Aledo vs diokno

On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a discharged Philippine Constabulary named Escolastico
Umbal executed a sworn statement implicating petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto
Mendoza who are partners in the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. He accused them as
the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German
national. Based on that confession of Umbal, a search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios of
the RTC of Manila.

Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), armed with the search
warrant issued separately raided the dwellings of police officers who were also pointed by Umbal as
the perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and ammunitions were found in the raid including Van
Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and their other co-defendants were charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and
usurpation of authority. Their case was referred by the PACC to the DOJ who took over the case.

After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto Diokno found probable cause and issued a warrant
of arrest without bail. The petitioners questioned the issued warrants of arrests. They claim that Judge
Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction as there is lack of probable
cause for him to issue the warrants. They further contend that the judge did not personally determine
the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence where the investigation was based from.

Issue: Whether or not a warrant of arrest without bail can be set aside and the case be dismissed for
lack of probable cause even if the accused was not in the custody of the court.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the PACC from enforcing
the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding in the case on the
ground of lack of probable cause. As with other earlier cases resolved by the high court, the accused is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding such, there is no requirement that the accused be in the custody of the law. Various
reliefs can be granted by the Supreme Court to accused even if they are not in the custody of the law.

Valerio vs Ca

Facts: A murder case was filed against Antonio E. Cabador, Martin M. Jimenez, Samuel C. Baran, and
Geronimo S. Quintana; while an Information for parricide was filed against the victims wife Milagros
E. Valerio.

Milagros filed an application for bail claiming that the evidence of guilt against her was not
strong. The prosecution, on the other hand, moved to discharge accused Samuel Baran and to have
him as state witness
 The RTC granted Milagros application for bail, but denied the motion to convert Samuel as
state witness. However , Laarni N. Valerio, sister of the victim, allege that t he RTC judge committed
grave abuse of discretion for granting Milagros bail and for denying the motion to convert Samuel as
state witness. Petitioners contend that Milagros is not entitled to bail as the evidence of guilt against
her is strong.

Issue: WON Milagros is entitled to bail

Ruling: No. Milagros is not entitled to bail.

Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, Section 7 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, states, No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

In this case, the trial court had disregarded the glaring fact that the killer himself has confessed to
the crime and has implicated Milagros as the mastermind. When taken in conjunction with the other
evidence on record, these facts show very strongly that Milagros may have participated as principal by
inducement in the murder of Jun Valerio. It was thus a grave error or a grave abuse of discretion
committed by the trial court to grant her application for bail. The appellate court clearly committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision granting bail to Milagros Valerio.

De Los Santos vs Mangino

Facts: Accused’s case was pending before the court in Angeles City. Accused applied for bail and was
approved by Judge Marvin Mangino of Branch 1 of Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac City.

Issue: WON Judge Mangino’s approval of bail valid

Ruling: No

Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that

Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the Court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province, city or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court
of said place, or, if no judge there is available, with any metropolitan judge, municipal trial judge or
municipal circuit trial judge therein.

Thus, bail may be filed with the same court where the case is pending. In the absence or unavailability
of the judge thereof, it may [sic] filed with another branch of the same court within the province or
city. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending,
bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge there is available, with
any metropolitan judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

In the instant case, the accused Jennifer Santos was not arrested. That being the case, she should have
filed her bail bond with the court where her case was pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City. In the absence of the judge thereof, it could be done at another branch of the same court within
the province of Pampanga or City of Angeles. Instead, accused Jennifer Santos filed her bond in the
Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac, respondent Judge Marvin B. Mangino, presiding, who approved the
same and ordered his [sic] release from custody. Res ipsa loquitor. Respondent Judges act is clearly
irregular and is in violation of the rules on the matter.

Rule 115 Rights of the Accused

Fulgado vs CA

Facts: The case was remanded case from the Court of Appeals to trial court for cross-examination or
presentation by the plaintiff of any additional evidence. However the witness presented by the plaintiff
cannot attend anymore as the other one has already died and the other one was already abroad.
Private respondent then claimed that the witness testimonies be stricken out as they were deprived to
cross examining the witness.

