in
particular in the hands of ethnic elites. Myths are created or discarded (Cano-
van, 2005). This is why scholars of ethnic elites have argued that “[…] a
great deal of ethnopolitical outcomes are in fact often determined by the
effective reframing of otherwise objective situations by ethnopolitical entre-
preneurs, and […] rigorous conceptual schemes are only half the recipe for
explaining real ethnopolitical dynamics” (Pettai, 2001, p. 266). The “effective
reframing” of peoplehood and nationhood may result in the overt and covert
manipulation of public discourses and policies to fit a desired outcome, and
may be cognitive as well as non-cognitive. What is important, therefore, is
that such strategies are identified and analyzed so that ethno-political dynam-
ics may be evaluated normatively. To put Estonia’s efforts at social integra-
tion to such a test is one objective of this chapter.
Tove H. Malloy 227
______________________________________________________________
Estonia’s government began designing its first post-independence so-
cial integration policy in 1998. While initially a blueprint for a language
strategy promoting Estonian nation building on the basis of one language, the
Estonian language, subsequent integration programmes have increasingly
espoused more inclusive views. Much has already been written about Esto-
nian integration programmes (Pettai, 2003; Kirch et al., 2006; Brosig, 2008),
and ideas have been on offer to describe the strategies of the new democratic
governments in Estonia (Laitin, 1998; Pettai and Hallik, 2002; Järve, 2005).
While Vello Pettai and Klara Hallik speak of control system and co-optation
(2002), Priit Järve refers to ethnic containment policies (2005).4 However,
little has been argued about the theoretical and conceptual ideas informing
the Estonian integration strategy as espoused in the social integration pro-
grammes. Close readings of social integration documents usually offer theo-
retical insights into the model of social cohesion pursued. The specific pur-
pose of this chapter is, therefore, a theoretical interrogation of the overall
Estonian integration strategy (hereafter the Strategy) beginning from the early
political statement in 1998 through to the 2008–2013 full-fledged policy.
The overall aim of this chapter is to inform the normative discourse on
minority rights with a critical theory analysis of the model of social cohesion
being implemented in Estonia. Critical theory is seen as a good approach
because it can excavate the ideological assumptions motivating ethno-
political dynamics. Thus, identifying and analyzing ideological assumptions
as well as psychological processes helps us understand the ethno-
mobilization resulting in dominant and oppressive actions. Subjecting ideo-
logical assumptions to arguments of post-structural pluralization, this chapter
will question whether the Estonian Strategy is robust enough to meet the
pluralization of the twenty first century. Post-structural pluralization is the
view that pluralism needs to be pluralized, or as William E. Connolly puts it,
the “refashioning of pluralist imagination” meaning contesting our conven-
tional views of pluralism (1995, p.xiii). The chapter begins the critical read-
ing of the Estonian Strategy by first putting social cohesion in the perspective
of integration in order to show the link between these. This is followed by a
rough overview of critical theory tools offered by Connolly’s theory of plu-
ralization. The main part of the chapter, the analysis of the Estonian Strategy
will focus on three major documents adopted by the Estonian governments
since 1998. In concluding, I assess the degree to which pluralism informs the
Estonian Strategy and thus the ideal of social cohesion.
1. Social Integration and Antagonism

Usually social integration strategies are a response to change. In Estonia the
Strategy was a belated response to the change resulting from independence
and the adoption of ideologies informing the subsequent nation and state
building. The (re-)establishment of the independent state of Estonia resulted
______________________________________________________________
not only in a change in public ideology from socialism to liberalism but also
in a change in power structures and management of public spaces from pre-
dominantly Russian dominated and Soviet oriented to predominantly Esto-
nian and Europe oriented.5 Such change touches all members of society. Pro-
grammes to enhance social integration are thus both functional tools for fos-
tering social cohesion and ideological ideals for social unity. Moreover, they
involve both people and institutions, and they must involve both the public
and the private spheres. Most importantly, they must include law and moral-
ity because their overall aim is to create social order as well as social unity.
Change happens furthermore not only within societies but also in the wider
context of the global society. Global phenomena influence the way in which
states adapt both internally and externally. Social integration strategies must
adapt to change both within and without. In several ways, social integration is
a two-way process.
Social integration strategies are furthermore political tools of democ-
ratization. Democratization through integration requires that integration insti-
tutions have legitimacy. These must be designed in such a way that they
foster a sense of collective reasoning, meaning some involvement of all
groups in society and where feasible joint decision-making on major issues.
Numerous models have been designed espousing varied degrees of collective
reasoning in divided societies (Rawls, 1971; Lijphart, 1977; Dryzek, 1990;
Connolly, 1991; Habermas, 1992; Tully, 1995; Phillips, 1995; Keating, 2001;
Goodin, 2003; Bader, 2007; Norval, 2007). It is beyond the scope here to
discuss these models of political integration. It suffices to emphasize that
without legitimate institutions of political integration it is difficult to foster
social integration. This is particular relevant in deeply divided societies, such
as Estonia where the social is divided into two major groups living to a great
extent divided by ethnicity and language. The current ratio between Estonians
and Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia is three to one.6 When politics go
bad in societies divided along ethnic lines it is therefore likely that there is a
negative self-identification in play.
Negative self-identification can manifest itself as antagonism. An-
tagonism usually emanates from the impossibility to deal with alterity.7 Con-
nolly explains alterity as the otherness which is related to the process of link-
ing identity to difference (2002[1991]). Difference is intrinsically linked to
personal identity in that identity is established in relation to a series of differ-
ences. Identity stands in a complex, political relation to the differences it
seeks to fix. It is an endless play of definition, counter-definition, and coun-
tering of counter-definitions. Contingency of identity is thus a stable part of
identity itself. However, identity formation contingent on the self’s definition
of the Other makes for a troubled relationship with ethics. To act ethically
may mean to call some comforts of identity into question (Connolly,
2002[1991], p. xix). To be ethical is thus to put identity at risk because one
Tove H. Malloy 229
______________________________________________________________
would have to interrogate one’s essential self and go beyond toleration and
show respect. The implication would be that a reassessment of one’s true
identity might be required. For this reason many equate the demands of mo-
rality with the identity they already confess. To ensure ethical behaviour in
social integration processes, identity has therefore to be de-essentialized
through the incorporation of contingency rather than the negation of differ-
ence.
Identity formation has furthermore a collective dimension. Connolly
explains that personal identity and collective identity are connected through
the channel of freedom (2002[1991], pp. 65–68). People must be able to
believe that state institutions carry with them sufficient efficacy to promote
the collective ends we prize. Thus one’s self-identification as a free individ-
ual is bound up with a common belief in the capacity of the state to promote
publicly defined purposes. Similarly, if one knows that one’s choices and
judgements matter in the public realm this also informs the orientation one
takes to a variety of other social roles. Thus, when circumstances are favour-
able, the personal-collective identity relation is one of loyalty. When they are
unfavourable, they degenerate into either disaffection with the state or a na-
tionalism in which the tribulations of history are attributed to an evil other-
ness which must be neutralized.
Serious threats to freedom can grow out of these ideological links be-
tween personal and collective identity (Connolly, 2002[1991], pp. 198–200).
Firstly, the politics of collective identity may organize the idealisms and
egoisms of its legitimate members into a collective egoism. And the politics
of collective egoism becomes more intense whenever it is faced with internal
or external affronts to its self-assurance. Secondly, in believing that one’s
identity or the collective identity of one’s group is the best and only true
identity, the function of converting difference into otherness sets in. Collec-
tive dogmatization thus happens when it is confronted by disruptive contin-
gencies. Next it constructs minorities as objects of resentment to protect its
own collective identity. Such resentment often turns into a generalized, exis-
tential resentment formed by people or groups unwilling to explore necessary
injustices in their own political ideals (Connolly, 2002[1991], pp. 25–26).
Injustices suffered due to majority resentment are usually undeserved and can
be systemic. Often these injustices cannot be eliminated. But what is alarm-
ing is that if these injustices are not recognized by the individual or the group
unknowingly afflicting them on others, they conceal the fact that they foster a
feeling of existential resentment in the person unwilling to take the steps to
self-scrutinize. In other words, from the base of a political ideal which is not
fully analyzed and scrutinized can emanate, without wilfully wanting to do
so, a “politics of resentment” that legitimizes these injustices (Connolly,
2002[1991], p. 26). It is rewarded by those of the in-group who harbour the
same resentment. In effect, electoral politics contain powerful pressures to
______________________________________________________________
become a closed circuit for the dogmatism of collective identity into threat
through the negation of difference. As threats are perceived as real, they
become the energy for the dogmatization of identity. This is why it has been
argued that a robust social integration strategy neither evades nor confirms
difference (Phillips, 1996, p. 143).
Multicultural policy making derived from a view of multiculturalism-
as-ideology is indeed a difficult issue in many countries in Europe (see
Malloy, 2008). States face great difficulties when seeking to conceptualize
multicultural policies based on liberal democratic theory. From the core prin-
ciples of liberal democracy has sprung a number of different views of multi-
culturalism with different approaches to freedom and equality. In fact it is the
clash between a class versus a status approach that divides these. Most de-
mocratic theories of multiculturalism prioritise equality over freedom (Wal-
zer, 1983; Phillips, 1999). This is because they see diversity of cultures as an
asset to society rather than a burden, and thus all cultures deserve equal moral
standing and protection. The emphasis is on “multi” first, and where needed
differentiation in rights and entitlements will be made in order to secure
equality. Liberal theories of multiculturalism also see diversity of cultures as
an asset to society but are less clear on equality versus freedom (Kymlicka,
1989 and 1995). The moral value worthy of protection and standing is as-
signed to the individual person rather than to the cultural group and in most
theories of liberal multiculturalism differentiation is not acceptable (Sandel,
1982). One might say that these emphasize neither “multi” nor “culture” by
remaining neutral (Rawls, 1971; Nozick, 1974; Dworkin, 1977). Finally,
communitarian theories of multiculturalism value the cultural survival of the
group above all and thus appear willing to forego both equality and freedom
(Taylor, 1989). This emphasis on “culture” becomes problematic not only if a
culture promotes illiberal practices which might oppress individual members
but also if it is unable to be inclusive in terms of extending membership to
new members except through assimilation. This muddled state of affairs of
theories of multiculturalism is not just an academic debate about ideals of
freedom, equality and culture, or which multiculturalism-as-ideology do we
value. It is about how to conceptualize social integration strategies based on
status.
2. The Estonian Social Integration Strategy

Social integration strategies in a deeply divided society, such as Estonia in-
clude numerous policy areas all of which it is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter to address. Here the focus is alone on the official Strategy laid out by
consecutive Estonian governments in key documents. Of importance when
assessing ideological assumptions behind any social integration strategy
aimed at integration of opposed groups is to bring to bear any relevant foun-
dational doctrines through a full reading of the chain-of-texts that constitute
Tove H. Malloy 231
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these foundations. Such a chain-of-texts may include any type of identity-
informing narrative, including constitutional frameworks and special rights
provisions that stipulate legally the democratic sharing of sovereignty, terri-
tory and collective goods. This chapter must confine itself to highlighting a
few tenets of the foundational ideology enshrined in the 1992 Estonian Con-
stitution. These include the notion in the Preamble that the Constitution
“guarantees the preservation of the Estonian nation and its culture throughout
the ages” as well as Article 6 which stipulates that “the official language of
Estonia is Estonian.”8 In addition, Article 50 and 52 are of importance as
these regulate the right of minorities to establish “institutions of self-
government in accordance with conditions and procedures determined by the
Law on Cultural Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities” (1993) as well as the pos-
sibility of using their own language when in contact with the authorities in
areas where more than half of the population speak another language.
Here it should be noted that the Law on Cultural Autonomy provisions
the right of national minorities to establish self-administrative cultural institu-
tions which can promote the cultural rights enshrined in the Constitution. The
word self-government is nowhere to be found in text of the Act. In general
the Law is considered a re-adoption of the policies that existed during the
inter-war period when there was no major large minority threatening the
unity of Estonia and thus useless for the present day situation where one third
of the population belongs to another language group and culture (Smith
2001). It has also been seen as a “smoke screen” erected to ward off interna-
tional criticism about lack of rights for the minorities.9
This section begins by a reading of the 1998 document, The bases of
the Estonian state integration policy for the integration of non-Estonians into
Estonian Society (hereafter NIP) which set off the social integration process
in Estonia. Next, follows a reading of the 2000 Integration in Estonian Soci-
ety 2000–2007 (hereafter SIP) which was the first full-fledged programme to
be implemented and which was rigorously monitored and evaluated by the
Estonian authorities. Finally, the section will finished with a reading of the
Estonian Integration Strategy 2008–2013 (hereafter EIS) which was designed
on the basis of lessons learned from the previous programme as well as nu-
merous other policies related to social integration.10
The Beginning
The first political statement on Estonia’s new national integration policy, the
NIP adopted in 1998, was a brief document that explained the background to
the new policy, including the reasons for taking the step in Estonia as well as
the principles and goals of integration over the next ten years. It argued that
based on “current national and social interests,” policies should ensure rapid
modernisation by remaining united in the pursuit of one Estonian culture
______________________________________________________________
rather than risk “two societies in one state”. This agenda was considered
feasible as the attitude among Estonians had become “more tolerant and
open”. The principles underpinning NIP were the value of the young, of de-
velopment, of inclusive participation, of confidence through tolerance and the
values of a united Europe. The goal of one integrated, tolerant and secure
Estonian culture would be achieved through improved attitudes toward the
Other as well as improved access to citizenship. A better Estonian education
system as the basis for integration was also a goal, as was improved language
skills among non-Estonian speakers, adaptation of minorities to Estonian
culture, elimination of regional disparity and political participation of minori-
ties in Estonian society. Finally, it would also require improved understand-
ing among Estonians of minorities as legitimate members of society.
The NIP was a clear political statement that Estonia needed to im-
prove its integration ratio. There was a legitimate concern that the Estonian
state could break into two, if attitudes and co-existence did not improve.
Moreover, the statement about a future policy came after much international
pressure on Estonia to perform better with regard to its minorities not only
normatively but also in the perspective of a future membership of the Euro-
pean Union (EU).11 The need to move towards integration policy had been
stalled by rising state nationalism in the 1990s. This did not appear to have
waned when the NIP was drafted. The NIP espoused a strong mono-ethnic
attitude. Not only the title, but also phrases such as “policy on non-
Estonians” and “integration requires a serious effort on the part of non-
Estonians” evince a certain degree of superiority. To an outsider, the NIP
appeared rather more as a dictum of “my way, or no way.” Certainly, the
dilemma of how to reconcile state building with nation building was visible
from the start.
The main theoretical concern in the NIP is the use of the concept tol-
erance. The juxtaposition of tolerance and openness noted above raises con-
cerns about the understanding of tolerance and the effect that toleration has
on societies that are deeply divided. Tolerance is the habit of permitting dis-
agreement and not disapproving of opinions that you do not share or life-
styles that are different than yours. In deeply divided societies this means that
tolerance must foster patient forbearance towards that which is not approved.
There is toleration only where there are things that are disapproved. This is
why Connolly warns us that toleration can create problems in the social
sphere (2002[1991], p. 43). Toleration of non-approved cultural practices can
result in contempt and resentment. The people who decide to tolerate a for-
eign culture within their social realm may feel themselves absolved from
further moves towards better understanding of that culture. Such groups
rarely conceive of themselves as requiring equal doses of toleration from the
others and thus may come to wear their toleration as an additional badge of
superiority. Toleration on this notion clearly does not celebrate difference as
Tove H. Malloy 233
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an asset in society. Once the feeling of superiority is prevalent in a society,
resentment is likely to produce an environment of antagonism.
Connolly has suggested that in those political systems which are all
too often antagonistic, and which create environments where no positive
social vision is enunciated, a form of agonistic respect should be fostered
(2002[1991]). Agonistic respect is a reciprocal virtue appropriate to a world
in which partisans find themselves in intensive relations of political inter-
dependence but maintaining a “pathos of distance” (Connolly, 2002[1991], p.
179). Agonistic respect furthermore carries the expectation that one may
contest one another on the source of respect especially when one party insists
that eligibility for respect itself requires acceptance of the universal it af-
firms.12 Agonistic respect is thus compatible with a model of pluralism. It
does not allow for the consolidation of a majority identity around which a set
of minorities is tolerated as satellites.13 Instead it provides minorities with the
possibility to surge into being from below the threshold of tolerance.
Another theoretical concern in the NIP is the reference to one Estonian
culture. Referring to one Estonian culture is of course feasible as long as it is
seen as embracing several ethnic groups and traditions. This is the general
idea of culture in many multicultural societies of today. But several cultures
within one society also means that cultural groups strive for cultural hegem-
ony (see Figure 1). Cultural hegemonic struggles are part of an ongoing proc-
ess where boundaries change constantly according to influences from a vari-
ety of sources, including ethnic mobilization. When the lines are drawn in the
sand in the cultural market place, social exclusion based on ethnic mobiliza-
tion, ethnic boundaries, and ethnic closure happens (Ballard 2002: 34). And if
a group achieves a hegemonic position in society by seeking ethnic closure,
ethnic exclusionism may happen (Coenders et al., 2007). Cultural hegemony
based on ethnic exclusionism is thus part of the every day ethnic struggles in
society. However, such struggles should be open to all groups in society
through inclusion and participation in political life. It does not appear that the
NIP promoted participation of several cultures. This was evidenced in its
normative or lack of normative approach. It was a statement that included no
linguistic rights of minorities and indeed lacked entirely a human rights ap-
proach.14 Moreover, it decreed mobility of Estonians into the regions where
minorities are in the majority in order to render these regions “multicultural
and open” (NIP, 1998) while at the same time, minorities were expected to
integrate into the Estonian majority culture. In short, the way in which to
avoid the feared two-society scenario appeared rather more like colonization
by members of the majority into minority regions and through assimilation of
minorities into the majority culture.
It is not surprising that the NIP espoused ethno-cultural existential-
ism and that ethno-nationalism15 and ethnic conservatism were the prevailing
ideologies informing the state nationalism.16 At the time, the
______________________________________________________________
Culture
Dominant ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity Excluded
ethnicity
Figure 1. Dynamics of cultural hegemony and ethnic exclusionism

Source: Malloy and Gazzola
Estonian elite was clearly still in a post-imperial mode of thinking (Laitin,

1998, p.106). The perceived threat to state security of the large Russian mi-
nority with the power of its kin-state behind it prevented the elite from acting
as true liberals.17 Moreover, the fear that the Estonian language might die out
in the competition with a large imperial language was another conceived
threat albeit unfounded. The political elite essentially acted as if it were still a
weak and victimized minority fearing for its existence.18 However, the Esto-
nian language has survived for centuries the onslaught of German, Swedish
and Russian speakers. While the instrumental aim of the need to make all
members of society fluent in Estonian is plausible, the fact that it is presented
in the policy as one-language, one nation indicates a fear of multiculturalism.
The methodology of integration was clearly cultural assimilation, or state
building through a culturalist programme rather than a civic programme (La-
itin, 1998, pp. 346–359). As David Laitin has noted, culturalist programmes
that seek integration through assimilation will result in elite rationalization
about cultural hegemony, whereas assimilation through a civic programme is
more likely to result in pluralism.19 Certainly, the NIP was not a policy seek-
ing integration through dialogue. In fact, words such as dialogue, inter-ethnic
co-operation etc. did not occur in the NIP. It is quite clear from reading the
document that the Estonian elite was facing a dilemma in terms of having to
meet international normative and modernization standards while also seeking
to build a mono-ethnic based state.
The NIP was followed up by an Action Plan 1998–99, The integration
of non-Estonians into Estonian society which again mirrors the one-way
process that was the prevailing attitude at the NIP. The Action Plan did take
Tove H. Malloy 235
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two important steps further towards a redefinition of the notion of Estonian
culture. Firstly, it introduced the notion of multiculturalism into the Strategy.
While the Action Plan thus assumed multiculturalism as an underlying notion
of integration, it nevertheless defined multiculturalism from the perspective
of a mono-ethnic Estonian culture (see Pettai, 2003, pp. 70–71). It is clear
that the difference between multiculturalism-as-a-fact and multiculturalism-
as-ideology was not appreciated. Indeed, multiculturalism-as-ideology is
nowhere visible in the document. Secondly, even though the Strategy ap-
peared to be adopting a republican notion by referring to a “common core,”
the document explicitly underlines that this common core must derive from
the ethnic Estonian culture. This would have been just fine if the notion of
Estonian culture was an unfixed and non-static phenomenon that is constantly
“rejigged, reinterpreted and reinvented” (Ballard, 2002, p.13). However,
there is little evidence of this in the Action Plan. Instead it seems more like a
nationalism providing a foil for dominance (Kaufmann paraphrasing Juteau
in Kaufmann, 2004).20 It does mention behavioural patterns developed in
Estonia as part of the common core and refers to minorities as contributing to
these patterns. Indeed, it declared that the preservation of the culture of ethnic
minorities was a major task. This was to be achieved by giving minorities the
opportunity to be educated in their mother tongue. These facts could be inter-
preted as if the common core of Estonian culture would be comprised of
several cultures. Instead the Action Plan created a hierarchy of cultures
whereby the Estonian culture holds a privileged position in relations with the
state. It was obviously not meant to be a notion of a common core of several
cultures. This is confirmed in the document which states that “whereas soci-
ety may become multicultural, the state is and shall remain Estonian-
centered” (quoted in Pettai, 2003, p. 71). It is difficult to see a multicultural
strategy spring from such discourse.
From Statement to Implementation
Estonia’s first full-fledged attempt at social inclusion policy making was the
SIP. The SIP incorporated some of the criticisms lodged against the NIP,
including making references to human rights enshrined both in the Estonian
Constitution and international law instruments ratified by Estonia. Moreover,
the text refers comfortably to the idea of creating “a balanced and democratic
multicultural society” (SIP, 2000, p. 13) “characterised by the principles of
cultural pluralism, a strong common core and the preservation and develop-
ment of the Estonian cultural domain” (SIP, 2000, p. 5). Indeed, integration
was to be seen as a bilateral and harmonising process based on a process
enabling the maintenance of ethnic differences on the basis of the recognition
of the cultural rights of ethnic minorities (SIP, 2000, p.13). Thus, integration
was to happen through three processes, linguistic-communicative, legal-
______________________________________________________________
political and socio-economic. The linguistic-communicative process would
focus on integration in education, including language knowledge of Estonian
among minorities and attitudinal changes among Estonians. The legal-
political process would focus on improving the naturalisation process, minor-
ity participation in the political sphere as well as the loyalty and responsibil-
ity on the part of minorities toward the welfare of the Estonian state. The
socio-economic process would focus on breaking down barriers excluding
minorities from both public and work life as well as on regional development
through migration to and from the Ida-Virumaa County.21 But most impor-
tantly, the SIP now enumerated two target groups, ethnic minorities and
Estonians. On the one hand, ethnic minorities would see the barriers against
their integration disappear, whereas on the other hand, Estonians would act
less repellent against ethnic minorities while also recognizing that there was
no reason to fear the non-survival of their culture. In short, in reading the SIP
one was lead to believe that Estonia was ready to abandon the post-imperial
fear of ethnic minorities and move towards a multicultural and pluralist view
of society.
Indeed, nationhood is an ongoing mobilization and mediation process
and nationalism is a social force that may vary in strength from period to
period but which never disappears (Canovan, 1996). On such a reading one
might be led to believe that the Estonian integration Strategy was reflecting a
change in state nationalism which allowed a greater degree of pluralism.
However, the SIP maintained the mono-ethnic approach and an overt ideol-
ogy of ethno-nationalism as state nationalism. The idea that the theoretical
tenets of the SIP evidenced a transformation from post-imperialism to multi-
culturalism is questionable to say the least. Granted, it has been argued that
the way in which the Russian-speaking minorities were perceived has
changed. While the legacy of many years of Soviet domination resulted in
Estonians seeing the Russian-speaking community as guest workers, a re-
definition happened in the public discourse whereby they came to be seen as
immigrants once Estonians began to realize that Russian-speakers were not
leaving (Pettai, 2001). In contrast to being a method of transformation, this
was a strategy of avoidance. What was to be avoided was the acceptance of
the Estonian state as a dual-society state which would have had to give rec-
ognition to the Russian-speaking minorities as a national minority and per-
haps even an autonomous self-administrating minority. The redefinition of
the status of the Russian-speaking minorities was therefore a political ma-
noeuvre rather than an ideological shift.
A closer look at the notion of the common core in the SIP thus reveals
a contradiction. First of all, the SIP established that “the common core oper-
ates on the basis of the Estonian language, common social institutions and
democratic values” (2000, p. 16). Mono-lingualism was thus maintained.
Secondly, democratic values enumerated in the document included normative
Tove H. Malloy 237
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standards as well as individual choice and cultural pluralism, in particular the
objective of integration as the “cultural acclimatisation of different ethnic
groups in Estonia” (SIP, 2000, p. 16, emphasis mine). One must wonder what
was meant by acclimatisation? Allowing for translation nuances, it is not
convincing language since the reference to different ethnic groups implies
exclusion of ethnic Estonians. This seems to be confirmed by the definition
of cultural pluralism offered in the SIP as “the recognition of the cultural
distinctiveness of minorities in Estonian society” (SIP, 2000, p. 16). While
this might sound promising for minorities, it is not clear how inclusive this
pluralism is? Does it include ethnic Estonians? Thirdly, the common core
would be based on the knowledge of Estonian history, pride of being Esto-
nian citizens and awareness of the multicultural nature of the country. This
means that the common core would create an environment that formed “a
basis for mutually enriching interaction and the recognition of common inter-
ests” as well as make minorities feel secure in Estonia (SIP, 2000, p. 16). The
concern for the security of minorities is of course noble but one must ques-
tion whether a knowledge of Estonian history and pride of being an Estonian
citizen really guarantee common interests?
Although this enumeration of democratic values could have been
taken right out of the textbook on multiculturalism-as-ideology, it prioritises
unfortunately the communitarian view of multiculturalism-as-ideology that
presupposes moral membership of the in-group and which extends its mem-
bership only through assimilation. Thus, the way in which minorities would
be invited to hold moral membership of the in-group would be in a rather
cruel manner akin to what Charles Taylor has termed “mis-recognition”
(Taylor, 1994).22 Moral membership for minorities in the common core of
Estonian society would require members of minorities to split their personal
identity. This is described quite clearly in the SIP in that “the languages of
ethnic minorities, ethnic traditions, religious beliefs, family traditions and
personal lifestyles are not treated as part of the strong common core of Esto-
nian society” because they are not considered common to all members of
society (SIP, 2000, p. 17). Indeed, these phenomena are considered the pri-
vate interests of each individual, and any opportunity for their advancement
must be found in the private sphere. The definition thus excludes ethno-
cultural minority identity characteristics from the public spheres and hence
from the common core. Separating the public and the private sphere in terms
of culture is a serious matter because it not only may promote dislodged
identities; it may also result in lack of social cohesion.
The idea that what happens in the private sphere of people’s lives is
not a matter of state concern is flawed for two reasons. Firstly, a horizontal
approach to integration both the social and the political are vital. One cannot
argue for a horizontal approach to integration at the political level without
also having some horizontal approach in social affairs. Some models main-
______________________________________________________________
tain the separation of the spheres with mixed results and only long-term pros-
pects for social integration.23 A vertical view of the social whereby ethnic and
cultural groups live separated will not create social integration even if the
political sphere is horizontal (see Figure 2). Moreover, the political environ-
ment confirms the laws of the state, and the state and its laws are the guardian
of an entire social order and of all the values which the social order requires.
One cannot argue that law is public whereas morality is private into which
the law can intrude only by violating individual rights or freedoms and so
undermining its won legitimacy. Women are mothers in both public and
private. Moreover, morality becomes public once it involves harm to one of
the involved. By the same token, the languages of ethnic minorities in Esto-
nia must be a public concern precisely because the SIP holds that while learn-
ing Estonian is important for the integration process, the state at the same
time “also supports ethnic minorities’ activities in the promotion of education
and culture in their native tongue and the preparation of a pedagogical cadre”
(SIP, 2000, p. 14). Since when did a pedagogical cadre not belong to the
public sphere? Separating the public and private spheres functionally is sim-
ply not feasible. Should the state support mother tongue learning only with
the view that it would be spoken in private behind closed doors? Why bother,
if this were the case?
Political sphere
Group Group Group Group

