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12196
Philosophical Investigations : 2018
ISSN 0190-0536
Abstract
Contemporary philosophers often purport to ‘borrow’ or ‘refute’ claims
made by past philosophers. In doing so they contravene a contextualist
methodological prohibition once defended by Quentin Skinner in his
seminal paper “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”.
Skinner’s methodology has been much debated by theorists of textual
meaning and interpretation, and yet the precise nature of the logical path
from his premises to his prohibitory conclusion remains elusive. This
paper seeks to refute two of the most promising variants of an argument
for his methodological prohibition on ‘refutation’, one of which draws
on his appeal to Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘meaning as use’, and the
other of which draws on his appeal to speech act theory.
9. Some of Skinner’s critics focus on his ‘attribution principle’ according to which: “no
agent can eventually be said to have meant or done something which he could never be
brought to accept as a correct description of what he had meant or done” (1969: 28). For
example, see Boucher (1985: 193–250) and Rosen (2011: 705–709). However, I set that
principle aside here. The reason for doing so is that, while the principle might suffice to
render certain claims made by contemporary western philosophers incommensurable with
certain claims made by (say) ancient Chinese philosophers (but see Cline (2013) and Stal-
naker (2006)), it would not suffice to generate the kind of radical incommensurability
within the western tradition that Skinner would need in order to justify his prohibition on
refutation. After all, it would not automatically preclude a philosopher at t2 from disagree-
ing with a philosopher at t1 in the latter’s own terms. (Indeed, this seems to be acknowl-
edged in Skinner (2002: 37–39).) Nor does the principle as such preclude the possibility
that (say) Aristotle could have been persuaded of the validity of a given contemporary
redescription of his position in non-Aristotelian terminology, which a contemporary
philosopher might then employ in the course of refutation. The reason for this is that the
implications of the attribution principle depend upon the precise modal interpretation of
its use of ‘could not’. I discuss this point in greater detail in an unpublished paper entitled
‘Interpretation, Attribution and Second-Order Belief’.
10. See, for example, Skinner (1984). For evidence that analytically oriented philosophical
histories are flourishing see Beaney (2013) and the papers in Reck (2013).
11. The confusion over the exact logic of Skinner’s argument is well-illustrated by the
selection of critical responses in Part III of Tully (1988), and the opening of the reply in
Skinner (1988b).
One way to show that contemporary and past philosophers never disagree
would be to maintain that all philosophical claims lack cognitive content and
hence truth-values (Philosophical Non-Cognitivism).13 Another would be
to maintain that their truth-values are relative to either individual philosophers
(Subjectivist Relativism) or philosophers in particular time periods (Historical
Relativism). However, neither of these approaches would appear to be of
any use to Skinner in providing an explicit defence of his prohibition.
One reason for this is that if Skinner were to construe the claims of past
thinkers in either Philosophical Non-Cognitivist or Subjectivist Relativist
terms in order to immunize them from meaningful disagreement, his own
philosophical claims would have to be construed in the same way. This
would then preclude his “Meaning and History” from achieving disagree-
ment with the alternative contemporary philosophies of intellectual history
that the paper purports to refute. His only option then would be to maintain
that, like the early Wittgenstein, he could somehow show that they were
mistaken without saying how.14 While Skinner does not claim that this is his
position there are certain contrasting parallels between his claims, and those
of the early Wittgenstein which it may be worthwhile highlighting.
In the Preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein says that the book aims to “draw
a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts
[. . .] The limit can [. . .] only be drawn in language and what lies on the other
side of the limit will be simply nonsense.”15 In contrast, Skinner’s prohibitions
purport to draw a limit, not to philosophical expression as such, but to
12. Skinner (1969: 53). Two dimensions of the focus of this paper merit further explanation.
Firstly, I focus on the first edition of Skinner’s paper rather than the second because the former
is far more suggestive of ways in which the methodological prohibitions could actually be
defended. That said, the second retains Skinner’s monistic assumption that there is one thing
which constitutes “the philosophical value of the history of ideas” (2002: 88, my italics), and
the claim that it can only be uncovered through his own preferred approach to the study of
historical texts. This implies that alternative methods for studying historical texts either (i)
lack philosophical value because of the misinterpretations they generate, or (ii) can only have
philosophical value despite their lack of historical value. One way of interpreting the difference
between the first and second versions of Skinner’s paper is that he shifts from endorsing the
former to the latter without explicitly stating that he has done so. While I do not accept (ii),
my focus here will be on showing why (i) is an untenable position. Secondly, I focus on
Skinner (1969) as opposed to Skinner’s other works because he explicitly warns against systematic
readings of other thinkers in his attack on the “mythology of coherence” (1969: 16–19).