Issue: WON private respondent’s contention tenable

Ruling: No

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers,
is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.

The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to cross-examine
may take various forms.

Rule 116 Arraignment and Plea

People vs Solamillo

Facts: Julian Solamillo maintains that the trial court erred in disregarding his tacit withdrawal of his
guilty plea. He claims that policeman Bayabos threatened to kill him if he will plead not guilty.
However there is nothing in the records to show that Julian filed a motion to withdraw his plea of
guilty or that he, in any manner, manifested unequivocally that he was withdrawing his plea. He
contends though that he made such manifestation when he testified on April 26, 1995 stating that
policeman Bayabos threatened to kill him if he will plead not guilty
Issue: WON such testimony constitutes a valid withdrawal of plea

Ruling: NO,

The above testimony is not a positive and categorical declaration that appellant Julian was
withdrawing his plea of guilty. Without any unequivocal act on his part, the trial court could not
assume that he was withdrawing his original plea. Furthermore, by appellants own admission, he went
to Dumaguete City with the intention of surrendering to the authorities.This belies his contention that
he was threatened into entering a guilty plea for if he was truly innocent, why is it that his first instinct
was to surrender?

Even assuming that Julian made an improvident plea of guilty and subsequently withdrew it, such fact
does not operate to automatically exculpate him from criminal liability.Convictions based on an
improvident plea of guilty are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial
court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.[32]

In the instant case, the trial court, in determining the guilt of appellant Julian Solamillo, relied on the
extensive evidence of the contending parties, not merely on his plea of guilty.Indeed his conviction can
be sustained based on independent evidence other than his plea. Thus, whether or not his plea of
guilty was improvidently made is inconsequential for the simple reason that his conviction was based
on other evidence proving his culpability for the offense charged.

Rule 117 Motion to quash

People vs Soriano

Facts: Petitioner erroneously filed a motion to quash on the ground of duplicity of the offense charge
in the information. However it was found out that there is no duplicity in the offense charge but there
are two informations charging different offense.

Issue: WON the motion to quash should be granted.

Ruling: No

The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the
facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged
as defined by law.The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal
complaint or information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under
the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute
proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do
not constitute the offense.[

Torres Jr vs Aguinaldo
Facts: Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, files a complaint against petitioner Artemio T.
Torres, Jr. (Torres) for falsification of public document. However, the Secretary of Justice reversed the
findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information. Then the
information was withdrawn before even the accused be arraigned

Torres contends that the order granting the withdrawal of the information rendered moot the petition
for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. Torres insists that an order dismissing a case without
prejudice is final if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.

Issue: Won Torres’ contention tenable

Ruling: No

The contention is untenable. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss.
While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the
withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, without
prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation.

On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt
thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality. In Baares II v.
Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus putting into place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal.

In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss.
Hence, Baares II v. Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw
information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative
once the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended
party: (a) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance
of the order without the case having been revived; or (b) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

There is provisional dismissa when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies with the
following requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; and (2) There must be
notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the filing of a motion to dismiss, and
not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law on provisional dismissal does not apply in the
present case.

Rule 119 Trial

Caballero vs Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner claimed that P.D 1038 violates the constitutional guaranty against speedy disposition
of case. They alleged that the challenged law complicates the prescriptive period of offenses and the
criminal and civil liabilities provided in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. To nourish their
argument, petitioners call attention to the fact that even prior to 30 November 1976, they had filed
directly with the Office of the City Fiscal of Gingoog City, two (2) criminal complaints, one, for theft
of bamboo poles and the other, for theft of coconuts, against private respondents. And as mandated
by the challenged law, the City Fiscal forwarded both case, on 1 February 1977 and I July 1977,
respectively, to the Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Misamis Oriental, for referral
purposes. As a result, months have passed, and yet, no advice or resolution has been received by the
City Fiscal from the Department of Agrarian Reform. Petitioners then conclude: "As to why as of July 1,
1977 no action has been taken by the Regional DAR on the referral cases (and this is so until now) is
beyond comprehension. This obtaining actual situation is this not a violation of Sec. 16 of the Bill of
Rights (sic)? Justice delayed is justice denied.