1 2 3 4
sphere
Social
Figure 2.Vertical social (non)-integration
Secondly, the functional separation between the private and the public
spheres is simply not feasible in terms of individual self-identification. The
fact that it is to be reality for minorities but not for the core ethnic Estonian
group does not promote pluralism. Rather, is seems like a full invitation to
create the much feared two-society state. The two-society fear is indeed a
legitimate fear if social integration is the goal.24 The SIP does recognize that
contradictions and conflicts cannot be ruled out in integration processes since
“the social harmonisation of society and the preservation of differences are
often conflicting processes” (SIP, 2000, p. 15). Openness and tolerance to-
wards differences are thus considered one of the principal challenges for
Estonian society, according to the SIP (2000, p. 15). All parties must exert
Tove H. Malloy 239
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themselves in achieving a more open society. Moreover, minorities must
learn Estonian, and Estonians must realize that the future of Estonia is not
ethnic based but political (SIP, 2000, p.15). However, while the SIP argues
correctly that social cohesion must be fostered through political institutions, it
is not ready to give up the ethno-cultural traditions of mother Estonia. This is
because the definition of the common core as noted above requires one lan-
guage, the Estonian language and one caretaker of the state, the Estonian
culture. This means that political institutions must follow the ethno-cultural
traditions of the Estonian culture, rather than succeeding in convincing mi-
norities to become part of this. The separation of the public and the private
spheres therefore results in excluding minority ethno-cultures from the politi-
cal institutions (see Figure 3).
Political sphere
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4

sphere
Public
Social sphere
Group 2 Group 3 Group 4

Private
sphere
Figure 3. Vertical cultural non-integration
As much as the framers of the SIP have tried to make it look like a
Strategy for fostering multiculturalism-as-ideology, they essentially gave
minorities only one choice, namely assimilation. The separation of the public
and the private spheres which is necessary for some but not for others will
not be overcome through tolerance. Group 1 which masters the requirements
for operating in the public sphere will hold hegemony over the political dis-
course whereas Group 2 will be forced to accept assimilation in order to par-
ticipate in that discourse. As a result, it would appear that the SIP will even-
tually defeat its own purpose of integration. Estonia is thus indeed what the
Constitution stipulates, a state with the dominant ethnic group exerting cul-
tural hegemony over the state institutions through constitutional exclusive-
ness. Had the SIP promoted sincere dialogue, however, the outlook might be
different. But even this hope is futile. Dialogue is indeed mentioned in the
SIP in that “in social dialogue all cultures functioning in Estonia are equal”
but in relation to the state, “the status of Estonian culture is different to that
______________________________________________________________
of minority cultures” (2000, p. 17). Notwithstanding that this means that
social dialogue does not include state affairs, it reiterates the hierarchy estab-
lished in the earlier statement that only Estonian cultural characteristics are
accepted in the public sphere and state affairs. By relegating minorities to a
secondary rank in society, it contradicts the democratic view of multicultural-
ism-as-ideology offered above which prioritises equality over freedom, and
where cultural diversity is seen as an asset to society rather than a burden,
and thus all cultures deserve equal moral standing and protection. At best the
multicultural view espoused in the SIP is communitarian; but a muddled and
exclusionary communitarian outlook which promotes normative standards
while risking damages to the self-identification processes of minorities.
Not surprisingly, the SIP was unsuccessful in achieving its goals and
targets. When the time came around for the Estonian government to draw up
a new five-year programme for integration, there seemed ample opportunity
to seek to design a coherent, non-contradictory programme which would take
into account lessons learned. As with the SIP, the government opened up for
consultation with civil society, including international experts.25 For this
purpose a working document, Strategy for the integration of Estonian society
2008–2013 (SIES) was drawn up and circulated in 2007. The SIES document
credited the lack of progress to the fact that “volume and speed of implemen-
tation were less than required” (SIES, 2007, p. 3). The SEIS document con-
cedes to international assessments of the situation which held that the SIP
2000–2007 programme did not pay strong enough attention to socio-
economic integration. Thus, combating unemployment and taking measures
to prevent HIV/AIDS should receive stronger attention in the next pro-
gramme. It also noted that the feeling of distance between Estonians and
minorities remained a concern, in part because there is in practice no public
communicative space. The media is virtually separated according to lan-
guages. This furthermore hampers the inter-cultural dialogue. However, the
SEIS document did not consider the multicultural goals and objectives of the
previous programme as flawed and in need of redefinition, nor did it find the
conceptual framework and implementation approach wanting (SEIS, 2007, p.
3). It did redefine the contextual situation of integration a bit by emphasizing
the increasing mixture of cultures at the global level and the influence that
this would have on Estonian society. The scope was thus broadened to in-
clude newly arrived immigrants who constitute around two per cent of the
population. Following that, it acknowledged the need to incorporate the EU’s
“Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the integration of Third-
Country Nationals in the European Union.” The EU’s definition of integra-
tion was reproduced in full in the SEIS document, and the principles adopted
by the Estonian government were declared in accordance with the EU defini-
tion.26
Tove H. Malloy 241
______________________________________________________________
In Search of Pluralism
Following the public consultation the EIS was drafted and adopted by the
Estonian parliament in April 2008. This document follows the SIP’s theoreti-
cal outlook but is greatly improved in terms of use of ethical language and
references to international normative standards. It evidences the cognition
that social integration is a delicate, emotional process which requires great
sensitivity to issues and wording. Thus, gone are the references to non-
Estonians, the unfortunate and misconstrued denomination of Russian-
speaking people living in Estonia without Estonian citizenship. Instead there
is reference throughout the document to permanent residents. While this is
not ideal either as it still implies immigration and thus out-group status (see
Laitin, 1998, p. 267), it takes the sting out of the reference. Moreover, refer-
ence to the common core is gone, and the notion that integration involves all
members of society is stated clearly several times. The principles of the EIS
are thus rephrased to fit better the international discourse on human rights
and freedoms and indeed prefaced loud and clearly by an adherence to EU
values, norms and standards. In that sense, the EIS may actually have ac-
quired its own power in the process. However, the EIS remains mono-ethnic
and mono-lingual as dictated by the Constitution. The division between the
public and the private spheres is also maintained although it is not described
as concisely as in previous documents. It furthermore maintains the idea of a
common Estonian identity although this is rephrased as a “common state
identity” (EIS, 2008, p. 4). Similarly, the fear of the dual-society is reiterated
although in terms of isolation and withdrawal rather than sovereign and po-
litical division. Finally, and most disturbingly, it maintains the notion of
tolerance as the agent destined to foster integration.
New language in the EIS includes a principle on civil society and the
need for more activity at the social level. This is seen not only as relevant in
terms of social integration but also as a tool to empower people through self-
realisation and make them more loyal to the state. This should be seen in
relation to the SEIS working document which discussed participatory democ-
racy and confidence in the process among all members of society. Participa-
tory democracy was seen in the SEIS as the “intensification of … mutual
contacts between people from different cultures based on toleration and co-
operation” (SEIS, 2007, pp. 7–8). While the ambitious notion of participatory
democracy did not make it into the EIS, a direct call for NGOs to help foster
more individual participation was included. Notwithstanding that participa-
tory democracy would have been ambitious in a democracy where a large
portion of the population is expected to shed itself of its cultural identity
when participating in public affairs, its absence from the final document may
be indicative of the fact that it would have required concessions in terms of
political minority rights.
______________________________________________________________
Interesting is the new notion of a common state identity. According to
the EIS it is to be based on a common understanding of Estonia as built on
the constitutional values of the Republic and the contribution of all in society
to this. Notwithstanding the fact that the idea of a state identity is odd, but
precisely therefore, it seems that this term must cover for something that is
too sensitive to be mentioned. Two issues make this concept problematic.
Firstly, the idea that the state identity must be based on the constitutional
values of Estonia. By now it is well known that the Estonian Constitution is
founded on a logic of ethnic ascendancy meaning the ascendancy of the eth-
nic group of Estonians (Järve, 2005). This logic is found in the Preamble to
the Constitution which holds that
“Unwavering in their faith and with an unswerving will to

safeguard and develop a state which is established on the inex-
tinguishable right of the Estonian people to national self-
determination and which … shall guarantee the preservation of
the Estonian nation and its culture throughout the ages.”
Multiculturalism in Estonia is thus if not a fiction certainly unconstitu-

tional.27 Secondly, the idea that all members of society can contribute to the
work towards an ideal of a state identity is problematic. Although the EIS
explains Estonian state identity as the “sense of us” and “the sense of security
of the people in that they are part of the Estonian social and political life and
share the positive emotional sense of belonging with the people and the terri-
tory” (2008, p. 11), such language seems insincere. For minorities to accept
the invitation, they would have to assimilate precisely because according to
the Constitution the aim of statehood is ethnic Estonian nationhood. The goal
of a common state identity is not, therefore, a case of a blurring between the
distinction between state building and nation building but rather, I would
argue, a case of a rational choice between two equally problematic notions of
collective identity.
If the term of national identity had been used, the integration Strategy
would have been seen as ambiguous as to which national identity was in
question. This is because the public discourse has delineated “the national” in
Estonia as Estonian and not Russian. Thus, the framers of the EIS were cor-
nered by the public discourse and of course by the Constitution. The term
state identity was perhaps chosen because it was considered safer not only
from a constitutional perspective but also from a psychological point of view.
By using the term state identity the reference to Estonia is saved because the
Strategy holds that the culture and language of the state is Estonian. More-
over, the term avoids implying the politically incorrect language of us-them
because it implies a civic republican notion, a notion which does not appear
sincere in the case of Estonia. However, ambiguity is not as alarming as often
Tove H. Malloy 243
______________________________________________________________
thought, as long as the self-identification process fosters solidarity. Jeff Spin-
ner-Halev has warned that democratizing states which are also nationalizing
need to develop a sense of solidarity through national identity formation
(2008). Solidarity, he argues provides the state with the power to establish
legitimate institutions. Solidarity is fostered through an appeal to a collective
identity, often a national identity, rather than a republican citizens-based
identity which only promises good governance. Since sacrifice is needed
from all members of society especially when the democracy is new, the ap-
peal to a national identity is more likely to foster this. Thus, Spinner-Halev
argues that “a national identity gives people a strong sense of purpose as they
build up state institutions; it encourages them to make sacrifices” (2008, p.
608).
The problem is that sacrifice is not easily fostered in new democracies
where the “nation” is divided. A feeling of threat thus takes over, and unless
the democracy has reached a certain maturity whereby the ruling elite and the
majority will assume the burden of providing protection and minority rights
to vulnerable groups, solidarity will not emerge. The method by which to
achieve this, according to Spinner-Halev, is through developing a nationhood
that contends with memories of past injustices, not a separation of identity
from politics, or what he calls privatisation of identity (2008, p. 619). In short
a complication and expansion of the collective identity even to the point of
sustaining ambivalence rather than a simplification (Spinner-Halev, 2008, p.
621). Had the framers settled for a reference to national identity it might have
been, therefore, an opportunity to invite members of the Russian-speaking
community to join an Estonian nation that was willing to be flexible and
redefine itself.
Here it is interesting to note that the term “Estonianness” had been in-
troduced in the SEIS without further clarification except that it would be a
common element of society. This term was not maintained in the EIS.
Whether this was due to the Bronze Soldier crisis of April 2007 that saw
violence break out during the protests of the Russian-speaking youth against
removal of the statue of the Soviet soldier from downtown Tallinn is difficult
to know. Certainly, it might have given the drafters second thoughts. This is
unfortunate because Estonianness is precisely what is needed but what re-
mains an illusion as long as the ideal of the Estonian language and the Esto-
nian culture remains the hegemonic goal for the public sphere. The Bronze
Soldier crisis shows that the process from dogmatization to a “politics of
resentment” can trigger events in the social environment. No matter who
blinked first, the crisis reignited old fears and feelings. Throughout the world
the events were interpreted as the beginning of the break-up of Estonia and
the fact that Russian-speakers remain suppressed in the Estonian society.
However, polls taken immediately after the event seem to negate these sup-
positions (Minister for Population 2007).28 Attitudes among both ethnic Es-
______________________________________________________________
tonians and Russian-speaking Estonians were in fact improved and sympathy
on the rise. In that sense the Bronze Soldier crisis may have been the good
news. This is because events can promote “nationness” (Brubaker, 1996, pp.
18–19), and nationness is what is lacking in Estonia. Rogers Brubaker ex-
plains that nationness is a cognitive frame and a socio-political category that
may crystallize as a result of sudden and unexpected events collectively in-
volving all members of society. Of course, nationness after the Bronze Sol-
dier could easily be seen to only mobilize ethnic Estonians. It therefore re-
mains to be seen if the polls hold up in the long term.29
A major concern raised by the EIS is labour market integration and
elimination of regional inequality. Integration in these sectors has suffered
due to the lack of mastering of the Estonian language among Russian-
speaking minorities. The SIP did not include activities in the field of eco-
nomic integration as this was promoted through other government pro-
grammes. Results now show that labour market exclusion is not due to ethnic
exclusion but due to structural deficiencies among minorities. However, the
idea that structural deficiencies in labour market performance can be seen
separately from the cultural identity of minorities is flawed. This argument
has been pointed out by economists who argue that in the economy “culture
counts” (see Malloy, 2005b). Culture in the economy supports the view that
individual economic action is based on culturally engendered capabilities.
The idea that capabilities are fostered through culture relies on the view that
certain functions are particularly central in human life, and these functions
render the human being a dignified free being capable of shaping her life in
co-operation and reciprocity with others (Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1999).
Moreover, a human life is shaped by these human powers of practical reason
and sociability, and each human being is thus a bearer of cultural value (Raz,
2005). In other words, the value of culture must be appreciated as a valuable
contribution to the individual’s development and capability to function in
society, especially the individual’s capability to act in the economic sphere.
Culture is therefore seen as one of the components of the multi-
dimensionality of social and economic inclusion.
Finally, encouraging about the EIS was the principle of adhering to
fundamental European values, including the normative values of the Euro-
pean Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Not that this would yield
minorities greater protection; the EU acquis communautaire does not include
any specific minority rights. But the cognition that Estonia is squarely em-
bedded in the European cultural area and the values that this brings is ground
for optimism. The notion that a social integration strategy is an isolated inter-
nal state affair has been challenged by the increased inter-dependency of
states, and the idea that state politics is subject to a de-territorializing global-
izing politics. Globalizing politics to Connolly means that individual loyalties
are bestowed not necessarily on a territorial polity but on late modernity
Tove H. Malloy 245
______________________________________________________________
(2002[1991], p. 216). Late modernity is a systemic time without a corre-
sponding political place. Globalising politics thus call the sufficiency of sov-
ereignty into doubt. “The reach and effects of global processes exceed the
reach of sovereign states, and state-centred definitions of these matters may
exclude exactly those issues and possible responses that would significantly
compromise the claims of sovereignty” (Connolly 2002[1991], p. 216). Un-
fortunately, the strategic objectives of the EIS do not take into account this
global perspective. The relations between social integration, social cohesion,
democracy and globalization do not appear to have informed the EIS.
Granted it is early days for the Estonian state both in terms of statehood and
in terms of membership of the EU. But globalization does not wait. The need
to put social integration strategies in the perspective of the globalized democ-
racy and new notions of sovereignty and territory is pressing.
Conclusion
Although social cohesion is a notion that is up for grabs in any society, the
intellectual manipulation by political elites to suit certain ideological and
instrumental goals can have devastating effects in societies divided along
ethnic lines. Universal vocabulary proves useful signifiers in such a dis-
course. It represents ideals that are difficult to repudiate, especially as ideals
for deeply divided societies. Usually these are promoted as norms that are
natural and true standards that anyone would endorse once they have experi-
enced them. However, rather than creating a true horizontal sphere of univer-
sal (common) values, such an agenda can in fact result in alienation and ex-
clusion. The problem is that if there is not consensus about universal defini-
tions, political power structures are free to take over and set the agenda for
nation and state building according to the prevailing view among the people
who populate these structures. This is one of the reasons that nations are
“zones of conflict” where the power to regulate populations is fluctuating
(Hutchinson, 2005, p.4). Particularistic values may be promoted as universal-
istic ideals. The Estonian social integration Strategy in focus in this chapter is
an epitome of such hegemonic strategies.
The problem is when states do not want a plural ethos upon which to
build its polity. Such states are forced to find a social cohesion myth that
conceals the real aim while purporting to promote pluralism. This type of
inclusive fiction, or what I would term “fictive pluralism” thus renders the
basis for social cohesion dubious. If social integration strategies are to be
seen as indicators of a country’s ideal of social cohesion, and ultimately of
the country’s ability to foster social cohesion, Estonia’s Strategy is an exam-
ple of contradictions. This is because, on the one hand, the Estonian integra-
tion Strategy is promoting pluralism in terms of multiculturalism whereas, on
the other hand, the founding document of the state, the Constitution is decree-
ing ethnic dominance. Granted it is feasible to promote pluralism in states
______________________________________________________________
dominated by one ethnie but if the dominant ethnicity is legally enshrined in
the constitution, pluralism will not stand up in a court of law let alone play a
role in collective identity formation. This type of “constitutional hegemony”
thus negates any feasibility of rendering the polity plural. This is the dilemma
that the framers of the Estonian social integration Strategy were facing all
along. The result we have seen is a vertical society detached from a fictive
horizontal polity. The contradiction between ideology and instrumental goals,
i.e. ethno-nationalism and dominant Estonian ethnicity, on the one hand, and
public policies of integration setting fictive targets for pluralism for some but
not for others, on the other, therefore puts the authenticity of the Strategy in
question.
As the transformation from a thick to a thin ethno-nationalism is thus
questionable, it is likely that the Estonian integration Strategy based on the
underlying assumptions of ethno-national ideology and ethnic dominance
will not reach its ultimate goal of social integration. Certainly, social cohe-
sion seems a long-term perspective if not a dream. Moreover, as global plu-
ralization begins to pluralize the Estonian ideal of non-plural social cohesion,
the ramifications may be dire. This chapter has shown that some of the theo-
retical ideals informing the Estonian Strategy are flawed either because they
are not pluralizing, such as the view of split-identity for members of society
who are not ethnic Estonians, or because they are not ethical, such as tolera-
tion. Split-identity may result in radicalization, and toleration fosters antago-
nism. Moreover, it has been argued that the notion of culture, one Estonian
culture for the public sphere is fabrication. Fabrication may be necessary to
create the myths of nation, the people and the polity. But fabrication which
separates the people according to spheres is basically social engineering.
These ideals and ethics, I believe cover for a resentment within the dominant
Estonian ethnicity which is manifested in antagonism and dogmatism thus
informing the Estonian integration Strategy negatively. If the Strategy is to be
successful in enhancing social cohesion in a globalizing world, it will have to
be further de-essentialized, de-antagonized and de-territorialized.
Endnotes
1 The Canadian Cultural Observatory study from 1998 about social cohesion
in Canada focused on mapping culture and cultural diversity in the areas
mentioned. See Jenson 1998. Will Kymlicka in a chapter named “The Ties
that Bind” discusses a similar 1991 study of the Canadian Citizen’s Forum
which analyzed shared values in the Canadian society. See Kymlicka 1995,
Chapter 9.
2 Emile Durkheim called this the organic solidarity and argued that it is fos-
tered through increased intensity in communication between segments of
Tove H. Malloy 247
______________________________________________________________
society. This constant social contact between groups and individuals creates
the moral and social consensus which is a pre-condition for social integration.
3 Piloting indicators in the area of social cohesion is still in an embryo stage
in the social sciences but the Government of New Zealand has taken a lead
though with its 2006 study which is in fact a compendium of cultural indica-
tors.
4 Indeed, Järve (2005) confirms all the analytical tools of Sammy Smooha’s
model of ethnic democracy (2005). Smooha’s model of ethnic democracy is
an analytical model for a regime that combines a structured ethnic dominance
with democratic rights for all.
5 During the Soviet era, the USSR had followed an integrationist politics
toward the Baltic states thus allowing for the local or titular elites to be in
governing positions as well as for the local or titular languages to be used
along side the Russian language. See further Laitin, 1998, p.67.
6 It should be noted that the denomination Russian-speaking in Estonia cov-
ers a number of national minorities, such as people from Belarus, the
Ukraine, as well as Russians from Russia proper.
7 For a good analysis of alterity in national identity construction see Camp-
bell 1998.
8 The full text of the Estonian Constitution can be found on the web-pages of
the Estonian President at http://www.president.ee/en/estonia/constitution.php
(8 January 2009).
9 For more on the Law on Cultural Autonomy, see Smith 2001. To read the
full text of the Law, see the Estonian Institute’s website at
http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/cult_auton/ (9 January 2009).
10 All three documents have been read in the English language as provided to
me by officials in the Estonian public administration. I would like to thank
Eva-Maria Asari for assistance. Any misjudgement on my part due to work-
ing from translated documents are indeed unfortunate, and I would be grate-
ful for any comments to that effect. The documents in are available in Esto-
nian at the website of the Office of the Minister for Population and Ethnic
Affairs http://www.rahvastikuminister.ee/?lang=en (9 January 2009).
11 Most notably the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities had
sent letters to the Estonian Government indicating that the country was vio-
lating international standards on national minority protection. For a list of his
letters and recommendations go to http://www.ecmi.de/emap/download/
Est_OSCE_1_List_of_documents.pdf (9 January 2009). The list also includes
references to Council of Europe and EU reports as well as those of the United
Nations’ Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
12 The scholarship of Bhikhu Parekh is another good example of this argu-
ment. Particularism is to be respected not because of it being particular but
because it is universal to the personal identity of the particular person. The
fullest account of this thesis is found in his latest book (2008).
______________________________________________________________
13 To be successful Connolly argues that agonistic respect must furthermore
be accompanied by a sense of critical responsiveness (1995). Critical respon-
siveness requires individuals to be willing to redefine their own identity in
the ongoing interaction with others. It does not mean that the individual re-
sponds paternalistic or humbly and warmly to the other to prepare the other to
convert to a universal identity. Critical responsiveness instead offers a view
that opens up cultural space and allows the Other to consolidate itself into
something that is un-afflicted by negative cultural markings. It thus does
away with the ‘us-them’ syndrome so often afflicting democracy in divided
societies.
14 For a good discussion of the various defects of the NIP, see Järve and
Wellmann 1998.
15 Ethno-nationalism is seen here as an ideological creed rather than a poli-
tics of separatism.
16 The term ‘radical ethnic nationalism’ has been used about this type of
post-communist nationalism that emerged in a number of post-Soviet states
(Delanty and O’Mahony, 2002, pp. 149-50). Characteristic for this type of
nationalism is a lack of coherent ideology and historic amnesia and little in
common with earlier nationalisms.
17 For a good description of the manoeuvres that members of the Estonian
parliament, the Riigikogu went through to prevent Russian-speakers from
standing for office in the 1993 election, see Laitin, 1999, pp. 182–183.
18 Will Kymlicka calls this phenomenon a ‘minoritized majority’ because it
describes a mode of thinking that new rulers in post-Communist countries
followed at least initially towards the representatives of the former imperial
rulers who had become minorities (2007, pp. 185-86). Usually this mode of
thinking is based on a fear that the former imperial rulers would rise again, or
that through the global market the former imperial rulers would be strong
enough to outdo the nation building of the new-found independent state.
19 Laitin explains further that elites that follow a culturalist programme of
integration will create a French-type republic, whereas elites that follow a
civic programme are more likely to create pluralists states , such as the USA
(1998: 351–352)
20 For a full theory of dominant ethnie see Smith 1986. For an excellent
discussion of dominant ethnicity see Kaufmann 2004.
21 Ida-Virumaa County is the county bordering to Russia in the North East of
Estonia. It is home to about 70 per cent Russian-speaking people
22 Taylor argues that lack of recognition of identity sub-groups in society is
likely to lead to serious psychological problems as well as political tensions.
See Taylor 1994.
23 Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy is the most well-known and
was theorized on the basis of the democratic model that emerged in the Neth-
erlands in the early part of the twentieth century. However, the model devel-
Tove H. Malloy 249
______________________________________________________________
oped into a virtual representative democracy and eventually rendered itself
obsolete. See Lijphart 1977
24 Theories of dual-society are not discussed here even though there are
several well-developed theories. This is because such theories do not explic-
itly pursue social integration between the two groups. Dual-society states
need not, however, be as divisive as often portrayed. Of course, finding ways
of living together ethically in dual-society states requires what Michael
Keating has called “a philosophy that binds them together and gives them a
democratic rationale” (2001, p. 171). But Keating’s own theory of plurina-
tional democracy offers just that. He suggests allocation of power to all na-
tionalities within the state often based on territorial claims but not requiring
statehood. As such, sovereignty will have to be seen as non-absolute not
vested only in states. Rather, sovereignty can have multiple attachment points
above and below the state. The normative view of nationhood is that dual-
society states are perfectly capable of being democratic and liberal.
25 The author was involved in this consultation process.
26 The definition offered by the European Commission consists of 11 princi-
ples emphasizing that integration of third-country nationals is a bilateral
process following European values involving the labour market, social com-
petence, education and youth work, equal access, inter-cultural dialogue,
culture and religion, participation, mainstreaming and assessment of effec-
tiveness of policies. See SEIS, pp.11–12.
27 I am thankful to Priit Järve for clarifying this to me.
28 English summary of survey commissioned by the Minister for Population
and Ethnic Affairs, titled Ethnic relations and challenges of integration pol-
icy after the bronze soldier crisis. The survey was prepared by scientists at
the University of Tartu. A copy is on hand by the author.
29 The 2008 Estonian Human Development Report shows a negative trend
from 2007 to 2008 in terms of self-assessed membership of the Estonian
nation among Russian speakers, citizens as well as non-citizens. See Estonian
Human Development Report 2008, Chapter 4, Table 4.4.1 at p. 91 available
online at http://www.kogu.ee/public/EIA2008_eng.pdf.
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Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Section III
The Interface of Minority and Majority

Communities
Round Pegs in Square Holes:
Integrating the Romani Community in Hungary
Aidan McGarry
This chapter assess the impact of three integration components

on Roma in Hungary: cultural; socio-economic; and political. It
argues that Hungary has initiated policies in all three
integration components but each has fallen short of the mark in
terms of addressing the specific needs and interests of Roma.
State integration efforts are focused on the protection of
national minorities whose interests are overwhelmingly cultural
in nature such as linguistic and educational provisions, and the
interests of Roma, which are primarily socio-economic and
political in nature, are sidelined. However, through ethnic
mobilization Roma have attempted to redress this
unsatisfactory situation.
Introduction
Amongst Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), which have
attempted to accommodate and protect minorities, Hungary is often cited as
possessing the most progressive minority policy (Ringold et al., 2004, p. xxi).
Hungary’s minority policy has been interpreted as serving as a good example
to neighbouring states in the field of minority protection to look after the
wider Magyar diaspora. Thus, minority policy at the state level is informed
by a desire to protect so-called national minorities within state boundaries
with the purpose of encouraging reciprocal treatment for the Hungarian
communities residing in neighbouring states. However, the institutions which
have been created as part of this policy are not appropriate for the Romani
community. Hungary officially recognizes thirteen “national and ethnic mi-
norities” with twelve being defined as national and only Roma are recognized
as an ethnic minority. This chapter argues that such a distinction, and particu-
larly the resulting policy provisions, impact negatively on attempts to inte-
grate the Romani community in Hungary. This has, in turn, necessitated the
creation of effective representation structures for the Romani community. All
minority communities require the capacity to articulate their interests and to
influence policy and decision making, and this is more pronounced for Roma
who are more disadvantaged and marginalized than any other minority in
Central and Eastern Europe.
Roma are recognized as an ethnic minority, rather than a national mi-
nority, because they have no kin state. Kin states are crucial actors in the
successful integration of national minorities as they are able to lobby and
258 Integrating the Romani Community in Hungary
______________________________________________________________
advocate on behalf of minority communities outside national borders. Roma
are the largest minority community in Hungary although determining exact
figures for the Romani population is fraught with difficulties. In the 2001
census, 190,000 individuals declared Romani ethnicity although reports from
domestic non-governmental organizations and international organizations
estimate this figure to be between 400,000–600,000 (Riba, 1999, p. 1). This
figure is sustained by the European Commission which estimates the Hungar-
ian Romani population to be between 550,000–600,000 (European Commis-
sion Regular Report on Hungary, 2002, p. 31). The divergence between the
declared and estimated figures can be explained by historical, social and
psychological reasons related to the history of Roma in CEECs (Marushi-
akova and Popov, 2001). Furthermore, Roma are geographically dispersed,
whilst national minorities tend to be geographically concentrated. As else-
where across Central and Eastern Europe, Roma are a heterogeneous minor-
ity and can be divided into the Hungarian-speaking Romungro (70 per cent),
the Romani-speaking Olah (22 per cent), and the Romanian-speaking Béas (8
per cent) (Kaltenbach, 1998, p. 62).1 Such heterogeneity and territorial diffu-
sion impacts negatively on the capacity of Roma to mobilize politically and
ensure that their voice is heard.
This chapter assesses three integration components: cultural integra-
tion; socio-economic integration and political integration. Hungary has initi-
ated policies in all three integration components but each has fallen short of
the mark in terms of integrating Roma. Though the numerous structural prob-
lems impeding the integration of Roma may account for the dire socio-
economic situation many Roma endure, there has been a dramatic increase in
the number institutions and organizations which have been established to
formally articulate the interests of the Romani community. Some of these
institutions have been created by the state such as the Minority Self-
Government (MSG) system as well as specific policies targeting Roma how-
ever this chapter maintains that although Roma are affected by such legisla-
tive interventions and policy provisions, they do not profit from their creation
for a number of reasons. That is to say, state minority integration efforts
(section I) are focused on the protection of national minorities whose interests
are overwhelmingly cultural in nature such as linguistic and educational pro-
visions, and the interests of Roma, which are primarily socio-economic and
political in nature, are sidelined. Roma are thus squeezed into a state minority
policy which emphasizes cultural interests and do not fit their specific cir-
cumstances (section II) or when policy is tailored to their specific needs such
as socio-economic interests (section III), significant improvements in the
situation of Roma have not been felt because targeted programmes have not
been implemented effectively. In light of these factors, the importance of
representation structures which articulate the interests of Roma and advocate
for meaningful integration efforts is inflated. These representation structures
Aidan McGarry 259
______________________________________________________________
have resulted from ethnic mobilization processes from the Romani commu-
nity and include political parties and civil society organizations (see section
IV).
Table 1. State integration in Hungary

