In this case, the right of a woman to run for public office was strengthened when the Supreme

Court ruled that petitioner was qualified to run in her home province, as she was no longer
bound by the domicile of her deceased husband, and had, thus, reverted back to her original
domicile. [Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, in a separate opinion, took exception to the rationale of
the decision and argued that the petitioner may be said to have established her domicile, not
because she automatically reverted back to the same upon the death of her husband, but
because she exercised her choice to establish Leyte as her domicile.]

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor, supplying
the following information in response to “item no. 8:”

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING

THE ELECTION: ___ Years and Seven Months

The incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo, who was then
seeking reelection, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement
for residency.

On 29 March 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing

the entry “seven” months to “since childhood” (in “item no. 8” of the amended certificate).
Petitioner explained that the entry of the word “seven” in her original Certificate of Candidacy
was the result of an “honest misinterpretation” which she sought to rectify by adding the words
“since childhood” in her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, since “she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.”

On 24 April 1995, the COMELEC came up with a Resolution: (1) finding private respondent’s
Petition for Disqualification meritorious; (2) striking out petitioner’s Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy; and (3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy.

According to the COMELEC, the petitioner’s conduct revealed her lack of intention to make
Tacloban her domicile: she registered as a voter in different places and, on several occasions,
declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she
is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in different
places.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner was a resident of the First District of Leyte, and
therefore, she possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the said district and province.

According to the Court, the deliberations of the members (of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission) on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond

1
doubt the principle that, when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually
means only “domicile.”

The Supreme Court stressed that it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile
of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage in 1952 to the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, for there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
“domicile” and “residence.” The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband’s
domicile, by operation of law, upon marriage, cannot be inferred from the use of the term
“residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two
concepts are well-delineated.

When and while petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos in 1954, petitioner was
obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband’s actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that, at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were: San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing as to
which of these places Mr. Marcos fixed as his family’s residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos
had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage
was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

Moreover, proceeding from the discussions pointing out specific situations where the female
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin, or chooses a new one during the subsistence of
the marriage, it would be highly illogical to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile
upon the death of her husband, absent a positive act of selecting a new one in situations during
the subsistence of the marriage itself, where the wife gains a domicile different from her
husband’s.

* Separate Opinion, Justice Flerida Ruth Romero

It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband to unilaterally fix the
residence or domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code, but to continue giving
obeisance to his wishes, even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to
live together has ceased, is to close one’s eyes to the stark realities of the present.

At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of
origin upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to
be endowed somehow with a domicile?

I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound
by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she
automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to
reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated
by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of

2
origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to
meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.

3
 IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS

GR No. 138509

July 31, 2000 

FACTS:

On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Ma. Dulce
Javier.  With said marriage not yet annulled, nullified nor terminated, he contracted a second
marriage with herein petitioner Imelda Marbella (on Jan. 25, 1996), and a third marriage with
certain Julia Hernandez, thereafter.

Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at the RTC of
Quezon City.  Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage license.  He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding
for bigamy invoking the civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the
criminal case.  The RTC granted the motion, while petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. 

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy. 

HELD: 

                Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage.  Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
the determination of the criminal charge.   It is therefore not a prejudicial question.  Respondent
cannot be permitted to use his malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. 

                A prejudicial question  is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.  It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.  It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which
the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action
would necessarily be determinative of the civil case.  Consequently, the defense must involve
an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.  Its two essential
elements are (a) the civil action involves an issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 

4
                In the case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy.  He cannot have his cake and eat it too.  Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity
of the first.  A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—
usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining
a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.  Such
scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy.  As succinctly held in Landicho v.
Relova, 22 SCRA 731(1968):

                Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, [as]
only competent courts have such authority.  Prior to such declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is beyond question.  A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy.         

                A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain
the further prosecution of the criminal case.  A party who raises a prejudicial question is
deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been
adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented
single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case.  A challenge of the
allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on
the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. 

                Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be successfully
invoked as an excuse.  The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law
have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act
penalized by the Revised Penal Code.  The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law.  As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of
nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly
obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently
defeat it by his own disobedience of the law?  If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous
marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial
proper in the criminal case. 

                The elements of bigamy are (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a subsequent
marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.  The exceptions to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41
of the Family Code and by PD 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.

5
 SMITH, BELL & CO. vs NATIVIDAD (Malcolm, J.)

40 Phil 136, 144-145 (1919)

Facts:

-Smith, Bell & Co. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine
Islands; majority of the stockholders are British; owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato—
brought to Cebu for the purpose of transporting Smith, Bell & Co.’s merchandise between ports
in the islands.

-application for registration was made at Cebu at the Collector of Customs---denied. Because
they were not citizens of the US/Phils.

-Act 2671, Sec. 1172. Certificate of Philippine Register.—upon registration of a vessel of

domestic ownership, and of more than 15 tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be
issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of 15 tons gross or less, the taking of the
certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.

-domestic ownership, as used in this section, means ownership vested in the (a) citizens or
native inhabitants of the Phil Islands; (b) citizens of the US residing in the Phil. Islands; (c) any
corporation or company composed wholly of citizen of Phils./US or both

-plaintiff’s contention: Act No. 2671 deprives the corp. of its property without due process of
law because by the passage of the law, the company was automatically deprived of every
beneficial attribute of ownership of the Bato and that they are left with a naked title they could
not use.

Issue: WON Smith, Bell & Co. were denied of the due process of law by the Phil. Legislature in
its
enactment of Act 2761.
Ruling: No. (judgment affirmed—plaintiff can’t be granted registry.)

RD: Act No. 2761, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the right to register
vessels in the Phils. Coastwide trade, falls within the authorized exceptions. Specifically within
the purview of the police power. Literally and absolutely, steamship lines are the arteries of the
commerce in the Phils. If one be severed, the lifeblood of the nation is lost. If these are
protected, security of the country and general welfare is sustained.

6
 G.R. No. 83598, March 7, 1997

 Presumption of marriage
 Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to
present it is not proof that no marriage took place.

FACTS:

This is an action for partition brought by Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog against Leoncia and
Gaudioso Balogbog. Ramonito and Generoso claimed that they were the legitimate children of
Catalina and Gavino, the elder brother of Leoncia and Gaudioso. Gavino died in 1935,
predeceasing their parents, the grandparents of Ramonito and Generoso.

Ramonito and Generoso presented witnesses: one, the mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934,
another, who was a family friend, and Catalina herself. For its part, defendants denied knowing
Ramonito and Generoso and claimed that Gavino died single and without issue. As proof of this,
they presented certificates showing that there was no record in the Register of both the
marriage between Gavino and Catalina and the birth of Ramonito.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of Ramonito and Generoso. CA affirmed, holding
that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be
legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the presumption of marriage applies

 Whether or not Ramonito and Generoso were legitimate children of Gavino

HELD:

The SC found no reversible error committed by the CA.

Petitioner contends that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should be proven in accordance of
Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 (only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the
Civil Registry) since the marriage was celebrated when such law was in effect.

7
But the SC noted that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect,
having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension
of that code to this country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this
case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined
in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil
Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence.

Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves
as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent
proof to the contrary.

Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage.
Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to
present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove
marriage.

Rationale for the presumption

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of
the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern.

Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that
of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is “that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.” Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always
presume marriage.

Legitimacy of Children

The SC held that the fact that there was no record of birth in the Civil Registry does not mean
that Ramonito and Generoso were not legitimate children. Their legitimacy was proved by
testimony of witnesses, including Catalina, the mother herself. Moreover, there was submitted
an official transcript of an investigation before the Police Investigation Committee of Balamban,
Cebu, wherein Gaudioso himself admitted that Ramonito is his nephew.

8
The Court held this admission of relationship as admissible against Gaudioso as a reliable
declaration against interest.

Decision affirmed.

9
 DUMLAO VS. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980]

Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as

discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution.

Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received
retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local
elective office from which he has retired.

Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection
and due process rights.

Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on
reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have been
classified differently from younger employees. The former are subject to compulsory
retirement while the latter are not.

Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be
retirees who are even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old
official who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is
trying to run for office because there is the “need for new blood to assume relevance”. When
an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same
government work.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared
valid.

10