Issue: WON the petitioner’s contention tenable

Ruling; NO

The term "speedy disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy trial" accorded an accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible
concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution
prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.

In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain factors
may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay,
assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may
also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the
administration of justice has violated the "speedy disposition of cases" guarantee.

To strike down a law on the ground that it violates the guarantee of "speedy disposition of cases"
requires more than a citation of what may be a misfeasance or malfeasance of a public officer whose
duty and responsibility it is to apply and administer the law. The challenge must be based on a clear
showing that it is the law, or its operation, and not merely its administration, which invades and
impairs constitutionally protected personal or property rights. In the case at bar, it is true that the
referral of cases to the Department of Agrarian Reform opens the door to more bureaucratic red tape
and, perhaps, more opportunities for corrupt practices. The defects in the bureaucratic system do not,
however, constitute valid arguments against the merits of legislative policy intended to protect the
legitimate tenant-tiller. Besides, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of PD 1038. This is a
matter left for Congress to re-examine in the exercise of its legislative authority.

Contrary to the petitioners' argument, the challenged law does not complicate the prescriptive periods
of offenses and criminal and civil liabilities as provided in the Revised Penal Code and other penal
laws. Under Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code, a period of prescription which has run before it is
interrupted, commences to run again only in two instances: (1) when a proceeding based upon a
complaint or an information terminates without the accused being convicted or acquitted or (2) when
such a proceeding is unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to an accused.
Applying these rules, once a complaint is filed with the fiscal and the latter refers the case to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his representative in the locality for preliminary determination, as a
consequence of an allegation by the respondent of a tenant-landlord relationship between him and the
complainant, and harassment by the latter, such a referral does not operate to resume the running of
prescription. This is so because, under the challenged law, the referral of a case to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform does not "terminate," but merely suspends, a proceeding. To "terminate" means to put
an end to, to make to cease or to end. 16 It connotes finality. On the other hand, the referral of a case
to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely discontinues temporarily a proceeding, or stops it with an
expectation of resumption. Likewise, when a proceeding before a fiscal is temporarily stopped by
virtue of a faithful compliance with the challenged law, neither can the suspension be considered
unjustifiable, and thus it is not a legal ground for the resumption of the running of the period of
prescription.

Considering, therefore, that the referral of a case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not permit
the resumption of the running of the period of prescription, the argument that the challenged Decree
provides a means by which offenses may prescribe during the pendency of cases involving such
offenses before the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his representative for preliminary determination,
cannot be accepted seriously.

Rule 120 Judgement

Teves Vs Sandiganbayan

Facts: The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and palpable errors in
convicting them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in
his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law. But they were convicted of having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different
from the offense with which they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was transgressed because
they were never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were being
charged with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991. The variancedoctrine invoked
by the respondent is but a rule of procedural law that should not prevail over their constitutionally-
guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them.

Issue: WON petitioner’s contention tenable

Ruling: NO. Petitioner’s contention is not tenable The answer is in the affirmative in view of
the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which both read:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.

The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a
cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction,
whether or not prohibited by law; and

3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest.

On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense proved, which is possession of prohibited
interest in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and

3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those
constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged,
as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily
included in the offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved.
The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting the conviction of
petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

Rule 121 New Trial or Reconsideration

Briones vs People

Facts: A criminal information was filed against Briones for crime of robbery. Briones allegedly took the service
firearm of S/G Gual while the latter approached the group where the former is involved in a mauling. S/G Gual
positively identified Briones. RTC found Briones guilty of the crime of simple theft (Art. 309 Par. 3 of RPC) after
giving weight to prosecutions positive testimony as against the defenses of denial and alibi.

On his appeal, he raised the issue of self-defense. The Court of Appeals found Briones guilty of robbery
under Article 293 in relation to par.5 of Article 294 of RPC and not of theft.

Issue: Whether or not a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
Ruling: No. The for new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
concurrence of the following conditions must obtain:

(a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial;

(b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence;

(c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and

(d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted.

In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established.

Evidence to be newly discovered, must be one that could not, by exercise of due diligence, have been
discovered by the court below. Briones failed to show he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate
the firearm

The allegation the he told his brothers and sisters to search for the firearm, which yielded in negative
result is purely self-serving. He now admits having taking the firearm and immediately disposed of it
at a nearby house, adjacent to the place of the incident.

Hence, even before the case went to court, he already knew the location of the subject firearm, but
did not do anything he did not even declare this knowledge at the trial below.

In petitions for new trial in a criminal proceeding where certain evidence was not presented, the
defendant, in order to secure a new trial, must satisfy the court that; he has a good defense, and that
the acquittal would in all probability follow the introduction of the omitted evidence. Briones change
of defense from denial to alibi to self-defense or in defense of a relative will not change the outcome.

Rule 122 Appeal

Batitis vs People

Facts: Batistis stated in the petition for review on certiorari require a re-appreciation and re-
examination of the trial evidence.

Issue: Won the petition for review should be granted

Ruling: No. A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law.

Batistis assigned errors stated in the petition for review on certiorari require a re-appreciation and re-
examination of the trial evidence. As such, they raise issues evidentiary and factual in nature. The
appeal is dismissible on that basis, because, one, the petition for review thereby violates the limitation
of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the
factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin.

There exists a question of law when there is doubt on what the law applicable to a certain set of facts
is. Questions of fact, on the other hand, arise when there is an issue regarding the truth or falsity of the
statement of facts. Questions on whether certain pieces of evidence should be accorded probative
value or whether the proofs presented by one party are clear, convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition are issues of fact. Such questions are not subject to review by this Court. As a general rule,
we review cases decided by the CA only if they involve questions of law raised and distinctly set forth
in the petition.

Rule 124 Procedure in the court of appeals

People vs Esparas

Facts: After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. The trial court found
her guilty as charged and imposed on her the death penalty.

Issue: WON the abandonment of the accused should dismiss the appeal

Ruling: No. There is mandatory review over death sentences and an exception to section 8 of Rule
124

The ecape of the Appelant does not preclude the exercise of review jurisdiction of the court.
Automatic review being mandatory, is not only a power of the court but a duty to review all death
penalty cases.

Rule 126 Search and Seizure

Te vs Breva

People vs Villareal

Facts:

:PO3 Renato de Leon was riding on his motorcycle when he saw appellant Nazareno Villareal from an
8 to 10 meter-distance. Villareal was then inspecting a plastic sachet containing shabu.De Leon
approached Villanueva whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug
possession but the latter tried to escape. He was apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver and
was brought to the police station. In his defense, Villanueva was walking when a man who was riding
a motorcycle called him from behind. He was approached, instructed not to run, then was frisked, and
took his wallet. Appellant was brought to the police station where he was detained and mauled. He
was also asked questions with a gun right beside his ear each time he failed to answer about a stolen
cellphone. The trial court convicted appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and such was
established properly through an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest. The appellate court sustained
conviction finding a clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest

ISSUE: Whether or not the in flagrante warrantless arrest was valid

HELD: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on
lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested

has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he

has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner

who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b)
of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an
offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.

In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact

of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under
paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while
under paragraph
bb), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.

The Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with

his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters
and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible
and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram)
inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant.

The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3

de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that
PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant
had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been
committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant,
it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was merely impelled to
apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous charge
for the same offense.

However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even

for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to
justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the
arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is
required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a
person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a
dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority
and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based
solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal
infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out
under Section 5.