Integration Compo- State Response Impact on Roma Integration
nent
Cultural Integration Local and National Minority Cultural interests are not as rele-
Self-Government vant for Roma as socio-economic
and political interests.
Socio-Economic Medium and Long-Term Lack of coordinated approach to
Integration Programmes targeting implement the Medium-Term
Roma. Programme. Impact of discrimina-
tion is under-appreciated.
Political Integration Local and National Minority Roma are under-represented in
Self-Government public life which has resulted in
processes of ethnic mobilization.
The issues facing the Romani community in Hungary are complex and
inter-related. It is not enough to address poverty without addressing societal
exclusion because the two are inextricably linked. Likewise improving access
to social services cannot be addressed without also tackling discrimination.
Of course, any policy that aims at promoting effective integration ought to
incorporate all three components and should be aware of the complex rela-
tionship between each component. Most models which attempt to understand
integration processes often over-emphasize one of the three components. This
is particularly true for Roma which require integration processes to focus on
all three components simultaneously and should ensure that policy in one
component is reflexively responsive to policies in other components. Thus,
each integration component “may require different policy objectives and
different policy instruments” (Entzinger, 2000, p. 115) but these need to be
attuned to the real needs and interests of all minorities in Hungary.
This chapter maintains that Roma cannot simply be the object of pol-
icy which is formulated and imposed from above. Effective integration policy
in the cultural, socio-economic and political components should be formu-
lated with input from Roma in order to be responsive to their interests. This
means that channels of communication and consultation must be build into
any integration efforts so that the voice of Roma can be heard and policy and
legislation tailored accordingly.
1. State Integration Policy

CEECs have shown a willingness to take measures to protect different ethnic,
linguistic cultural and religious groups in their countries (Pataki, 2002, p.
247) in line with the process of democratization. Integration here is under-
______________________________________________________________
stood as “a situation in which groups of different cultural backgrounds and
different beliefs can participate in society on an equal footing” (Cashmore
and Troyna, 1982, p. 61). There exists a variety of institutional mechanisms
for ethnic accommodation which can be utilized including self-governance,
cultural and territorial autonomy, assimilation and integration. Moreover,
several services, benefits and valued resources are allocated by state agencies
to people on the basis of their ethnicity (Drury, 1997, p. 20), and are de-
ployed to foster integration. Therefore the state must first officially recognize
an ethnic minority and its constituent members on the basis of ethnic catego-
rization. Article 68 of the Constitution provides the basis for Act LXXVII of
1993 “On the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities” (hereafter “Minori-
ties Act”) which recognizes thirteen national and ethnic minorities in Hun-
gary.2
Roma face barriers to effective integration which follows from a posi-
tion that differs from other minorities for two key reasons. Firstly, Roma
“occupy the lowest social and economic strata in large part as a result of their
ethnic identity” (Jenne, 2000, p. 190–191). This means that the majority
ascribes negative associations onto the Romani identity which in turn means
Roma are marginalized and discriminated because they are ethnically Ro-
mani. Secondly, unlike Bulgarians, German, and Croatians, amongst others,
Roma have no kin state to lobby and advocate on their behalf. Kin states are
often effective representatives on behalf of diasporas which possess some
leverage in bilateral relations. Jenne points out that the international commu-
nity, in the form of intergovernmental organizations, mitigate this phenome-
non to some extent for Roma (Jenne, 2000, p. 191) however it has been con-
vincingly argued that this interest in the Roma issue is primarily motivated by
the desire to curb East-West migration in Europe (Simhandl, 2006).
In the past Roma have been assimilated through state policies which
sought to eradicate the Romani identity. From the mid-eighteenth century
both Maria Theresa and Joseph II attempted to deal with the Gypsy question
through a policy of forced assimilation. Such measures included banning the
name “Gypsy” and prohibiting the use of the Gypsy language (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2004, p. 2). The policy of assimilation proved successful
with many Roma no longer speaking Romani indeed, 70 per cent of Roma in
Hungary speak Hungarian. Whilst the relative socio-economic position of
Roma improved under communism, expressions of cultural identity was
suppressed and the Hungarian state restricted the nomadic way of life for
Roma through forced sedentarization.
Hungary’s current integration policy is primarily informed by its con-
cern with the Magyar diaspora in neighbouring states. The Treaty of Trianon
(1920) resulted in 2.8 million (about 22 per cent of all Hungarians) living in
neighbouring states and Hungary has endured strained relations with many of
its neighbours. Hungary’s seemingly progressive minority protection policy
Aidan McGarry 261
______________________________________________________________
is influenced by its desire to serve as a good example to neighbouring states
which house Hungary’s diaspora (Bessenyey Williams, 2002, p 234). Such a
policy may be motivated by a number of factors including “the level of ethnic
solidarity, the electoral interests of office-seeking elites, and the presence or
absence of effective external incentives to comply with the preferences of
international actors” (Stein, 2000, p. 14). Furthermore, “it is a constitutional
obligation (chap.1, art 6, para. 3) of the Hungarian government to take re-
sponsibility for the Hungarians living beyond the country’s border” (Bessen-
yey Williams, 2002, p. 229). Therefore, kin state behaviour may include
material support for home state minorities such as donating school textbooks,
lobbying in the international political context, or bilateral agreements with
home state governments. The latter is of particular relevance for Hungary
which concluded a series of bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries
in the 1990s.
After the first free elections in 1990, Prime Minister Antall stated: “It
is time that the national minorities truly formed the most important bridge of
friendship between countries, but this can only be done by communities who
have gained their rights and sense of dignity”. Prior to 1994 with the elabora-
tion of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection for
National Minorities (FCNM) there existed no legally binding international
standard covering national minorities however Hungary managed to safe-
guard some rights for the Magyar diaspora through bilateral agreements. By
the end of 1992 Hungary had concluded bilateral treaties and conventions
with Germany, Poland, Ukraine, Croatia and Slovenia, amongst others. The
treaties contained a commitment to co-operate in various fields including
language and culture and the central purpose of these treaties was to safe-
guard the future existence of the Magyar diaspora. Whilst the treaties con-
cluded prior to 1993 were relatively uncontroversial as they had strong sup-
port by the host state the same cannot be said of the protracted treaties nego-
tiated with Slovakia (1995) and Romania (1996). The main problems with
these treaties being the respective fear on the part of Slovak and Romanian
authorities in terms of group rights and any form of autonomy, particularly
territorial autonomy. These bilateral treaties paved the way for the Law on
the Hungarian Minorities Living in Neighbouring Countries which entered
into force in 2002 and gives Hungarian minorities living abroad, upon regis-
tration, certain rights and privileges in the area of education and culture.
Such developments did not affect Roma because they possess no kin
state. There exists no Romanistan to lobby and advocate for the rights of
Roma. The bilateral agreements concluded by Hungary placed an emphasis
on national minorities, that is, those minorities which had a kin state. The
rights and duties of national minorities are overwhelmingly cultural in nature
as they relate to protection of language and ownership over media, and can
secure material resources from their kin state to help preserve their cultural
______________________________________________________________
identity. Therefore when Hungary elaborated its considered integration policy
through the “Minorities Act”, it was no surprise that the interests and rights
concerned culture. Roma were not given any particular concessions or cre-
dence even though they are the largest minority in Hungary. Thus integration
efforts directed towards national minorities have been relatively successful
whilst such efforts have largely by-passed the Romani community. In its first
Opinion on Hungary in 2000, the Advisory Committee on the FCNM notes
the difference in terms of interests between Roma and the twelve national
minorities: “The situation of the Roma gives rise to deep concern, notably
regarding numerous acts of discrimination in a wide range of societal set-
tings, widespread negative perceptions and significant differences in socio-
economic and living conditions between Roma and the remaining population
(…) In respect of other national minorities, issues to be addressed lie notably
in the fields of media, education, and the participation in public life” (Council
of Europe, 2000, p. 2).
The issue of integration of Roma is one of the most pertinent and
pressing in Hungary today. In 2007, a new Parliamentary Commissioner for
National and Ethnic Minorities Rights (Minorities Ombudsman) was ap-
pointed. Erno Kallai, a Rom, prioritizes the integration of the Romani minor-
ity into Hungarian society and describes this objective as a “crucial question”
(ERRC, 2007a) facing Hungary. Whilst important measures have been taken
to promote the integration of Roma into society, they continue to face par-
ticular difficulties which other minorities do not. Roma find themselves in a
triple exclusion: cultural, socio-economic and political (Barša, 2002, p. 252),
therefore their situation is unique. Their cultural exclusion is manifest in the
disproportionate number of children attending “special” schools and the in-
adequate support for Romani educational and media initiatives. Their socio-
economic exclusion can be found in extremely high rates of unemployment
and low standards in health and housing provisions. Finally, their political
exclusion is reflected by their almost complete absence from the political and
administrative architecture of the state. Hungary has attempted to address this
exclusion both indirectly and directly through a series of legislative and pol-
icy interventions. Each component of integration policy is assessed in terms
of stated objectives and formal implementation, and the impact on Romani
integration.
2. Cultural Integration: Minority Self-Government (MSG) in

Hungary
The Hungarian minority protection system is based on the concept of cultural
autonomy (Eiler and Kovács, 2002, p. 176) which means a community living
anywhere in the country can be joined together in an autonomous organiza-
tion on the basis of their common ethnic belonging and is recognized as a
constitutional entity, namely nations with cultural sovereignty. Gál notes that
Aidan McGarry 263
______________________________________________________________
cultural autonomy (sometimes referred to as personal autonomy) accord
rights which are usually limited “to matters of culture, language, religion and
education” (Gál, 2002, p. 8), and the cultural autonomy system in Hungary
provides the platform for the articulation of cultural interests related to lan-
guage, preservation of tradition and heritage, and education. Each national
and ethnic minority has its own local and national self-government or “cul-
tural parliament” (Krizsán, 2000, p. 251) which has exclusive legislative
authority in cultural matters, and also has a separate cultural ministry and a
national Secretary of State.
The national self-government is a “body of representatives supposedly
representing the interests of the whole community throughout the country”
(Krizsán, 2000, p. 253) and is elected by delegates of the local minority self-
governments. The national minority self-government is made up of 53 mem-
bers, led by a President, which form the general assembly which is required
meet four times annually. Local and national minority self-governments can
participate in legislative and administrative activities from the lowest to the
highest levels of governance, express their views on draft legal regulations
and request information from public administrative bodies and local govern-
ment on issues affecting the minority they represent, and propose measures to
address. They have a right of veto on matters relating to education, culture,
local media, efforts to sustain traditions, and the use of minorities’ languages,
however in other areas their function is purely consultative.
Before discussing the role and competencies of the MSG system and
how these fit with general integration efforts towards national minorities as
well as their appropriateness vis-à-vis the Romani community, it is first nec-
essary to highlight some key recent changes in the MSG system. The MSG
system was widely criticized for allowing non-national and other ethnic mi-
norities to vote in the MSG elections however amendments in 2005 have
improved this unsatisfactory situation. To explain, since the explicit purpose
of the MSG system is to represent the cultural interests of national and ethnic
minorities, it would seem appropriate to ensure that only individuals con-
sciously identifying with one of the thirteen national or ethnic minorities
could vote or stand in MSG elections. However, Article 70 of the Constitu-
tion states that everyone can vote and stand for election in the MSG elections
irrespective of their group identity or affiliation. This meant that prior to
2006, representatives of minorities were not elected by the groups themselves
and, more worryingly, some deliberately abused the electoral system so non-
minorities sat on local self governments. The latter phenomenon tended to
disproportionately affect the Romani community. This unsustainable situa-
tion led to a revision of the “Minorities Act” including how candidates are
elected which will go some way to reducing the abuse of the MSG system.
Since 2006, candidates and voters must register their ethnicity prior to elec-
tions at the local election office and only those who consciously identity as a
______________________________________________________________
national or ethnic minority will be able to vote in the corresponding MSG
election. However minorities in CEECs, and particularly Roma, have a dis-
trust of ethnic registration therefore there is a concern that fewer individuals
from minority communities will register which could make the MSG less
representative and democratic.
The status of these bodies as the most prominent representatives of a
minority is not appropriate to its structure and competencies therefore there is
a mismatch. In its present form it is not equipped to cope with the competi-
tive and heterogeneous nature of Romani interests because “the very design
of the system prevents it from having a significant impact on issues of great-
est concern to most Roma and hinders political integration” (NDI, 2006, p.
6). The MSG system was never intended to promote one factional interest
over another rather it was created to enhance the status and authority of a
minority through formal representation of cultural interests. Indeed, Article
5(2) of the “Minorities Act” states: “The basic function of minority govern-
ments is to protect and represent the interests of minorities by performing
their duties and exercising their statutory authority.” Kovats points out that
there is an inherent tension between the “fundamental purpose of Roma poli-
tics to achieve equality for Roma with regards to the rights and opportunities
enjoyed by other citizens and the primary role of the self-government system
to promote the differences of minority identities through facilitating cultural
autonomy” (Kovats, 2001, p. 21). The minority self-government system pro-
vides minorities with a platform to address cultural interests and promote
their cultural identity and since minority groups such as Roma are often de-
fined by their collective ethnic identity, the minority self-government system
offers opportunities to reaffirm and embrace this ethnic identity in a public
institution.
Whilst other minority communities are principally concerned with cul-
tural interests such as education and language, the Romani community face
more pressing challenges such as poverty, discrimination, and unemploy-
ment, amongst others. This does not mean that cultural interests are irrelevant
for Roma because the unique cultural heritage of Roma must be preserved,
and the local and national Roma self-governments strive to ensure that the
Romani identity is promoted. As noted previously, 70 per cent of Hungarian
Roma speak Hungarian (Stewart, 1997, p. 10) as their first and preferred
language due to previous assimilation policies. Certainly the linguistic aspect
is more relevant to the twelve national minorities who have kin states and in
many cases rely on the linguistic component of their identity to mark their
specificity as a national minority, and the purpose of the MSG system is to
protect the cultural identity of minorities. In multicultural societies, the cul-
tural component is often favoured over socio-economic and political compo-
nents of integration - because it is less demanding on resources - and there-
fore it tends to privilege some groups more than others. This is the case in
Aidan McGarry 265
______________________________________________________________
Hungary which has privileged national minorities by creating appropriate
institutions which are tailored to their cultural interests. I do not dispute that
the MSG system is a useful resource for national minorities however it is
inappropriate for Roma and actually impedes integration efforts of the Ro-
mani community in other areas (section IV).
Additionally, confusion exists over the role and competencies of local
minority self-government and in particular their relationship to municipal
governments. Local and national self-governments are intended to be partners
to municipal governments at the local level, and to co-operate with the execu-
tive and the legislature at the national level however the relationship between
the local minority self-government and the municipal governments is unclear
meaning that “Roma often approach their minority self-government expect-
ing assistance related to a broad number of issues including housing, em-
ployment, discrimination and utility services” (NDI, 2006, p. 22). To com-
pound matters, municipal governments consistently refer Roma to their self-
governments to address issues which fall well beyond their remit and result in
Roma finding no solutions to their (invariably socio-economic and political)
problems from either municipal government or from their local self-
government. In light of these shortcomings, it is imperative that the govern-
ment pursues policies that reflect the real needs and circumstances of the
Romani population, thus ensuring that socio-economic and political interests
are addressed effectively. As Eiler and Kovács (2002, p. 183) accurately
surmise: “While the principal objective of the 12 national minorities today is
to stop the processes of assimilation and to fill the framework of cultural
autonomy with actual content, the greatest challenge for Roma minority self-
governments is the social and economic integration of the Roma minority.”
The MSG system has won praise from international actors in terms of
integrating minorities in Hungary and the twelve national minorities have
certainly benefited greatly from the cultural provisions and institutions estab-
lished by the “Minorities Act” in terms of protecting and preserving language
and culture. The same cannot be said of Roma however. If the purpose of
integration is to promote and protect ethnic identities then the MSG system is
a success despite some shortcomings. However, if the purpose of integration
is to ensure equality then the MSG system in its present form does not fit the
Romani community because the issues facing Roma in Hungary are too
multi-faceted and complex. They require a concerted effort on the part of
state institutions as well as the Romani community and in some cases this
means treating Roma differently in order to encourage integration.
______________________________________________________________
3. Socio-Economic Integration: Medium and Long-Term Plans for

the Integration of Roma
The MSG system ensures that the socio-economic interests of Roma are
articulated and that decisions affecting Roma are reached with their agree-
ment and input. When discussing the merits of the MSG system, the Presi-
dent of the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, Toso Doncsev, argued
that “the operation of Roma minority self-governments promotes social inte-
gration, resulting in better communications between Roma and non-Roma
inhabitants of the same settlement” (IRB, 2001, p. 3). Whilst most MSGs are
involved in the preservation of culture, language and traditions (for which
support from the kin state is usually available), Roma self-governments are
additionally involved in social issues, health care, employment and combat-
ing discrimination. However, the role of socio-economic integration primar-
ily falls under the jurisdiction of municipal governments, backed up by mate-
rial resources, whose relationship with Roma self-governments is often con-
tentious. Indeed, “many municipalities tolerate, support or even implement
segregation practices at the expense of Roma in several areas” (Council of
Europe 2004, p. 5), including housing, health and education. Suffice to say
that integration efforts will always be undermined when manifestations of
segregation persist.
Although Hungary has supported initiatives to integrate Roma, to
some extent it was only since 1997 that there have been comprehensive
measures to integrate Roma with the responsibility for the related measures
being allocated to individual ministries. The “Medium-Term Roma Action
Programme”3 provided for the establishment of targeted programmes in edu-
cation and employment with each ministry submitting annual reports detail-
ing how targets were being met. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is one of
the key actors in ensuring the integration of Roma and allocated funding to
support the Programme which focused on re-training and labour projects, as
well as subsidies to support the long-term unemployed. One of the key prob-
lems facing Roma is the inability to access socio-economic provisions which
is impeded by widespread direct and indirect discrimination. Although suc-
cessive governments regard the social integration of Roma as both a minority
policy and a social policy, which are informed respectively by group and
individual approaches, this has meant that the Medium-Term Action Pro-
gramme focuses on social issues, but does not address racial discrimination.
This means that the socio-economic problems which Roma face are because
of discrimination on the basis of ethnic affiliation. Put simply, Roma are
discriminated against because they are Roma therefore integration efforts
cannot ignore such underlying structural factors when attempting to improve
their situation. Law CXXV on Equal Treatment and the Promotion of Equal
Opportunities (2003) contains a general ban on all forms of direct and indi-
Aidan McGarry 267
______________________________________________________________
rect discrimination including discrimination based on affiliation to a minor-
ity. Equality of opportunity means “the prevention of racial and ethnic dis-
crimination in the allocation of rights in such spheres as housing, employ-
ment and education” (Rex, 1997, p. 7). In this respect, it utilizes a (individ-
ual) human rights approach which would suggest that targeting the Romani
communities collectively through state policies such as the Medium-Term
Roma Action Plan is not enough in order to promote meaningful integration.
Another key actor which facilitated the Medium-Term Roma Action
Programme for the integration of Roma was the Ministry of Education. A
large number of Roma were (and continue to be) over-represented in so-
called “special schools” or specially-designated “catch-up classes” within
schools which is the result of societal prejudice and institutional racism rather
than weak cognitive and learning capabilities. The issue of segregated school-
ing for Romani children has become a visible and potent motivator of collec-
tive action, particularly at the transnational level. In 2002, the Budapest-
based European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) submitted written comments to
the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(UNCERD) which argues that discrimination pervades all aspects of life for
Roma in Hungary, notably in the fields of education, housing, and access to
public services and the subsequent report from UNCERD maintains that in
spite of the Medium-Term Roma Action Programme “[abuse and discrimina-
tion] practices have not ceased” (ERRC, 2002a, p. 1). In 2007, one Romani
Member of the European Parliament Viktória Mohácsi initiated a lawsuit,
together with the Romani Civil Rights Foundation and Amalipe, against
schools which continue this practice and has called for the number of Romani
children classified as mentally disabled to be reduced. It is estimated that 20
per cent of Romani children are classified as such which is ten times more
than the proportion of non-Roma children (ERRC, 2007b, p. 1). This phe-
nomenon, which is discussed by Cashman in this volume, excludes socially
disadvantaged children from mainstream public education. Whilst equality
cannot be achieved by treating everyone the same, persistent segregation in
the education system reinforces negative associations with Romani identity
and is antithetical to integration efforts.
The true test of any integration policy is how it is implemented. In
2000, one Romani politician, Aladar Katai, argued that the Medium-Term
Action Programme was too slow and was not producing the expected results4
and another commentator, Gabor Czene, maintained that the Programme had
not improved the situation of Roma in 2000 “significantly enough to be felt”
(cited in IRB, 2001, p. 4). This led to a series of major institutional changes
following the elections in 2002. Roma affairs became the direct responsibility
of the Prime Minister’s Office and a Political State Secretary for Roma Af-
fairs was nominated. Additionally, the Council for Roma Affairs, a co-
ordinating body without decision-making powers, was set up. The work of
______________________________________________________________
the State Secretary is supported by the Office for Roma Affairs, which was
created to deal with issues concerning the social integration of Roma. In
2002, the new state policy placed particular emphasis on equality of opportu-
nity in accessing socio-economic rights.
The role of international actors has been a key influence in minority
policy in CEECs. Accession to the European Union was a motivating factor
for most CEECs in 2000 and this led to the creation of two Roma Social
Integration PHARE programmes in 2000 and 2002. The 2000 Programme
supported projects aiming at combating discrimination in accessing socio-
economic provisions whilst the 2002 sought to enhance the efficiency, im-
plementation and impact of the Medium-Term Roma Action Programme
(Prime Minister’s Office, 2003, p. 3) however the socio-economic situation
did not improve as was hoped. The Advisory Committee to the FCNM notes
that important measures have been taken to promote the integration of Roma
into society however, “they continue to face particular difficulties and various
forms of discrimination in a range of fields such as education, employment,
housing and health care” (Council of Europe, 2004, p. 1). In 2007, the United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) sub-
mitted Concluding Observations on Hungary’s compliance with the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee
expressed concern at the inadequate access of Roma to social and economic
rights including housing, employment, health, and education. The Committee
noted that: that the housing conditions of Roma were inadequate and that
Roma were subject to forced evictions and there exist barriers to accessing
social housing; Roma faced discrimination in the labour market; Roma are
frequently denied access to health services and experience segregation in
hospitals; and a high number of Roma children are segregated in separate
schools and classes (CESCR, 2007). This would suggest that the socio-
economic situation of Roma has not substantially changed in post-
enlargement Hungary.
Turning to more recent developments it is possible to gauge whether
lessons have been learned from past failures. Despite previous shortcomings,
current state integration efforts reflect minor adjustments rather than a radical
departure from the past. However, the medium-term vision, so prevalent in
previous government policy, has been abandoned in favour of a long-term
approach thus Hungarian authorities have recognized that the integration of
Roma should not attempt any quick fix solutions. In 2007, Hungary adopted
the Roma Integration Decade Programme Strategy Plan for the period 2007–
2015 which sets out tasks in two-year action plans. As before these include
concrete measures and monitoring tasks primarily in the field of employment,
housing, education and health, although the government also recognizes that
legal measures and incentives are not enough; it is essential to change atti-
tudes and values system too which can only be achieved in the long term. The
Aidan McGarry 269
______________________________________________________________
first two year action plan (2008–2009) adopted by Governmental Decree
1105/2007 contains projects with deadlines and allocated resources (of ten
billion HUF) in the priority areas of: education; employment and develop-
ment of enterprises; housing; health; anti-discrimination; culture, media and
sport; and gender equality as a horizontal issue (Ürmös, 2008, p. 3). The new
state policy will target Roma in areas where Roma are over-represented in-
cluding long-term unemployment, low educational attainment, early school
leaving, etc. It remains to be seen whether the long-term approach will suc-
ceed where the medium-term approach has failed although there does appear
to be a concerted effort on the part of government to address the socio-
economic interests of Roma. It has been argued that state Roma integration
policy is distributive, rather than developmental (ERRC, 2002b, p. 44), and
this distinction is important. Allocating funding is important up to a point but
it also requires supporting legislation and policy which addresses the specific
interests of Roma, however such interests can only be known through the
active participation and representation of Roma in public life.
4. Political Integration: Participation and Representation of Roma

Romani mobilization and participation in public life are necessary for the
interests of Roma to be heard. Through self-organization, the collective ex-
periences and interests of Roma in Hungarian society can be articulated, and
this ought to inform state integration policy. Too often the interests of Roma
are assumed by state agencies and these are often tacked onto institutions
designed for national minorities. Taking the MSG system as an example, the
emphasis on cultural interests has had the unintended consequence of high-
lighting its political shortcomings, and begs the question: How is it possible
to manage and articulate shared socio-economic and political interests
through an institution primarily designed for establishing the cultural auton-
omy of minority populations?
It can be argued that by providing representation through the MSG
system the state suffocates calls for representation in parliament. Paragraph
68 of the Constitution states that national and ethnic minorities are constitu-
ent factors in the State and that “the laws of the Republic of Hungary ensure
representation for the national and ethnic minorities living within the territory
of the country.” In the Constitution there is no explicit statement relating to a
level of political integration for national and ethnic minorities therefore
Krizsán (2000, p. 258) points out: “a literal reading of the Constitution sug-
gests that even minority self-governments could be an acceptable means of
representation.” But parliament has proven a difficult institution for Roma to
access. There is currently no Romani parliamentarian who has been elected
on an ethnic ticket, either independently or with a Romani political party.
There are Romani candidates on mainstream political party lists but the de-
scriptive representation of Roma in parliament does not match their demo-
______________________________________________________________
graphic weight. There are only three Romani parliamentarians at present, out
of a potential 386, (on the side of the opposition Fidesz-Hungarian Civic
Union) yet the population of Roma in Hungary is approximately 6 per cent.
This has led to calls for a guaranteed seat in parliament for national and eth-
nic minorities but there is a danger that such an innovation would be merely
decorative and tokenistic and may not improve integration efforts of Roma,
as is the case in Romania (McGarry, 2008). Thus a valid concern of oppo-
nents to guaranteed representation in parliament is that it creates an “illusion
of power” (Cole, 1976, p. 221; cited in Adolino, 1998, p. 19) which would
not produce tangible benefits for Roma.
Political integration of the Romani community refers to the participa-
tion and representation of Roma in public life, so that they are included in the
main institutions of society. Phillips (1993, p. 174) argues that “some of the
disadvantages that oppressed groups suffer can be remedied only in policy by
an affirmative acknowledgement of the group’s specificity.” But the political
integration of any group is different from cultural or socio-economic integra-
tion in that it requires mobilization of the community in question to articulate
interests and demands. The state can provide resources to stimulate political
integration but the onus is on the community in question. There is a danger
that vertical political integration efforts can create dependency on state re-
sources and by extension calls into question the autonomy of an organization
if it is sponsored by the state (ERRC, 2002b, p. 4). Given the emphasis on
cultural integration by the state, efforts to integrate Roma politically have not
been adequately pursued. Adolino (1998, p. 1) argues that “participation in
parties, elections and representative institutions are important means for pro-
moting political integration.” In this respect political integration refers to the
incorporation of Roma into mainstream political institutions such as political
parties and parliament. Whilst such pursuits are certainly important, they
have only attained a modicum of success. To examine the instances of politi-
cal integration of Roma this section will focus on how Roma in Hungary
have attempted to create their own representation structures to articulate their
interests and focuses on Romani political parties and civil society organiza-
tions. Needless to say, the creation of such representation structures requires
appropriate policy and legislative responses from the state, which will further
encourage political integration efforts.
Roma need to be able to influence decision and policies which affects
them directly though this does not necessarily mean having control over
decision-making. Political parties and civil society organizations are key
actors which stimulate political integration. The two largest Romani political
parties in Hungary are Lungro Drom and MCF Roma Union, the former
being the largest political association. In the 2006 parliamentary elections,
Lungro Drom, in coalition with the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union grouping
secured three seats, whilst MCF Roma Union, allied with the MSzP attained
Aidan McGarry 271
______________________________________________________________
only 0.08 per cent of the national vote. In assessing the role of political par-
ties based on ethnic affiliation, it has been argued “membership and constitu-
encies are coeval with the minority’s population, electoral mobilization is
unproblematic, and turnout is akin to a census” (Stein, 2000, p. 19). But such
confidence in electoral support is misplaced as this is clearly not the case
with Roma who do not tend to vote for Romani political parties because if
they did their parliamentary representation would be much higher. Indeed
Roma, more generally, do not engage in democratic procedures due to lack of
identification papers and an antipathy towards mainstream political institu-
tions, which continue to marginalize Romani communities. The Roma vote is
split between these two political parties which impede attempts to build an
effective political platform. Furthermore, the practical implications of the
MSG system means that Roma direct their efforts towards the local and na-
tional minority self-governments, at the expense of creating and nurturing
other representation structures to foster political integration. Representation
for marginalized groups requires institutional mechanisms and material re-
sources, and representation is important as it ensures that all interests in the
public are recognized in democratic deliberations.
Civil society organizations have been much more useful than political
parties in facilitating political integration. The proliferation of Romani civil
society organizations and associations after 1989 testifies to the culture of
civic advocacy and activism in Hungary today. And MSGs have very few
advantages over non-governmental organizations “other than very limited
government funding and the right to consent on issues of education, lan-
guage, and cultural preservation” (NDI, 2006, p. 22). Civil society organiza-
tions ensure that citizens, including minorities, organize themselves and take
part in the monitoring and implementing of policy measures beyond the con-
trol of the state. These representation structures are on the fringes of bureau-
cratic and administrative institutions which have carved out a new social
space by filling a niche: they articulate interests which have been sidelined by
state-controlled structures. In this respect, civil society organizations provide
a mechanism for political integration which supplements the electoral proc-
ess. The real quality of Roma civil society organizations lies not just in their
ability to effect social change or successfully impact on the distribution of
state funding, but in their capacity to ensure the Romani community have a
political voice.
Civil society organizations also articulate the socio-economic interests
of Roma. The state budget provides statutory funding to help integrate Roma
into the labour market. The key partners in this policy are locally-based
Roma NGOs who, as representatives of the Romani minority, gather informa-
tion about who is employed and what qualifications they have (Babusik,
2004, p. 15). Locally-based Romani NGOs are viewed as trusted partners by
both the state and the Romani community so are privy to data on those indi-
______________________________________________________________
viduals who are registered with them in order to find a job. One prominent
example is the Autonómia Foundation which was established in 1990 with
the aim of helping the merging civil society through implementing pro-
grammes and developing projects including “Employment Without Preju-
dice” in Tolna County in 2004/2005 which contributed to the fight against
labour market discrimination in a localized context.5 Guided by its long-term
vision of self-reliance of Roma, Autonómia mobilizes the support of local
communities by training leaders and assisting employment initiatives. Politi-
cal integration clearly requires the political will of Roma as well as support-
ing institutions (in the form of policy and legislation) where necessary. Po-
litical integration, like cultural and socio-economic integration, is an ongoing
process and is not unproblematic. The Romani community may be unwilling
to engage in mainstream political structures but signs of political integration
are slowly emerging.
Conclusion
Hungary’s policy towards national and ethnic minorities has been character-
ized by an emphasis on cultural integration first and foremost. For Roma, this
has resulted in efforts to preserve identity, language and traditions through
MSGs. Whilst cultural integration efforts ought to be encouraged and sus-
tained, this needs to be complimented by a more concerted and considered
approach to socio-economic and political integration which are more relevant
to Roma. Minorities often seek differential treatment with regards to cultural
interests, that is, that their respective otherness should be celebrated. How-
ever, usually they seek integration in the socio-economic and political com-
ponents so that they are afforded the same opportunities as other citizens. All
three components are relevant to Roma and policy and legislation ought to be
attuned to the relationships between and across the different integration com-
ponents. In this respect it is more appropriate to conceive of integration as a
process, not a tangible product.
The principal mechanism for promoting integration of minorities has
been the establishment of the MSG system. This system has benefited the
twelve national minorities and is certainly an important tool for Roma al-
though the cultural remit of the MSGs do not match up to the interests of
Roma. For this reason state policy towards Roma can be described as putting
round pegs in square holes; Roma have been tacked onto a system which is
not designed for them. Attempts to target Roma through budgetary allocation
and Programmes have thus far failed to produce notable changes for many
Romani communities due to their short-term focus and inability to adequately
appreciate the impact of racial discrimination on Romani access to socio-
economic goods and services. The one component where state integration
efforts have been subdued has been in the sphere of politics. It is not the sole
responsibility of the state to guarantee formal representation for minorities
Aidan McGarry 273
______________________________________________________________
and evidence in other states suggests that these are often tokenistic. Political
integration for Roma has the most distance to travel because Roma are build-
ing on unstable foundations, therefore it will take time. Recent mobilization
efforts by Roma have secured democratic representation in the national as-
sembly but this is does not reflect the demographic weight of Roma in Hun-
gary. Additionally, projects and efforts in civil society indicate an increasing
dynamism to advance political integration of Roma on a local level. Mean-
ingful integration will require that Roma are able to participate in public
institutions at the local and national level for it is only through representation
structures that Roma are able to articulate their interests. It has been argued
that policies on Roma are designed and shaped by administrators with “little
knowledge of the needs and insights of the Roma people” (Puxon, 1973, p.
13). The importance of political representation is exacerbated due to the lack
of an effective ally or advocate in the shape of a kin state. The history of the
Romani community across Europe demonstrates the necessity of possessing a
political voice- it means that ignoring, excluding or presuming needs and
interests are assuaged.
Endnotes
1 For a historical overview of the Romani sub-groups in Hungary see: Ma-

rushiakova and Popov, 2001: 38–39.
2 These are: Roma, Germans, Slovakians, Croatian, Serbian, Armenian, Ro-
manian, Polish, Greek, Bulgarian, Slovenians, Ukrainian, Ruthenian.
3 After a 1999 revision the Programme was officially titled, “Government
resolution No. 1047/1999 (V.5) about Medium-Term Measures to Improve
the Living Standards and Social Position of the Roma Population” (Kadét
2001, p. 4).
4 RFE/RL, 8th August 2000.
5 Autonómia Foundation Annual Report 2004: 21.
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Empowerment as a two-way Process:
The Role of Romani NGOs in the Integration of
Macedonian Society
Sara Nikolić
This paper analyzes the paths to integration of the Romani

community in the Republic of Macedonia. Taking Amartya
Sen’s capabilities approach to human development, it argues
that both individual capacities and the capacity of society to
create a framework for cooperation are essential for integrating
traditionally marginalized groups. The Macedonian case study
indicates that one path to integration along the designated lines
leads Romani communities to engage in NGO activity. The
role of this sector as both an initiator of work on Romani
integration, and as a promoter of participatory capabilities by
the Romani public, provides leverage in addressing public
policy issues specifically relevant for both individual and
community well-being.
Introduction
Recent data on the well-being of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe clearly
points to their marginal social and economic position in their respective so-
cieties.1
“The particular predicament of the Roma […] is well docu-

mented. Problems of pervasive discrimination in several areas
of life, especially regarding access to employment, education,
health care and housing, go hand in hand with numerous in-
stances of racial violence, and mistreatment by the police”
(Henrard, 2003, p. 183).
The issues of Romani marginalisation and exclusion in states of Cen-

tral and East Europe and beyond are broadly covered in numerous recent
publications, in the contributions of this volume among others. Instead of
addressing these problems, my paper seeks to identify avenues that could
enable members of the Romani community to alter their present state. By
discussing the Romani community in Macedonia I explore different ap-
proaches to the empowerment of the group in more general terms.2 For this
purpose, the discussion is grounded on Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities’ approach
to human development (Sen, 1999). It suggests that empowerment should be
seen as an enhancement of one’s capabilities, dependent on both individual,
280 Romani NGOs in Macedonia
______________________________________________________________
as well as on societal capacity to create a framework for human development
and capability realization. Sen further defines capability enhancement as
achievable via the development of favourable public policy. As the latter is
dependent on the use of participatory capabilities by the public itself, it will
be the objective of my contribution to focus on this two-way approach to
empowerment. I therefore investigate developments in public policy and
public advocacy, and consider the relationship between the two in order to
depict the process of empowerment of Roma in Macedonia in terms of Sen’s
approach.
The main argument suggests that empowerment can be achieved
through policies promoting the favourable integration of Roma in Macedonia,
partly developed by Roma themselves, via Romani non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) as viable participatory mechanisms. This argument is
necessarily composed of two parts. Firstly, I argue that the process of inte-
grating Romani communities in Eastern Europe has better chances for suc-
cess if it is accomplished under terms favourable to the group. Enhancing
Romani capabilities can, as such, be a means for this group’s empowerment
and hence integration. The perspective on integration I chose in this context
fits within the liberal-pluralist framework, giving importance to both individ-
ual and community rights.3 It is generally accepted that this perspective is the
most favourable in contemporary settings and is highly conducive to minority
empowerment in a society dominated by another group. To illustrate this, I
assess empowerment strategies using the process of Romani integration in
Macedonia as a case study, and evaluate the development of public policy,
which enables integration on positive terms.
The second part of my argument focuses on the role of the Romani
non-governmental sector as a promoter of improved participatory capabilities
for the Romani public. By discussing the role of Romani NGOs in public
policy-making on the issue of integration, I argue that the empowerment of a
minority is stimulated by inter-communal dialogue and cooperation. I further
demonstrate that Romani NGOs are a means to facilitate the political and
social participation of the Romani community in Macedonia’s policy-making
process. Overall, while Romani empowerment presumes integration under
favourable terms, successful integration can only be accomplished through
the participation of the Romani community itself in the development and
implementation of policies relating to them. NGOs play a crucial role in this
process, being one of the sensible tools enabling this participation4 and en-
hancing the collaboration between the minority and majority communities.
My study is based on field research conducted in Macedonia in the
summer of 2006. 14 interviews were conducted with civil society and gov-
ernment sector representatives working on Romani integration issues. The
field-work data is supplemented by reviews and analysis of the relevant ana-
lytical digests and policy documents of the Macedonian state.
Sara Nikolić 281
______________________________________________________________
1. Theoretical Framework of Empowerment and Integration

As the aim of this work is to consider a plausible path for the empowerment
of a disadvantaged community, it requires a focus on equality of opportunity
not solely from the point of view of the individual but also of the community
as a whole. Therefore, this discussion very much reflects the ideas of a multi-
faceted, or human, approach to development. A leading name when consider-
ing human development and taking a dual perspective of examining the cir-
cumstances from the point of view of the disadvantaged group, as well as of
the wider society it is based within, is Amartya Sen. Adopting a ‘capabilities’
approach to human development, Sen argues that the ‘expansion of the “ca-
pabilities” of persons to lead the kind of lives that they value – and have
reason to value’, is relational, rather than solely individual (Sen, 1999, p. 18).
Its realization depends both on individual agency, as well as on the capacity
of society to create a framework for the realization of these capabilities.
Using this approach, Sen explains poverty as being characterised by
deeper factors than simply low income, as rather being the result of depriva-
tion of a number of basic capabilities. These include limited educational
opportunities, insufficient access to proper health care and nonexistent public
participation mechanisms, leading to a general state of disempowerment
within which it is difficult to prosper. Low income can have adverse effects
such as illiteracy and ill health, but it is only by tackling these issues through
focused policy measures that human well-being can be achieved and sus-
tained (Sen, 1999, p. 19). Low income is, therefore, only the end-result of a
general incapacity to access basic capabilities. Consequently, the realization
of these capabilities is important for human development and empowerment,
while income remains only instrumentally significant in the process (Sen,
1999, p. 87). Human development is, therefore, expressed through the capac-
ity to act (Kavan, 2006).
Thus, sources of poverty do not lie solely in individual capacity but
are rooted in social structures which prevent individuals from making the
most of their opportunities. This framework makes clear that the difficulties
with integration experienced by Roma need to be addressed in terms of em-
powerment and expressed through the enhancement of capabilities (Kavan,
2006). Sen states how “[…] capabilities can be enhanced by public policy,
but also, on the other side, the direction of public policy can be influenced by
the effective use of participatory capabilities by the public” (Sen, 1999, p. 18,
italics are my own). Therefore, empowerment can be defined as a set of
mechanisms that enable communities to access and participate in decision-
making on policy issues. This type of participation requires both capacity-
development within the given community and a society open to the participa-
tion of previously excluded groups.
______________________________________________________________
Looking at the idea of empowerment from another angle, it becomes
important to define a context that is conducive to the empowerment of a mi-
nority group. Kymlicka’s discussion of minority rights in the context of na-
tion-building provides additional insights into how the model can be de-
ployed. His argument is that the members of majority groups have an invari-
able advantage over minority ethnocultural communities in devising political
institutions to suit their interests (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 19–22). Minority
groups, according to Kymlicka, either have the option to ‘integrate into the
majority society or seek the self-government needed to create and sustain
their own modern institutions’ (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 23). This model has,
however, only marginal applicability for stateless and dispersed communities,
such as Roma. Instead, integration into the structures of the nation-states
where they reside appears to be the best approach to empowerment available
for Romani communities (Djordjević and Filipović, 2005, pp. 57–58). There-
fore, keeping this in mind, my discussion evaluates mechanisms that enhance
capabilities and thus achieve empowerment. To do so, I turn to the notion of
integration.
Integration can be understood in different ways. For the purposes of
this paper, I use the concept to determine conditions required for and result-
ing in empowerment. To do so, I move away from basic liberal theory and its
exclusive focus on the rights and empowerment of the individual to also take
into account the concepts of empowerment of ethnocultural groups explored
in communitarian theory. Therefore, I prefer to define integration in liberal-
pluralist terms, as this approach presents a synthesis of both the liberal and
the communitarian models. Such a definition advocates a combination of
both civic and communitarian values in order to obtain the most favourable
model of inclusion for ethnocultural groups. Kymlicka recognizes that “con-
troversies and conflicts over the management of ethnocultural diversity won’t
go away, or spontaneously resolve themselves [but rather] they are a perma-
nent and enduring feature of liberal democracies that must be tackled head-
on” (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 82). He argues that the standard liberal model sepa-
rating state and ethnic identity in an attempt at ‘cultural neutrality’ is inap-
propriate, because ethnicity is not a marginal phenomenon and will not dis-
appear as states modernize (ibid., pp. 14–15). Instead, Kymlicka argues for
ethnic relations based upon ‘ethnocultural justice’ (ibid., pp. 21). Striking a
middle ground between liberal and communitarian perspectives, his sugges-
tion seeks to address the challenges to equal treatment experienced by mem-
bers of contemporary multi-ethnic and multicultural societies.
Kymlicka places ethnocultural justice within the framework of a lib-
eral democratic model of ‘nation-building’, urging a greater focus on minor-
ity rights. Essentially, he argues that it is through access to minority rights
that a member of a minority community can come to exercise their individual
rights on an equal basis. In this sense, minority rights both “[…] protect the
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freedom of individuals within the group; and they promote relations of equal-
ity (non-dominance) between groups” (ibid., pp. 28). This approach, there-
fore, excludes the possibility of internal restrictions – of groups legitimately
limiting “the basic civil or political rights of their own members in the name
of preserving the purity or authenticity of the group’s culture, traditions, or
bloodlines” (ibid., pp. 27–28). As such, Kymlicka considers the communi-
tarian perspective but adjusts it to the liberal expectations of preserving indi-
vidual rights and liberties, bringing forth ideas that correspond to functional
improvements in the position of minorities.
To establish the key elements of integration under favourable terms,
Kymlicka looks at integration from the perspective of different types of eth-
nocultural communities. He identifies the integration of recognised national
minorities to be particularly complicated,5 because it represents an “imposed
choice” rather than the outcome of deliberation between the group members
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 63).
National minorities require the “same tools of nation-building avail-
able to […] the majority nation, subject to the same liberal limitations”
(Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 27). In addition, they need a set of ‘external protec-
tions’ - minority rights, which reduce their vulnerability to the majority’s
economic or political dominance, without in turn enabling them to dominate
over other groups (ibid., pp. 28). In this way, minority groups are able to
assume a position of “positive equality”, not being disadvantaged by the
possession of cultural traits different to those of the majority.
For Kymlicka, Roma, as a group, could either be defined as “national
minority”, or as “transnational” minority. In the first instance their countries
of residence would be required to provide them with additional guarantees, in
the latter case, being a “European” minority would result in a civil-rights-
oriented approach, taking ethnocultural issues beyond the responsibility of a
nation-state (ibid., pp. 74–75). Currently the two approaches are combined,
putting “increased emphasis on cultural differences alongside issues of elimi-
nating discrimination” (ibid., pp.74). Kymlicka concludes that with the ma-
jority of Roma adjusted to their host-cultures, and highly fragmented in terms
of their native language and customs, negotiating their status in their coun-
tries of residence becomes of primary importance (ibid., pp.76). Additionally,
integration processes will vary across the CEE region, which explains the
need for a country-focused approach for discussing the issue.
Integration, according to the liberal-pluralist perspective, needs to ad-
dress some elements of individual choice, but also include an emphasis on
minority rights and the recognition of separate ethnic identities, the fight
against prejudice and discrimination and the enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws. Furthermore, political institutions need to be modified to
make them more accommodating to cultural differences and to reduce the
bias in favour of the dominant group.6 Kymlicka points to the right to repre-
______________________________________________________________
sentation as an important element of inclusion, whether in the form of geo-
graphic constituencies or of non-territorial representation in the public sphere
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 176). Integration simultaneously involves the recogni-
tion of one’s duties and obligations, and, furthermore, can only function as a
“two-way process”– if both the mainstream society is ready to adapt to the
minority groups, and vice versa (ibid., p. 96).
In this section of my paper, I have argued that integration is most suc-
cessful if it follows the path of empowerment and leads to the enhancement
of one’s capabilities. I have also argued that participation of the disempow-
ered in policy-making can be achieved by providing the non-dominant group
with both individual and collective rights. Now I turn to discuss the process
of empowering Roma in the Republic of Macedonia. My argument will be
illustrated by examining their participation in policy-making relevant to Ro-
mani integration and looking, in particular, at the participation of Romani
NGOs in the policy-making process.
2. The Macedonian Integration Framework

Before examining the process of Romani integration in Macedonia in particu-
lar, I will outline the background to the regional context of Romani integra-
tion. When it comes to policy developments regarding Roma in Eastern
Europe,7 as well as the integration of minorities in general, an important shift
in frameworks can be observed since the end of the communist period. It is a
move towards more liberal-pluralist understandings and practices of integra-
tion.
As Jean Pierre Liegeois argues, although the communist policy to-
wards the Roma in Eastern Europe was one of inclusion, it was in fact an
inclusion that was technocratic and controlling, with an underlying intention
to assimilate rather than to integrate (Liégeois, 1994, pp. 143–144). This
approach fits within the overall goal of minimizing ethnic differences within
society (Ringold, 2000, p. 5) through “[melting] individual and ethnic dis-
tinctiveness into a homogenous working class” (UNDP, 2002, p. 21). This
goal was to be achieved throught the application of restrictive policies, such
as the prohibition of nomadism and the adoption of legislation on sedenteri-
zation. Additionally, extensive industrialization absorbed the Romani popula-
tion into the ranks of unskilled labourers in the state-controlled economy, to
the detriment of the traditional independent occupations they held in the in-
formal sector (Liégeois, 1994, pp. 143–144 ; Thelen, 2005, p. 29; Friedman,
2002, pp. 23–47). All of these practices show how “[i]nclusion of Roma in
socialist societies was done in an assimilative and non-participatory way”
(UNDP, 2002, p. 19).
Several relevant shifts in practices can be observed in the period fol-
lowing the fall of communism. The negative economic trends and the loss of
Sara Nikolić 285
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certainty, security, full employment, and welfare that ensued in the post-
communist period affected most of the citizens of Eastern Europe unfavoura-
bly (Vejvoda, 1997, pp. 40–42) but Roma have been particularly hard hit. In
material terms, they were greatly affected by the crisis in the heavy industry
sector, where a great majority made a living (Huber, 1993, p. 47; Thelen,
2005, p. 30). Furthermore, the climate of rising tensions due to feelings of
popular frustration has found release in growing ethno-nationalism, xenopho-
bia and scapegoating. Roma often bore the brunt of the rising discrimination,
further aggravating their overall well-being (Henrard, 2003, p. 183; Huber,
1993, p. 46; Petrova, 2004, pp. 24–25). From the desired socialist homogene-
ity of the communist period, there was a switch to particularization according
to ethnic belonging, shifting the framework from assimilation to segregation.
However, with the opening of the public sphere created by the break-
down of totalitarian state control, as well as global and regional advance-
ments in the field of human rights protection, positive shifts in the treatment
and status of minorities also began to emerge (Petrova, 2004, p. 8). The
strong pressure and incentives, to implement measures to protect both human
and minority rights in the newly emerging, transitional democracies of the
East, is to a great extent related to the push for membership in an enlarging
European Union. The special emphasis on favourable minority policies, as
well as a closer focus on the situation of Roma in particular, was part of a
pre-emptive enlargement agenda of Western governments, the EU and supra-
national organizations (Kovats, 2002, p. 1). In the context of the growing
mobility which accompanies the process of EU integration, “[s]upporting
vulnerable groups’ desires for social integration in the CEE countries is the
only sustainable way to prevent the emergence of impoverished, alienated,
underclass strata when the countries join the EU” (UNDP, 2002, p. 83).8
Therefore, national policy developments concerning Roma in Eastern Europe
can at least in part be identified as a direct outcome of wider European inter-
ests.
As a result, in recent years, especially since the late 1990s, significant
efforts undertaken by Eastern European states on behalf of their Romani
populations can be recognized:
“They have established new institutional structures to deal with

minority affairs, designed and introduced a number of pro-
grams and policies, and generally devoted increasing attention
to the Roma’s predicament. The status and rights of the Gyp-
sies […] have become more or less strongly safeguarded by
new laws in all of the region even though in practice these
rights are not always protected effectively” (Barany, 2002, p.
322).
______________________________________________________________
These new measures also include the passing of anti-racist and anti-
discrimination bills (Barany, 2002, pp. 311–316), as well as the development
of specialized national strategies for Roma in many South-East European
states (Abdikeeva, 2005, p. 1). Finally, emerging from the 2003 regional
conference in Budapest “Roma in an Expanding Europe: Challenges for the
Future”, the Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005–2015) presents the political
commitment of ten Central and South-East European states to actively en-
gage in resolving the issues of Romani poverty, exclusion and discrimina-
tion.9 The initiative was founded by a group of regional and international
actors, which again points to the growing global, and most notably European,
concern for the situation of Roma in the region. Of course, reaching positive
results requires the active involvement of the majority populations in the
process, as well as of Roma themselves.
Taking all of this into consideration, it can be argued that important
steps are being taken with regard to including and recognizing the Romani
population in state affairs. In addition, the opening of the public sphere as a
result of the fall of communism creates a space for action and for the mobili-
zation of the citizens themselves. This is now possible outside of the sphere
controlled by the state, giving the “[…] opportunity for ethnic minorities to
express their ethnic identity and participate in society” (Ringold, 2000, p. 6).
The opportunities available for civic participation will be examined below.
Minority Integration in Macedonia
I now turn to look at country-specific developments in the context of the

post-1989 framework in the case of the Republic of Macedonia. In the previ-
ous period, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stood somewhat
apart from other socialist states in the region with regard to the treatment of
its Romani population. It was the only state not to resort to assimilationist
policies. It provided local Romani communities with recognition as a unique
‘ethnic group’, permitting Romani traditional occupations and supporting
Romani cultural development (Friedman, 2002, pp. 41–68). However, more
than anything, Roma were treated with ‘benign neglect’ (European Centre for
Minority Issues, 2004, p. 7), a legacy the Republic of Macedonia seems to
have inherited to some extent.
The conditions of the Romani population in Macedonia are recognized
as ‘considerably better than those of the Roma in other East European states’
in relative terms (Barany, 1995, p. 527), but the overall standing of the Roma
population in the state remains poor (Demirovski, 2000, p. 154). It should be
pointed out that the Macedonians have shown a level of tolerance towards
Roma, which distinguishes them from other Eastern European majorities.
This can be explained by the fact that Macedonians do not perceive Roma as
intimidating or threatening, when put in the context of the persistent tensions
Sara Nikolić 287
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with the much larger and politically stronger Albanian minority (Barany,
1995, p. 527). This fact has both positive and negative effects. On the one
hand, there is a relatively high social acceptance of Roma and a fairly posi-
tive relationship between the majority population and the Romani minority.10
On the other, this societal indifference also implies that, in terms of advocat-
ing for further improvements in status, Roma need to take a lot more initia-
tive to achieve recognition. Within the new post-communist framework,
national, regional and international factors, as well as the additional context
of Yugoslav dissolution, interplay in the minority integration framework in
place in present-day Macedonia.
Among the measures and policies implemented in Macedonia, the
Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) certainly ‘constitutes the most impor-
tant overall political context for improving interethnic relations and overcom-
ing stereotyping’ (European Agency for Reconstruction, 2003, p. 8). Follow-
ing its signing on 13 August 2001, the agreement was codified through 15
Constitutional Amendments in November 2001. The main goal of the agree-
ment, besides putting an immediate stop to the Macedonian-Albanian con-
flict, was to ensure the survival of the Macedonian state, by focusing on
greater respect for the ethnic identities of its citizens.11 The development of
civil society was highlighted as one of its aims for the future. Furthermore, a
larger space for ensuring minority rights was opened up in this context, al-
though this particularly focused on the rights of the large Albanian minority,
who constitute 25 per cent of the total population.12
One of the most important aspects of the OFA with regard to Mace-
donia’s minority communities is its focus on their equitable representation in
both central and local public bodies as well as at all levels of employment
within these bodies. This allows for a greater strengthening of the ethnic
identity of communities, as this identity acquires significance in terms of
participation in state authorities and public life in Macedonia. (Skaric, 2004,
pp. 182–189). It creates a space favourable for the successful integration of
minority communities, by encouraging their greater participation in public
life and greater interaction with the majority group.
However, these provisions have taken time to implement. In the spe-
cific case of the Romani minority, as of 2006 there were only three represen-
tatives working at the level of state institutions. There were also two Romani
representatives in the Parliament (Kamberi, 2006). Overall, “[t]he imbalance
between the total number of the Roma and the number of them employed in
state agencies and public institutions is [very] high” (Skaric, 2004, p. 200).
Feat Kamberovski, the President of the Romani Rights Forum ARKA, from
the city of Kumanovo, suggests that the biggest problem for the Romani
community is the lack of educated persons to fill the Ohrid quotas, further
exacerbated by the fact that those qualified are often drawn into better posi-
tions elsewhere (Plaut, 2006, p. 11). However, in an interview with the author
______________________________________________________________
Kamberovski admitted that the situation is slowly improving, with younger
Roma graduating from university and entering employment in public institu-
tions (Kamberovski, 2006). For the time being however, the Romani commu-
nity would also benefit from more participation in alternative initiatives, such
as the civil society sector emphasized in the agreement itself, an option that
will be further explored below.
The OFA supports the favourable integration of ethnic communities in
many ways. It promotes greater respect for ethnic identity with emphasis on
minority rights and equal representation in public life. Integration is also
supported by the greater decentralization of power and local self-
administration than was set out in Macedonia’s initial Constitution in 1991,
offering minorities more space to organize in their own communities (Skaric,
2004, p. 185).13 These provisions provide ethnic communities with more
structured opportunities for participation in public life (European Agency for
Reconstruction, 2003, p. 8). This is a very positive step towards making these
communities feel more a part of the Macedonian state, as well as making the
state itself come to acknowledge their presence and involvement.
The interviews conducted with Romani representatives in Macedonia
revealed both their receptiveness to the new form of integration and their
willingness to take responsibility for the process of its realization. This im-
plies that the space and readiness exist to transfer these empowerment trends
onto the community as a whole. My respondents also recognized that the
state as a whole needed to engage more actively in order for integration to
occur, indicating how important it is that the majority society is willing to
actively participate in this process (Kamberovska, 2006). Akin to other coun-
tries in the region, the Macedonian state has recently shown a greater interest
in supporting this initiative.
In the context of aspiration towards EU membership, a Strategy for
the Roma in the Republic of Macedonia was developed. Its focus is on key
areas requiring improvements in order to achieve a better quality of life for
the Romani community,14 justifying demands for action when it comes to the
implementation of favourable policies (Redzepi, 2006; Kamberovski, 2006;
Friedman, 2006). The strategy document also testifies to the state’s aware-
ness of the existing problems of the Romani population. The Decade of Roma
Inclusion initiative, which was initiated in the same period, also contributed
to raising public awareness about issues related to Romani inclusion, marking
the start of specialized policies and programs for Roma in Macedonia (Zeki-
rova, 2006). The resulting National Action Plan, which focuses on education,
employment, health and housing, suggests a more active state position on the
issue of Romani integration. Both documents played an important role in
opening up communication between the government and the Romani com-
munity (Kamberi, 2006).
Sara Nikolić 289
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Therefore, with the developments related to the OFA, the national
strategy and the Decade, a structure conducive to Romani integration on
favourable terms has been established in Macedonia. It is also evident that the
willingness to participate in the advancement of work on integration exists in
the Romani community. Given the present low levels of participation within
the public sector – such as through the proportional representation quotas set
by the OFA – exploring alternative participatory mechanisms for the Roma in
Macedonia would be worthwhile. The final part of my contribution to this
volume looks at whether the mechanisms which have been devised in this
regard actually function by assessing Romani participation in civil society
initiatives.
3. The Role of Romani NGOs in the Process of Romani

Integration
In order for Roma to fight discrimination and attain empowerment in the
societies in which they live, they must participate actively in the processes of
identity building and decision-making. In addition, the active engagement of
the society as a whole in the process, most notably of the state-bearing ethnic
groups, is necessary. This is where civil society becomes significant.
When discussing the contribution made by civil society to social inte-
gration, many authors present it as the ““middle ground” between the indi-
vidual and the state, a space that can limit state’s excesses and allow individ-
ual’s capacities to be expressed and developed unimpeded” (Belloni, 2000, p.
10). This characteristic of civil society makes it conducive to citizen empow-
erment in decision-making on governance matters and a ‘source of consider-
able popular leverage’ (Howard, 2002, p. 165). It can result in political proc-
esses which better serve citizens, protecting them from unfair policies and
laws, but also in the promotion of legislation, favoured by the populations
affected. As such, civil society is “a venue for the aggregation and communi-
cation of societal interests” (Green, 2002, p. 455), capable of bringing more
public control to the governance sphere (Scholte, 2004, p. 212). By virtue of
presenting citizens with the means to voice their concerns and exercise influ-
ence over policy-making, civil society has the potential to be an extremely
valuable element in giving a voice to minority groups, and establishing the
conditions necessary for a more balanced inter-communal (minority-
majority) dialogue.
NGOs are an important component of civil society when it comes to
participation in public life. As pointed out by the 2006 Open Society Institute
report on Roma Inclusion:
“Over the past decade, the NGO sector, within the broader
sphere of civil society, has proven to be the entry point for
______________________________________________________________
Romani participation in public life. It is largely due to Romani
civic activism that there is any public awareness or recognition
of Romani issues. In addition to their role as advocates for
Romani rights, NGOs with strong ties to local communities are
key to the success of any initiative or intervention targeting
Roma” (Rorke and Wilkens, 2006, pp. 22–23).
The Macedonian transition towards democracy formally enshrined

freedom of association and autonomous action as constitutional liberties
(Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, 2005a, p. 73). Further-
more, the overall development of the civil society sector is also connected to
the main events of the past decades: the increase in the activities of interna-
tional aid organizations in Macedonia as a result of the wars on the territory
of the former Yugoslavia, the influx of refugees into the country, the devel-
opment of legislation encouraging the expansion of the NGO sector, followed
by the advent of an even larger number of international NGOs and donors in
the context of the 2000–2002 Kosovo crisis (European Agency for Recon-
struction, 2003, pp. 10–11). In the case of Romani NGOs in particular, the
growth of their numbers started in the mid-1990s, with 120 registered organi-
zations appearing by 2003, 30 of which are considered truly active, covering
practically the entire territory of the state (Plaut 2003, p. 20). Their activities
focus mainly on human rights issues, provision of legal advice, formal and
informal education, monitoring of the judicial system, activism and advo-
cacy, women’s issues and cultural development (Plaut, 2003, pp. 6–7).
According to Eben Friedman, Regional Representative of the Euro-
pean Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), civic consciousness among Roma is
more common than among other minorities in Macedonia (Friedman, 2006).
This view is confirmed in the Government Strategy document, testifying to
“[…] the fact that Roma more and more frequently associate and form citi-
zens’ organizations with the aim of helping each other and protecting their
interests as a group. This trend is more frequent among Roma than among the
other ethnic groups in Macedonia” (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of
the Republic of Macedonia, 2004, p. 20). Having received donor support
since 1995, the Romani NGO sector is recognized as having perhaps the most
experience and capacity in this field in Macedonia to date (Daftari and
Verma, 2002, p. 9). This elaboration favours understanding of NGOs as
mechanisms conducive to community empowerment: they are well spread-
out, focus on issues relevant to local communities, and capitalize on organ-
izational know-how (in terms of fundraising, project implementation, etc.).
Finally, as pointed out by Nadir Redzepi of the Roma Humanitarian Associa-
tion of Macedonia “Sonce”, in the past decade, it is the NGO sector particu-
larly that has seen the emergence of a ‘beginning elite’ in the Romani com-
Sara Nikolić 291
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munity, gathering a critical mass of skilled individuals capable of lobbying
for the advancement of community needs.15
Both Romani and non-Romani experts working in the field point out
that Romani NGOs have demonstrated their importance both as initiators of
activities relevant to their community, and through connecting the Romani
community with the state institutions (Zekirova, 2006). As such, Romani
NGOs play a key role in facilitating inter-communal dialogue and in the
overall integration process. The Romani NGO sector has had an input into the
process of Romani integration and empowerment through participation in
both local-level initiatives and in the shaping of public policy, which will be
addressed in the following sections.
Local Initiatives
In several of the field interviews conducted for this study, Romani NGOs
were identified as the principal actors of Romani integration, investing the
greatest amount of human resources and activities in relevant issues, more so
than the other actors in the Romani community (Memeti, 2006; Redzepi,
2006). All of the representatives of organizations interviewed for the purpose
of this research have contributed to the integration process through local-
level initiatives, in several relevant fields. For example, in the domain of civil
rights, the Roma Rights Forum ARKA based in the city of Kumanovo, has
been providing free legal assistance to people without citizenship since
2001.16 They managed to provide help to 399 individual cases by 2006, a
significant percentage of the total number of cases in the area. They helped
400 Romani individuals to obtain registration and basic personal documents,
an essential step to ensure these individuals’ equal participation within the
Macedonian society, in terms of access to services, resources and opportuni-
ties and the protection of the Macedonian state (Kamberovski, 2006).
Romani NGOs also demonstrated their capabilities through the elabo-
ration and implementation of projects which focus on education, such as an
initiative to enhance the participation of young Roma in primary education.17
With the support of Romani NGOs, awareness-raising and support activities
linking local schools and Romani communities have been established. The
NGOs succeeded in improving the understanding and knowledge of the
school staff about the living conditions of Roma, as well as facilitating dis-
cussions between Romani parents and school personnel. This resulted in a
more positive attitude among teachers towards the Romani children, as well
as increased interest in inter-cultural educational training. This improvement
in attitude and inter-community communication also contributed to increased
pupil motivation for school attendance (Macedonian Center for International
Cooperation, 2005b, pp. 3–14). The president of the Romani Women’s Asso-
ciation of Macedonia “Daja”, Dilbera Kamberovska, notes that schools were
______________________________________________________________
not very open to collaboration with NGOs, and particularly Romani NGOs, in
the past. This has now changed in an important way, with schools realizing
the usefulness of both this collaboration and of the additional training and
awareness-raising that can be organized thanks to this extra support (Kam-
berovska, 2006).18
As a final example of local level initiatives, the Roma Humanitarian
Association of Macedonia “Sonce – Tetovo” started off as an informal group
of citizens in 1996, through a collection of charitable donations from the
community itself to cover the expenses of its poorer members (Redzepi,
2006). As a sign of the Romani community’s personal engagement in its own
development, this kind of support also validates the NGO as a rightful pro-
moter of community interest.
Policy Advising Mechanisms
Another key aspect of empowerment is minority participation in shaping

public policy. Here I consider the contribution of Romani NGOs to policy-
making on issues of direct relevance to their own community, both at the
national and at the local level. As will become clear, these processes are also
paralleled by the contribution made by NGOs to the advancement of inter-
communal dialogue and cooperation.
In 2002, inspired in part by the developments of the Council of Europe
proceedings on Romani issues,19 some of the most active Romani NGOs in
Macedonia recognized the need to develop a national strategy for Romani
inclusion, and joined together within an NGO network, Roma 2002 (or
RNGO 2002), in order to do so. The network’s strategy20 focused on building
capacities within the Romani NGO sector, with the goal of “more efficient
action at the national level” (RNGO – Roma, 2002, p. 3). It also set out the
main areas in which strategic action was needed in order to improve the over-
all quality of life of the Romani population. The strategy reviewed the prob-
lems faced by the Romani community, and proposed paths for solutions in
the spheres identified21 which are similar to what is later set out in the official
Government Strategy for the Roma, developed in 2004. Parallels can be
drawn between the two strategies, in regard to both concerns elaborated and
solutions proposed.22 An overview of both strategies points to the initial
RNGO 2002 document serving as the basis for the later governmental docu-
ment. The RNGO 2002 strategy, actively employed and listed as a source of
reference in the latter document, thus signals the network’s input into public
policy shaping. The fact that the document was used in the elaboration of the
official strategy also indicates the ever greater level of legitimacy granted to
the work of civil actors. It also exemplifies the fact that the state is increas-
ingly willing to cooperate with minority organizations on the policy-making
level.
Sara Nikolić 293
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Apart from demonstrating the input into policy making of NGOs, the
RNGO 2002 strategy, conceived two years prior to the government strategy,
also highlights the future-oriented thinking of the Romani NGO sector. It
testifies to their insight into areas of relevance for the Romani community.
An important factor to note is that the network formation and strategy devel-
opment were enacted on a voluntary basis, with the participant organizations
providing the logistical support and hosting the meetings which led to the
NGO strategy. The network continued to operate in this way until 2005 when
the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC) provided it
with financial support to establish an office in Skopje in order to continue
lobbying and awareness-raising efforts in close proximity to the government
offices (Kamberovska, 2006).23 This case demonstrates the dedication of
individuals working within the NGO sector and presents a counterpoint to the
often-cited critique of this sector being primarily guided by a quest for fund-
ing.
Romani NGOs have also had input into the development of public pol-
icy at the local level, where cases of successful NGO cooperation with the
local government can be identified. As a requirement of the Decade of Roma
Inclusion, a National Action Plan for improvements in the spheres of educa-
tion, employment, health and housing was developed in 2005. In Macedonia,
as a further expansion of this initiative (within the context of the law on local
self-government segment of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, whose final
component came into force in 2005)24 the creation of focused action plans for
the Decade was also undertaken at the local level. At the time of research,
this was being implemented in several Macedonian cities (Tetovo, Ku-
manovo, Gostivar, Stip, Delcevo), with local NGOs playing a leading role in
the process, in collaboration with local government representatives
(Jasarevski, 2006).
In Tetovo, a local team for the Decade of Roma Inclusion was formed,
and a local action plan was created and adopted by the Tetovo Municipal
Council, entering the official gazette of the city, guaranteeing 10 years of
municipal support for Roma inclusion activities (Redzepi, 2006). The local
action plan places strong emphasis on collaboration between the local gov-
ernment and local NGOs.25 This shows that joint responsibility for the im-
plementation of the initiative has been accepted, suggesting a long-term
commitment to cooperation between these two sides.26 It also indicates that
positive steps were made in terms of NGO input into policy developments
relevant to Roma integration. At both the local and the national levels the
NGO sector emerged as a functional tool for Romani community participa-
tion. Future progress will have to be determined by the capacity to implement
the concrete actions specified in the plans and strategy.
Finally, as stated in the MCIC “Civil Society Index” report, more fa-
vourable cases of dialogue and cooperation between the government and the
______________________________________________________________
civil society sector have been noticeable in recent years. This has particularly
been the case in the sphere of humanitarian activities, as well as in the con-
text of drafting laws and strategies, one example being the 2004 National
Strategy for the Roma Population (Macedonian Center for International Co-
operation, 2005a, p. 74). Mabera Kamberi, Administrator of the Decade of
Roma Inclusion, also points to the preparation of the National Action Plan
related to this strategy and to the Roma Decade itself as significant factors in
the establishment of linkages between the government, NGOs and the wider
Romani community (Kamberi, 2006). This is a significant improvement, as
the government essentially moved away from perceiving NGOs as the “en-
emy” or “opposition” to government.27 Instead, they realized that there are
quite a few benefits to cooperation, such as better insights into specific issues
and opportunities to delegate certain tasks.28 This shift in attitudes and prac-
tices established the basis for a successful process of integration of Roma, as
both the community and the state now have a say in developments and have
shown willingness to cooperate in this process.
Conclusion
This contribution has discussed possible paths to minority empowerment
based on the example of the Romani community in the Republic of Mace-
donia. Taking Amartya Sen’s “capabilities” approach to human development,
empowerment was depicted as the enhancement of one’s capabilities. As
such, it was shown that empowerment is dependent on both individual ca-
pacities and on the capacity of the society to create a framework for human
development and capability realization. As demonstrated, the latter can be
accomplished by establishing favourable public policies, which can in turn be
achieved through the effective use of participatory capabilities by the public
itself.
For Roma in Eastern Europe, favourable public policy was shown to
be one factor enabling their successful integration into society. Integration
was defined as the recognition of both individual and minority rights, and the
fight against prejudice and discrimination leading to a positive form of equal-
ity - or inclusion. In line with a pluralist conceptualisation of national iden-
tity, this conceptualisation of integration calls for the acceptance of differ-
ences and is above all a two-way process, requiring the willingness and input
of both the majority and the minority. Under these provisions, integration is
seen as means of empowerment of a minority group. It enables the group’s
members to enhance their capabilities and to participate on equal terms with
other members of society. Therefore, it can be concluded that the creation of
public policy favourable to Romani integration can lead to empowerment,
provided it involves the participation of both the broader society and espe-
cially the Romani community itself in its development.
Sara Nikolić 295
______________________________________________________________
This type of participatory approach was not possible during the com-
munist period, as the state dominated the public sphere and employed poli-
cies of an assimilationist nature. However, integration became more viable
after 1989, with the development of some favourable state, as well as interna-
tional and regional (and particularly EU accession-related) policies. In addi-
tion, it was supported by the opening of a space for the development of Ro-
mani civil society.
Looking at the specific case of the Republic of Macedonia, a policy
structure more conducive to Romani integration on favourable terms was
identified in the developments relating to the Ohrid Framework Agreement,
the Strategy for the Roma in the Republic of Macedonia and the Decade of
Roma Inclusion and its related National Action Plan. Additionally, the Ro-
mani NGO sector has become a viable mechanism for Romani participation
in policy creation. I demonstrated the input of this sector as both an initiator
of work on Romani integration and a promoter of participatory capabilities by
the Romani public, allowing the community to influence the creation of pol-
icy on both the state and local levels. This highlighted the sector as a plausi-
ble means of empowerment for the Romani community.
As another positive trend, one of the significant outcomes of the proc-
ess of policy-making related to Romani integration to date was shown to be
the growing cooperation between the Romani NGOs and the government.
This cooperation needs to develop further in the future, as the dedication of
both sides is necessary to advance integration efforts and strengthen the ca-
pabilities of the Roma community.
Further developments and improvements are of course required. I ad-
vocated no fully fledged solutions but merely identified certain positive de-
velopments, outlining a plausible path towards future progress. It is possible
to recognize some recent empowerment trends in Macedonia, thanks to more
responsible actors emerging in the Romani community in the past decade,
greater government engagement in the process of Romani integration and the
overall enhancement of cooperation between the two sets of actors. In order
for empowerment trends to develop further, concrete action, guided by con-
centrated joint effort is needed.
Endnotes
1 “[O]ver 40 percent of Roma in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,

Romania and Slovakia are unemployed […], compared with one-digit unem-
ployment figures for the general population. Only 10 percent of Romani
schoolchildren in Croatia eventually finish elementary school […]. In Serbia
and Montenegro, the Roma are the ethnic group with the highest illiteracy
rate, 34.8 percent, and the largest percentage of people who have not finished
______________________________________________________________
elementary school, 78.7 percent. […] According to a survey on health condi-
tions of the Romani in Borsod County in northeast Hungary, […], the life
expectancy of the Romani population is approximately 10 years lower than
that of other groups” (Petrova, 2004, p. 25). The list unfortunately goes on.
2 The overall conditions of Roma in Macedonia have been recognized as
considerably better than in other Eastern European states by a number of
authors (for example, see Poulton (1993), Barany (1995), Friedman (2002)).
Macedonia was chosen as a case study for this contribution, as the compara-
tively better situation makes it easier to identify the elements of empower-
ment.
3 For discussion, see the contribution of Tove Malloy in this volume.
4 While recognizing there are other important elements of empowerment of a
community, such as political parties, the media, and the business sector, this
analysis will limit itself to looking at the particular role of the NGO sector in
the process in order to ensure greater focus. Due to the stated focus on em-
powerment within and via the NGO sphere (and also due to space limita-
tions), rather than presenting a comprehensive analysis of this sector, stress
will be placed on its positive accomplishments, in order to identify elements
of empowerment of the Romani community. This being the objective, it is
recognized that the analysis does not adopt a neutral perspective but rather
seeks to reveal positive traits in the process of Romani integration and par-
ticipation in order to discern paths for future improvements.
5 Although there is no single institutionalised definition of national minori-
ties, the one most commonly cited is that of Francesco Capotorti, which
states that a national minority is: “[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of
the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – be-
ing nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteris-
tics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only im-
plicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, tradi-
tions, religion or language” (Capotorti, 1979, para. 568).
6 “Integration into common institutions operating in a common language
should still leave maximal room for the expression of individual and collec-
tive differences, both in public and private, and public institutions should be
adapted to accommodate the identity and practices of ethnocultural minori-
ties. Put another way, the conception of national identity, and national inte-
gration, should be a pluralist and tolerant one” (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 48).
7 This overview excludes the countries of the former Soviet Union, which
have a different situational background when it comes to the Roma.
8 For more insight, see also Vermeersch 2004.
9 The countries taking part are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and as of recently
Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of them hosts to quite large and disadvantaged
Romani minorities. The program priorities include concentrated action in the
Sara Nikolić 297
______________________________________________________________
core areas related to improving the quality of life: education, employment,
health and housing. The Decade also puts an important emphasis on the in-
volvement of the Roma themselves in the process, specifically by means of
the Romani civil society (The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015; Ab-
dikeeva 2005, p. 2).
10 As stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Roma: “This minority
is characterized by a high degree of integrity and a clearly expressed feeling
of belonging to the Republic of Macedonia” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Macedonia 1997, p. 3).
11 Contrary to the Constitution of the Former Yugoslavia, where they were
categorized as an “other minority”, the Roma are recognized in the Macedo-
nian Constitution as a group equal in status to other major ethnic communi-
ties living in the country, and were mentioned for the first time in the Consti-
tutional preamble of a country (UNDP, 2005, p. 43; Skaric, 2004, p. 192).
Furthermore, the Constitutional Amendments introduce the notion of “com-
munity”, giving members of the listed communities (Macedonians, Albani-
ans, Turks, Vlachs and Romanies) the right to express their identity and
community attributes, and guaranteeing the protection of their ethnic, cul-
tural, linguistic and religious identity (Constitution of the Republic of Mace-
donia (2001) Amendment VIII replacing Article 48).
12 In this also lies the biggest critique of Ohrid from the perspective of Ma-
cedonia’s smaller minorities, that due to the overwhelming focus on the Ma-
cedonian-Albanian relationship, their concerns are being neglected and they
not adequately taken account of in the measures serving to implement OFA
provisions (Skaric, 2004, pp. 183–184; European Commission against Ra-
cism and Intolerance 2005, p. 29).
13 At the local level, the Suto Orizari Municipality of Skopje, the first mu-
nicipality in the world with a Romani majority (64.14 per cent), is the only
municipality in Macedonia where the members of the Romani community
have the right to the official use of their language. The only Romani mayor
and Romani members of a Municipality Council are in Shutka too. Finally, at
the time of research, the only Macedonian school with optional teaching in
the Romani language was located there. (Working Group on Minority Issues
204, p. 31; Skaric, 2004, pp. 199–200).
14 It was recognised that membership “entails elaboration of a comprehen-
sive Roma development policy in accordance with the Copenhaguen criteria
for EU accession, as well as many other EU documents concerning the Roma
directly.” Among the documents discussed in the EU Agenda 2000 (1997),
stipulating “it is necessary to achieve ongoing development of social, eco-
nomic and political sphere, and to provide protection against discrimination
and racism, including decent housing, adequate education and health ser-
vices.” The Draft Recommendations of the Council of Ministers of the Coun-
cil of Europe also determine measures, which states should implement with
______________________________________________________________
regard to the Romani population in particular (Ministry of Labor and Social
Policy of the Republic of Macedonia, 2004, pp. 4–5).
15 These are ‘people who have certain power and knowledge – connected to
education, economic power, political power – people who are leaders and
want to change the life of the community for the better’. From 1995, when
the work of the sector started, Redzepi witnessed the slow but gradual growth
of this mass of people. In our interview he pointed out that the NGO sector
had a particularly positive effect in this respect, coupled with the increasing
numbers of university-educated young Roma joining the efforts (Redzepi,
2006).
16 Access to citizenship remains a big problem for the Roma community in
Macedonia, hindering ‘their integration as full-empowered members of soci-
ety’ (European Roma Rights Centre, 1998, p. 17).
17 15 NGOs were the implementing organizations of the Macedonian Center
for International Cooperation’s (MCIC) 2Applied Education for Young
Roma” programme.
18 The same obstacle was witnessed by Drom in their early work with pri-
mary schools, around 2001. The present change of pace, with greater confi-
dence placed in NGO input, and greater collaboration overall, has resulted in
lower dropout rates (Jasarevski, 2006).
19 Such as the Draft Recommendations of the Council of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on Policies Towards the Roma/Gypsies in Europe (2002).
20 Initially developed in a document entitled “Strategy for Development of
Roma NGOs in Republic of Macedonia” (2002), and later in the “Strategy of
RNGO – Roma 2002 for Development of the Roma Community in Republic
of Macedonia 2005–2015” (2004).
21 These are: education; socio-economic development; civil society, human
rights and women’s issues; culture, science and media; NGO development;
health care; and sport, youth and ecology (RNGO – Roma 2002 2002, p. 15;
RNGO – Roma 2002 2004, p. 12).
22 For example, both strategies recognize the need to encourage the atten-
dance of Roma children in preschool education as well as the lack of com-
munication between parents, schools and students as some of the important
problems, and emphasize the involvement of Romani citizens’ organizations
in motivating the community, as well as collaborating with the educational
institutions and the state (RNGO – Roma 2002 2002, pp. 16–18; Ministry of
Labor and Social Policy of the Republic of Macedonia 2004, pp. 43–46).
23 Dilbera Kamberovska is also the Vice-President of RNGO2002.
24 Following the Law on Local Self-Government and the Law on Financing
of Local Self-Government, the Law on Territorial Organization of Local Self-
Government was adopted in 2005.
25 For example, in the action plan for education, the realization of almost all
the core activities has both a government and an NGO component, with 31
Sara Nikolić 299
______________________________________________________________
sub-activities attributed either to a joint effort (11), or to realization by NGOs
(8), the municipality (6) and the educational institutions (6) (Lokalen Ak-
cionen Plan za Dekada na Vklucuvanje na Romite - Tetovo. 2006).
26 Development of the NGO/local government cooperation has been noted in
the Kumanovo municipality as well. Drafting and implementing the local
action plan involved a lobby group of local experts from different spheres:
the President of the Municipal Council, the Director of the Health Centre,
elementary school representatives, as well as representatives of four local
NGOs (Jasarevski, 2006).
27 As pointed out by many NGO leaders interviewed.
28 The following statement about Romani organizations, featured in the
Government Strategy depicts this realization well: “[…] activists of these
organizations acquired skills and training through formal and informal forms
of education, creating a mass of people ready and able to work and deal with
the challenges in their community. Since the success of […] the Strategy
directly depends on the level of direct engagement of people from the Roma
community, especially from these citizens organizations […] it is necessary
[…] to use the potentials of these organization […] meaning to make them
partners of the state” (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of the Republic
of Macedonia, 2004, pp. 20–21).
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Romani Teaching Assistants in the Czech
Education System: An Opportunity to
Address Barriers to the Labour Market?
Laura Cashman
This chapter examines the factors which explain the
disproportionately high rates of unemployment among Roma in
the Czech Republic. The teaching assistant programme is
presented as a case study, with an emphasis on how the
programme can contribute to the reduction of Romani
unemployment rates in the long term. The chapter concludes
that the employment of Romani teaching assistants alone will
not end the marginalization and exclusion which Roma in the
Czech Republic endure, but this programme is certainly a step
in the right direction and one that deserves more support from
the state.
Introduction
The Czech Republic is a very homogenous state, with approximately 95 per
cent of the population claiming Czech nationality. However, it is also home
to a number of national and ethnic minorities. While relations with most
minority groups are generally harmonious, relations with Roma remain prob-
lematic. Opinion polls consistently show that most Czechs would prefer not
to have Romani neighbours (CVVM 2003; 2006; Eurobarometer 2008) and
the international reputation of the state has been damaged by scandals such as
the infamous wall built in Ústí nad Labem in 1999 (European Commission,
1999:16; Roček, 1999), the sterilization of Romani women without their
informed consent (Czech Ombudsman, 2005) and the disproportionate
placement of Romani children in remedial special schools (European Court
of Human Rights 2007). Before the Czech Republic joined the EU, the Euro-
pean Commission exerted significant pressure on the state to take steps to
improve the integration of Romani communities (Guglielmo and Waters,
2005; Guy, 2001; Ram, 2003; Vermeersch, 2004). The most pressing con-
cerns were tackling anti-Romani discrimination and resolving the problems
of social exclusion which have progressively worsened since the fall of
communism.
While the challenges facing Roma in the education systems of Central
and Eastern Europe are well documented (Čanek, D, 1998; ERRC, 1999;
Liégeois, 1994; Polechová, 2003; Smith, 1997) this chapter looks at another
major barrier to successful integration – unemployment. Using the Czech
Republic as a case study, it discusses the factors contributing to the high
306 Romani Teaching Assistants in Czech Education
______________________________________________________________
unemployment rates in Romani communities and considers how the employ-
ment of Romani teaching assistants – a policy which primarily targets the
education system – could also have a positive effect in terms of reducing
rates of unemployment among Roma.
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the aims of
the Czech national integration strategy. The chapter then examines the factors
which explain the disproportionately high rates of unemployment among
Roma. The role of the teaching assistant and the background to the imple-
mentation of the teaching assistant programme is presented in detail. The
impact of the scheme is then analysed, with an emphasis on how the pro-
gramme can contribute to the reduction of Romani unemployment rates in the
long term. It is my conclusion that the employment of Romani teaching assis-
tants in schools will not solve all the problems of marginalization and exclu-
sion which Roma in the Czech Republic have to endure, but this programme
is certainly a step in the right direction and one that deserves more support
from the state authorities to ensure as many schools as possible get involved.
It was anticipated that employing Roma as teaching assistants would provide
Romani pupils with additional support and encouragement and offer a possi-
ble career to interested and suitably qualified Roma. However, this chapter
will argue that a further positive consequence is the way in which the pres-
ence of Romani teaching assistants in schools transforms the attitudes of non-
Romani teachers and pupils too. Given that social integration can only be
achieved with the support of the majority society, this may in fact prove to be
the most important consequence of the scheme.
1. Methodology
This chapter is based on the findings of research examining the development
and implementation of a range of policies to support the social inclusion of
Romani communities in the Czech Republic conducted in two cities, Česke
Budějovice and Ostrava, over a period of four months between October 2004
and May 2005.1 Both cities were visited again in October/November 2007. In
total, approximately 100 people – local Romani Advisors, municipal and
regional officials in the departments of education, social welfare and em-
ployment, representatives of NGOs supporting Romani communities, school
principals, teaching assistants, social workers and field social assistants –
were interviewed. The discussion presented here is based mainly on inter-
views conducted with principals, teachers and teaching assistants in 14 main-
stream and remedial special primary schools with high numbers of Romani
pupils.2 A further 67 teachers completed survey questionnaires.
Ostrava, capital of the Moravia – Silesia Region, is the third largest
city in the Czech Republic with a population of 320,000, of which between
20,000–30,000 are estimated to be Roma.3 The city’s economy was hugely
dependent on coal and steel enterprises but unemployment levels rose dra-
Laura Cashman 307
______________________________________________________________
matically when state subsidies for these industries were withdrawn in the
1990s, peaking at 18.4 per cent in 2004 (Czech Statistics Office 2008a). In
2007 the unemployment rate had fallen to 9.4 per cent but it is still among the
highest rates in the country (Czech Statistics Office 2008b). Given the size of
the Romani population, Ostrava, has a high international profile in terms of
how the city has attempted (and sometimes failed) to manage the integration
of Romani communities living there. NGOs in the city have been at the fore-
front of developing innovative ways to improve Romani integration – pre-
paratory classes, teaching assistants and field social assistants were all first
piloted in Ostrava. However, there have also been serious scandals including
the failure of the city authorities to re-house Romani families after floods in
1998 destroyed many homes (ERRC 2002), the offer of sub-municipal mayor
Liana Janáčková to subsidize one-way tickets to Canada for any Roma who
wished to emigrate (Fawn, 2001, p. 1203) and the 2007 ruling of the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), that the place-
ment of disproportionate numbers of Romani children in remedial special
schools for children with special educational needs constituted discrimination
(ECHR 2007).
Česke Budějovice, capital of the South Bohemia Region is an average
sized Czech city with a population of approximately 90,000 and a propor-
tionally smaller Romani population of approximately 2,500. The diverse
industrial base of the city and surrounding region has also allowed it to be-
come one of the success stories of the transition period, with consistently low
unemployment. The unemployment rate was 3.9 per cent in 2005 (MLSA
2006a) and 3.8 per cent in 2007 (Czech Statistics Office, 2008b). In spite of
the generally favourable economic conditions in the city, unemployment in
Romani communities is as much a problem as it is in other cities. Ghettos are
developing as non-Roma with the means to do so move away from suburbs
where Roma live. Schools still struggle with high rates of absenteeism among
Romani pupils and are trying to find ways to ensure that Romani pupils com-
plete their education and get meaningful qualifications.
The schools in Ostrava tended to have higher proportions of Romani
pupils, with some principals estimating that sixty percent or more of their
pupils were from Romani families.4 In České Budějovice the principal of the
school with the highest proportion of Romani pupils thought that about ten
per cent of the pupils were Romani. It was not possible to visit the only re-
medial special school in České Budějovice but it was reported that more than
half of the pupils in that school were Romani. All of the schools visited in
Ostrava employed Romani teaching assistants whereas in České Budějovice
four schools employed teaching assistants and two did not. Only one teaching
assistant employed in České Budějovice was Romani. Overall, the authorities
in Ostrava were more engaged with implementing policies to improve Ro-
mani integration than their counterparts in České Budějovice. This was ex-
______________________________________________________________
plained by the ideological positions of local officials and their views on the
need for affirmative action policies to improve Romani integration and also
the urgency of the situation; in Ostrava it was simply no longer possible to do
nothing.
2. Background to the Czech National Integration Strategy

Following significant international criticism, a comprehensive integration
strategy – the Concept of Government Policy Towards Members of the Ro-
mani Community Designed to Facilitate their Social Integration (hereafter
the 2000 Concept) – was passed in 2000. It introduced policies and pro-
grammes to improve the integration of Roma in all spheres of life (Govern-
ment Resolution, 2000). The 2000 Concept acknowledged that the full inte-
gration of Roma as equal members of Czech society would only be achieved
by tackling the low levels of educational attainment and high rates of unem-
ployment among Roma and the widespread anti-Romani prejudices held by
the majority society. Dealing with unemployment in Romani communities is
arguably the cornerstone of the entire integration project because it is the
perceived unwillingness of Roma to find employment which fuels much of
the anti-Romani sentiment so prevalent among non-Roma. The comment
“I’m not racist but why should I have to work and pay taxes while those
Roma live off the state?” was heard many times in interviews for this re-
search.
The Czech state is attempting to tackle the high rates of unemploy-
ment in Romani communities in a number of ways. The National Action Plan
on Social Inclusion stresses the links between social exclusion and unem-
ployment (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2004a). The National Ac-
tion Plan on Employment for 2004 to 2006 includes policies to combat dis-
crimination and to promote the inclusion of older workers and individuals
from disadvantaged backgrounds into the labour force. It also contains the
additional priorities of addressing regional employment disparities, enhanc-
ing work attractiveness and transforming undeclared work into regular em-
ployment (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2004b). Anti-
discrimination clauses, which have been incorporated into existing employ-
ment legislation, are intended to benefit Roma (Act on Employment Amend-
ment, 1999). In addition to general policies to support jobseekers of all eth-
nicities, the Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs and of Education also
support some programmes specifically aimed at Romani communities.
The development of the teaching assistant posts (the focus of this
chapter), Romani Advisors and field social assistants who work for municipal
authorities and the opportunities for Roma to train as police officers are in-
tended to offer Roma alternative paths to employment. In terms of policy to
date, more emphasis has been placed on addressing the socio-economic prob-
lems in Romani communities than on challenging the deep seated anti-
Laura Cashman 309
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Romani prejudices which exist in Czech society (Cashman, 2008). However,
as this contribution will show, some of the more successful policies, such as
the employment of teaching assistants, are effective precisely because they
address both kinds of barriers to integration. Teaching assistants improve the
employment prospects of the pupils they support by making their experiences
of the education system more bearable and their presence in schools also
challenges the prejudices of non-Romani pupils and teachers, helping, albeit
in a small way, to improve social relations between both groups.
3. Unemployment in Czech Romani Communities

Since 1990, the Czech workforce has had to come to terms with the threat of
unemployment. Restructuring of inefficient enterprises led to redundancies
but the overall rate of unemployment increased very slowly because indus-
tries were privatized and rationalized at a gradual pace. This was often re-
ferred to as the Czech ‘unemployment miracle’ because it was thought that
Czech labour policies had solved the problem of restructuring without caus-
ing mass unemployment (Flek and Večerník, 2004, p. 7). In fact, there was
no miracle. The slow pace of privatization and restructuring simply delayed
the inevitable and the unemployment rate peaked at 10.9 per cent in February
2004 (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2006a). This rate still compares
favorably to other states in the region but it disguises significant regional and
social inequalities among those who are unemployed. In the labour market,
some social groups are more disadvantaged than others, especially women
with small children, older workers and people with few qualifications. How-
ever, according to a report published by the Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs in 2003, Roma are one of the most significant groups identified
among the unemployed (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 2003, para.
1.2).
It is estimated that in many Romani communities, unemployment
ranges from 70 to 100 per cent (Government of the Czech Republic, 1997, p.
7.2; Gabal, 2006, p. 42). The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs does not
keep precise statistics on how many Roma are unemployed (this is considered
to be a breach of the regulations with regard to collecting data about citizens
based on their ethnicity) but estimates that Roma make up almost a third of
all those registered as unemployed. This is despite the fact that Roma account
for only about 3 per cent of the population (Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs, 2003, para. 1.2). There is some debate about how best to measure the
rates of unemployment among Roma. For example, O’Higgins and Ivanov
(2006, p. 7) argue that because official statistics do not take employment in
the informal sector into account, they do not reflect the true situation of in-
come and work activity in Romani households. This point was also made by
an NGO representative interviewed in May 2005:
______________________________________________________________
“They go collecting iron, things like that and this earns them
more than if they were working somewhere for the minimum
wage, which I can of course understand. If this kind of work
were counted then maybe 50 percent would be unemployed but
as we only count legal work then it really is 99 percent” (NGO
Representative 2005).
However, O’Higgins and Ivanov (2006, p. 10) accept that even if em-
ployment is defined in the broadest possible sense, rates of unemployment in
Romani communities are very high and consistently higher than for non-
Roma.
Long-term unemployment is a particular problem. A significant pro-
portion of Roma have been unemployed since the mid-1990s and there are
many Roma living in the Czech Republic who have never had permanent
legal employment and have been dependent on social welfare for all of their
adult lives. While the majority of Roma worked during the communist period
(by 1981, 75 per cent of working age Romani men and women were em-
ployed) (Kostelancik, 1989, p. 315), twenty years later, the problems of long-
term unemployment are increasingly apparent. Research conducted in West-
ern countries reveals that long-term unemployment can contribute to the
social exclusion of individuals and families regardless of ethnicity. The ex-
perience of long-term unemployment can cause psychological problems,
particularly stress and anxiety related disorders and “a sense of powerlessness
and resignation that colours people’s broader attitudes to politics and society”
(Gallie and Marsh, 1994, p. 14).
The reasons behind the high rates of unemployment among Roma are,
despite what many members of the majority society might think, complex
and interconnected. Many non-Roma complain that Roma take advantage of
the generosity of the state but under the current social welfare policy, families
with four or more children are better off receiving social welfare benefits,
than if one parent works and earns the minimum wage (Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs 2003, para. 2.4). The attractiveness social welfare benefits
increases further when the opportunities for undeclared casual work are taken
into account. As reported by the NGO representative cited above, many
Roma find short-term work labouring on construction sites or gathering scrap
which provides them with an additional source of income for their family.
They would not have time for such activities if they were working full time.
This problem was acknowledged in the 2004 National Action Plan for Em-
ployment (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2004b, pp. 38–39) but a
suitable solution has yet to be identified.5
The two most important factors which contribute to the high rates of
unemployment in Romani communities are discrimination and low levels of
educational attainment. The discrimination Romani jobseekers face in the
Laura Cashman 311
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labour market is widely recognized, and even senior state officials concede
that when given the option, employers usually choose a non-Romani appli-
cant (Jařab, 2003; Government of the Czech Republic 1997, para. 7.4). Since
anti-discrimination clauses were included in the Labour Code in October
1999 (Act on Employment Amendment, 1999) two landmark cases, those of
Marcela Zupková in 2003 and Renata Kotlárová in 2004, have been success-
fully prosecuted in the civil courts and received a great deal of media atten-
tion (Mladá fronta Dnes, 2003a; Mladá fronta Dnes, 2003b; Právo, 2004).
However, despite the introduction of this legislation, problems persist (Ro-
mani Advisor, 2005; ERRC, 2007). Jakub, a Romani teaching assistant inter-
viewed as part of this research had personally experienced the most common
form of discrimination which Roma suffer. He made a telephone enquiry
about a vacancy and was invited to an interview. However, when he met the
interviewer he was told that the position had already been filled:
“I know it’s hard to prove but it happened to me personally. On

the phone I speak correctly and I read a lot and Czech doesn’t
cause me any problems. I was born here in Ostrava. On the
phone they said ‘yes come along’ [for an interview] but when
he saw with his own eyes that I was a Romani, the prejudices
were terrible” (Jakub, Teaching Assistant 11, 2005).
Along with discrimination and structural problems, arguably the most

important barrier to employment is the low level of educational attainment
among the majority of Roma. An educated, middle class of Roma is growing
slowly but many Roma were educated in zvlaštní školy, remedial special
schools for children with learning difficulties, and very few have secondary
school or university qualifications. As a result the majority of Roma are not
qualified for anything other than unskilled, menial work which will only pay
the minimum wage. Young people who leave school with few qualifications
have greatest difficulty finding employment. This is equally true for non-
Roma. According to the National Action Plan on Social Inclusion, those
most at risk of unemployment belong to more than one ‘at risk’ category “for
example unskilled Roma or low-skilled young people” (Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs, 2004a, p. 9). This has been backed up by other research
which has identified education as a key determinant in explaining the inci-
dence of unemployment (Mareš and Sirovátka, 2004, p. 57).
Worryingly, the message that qualifications and skills can determine
whether a jobseeker will find employment has not yet entered Romani dis-
courses on employment and employment prospects. O’Higgins and Ivanov
(2006) report that only a small proportion of Roma surveyed for their study
identified their low levels of knowledge and skills as the reason why they had
trouble finding employment. This suggests that “many Roma do not connect
______________________________________________________________
their employment difficulties to their lack of formal knowledge and skills”
(O’Higgins and Ivanov, 2006, p. 11). Young Romani street sweepers inter-
viewed in České Budějovice in 2004 revealed similar attitudes. The sugges-
tion that they remain at school and get qualifications which would help them
find better work was dismissed as naive and impractical. One pointed out that
even if she finished her education there was no guarantee of finding better
work than street sweeping so she would be wasting her time and only putting
off the inevitable. The entire group agreed that education was not a guarantee
of a better life and therefore, not worth investing more time in than was abso-
lutely necessary.
4. Employing Romani Teaching Assistants in Czech Primary

Schools
Discussions of the integration of Romani communities often focus on what
Roma have to do to integrate. While it is true that Roma will have to recog-
nize the importance of qualifications in order to find legal employment, as
this is the only way they can escape the poverty trap, for an integration policy
to succeed the majority society also has to adapt (Říčan, 1998). Employers
have to treat all applicants fairly regardless of their ethnicity and schools
have to find ways to engage with Romani pupils and encourage them to com-
plete their education. The benefits of employing more members of ethnic
minority communities in schools are well established (Basit and McNamara,
2004; Jones and Maguire, 1998; Pole 1999; Siraj-Blatchford, 1993;
Tomlinson, 1990) and the employment of teaching assistants who either
belong to Romani communities or who can gain the trust of the community is
a policy which may go some way towards improving the employment pros-
pects of the next generation of Roma. The aims of the policy of employing
Romani teaching assistants are threefold: The presence of Roma in positions
of responsibility in schools allows them to act as role models for Romani
pupils. Teaching assistants also act as a link between the school and the local
Romani community promoting educational values and encouraging their
parents to get involved with school activities, thus creating more inclusive
institutions. Thirdly, by employing Roma in these roles wherever possible,
new career opportunities are opened up to Roma.
The first Romani teaching assistants were employed in a primary
school in Ostrava in 1993. The aim was to improve the quality of education
offered to pupils by allowing teachers to work with Romani teaching assis-
tants in the classroom. The 1997 Bratinka Report6 On the Situation of Romani
communities in the Czech Republic noted that the employment of teaching
assistants had been very effective (Government of the Czech Republic, 1997,
para. 4.3.1) but its authors were not yet ready to completely endorse the em-
ployment of teaching assistants because of reservations about the quality of
their training. Taking these concerns into account, the government resolution
Laura Cashman 313
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which accepted the Bratinka Report, instructed the Ministry of Education to
“determine the qualifications required for the position of Romani pedagogical
assistant” and to “earmark funds totalling Kč 2,268,000 (€70,000) for the
wages of at least 20 pedagogical assistants” (Government of the Czech Re-
public, 1997: III, 1a). Between 1 September 1997 and 30 June 2000 the Min-
istry employed teaching assistants on a trial basis. The trial was considered a
success (Council for Romani Affairs, 2005, para. 6.6) and in 2006 the Minis-
try of Education funded 328 assistants in 127 primary schools (Council for
Romani Affairs, 2007, p. 9, Gabal, 2006, p. 63).
According to the requirements established by the Ministry of Educa-
tion, applicants for the position of teaching assistant must be over 18 years of
age, have completed primary school, have a clean criminal record and meet
the general recruitment requirements which apply to all school employees
(Nová Škola, 2005a). Training programmes for teaching assistants were of-
fered by NGOs until the Ministry of Education adopted the scheme. Origi-
nally, the training consisted of 72 training hours focusing on the basics of
education theory, child psychology, mathematics and the Czech language
(Nová Škola, 2005b). However, the training course has become more inten-
sive and now applicants have to complete 180 hours of training before they
can qualify (Nová Škola, 2005c). In addition to this training, teaching assis-
tants are encouraged to further their education in other ways. The 2005 Up-
date to the Concept noted that an increasing number of teaching assistants are
completing their secondary and higher education or have expressed an inter-
est in doing so (Council for Romani Affairs 2005, para. 6.8). Of the 11 teach-
ing assistants interviewed as part of this research, seven had the Maturita, i.e.
they had completed secondary school; the others had completed primary
school and subsequently educated themselves in other ways. Jana was plan-
ning to go to university the following year to train as a lawyer and Daniel was
training to be a teacher via a university correspondence course.
In total 14 schools in Ostrava employed Romani teaching assistants in
the school year 2004/05. Eight of these schools were studied for this research
project. Most schools employed one or two assistants but one school had
three and one school had ten, seven of whom were Romani. In these cases,
the school paid the wages of the extra assistants through private fundraising
initiatives. In the school year 2004/05 only one school in České Budějovice
employed a Romani teaching assistant; of the six schools visited in the city, a
further three employed non-Romani teaching assistants. In 2006/07 there
were no Romani teaching assistants working in the city – the Romani teach-
ing assistant previously employed was on maternity leave.
Integration policies can only be successful if they are embraced by
both the minority and majority communities and this is especially true for the
employment of teaching assistants in schools. Given the increasing pressures
on schools to stretch their budgets, if teachers and principals do not think the
______________________________________________________________
programme is worthwhile and do not fully support it then it cannot succeed.
There are two aspects to this programme which need support from teachers.
First, some teachers may not like the idea of sharing their classroom with
another adult and secondly, there are the issues around the ethnicity of the
teaching assistants. Some teachers might accept a non-Romani teaching assis-
tant but would find it more challenging to have a Romani person as their
colleague. A survey of teachers in ten schools in Ostrava and České Budějov-
ice revealed that the employment of Romani teaching assistants was viewed
positively by the majority of teachers.
67 teachers responded to the survey and of those 38 (57 per cent) had
worked with a Romani teaching assistant. Six of the respondents who had
worked with a Romani teaching assistant reported negative experiences. Two
did not like sharing their classroom with a teaching assistant and four claimed
that they did not see that the presence of an assistant in their school had any
positive effects. The overwhelming majority (32 respondents or 84 per cent
of respondents who had worked with a Romani teaching assistant) reported
positive experiences and felt it was an advantage to employ Romani teaching
assistants in the school. They praised the way the teaching assistants acted as
mediators between the school and the community and welcomed them in
their classrooms to allow children to receive more individual attention.
Comments included:
“The assistant ensures a calmer environment for teaching.”

“Without the assistant the situation would be far worse.”
Altogether 29 of the teachers surveyed (43 per cent) stated that they
had no experience working with Romani teaching assistants, either because
there were none employed in their school or because they worked in schools
where the work of the teaching assistant was directed at junior classes. None-
theless, a majority of these respondents (17 or 59 per cent) stated that they
would be interested in working with a teaching assistant should the opportu-
nity arise. Nine respondents (31 per cent of respondents who had no experi-
ence working with a Romani teaching assistant) did not wish to engage with
the programme. Some respondents stated that they preferred to work alone in
the classroom while others were sceptical that the teaching assistants would
make much difference. Two respondents commented that the problem lay
with the pupils and their families and that if they changed their attitude to-
wards education then these assistants would not be required. One teacher
wrote:
“I would love that [to work with a teaching assistant] but I

know that not even a Romani assistant has the stamina, pa-
tience, constant love of their work and endurance.”
Laura Cashman 315
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These survey responses indicate that the employment of teaching as-

sistants has been largely successful. While teachers with no experience of
working with teaching assistants are more sceptical about the concept, this
research revealed that where the scheme has been introduced, most teachers
recognized the valuable contribution made by teaching assistants to their
schools.
5. Role Models
One of the main reasons why schools wish to employ teachers and teaching
assistants from ethnic minorities is so that they can act as positive role mod-
els for pupils to encourage them to participate in education and improve their
chances of finding employment when they leave school. Research in the UK
has revealed that the opportunity to act as a positive role model is also a mo-
tivation for people from minority communities to work in schools (Basit and
McNamara, 2004, p.118; Carrington and Tomlin 2000, p.149; Pole, 1999).
Teaching assistants interviewed as part of this research also indicated that this
was an important consideration for them. Jakub claimed to be very aware of
his responsibility to be a role model to show pupils that they could make
something of their lives if they wanted to. The high rates of long-term unem-
ployment in Romani communities meant that many of the pupils they taught
had no experience of anyone in their family ever having worked and so were
growing up with an expectation that all they could do was live on social wel-
fare benefits. The teaching assistants hoped that they could challenge this
position in a positive way.
When asked why they had been motivated to finish their education
and get qualifications, the teaching assistants attributed this to encouragement
from their parents. A common theme was that their parents had instilled a
strong work ethic in them, again challenging the assumption that all Roma
are work-shy. In some ways, however, these families, who put such emphasis
on education, were distanced from traditional Romani communities. Lukaš’
family spoke Czech at home to help him cope better at school. Two more
admitted that they could not speak the Romani language at all. Anna was
from a mixed family; only her mother was Romani. Jana’s father grew up in a
children’s home so her family did not have a strong bond with other Roma
and had never lived in a predominantly Romani neighbourhood. She was also
married to a non-Romani man. Only the eldest interviewee, a man who had
many years of experience as a Romani activist, but no secondary school edu-
cation, claimed to speak fluent Romani. He was very keen to promote the
culture as much as possible. All but one of the teaching assistants interviewed
began their education before the fall of the communist regime. Therefore, this
can be seen as evidence of the legacy of the communist assimilation policy:
______________________________________________________________
individuals who had weaker ties to Romani communities were more success-
ful in the education system (Gheorghe and Mirga, 1997).
A question worth considering is the extent to which teaching assistants
are acting as a tool for genuine inclusion or whether their presence is in-
tended to ‘socialise’ Romani children into the norms and values of the major-
ity Czech society. This is a phenomenon also encountered in the West, with
black teachers sometimes being accused of being ‘coconuts’ – brown on the
outside and white on the inside (Carrington and Tomlin, 2000, p. 150; Pole,
1999, p. 302). The teaching assistants interviewed for this project admitted
that they felt different to many of the children they were teaching, and as
argued above, their success in the education system was attributed to the
willingness of their parents to submit to the assimilatory pressures of the
time. However, the assistants also stressed that they were proud of their Ro-
mani heritage and they made it clear that they wanted to offer positive repre-
sentations of Roma rather than deny their ethnic identity. They regretted not
speaking better Romani but did not think they were in any way ‘less’ Romani
as a result. They pointed out that the vast majority of Roma no longer speak
Romani and unlike for other ethnic minorities in the region, language is not
considered the primary marker of difference. Edita and Gabriela noted that
there were cultural differences between how wealthier and poorer Roma lived
and that the problems Romani children had at school were more pronounced
in children from socially deprived backgrounds.
It has been argued elsewhere that a major problem in terms of building
a positive Romani identity is the conflation of the Romani ethnic identity
with the social exclusion they have endured for so many generations
(Pogany, 2006; Gheorghe and Mirga, 1997). Indeed for some, there can be no
such thing as middle-class Roma (Stewart’s, 1997 account of life in a Romani
community in Hungary offers a thoughtful analysis of this dilemma). How-
ever, this was not a view held by the teaching assistants and other young
Romani activists encountered during fieldwork. Jana in particular was very
clear that she wanted to show the world that there was more to Roma than
just the very poor people who formed much of the stereotype.
The teaching assistants also spoke about having a responsibility to
present non-Romani children with positive representations of Roma. Eva, a
teaching assistant working in a town near České Budějovice claimed that one
of the most important things she does is challenge the prejudices the non-
Romani pupils in the class have learned at home:
“Parents tell them how dreadful Roma are and when I say I am
a Romani woman they don’t believe me. They say: ‘but you
can’t be you’re really nice’” (TA 3, Eva 2004).
Laura Cashman 317
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However, while it is certainly important to challenge racist views held
by school children, it is even more important that the teaching assistants
challenge the prejudices held by their teaching colleagues. Research in the
UK and the US has also revealed that the employment of teachers or teaching
assistants from minority communities can be challenging for both teachers
and pupils from the majority community because as they do not fit the
“white, middle class stereotype” (Troyna, 1994) they are not always recog-
nized as ‘legitimate’ teaching staff (Subedi, 2008). Furthermore, Subedi
(2008, p. 60) argues that members of mainstream society struggle to accept
that there can be a great deal of differentiation within minority communities,
preferring instead to see them all as ‘exotic’ ‘others’. Interviews with teach-
ers and principals indicated that the introduction of teaching assistants had
not always run entirely smoothly, with teachers needing time to get used to
the idea of working alongside Romani teaching assistants. One teacher inter-
viewed in March 2005 reported a great deal of resistance to the idea when the
teaching staff at her school first heard of the plan. They thought it was an
unnecessary waste of money which was needed for other projects. She felt
that there was also opposition because the teachers – and she included herself
– had their own prejudices about Roma and could not imagine having Ro-
mani colleagues. However, after working with a teaching assistant she
changed her mind. She claimed to now prefer working as a part of a team in
the classroom. She was very honest in her appraisal of how her own attitudes
had been transformed by the experience. Such reluctance was also experi-
enced in other schools. The principal of another school spoke of how in the
beginning some teachers had questioned whether the teaching assistant would
share their staff room:
“At first the teachers asked ‘and is she [the Romani teaching
assistant] going to sit with us in the staff room?’ But today …
nobody thinks about the fact that she is Roma, not at all. She is
simply a member of the team; it’s excellent” (Principal 11,
2005).
Thus, employing Roma in schools allows members of the majority so-

ciety to come into contact with Roma who do not conform to the traditional
stereotype and as in the cases cited above, individuals are forced to reassess
their own prejudices.
6. Promoting More Inclusive Educational Institutions

A significant problem facing Romani pupils in mainstream education is their
sense of alienation from an institution where they encounter no adult mem-
bers of their own community and learn little about their own culture. The
widespread low levels of educational attainment in Romani families and
______________________________________________________________
communities also leave children without anyone to whom they can look for
support when they find life at school challenging. Schools have found it
difficult to communicate with Romani parents and to convince them of the
importance of education. Teachers have experienced problems trying to
communicate with children because they are not familiar with Romani tradi-
tions and ways of thinking about problems (Balabánová, 2002; Šotolová,
2001; Smith, 1997). As stated above, it was envisaged that the employment
of Romani teaching assistants should address some of these problems. The
teaching assistants themselves reported having similar problems when they
were at school and thus were conscious that they had a duty to help other
Romani children. Three teaching assistants spoke of how they had been very
unhappy at school because all their friends were in the local remedial special
school and they were the only Roma there, but their parents insisted that they
remain at school and not let the bullies or loneliness upset them.
In schools where teaching assistants were employed, interviews with
principals and surveys of teachers revealed that the presence of teaching
assistants had significantly improved relations with parents and that more
trust had built up on both sides. Five teaching assistants said that they felt
closer to the children because they belonged to the same community. They
understood the children better and the children trusted them more. Daniel and
Milena commented that parents felt more comfortable when they knew a
Romani teaching assistant was in the school. They also both believed that
parents accepted criticism better from them than from non-Romani teachers,
for example when dealing with truancy or disciplinary matters.
Basit and McNamara (2004, p. 98) claim that the employment of eth-
nic minority teachers transforms schools in a number of ways. Although their
work focused on schools in the UK, their findings can also usefully be ap-
plied in the case of Romani teaching assistants. Teachers can learn more
about Roma and the discrimination they face through discussions with col-
leagues. This can prompt them to give more consideration to how they design
lessons or manage their classes. Another important outcome of employing an
ethnically diverse staff is that pupils see the staff working together and show-
ing respect for one another. They can learn from these positive examples of
cooperation and as they grow up they will be more open to working and liv-
ing in a diverse society. One principal also raised this as an important reason
to employ Romani teaching assistants:
“I believe that a Romani teaching assistant for Romani pupils is

the best there can be… That’s why I’m pleased that there is a
Romani woman here, who has qualifications and can be a kind
of role model. [She’s] not just an enemy who does things dif-
ferently, has a different skin colour, a different mentality.
Laura Cashman 319
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Therefore, it’s good that she’s a Romani woman” (Principal 5,
2004).
Thus, employing Roma in schools is a measure which not only trans-

forms schools but could gradually lead to a more inclusive society.
Improving relations between schools and communities and children’s
experiences at school should help to improve the levels of educational at-
tainment of Romany pupils, however, as a means to improve their employ-
ment chances, the presence of teaching assistants in primary schools can
bring only limited success. Many principals reported that thanks to intensive
support and mentoring, almost all of their Romani pupils finished the primary
stage of their education and enrolled in secondary schools, yet very few man-
aged to complete more than a year or two of secondary education. While this
was sometimes due to peer pressure, or demands from their families to con-
tribute to the family income, it is also the case that the criticisms of main-
stream primary schools as alienating institutions apply just as much to secon-
dary schools. In Ostrava, the Romani Advisors had tried to convince the
principals of secondary schools to get involved with the teaching assistant
programme but the response was less than encouraging (Romani Advisor,
2005). At present, the main policy to encourage Roma to complete their sec-
ondary education is the offer of grants to subsidize their studies. While this
financial support is important, the presence of Romani mentors in secondary
schools could offer the emotional support which is lacking at the moment.
7. A Path to Employment for Roma

The employment of teaching assistants is first and foremost a means to sup-
port Romani pupils in mainstream schools but by training and hiring Roma
for these positions it is also possible to directly assist Romani jobseekers.
Obviously, it would be impossible for all unemployed Roma to be employed
as teaching assistants, even if they were all qualified for the job, but the ques-
tion remains whether such a form of positive discrimination is an acceptable
policy. Officially, the policy does not only target Roma for the positions, just
as the assistants provide support to any children from ‘socio-culturally disad-
vantaged’ homes and not only Romani children. Any person who has the
correct qualifications and can demonstrate that they have enough empathy to
work with the children and communicate with their families must be consid-
ered for a post.
All the principals interviewed for this research were asked for their
views on hiring Roma to work as teaching assistants. Generally the principals
of schools where Roma were employed believed that it was important to
employ Roma wherever possible. They listed many of the advantages already
discussed in the preceding sections – the children and parents trusted them,
they gave teachers much needed additional support, they provided pupils with
______________________________________________________________
positive role models and they helped to improve the school’s relationship
with the local Romani community. However, the principals felt it was not
enough to simply hire any Romani person for the job. Not every candidate
was a success and the principal of one school in Ostrava reported that a
teaching assistant was dismissed the previous year because he was not doing
his job properly. Two of the principals said they preferred to employ Roma
who had completed their secondary education even though the actual re-
quirement for the job is to have completed the primary stage of education:
“The assistant can be a person with primary education but I

prefer when they have the Maturita because that shows Roma
all that a person can achieve, that if they do something for it
themselves then they have a chance” (Principal 11, 2005).
However, some principals were unconvinced. Principal 3 reported

negative experiences with Romani teaching assistants in the past and now
preferred to employ non-Romani teaching assistants:
“I have experience with Romani assistants from the last place

where I worked. They often supported the claims of Roma that
we were treating them badly. They wanted excessive advan-
tages, which we could not give them. We cannot give them
everything for free. There are some things that everyone must
pay for themselves. And the assistants were always defending
them even when they were in the wrong” (Principal 3, 2004).
The principals of schools which had non-Romani teaching assistants

insisted that although a member of a Romani community might have some
additional advantages over a non-Romani assistant, they were happy with the
work being done by the non-Romani teaching assistants. When asked how
she viewed the situation, the only non-Romani teaching assistant interviewed
argued that the ethnicity of the teaching assistant made little difference as
long as the children received the support they needed.
The employment of teaching assistants has been successful in the
sense that some mainstream schools are now more inclusive environments for
Romani children and communication has improved between families and
schools. However, in spite of the positive results of their work the assistants
were aware that there are still many problems to be overcome. Sometimes
they felt that some of the expectations of what they could achieve as a link
between Romani parents and the school were unrealistic. If parents had a
negative attitude about education then sometimes even a teaching assistant
from their community could not do very much to change their minds. Barbora
spoke of the frustration she sometimes experienced:
Laura Cashman 321
______________________________________________________________
“The only thing about my work which bothers me at present is

that the cooperation with some parents is not as good as I, or
the other teachers, would hope it to be. They don’t accept the
recommendations from the school or from me. I can’t convince
them of the importance or the benefits of learning” (TA 2,
2004).
In the schools where teaching assistants were employed, it was appar-

ent that they had a positive impact. However, more schools could get in-
volved in the programme but their principals choose not to. One reason for
this is the fear that by engaging in programmes to support Romani pupils, the
school might get a reputation locally as a ‘Roma’ school – a label which
principals were desperate to avoid. The other main reason offered was that
the financial arrangements to pay the wages of teaching assistants were too
complicated and busy principals did not have time to deal with all the red
tape. Indeed, while the principals of schools involved with the scheme re-
ported positive experiences with the teaching assistants, they also cited prob-
lems with how the wages of assistants were funded. Schools have to reapply
to the Ministry of Education every year for the funding to pay assistants’
wages. This means an increased bureaucratic burden and the uncertainty of
not knowing whether the application will be approved. As a result teaching
assistants can only be employed on fixed contracts and this lack of job secu-
rity can be a problem when trying to recruit the best candidates. The principal
of one school in České Budějovice had attempted to hire a Romani person for
the position of teaching assistant but the local Employment Office and the
Regional Coordinator for Romani Affairs could not find any suitably quali-
fied Roma interested in doing the work. Given the strength of the local econ-
omy in České Budějovice, a Romani person with some educational qualifica-
tions had other options for employment and so a temporary contract was not
as appealing as it might be in cities like Ostrava where there was high unem-
ployment. Given the state’s professed commitment to tackling unemployment
among Roma and the overwhelmingly positive feedback from schools about
the contribution teaching assistants make, the Ministry of Education has a
responsibility to ensure more stability for both schools and jobseekers by
offering permanent posts to teaching assistants.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the problems of unemployment among Roma.
There is a vicious circle in many communities where long-term unemploy-
ment has robbed people of hope and educational aspiration. Despite all the
evidence that educational qualifications are of crucial importance to job-
seekers, some Roma do not believe that they would find employment even if
______________________________________________________________
they invested time and energy in education. Without role models who can
prove otherwise it is difficult to see how this circle can be broken. Employing
teaching assistants in schools is one small way to tackle these problems.
Jobseekers have a new avenue to gain work experience and schools become
more inclusive. Romani children see members of their community in posi-
tions of authority being treated with respect and non-Romani children (and
teachers) also benefit from the experience of having their prejudices about
Roma challenged. Problems remain with how the scheme is funded and man-
aged but as part of a wider policy to deal with the root causes of social exclu-
sion in Romani communities, this is an important programme.
The scheme as described here is not perfect. Thus far only 127 out of
more than 4,000 Czech primary schools employ teaching assistants. As dem-
onstrated in the above discussion, not even all schools with Romani pupils
employ Romani teaching assistants. In fact, it is clear that all schools would
benefit from the presence of Romani members of teaching staff as this is the
best way to teach children about life in an ethnically diverse and mutually
respectful society. Equally, the impact of the positive changes occurring in
primary schools is lessened by the failure to continue the scheme in secon-
dary schools. Principals interviewed for this research reported that their pu-
pils were now completing their primary education but dropping out of secon-
dary schools because they needed more support than could be made available
to them. A further problem is the lack of certainty about the security of the
jobs of teaching assistants, given that contracts are always offered on an an-
nual basis. Principals waste valuable time reapplying to the Ministry of Edu-
cation for funding every year and teaching assistants may become demoral-
ised as they go through the same uncertainty annually. Given all the indica-
tions of how effective this programme can be, if the Czech state is really
serious about building a fully integrated society then more support should be
offered to schemes such as this.
In the introduction to this volume the rationale behind integration
policies in Central and Eastern Europe was questioned and it is worth reflect-
ing on the underlying aims of the teaching assistant programme – is this
genuinely a positive way to integrate Roma or is it actually a means to ho-
mogenize Roma by using teaching assistants to socialize Romani children
into the dominant modes of behaviour? The latter argument could be sus-
tained as many of the teaching assistants interviewed for this study, although
Romani, did not belong to the communities they were supporting. However,
based on the findings of this research I would argue that this is not the case.
These teaching assistants aspired to belong to the middle class but they were
not willing to deny their Romani heritage to achieve this goal. As one teach-
ing assistant explicitly stated, it was their wish to broaden understandings of
what it means to be Roma to allow educated, middle class individuals to also
be seen as belonging to Romani communities. By gaining the respect of their
Laura Cashman 323
______________________________________________________________
non-Romani colleagues and pupils, Romani teaching assistants can improve
understanding between both communities and – given the importance of
convincing the majority to embrace a multicultural vision of Czech society –
they can help make their schools more inclusive institutions by promoting
integration in the staff room as well as in the classroom.
Endnotes
1 Research conducted in the period 2004–2005 was funded by the ESRC

(PTA-030-2002-011) and a Europe-Asia Studies scholarship.
2 Primary school (Základní škola) is first stage of education which takes nine
(compulsory) years, usually from the age of six to fifteen.
3 Statistical information about Roma is notoriously unreliable. The popula-
tion figures for both cities were provided by municipal officials with respon-
sibility for local Romani integration strategies.
4 Very few pupils registered their nationality as Romani, as Roma tend not to
identity themselves on official documents, but the principals had a good idea
of the ethnic profiles of their schools.
5 It should be noted that there is no cultural reason to explain high levels of
unemployment among Roma. It is sometimes argued that Roma have no
work ethic and prefer to steal or beg than to work for their living. However,
this is not borne out by historical accounts, which refer to Roma as specialists
in particular trades, especially metal work or horse-dealing (Fonseca, 1996;
Fraser, 1995; Stewart, 1997), and as noted above Roma still look for casual
work opportunities wherever possible. This work may not be legal but it
remains a challenge to the stereotype of the ‘layabout’ Rom.
6 Named after Pavel Bratinka, President of the Council for National Minori-
ties, who commissioned the report.
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Multicultural Solutions for Central and Eastern Europe?
Concluding Observations

In this chapter we revisit the topics of the volume and discuss
whether multiculturalist take on ethnic diversity in Central
Eastern Europe (CEE) has much to offer for the minorities
affected. We argue that the group-based approach to minority
integration is likely to miss its envisaged goals, because it
essentializes cultural communities as homogeneous. While we
view the cultural bias embedded in the integration policies as
the major impediment for securing equality between the
groups, we claim that safeguarding diversity is possible only by
addressing individual preferences of members of different
communities. If political structures really seek minority
integration, they need to address individuals and not
exclusively groups as the bearers of rights and duties. For this
to happen, further consolidation of liberal democratic regimes
across CEE seems to be a minimal requirement.
Introduction
Since Canada devised a comprehensive policy to manage its multiethnic
society in the late 1960s “multiculturalism” has become a much debated
concept across the globe. CEE countries could only join the deliberation after
the Iron Curtain fell in the late 1980s. However, today they remain very much
at the centre of the European debate on social equality and non-
discrimination, not least because international organizations increasingly
sponsor and promote minority integration programmes based on multicultur-
alism. Across the post-socialist world, multiculturalism usually defines a
public policy approach to the management of cultural diversity in society.
Advocates of multiculturalism in Central and Eastern Europe additionally
stress respect and tolerance for differences among ethnic and linguistic
groups through emphasis on the uniqueness of cultures, especially in how
they relate to one another and to national institutions. In so doing, scholars of
multiculturalism effectively address collective rights inherent to members of
minority groups, while at the same time dispensing with questions of individ-
ual autonomy.
Although, multiculturalism has grown out of the original idea of de-
fending and promoting the ethnic cultures of national communities, local
minorities, or migratory communities, its area of application is most suitable
under situations in which one culture dominates others. Current debates on
332 Multicultural Solutions for Central and Eastern Europe?
______________________________________________________________
multiculturalism observe that its distinguishing feature lies in implicit or
explicit attempts to honour liberal and democratic egalitarianism simultane-
ously, an endeavour which is difficult to reconcile with the growing accep-
tance of the cultural heterogeneity of citizenry (Modood, 2007). Hence, while
having evolved from the liberal democratic values of liberty and equality,
multiculturalism remains undecided as to the nature of these two fundamental
concepts and thus far has been slow to produce a universally applicable col-
lective understanding of the issues. All Western and Eastern European states
largely acknowledge that present-day societies are culturally diverse. How-
ever, the policy-focus on guaranteeing group rights to minority groups is
particularly difficult to reconcile with the liberal connotations of personal
identity, which presumes freedom of choice to belong to any group.
Studies of ethnopolitics, whether of Western or Eastern European so-
cieties tend to apply rational choice theoretical approaches to explain when,
why and how primordial identities are mobilised and tend to cause conflicts
(Brubaker, 2004; Hale, 2008; Hechter, 2000; Laitin, 2007). Taking an ex-
treme position on the salience of group identities - cultural, ethnic or linguis-
tic - rational choice approaches essentially deny the reality of individual
commitment to a group agenda. Although our authors have avoided sliding
into the debates on the nature of identities involved in the process of social
integration, on many occasions the salience of these identities for the devel-
opment of policies to facilitate minority integration is implicit. We claim that
this view does not result from the “area studies fallacy” of the volume. In-
stead, we believe that our authors highlight the fundamental challenge of
bringing about multiculturalist solutions to minority integration: essentializ-
ing groups on the one hand, and seeking their convergence on the other are
difficult outcomes to reconcile.
1. What kind of Multiculturalism?

Multiculturalism has many faces and many more conceptual formulations.
Two currents can be discerned from the multitude of approaches, with
“communitarian multiculturalism” dominating the scene and “pluralist multi-
culturalism” established as a secondary issue within the debates surrounding
the design of democratic processes. The communitarian version of multicul-
turalism, naturally, distinguishes groups as objects of rights, estimates a pol-
icy’s effectiveness with respect to cultural communities and treats these
communities as homogeneous entities (Benhabib, 2002; Taylor, 1992, 2004).
The pluralist version also sees groups to be the bearers of specific rights and
obligations, defends non-dominant cultural groups and suggests different
forms of political representation of group interests, by various means. How-
ever, pluralist multiculturalism advocates self-government, cultural autonomy
and similar rights for the members of groups, because it treats them as indi-
______________________________________________________________
viduals in their own right (Kymlicka, 1995, 2000; Kymlicka and Patten,
2003; Phillips, 2007; Sen, 1999).
Neither approach to multiculturalism however, addresses the policy-
bias in favour of the dominant group which naturally has a greater influence
over policy-making than ethnic minorities do. Frequently the state-bearing
majority treats members of various groups as objects of group processes, but
not as subjects choosing identities and thus forming groups as such. And
because multiculturalisms distinguish the groups, not the individuals, as the
bearers of distinct rights and freedoms, societal integration can only be un-
derstood as a process through which individuals move closer together into a
common, culturally blind space (Philips, 2007; Tamir, 1992).
Conversely, the group approach to societal integration and its empha-
sis on the centrality of collective rights points to a blind spot in the debates on
multiculturalism. However defined, groups rarely engage in any integration
measures. It is the individual member of the group who is affected by incen-
tives and policies and who has very limited opportunities to determine either
the direction or the pace of these processes. Multiculturalism, following the
founding principles of democratic liberalism treats groups as nothing more
than a sum of individuals, endowed with a set of inalienable rights. In so
doing, multiculturalist solutions to integration are caught in a dilemma. On
the one hand, they seek to accommodate the interests of groups, while on the
other, they emphasise that rights and freedoms are always individually allo-
cated. Ultimately, multiculturalism is biased towards groups in general and
towards any kind of community in a disadvantaged position in particular.
Groups are either conceived of as being internally homogeneous, or exhibit-
ing such intragroup variation that it is impossible to reach internal agreement
of criteria for group membership.
Although our contributors have focussed on what is at stake during the
process of integration in CEE states, they are less explicit about the kind of
multiculturalism that is being developed throughout the region. First and
foremost, all the contributions address the shortcomings of the group-based
approach of policies on societal integration applied across CEE states. Con-
tributions to the Section One recognize the deficits implicit in the group ap-
proach to societal integration and emphasize the growing focus on individual
rights, as advocated by international organizations. The contributions in Sec-
tion One make clear, international organizations frequently address non-
dominant groups as if they were homogeneous, while at the same time view-
ing disadvantaged individuals as if they were not members of any group.
Furthermore, in addressing the structural framework of integration
processes in CEE countries, the contributions in Section Two suggest that
internal group differences, particularly among the members of non-dominant
communities are often overlooked by state approaches to integration. The
base-line for successful integration of minority communities is de jure culture
______________________________________________________________
blind political institutions, as all of the contributions to Section Two argue.
However, in none of the cases examined in this volume are political struc-
tures de facto culture blind because they are all too frequently used by domi-
nant groups to support their own nation-building projects.
Finally, the conflicting logics of nation- and state-building are ad-
dressed from the perspective of non-dominant groups. Contributions to Sec-
tion Three focus on conditions of access to political institutions and call for a
redefinition of these from a functional perspective: Why do established insti-
tutions fail to address the structural conditions, which determine the marginal
position of non-dominant groups? One of the central preconditions for inte-
gration in the multicultural societies in question lies in addressing the differ-
ences within the non-dominant groups. The contributions to Section Three
illustrate the lack of sensitivity state-policies demonstrate when approaching
different segments of the non-dominant Romani communities. However,
throughout the volume we see that while policies remain blind towards dif-
ferences within non-dominant or excluded groups, reducing inequalities
among some members of these groups immediately leads to the further mar-
ginalization of the least competitive members of these communities. Women,
children and individuals with less formal education are always jeopardized
when attention is granted to larger entities, such as ethnic or linguistic
groups.
In sum, the contributions to this volume do not articulate, but always
suggest that a group approach is a necessary base-line for equality between
non-dominant and dominant groups. However, because there are critical
differences within dominant and non-dominant groups in terms of resources,
preferences and beliefs, a focus on intergroup differences should not over-
shadow intragroup variations. Effective implementation of the group-based
approach to integration is more than likely to reproduce inequalities between
the sub-groups, unless it is combined with the differentiated treatment of
individual differences within the groups affected by the process of minority
integration.
All the contributors address the incentives for dominant groups in
their approaches to minority integration. CEE approaches to integration pro-
mote individual involvement with the group that has better access to scarce
(and, at times, highly contested) resources, central positions and benefits
controlled by the dominant group. At the very least, this resembles a state
sponsored process ensuring social cohesion at the expense of cultural diver-
sity. At most, it is reminiscent of incentives for the members of non-dominant
groups to assimilate into the dominant group. In both cases, however, a one-
way integration process is at work with non-dominant groups adapting to the
rules, set out by the dominant community, which is state-bearing, liberal
democratic and held to be inherently good.
______________________________________________________________
This false opposition between the choice of assimilation and margin-
alization, as our volume demonstrates, ultimately results in a new form of
post-socialist multiculturalism. Across the region, we observe the develop-
ment of policies protecting (if not promoting) the culture of the majority, as
well as the evolution of a social consensus that the public space can dispense
with visible presence of minority cultures, which are largely pushed into
private sphere.
In part, the retreat of non-dominant cultures into the private sphere is
the result of the concerted action of international, national and local actors,
working through policies of social cohesion. International legal instruments,
local political leaderships, and the communities they target all see multicul-
turalism as a means for groups to interact, as if they were homogeneous, self-
sustained and largely independent units within nation-state borders. However,
while policy-making focuses on collectivities with hard boundaries, policy-
implementation depends on flexible understandings of group memberships
and the freedoms of their individual members, who can appeal for affirmative
action and special standards of consideration.
The chapters on Roma in this volume suggest that a group approach is
at least one of the reasons – if not the central reason – to explain why Roma
failed to achieve success in their integration endeavours across CEE. Multi-
culturalism affirms group rights but does so by essentializing cultures, ho-
mogenizing them for policy purposes, and tending to neglect differences
within and similarities between cultures. The dilemma we see with ap-
proaches to societal integration across CEE is not that groups do not interact
with each other to the degree necessary for a multicultural public sphere to
emerge in any one country but that interactions take place between individu-
als, who classify each other exclusively in terms of belonging to different
cultural communities.
In spite of this, there is no debate on the fact that multiculturalism is a
reality across CEE states and societies. Contrary to the commonly held view,
multiculturalism does not emerge as the result of intellectual construction,
nor is it an attempt to address potential conflict in multiethnic societies. In-
stead it has its source in the problems of real world politics and is driven by a
growing awareness of inequality between different segments of society. The
increasing heterogeneity of political communities across the globe links vari-
ous questions of concern for the multiculturalist debate: from international
relations between states to intergroup relations within state borders, from the
choices made by individual members of non-dominant groups to the ap-
proaches of states to integrating their citizenry.
Disregarding these differences between the groups at the cost of pre-
serving societal and political integrity would be wrong-headed at best, coun-
terproductive at worst. In this light, social integration is a means and an end
in the multiculturalism debate. Offering solutions to agents on the ground, the
______________________________________________________________
makers of policy-frameworks and monitoring the debates of the international
community on social integration are always about the real-world society and
the limits of political and social theories. At all times, however, understand-
ing what is the base-line for integration and what is the drive behind the re-
spective policies is central to estimating the envisaged outcomes.
2. The Role of European Organizations in Minority Integration

Contributions in Section One analyze international norms and the instruments
employed to promote equality and non-discrimination. While non-
discrimination norms form the desired minimum consensus which will affect
all further policy measures to foster minority integration, the promotion of
effective equality has only recently been emphasised by European institu-
tions. European organizations have now taken a leading role in the promotion
of minority non-discrimination and equality norms and programmes. In CEE
practically no country has remained untouched by international efforts to
integrate politically, socially or economically disenfranchised minority
groups. Despite the large number of excellent studies investigating minority
rights in CEE (Brubaker et al., 2006; Galbreath, 2005; Csergı, 2007; Harris,
2002; Kelley, 2004; Rechel, 2008; Smith, 2005; Schimmelfennig et al., 2006)
much of this literature primarily analyzes the formal adoption of minority
rights before EU enlargement and the impact of EU membership condition-
ality. However, this volume focuses primarily on the period after EU
enlargement and on the much narrower issue of minority integration pro-
grammes in a variety of CEE countries.
The prohibition of racial discrimination in particular, aims to create a
public sphere which accommodates a range of diverging opinions and indi-
vidual expressions of difference. In this manner, international organizations
create a base-line for European values, where any kind of primordial loyalties
and identities can be expressed freely within the context of societal debate.
Equality promotion attempts to define this new public space in terms that
ensure parity between all cultural groups, irrespective of their cultural back-
ground. Here, international regulations fortify individual liberties against
group cohesion and potentially undermine individual expressions of cultural
differences.
For European organizations the principles of equality between major-
ity and minority groups and non-discrimination of non-dominant communi-
ties constitute two fundamental principles of minority protection. This under-
standing was barely recognized in national legislation affecting minority
treatment in the CEE countries after the end of Communism. Only non-
discrimination norms have been formally adopted in a comprehensive manner
in the wake of EU enlargement and membership conditionality. The chal-
lenge for international organizations in promoting non-discrimination norms
and standards of equality appears to lie in the promotion of general standards
______________________________________________________________
for the very divers living conditions minorities face in Europe. Sponsorship
of political practices, accountability of social interactions and recognition of
individual freedoms are the focus of European organizations’ activities.
Efforts by international organizations to positively steer minor-
ity/majority relations come with a multitude of instruments and approaches
covering very different features of minority life. Our authors provide an ana-
lytical synopsis of at least two aspects in which international organizations
are involved in minority integration. Firstly, international institutions engage
in a norm-setting process. They develop standards for appropriate behaviour,
either at the legal or policy level, promote them and monitor their application.
Secondly, international organizations are norm promoters applying different
methods and instruments to foster compliance for international standards.
However, the promotion of integration measures by international organiza-
tions lacks a systematic and comprehensive approach grounded in normative
theory.
Standard-setting
During the last two decades international organizations in Europe have estab-
lished a widely accepted set of minority rights of which non-discrimination
and equal treatment are at the core for ethnic minorities. The relative success
of this process of standard-setting becomes apparent when we observe the
reactions of CEE countries to these minority rights claims. Even in those
countries where substantial cleavages exist between majority and minority
groups, the basic rights of minorities are officially acknowledged although
often inadequately implemented. Admittedly, this is why a general accep-
tance of non-discrimination and equality standards across CEE is insufficient
to guarantee effective equality on the ground.
International organizations have not developed a uniform or standard
approach to integration based on any particular theoretical or normative ap-
proach to multiculturalism. However, European institutions increasingly
promote the social integration of ethnic minorities and thereby, willingly or
not, borrow from basic assumptions linked to the ‘multiculturalilst approach’.
On the one hand, we observe that international standard-setting aims to tran-
scend tight cultural bonds between individuals by guaranteeing everyone a
life free from discrimination. However, as all social acts and practices are
culturally determined culture-blind values and practices cannot exist. Thus
international institutions engage in the promotion of standards on equality
and non-discrimination. The multiculturalist solutions provided by interna-
tional organizations implicitly ensure the recognition of cultural differences.
However, the absence of strict international norms on the application of “ef-
fective equality” means that nation-states enjoy a fairly high degree of discre-
______________________________________________________________
tion in setting up integration programmes which suit their own particular
preferences.
But how do international norms on minority integration take shape in
the EU, COE and OSCE? As Riedel observes in her contribution, minority
rights are not codified in any of the EU treaties. With the drafting of the Ra-
cial Equality Directive in 2000, the EU took an important step forward in
guaranteeing equal treatment for ethnic minorities without clearly formulat-
ing a set of exclusive minority rights. The Racial Equality Directive obliges
EU member states to transpose all of its provisions into national legislation.
Measures of positive discrimination are explicitly accepted in Article 5 which
draws a connection between non-discrimination as “full equality in practice”
and the adoption of “specific measures” to ensure minority equality. Al-
though, as Riedel makes clear, strictly speaking, EU law does not spell out a
legal right to positive discrimination, such actions are permissible in practice
under the Racial Equality Directive.
In his contribution Brosig discusses the more progressive attitude to-
wards equality rights found in the comments by the Advisory Committee
(AC) of the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities
(FCNM) which monitors the application of the FCNM. Correspondingly,
Morawa’s chapter on the jurisprudence of the European Court for Human
Rights on Article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) supports this
view. In his contribution, Brosig argues that the AC delivers the most proac-
tive approach of all European organizations. However, while the AC did not
develop criteria for the application of affirmative action policies, it refers to
cases where persisting inequalities between dominant and non-dominant
groups of societies require monitoring. Affirmative action is most frequently
requested regarding the status of Roma and their access to employment,
housing, and education. In the AC country reports, states are called upon to
undertake measures to remedy severe and durable forms of marginalization,
in order to reverse previous discriminatory treatment of socio-economic and
ethnic groups. In sum, Brosig concludes, the AC bases its decision to recom-
mend certain integration measures on pragmatic assumptions of minority
living conditions and avoids the normative language of multiculturalism.
In his chapter, Morawa follows up the areas where special considera-
tion of minority rights is often warranted. He argues that it corresponds to
current trends in the approaches of all three organizations to minority integra-
tion measures. There is an increasingly strong emphasis on positive action
that would guarantee effective equality and enhance protection against dis-
crimination. In its Chapman judgement the European Court for Human
Rights has already confirmed that for states a positive obligation exists to
provide effective equality. However, as Morawa indicates, it is relatively
silent on the concrete application of its “special consideration standard”. The
______________________________________________________________
Court has also not systematically advanced the concept of affirmative action
in its recent judgments.
Norm Promotion
The institution of the HCNM does not aim to develop formal minority rights
and thus we cannot analyze legal provisions for minority integration at the
HCNM. However, the HCNM plays such an important role in minority issues
in Central and Eastern Europe that it can hardly be ignored in the concert of
international institutions. Nevertheless, the HCNM can be said to engage in
soft law standard-setting or at least in the promotion of a certain concept of
minority rights in those areas in which ethnic conflicts are likely to arise or
currently persist. As Sabanadze notes in her contribution, the HCNM bases
its conflict prevention strategy on the idea that security and social justice are
not opposing but rather mutually reinforcing concepts. To achieve political
stability the HCNM promotes the concept of ethnic diversity with the overall
aim of preventing potential ethnic conflict and violence. These soft standards
do not entail hard positive obligations with specific guidelines outlining what
should be done. Instead, Sabanadze concludes, these soft standards reflect the
built-in expectations which would be expressed by the HCNM to govern-
ments in the event of a potential ethnic conflict.
An examination of how international organizations in Europe protect
norms relating to minority integration indicates the emergence of increasing
demands on states to remedy cases of discrimination and marginalization
more effectively. As all four contributions to Section One make clear, af-
firmative action has become a progressively more legitimate tool through the
promotion of equality standards by international organizations. However, the
application of preferential measures is not warranted under all circumstances
and every case requires careful analysis in the context of ‘real life’ condi-
tions. All institutions analyzed in the first section of this volume are very
cautious in their promotion of affirmative measures which must not lead to
unjustified privileges of a minority in comparison with the majority.
All of the organizations analyzed in Section One of the volume ad-
vance minority rights by promoting equal treatment and non-discrimination.
However, they differ according to the instruments used to promote and en-
force these standards. In fact the EU applies hard and soft law instruments,
ranging from new modes of governance like the open method of coordination
to legally biniding standards such as the Racial Equality Directive. An exclu-
sively legal approach is taken by the European Court for Human Rights, the
AC oversees the correct implementation of the FCNM which requires both
legal expertise but also policy advise and lastly the HCNM engages in con-
ventional diplomacy as emergency mediator in situations of ethnic conflicts.
Together these organizations make up a European minority rights regime,
______________________________________________________________
although still fragmented (Thiele, 2006), which emphasises different aspects
of minority protection of which equality promotion and non-discrimination
are the cornerstones.
International orghanizations played a pivotal role in establishing mi-
nority rights norms in Europe and bringing states to acknowledge minority
claims on equal treatment, non-discrimination, and cultural rights. However,
neither the EU, nor Council of Europe, nor the OSCE have developed or
promoted a single model of multiculturalism which they want their member
states to adopt. This can be referred to the practical impossibility to promote
a comprehensive model of multiculturalism as living conditions of people
vary significantly throughout Europe as well as to political disagreement
among states which direction a multiculturalist society should take. With
promoting norms and principles such as effective equality, non-
discrimination and cultural diversity these organizations made it clear that
national programmes developing multicultulturalist goals on minority inte-
gration must not fall back behind these basic international standards. How-
ever, the design and implementation of integration programmes and projects
is seen by international organizations as a task of domestic politics, societal
debate and minority participation.
3. The Role of Nation-States in Minority Integration

It is striking that international actors are largely silent on the use of specific
instruments for minority integration. The normative grounds on which they
promote standards of equality leave ample space for the discretion of nation-
states. This is particularly the case with European non-discrimination legisla-
tion which is framed as negative obligations not to discriminate on the basis
of race, ethnicity, linguistic identity etc. Although these norms are strict and
increasingly comprehensive, European institutions are prepared only to a
limited extent to formulate positive obligations which would bind nation-
states to certain measures ensuring effective equality. The lack of positive
obligations on nation-states towards their minority communities also hampers
the ability of international organizations to advocate integration programmes,
leaving it to national governments to devise their own approaches to societal
integration.
As contributors to Section Two of our book indicate, efforts are being
made across the CEE region to remedy cases of discrimination and to pro-
mote equality between dominant and non-dominant groups. Our authors
observe that CEE societies are working on specific multiculturalist solutions
to accommodate ethnic diversity. Some might notice some similarities be-
tween the societies in the Centre and Eastern and those in the Western
Europe.
Non-dominant groups are treated as homogeneous collectivities; non-
core ethnics and migrants are perceived as a challenge to majority-serving
______________________________________________________________
state institutions; the lack of transparency and accountability in parts of pub-
lic, social, and cultural life to aspirations of minority groups. However, the
CEE versions of multiculturalism diverge significantly from those of Western
European states simply because they are engaged with state-building proc-
esses while struggling to complete nation-building projects. One big differ-
ence is that the Western European minorities were entrapped with existing
political institutions serving local majorities, while the CEE minorities found
themselves excluded from participating in institution-building in their states
of residence.
Naturally, this vision has little to do with any version of multicultural-
ism and provides only two viable ways out. On the one hand, political institu-
tions across CEE are too inadequately prepared to address the real grievances
of the non-dominant members of these societies. The fact that the state is
perceived to be a bulwark of national identity is not always unproblematic, as
is reflected in the Western European debate on integration (see, Bowen,
2007; Phillips, 2007; Wallach Scott, 2007). Case studies presented in Section
Two suggest that understanding whose interests state institutions should
serve, and how differences – cultural, ethnic, linguistic and others – should be
addressed is highly problematic. State institutions became deeply ethnicized
in the process of political competition, perpetuating inequalities between the
majority and the minority communities by making the state home to only one,
ethnocultural community (Berg-Schlosser and Vetik, 2001; Harlig, 1997;
Kuzio, 1998).
As a reaction to international organization’s promotion of minority
rights and as a consequence of the genuinely disadvantaged position of many
members of minority groups in CEE, states have adopted national legislation
on non-discrimination and equal treatment (see Faist, 2009; Rechel, 2009;
Preece, 1998). However, neither the integration programmes for Roma in
Hungary, nor for Egyptians in Albania, neither for Hungarians in Slovakia,
nor for Russian speakers in the Baltic states sought to increase the multicul-
tural accountability of state institutions. Instead, they provided minority
groups with limited possibilities to act within the existing (majority domi-
nated) institutions to accommodate their interests. It appears that a similar
conundrum of integration is embedded in all efforts of social cohesion, re-
gardless of whether the states are in Eastern or Western Europe (see also,
(Kymlicka, 2007; Vitikainen, 2009; Soutphommasane, 2005).
Limits of the Group-Based Approach to Integration
This is where the approach of international organizations’ and the state-led

view of societal integration converge: they focus too much on groups in order
to ensure equality and guarantee non-discrimination. Moreover, non-
dominant groups are presumed to possess clearly distinguishable identities
______________________________________________________________
that differ from those of the mainstream society, thus opening the gates for
the special protection of non-dominant groups. While international organiza-
tions attempt to support the preservation and development of minority cul-
tures and protect the individual against discrimination, states across CEE are
far less sophisticated in their approach to creating and sustaining group
bonds.
Contributors to this section argue that non-dominant groups have little
leeway for action in the public sphere across CEE unless they cooperate on
terms envisaged by the majorities. Common identities are constantly rein-
forced and created by recurring expressions of allegiance and mass attach-
ment on the side of the majority, prompting minority groups to engage in the
same processes to define their group borders (Sainsbury, 2006; Kurthen and
Heisler, 2009; Vucetic, 2007). Framed and reframed in the national political
rhetoric, common parlance and self-understanding, these eth-
nic/cultural/linguistic identities can be vague and ill-defined and yet provide
a set of more or less clear behavioural patterns which come to be expected
from the members of the group. Minority groups throughout the region have
learnt far too well that in order to access resources in the grasp of the domi-
nant group, they need to align themselves with the most powerful actors in
the field, preferably policy-makers. In this context, studies of minority inte-
gration continuously address a subversive trend towards assimilation into the
majority culture among labour-migrants and substantially disadvantaged
communities (Laitin, 2007; Oudenhoven and Eisses, 1998; Soysal, 1994).
In their individual contributions, the authors in the Section Two make
explicit that since the collapse of communism the political elites in their case-
studies have instilled societies with the idea that statehood belongs largely, if
not entirely, to the dominant group in society. This also allows CEE states to
extend specific expectations towards minority groups. While it is the majority
that “feels it has been the victim of oppression, often at the hands of minori-
ties acting in collaboration with foreign enemies. […] The sort of historic
injustice that is central to postcommunist debates, unlike that in the West, is
the historical oppression of the majority group by its minorities in collabora-
tion with a kin-state or foreign power” (Kymlicka, 2008).
Prominently, this context provides the dominant groups with argu-
ments to deploy against the claims of non-dominant groups, and hence con-
strains the development of institutions supporting integration processes. If
anything, political institutions, playing the role of “service station” on the
terms of the majority, further undermine the options for equal access of vari-
ous cultural groups, even for those who enjoy full citizenship (Budryte,
2005). However, if political institutions are presented as guarantors of the
cultural identity of the dominant group, non-dominant groups can do nothing
but see cooperation with political institutions as a way towards their coopta-
tion and ultimately, assimilation. In addition, if policies implemented aim to
______________________________________________________________
undo previous injustices inflicted upon the dominant groups by “imperial
minorities”, political institutions will do nothing less than undermine the
cultural diversity of a society affected by these political structures (Badescu
et al., 2004; Csergı, 2007; Harris, 2002).
Independent of the limitations imposed on the non-dominant groups,
the cultural favouritism of political institutions across CEE prevents Euro-
pean non-discrimination and equality norms from becoming fully effective.
On the one hand, culture-biased institutions allow considerable space for the
claims of non-dominant groups to guarantee effective equality in individual
relations with state organs. At the same time, political institutions seem to
focus on the prevention of discrimination against non-dominant groups. In
this sense, the previous focus of state institutions on guarantees of individual
equality was undertaken to account for the autonomy of group cultural orien-
tations without addressing differences within the groups themselves. In order
to bring the presumption of group autonomy into equilibrium with that of
individual liberty, individual decision making and the structure of personal
intentions should be taken into greater account.
Institutions ensuring integration are usually considered successful,
when they do not impose any obligation on the dominant community to par-
ticipate in the process. As a result, as the cases in Section Two make clear,
members of the majority envisage that the state, political institutions and
political processes could be run solely by the majority community with little
or no consultation with non-dominant groups. Specifically, collective identity
is perceived as a marker of a group’s distinctness, legitimizing the group’s
self-determination and the institutionalization of a common identity.
On the one hand, all five contributions in Section Two find that state
institutions across the region are in dire need of consolidation. In all five
states discussed in the section, the majority of democratic voters do not ques-
tion the institutional design of new state structures, which primarily serve the
interests of state- bearing majority. The consent of the majority of the citi-
zenry, however, should not distract the attention from the discrimination
perceived by members of non-dominant groups with regard to the institu-
tional design of these states. Doubtless, this leaves little lee-way to renegoti-
ate state/society relations writ large, and majority/minority relations in par-
ticular.
On the other hand, minority integration constitutes an integral part of
a state-building project, which is still far from accomplished. While these
authors do not find any evidence that minority communities, their leadership
or their external advocates are inherently in opposition to the emerging uni-
tary state structures, all contributions in Section Two argue that the members
of minority communities would have been much better off if they had been
treated as partners during the process of state-building. For example, the
discussions on the policy-making aimed at the integration of societies in
______________________________________________________________
Slovakia, Latvia and Estonia underline that many policy goals were deemed
ineffective, as they did not reflect the capacities and opinions, not to mention
the preferences, of the minority communities they were intended to target.
All of the contributions in the Section Two of the book independently
determine that relations between the minority and majority groups can only
be considered adequately against the backdrop of converging processes of
nation- and state-building under way across the region. Where Tremlett and
Salamun argue that group identities are essential to effective policy-making
and implementation, Regelmann, Agarin and Malloy suggest that the policies
advanced are too concerned with the status of the dominant group to be suffi-
ciently sensitive to the grievances of minorities.
Some previous studies claim that such policies are indicative of the
majority’s self-perception (Alexius, 2008; Walsh and McLeod, 2007) and the
contributions in Section Two point out that integration policies are indeed
made by “minoritized majorities” (Bessenyey-Williams, 2002) Policy-makers
across CEE accept that states are inherently, not only contingently, owned by
one group, standing in permanent and inevitable all-out conflict over scarce
resources with the subordinated groups.
The Importance of Individual Autonomy
To address the multicultural nature of societies in CEE, the limits of individ-

ual equality and autonomy embedded in majority-led state- and institution-
building need to be assessed consistently. The recognition of different ethnic
groups as integral parts of a multicultural society would remain largely inef-
fective without guarantees of equality in intergroup interaction. Provisions
for non-discrimination should ensure the rights of members of non-dominant
groups to contest the leading role of the members of the dominant group in
the process of institution- and state-building. In addition, collective rights for
minority groups would allow different cultures to be accommodated in the
public sphere. Embedding group rights to express cultural distinctiveness in
the public sphere, for example, would allow for more flexible multicultural
solutions and thus be fundamentally different from the right to non-
discrimination, pursued to date.
To understand how CEE nation-states develop relations with their mi-
nority populations the potential for social integration across the region must
be investigated. Remarkably, all of the contributors in Section Two address
political institutions across CEE as reflecting the choices of majorities in the
respective societies. The stance of these states towards their non-dominant
communities is, therefore, largely determined by the majority’s own view of
post-socialist statehood. Membership in the international democratic commu-
nity is largely informed by the dominant elites’ definition of their national
interest. Throughout the region we observe that policies are designed to draw
______________________________________________________________
non-dominant minorities into broader social processes, while at the same time
prescribing the criteria for an integration model, based on the culture of the
majorities. Acceptance of a particular version of national history, proficiency
in the state language and enthusiasm for the culture of the majority emerge as
the criteria indicating social inclusion.
The way ahead, as presented in the contributions to Section Two, is to
address what is at stake for all members of society, irrespective of their mi-
nority or majority status. Blocking perceptions of national identity as the
fulcrum of national sovereignty and the basis for political participation is one
option proposed. Tremlett, Salamun, Regelmann, Agarin and Malloy argue
that national identity needs to be emptied of cultural content, while at the
same time filling the interpersonal space with culture-blind social relations.
This is obviously a utopian endeavour, because no institutional ar-
rangement or policy can ever be totally culture free but it is precisely the
institutionalised cultural bias in favour of the majority population that our
contributors are highlighting. Contributions to Section Two argue that as long
as national identity can be understood only from one particular, usually ma-
jority, cultural background, the tension between members of dominant and
non-dominant groups is likely to prevent functional interaction. Regelmann,
Agarin and Malloy further suggest that if national identity is defined by a
particular cultural background, it is likely to create two kinds of political
communities, those with privileged access to political institutions, and those
with limited access to participation through membership.
Tremlett and Salamun, on the other hand, suggest that national identity
can embrace non-dominant groups if substantial elements of individual
choice are incorporated into the design of minority integration instruments .
By recognizing individual choices within equality measures, the recipients of
integration can be addressed without essentializing group membership. Ulti-
mately, this creates the basis for a consolidated multicultural society. Avoid-
ing an ethnic understanding of nationhood would automatically allow indi-
vidual choice of civic or constitutional community identity over cohesive ties
of ethnic or linguistic kinship. Tremlett and Salamun emphasise that as long
as “national identity” means political identity, as envisaged by the dominant
ethnic community, there is little chance to address the grievances of non-
dominant groups, such as Roma or Egyptians.
Needless to say, how multicultural solutions will be embedded into
policy-making largely depends on the guarantee of liberal democratic gov-
ernance throughout CEE. Not all states across the region have an equal start-
ing point for discussions about the liberal distribution of rights and obliga-
tions to individuals affected by state institutions and policies. In many cases
members of non-dominant groups lack formal rights to participate in political
decision making. In other cases, social and economic constraints prevent the
equal engagement of minority groups. The case studies of “imperial minori-
______________________________________________________________
ties” by Regelmann, Agarin and Malloy might suggest that recognition of
difference between the groups would allow all individuals’ interests to be
embedded within the existing political structures. Moreover, the case studies
of Roma in chapters by Tremlett and Salamun indicate that shared interests
and concerns for liberty and equality, so central to democratizing CEE socie-
ties, still need to be established in the public sphere and embodied in political
structures.
In this, further democratization is the prerequisite for broader institu-
tional accountability to the demands of cultural communities and individual
dissenters. Guarantees of political and social pluralism will open up ways to
address inherently cultural interests, while at the same time updating the
understandings of equality embedded in existing political institutions and
allowing the elaboration of the novel forms of multicultural integration.
4. The Interface of Minority and Majority Communities

The problems of multiculturalist solutions are particularly clear when state
institutions attempt to deal with the integration of Romani communities. The
inability of multiculturalism to address marginal groups without a discernable
cultural core, but discriminated against nonetheless, becomes particularly
striking.
Here, the question of individual autonomy returns with great force.
Equality between the individuals of different cultural backgrounds can hardly
be guaranteed as long as it is the group that is the focus of non-discrimination
and equality protections. The fundamental problem of effective equality
arises when policy-making regarding national minority integration pro-
grammes is exclusively based on essentialized group features. Because group
features may significantly deviate from individual perceptions of equality,
any policy that only recognizes group values as the exclusive point of refer-
ence potentially or de facto infringes on individual choices for equal treat-
ment. However, the importance of group rights for realizing individual equal-
ity should not be dismissed too quickly. Although integration measures must
not essentialize group features, the autonomy for making choices depends on
the individual’s membership of a certain group.
Individual freedom to choose cultural loyalties opens the way for an
intercultural dialogue, limits group-exclusion and makes group-based dis-
crimination more difficult. Along the lines advocated by communitarian
multiculturalists, differential treatment of groups would undermine exclusion
based on group membership, as in cases of intergroup competition on the
same political stage, such as in South Tyrol - Alto Adige. Guaranteeing indi-
viduals the freedom to choose cultural identity on the basis of which they
would prefer to be treated would allow greater formal equality between the
members of the same political community, as is envisaged by the liberal
multiculturalists. This principle is at work in the cases of state interaction
______________________________________________________________
with endogenous, non-dominant residents, such as Sami in Nordic states and
First Nations in Canada. In all cases however, both schools of multicultural-
ism agree that when members of a non-dominant community present them-
selves as members of the dominant community, they are likely to gain greater
acceptance. For multiculturalists, this adds up to greater equality of individu-
als from different cultural backgrounds when they interact in the public
space. At times, however, this individual choice might result in creeping
assimilation (see Laitin, 1998).
The case studies in this volume confirm that either way, the more sali-
ent the perception of group identity is with both dominant and non-dominant
communities, the more supportive institutions would need to be to alleviate
the grievances of disadvantaged members of non-dominant groups. Thus, it
seems logical that the greater focus on individual autonomy would allow one
to address individual preferences and choices of integration strategies. Addi-
tionally, the focus on individual autonomy would allow a definition of indi-
vidual preference formation in terms of individual choices rather than as a
result of group cohesion. The most obvious outcome of a focus on individual
autonomy would be deeper societal integration.
Cultural Bias as an Embedded Limitation for Integration
The contributions to Section Two suggest that all states in question have
erected political institutions serving primarily the needs of the dominant
cultural community. In Section Three McGarry, Cashman and Nikolić dis-
cuss the integration of Roma into different societies. All individually the
authors conclude that the successful integration of Roma would result in this
group’s embracing the set of claims for equality previously embraced by the
dominant groups in their societies.
What we see in the contributions to Section Three is that the ap-
proaches of nation-states to Romani integration in particular, see collective
features to reinforce group identification apparently not as means for social
stability, but as an end in itself. If there is no space left for dissenting indi-
viduals to opt out of, voice their concerns with, or reform cultural traditions
from within, cultural communities are likely to perpetuate themselves, as will
the borders and inequalities between different cultural groups – something
that minority integration supposedly seeks to circumvent!
As such, the contributions about Romani integration in Sections Two
and Three highlight that resource redistribution between the groups is a tricky
process. While our authors do not address the issue explicitly, from a multi-
culturalist point of view there is a potential danger in according resources to
cultural groups, as there is a risk that more vocal members could subordinate
the interests of other group members. In Hungary, as McGarry writes, Ro-
mani representatives call for the accommodation of cultural differences in the
______________________________________________________________
political sphere on terms that would suit other minority groups, with distinct
ethno-cultural features, possibly with the support of external homelands, but
always with prior experience of fully fledged participation in political proc-
esses. If this process would take place in a multicultural setting, the members
of Roma community with expertise and capability to engage in political bar-
gaining could capitalize on their privileged access to whatever resources are
made available, at the expense of less vocal members of their community.
A similar process is observed by Nikolić in Macedonia, where the civil
society activism of Romani groups aims to bring about equal access for this
group to social and political resources, already available to the local domi-
nant group and other communities of non-dominant citizens of Albania. Al-
though Nikolić is highly positive about the Romani NGO activities in Mace-
donia, we see that in this situation, however, more active members of Romani
communities are able to cut off the bigger part of the pie for use in their
communities and neighbourhoods. Finally, guaranteeing Roma access to
education is also complicated in the Czech Republic, as Cashman discussed
in her paper. It appears that only those members of community resident in the
areas with special projects for Roma have a chance to successfully integrate
into the dominant society.
What we see as a potential challenge for the dominant societies’ deal-
ings with Roma from these contributions is that engagement in political par-
ties, non-governmental organizational activity and grass-root pressure groups
are fine as long as they increase the political representation of minority
group. However, when these groups are granted a chunk of decision-making
power over regular members of non-dominant communities, they might be-
come manipulators of those who have little say.
The case of Roma is particularly telling here. Cooperation between the
dominant elites with Romani representatives essentially entails the cooptation
of the Romani leadership, as McGarry observes. Nikolić suggests further that
cooptation is geared towards the entrapment of minorities into a presumably
enlightened and liberal mainstream society. In addition, Cashman discerns
agency paths as being subordinated to institutional prescriptions and deter-
mined by the pervasiveness of liberal democratic values in the terms of ma-
jorities’ own national-cultural customs. In the Czech case, the presence of
Roma in the classroom was clearly perceived as a threat to integrity of the
dominant ethno-cultural group. Although intergroup competition was not
observed by Cashman, the visibility of Roma in the public sphere presents a
clear challenge to the homogeneity of the dominant society and exemplifies
the importance of ethnocultural particularism for the members of the domi-
nant group. Romani children seeking equality and non-discrimination in
educational institutions were presumed to have little autonomy to decide for
themselves and practise their own choices on par with Czech pupils.
______________________________________________________________
Somewhat more optimistically, Nikolić presents the activities of Ro-
mani NGOs where rigorous observance of a common agenda in the public
sphere make up for hollowing out the group agenda. Clearly, also in the ex-
ample of Macedonia, Roma are denied a public space if they overemphasize
differences. Furthermore, albeit, motivated by the best of intentions, Nikolić
seems to speak about the creeping outsourcing of responsibilities for integra-
tion onto the shoulders of NGO activists and pressure groups by the Macedo-
nian state.
Finally, while McGarry does not necessarily want to cast doubt on
Hungary’s commitment to Romani integration in theory, or in practice, his
presentation of the politicking of the Romani leadership demonstrates that the
choices they make are largely predicated by the options made available by
the dominant community. Although, Hungarian Roma do not lack avenues to
formulate strategies and interests framed as expressions of individualism,
autonomous agency and group equality, Hungary’s political structures still
hamper their agenda. In spite of these concerns, all three contributions make
clear that non-dominant Roma are agents in their own right and are capable
of formulating their cultural claims themselves.
In short, what we desperately need when addressing the grievances of
marginal and non-vocal minority groups is a clear-cut distinction between the
claims of individuals to sustain their distinct identity and to acknowledge the
right of individuals to determine her/himself whether or not s/he would like
to belong to a group. McGarry, Nikolić and Cashman address this conundrum
and try to sort out which claims warrant equality, which non-discrimination,
and which do not warrant any special treatment. Certainly, where policy-
makers seek to address the concerns of non-dominant groups they need to
begin with the notion that individual rights to equal treatment and non-
discrimination can only be effective when decoupled from cultural back-
grounds and membership in any kind of community. The focus on individual
differences, albeit rooted in a common cultural background would prevent
stereotypical and simplistic assumptions about culture-based forms of politi-
cal participation (McGarry), civic engagement (Nikolić) and preference for
education (Cashman).
After all, say our three contributors to the final section, the members
of minority cultures do not have culturally determined action patterns that
cannot also be found among members of dominant groups. If multicultural-
ism is to be successful, it needs to demonstrate new options to address the
individual preferences of members of different communities – and demon-
strate that the claims of individuals from the different groups can be indistin-
guishably similar –, rather than overemphasize differences.
______________________________________________________________
5. The Potential for Multicultural Solutions in CEE

Multicultural solutions to societal integration mainly address the options for
non-dominant groups to engage in political process previously determined by
majority groups. In so doing, multiculturalism not only overemphasizes the
importance of groups, and their influence on the preference formation of an
individual’s cultural identity, but, furthermore,, multiculturalism treats all
individual expressions of choice as being subordinate to the group’s action
patterns. Thus, multiculturalist solutions to societal integration tend to see
cultural communities as homogeneous, irrespective of variance among their
members. For multicultural approaches to societal integration to be viable,
the cultural groups targeted cannot have contingent borders and must project
cultural identities onto all their members to the same degree. However, it
goes without saying that not all individual choices result from culturally or
otherwise group-determined action patterns. Although, autonomous prefer-
ence formation can be determined by individual cultural baggage, preferences
for interaction strategies are more often made from the contextual back-
ground.
At the same time, from a multiculturalist perspective any judgement
on culturally determined action patterns should be dismissed as immoral and
discriminatory. This puts off the evaluation of cross-cultural similarities in
values, expectations and preferences of individuals belonging to different
cultural groups. Additionally, the failure to communicate across the cultural
divide discourages the negotiation of possible ideas of convergence and leads
to dissimilar attitudes not only on collaboration, but also on issues of mutual
enrichment. Matters such as the value of human life, ethics and perceptions
of individual freedoms all need to disappear from multicultural discourse.
Particularly our contributors discussing state approaches to Romani commu-
nities underline that policy-making treats all Roma as if there were no inter-
nal subgroups among their representatives.
What you see, is what you get: Institutions need to assume that cul-
tures are fully internally homogeneous, and that the subjects belonging to
cultural communities mutually share not only a language and values, but also
interests and resources. However, as no multicultural society can be built
from a blank canvas, all versions of multicultural institutions will necessarily
accommodate dominant perceptions of politics, society and culture. The vi-
cious circle is often thus reinforced by political institutions and social struc-
tures designed and driven by the concerns of the majority for the preservation
of the status quo. As the contributions to our volume demonstrate, however,
it is multiculturalist rhetoric married with institutional determinism which
embodies the approaches to minority integration in CEE states. What is
worse - political institutions, actors and policies further embed cultural bias
into all kinds of social relations.
______________________________________________________________
The purpose of political institutions is to improve the relationship be-
tween members of non-dominant communities and the privileged majority
group, both of whom have different perceptions of public space. Political
institutions also seek to make the members of non-dominant groups autono-
mous agents in their relationships with minority culture, but without provid-
ing them with any motivation to relate positively to the dominant culture.
And although the two claims are central to multiculturalism, they stand in
constant strain with one other. Hence, the adherents to multicultural commu-
nitarism are able to claim the primordial nature of cultural features, while at
the same time favouring the assimilation of minorities of less sophisticated
cultures into the dominant one. At the same time, multicultural pluralists are
vocal defenders of cultural equality, while at the same time underlining the
impossibility of communication across cultural divides.
Our contributions make particularly clear that both the advocacy for
and opposition to multiculturalism emerged on exactly the same grounds.
Multiculturalism assumes that cultural memberships are primordial and in-
voluntary, and hence constrain their members’ options for interaction with
representatives of other cultural groups. This allows multiculturalists to call
for accommodation of individuals who (allegedly) lack autonomy within
political institutions that are (allegedly) culture blind. At the same time, these
institutions are predicated on the majority culture, and allow its members a
degree of freedom and equality, which the members of non-dominant groups
cannot enjoy (see Bowen, 2007; Modood, 2007).
This is where our discussions on minority integration in CEE coun-
tries have a clear fit with the debate on multiculturalism: Cultural claims of
minority individuals are more often than not agent-driven and thus provide
sufficient incentives for political institutions to respond accordingly. How-
ever, the claims of minority groups for their greater integration are misunder-
stood by dominant groups and seen as being agenda-driven, in the sense of
reflecting their own experiences with political institutions. In all cases, the
agenda-driven claims of the non-dominant groups seek to further redistribute
resources and gain greater structural advantages from the dominant groups.
If political institutions were to consider the stakes of minority integra-
tion carefully, they would need to address the disparities embedded in the
treatment of groups as the bearers of rights and duties. In the process how-
ever, individuals with dissenting opinions and those with marginal opinions
are bound to be the losers of integration, undermining the very project of
institutional consolidation in the long run. Debating the content and extent of
values distinguishing minority and majority groups, an integrated society
from a non-integrated one, multicultural from cultural communication is
needed to ensure the consolidation of liberal democratic regimes in the CEE
states.
______________________________________________________________
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Contributors
Timofey Agarin is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of
Aberdeen. His academic work focuses on Central Eastern European states
and their relations with local minority populations. His interests include
cooperation between civil society groups and governments across the post-
socialist states, multilingualism and multiculturalism, as well as social
integration processes across Europe.
Malte Brosig is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of the

Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. He holds a PhD form the University of
Portsmouth and is a co-speaker of the working group on human rights of the
German Political Science Association.
Laura Cashman is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at

Canterbury Christ Church University, UK. She has previously published
articles on the integration of Romani communities in Studies in Ethnicity and
Nationalism and Journal of Contemporary European Research.
Tove H. Malloy is a Director European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) in

Flensburg, Germany. She specializes in the political aspects of minority
rights in international law and IR with a specific focus on the European
context. She is the author of National Minority Rights in Europe (OUP 2005).
Aidan McGarry is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Brighton. His

book ‘Who Speaks for Roma? Political Representation of a Transnational
Minority Community’ will be published in 2009 by Continuum.
Alexander H. E. Morawa is Professor of Comparative and Anglo-American

Law, Associate Dean for Internationalization, and Director of the
Transnational Legal Studies Program and the Lucerne Academy for Human
Rights Interpretation at the University of Lucerne School of Law,
Switzerland.
Sara Nikolić currently works as Senior Policy Researcher at the Association

Alumni of the Centre for Postgraduate Studies in Sarajevo. In the last years,
she has conducted research on Romani Issues in both the Republic of
Macedonia and in Croatia.
358 Contributors
______________________________________________________________
Ada-Charlotte Regelmann is a PhD student at the Department of Central

and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow. Her PhD research
focuses on the relationship between minority politics/minority rights and
agency options of non-dominant ethnic groups in Estonia and Slovakia.
Manuela Riedel is a PhD student at the Jean Monnet Chair for European
Affairs at the University of Cologne. Her PhD project specialises on minority
protection in EU enlargement processes.
Natalie Sabanadze is Senior Adviser to the OSCE High Commissioner on

National Minorities. She holds PhD from Oxford University in Politics and
International Relations. Her academic work has focussed on questions of
political nationalism, ethnic conflict, globalisation, and post-communist
transition.
Michaela Salamun is Researcher and Lecturer at the Department of

Austrian, European and Comparative Public Law, Political and
Administrative Sciences and the Competence Center Southeast Europe at
Karl-Franzens University Graz.
Annabel Tremlett currently works as a Senior Lecturer at the University of

Portsmouth UK. She works on conceptualisations and representations of
inclusion and marginalised groups in Europe, along with looking at
innovative ways to approach research in these areas using a critical
application of approaches from sociology and social anthropology. She is
also interested in the interface of language, ethnicity, popular culture,
research claims and ethics.

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Minority Integration in

Central Eastern Europe

Leonidas Donskis, Member of the European Parliament, and previously

Editorial and Advisory Board

Timo Airaksinen, University of Helsinki, Finland

Edited and introduced by

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2009

The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of

The Special Consideration Standard as a Modern Tool for

The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for

Beyond Conflict Prevention: HCNM and Minority

The Roma and Egyptian Minorities in Albania:

Cooptation as Integration? National Programme

Social Cohesion Estonian Style: Minority Integration

Empowerment as a two-way Process: The Role of

Romani Teaching Assistants in the Czech Education

Multicultural Solutions for Central and Eastern Europe?

Timofey Agarin and Malte Brosig

policy-making, but also pointing to potential issues of contention between

1. The European Dimension of Minority Integration

tered in Brussels, 60 indigenous languages are actively spoken in the EU

2. The National Dimension of Minority Integration

Not surprisingly, the lack of normative guidelines at the international

grievances be continuously neglected. On the flip side, even though political

3. The Role of Society in Minority Integration

period of institutional change (Connor, 1993; Pridham and Gallagher, 2000).

between ethnic minority communities and majority groups in CEE societies

stantly updated to changing expectations of groups involved and re-adjusted

4. The Structure of the Book

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Connor, W. (1993), “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational

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International Organizations and Minority

The article presents various aspects of minority integration in

1. Minority Integration in the EU’s External Relations

2. Minority Integration in the EU – Promoting Equality

3. Formal Equality versus Substantive Equality

Conclusion and Summary of Academic Discussion