13. Compare the interpretation of the later Wittgenstein in Dummett (1978: 439).
14. Wittgenstein (2016: §6.54).
15. Wittgenstein (2016: 23).
16. Wittgenstein (2016: 23). Similarly, see the Preface of Wittgenstein (1967: viii).
17. Skinner (1969: 53).
18. The Historical Relativist claim, that the truth-value of a statement with a constant
meaning may vary relative to the historical context in which it is made, is distinct from
the claim that its meaning may vary relative to historical context. We will explore the
(more promising) possibility of grounding Skinner’s prohibition upon the latter claim in
section V below.
19. Skinner (2002: 52) denies that he has ever held such a position. In the same text he
indicates that his position (as of 2002) is that there is no methodological impropriety in
disagreeing with the truth-values which past thinkers assigned to particular propositions
(30–1, 51–2). However, he also maintains that a belief can only be irrational relative to a
web-of-belief, and that, therefore (say), the belief in witches can be rational relative to
one web-of-belief but irrational relative to another. This allows him to derive a prohibi-
tion on contemporary philosophers denying the truth of Jean Bodin’s second-order belief
that his belief in witches is rational with reference to either their own contemporary webs-
of-belief or a non-existent form of non-relative rationality, without simultaneously pro-
hibiting them from contradicting the rest of the contents of Jean Bodin’s web-of-belief.
However, this is a long way from grounding a prohibition on, or demonstrating the lack
of the philosophical value of, the traditional philosophical practice of critically examining
and potentially refuting the arguments in past texts.
24. Wittgenstein (1967). The textual references which follow in the body of the text are
to section number.
25. Pleasants (2014) argues that, while one cannot use Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to
ground a critical social theory, this does not preclude the Wittgensteinian from seeking
social change. For further discussion of whether Wittgenstein’s philosophy is conservative
see Jones (1986).
26. See also (PI:518). Given that Wittgenstein claims that this position rests on the same
mistake as Russell’s ‘individuals’ and his own tractarian ‘objects’, it also shows that he
believes in the possibility of ‘borrowing’. However, this is not to say that Wittgenstein actu-
ally borrowed the idea in the Tractatus. To support the latter claim one would need to pro-
vide evidence that the similarity in the positions is due to influence rather than coincidence.
27. For a parallel argument, purporting to show that one cannot appeal to Wittgenstein’
later philosophy in order to support Skinner’s early methodological prohibition on ‘con-
ceptual history’, see Burns (2011).
(1) Some knowledge of the historical context in which a text was written
is necessary to understand the non-basic illocutionary acts which the
text was intended to perform.
(2) An understanding of an utterance’s non-basic illocutionary acts is
necessary to identify (i) its basic illocutionary acts, and (ii) the precise
content of its propositional acts.
(3) The precise content of the philosophical propositional acts performed
by the texts of each epoch is sufficiently parochial that no philosoph-
ical assertions made in one epoch contradict philosophical assertions
made in another epoch. So Non-Disagreement and the Illusion Thesis
are true.
This is not intended to be an argument as, while (1) and (2) do purport
to be claims with truth-values, they do not purport to entail (3). Claims
(1–3) are better thought of as a possible process of thought or discovery,
in which one might be led step-by-step from the discovery of (1) to the
discovery of (3).
The great achievements of Skinner, and his intellectual forbear Peter
Laslett, include works which indirectly reveal the truth of (1) by showing
that a rich knowledge of the historical context in which a classic text
was produced can help to reveal the non-basic illocutionary acts its
31. Cf. Skinner (1969: 31). Boucher (1985: 322–323) claims that when Skinner divides
opponents of his view into textualists, who believe that texts can be fully understood with-
out any reference to context, and contextualists, who believe that the meaning of a text is
fully determined by its context, he is essentially knocking down straw men. The view
presented here rejects textualism, by conceding the need for some contextual knowledge
in order to establish textual meaning, while maintaining that the basic speech acts per-
formed by texts are generally transparent. This position opens the door to the kind of
argument-focused studies which Skinner deems to be methodologically flawed without
any appeal to the crude textualist position upon which Skinner takes them to rely (1969:
4).
32. For example, see the discussion of Hobbes’ rhetoric in Skinner (1996: Ch. 10).
33. Laslett (1965: 46–47).
34. For a comparative discussion of other forms of contextualism, see Bevir (2011) and
Skinner (1969: 39–48).
35. Steinberger (2009) also argues that Skinner’s use of speech act theory fails to support
his conclusions. The analysis which follows is designed to go further by helping to explain
how someone might come to think that Skinner’s premises support his conclusions.
41. Skinner (1988b: 270). Note that if (a) the meaning of an utterance is determined by
its basic illocutionary force and its propositional content alone; and (b) an assertion has
the same meaning whether it is made sincerely or insincerely; then (c) Defoe’s non-basic
illocutionary target of ridicule can’t be those who merely assert the propositional content
in question, as this would mean that he is targeting himself. His real target is not those
who (like himself) assert it insincerely, but those who assert that propositional content sin-
cerely. It follows that, since the sincerity of the utterance, as opposed to the fact that it is an
assertion, is not determined by its meaning, but by its higher-order non-basic illocutionary
properties, it is false to say that a “mere inspection” of the meaning of the utterance would
lead us to conclude that it is sincere.
42. See the articulation of Skinner’s position in his (1969: 32) and (1988b: 274), as well
as the criticism of Wittgenstein in Dummett (1978: 450, cf. 445).
43. Mill (XXI: 269).
44. Aristotle (1996: I: §5). The analysis of Aristotle in Kraut (2002: 301–303) suggests
that the contradiction is genuine.
45. Bevir (1994: 667) claims that the question of whether there have been ‘perennial’
answers to philosophical problems is ultimately an empirical one.
46. Skinner (2002: 53) posits an analogy between asking whether Machiavelli’s belief
that mercenary armies are antithetical to liberty is true, and asking whether the King of France is
bald. This implies that either Machiavelli only intended to refer to the mercenaries of his
own time, or that he used a term to refer to them the meaning of which was so precise
that it cannot be used to refer to anything in our own time.
51. Note the difference between claiming that (i) when Aristotle posits natural slaves he
also endorses certain institutions, and (ii) when Aristotle appears to posit natural slaves he
is not actually doing so but is rather merely endorsing certain institutions. In the former
case, he would be making a philosophical claim, which is conducive to inter-epochal dis-
agreement, and simultaneously using it to engage in a non-basic illocutionary act. (This
would leave it an open question whether the claim is made sincerely or as a mere means
to the desired end. For a discussion of the role that appeals to principles play in political
action, see Skinner (1988a: 108–110).) In the latter case, he would be merely expressing
support for particular institutions without actually making any assertions whatsoever. Since
the former understanding of what is going on is entirely compatible with a belief in ‘refu-
tation’ – the fact that a past thinker put forward an argument in the course of an attempt
to achieve a political end does not preclude contemporary philosophers from examining
whether it is sound – the opponents thereof would have to defend the latter.
52. Aristotle (1996: I:6).
VI. Conclusion
53. Skinner (1988b) maintains that his (1969) merely “appeared” to deny the existence
of longstanding continuities and disputes in the history of western philosophy, and restricts
his objection to the practice of “abstracting” arguments from the context in which they
were articulated with a view to viewing them as “contributions” to such disputes. How-
ever, once one acknowledges that there can be shared propositional content in the philo-
sophical assertions of past and contemporary thinkers, even though the illocutionary acts
performed in making those assertions were distinct, there is actually no reason to treat
such abstractions as methodologically suspect. Bevir (2011: 19) raises the concern that as
Skinner’s perspective developed he withdrew premises without withdrawing the conclusions
that were dependent thereon.
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References
54. Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Eric Beerbohm, Andrew Murphy, Richard
Tuck, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper.