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GRAVIMETRIC FEEDER CALIBRATION / COMMISS

GRAVIMETRIC FEEDER CALIBRATION / COMMISSIONING CHECKLIST

The following preliminary checks are to be done :


1.     Check all cable connections for tightness and proper termination in both local and remote.
2.     Check tightness and proper mounting of all cards in local and remote.
3.     Check all fuses for continuity.
4.     Check proper earthing connections.
5.     Set thumbwheel switch at FRD (A4) card at PCR to 20 for 50 TPH span.
6.     Set thumbwheel switch at LCA (A2) card at local to 20 also. The right switch is to be ‘0’ and left one ‘2’.
7.     Check that the main motor and the conveyor motor are healthy (use 1KV meggar).

A.    The following is the procedure to put the feeder for trial and belt stretching :
1.     Verify that all the 4 feeder doors are open and proper tools available for belt tracking and tension adjustme
2.     Verify that the load cells and calibration weight are mounted and the belt is tightened properly and equally
3.     Verify SSF (REMOTE/OFF/LOCAL) switch is in OFF (PCR).
4.     Verify SSC (Conveyor RUN/OFF) switch is in OFF (PCR).
5.     Verify SSL (REV/OFF/FWD) is in OFF (Local).
6.     Verify SLF (Feeder OFF/RUN) is in OFF (Local).
7.     Verify incomer main switches CS-1 and DS-1 are OFF.
8.     Adjust Coal on belt, Discharge plugged and Shear Pin Failure switches.
9.     Charge incoming power supplies.
10.  If OK, put ON DS-1 and CS-1.
11.  Check voltage across transformer T1 secondary (X1 and X2) is 115 VAC.
12.  Check voltage across transformer T2 secondary (1X1 and 1X2) is 95 VAC.
13.  Check voltage across transformer T2 secondary (1X1 and 1X3) is 115 VAC.
14.  With no demand applied at TBC-6 :72 and 73, adjust MIN FEEDRATE pot (R23) in A2 (ISF) card to get 1.0
15.  With 20.00 mA demand applied at TBC-6 :72(+) and 73(-), adjust SPAN pot (R18) in A2 (ISF) card to get 5
16.  Remove demand signal.
17.  Put SSL to LOCAL.
18.  Press Phase failure reset button and proceed to local.
19.  Put switch SSL to FORWARD.
20.  Briefly (for 3 to 4 seconds) put Switch SLF to RUN. Feeder belt should start.
21.  Verify direction of belt rotation and correct if required.
22.  Put SLF to RUN briefly and verify correct rotation of belt.
23.  Put SLF to OFF, SSL to REVERSE, again SLF to RUN briefly and verify reverse rotation of feeder. Keep the b
24.  Put Switch SSC in RUN(PCR) and check for correct rotation of Cleanout conveyor. Rectify if required.
25.  Start feeder in forward direction. It should run at about 300 RPM. Cleanout conveyor should also run.
26.  Check and adjust for proper belt tracking.
27.  When belt tracking is OK for about 3 to 4 minutes, increase speed demand by giving 16 mA at TBC-6 : 72(
28.  Check and adjust for proper tracking and belt tension.
29.  Let the feeder run for 6 to 8 hours under constant watch and intermittent adjustment for proper belt tensio
at a time.

B.    The following is the procedure for local calibration of the feeder


1.     After running feeder for 6 to 8 hours as per step 30 of sec A, stop the feeder and conveyor by putting SSL
2.     Ensure calibration weight is not engaged.
3.     Use checkbars and shims to adjust load cells proper and equal loading. After adjustment remove checkbars
a.     Engage calibration weight.
b.     Measure voltage (peak value) at TP4(WHT) and TP5(BLU) of LCA(A2) card. These should b
When this is achieved, the load cell alignment is OK.
4.     Tighten load cell check nuts and verify readings as in step 3.
5.     Disengage calibration weight .
6.     Adjust 0.0 +/- 0.01VDC at TP8(GRN) of LCA (A2) by COARSE TARE adjustment pot R33.
7.     Engage calibration weight.
8.     Adjust 6.5 +/- 0.25VDC at TP8(GRN) of LCA (A2) by COARSE SPAN adjustment pot R19.
9.     Disengage calibration weight.
10.  Check CMMR contacts are not actuated as the feeder is not running now.
11.  Run feeder in local (SSL in RUN) and verify that when coal on belt paddle is actuated, feeder trips after ab
12.  Run the feeder and check CMMR contact is operated now.
13.  Put feeder off.
14.  Thread in the calibration probes at the designated locations after removing the caps. These should engage
15.  Put 4 reflective stickers on the teeth of the belt towards the Electronic card side in such a way that the min
stickers should be equidistant on the periphery of the belt.
16.  Place the calibrator at a convenient location with switch in OFF position.
17.  Connect the cable having 7 pins to the feeder electronics cage and corresponding socket of the calibrator.
18.  Connect the remaining two cables from the probes to the calibrator. The probe nearer to the feeder inlet s
to ‘B’ on the calibrator.
19.  Verify that the calibration weight is not engaged and start the feeder from local (SSL to RUN).
20.  Adjust speed to around 900 RPM.
21.  Set feedrate code to 20 in calibrator.
22.  Set Event Select to 4 in calibrator.
23.  Put calibrator switch to BELT and after 10/15 seconds press RESET.
24.  The display count will start increasing and after one full belt revolution, it will stop. Note this count.
25.  Repeat the procedure by pressing reset until the counts are tallying within +/- 10, and there is no definite
26.  When BELT count as above is satisfactory, let the latest count remain. DO NOT RESET.
27.  Turn the switch in the calibrator to TARE and press RESET. The counter will start counting downwards and
value) or negative (flashing value). Remember this value with sign.
28.  Measure the voltage ‘V’ at TP8(GRN) of LCA card.
29.  Calculate the change in voltage required as
C= TARE COUNT /[ {(BELT COUNT) – (TARE COUNT)} / V]
30.   a. If the TARE reading had been positive, then by adjusting FINE TARE pot (R34)
clockwise set a value of V+C volts at TP8(GRN) of LCA card.
             b. If the TARE reading had been negative, then by adjusting FINE TARE pot (R34)
anticlockwise set a value of V-C volts at TP8(GRN) of LCA card.
31.  Press RESET and again the calibrator starts decrementing from the same value. Repeat adjustments as ab
32.  Engage the calibration weight.
33.  Put switch in SPAN position at the calibrator.
34.  Press RESET. The count resets to 100.00 and starts downward count after a little while. The display stops
the % error in span. Note it as ‘S’.
35.  Calculate adjustment voltage as follows:
a.     Place the calibration switch in TARE mode.
b.     Measure voltage ‘V’ at TP8(GRN) of LCA (A2) card.
c.     Calculate change in voltage C= V * (S/100)
36.  Adjust as follows:
a.     If the % error was positive, then by suitably turning the COARSE or FINE SPAN adjust pot
THE CALIBRATOR IS IN TARE MODE, WE ARE ADJUSTING THE SPAN POT AND NOT
b.     If the % error was negative, then by suitably turning the COARSE or FINE SPAN adjust po
THOUGH THE CALIBRATOR IS IN TARE MODE, WE ARE ADJUSTING THE SPAN POT
37.  Put calibrator in SPAN mode and press RESET.
38.  Repeat span adjustment by calculation as above or by trial and error until the final error reading is within +
39.  Stop feeder and put the calibrator to OFF position.
40.  Disconnect all cables to the calibrator and remove the calibration probes. The stickers may or may not be r
41.  Disengage the calibration weight. (This step can be bypassed if immediately afterwards feeder remote cali
42.  Put SSF in remote panel to OFF.

C.    The following is the procedure for remote calibration of the feeder :


1.     Engage calibration weight if not already engaged.
2.     Keep the Coal on Belt switch (LSFB) operated by tying the paddle at the feeder.
3.     Remove the field wires to the feedback mA output terminals (4 sets).
4.     Simulate external start command by shorting TBC-1 : 8 and 9 and TBC-1 : 7 & 8
5.     Put SSF on REMOTE.
6.     Feeder should start with TPH display.
7.     Increase speed to 100% by giving 20.00 mA demand.
8.     Measure Frequency at TP3(ORN)/FRD(A4). Verify that this gives 10 times the TPH reading.
9.     If the TPH reading is hunting or the feeder is oscillating between gravimetric and volumetric mode, then ad
10.  Adjust GRAVIMETRIC FEEDRATE pot (R45) in ISF(A2) card to get 50 TPH on FRI and 500 Hz at TP3(ORN)/
11.  Adjust the 4 tachometers as follows :
a.     Set span switch to 13.
b.     Put feeder off by putting switch SSF to OFF.
c.     Adjust the OFFSET pots to get 4.00 mA.
d.     Run feeder to full demand.
e.     Adjust SPAN pots to get 20.00 mA
f.      Repeat procedure to get correct 4 – 20 mA.
12.  Set speed demand to 4.00 mA.
13.  Adjust MINIMUM FEEDRATE pot (R23) on ISF(A2) card to get 10 TPH at FRI and 100Hz at TP3(ORN)/FRD(
14.  Give full demand and check for 50 TPH. Repeat the above steps for correct 10 to 50 TPH.
15.  When above adjustment is complete, when the feeder is running to full demand measure the frequency ‘F’
16.  Set demand at 4 mA and adjust CR2 to just operate.
17.  Set demand at 12 mA and adjust CR1 to operate at 12 mA increasing.
18.  Take calibration readings for gravimetric mode as follows :
19.  During the above operation verify that the Total coal integrators on the feeder cabinet and on the SCP inte
20.  Operate Discharge chute pluggage paddle and verify feeder trip. Put SSF to OFF.
21.  Disengage calibration weight.
22.  Start the feeder by putting SSF to REMOTE and increase demand to 20 mA. Feeder will run in volumetric m
23.  Adjust VOLUMETRIC FEEDRATE pot (R42) on ISF(A2) card to get same value of RPM as was obtained in co
16) for 20.00 mA demand input.
24.  With demand at 20 .00mA, measure the frequency at TP2(YEL) of FRD(A4) card. Compare it with the value
the same value as was noted in step 14.
25.  Take volumetric calibration readings as follows:
26.  Stop feeder. Remove remote start command shorting loop from TBC-1 : 8 and 9.
27.  Calibration is now complete. Normalise feeder, cables, etc., and close all doors of the feeder after verifying
boiler technical terms
Hydrotest Pressure Vs Design Pressure.
Design pressure is usually the pressure set by process engineer, based on the re
is
Sothe actual
if the pressure
design theisvessel
pressure is tested
100 KPa(g), theat. Usually the
hydrotest hydrotest
pressure pressure
would be 130isKPa
1
rule.

Maximum allowable
 Design pressure Working
is usually pressure
the pressure set(MAWP) Vsengineer,
by process Design pressure
based on the r
pressure based on the actual characteristics of the vessel/equipment (which is u
process engineer). Maximum allowable working pressure is always greater than

Permissive,
The PERMISSIVES,interlock - Difference
are some conditions that need to be satisfied before you can
only when there
INTERLOCK: is sufficient
During suction
the process, pressure. fails, interlocks are activated. For
if a condition
level of drum goes low.
An interlock can also be a permissive, but the converse is not true. For the comp
pressure is a permissive, the compressor will not shutdown, if there is insufficien
start. But if insufficient suction pressure was an interlock, the system will shutdo
value. But once shutdown, all the permissives need to be satisfied before the sy

Hot boltingis a method of replacing the bolts on a live line.  Normally done one
Hot bolting
there is no other reasonable choice.

The
• Thecriteria typically
operating followed
pressure mustisbesomething
less thanlike:
75% of the MAWP as allowed under
system to be hot bolted.
• The flange must have a minimum of 8 bolts
• The process temperature must be between 4°and 71° C.
• All flangesfor
Monitoring and associated system
hydrocarbons is also aequipment
must during must
thebe adequately
operation.  supported,
Generally the
tightening
• The gasket operation.
area must not show signs of leakage. Piping, flanges, and bolts mu
their integrity.
• Existing flange bolts/nuts must be tight and of the correct size and grade.
Hot Bolting" Calculations
perform a Hot Bolt procedure (ie, removing one bolt at a time for maintenace pu
Section VII calculator (Mr. Pedersen's), but when you reduce the number of bolts
diameter.  If I remove half the bolts (to accurately reflect the increased distance
bolt stress for MAWP is too conservative as compared to removing only one bolt
either
I have MAWP or seating
never heard perspective-
of anyone whichever
taking one bolt at is
a greater).
time for maintenance purpose
to me.
RossABQ - yes, one bolt at a time...but not necessarily "replacing" - we often jus
on it (the lubricant issue is a whole other can of worms), and then re-install the
AND on vessel manways....most often in preparation for turnaround maintenanc
some corrosion or when when find a "short bolt" (ie, a bolt that is too short and
acquired at one time or another) or when we find a nut or bolt that is not the co
the bolt and/or nut. desertfox - I don't believe it is "extrememly dangerous" - the
companies have specific procedures for this operation (I have copies of the BP, C
Bolting). Folks, thanx for your interests...and look forward to your thoughts and
Hot bolting is fairly common, I've been around it quite a bit before.  It's simply re
time.  That being said, hot bolting should be usedo nly when there is no otehr re

The
• Thecriteria typically
operating followed
pressure mustisbe
something
less thanlike:
75% of the MAWP as allowed under
system to be hot bolted.
• The flange must have a minimum of 8 bolts
• The process temperature must be between 40°and 160° Fahrenheit.
• All flangesfor
Monitoring and associated system
hydrocarbosn is also aequipment must
must during thebe adequately
operation.  supported,
Generally the
tightening
• The gasket operation.
area must not show signs of leakage. Piping, flanges, and bolts mu
their integrity.

InExisting flange
my opinion, thebolts/nuts
answer tomust
yourbe tight
stud and
bolt of the correct
question is.... "it size and grade. dep
depends"....!!!It
bolt. If the bolt is of large diameter and of expensive materials, it pays to be car
be replaced
process as aDaging,
we call mater of policy
the addition of a collodial graphite lubricant. We run eac
existing Dag and the disassembled studs and nuts are run through the Daging b
assembled with a full nut engagement on each end of the stud. I would say less
the rejected studs are recovered by lite duty mechanics. It is a very rare occurre
piping is reassembled. Some of the studs in use are over 40 years old as witness
found in service. At various times I've removed a sample of studs and physically
approaching rejection. There is problem sometime with meaning of "hot bolting"
operating conditions. "Hot bolting" and "hot torquing" are two separate operatio
sevral problems with "hot torquing" were people forget the proper tightening se

POWER PLANT OPERATION


BY MUJIYONO
BOILER
Definition
As per Indian Boiler Act 1923, Boiler is defined as any closed vessel exceeding 2
generating steam under pressure and includes any mounting or accessories atta
pressure, when steam is shut off.
A good Boiler should have some essential qualities.
1.     Capable to meet large load fluctuations.
2. Fuel efficient i.e. to generate maximum steam with minimum fuel consumptio
3.     Ability to start-up quickly.
4.     Easy in maintenance and inspection.
5.     Occupy  less floor space.
6.     Lower friction loss in water and flue gas circuit
7.     Little attention for operation and maintenance.

Systems in a Boiler
A Boiler mainly contains following systems :
1.     Feed water system.
2.     Steam system.
3.     Air system.
4.     Flue gas system.
5.     Fuel handling system.
6.     Ash handling system.

Boiler Mountings
Fittings on a Boiler which are required for its safe and efficient operation are call
1.     Safety valve
2.     Water level sight glass (gauge glass)
3.     Pressure gauge
4.     Blow down valve
5.     Main steam stop valve
6.     Feed water check valve (NRV)
7.     Air Vent
8.     Start-up vent
9.     Manhole

Boiler Accessories
The devices which are used in a Boiler as an integral part and help to run the Bo
1.     Super heater
2.     De-super heater
3.     Economizer
4.     Air Pre-heater
5.     Soot Blower
6.     Feed Pump
7.     ID and FD fans
8.     Ash Removal system
9.     Fuel supply system
10.   Dosing system
11.   Deaerator

Steam Generation
In a Boiler In A Boiler..contd
fuel is burnt to get heat energy which is converted from chemical ene
produce steam from feed water.
arranged around the furnace and flue gas path. Water tube arrangement made
circulated in these tubes. Water comes to water wall from Boiler drum, and circu
difference in density which is created due to difference in temperature, water cir
Natural Circulation.

During circulation of water in tubes, steam is generated and collected at the upp
corresponding to Boiler drum pressure. This steam is further heated in Superhea
Boiler Drum is filled with fresh feed water. The feed water, before entering into d
flue gas path. Most of the heat of the flue gas is utilized inside the Boiler. Still co
heat is utilized in Economizer to heat up the feed water.
For burning of fuel, required Oxygen is obtained from atmospheric air. Air is requ
Forced Draught (FD) fan. This air is heated at air pre-heater (APH) before being s
in energy. Air pre-heater is placed at the flue gas path after Economizer. Air pre-
flue gas to the cold air, which is to be used in furnace. By heating the air, burnin
flue gas would not be used to heat up feed water at Economizer and air at Air Pr
Finally the flue gas passes through Electrostatic Precipitator (ESP) and exhauste
particle in the flue gas is trapped and clean gas  escapes to atmosphere.

Ash which is produced in the Boiler due to combustion of solid fuel is collected a
and ESP. This ash is disposed off with the help of suitable ash handling system.

Preparations for Cold Start-up


1.   All the manhole doors should be in close condition.   Tightness of the Nuts a
2.     All the water wall drain lines should be in close condition.
3.     All the steam drain lines should be in open condition.
4.     Start-up vent Root Manual isolation valve  should be in open condition.
5.     Drum level should be at Normal Water Level (NWL).
6.  Continuous Blow Down (CBD)  and  Intermittent Blow Down (IBD) drains shou
7.   All the super heater vents including Drum vent and Puppy Header vent shou
8.     Before and After Isolation valves at Feed Control Station (FCS) should be in
9.     Attemperation Control valve before and after isolation valve should be in o
10.   Hydra step should be in healthy condition.
11.   Safety valves should be in healthy condition.
12.   Main Steam stop valve and by- pass valve should be in close condition.
13.   Soot blower manual isolation valve and control valve should be in close con
14.Boiler Drum Gauge glass steam side and water side isolation cocks should be
15.   HP Dosing Pumps should be in Healthy condition and open suction and disc
16.   Solution in HP Dosing agitator tank should be at normal level.
17.   Boiler Feed Pumps should be in healthy condition.
18.Deaerator water level should be maintained at 60% by taking DM Transfer pu
19.   Air compressors should be in healthy condition.
20.   Ash handling systems should be in healthy condition.
21.   ESP should be in healthy condition.
22.   ID fan damper should be in Zero position.
23.   All the interlocks and protection should be checked properly viz. Drum leve
discharge pressure low, Flue gas temperature at Post Combustion Chamber (PCC

Cold Start-up process


1.     After Kiln light-up, when flue gas temperature at PCC outlet increases to m
natural draught
2.     After openingcreated
of ID by
fanchimney, flue gas
damper, Boiler passestemperature
furnace through Boiler and
rises slow Wh
slowly. he
fan damper 10%.
3.     When Flue gas temperature at PCC outlet rises more than       600 deg C., c
4.     When Drum pressure reaches 5 Kg/cm2, close the Drum vent and Puppy he
5.     When Boiler Drum pressure reaches 20 Kg/cm2, give blow down of the wat
6.    By adjusting damper opening raise the Boiler pressure upto 45 kg/cm2 and
7.    Start-up vent should be in open condition since the admittance of hot flue g
8.   Open the Main steam line drains in between Boiler Main Steam Stop Valve (M
9.  Open the MSSV by pass valve to remove all the condensate in main steam lin
10.   After removal of all the condensates in Main steam line and proper line hea
11.   Close Super heater drains.
12.   Put Drum level controller in Auto mode.
13.   Put Attemperator controller in Auto mode.
14.   Close Start up vent as per the steam demand of TG set.
15. Charge ESP when Flue gas temperature after Economizer reaches 160deg. C
Finally the flue gas passes through Electrostatic Precipitator (ESP) and exhauste
particle in the flue gas is trapped and clean gas  escapes to atmosphere.
Ash which is produced in the Boiler due to combustion of solid fuel is collected a
and ESP. This ash is disposed off with the help of suitable ash handling system.

Start-up of Waste Heat Recovery Boiler (WHRB) 


 Hot Start-up

Start-up of Boiler within 2 Hrs of Tripping of Boiler is known as the Hot Start-up o
1.     Ensure the Drum level of Boiler. It should be at Normal water   level.
2.     Start Air Compressors.
3.     Start Boiler Feed water Pump.
4.     Start ID fan with ID damper in Zero position.
5.     Open Start-up vent.
6.     Slowly open damper of ID fan. Watch Drum level.
7.     Regulate Boiler pressure by opening start-up vent.
8.     Super heater temperature has to be maintained with the help of attempera
9.   Raise the Boiler pressure upto 45 Kg/cm2 and temperature  to 485 deg C.
10. Open the drains of Main steam line in between Main Steam Stop Valve (MSS
11.   Open By-pass valve of MSSV.
12.   Condensate, if any, will be drained out and main steam line heating will be
13.   After ensuring proper Main steam line heating, open Main
14.   steam stop valve.
15.   Close all drains in main steam line.
16.  Charge ESP when flue gas temperature at Economizer outlet reaches 160 d
17.   Put drum level controller and attemperator controller in Auto mode.
18.   Regulate the pressure of Boiler with the help of start-up vent.
19.   Close Start-up vent as per the steam demand of TG set.
20.   Normalize ID fan damper by gradual opening and loading of Boiler.

Charging of De-areator
It removes the dissolved gases from the condensate mechanically by following t
1.     Henry’s Law
2.     Dalton’s Law of Partial Pressure.
·        According to Henry’s Law, Solubility of dissolved gases decreases by incre
Deaerator water temperature increases and soluble gases in condensate depart
·        According to Dalton’s Law of Partial Pressure Pm= Ps+Pa
Where Pm= Partial pressure of Mixture
Ps=   Partial pressure of Steam
Pa=   Partial pressure of Air
·        The partial pressure of air present inside the Deaerator comes out
·        through Deaerator vent for equilibrium state.

Procedure Of Charging
1.  Ensure DM Storage Tank level is more than 60%.
2.  Start DM Transfer Pump by opening Recirculation valve.
3.  Ensure Deaerator level is 60%. If the level is less then take the make up wate
4.  Open all drain lines  of Pegging PRDS line and observe that condensate is com
5.  Slowly open Pegging PRDS pressure Control Valve and ensure that condensat
6.  Gradually increase the pressure to 2.8 Kg/cm2 by increasing pegging PRDS p
7.  Slowly heat the Deaerator by opening the heating line isolation valve and rai
8.  Open the before and after isolation valve of Deaerator Pressure Control valve
increase the Deaerator pressure upto 2 kg/cm2 .After that put the Deaerator Pre
9.  Start LP Dosing pump.
10.   In LP Dosing Hydrazine is used. Hydrazine removes oxygen by chemical rea
11.  EQUATION- N2H4+O2=2H2O+N2
12.   By adding Hydrazine dissolved oxygen becomes water and Nitrogen gas re

WHRB Interlocks
1.    
2.     If Drum
This is tolevel becomes
protect very tubes.
the Boiler low i.e.At25%
low then
DrumIDlevel,
fan Trips
heatand
fluxEmergency
input has toc
starvation takes place.
3.     If PCC out let temperature rises to 1050 deg C then ID fan damper become
4.     This protection is incorporatedto protect the Boiler tubes from overheating.
5.     If all BFPs trip then ID fan damper becomes Zero and Emergency cap open
6.     When all running BFPs Trip, then Drum level falls drastically. To protect the
7.     If Deaerator level becomes very low i.e.25% then All BFPs Trip.
8.     Running of BFPs at Low Deaerator Level is harmful for the Pump.
9.     If Ash ash
10.  When SiloSilo
levelis is
athigh,
high all ashthen
level handling systems
conveying morestop.
ash from ash handling s
prevent this, it is better to stop the systems and unload ash from Ash Silo.
11.   Boiler
12. This Main steam
protection is to stop
avoidvalve will not opendue
line hammering if by-pass MOV of
to presence of condensate
MSSV is in clo
in
towards Turbine side.
13.   Boiler
14.  If  feedFeed
waterWater MOVinwill
is empty not open ifand
Economizer by-pass
in theMOV
pipe of Feed
line water
after FeedMOV is iM
water
opening FW by-pass, MOV will lead to overloading of BFP, resulting BFP Trip.
15.  ESP trips, if Ash Hopper level is high.
16.   ESP has high voltage. Ash has presence of combustibles.
17.   This protection is to safeguard ESP at Ash Hopper level high.
18.   ESP can not be charged without starting of Purge Air Blower.
20.    This is to Seal the ESP by the air from Purge Air Blower  before charging it.
22.  ESP can not be charged till flue gas inlet temperature reaches 160 deg C.
23.   This is to avoid deposition of moisture and oil content influe gas on ESP.

1.     Decrease in Drum level


a.     Tripping of  Feed Pump
If Boiler feed Pump trips then Feed water supply to Boiler interrupts and leads to
that the auto stand-by Boiler feed pump has started in Auto mode. If the auto st
then start the Boiler feed pump manually otherwise Boiler will suffer from starva
Boiler.

b.     Tube failure in Economizer


If Boiler Economizer tube fails then water supply to Boiler Drum will be affected.
valve
Observewillthe
open moreflow
steam to compensate theflow.
and feed water DrumIf level
feed to Normal
water water
demand tolevel,
drumwhich
is in
has failed inside boiler then hissing sound comes and it can be noticed from out
If it is of white colour then tube failure in side the furnace is confirmed.

c.     
WhenUnitUnitgetting
comes into Island
to Island modeit follows the load connected to the Generator
mode,
load and exporting to Grid.
At the time of Islanding, Generator will follow the load connected in this Unit and
load and allow the steam to pass through Turbine. The surplus amount of steam
This drum pressure will exert a downward thrust to the drum level and it decrea

d.    
If anyWhether CBD
operating valve, EBD
personnel has valve
openedor any
IBD valve opened?
of these valves without proper reaso
Ensure first then close the valve or regulate it observing the drum level.

2.     INCREASE IN DRUM LEVEL


a.  Whether Cold start-up in Boiler is in progress?
During Cold start-up when water temperature reaches 900 C then formation of b
this is the case then blow down has to be given to maintain the drum level at No

b.    Whether Instrument air compressor tripped and air lock unit at feed control
If Instrument air compressor trips, then air lock unit of control valve at feed cont
it was, before supply of instrument air. This is known as stay put condition. If air
stay put condition, then when supply of instrument air fails, it leads to 100% ope
instrument air compressor as early as possible and regulate the feed station con

c.      Whether Start-up vent has opened or safety valve popped up?
pressure in drum. If the steam demand in TG has reduced to a large extent then
instant drum level falls rapidly.  When start-up vent is operated to release the su
increases rapidly. In this case at first ensure for what reason the pressure in Boil
then give blow down to regulate it. Because at higher side drum level, the steam
to super heaters and turbine will take place, which is very much harmful.

d.    Whether Start-up vent has opened or safety valve popped up? Continued…
because if the control valve is closed completely, the feed water in Economizer
due to heat in flue gas and when feed water supply through Economizer will be
hammering in Economizer tubes due to presence of steam. This may lead to Eco
start-up vent and dump the surplus steam in Condenser. Ensure that the safety
observed.

e.     
If drum Whether drum levelistransmitter
level transmitter is malfunctioning?
malfunctioning then observe the level in hydrastep a
personnel about this.

f.       Whether rapid heat supply to Boiler?


If heat supply to Boiler will be increased suddenly with a huge amount then it aff
the heat input supply in a gradual loading manner. Sudden and huge amount of
and it suffers from fatigue. In course of time tube fails.

g.     Whether stand-by Boiler Feed Pump has started?


When stand-by Boiler feed water pump has started with running Boiler feed wat
opening in Boiler feed Control valve when feed water pressure increases, more f
valve and leads to increase in drum level. This case normally happens during sc
pump. At first the stand-by feed water pump is started and discharge valve of th
previously running Boiler feed pump is stopped. Ensure whether it is a schedule

h.     Whether TG has come to Island mode?


If TG has come to Island mode then Boiler pressure increases as there is a cut o
connected to it in this unit. If unit was exporting the power to Grid then the surp
is running under Island mode. Open the start up vent to release the pressure. En
popped up then it has reset properly or not. Observe the drum level during this
properly or not. If it is responding properly then try to supply steam to condense
pressure has reduced and safety valve has reset.

h.   Whether TG tripped?


If turbine trips then steam demand in Turbine will cut off and resulting Boiler pre
Control valve of dump and close the start-up vent after ensuring that the safety

i.       Whether any Cooling water pump in TG has tripped?


if the auto stand-by pump fails to start then the load set point at Generator has
will trip due to low vacuum. When load set point at Generator decreased sudden
communicate with the TG operator and open start-up vent and lower the Load s
manually. After restoration of cooling water pump divert the steam from start-up
load of Generator.

3.     Decrease in Boiler Steam Pressure


a.     Whether flue gas inlet temperature has reduced?
If flue gas inlet temperature reduces then it steam generation reduces in Boiler
carefully and the generator Load set point has to be lowered, otherwise the TG w

b.     Whether more steam demand at TG end?


steam generation then Boiler pressure decreases. and TG is running with low loa
came to Island mode then the Generator will follow the load which is connected
steam generation in Boiler. So Boiler pressure decreases. As we can not change
value, Load on the Generator has to be lowered by cutting off the load connecte
Generator and cut off it as quickly as possible otherwise the unit will suffer from
pressure low and Grid power is unavailable.
The same case happens when the steam generation in Boiler is low

c.      Whether superheater tube failed?


and feed water flow is at increasing trend then it indicates that tube has failed. I
white smoke comes out from chimney. When steam pressure decreases then red
at main steam pressure low and ensure whether tube has failed or not. If tube h
the failed tube with a new tube.

d.      Whether
This case ID fan
happens damper
when has temperature
flue gas closed to zero
atposition?
Post Combustion Chamber rea
damper closes. It means heat supply to Boiler has cut off. It results in less steam
temperature, immediate load reduction has to be carried out in Generator to avo

e.     
If any Whether hand
person has lever ofthe
operated Safety
handvalve
leverhas been operated?
of safety valve without proper commu
Boiler steam pressure decreases and drum level increases. 

4.     INCREASE IN MAIN STEAM TEMPERATURE


a.     Whether Boiler is loaded with huge amount of heat suddenly?
Main steam temperature rises if flue gas temperature at Boiler inlet rises sudden
therefore when flue gas temperature rises, it increases the superheater tempera
main steam temperature then TG will trip due to main steam temperature going
temperature rises due to rise in flue gas temperature, then immediately attemp
attemperation should be increased. Also communicate with the kiln personnel a

b.    
During Whether Soot Blowing
soot blowing, steam is in progress?rises because more steam is required f
temperature
increased by opening the ID fan damper. So during soot blowing, main steam te
control valve fails to control the rise in main steam temperature in auto mode, t

c.      Whether Attemperation control valve is in manual mode or wrong value co


temperature in Auto mode. So the concerned operator has to take the attemper
temperature. But if he forgets to put this control valve in Auto mode after stabili
manual mode and during  more heat input from Kiln, the main steam temperatu
command for attemperation control valve opening from control station in manua
temperature.

d.     Whether forget to open before and after isolation valves of attemperation C
This situation comes during cold start-up of Boiler, if the inspection and checkin
During initial period, this thing cannot be noticed but at the time of main steam
flow of water cannot be established as before and after isolation valves are in cl
inspection and checking before start-up.

5.     DECREASE IN MAIN STEAM TEMPERATURE


a.     Whether inlet flue gas temperature has dropped?
If flue gas inlet temperature drops due to problem in Kiln side then main steam
in decreasing trend then first observe the flue gas inlet temperature to Boiler.

b.    
If LoadWhether Load
set point set point isisgiven
in Generator giveninmore
Generator more
than the thangeneration
steam the Steamingenerat
Boiler
steam temperature decreases

c.      Whethercomes
This situation valve sheet
duringofLow
Attemperation control
Load operation valve If
of Boiler. is heat
eroded?
input to Boiler i
generation. At that time, feed water passes due to eroded valve sheet of attemp
temperature.

d.    
supply Whether IDfrom
to Boiler damper
Kiln has become
stops ZeroSodue
suddenly. to PCCin
it results outlet
rapidtemperature High?
decrease in main
attemperation control valve has to be taken to Manual mode from Auto mode an
controlled.

6.        FURNACE DRAUGHT TOWARDS POSITIVE SIDE


a.     Whether
In furnace, thetube failure
draught has occurred
is maintained atin side furnace?
negative side to carry out the hot flue g
chimney through ID fan. If Boiler tube fails inside furnace then draught goes tow
density.  Also it adds an additional load on ID fan. So ID fan takes more current i

b.  Whether draught transmitter is showing wrong value?


This can be known if other draught transmitters in flue gas path are showing rig
problem should be brought to the notice to shift in charge and instrumentation p

7.     LONG RETRACTABLE SOOT BLOWER IS NOT AT ITS ORIGINAL POSITION


a.     Whether Long Retractable soot blower’s chain has broken during Soot Blow
position i.e. home position. Check the position of lancer tube, when soot blowing
situation, donot cut off steam flow through lancer tube. It is because it is situate
as a coolant, it will take the heat added to the lancer tube and will protect the la
tube has to be drawn out manually. After ensuring that it has been drawn to its h
off and chain maintenance work can be carried out.

b.     Whether
This may home
happen position
after limit switch
completion of sootisblowing
malfunctioning?
by Long Retractable Soot Blow
position feed back of the LRSB due to malfunction. If this case happens then imm
checked. Limit switch at home position has to be rectified by Instrumentation de

c.      HAMMERING OF MAIN STEAM LINE DURING CHARGING.


Usually main steam line hammering occurs if the condensate present in that line
condition. If huge amount of steam is allowed to pass through that pipe line then
for the pipe line. So to avoid this case happening always open the drain of the p
that pipe line. After completion of condensate draining, warm-up the pipe line w
pipe line temperature. After confirmation that the line is properly heated, more s

Steam
Steam Turbine
turbine is a mechanical device that extracts thermal energy from steam a
turbine consists of several sets of blades. Some set of blades are fixed at casing
rotor ( Moving Blade) .
Fixed blades convert potential energy of the steam into kinetic energy and direc
kinetic energy in to force, caused by pressure drop and result in rotation of turbi
through control valve. This steam after passing through different stages of blade
in a condenser and condensate then reused in boiler.
1.     Impulse Turbine
2.     Reaction Turbine

1) IMPULSEturbine
In Impulse TURBINE:
instead of set fixed blades a set of nozzles are fitted in the ca
and velocity of steam increases. This high velocity jet of steam contains significa
passed through a set of moving blades, where pressure of the steam remains co

2) REACTION TURBINE:
In reaction turbine fixed blades are fixed in the casing. Shape of these blades is
same as shape of nozzle. Moving blades are fixed to the rotor. Fixed blades guid
designed that steam glides over the blades. Steam while gliding over moving bl
produce the rotates the rotor.
1.     Casing
2.     Rotor
3.     Moving Blade
4.     Fixed Blade
5.     Steam Sealing System
6.     Bearing
Ø Joural Bearing
Ø Thrust Bearing
7.     Gland
8.     Exhaust Hood
9.     Emergency Stop Valve
10.  Governing Valve And Control Valve
11.    Barring Devices.
12.    Governing Systems

v CASING
Casing of turbine plays important role for the performance of a turbine. This is t
attached to this. Casing facilitates to accommodate moving parts and provides p
the temperature of steam for operating turbine is high so, normally Cr, Mo alloy
metal joint sealing is done to ensure no leakage of steam.

v ROTOR
Rotor is the moving part of a turbine which extracts work from steam. This is the
manufactured by forging. Rotor consist of shaft moving blade and inter stage se
axial thrust of rotor during various load conditions. Rotor of the turbine is allowe
allowed to remain stand still when it is hot. Due to its self weight there is a chan
v Moving Blades
Enthalpy of steam is converted into rotational energy as it passes through turbin
moving and fixed blade. As in each step pressure of steam decreases, its volume
steam. Blade has to withstand high pressure and temperature of  steam. Good t
damping property, low ductility, resistance to corrosion and erosion is essential.
1.     Tip
2.     Profile
3.     Root

v Fixed Blades
Fixed blades facilitate expansion of steam and guide it to flow over subsequent
turbine casing are called diaphragms. It holds vane shaped nozzles or fixed it
MAIN COMPONENTS OF STEAM TURBINE
1.     JOURNAL BEARING
Journal bearing is a cylinder, which surrounds the shaft and is filled with some fo
hard metal and soft metal at the inner cylindrical part. In this bearing a shaft or
lubricating oil, separating the shaft and bearing through a fluid film by dynamic
soft metal called as white metal or Babbitt. This is a tin or lead based alloy.

2.     THRUST BEARING


Journal bearings are used to take radial load of the shaft. But it can’t take axial l
the axial float is restricted to certain limit. Excessive axial shift may damage rot

EMERGENCY STOP VALVE


Ø This valve is normally hydraulically operated. The valve opens hydraulically ag
Ø Fluid is drained and valve closes immediately due to force of spring. This valv

Auxiliary System Of Steam Turbine


1.     OIL SYSTEM
Ø Oil tank
Ø Oil Pump
Ø Oil Cooler
Ø Oil Filter
Ø Oil Centrifuge
Ø Oil Over Head Tank
Ø Accumulator
2.     CONDENSATE SYSTEM
3.     GLAND SEALING SYSTEM
4.     STEAM EJECTOR AND VACCUM SYSTEM
5.     CONDENSER
6.     COOLING WATER SYSTEM

Turbine Cold Startup Sequence Method


Operation of steam turbine is a complex process. Before starting the rolling of a
service. Normally for start up of a turbine some operations are followed in seque
v Charging of Steam Pipe Line
From  Boiler, steam is carried to turbine main steam pipe line. In cold condition,
allow
Drain gradual thermal
points are expansion,
provided beforeline
at the steam giving full load
to drain on the turbine.
out condensate present in s
steam. First of all, these drains are opened before charging steam on the pipe lin
stop
Someby pass is
steam valve is opened
allowed to flowslowly . the pipe line and it starts gaining heat fr
through
condensate along with some steam is allowed to come out through the drain. Th
condensate
Steam trapsbut only dry
provided steam
in the pipecomes outkept
line are frominthe
linedrain.
once drains are closed. The
so that the line temperature is increased gradually. Ensure extraction is not rest
reaching the normal level after which stop valve of boiler can be opened fully.
To circulate cooling water in the Condenser, cooling water pumps are to be start

Before starting pump


1.     Ensure Sump level of the cooling tower basin is normal (>80%)
2.     Keep suction valve of the pump in open condition & discharge in closed con
3.     Ensure inlet & outlet cooling water valves of Condenser distributer valves o
4.     Ensure vents provided at Condenser water box are in open condition to rem
5.     Start the pump & open the discharge valve .
6.     Observe whether cooling water is falling on the cooling tower or not.
7.     Ensure that distribution of cooling water in all chambers is equal, otherwise
8.     Observe whether all the cooling water pumps are sharing load or not.
9.     Once Turbine is started and loaded, cooling tower fans can be started one b

Starting Of M.O.P ( Main Oil Pump )


1.     Before starting of M.O.P check the healthy condition of  Main Oil Tank ( M.O
2.   Before starting M.O.P,  check oil level in M.O.P oil cup as well as oil level in A
3.     Ensure again suction & discharge valves of M.O.P, A.O.P & E.O.P are in open
4.     Start M.O.P .
5.     Open J.O.P suction line coming from M.O.P  & A.O.P discharge header , then
6.     Put A.O.P, J.O.P & E.O.P in auto selection mode.

Taking Oil Cooler into Line


1.     When M.O.P starts, oil circulates to the circuit through oil cooler
2.   To ensure oil is passing through the oil cooler or not, see through the view g
3.    After confirming oil is passing through the vent valve to M.O.T, close the ven
4.     Open the oil equalizing line of standby oil cooler and wait for some time to
5.   Maintain lub oil temperature in between 420C - 450C by adjusting the outlet

Taking Oil Cooler into Line


1.     When M.O.P starts, oil circulates to the circuit through oil cooler
2.   To ensure oil is passing through the oil cooler or not, see through the view g
3.     After confirming oil is passing through the vent valve to M.O.T, close the ve
4.     Open the oil equalizing line of standby oil cooler and wait for some time to
5.   Maintain lub oil temperature in between 420C - 450C by adjusting the outlet

Checking Of Lub Oil Header Pressure and Individual Bearing Pressure


1.   Check the lub. oil header pressure from field and H.M.I . It must be more tha
2.     Check the individual bearing oil pressure
                                                             i.      TG Front Journal Bearing – 1.2 Kg/cm
                                                           ii.      TG Thrust Bearing – 1.2 Kg/cm2 
                                                        iii.      TG Rear Journal Bearing – 1.2 Kg/cm2 
                                                        iv.      Gear Box – 2 Kg/cm2           
                                                           v.      Alternator Front Journal Bearing – 1 K
                                                        vi.      Alternator Rear Journal Bearing – 1 Kg
3.  Check individual  bearing's  return oil line view glass whether oil is passing th
4.   Check overhead tank oil return line view glass , ensure oil flow through retur
5.    
OnceCheckthe above healthiness
systems  of are
overhead tankgland
in service, oil level indicator
steam can be. charged at gland. C
Turbine. As the gland area of Turbine is at normal temperature during cold condi
area. To avoid this, steam is to be charged slowly and condensate produced is to
 Following steps are to be followed for gland steam charging :
1.     Charging of auxiliary PRDS (Pressure Reducing & De Superheating)
2.     Charging  of  Gland Header
3.     Charging Of Aux PRDS (Pressure Reducing And De-Superheating)
4.     Open all drain valves
5.     Open main manual isolation valve before & after PCV  (Pressure Control Val
6.     Open PCV by 5% from operation station
7.     Open PCV by 10% as soon as condensate comes out from line
8.     Close all drain valves
9.     Put the PCV in Auto mode with desired pressure set point
10.   Open manual isolation valve of  TCV ( Temperature Control Valve)
11.   Observe the temperature and then put TCV in auto mode with desired temp

Charging of Gland Header


1.     Open all drain valves of gland steam header
2.     Open gland steam header manual isolation valve
3.     Open gland steam header PCV by 5% for line heating.
4.     Open gland steam header PCV by 10% to increase gland steam header pre
5.     Close all drain valve in gland steam header
6.     Put  gland steam header PCV  in auto mode with desired pressure set point
Exhaust steam of turbine is condensed at condenser with the help of cooling wa
condenser by the help of Condensate Extraction Pump (CEP). This condensate p
condenser to gain heat of the gland steam and ejector steam respectively. So th
feeding to deaerator for further use at boiler.
This condensate is further heated at L.P. Heater  (if provided) by using LP Steam

To put the condensate system in operation, following steps are required to be fo


1.  Ensure condenser hot well level is adequate, otherwise fill the hot well with m
2. Open Suction and discharge valves of the pump. Ensure differential pressure
3.     Open condensate inlet and outlet valves of gland seal condenser, ejector c
4.     Put the re-circulation control valve in auto mode
5.     Open pump gland cooling valve and start the pump
The condensate will pass through gland seal condenser & ejector condenser.  It
recirculation control valve. Once steam starts entering into turbine, discharge co
the hot
If the well.
condensate extraction pump is to be started and if there is vacuum inside
opened to avoid any air trapped inside the pump.
Before Main steam enters into the turbine, there should be vacuum in the conde
from condenser. This is a single stage non-condensing type ejector.

      Take the following steps to build up vacuum  by starting ejector:


1.     Ensure availability of auxiliary steam at desired pressure & temperature
2.     Ensure the vacuum breaker valve of the condenser is closed.
3.   Ensure cooling water is circulating in the condenser and turbine gland is cha
4.     Open steam valve of the starting ejector
5.     Observe steam is vented to atmosphere
6.     Open ejector air valve
7.     Observe vacuum inside condenser is increasing slowly. 
8.   Main ejector is to be taken into line once turbine is loaded and starting eject

To putejector
Main main ejector
is to beinto line,
taken following
into steps
line once to beisfollowed
turbine loaded.  :Starting ejector is to
steps to be followed.
1.     Ensure Condensate Extraction Pump (CEP) is running .
2.     Ensure cooling water inlet and outlet valves of the ejector condenser are op
3. Vent out air from water box of  the ejector condenser by opening rotametre v
4.     Open ejector condensate trap before and after isolation valve
5.     Fill up the “U” tube by water locally
6.     Open flash box stand pipe isolation valve
7.     Close all drain valves of ejector
8.     Open the main isolation valve of the ejector steam line
9.  Slowly open the air line valve of the ejector and observe vacuum is increasin
When vacuum is
Once Auxiliary stable, are
systems theninthe slowly ejector
operation and fullcan be stopped
vacuum by closing
is obtained inside,air va
cond
started in two different conditions.
1.     Cold Start-Up
2.    
In coldHot Start-Up
startup turbine is started from cold condition. In this case, special care is
thermal expansion. As both rotor and casing are in cold condition it requires tim
rotor are in hot condition. So it can be started within a short period.

Startup Curve
To allow proper thermal explanation of casing and rotor, the turbine manufactur
Ø steam should not enter immediately to turbine as it may damage the turbine
Ø Manufacturers suggest soaking time for low idle speed and high idle speed for
means
Soakingtotime
holdisthe turbinefor
different atcold
the particular
startup andspeed for a particular
hot startup.  time, then
Manufacturer’s allo
advice
up curve in cold startup and hot start up conditions.

Turbine
To start Rolling Preparation..contd
rolling of turbine, some steps are followed depending upon mode of star
(Hydraulic or Electro Hydraulic)

Before rolling of turbine check, ensure the following points :


1.     Lube oil level and control oil pressure are normal
2.     Lube oil temperature is between 42 to 450C
3.     Ensure gland sealing system is in operation and gland sealing pressure is n
4.     Ensure starting ejector is in the line and condenser pressure is -0.9 kg/cm2
5.     Ensure cooling water is circulating in condenser and auxiliary cooling  wate
6.     Ensure the casing drain, TG inlet steam line drain, TG warm
7.     up vent and drain are in open condition
8.     Ensure Accumulator is in line
9.     Ensure over head oil tank is full and return oil flow is visible in the viewing
10.  Ensure Condensate Extraction pump (CEP) is in operation
11.   Ensure Exhaust  hood spray solenoid valve is in operating condition.
12.   
13.    Open
Ensurethe bypass removal
complete of Turbine
ofSteam stop valve
condensate from (TSSV)
TG inlet line and ensure the
drain valves. the
14.  Throttle Open Turbine
warm Steam
up vent Stop
as per Valve   (TSSV)
requirement and observe steam temperat
temperature, then prepare for TG rolling.]

TG Rolling
1.     Reset the governor from wood yard SOS
2.     Reset from HMI
3.     Engage trip lever and ensure build up of trip oil pressure at governing cons
4.     Open E.S.V. (Emergency Stop Valve) from H.M.I.
5.     Check physically the opening of ESV (Emergency Stop Valve)
6.     Give  run command from HMI
7.   Observe the rise in rpm gradually.  RPM goes up and after reaching 1000 rpm
minutes in hot start up and 30 minutes in cold startup (in case of auto rolling). 
8.     Ensure oil pressure is normal. Check vibration and any abnormal sound
9.     First stop barring  gear then stop jack oil pump (J.O.P)
10.  After
11.  Get the relay reset
completion of before 2000
the hold timerpm
at 1000 rpm, R.P.M. goes from low idle spe
otherwise
12.  increase 2500
After reaching the speed
rpm, manually
it holds for 15 minutes in case of hot startup and 3
auto rolling, hold the speed as per advice of manufacturer.
13. Close the TG casing drain, inlet steam line drain, warm up vent, warm up dra
14.Check the lube oil pressure at different bearings and check bearing temperat
15. After completion of high idle speed (2500 rpm) soaking time. R.P.M. will rise
16.Maintain lube oil pressure and temperature at different bearings as per the m
17.  Maintain TG inlet pressure and temperature as per design
18.   Give clearance to synchronize to generate power.
Turbine
In PowerAuxiliary System
Plant other than turbine, there are other associated systems. The syste
important components and systems for auxiliary systems are :
1.     Oil System
2.     Condensate System
3.     Gland sealing System
4.     Ejector and Vacuum System
5.     Cooling water System
6.     Condenser

Oil  System
Lubricating oil is supplied to the bearings and used for governing of turbine. Mai
1.     Lubricate the bearings.
2.     Cooling of bearings.
3.     Flush out metallic  debris.
4.     Control speed of the turbine. \

Principles of Lubrication
To maintain a film of lubricant between the surfaces in running condition any on
1.     Hydro dynamic lubrication
2.     Hydrostatic lubrication
3.     Elasto-hydrodynamic lubrication

If none of the above conditions exists the condition will be of :-


Boundary lubrication

Hydrodynamic Lubrication
Also called Full Flood Lubrication/Wedge film lubrication
Wedge film formation due to geometry & speed.
a.     In hydrodynamic principle fluid viscosity is not sufficient to maintain a film
to support the load until the fluid film is established, the required pressure gene
b.    
c.      The
The wedge film of
formation  lifts the journal
a thick andthat
fluid film allows
willcomplete
separate separation
two surfaces and supp
other.
By feeding oil from an external source under heavy pressure into the pocket ma
lifted
Whenand the floated
journal on fluid films.
reaches a speed sufficient to create hydrodynamic films the ex
continue to operate in hydrodynamic manner.                                   

Components of Lubricating Oil System


Main components of lubricating oil system are :
1.      Oil tank
2.      Oil pumps
3.      Oil filter
4.      Oil centrifuge
5.      Oil overhead tank
6.      Accumulators

Oil tank
The tank base is made sloped to one side, so that the sediment in oil can be col
opening drain valve. The tank has level measurement facility to give alarm for lo
level at any instant. Suitable tapings are provided to facilitate oil suction for oil p
system, connection for oil centrifuge, fill up of fresh oil etc.
One oil mist fan is provided on the tank to vent out any oil vapor and keep the t

Oil Pump oil from the oil tank to various lubrication points and controlling purpos
To pump
provided. These pumps are :
1.      Main oil pump ( M.O.P )
2.      Auxiliary oil pump ( A.O.P )
3.      Emergency oil pump ( M.O.P )

Oil Coolers
Normally two oil coolers of 100% capacity are provided to cool down entire oil su
bearings for lubrication. Governing oil is not cooled at oil cooler. This oil taken ou
one is kept as standby. Online changeover facility is provided to take the standb
while
Beforeturbine is running.
changeover, it is to be ensured that the standby cooler is filled with oil an
lock and oil
Oil cooler is supply
a shell to
and bearings may
tube type interrupt.
heat exchanger. Cooling water flows inside the
for oil cooler is obtained from main cooling water system of power plant. Regula
cooling water
To increase andsupply line.         
decrease oil temperature, cooling water flow is decreased and in
Always the cooling water outlet valve is regulated to vary flow of cooling water.
as sufficient cooling water will not available inside tub and tube may damage.
Drain point is provided at the cooler to drain out settled sediment at bottom of t

Oil
Oil Filters
coming out from cooler is passed through oil filter to remove any contaminat
removable filter cartridge. Like cooler there are two filters of 100% capacity eac
filtered up to
Differential 20-25 micron
pressure across level on these
the filter filters before
is measured whichcirculating in bearings.
indicates the choking co
indicates, filter is choked and needs cleaning.
Before changeover of oil filter when turbine is in operation, it is to be ensured th
inside. Filter cartridge of standby filter is always to be kept clean, so that at any

Oil Centrifuge..contd.
Centrifuge is a machine which separates water and solid particles from oil. This
bowl inside the separator. Due to centrifugal force, heavier particles are displace
oil is displaced towards center of the bowl, where it is collected and sent back to

Steam Ejector And Vacuum System


Vacuum is maintained by continuously evacuating non condensing gases from t
non condensing gases decrease condenser efficiency. For removing non condens
steam ejector is used. This is like a pump in which venturi effect of a converging
of steam to velocity energy to create suction effect.

WORKING PRINCIPLE
High pressure motiveOF EJECTOR
steam enters to ejector chest through nozzle and then exp
velocity. Increased velocity causes reduced pressure  which  socks vapour.Diffus
exhausted to condenser.

Operating Procedure Of Ejector System


1.     Circulate condensate through ejector condenser.
2.   Open steam of ejector. So it will create vacuum in inter ejector condenser.
3.     Open steam of ejector.
4.     Open air valve of condenser.

Condenser
Condenser is an important Auxiliary equipment of any steam turbine. Exhaust st
condensed in vacuum. By maintaining vacuum in condenser, maximum energy
increases. Condensate obtained is utilized again at boiler for steam formation.

There are different types of condenser. Some of the important types of  condens
1.      Jet type condenser
2.      Air condenser
3.      Surface condenser

Surface Condenser
This type of condenser is widely used at power plants. Cooling water is not mixe
pure and can be used in boiler. This is a shell type and tube type heat exchange
inside the shell in which cooling water flows. Condenser neck is connected to th
in-between
Steam from to facilitate
turbine flows thermal
at the expansion.
shell side of condenser and cooling water flows
are :
- Shell                            - Hot well
- Air outlet                    - Tube
- Rapture disk                - Water box  
Overhead Tank
Oil accumulator is provided on the governing or control oil line of the turbine. Th
momentary fluctuation
In the accumulator of oilgas
an inert pressure during oil
filled bladder pump change
is provided. over or sudden
Gas pressure op
inside th
pressure.
During normal operation, oil pressure of the line compress the bladder and oil is
pressure at the line drops, the bladder is expanded, due to the inside gas pressu
momentary oil pressure fluctuation.
Oil Accumulator
Oil accumulator is provided on the governing or control oil line of the turbine. Th
momentary
In fluctuation
the accumulator of oilgas
an inert pressure during oil
filled bladder pump change
is provided. over or sudden
Gas pressure op
inside th
pressure.
During normal operation, oil pressure of the line compress the bladder and oil is
pressure at the line drops, the bladder is expanded, due to the inside gas pressu
momentary oil pressure fluctuation.
Emergency Situation In  Steam  Turbine
Steam Turbine is a critical rotating equipment. High temperature and pressure s
the rotating  part is high. There is always chance of severe misshapen leading to
Incase of any system goes wrong generation of power may be interrupted for a
power plant engineer should be trained enough to face any emergency situation
1) Overspeed
come out. Failure of blade root can cause severe accident and damage to turbin
with mechanical and electrical over speed trip arrangements. Tripping limits are
110% of rated speed. These overspeed tripping limits are to be checked regular
limit and checked at suitable intervals. At any circumstance overspeed tripping
work, immediately stop the turbine by applying emergency trip push button. For
limit is 7865 rpm.
2 ) Failure Of Lubrication Oil System :
Lubrication Oil is used to lubricate and cool down bearing metal. Sometimes the
pumps, leakage in oil line or choking of oil filter. This condition may damage bea
reason, the turbine is required to be stopped as soon as possible.  Low lube oil h
trip the turbine immediately.  If lube oil header pressure becomes 1kg/cm2, oil s
resuming oil supply, if possible, turbine is to be rotated manually to find out any
3. High Vibration
blades and damage of any rotating part may create heavy vibration. Damage of
and rotating parts of the turbine are closed spaced. Due to disturbance in rotor
Rubbing creates high vibration and abnormal sound, so at any case high vibratio
the turbine should be stopped immediately and turbine internals to be inspected
logic is incorporated with turbine to trip the turbine when turbine front and rear
box front and rear journal bearing goes to 340 microns.
4) High Bearing Temperature  
High bearing temperature occurs due to inadequate oil flow in the bearing or me
temperature damages Babbitt material of the bearing. In case of high temperatu
supply to bearing is to be checked and if required bearing is to be opened for ins
provided to turbine. For different bearing 1150C is a tripping limit.
5) Failure
When  Of Barring
turbine Device
is stopped in hot condition, it is to be put on barring. In some situ
found not working. It is not recommended to keep the rotor in standstill conditio
barring arrangements provided to change the rotor position by 180◦C continuou
6) High Condenser Hot Well Level
Due to problem in condensate extraction pumps, sometimes the condensate can
becomes high. In this situation there is possibility that water level in condenser
Condenser vacuum reduces drastically in this condition. If at any case water ent
and damages the turbine. Load is to be reduced on turbine in this situation. If si
9)  High Steam Parameter 
Like low steam temperature and pressure, high steam temperature and pressure
temperature may damage turbine as the metrology of the turbine is designed fo
10) Low Condenser Vacuum
Due to vacuum in condenser the steam from turbine is easily exhausted into con
exhaust of steam of turbine. This creates back pressure inside turbine. Vacuum
ejectors, or leaking condenser air line. Standby ejector or starting ejector is to b
arrested promptly or cooling water supply to be increased. If vacuum is not impr
vacuum protection logic is provided to trip the turbine when condenser vacuum
11) Failure Of Cooling Water Systems
Due to failure of cooling water pumps or choking in cooling water circuit, cooling
turbine exhaust steam cannot be condensed. This will increase the pressure of t
condenser may rapture, heavy back pressure will be created in turbine. In this c
normalize cooling water supply. If situation does not improve then turbine is to s

Black Out maneuver Method for  WHRB Power Plant

Both the
1.    In TG
the fails and
above Grid
cases not available
( Total : (BLACK OUT
blackout condition CONDITION)
) ensure availability of  DG em
CPP within 10 seconds (i.e. Boiler main steam stop valve, Auxiliary oil  pump, Ba
discharge
2.  Ensure valve, CPPpressure
from field area lighting  
gauge & that
Jacklubrication
oil pump &continues
TG steaminstop
bothvalve ) b
the TG
TG bearings and returns to main oil tank by drain header )
3.  Ensure from HMI & field that Emergency oil pump is running  through DC pow
4.    Start the Jack oil pump of TG.
5. If emergency power is not available  within 10 seconds, then immediately con
try
6.   toAfter
resume emergency
resuming  power aspower,
of emergency quicklyclose
as possible, with stop
main steam the help of of
valve Shift In C
all the
start-up vent.
7.  In blackout condition, ensure that Kiln stack cap will remain 100% open till th
or partially closed, then contact Kiln control rooms to open the same through Sh
8. In blackout condition, all the boilers will be in hot box-up condition.
9.    Ensure emergency stop valve of TG is in closed condition
10.  Close the TG inlet motorised valve .
11.  Closeresuming 
12. After all the boilers feed pump
of emergency discharge
power, motorised
auxiliary valves.
oil pump will start in auto  mo
emergency oil pump
13. After resuming of from panelDG,
1000kva and put itstart
power in auto
onemode.
feed pump of CPP-1 and sup
up to 40% .

Difference
They are notbetween
built with BPCS
safetyand SIS and are not dedicated to the task. Becaus
in mind
have diagnostic routines searching for faults. Click here for more information on
opposite of process control systems. They are dormant, or passive. They sit ther
action. An example would be a pressure relief valve. Normally the valve is close
If the pressure never exceeds that value, the valve never operates. Many failure
valve is plugged, there is no immediate indication. A PLC could be hung up in an
would not be able to recognize the problem. There is a need for extensive diagn
systems should be incorruptible – need to be kept to a fixed set of rules and acc
highly reliable and be able to respond instantly when a hazardous situation deve

How to Reduce Common SIF/SIS Mistakes


Don Rozette
Monday, January 14, 2013 - 8:00am

A recently published study by Great Britain’s HSE broke the safety lifecycle into
Hazards Assessment/SIF Specification
SIF Design and Verification
Operation and Maintenance
 Not surprisingly the study concluded that 44% of all SIS/SIF related errors occur
the lifecycle.  The study goes further to state that many of these errors occurred
interactions of one SIF to the rest of the process.  In essence, the activation of o
caused unforeseen demands, and hazards in other areas of the process. 
systems, shouldn’t we really call them keep running systems?”  His premise was
enamored with or “sold on” the “fail-safe” design.  Not only is this not required b
activation of a SIF can in fact cause hazards elsewhere that may not have been
specification phase of the lifecycle.
tolerant” without increasing hardware count or cost.  In the example below, you
arrangement, which based strictly on voting architecture is an extremely reliable
pressure sensor and associated high pressure alarm.  In this case the SIF design
003.  By using the comparative process indication the engineer could have impl
between the SIF sensor indication and the comparative BPCS sensor indication. 
would be almost as reliable, with 1/3 less cost to install and maintain.   

Below is a list of common initiating events that should be considered during the
lifecycle.  How well we manage or reduce the probabilities associated with initia
of risk.  (e.g. plan for the best, but prepare for the worst).
Type of Initiating Event   Examples
 External Events            High Wind
Seismic Event
Flooding
Lightning
Vehicle Impact
Fire or Explosion in an adjacent area
 Equipment Failures       BPCS (basic process control system) component failure.
Utility failure.
Vessel/Piping failure due to wear, fatigue, or corrosion.
Vessel/Piping failure caused by specification, design, or manufacturing defect.
Vessel/Piping failure caused by over or under pressurization.
Vibration induced failure (e.g. rotating equipment)
Failures caused by inadequate maintenance/repair.
Failures caused by temperature extremes.
Failures resulting from flow surge or hydraulic hammer.
 Human Failures             Failure to properly execute a task, by omitting steps, or
Failure
 At this to observe
point or respondtoappropriately
it is necessary differentiate to conditions
initiating or prompts
events by the
from latent systc
or root
or latent causes. In general, root or latent causes create latent weaknesses in a
the system, these
 • “Inadequate weaknesses
operator give
training” is rise to an
not an initiating
initiating event.
event, butFor
is aexample:
potential und
type.
 • “Inadequate test and inspection” is not an initiating event, but is a potential u
failure’ type
that manages instrumentation and controls.  Ensuring that these two groups can
the two need to share the responsibility of hazards assessment and SIF specifica
common management platform.  APM’s Asset Safety work process is enabled th
TUV certified SIF design verification and periodic validation platform that encom
with requirements specification can be reduced, functional safety can be improv
application of a little common sense and a work platform that pro-actively mana

See my reply in BLUE....

I need detailed response of my below mentioned queries related to design engin

1-The difference between documents "instrument index" and "instrument I/O list
Instrument index consist of types of instrument installed in the plant whereas in
Systems...

2-The difference between "segment wiring diagrams" and "instrument terminati


instruments termination diagrams are referred in Instrument loop diagrams.... se
entire loop whereas instrument termination diagrams shows how instrument is c
BPCS it is instrument, but it depends on how GC is sending data to BPCS or how
three , four , 5 , 10 or 25 wire connection or via some industrial communication
how both instrument & BPCS are connected...

3-Is data sheets preparation regarding "PCV" and "PSV" in instruments scope of
are in maintenance then in case there is new installation of PSV or PRV or CV the
data from Process Engineering/Project Engineering and prepare a data sheet...Si
you should start with simplest Control Valve rather than jumping directly to PSV
CV/PSV/PRVs... and basics of CV sizing remains same most of the time.. but it m
Valve...

4-What is difference between "Fail close" and "Fail open" position of control valv
Both terms are used when Safe State of Valve is considered..(Please refer to Pla
valve)... Fail Close or Fail Open means in case of failure of air supply, 4-20mA or
determined safe position i.e. Close or Open respectively...
5-The difference between "RTD" and "thermocouples".Which is better for temper
Principle of operation for both is different...
RTD is relatively more accurate and exhibit linear characteristics from low to me
less accurate but exhibit linear characteristics from low to very high ranges tem
6-What is difference between "FFB (Foundation field bus) " and "conventional" p
There
7-Whyis"digital
not such thingsare
signals" as used
Conventional
for on/offProtocol... Please
operations?? andre-phrase
analogueyour quest
signals for
difference of both methodologies.
Because
A word ofyou can't use
advice... Thisitforum
other is
way
for around.... Please re-phrase
discussion/problem your
solution... question
Some wit
questio
suggest you to buy & read few instrumentation & control system books.... It wou
if you ask question too the point and if necessary give an explanation with some
Have a few more comments on a few of your questions.
concerned. But for maintenance, it depends from plant to plant since responsibi
organizations. As an example, the plant I work at, designing & sizing of all kinds
They will develop data sheets which they will then hand over to the instrument
procured, the project engineer (mechanical engineer) will have it installed in the
electrical and pneumatic connections. As for the PSV, that is completely out of In
Process Engineer
7- I agree and installation
with Sameen andpossible
that it is not maintenance falls
to have under
it the domain
other of station
way round. Dig
purposes, generally the requirement is to have infinite intermediate values betw
through use of digital signals.

Re: Difference between HAZOP and PHA

by Black Onyx » 10 Jul 2012, 16:33


Nabeel,
Process Hazard Analysis (or PHA) is a study that should be carried out for identifi
Process and provide mitigating actions (aka layers of protections) to reduce the
ALARP or As Low As Reasonably Practicable).

PHA may be carried out at following different stages of life cycle of a plant i.e.
1. Conceptual Stage PHA (when only basic technology / design is known)
2. Detailed PHA (when 70%~90% design is locked and complete details are ava
3. Pre-Startup PHA
4. Baseline PHA (after successful commissioning has been carried out)
5. Cyclic PHA (once in 5 years for HHP)
6. Decommissioning or Mothball PHA
Now PHA itself consists of two Parts
1. Consequence Analysis, which is further classified into
 a. Qualitative Consequence Analysis
 b. Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)
2. Process Hazard Review or PHR (which can be done using anyone or a combina
 a. HAZOP (Hazard & Operability) Study
 b. What-if Method Study
 c. Checklist Method
 d. FMEA (Failure Mode & Effect Analysis)
 e. FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)
In addition sometimes, various other studies are carried as part of PHR, such as,

Following few outlines could help to asses the criticality of new site.

Process safety information.


Work place & process hazard analysis, consultation and action planning.
Responsibilities & participation of personnel.
Written operating procedures for all operation phases and limitations.
Permit system.
Compliance auditing.
Employee & contractor safety information & training.
Mechanical integrity evaluation & maintenance systems.
Design, fabrication & installation.
Emergency planning, response & training.
Pre-startup safety reviews.
Management of change procedures.
Incident investigation.

Piper Alpha Incident

by
Theashfaqanwer
accident that» occurred
25 Nov 2010, 05:06
on board the offshore platform Piper Alpha in July 19
property damage.
It was caused by a massive fire, which was not the result of an unpredictable “a
questionable decisions. Most of them were rooted in the organization, its structu

Some of the causal factors of the incident include:-


1. Platform Design issues
2. Site Mgt was not authorized to shutdown the plant without prior approval from
3. Blast walls were not available
4. Temporary under-rated blind installed in place of removed PSV
5. Communication gap between both shifts as incoming shift was not knowledge
6. Emergency Response decision makers died in the first explosion & no stand-in
7. Fire pumps were on manual mode as divers were working on suction line
8. Helicopter could not land on the platform due to flame & heavy smoke
9. Inadequate firefighting equipment

My findings
1. PTW permitaretoaswork
below:-
system is not up-todate at that time. Now a days PTW ha
person issuing the permit can only withdraw a permit after unlocking the lock w
Operations.
2. The facility is designed for pumping oil only, it can not be modified for Gas ex
extraction.
3. No NRVs non return valves are placed on branch pipe lines connecting with m

Accident of ABB Generator at Jamnagar, India


STAY SAFE!!! TRAINING, TRAINING, AND MORE TRAINING!!!!!!!

Accident of ABB Generator (130.5MW) at Jamnagar, Reliance Industries Ltd,


India
Please find an accident of ABB Generator (130.5MW).It is good lesson to be learn
procedures are not followed. Self isolation may lead to disaster.
Please findreason
The main belowfor
an this
incident which
incident has lead to
is "CLOSING OFthe complete
CONTROL damage
OIL RETURNof LINE
SteamMA
WORK AND NOT
The generator OPENED
Exciter endAFTER COMPLETION
and Turbine OF was
end Shaft THEfound
WORK".
sheared off and sha
all high pressure/temperature steam hot liquid poured into all the cables and au
war Zone.
Findings:
In the control oil (Hydraulic skid) 4 fluid coolers isolation valves (in return line) in
investigation, it is understood that the mech. main. took permit to replace hydra
maintenance had done their self isolation on the 4 fluid coolers isolation valves
reopening/normalization (as required) they had cleared the Permit.
function.  Due to pressure build-up in the return line the connector on drain line
trip request (until the rupture of the piping connection that acted as drain).Due
(in return line) the problem was experienced even during the startup before acc
speedup (loss of control and fast speed up) this resulted in servo valve drain por
correct closure & movement of the control valves.
As per inspection, and also after examination of event recorder log indicated all
the cause
system, ofan
i.e. theimproper
accidentstatus
is located onabove
of the the hydraulic part of
said isolation the control
valves, left without no
of stop and control valves upon trip request has generated a turbine/generator o
the speed value accurately as speed reached beyond sensing scale, but surely a

Safety Incident Circular of a Pressure Vessel Hydrotest Failure in Chine in early 2


of serious equipment/material failures with equipment being sourced out of the
and others. These examples are becoming almost a weekly occurrence now and
manufacturing economies since the 1930's. Again we need to ensure vigilance i
the need to know where the base materials are sourced from. Apparently this pr
test pressure when the shell ruptured. A metallurgical failure report is not availa
observations could be made regarding the quality of the material and the weldin
Lessons & Learnings:
(1) All base metal requirements shall be specified in P.O Requisition per project/I
(2) Consult specialists (i.e., Materials and Corrosion Engineers) whenever you do
(3) All inspection (from base materials to final products) should be performed pe
(4) Especially when you selected the manufacturers in China, the above (1), (2)
octane, let me put some light on PHA methodologies, which are;
Qualitative Hazard / Risk Assessment
Job Safety Analysis (JSA)
Logic diagrams
What-if/Checklist
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
Quantitative Hazard / Risk Assessment
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
In-process energy modeling
Event probabilities
Risk/cost trade-off
Every method has its own limitations including pros n cons. For example FMEA m
with in any logic or control loops. And HAZOP technique is used for huge and co
Whereas What-if / Checklist is a very detailed and usually recommended of simp

SIL
The concept of safety integrity levels (SILs) was introduced during the developm
quality or dependability of a system which has a safety function – a measure of
perform that function.
Following are 2 popular methods of determining SIL requirements to process ind
– risk graph methods
- layer of protection analysis (LOPA
But all these methods requires a lot of data, assumptions & calculations.
Is there any
Actually keytoavaiable
I need determineto determine
SIL prior toSIL requirement
design for any
a protection specific
system for process
an amm
ammonia in it. Should it be SIL-1 or 2 or 3?
ANSI S84.04 requires that companies assign a target SIL for all Safety Instrment
team may determine that certain critical systems require that a SIL be assigned
that is necessary to mitigate the risk associated with the process to an acceptab
choices must then be verified against the target SIL.
commonly used methodology. If the risk is unacceptable then it is reduced or eli
only after all the non-SIS protection layers have been considered. HAZOP’s ident
hazards. Target SILs are assigned to SIF’s of the SIS identified in the PHA studies
target SILs. As in the case with PHA studies, the assignment of Target SILs must
experience. Methodologies used for determining SILs include, but are not limited
•Consequence only
•Risk Graph
•Layered Risk Matrix
•Risk matrix
•Layer of protection
•Fault tree
selection ofanalysis
SIL 2 or SIL 3 forces the SIS design toward device redundancy and d
the approach that "a safety system is a safety system and therefore should be S
escape is possible, someone will be injured or killed or the impact will be on-site
documentation in justifying the SIL choice, and ensures consistency across proce
comes to assigning SILs. The choice involves examining safety, community, env
must be developed at the corporate level to ensure that the choice of SIL is cons
and that the assignment method is congruent with the existing characteristics o
can however be used as a conservative guide,
SIL 4 --- For hazards that can lead to Catastrophic Community Impact
SIL 3 --- For hazards that can lead to Employee and Community Impact
SIL 2 --- For hazards that can lead to Major Property and Production Protection. P
SIL 1 --- For hazards that can lead to Minor Property and Production Protection

Difference between MAT and MDMT


Usually, MDMT is designated based on the transition temperature below which t
Ideally both MAT and MDMT should be same. However, if you take the vessel be
take any impact and will fail in brittle mode, without any elongation. It can be sa
vessel will not be able to withstand any impact or energy absorbance in case of
At a specific pressure, I understand there should be a minimum allowable tempe
pressure, I understand that we can set a minimum allowable temperature even
Yes, for that case you can have a lower temperature range. But bear in mind MD
pressure. If you talk about pressure only, even at design pressure, you can have
loading case which may occur, no matter how low operating pressure you are us
energy and fail suddenly.

Hydrotest after welding


A contractor has manufactured some columns for us ( design is based on ASME
shell. Now contractor wants to relocate some of these supports and weld them a
As per AI ( Authorized Inspector) hydro test is not required after welding. Only R
want to know is it same as AI is saying? or hydro test is required? I s there some
API 510 gives complete authority to AI in deciding the need of a hydrostatic test
Ask him
These for an appropriate
columns NDE tosobeAPI
are not in service done
510on
is the
not new weld and
applicable. the are
These older surfa
fabricat
but it came to know that there were some supports welding issues
necessity. Perform MPT if it is carbon steel or PT if stainless. That would suffice t
would have been a major repair involving a butt (or groove) weld, I would have r
client, if you still want to go for hydro after this repair, please ask AI to go for th
of raising the concern.

Pipeline hydrotesting
one section of corroded piping are composite wrapped at corroded location to w
the pipeline. My question is for calculating hydrotest pressure whether only rem
without composite wrapping or both will be considered. Any reference standard
test pressure recommended by the construction code. What's the code in this ca
piping sections just because of one composite repair. I would have only accepte
design pressure if following ASME B31.3 as construction code.

Re: IS Isolators
Let me & Functional
explain this Safety??
by example. A device is Intrinsically safe if it does not carry e
circuit or over-current condition exists causing ignition conditions at the device.
which lie outside
The purpose of anofIntrinsically
the Classified (Zone0
Safe /Div1)(or
instrument area in using
loop a control cabinet,
an IS and
isolator) is fu
q
used to limit chances of an explosion as stated in Wasif's explanation. However,
the operating equipment in case of a parameter/process upset, often by initiatin
chances of explosion and not to improve or alter the availability of the system. A
again there will be no impact on the availability of the system), but you may run
which might itself cause an explosion. In that case, I'd say Yes, you are affecting
make the overall system more safe, but it does not affect the availability provide
other components in the SIS system. Of course, SIL rating of the isolator will also
and responded accordingly.
Dear Ali, IS Isolators are part of the SIS loops.. we agree on that.. Since SIL Calcu
level.. Therefore, availability figures of IS Isolators & all possible scenarios of fail
concept that IS Isolators are used to reduce probability of explosion in the hazar
availability of system..In functional safety there are two things which are greatly
1) Safety when all components are integrated together & Safety at component l
2) Availability of smallest items can affect the availability of the whole system (s
In simple words, failure of IS Isolators will result in failure of loop functionality.. w
""High Availability does not always ensure Safety""A safe device is made with in
A available device is made with intention to maximize availability... My query wa
Isolator failures & what kind of IS Isolator failures we should look in to when des

RBV or MOV?
RBV is a Remote Block Valve. Its basically an isolation valve or ESD valve.Questi
operated valves
your process or motor operated
requirements. valves for purposes
Most significantly, of isolation
the closure of a natural
time. Especially with lg
closure, but you don't need slam-shut, otherwise a surge can occur. Then, since
consider the supply of power to the MOV - check with your electrical disciplines
require. Additionally, you will need a 415V UPS, since MOVs on emergency servi
regular power supply will not do. So you can compare the cost of installing a 415
areas against the option of pneumatic valves. The point is, you can use a suitab
are more reliable. And in most cases, pneumatic valves will also prove to be mo
background study on all the requirements of both cases, you'll get a clearer pict
Thanks Absar. The central idea im taking here is that there is nothing against sta
pneumatic valves.Because
Electro-hydraulic. It basically
youcomes down tonot
will definitely technical and
be using economic feasibility.
conventional electrica
yeah, there is nothing in the standards against using EH valves, because SIL-3 c
application of those is rarely every feasible, so a background study is a must he

PLC - Architecture Vs Safety


Hi Guys,Does a QMR architecture is much more safer than a TMR or DMR?? Is th
cost of higher capital cost. So yes QMR is much more reliable than TMR and DMR
particular environment for a specific mission time. Reliability is a statistical prob
is to increase the odds of success as much as you can within reason. So we can
of the control system, more safer you equipment will be.
important thing that you always want is that it should fail in predetermined safe
availability of the system & in terms reliability of the system.. but in the mean ti
figure out all the possible failure scenarios and measures are taken so that if sys
the system complexity, the big Question comes.. Have we covered all possibilitie
justification... so system can be reliable and more available but I doubt that it be
still stands that Does QMR architecture is more "SAFER" than TMR or DMR?
Sameen,
This answer to this question is not very simple. However, if I were to place the re
order would be,
2004 / 1oo3 --> 2oo3 / 1oo2D --> 2oo2

Control Systems have 2 important parameters that a consumer might be interes


1- the system does not fail, i.e. high availability or fault tolerance,
2- the system must fail in a safe manner, i.e. high safety level.
You are absolutely correct in saying that as availability increases, safety level is
For instance, 1oo1 voting is the simplest to install. It can be programmed to be f
scheme is that the production losses will be higher due to false trips, and theref
1oo1D voting is an improvement over 1oo1 voting, the architecture improves fa
failures by de-energizing the output.

tolerant than the 1oo1 configuration but safety level will be compromised since
out service (for instance during maintenance) and in that case, even if the other
configuration is also referred to as a 2-1-0 scheme. It is estimated to be three tim
half as safe as a simplex (single channel) configuration. This is because both cha
trip, and both must operate for the system to achieve the safe state, and herein

1oo1 scehem. In the 1oo2D configuration the convention used will be that only o
case of a single failure, its diagnostic contact will open the output channel and r
continues to be performed by the remaining channel. The system can then be sa
normally the scheme operates with a 2-1-0 configuration but reverts to 2-0 sche
However, such a scheme depends greatly on the system's internal diagnostics.
other for faults. The internal diagnostics are designed such that at least one of t
operation.  In addition what also determines how safe/available a system is the
QMR scheme is at least compatible with the TMR scheme since both have the sa
Another aspect is comparison of PFD(avg) expressions for each system. Referrin
that the Quad (2oo4) architecture is comparable to the ultra safe 1oo3 architect
By comparison, TMR (2oo3) is comparable to the 1oo2D architecture in that both
This comparison concludes that the QMR (2oo4) architecture provides an order o
(2oo3) or 1oo2D architecture, and is a major technological enhancement in safe
architectures.
1oo2: PFD avg. = (λ^DU)^2 x (TI/3)^2 + . . .
1oo3: PFD avg. = (λ^DU)^3 x (TI/4)^3 + . . .
2oo3: PFD avg = (λ^DU)^2 x (TI)^2 + . . .
2oo4: PFD avg = (λ^DU)^3 x (TI)^3 + . . .
This
Just aisthought
the reason why
- first, I listed
the level the schemes in does
of redundancy the order that Iadid
not imply in the
safer start Eve
system. of m
system (as proven by many FMEDA reports that can be viewed from websites of
for the particular SIL level, the level of redundancy of the system, in my opinion

What
part ofis the
the link...
overall "Inherent
safety Safetyon
that depends & the
Functional Safety of safety-related s
correct function
out their intended functions (safety functions) under defined error conditions an
process on the other hand, has a low level of danger even if things go wrong. In
one that avoids hazards instead of controlling them, particularly by reducing the
hazardous operations in the plant.In simpler words, inherent safety implies that
of a failure, the level of danger will be low and therefore would not result in serio
the other hand is a concept applied to a safety system in place reduce or mitiga
process from going wrong in the first place.
even if things go wrong. It is used in contrast to safe systems where a high degr
not be confused with intrinsic safety which is a particular technology for electric
perfect safety cannot be achieved, common practice is to talk about inherently s
avoids hazards instead of controlling them, particularly by reducing the amount
operations in the plant.”

Functional Safety is the part of the overall safety of a system or piece of equipm
correctly in response to its inputs, including the safe management of likely oper

Line monitoring & SIL 3 applications??


Hi Guys,you
I think, Is line
get monitoring mandatory
confused with requirement
LOPA and for SILnetwork
SIL. Line (piping 3 Applications?
or pipeline) mo
Analysis) and as far my knowledge it has no relation with Safety Integrity Level(
systems, where as inspection plans for pipelines, PSVs and other mechanical pro
logic in PLC to diagnose open or short circuiting to let operator know thru an ala
Maintenance of associated SIS, for proper functioning is a mandate for that spec
demand due to lack of maintenance, safety integrity level decreased due to ass
requirement for all SILs. Mostly independent on-skid type PLCs force shutdown t
experienced such configuration in SOLAR gas-turbine driven compressors).
monitoring in actual improves PFD of the system.. thus it is mandatory for SIL 3
important, fault detection, fault Isolation & fault identification... mostly a simple
detection but in redundant safety system architectures fault isolation & fault ide
system..Major requirements for SIL 3 Loop is redundancy and line monitoring of
question arises that will it make the loop to fail in safe manner... the answer is N
loop, redundancy is must requirement, in case if there is STUCK ON or OFF the lo
be isolated for maintenance...There were days when relay based systems were u
using any line monitoring.. , that is why they used to have many spurious trips a
Excellent knowledge sharing, I must say. So we concluded that line monitoring is
alarm operator about faults in line, rather than just tripping the machine upon lo
element as far as SIL implementation is concerned. The next direct question tha
generally employed. Ive come across accounts where the use of an End-of-Line
vague to me as to how is the technique generally useful. Can one of you guys th
you can share some literature or link regarding the same.

4 Rules For Designing Safety into Control Systems


 Nov 13, 2012 3:47:49 AM | Posted by Brad Ems

in
Share

When you see a talk about safety, your first expectation is probably something o
are typical fodder for safety “toolbox talks.” What I’d like to discuss in this post,
into your process control system.
First off, a disclaimer: I am an engineer, although not (yet) a PE and I have no ce
years of experience in working around heavy equipment, much of it quite dange
properly managed. In that time, a picture of what process safety is and how to a
proper implementation of a safe process system, safety concepts must be desig
design is complete and drawings are available, a deep review of them begins. T
process hazard analysis (PHA). This analysis looks at the hazards of the process,
occurrence. From this, a hazard mitigation plan is developed. There are several
developed to quantify these risks. Be sure to choose one applicable to your proc
The first line of defense in any process is the basic process control system (BPCS
process parameters within safe limits, and to alarm and/or take action when tho
certainly have shown that there are some risks in your system that have sufficie
mitigation that is more reliable than a standard BPCS can provide.
That is where the safety system comes in. A properly-designed safety system w
include operator-initiated devices like E-stop buttons), and through logical analy
condition be detected, the safety system will then shut down the process in a pr
from the process and put it into a safe condition. Note that process design here
actuators must be designed to fail both electrically and mechanically in a safe c

4 basic rules for the safety system include:

1. It is usually separate from the BPCS. There are safety controllers that integrat
are still distinct. More common are systems that have completely separate hard
2. Redundancy is almost always a requirement. In all but the most benign and ri
degree of reliability. To achieve this, redundant circuits, devices, and even contro
from allowing the safety function to fail when called upon.
3. The safety system is self-monitoring. Safety output devices (relays, valves, VF
ensure that they do indeed move to a safe state when called upon to do so. Sho
bring the process to a safe shutdown state, and the safety system must then pre
component is repaired or replaced. In addition, most safety systems have the ab
reliable operation,
4. Devices though
in the safety they may
system mustrequire special
be rated wiring
for safety and/or
duty. programming
Devices such as c
so on, are available for duty in safety systems. Be sure to confirm that the devic
specialized materials and designed for high reliability.
Process safety has become a more critical focus of industry in the past twenty y
services intended to achieve a high degree of reliability in shutdown systems. A
plummeted and it is no longer a difficult or expensive task to find vendors and s
priority, in my mind, that engineers take the time to understand how safety syst
employers’ and clients’ property, surrounding communities, environment, emplo

Safe Failure Fraction (SFF)


cases, would be a “safe” failure. SFF is (the sum of the rate of “safe” failures plu
sum of the rate of “safe” failures plus the rate of detected and undetected dang
types of failures to be considered are those which could have some affect on the
such as E-stop buttons and interlock switches will (on their own) have a relative
designed in redundancy and monitoring therefore an SFF of greater than 90% is
Diagnostic Coverage capability.

Use Elegant Design to Bolster Inherent Safety


Embrace a variety of strategies that can eliminate hazards from operation
Trevor Kletz was able to simplify the concept of inherent safety in such a way th
can’t leak” is so clear and powerful that it has grabbed the attention of all stake
members and regulators, who have an interest in safer processing facilities of al
no harm comes from the operation of process facilities that manufacture the ma
the concept of inherent safety goes beyond simply not having materials that po
that make up manufacturing facilities. We must understand all the ways those m
the environment and our facilities. Without a thorough understanding of those s
evaluate the risks posed by different technological approaches and effectively a

Sulfonic Acid Plant


Figure 1. Traditional design includes a compressor and knockout drum.
For example, the lower annual corrosion rate of a stainless alloy compared to ca
However, chloride exposure may cause stress corrosion cracking in the alloy; th
component failure occurs. So, in fact, the inherently safer option may be to use
replacement program that manages the hazard of corrosion effectively.
Fundamental Strategies
Kletz in his groundbreaking 1984 paper [1] described four basic strategies for ac
• intensification;
• substitution;
• attenuation; and
• limitation of effects.
In its 2007 book, “Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach” [
those terms into simpler ones readily understood by a wider audience than just
• substitute — replace a material with a less hazardous one;

• minimize
moderate— —reduce
use lessthe quantities
hazardous of hazardous
conditions, substances;
a less hazardous form of a materia
hazardous
• simplify —material
design or energy;
facilities andeliminate unnecessary complexity and make o
that
that occur.
Let’s consider their application to the use of a chlorine cylinder:
• substitute — change from chlorine to a bromine tablet;
• minimize — keep only one cylinder on the site;
• moderate — connect a vacuum inductor to the cylinder; and
• simplify
process — adopt a equipment,
technology, distinct design withorunique
design layoutconnections
that makes for chlorine hoses.
higher-potential-co
take advantage of a number of Kletz’s strategies — and may even go beyond th
elimination.

Safer Set-Up
Figure 2. Modified design requires less inventory of SO2 and eliminates equipme
Simply put, the concept of inherently safer design is: “What can’t happen can’t
Any number of design features can contribute to preventing something from hap
can provide absolute certainty against an occurrence. Minimization, moderation
certainty. Instructions and procedures can help but offer the least degree of cert
facility.
Every strategy doesn’t have to result in the complete elimination of the hazard o
assembly impossible (or at least very difficult) or design to accommodate the er
Where doable at a reasonable cost, this may be an attractive strategy because i
cylinder example, mistake proofing might include using unique connections for t
containment) to correct the error before an undesirable outcome occurs, or, if n
the chlorine cylinder, a mistake tolerant strategy might involve isolating chlorine
system.
Putting
To The Strategies
illustrate To Use
the application of inherent safety strategies, let’s look at several rea
chloride (AlCl3) handling, a utility station and an electrical switchgear.
Sulfonic acid plant design. Reacting sulfur trioxide (SO3) dissolved in sulfur diox
This is an exothermic reaction that boils off SO2 as its primary means of heat re
allow intimate contacting between alkylate and SO3, which otherwise would onl
flammable. The SO2 and SO3 are both inhalation toxics.

The heat of reaction boils the SO2 and SO3 from the reactor. In the traditional pl
vapor and allow the return of SO3 and any knocked-out liquid to the reactor. A c
liquefied SO2 for recycling to the reactor.
Following inherently safer design principles, the process was modified to elimina
standard pumps with seal-less ones (Figure 2). This very significantly reduced th
removed two pieces of rotating equipment, each of which had the potential to le
refrigerant is used, the bulk of the SO2 now is at a temperature not far from its b
a
Theleak. However, these
minimization process safety
and moderation improvements
strategies enhancedwere achieved
process by—using
safety an
but opp
inherently safe: exchanger as knockout pot and provide for gravity drain of coo
• Use the cooling
requires relocation of the SO3 injection point.)
• Find a safer solvent than SO2.
Figure 4. In the
In addition, evenevent of drain-line
greater plugging,
inherent safety maywater will overflow
be possible at the the
by avoiding air break
proces
alternatives that are made via inherently safer processes.

skin results in burns. Low-pressure nitrogen is used to unload AlCl3 from delivery
from which it is conveyed into the reactor. The AlCl3 is a very fine powder, some
nitrogen is returned to a silo that can contain as much as 80,000 lb of AlCl3. It th
to the silo. What passes through the filter is scrubbed from the nitrogen in a pac
as the nitrogen rises and is released from an elevated vent stack. The slightly ac
wastewater sewer.
This is a fairly simple process — but what happens if the p-trap plugs? Water wil
towards the silo. Because the top of the vent from the scrubber is considerably h
eventually will reach the silo, resulting in a highly exothermic reaction and gene
The normal way to address this issue would have been to install level sensors in
scrubbing water. An elegant and inherently safer design was to provide an air br
top of the funnel is at an elevation considerably lower than that of the filter — th
the top of the funnel. Little-to-no pressure head was required to get the water th
This modification
It’s difficult to putwas
this far less costly
inherent safetythan installing
strategy into the
anysafety
of the critical devices
four basic ones.firs
It
the scenario of water backing into the silo non-credible.
Aluminum chloride handling, part 2. Figure 5 shows the situation that existed at
AlCl3 passes at a controlled rate through a rotary feeder into the reactor. The Al
feeder and the reactor. An operator’s natural inclination is to blow the plug free
close by. Fortunately, there’s never enough catalyst in the standpipe to cause a
What can go wrong in this situation? If the valve between the bleeder where the
the nitrogen overpressures the day pot, blowing the rupture disk and sending fin

To make the situation more mistake tolerant, the nitrogen source within a hose l
well below the set pressure of the rupture disc on the AlCl3 day pot. To prevent a
that regulated nitrogen, a safety valve that relieves to an elevated location limit
This didn’t prevent one ambitious operator from stringing two nitrogen hoses to
working unsuccessfully for several hours to remove a clogged drop line using th
Utility station. The use of a hose connected to a utility station is one of the most
facilities. Figure 6 depicts a typical set-up for a utility station near the point of us
What could go wrong here? How could this set-up be improved?
coded in a fashion that allowed even those suffering from color blindness to dist
darkness. The distinct connector and color of each hose made mismatching, and
process very unlikely. In addition, the arrangement of the utility station was mod
one more barrier to mistakenly using nitrogen to drive a tool in a confined space

Utility
Figure Station
6. Use of similar types of connections makes it easy to connect a hose to
color-coding makes for
It remains possible hookup
somemistakes
ambitious unlikely.
soul to prepare a crossover connection b
must carefully control these utility station fittings.
This is an switchgear.
Electrical application of the mistake
Figure 7 depictsproofing form of
an electrical inherentlyinsafer
switchgear design.
2,300-V service
lockout pointthe
Where does forlock
isolating
go toaensure
large pump
that thewhen it needs can’t
equipment service.
be re-energized whil
placed in plain view on the handle that opens the cabinet door. However, the loc
disconnect switch that can be pulled out when the switch is in the off position.
You could try training your personnel on the proper location for the lock. You cou
goes. Then you could realize operators will hang the lock in the wrong location b
location — and put another sign on the wrong location that says: “Lockout lock d
becomes just background noise.
We tried all these things before happening upon a solution that worked — cuttin
An operator knows a lock must be placed on the switchgear. Now, if the operato
think about it and either come up with the right — and only — solution or ask. T
Is this inherently safer switchgear? Yes.
Does it fall into one of the four basic inherent safety strategies? Not really, altho
The Key To Success
Application of inherent safety principles is just one aspect of making safety seco
equally effective as the basic four and may be economically feasible when none
mandating the use of inherent safety is like placing signs throughout the workpl
have translated the mindset into practical application.
You achieve expertise in the practical application of inherent safety principles th
application of inherently safer solutions. This experience is what makes a safety
earn a living. You train your brain to spot applications for solutions you’ve seen
solve new problems. The end result is a mindset that makes safety second natu
http://managementstudyguide.com/planning_advantages.htm

Prevention through design: adopting inherently safer approaches

15-Aug-14
Graeme Ellis, principal safety consultant at ABB Consulting, has been responsibl
guidance on behalf of the Energy Institute. Here, he outlines the benefits this m
as presented at the unveiling of the new guidance at Hazards 24, IChemE’s lead
Edinburgh in May 2014.

Stock image
Process safety accidents normally involve the failure of several protective barrie
assure performance. But what about the alternative? The ‘inherently safe appro
consequences through initial design rather than relying on ‘bolt-on’ protection th
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) defines this ‘inherently safe’ approach to
eliminate hazards, or reduce their magnitude, severity, or likelihood of occurren
layout.”
 Whilst there are good examples of inherently safe designs in a range of industri
lack of design methods to ensure opportunities are systematically identified and
amongst project leaders in the upstream and downstream energy industry, awa
safety features.
unnecessary risks in design safety cases for the UK offshore oil and gas sector. 
guidance up-to-date to meet new regulations and be more widely applied throug
has been broadened to large and small organisations covering offshore producti
and power generation stations.
 The guidance proposes that companies should develop procedures to ensure th
reviewed throughout the design lifecycle. This should mean that all opportunitie
assessed.
 It is recognised that implementing improvements will in practice be subject to c
should consider total project and lifecycle costs, as inherent safety options may
reducing the overall capital and operating expenditure.

Traditional approach versus inherently safer approach


 If we take an example of a common hazard we can compare and contrast the tr
alternative inherently safer approach that could be adopted. A common hazard
of temperature control.
isolating the heating system and a pressure relief system designed for the maxi
features will require additional costs as well as maintenance costs which need to
key is elimination - this means a vessel with its design pressure above the maxim
savings in providing and maintaining the add-on systems.

 For major projects in the energy industry, an inherent safety workshop at the co
(Hazard Identification) studies required during the subsequent front-end enginee

 The concept stage workshop should ensure that:


 •  project objectives and processes are fully understood;
 •  project impact on existing facilities are fully considered;
 •  learnings are taken from relavant process safety incidents;
 •  the introduction of news hazardous substances are taken into consideration;
 •  new process technologies and conditions are taken into consideration;
 •  new updates to regulatory process safety documentation are reviewed and a
 •  Increased hazards to people, transportation methods and external hazards su
 •  suitable Design Guidelines, Codes of Practice, and Standards are factored int
 •  existing emergency facilities are adequate to meet increased demands.
 An inherent safety workshop will not be appropriate for all projects particularly
the workshop team identifies potential hazardous events based on a process blo
identify improvement options, following the inherent safety principles hierarchy:
segregation and simplification.
Principle           Meaning
 Elimination        Avoid the hazard completely
 Substitution      Reduce the hazard severity by changing nature of hazard
 Minimisation      Reduce the hazard severity by changing scale of hazard
 Moderation        Reduce the hazard severity by minimising the impact of a relea
 Segregation      Limitation of effects reducing potential for hazard to cause harm
 Simplification     Reduce the hazard likelihood by inherent features of the design

Figure 1: A Table outlining the principles of inherent safety


 For every process option there should be a process block diagram, which should
example a new offshore production may well include options for subsea facilities
platform. Each block should represent a process system, e.g. storage, heating, s
should show basic process parameters such as pressure, temperature and fluid
 The inherent safety workshop team firstly ‘brainstorms’ potential hazardous eve
experience. The inherent safety principles will then be applied to assess process
the hazard, rather than reducing the likelihood by providing ‘bolt-on’ risk reduct

Cost-benefit analysis
 Following the inherent safety workshop several design options may need to be
route. Some form of cost-benefit analysis will often be required to choose betwe
judgement by an experienced study team should be sufficient.
 It is at this point that a HAZID study at the subsequent FEED stage further iden
further measures are required to reduce risks to a tolerable level. HAZID study t
reduction measures to reduce the event likelihood, rather than first looking for i
procedures for HAZID studies are reviewed, to ensure that the team is encourag

The focus for improvement is elimination


 Throughout the energy industry there is an acceptance of the importance of inh
structured reviews during the design stage of projects has not gained general ac
as HAZID and Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. The main difference is th
reduction of hazards rather than provision of ‘add on’ risk reduction measures.
applying inherent safety in design are not being systematically assessed. This is
lack of tools to be applied during normal projects to encourage inherent safety t
opportunity to apply inherent safety in design for established technology, partic
under license.
 Inherent safety in design can however be applied to all stages of the design life
benefits will be obtained during the early concept stage.
Legislative drivers
Offshore Safety directive 2013 related to offshore oil and gas operations require
operations and systems, from an initial concept to the submitted design or selec
used, and the design concepts included in the process”, and later requires the C
described in the design notification have taken account of risk management so
are incorporated.”

  Failure to comply with requirements such as those stated in the EU Safety Offs
‘Seveso III’ Directive, could result in significant delays and costs at later stages o
 On the other hand there is the US OSHA PSM standard, a standard which requir
Process Hazard Analysis to identify and assess hazards, but has no specific requ
an increasing awareness of the importance of ISD in the US, and some States ar
new process designs.
been made on the choice of equipment. At this early stage, the design only app
achieving substantial reduction in risks, and potentially reducing the overall lifec
increasingly fixed, it becomes more difficult and costly to make changes and the
overall process become limited.
 The new ISD guidance (Energy Institute, 2014) outlines how the effective applic
following benefits:
 •  unlike traditional approaches to process safety that require expensive 'add-o
provides
 • an opportunity
 the principle to identify
of 'minimisation' improvements
challenges large that can reduce
inventories overall capita
of dangerous subs
cost and weight, particularly beneficial for offshore platforms;
 •  eliminating or reducing hazards early in the design will avoid potential delays
 •  reduction in process equipment and 'add-on' safety systems reducing the tim
 •  less reliance on 'add-on' safety systems decreases maintenance, repair and i
 • 
 In reducing
many casesthethe
number of hazardous
benefits activities
of an inherent safetyand hence number
improvement of personnel
option will be cle
between options that need detailed assessment to resolve. There may also be c
such as cost implications, operational flexibility, personal preferences, available
Conclusions
 Inherent safety is not a new topic but the process industry has often failed to m
approach and reap the benefits including reduced lifecycle costs. Whilst internat
safety and can perpetuate risk reduction using ‘bolt-on’ safety systems, global r
safety improvement options have been effectively assessed using structured tec
 The main additional requirement for design teams is to carry out structured inh
the greatest opportunity exists to benefit from applying inherent safety. The inh
latter stages of design, but should nevertheless be actively encouraged during H
traditional ‘bolt-on’ safety systems.
 The most inherently safe process will not always be the most attractive econom
teams should be aware that technology continues to evolve, and inherent safety
project should be retained for consideration on future projects. The design stage
process facilities that pose the potential for significant harm to both people and

Legislating for Inherent safety in the US: Reflections on the ongoing debate
10-Feb-14
Kehinde Shaba
 0

There has been a recent public exchange of views between the head of the US C
Dooley (head of the American Chemical Council, an industry trade association).
argued (in a New York Times Op-Ed piece) that enshrining Inherently Safer Desig
significant reduction in safety incidents, with several recent large incidents cited
Is Inherent Safety legislatable?
Whether or not implementing inherent safety into law will improve achieve safe
evidence on application of similar principles (As Low as Reasonably Practical [AL
Precautionary Principle, Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Cost [
well known that European countries—especially the northern European ones—ha
It is worth noting that these concepts generally tend to be qualified when used i
versus other competing considerations such as risk, benefit and cost. It goes wit
action should always be weighed against the cost required to achieve it. Additio
public policy.
The success of such initiatives goes beyond codifying requirements in law. There
place not least a highly competent regulator and most importantly “buy in” by a
instructive and definitive – it is difficult to achieve commitment without involvem
The case
Dooley against…
writes1 that “Inherently safer approaches are already considered by com
principles, surely implementing them in legislation shouldn’t be an issue? It seem
reaction to an activity already engaged in by industry.
impractical and would create a regulatory requirement that has been recognised
as ‘monumentally difficult’ ”. This is a point worthy of note. Philosophies such as
implemented in performance based regulatory regimes where emphasis is place
the outcome. US legislation is for the most part, largely prescriptive (i.e. very pa
ISD
It is would
fair to work in that
say this environment
initiative would
can present be monumentally
significant difficult.
challenges, but the Europea
question here is whether the concerned stakeholders are willing to come togeth
otherwise—that will help improve the current safety standards, which it is fair to
Statement from CSB Chairperson Rafael Moure-Eraso on the Passing of Noted Ch
Click here to see CSB video excerpts from Dr. Trevor Kletz

safety, Dr. Trevor Kletz.  Starting as a research chemist in the United Kingdom, D
in chemical process safety, safety culture, and as an advocate – indeed the fath
processes.  One of his seminal papers was entitled, “What You Don’t Have Can’t
refocused the emphasis from individual lapses to systems failures and safer des
safety management thinking.
professor of the Texas A&M University and Visiting Professor of Chemical Engine
particularly attached to the work of Dr. Kletz as his commentary – excerpted from
our 2008 CSB safety video, “Anatomy of a Disaster,” which tells the story of the
workers and injured 180 others.
 In the video, Dr. Kletz says, “There's an old saying that if you think safety is exp
And, not only in damage to plant and in claims for injury, but also in the loss of t
the company’s reporting and learning culture: “Well, after an accident, manager
happening,’ as the case may be, ‘if I'd known it, I'd have stopped it.’  Now this is
is going on.  And, he can do that by going round and by keeping his eyes open a
 These are typical of the ways in which this wonderful man, so committed to pre
such plain and effective language. Consider this typically pointed comment – als
prevention should be about looking for root causes, and not individual blame:  “
were due to human error and this is true in a sense but it's not very helpful.  It's
 The titles of just some of Dr. Kletz’s many authoritative books display his keen f
“Lessons from Accidents,” “Process Plants – a Handbook for Inherently Safer Des
Industry.”
 So today we mourn the loss of Trevor Kletz, whose lifetime of work has unquest
prevented – a legacy we will try to emulate at the CSB.

Process Safety Lessons Learned


such as last year’s Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico. On a posit
anymore. Many process industry business leaders and managers are taking a st
protected or not. Still, some are making the mistake of assuming that their past
safety success.
I just read an article by Walt Boyes titled Process Plants Accidents – Careful. We
strong points about the lack of process safety improvements over the past 25-p
process safety management (PSM) ball rolling. Walt once corrected me on a poin
ago, I was talking to him about the need to simplify regulatory compliance and h
goal to strive for. If you are hoping to improve your safety by becoming “regulat
woefully short of actually managing your process safety. The regulatory complia
you are not careful. This is a major contributor to many ineffective safety progra
investigations into the Deepwater Horizon incident, we saw clear examples of ve
goal was to meet the regulatory compliance requirements set by the Mineral Ma
is important to focus on the goal–managing process safety.
In addition to the regulatory compliance goal inadequacy, many of the key point
video title Anatomy of a Disaster are still valuable lessons for the process indust
you to schedule an hour into your calendar and take the time to learn some less
the CSB, I have picked out some of the more valuable quotes from the process s
“There’s an old saying that if you think safety is expensive try an accident. Accid
and claims to injuries but also in the loss of the company’s reputation.”-Dr. Trevo
This week I read the IndustryWeek article, BP Refines Post-Spill Drilling Strategy.
there are already signs of BP’s top management taking a leadership role in drivi
like this isn’t something that can be driven from the bottom up. You need top do
some of the safety culture and management changes that the new CEO Robert D
saying that production shutdowns are costly, but “safety is good business.”
“My fear is that some of the other refineries within the United States will feel, th
couldn’t happen at their site are the ones that are set up to have it happen ther
multinational oil companies testified before Congress that something like this co
kind of industry event. However, the major oil producers did come together afte
all pretty much the same and they were indeed subject to some of the same pro
BP have since formed a non-profit organization, the Marine Well Containment Co
capture and contain oil in the event of another blowout in the Gulf of Mexico.
“Process safety deals with the fires, explosions, and toxic releases and things lik
we call “hard hat accidents” and not for process ones.” – Dr. Trevor Kletz
careful not to be burned by spilled coffee. If you drive down Highway 225 in sou
outside of refineries and chemical plants that display hundreds of thousands of m
While this is very important to celebrate personal safety management milestone
performance. Having a very low lost-time accident rate can induce a feeling of c
managed. Key lessons from recent incidents were the need to focus on leading a
metrics.
“The factThe
thatAIChE Center
you’ve gone for
for Chemical Process a
20 years without Safety (CCPS) has
catastrophic recently
event mad
is no guara
Hopkins
Personal safety focuses on preventing high frequency, lower consequence incide
preventing much lower frequency events with a catastrophic consequence. Man
occur only once in the life of a facility, or even only once in the life of an industr
Some hazardous event frequencies are measured in terms of once in thousands
causes related to a complex sequence of failures in equipment, people, processe
celebrates the personal safety successes while having to fight complacency on t
safety engineers complain that change is hard to justify because current practic
a catastrophic kind of event to invigorate the organization’s focus and commitm
interlocks checking

SoNo Description Logic Set. Pt.

1.      LUB OIL PR.V.LOW  Behind the


  Filter 2-Mar <1.2Kg/Cm2

AXIAL SHIFT VERY 


HIGH    

2.    
  2-Mar ± 1.0 mm

500 0C

3.     HP outer casing Exhaust Steam


  temp HI . 2-Mar (0-600 0C)
COND. PR. VACUUM TRIP
(VSP)

4.     As per  the 


  2-Mar curve
0.70KSC
&turbine 
speed>
5.     6.67%
  COND. PR. VACUUM TRIP (FSP) 2-Mar of3600 RPM

>± 100 0C
&
actual
load > 100
mw

(16.67% of
600MW )
6.     HP CASING TOP-BOT Diff temp
  Very  high 2-Mar

IP CASING TOP-BOTTOM Diff


temp Very  high >± 45 0 C
 (FRONT) &

actual
load > 45
mw
7.     (7.5% of
  2-Mar 600MW )

IP CASING TOP-BOTTOM Diff


temp Very  high >± 45 0 C
 (REAR) &

actual
load > 45
mw
8.     (7.5% of
  2-Mar 600MW )
1050 MM
MOT level

(0-1600mm)
9.    
  FIRE PROT'N CHECK 1 & 2 2-Mar From Top

GENERATOR MECHANICAL PROTECTIONS ( Sl no 10-19)

10.  LIQUID MAINLEADS Level  >


  TOP                                2-Mar MAX

11.   SO TEMP AFT CLR AIR SIDE V.


  HIGH 2-Mar > 55 0 C
11.   SO TEMP AFT CLR AIR SIDE V.
  HIGH 2-Mar > 55 0 C

12.  HOT AIR MAIN EXCITER V.


  HIGH 2-Mar > 80 0 C

13.  COLD GAS AFT CLR A/B V.


  HIGH 2-Mar > 60 0 C

14.  COLD GAS AFT CLR C/D V.


  HIGH 2-Mar > 60 0 C
< 70 %

<48 M3/hr
15. 
  STATOR WNDG. FLOW V. LOW 2-Mar

16.  PRIM WATER TEMP. AFT CLR V.


  HIGH 2-Mar > 55 0 C

< 73.88 %

<1.33
M3/hr
17. 
  FLOW MAIN BUSH 'R' V. LOW 2-Mar

FLOW MAIN BUSH 'S' V. LOW < 73.88 %

<1.33
     M3/hr
18. 
  2-Mar

< 73.88 %

19. 
<1.33
M3/hr

19. 
  FLOW MAIN BUSH 'T' V. LOW 2-Mar

Relay 
186/286
GROUP
Operated
20.
  GEN PROTECTION 2-Mar

21.  MFT  took


  MFT          1-Mar place

22. 3270 RPM


  ELECTRICAL OVERSPEED 2-Mar (109%)
pressed
23. EMERGENCY TRIP FROM THE PB simultaneou
  PROVIDED IN TG DESK (both) 2-Mar sly
Vertical
24. EMERGENCY TRIP from Vertical Panel
  Panel in CCR 2-Mar Console

25. MANUAL TRIP from Local


  protection Rack 1-Jan Pressed
26. Pressed
  Emergency Trip from VPC 1-Jan from CRT
Method of Channel CRT  Trip BHEL 
Field Switches Checking acting Status CRT LVS alarm

MAV 42 CP 016
By draining the pr. P P P
MAV 42 CP 017 Ch- 1
switches in
MAV 42 CP 018 combination Ch- 2 P P P

Simulation DONE 
MAD 11 CY 011 FROM THE  Panel.
MAD 12 CY 011 16% &84%
MAD 13 CY 011 Ch- 1 P P P
(0-50%-100%) Ch- 2 P P P

Simulation DONE 
MAA 50 CT 021 FROM THE  Panel.
MAA 50 CT 022  (84% ) Ch- 1 P P P

MAA 50 CT 023 Ch- 2 P P P


- MAC 11 CP 001 
+ MAG 10 CP 002
- MAC 11 CP 002
+ MAG 10 CP 003
Speed signal & LPT P P P
- MAC 11 CP 003 Ch- 1
inlet pr. Simulation
+ MAG 10 CP 004 in Panel Ch- 2 P P P
MAG 10 CP 002 
Speed simulation in P P P
MAG 10 CP 003  Ch- 1
Panel. & Vac sim  30
MAG 10 CP 004 % Ch- 2 P P P
MAA 50 CT 051 A/B (Top) MAA 50
CT 052 A/B (Bot)
MAA 50 CT 053 A/B (Top)

By  simulation 
MAA 50 CT 054 A/B (Bot)

By  simulation 
from  Panel  both P P P
MAA 50 CT 055 A/B (Top) Ch- 1
Load  &  Temp 
MAA 50 CT 056 A/B (Bot) points Ch- 2 P P P

MAB 50 CT 041 A/B (Top)


MAB 50 CT 042 A/B (Bot)

MAB 50 CT 043 A/B (Top) Ch- 1 P P P

MAB 50 CT 044 A/B (Bot) Simulation in Panel Ch- 2 P P P

MAB 50 CT 061 A/B (Top)


MAB 50 CT 062 A/B (Bot) Ch- 1 P P P

MAB 50 CT 063 A/B (Top) Ch- 2 P P P

MAB 50 CT 064 A/B (Bot) Simulation in Panel Ch- 2 P P P


MAV10CL021
MAV10CL022
By Simulating the
level & also by P P P
MAV10CL023 Ch- 1
pressing the push
FP  PB AT LOCAL button. Ch- 2 P P P
ECTIONS ( Sl no 10-19)
MKA 24 CL 001 
By simulating  the P P P
MKA 24 CL 011 Ch- 1
level switches from
MKA 24 CL 021 local. Ch- 2 P P P
MKW 71 CT 001
Ch- 1 P P P
By Simulating the
temp. switches.
MKW 71 CT 004 Ch- 1 P P P
By Simulating the
MKW 71 CT 005 temp. switches. Ch- 2 P P P
MKC 09 CT 001 
MKC 09 CT 004 
MKC 09 CT 005 By Simulating the
temp. Switches. Ch- 1 P P P
MKA 75 CT 001
By Simulating the P P P
MKA 75 CT 002A Ch- 1
temp. RTDs AT
MKA 75 CT 003A LOCAL Ch- 2 P P P
MKA 78 CT 001
MKA 78 CT 002 A Ch- 1 P P P
By Simulating the
MKA 78 CT 003 A temp. RTDs. Ch- 2 P P P
MKF 82 CF 001 A
MKF 82 CF 001 B

MKF 82 CF 001 C Ch- 1 P P P


by reducing the the
actual flow Ch- 2 P P P
MKF 80 CT 001 
By Simulating the P P P
MKF 80 CT 005 Ch- 1
temp. Switches AT
MKF 80 CT 006 LOCAL Ch- 2 P P P

MKF 83 CF 001 A By draining the


flow switches in
combination & also P P P
MKF 83 CF 001 B Ch- 1
by reducing the
MKF 83 CF 001 C flow. Ch- 2 P P P

MKF 83 CF 011 A By draining the


flow switches in
combination & also P P P
MKF 83 CF 011 B  Ch- 1
by reducing the
MKF 83 CF 011 C flow. Ch- 2 P P P

MKF 83 CF 021 A
By draining the
flow switches in
combination & also P P P
Ch- 1
by reducing the
By draining the
MKF 83 CF 021 B flow switches in
combination & also P P P
MKF 83 CF 021 C Ch- 1
by reducing the
flow. Ch- 2 P P P

MKY 01 EZ 000 A X 401


MKY 01 EZ 000 B X 401 Ch- 1 P P P
By simulating the
MKY 01 EZ 000 C X 401 concant in GRP. Ch- 2 P P P
Ch- 1 P P P
Checked by actually
From FSSS tripping the boiler. Ch- 2 P P P
Ch- 1 P P P
Speed signal
Speed  transmitters simulation Ch- 2 P P P
By pressing   both P P P
Ch- 1
push buttons
PB  from TG  desk simultaneously Ch- 2 P P P
By pressing the P P P
Ch- 1
push button in
PB in Vertical Panel vertical panel. Ch- 2 P P P
By operating the
trip lever in main Mech
Local  Trip PB trip device. Trip P P P
By pressing from Both
CRT VPC CRT Channel P P P
SOE 
Point  in
THL  CRT

P
P

P
P

P
P

P
P
P
P

P
P

P
P

P
P
P

P
P

P
P

P
P

P
P

P
P

P
P

P
P
P

P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P

P
200 mw protections

1
MAIN BOILER

Type
 Natural Circulation
 Dry Bottom
 Single Drum
 Tangential Fired
 Balanced Draft
 Radiant Reheat Type with Direct Corner Fired
 Pulverised Coal System
Coal Analysis
F.C – 25% ; V.M – 20% ; Moisture – 15% ; Ash – 40%
CV – 3200 kcal / kg
U.H.V = 8900 – 130 (A + M) kcal UHV – Useful Heat Value
A – Ash
M – Moisture
Superheater
DRUM
PLATEN PENDENT
SUPERHEATER SUPERHEATER
FURNACE
S
T
A
C
K
ID
FAN
2
Platen Superheater
Heat transfer is mainly due to Radiation.
Q  T4 (Temperature)
Temp  v (velocity of steam)
Pick up (C)  T (Temperature difference between
heating and heated media)
MW
Pendent Superheater
Heat transfer is mainly due to Convection.
Q  T (Temperature)
Temp  v (velocity of steam)
Pick up (C)  vg (Volume of flue gas)
MW
Normal Operating Values
STEAM CIRCUIT
270C 354C 413C 518C 540C
LTSH PLATEN
SH
FINAL
SH
BOILER
DRUM
HP
TURBINE
3
161 ksc 160 ksc 147 ksc
Temperature Limits No. of coils in Boiler
Boiler Tube Metal Temperature LTSH – 120
Platen SH – 29
NORMAL MAX. Final SH - 89
 LTSH 445 485 Reheater Front – 59
 Platen SH 540 565 Reheater Rear - 59
 Final SH 544 565 Economiser – 145
 Reheater 575 605
FLOW (T/Hr) OXYGEN v/s LOAD
NCR MCR
Steam at Final SH outlet 603 670
Steam at Reheater outlet 533 593
Water at Economiser 592 670
Coal flow (Design) 147 162
Coal flow (Worst) 180 200
Primary Air at APH outlet 194 207
Secondary Air at APH outlet 551 555
Total Combustion Air 790 874
100 150
Recommended Boiler Chemistry Limits
Drum operating pressure (kg/cm2) 60-125 125-165 165-180
Total dissolved solids (ppm) 100 50 25
Sp. Conductivity at 25 C (mho-cm) 200 100 50
Phosphate (ppm) 5-20 5-10 3-7
pH at 25 C 9.1-10 9.1-9.8 9.1-9.8
Silica (ppm) < 0.02 < 0.02 < 0.02
Coal Bunker
Weight Distribution Of Ash :
 Bottom Ash hoppers – 20%
 Economizer hoppers – 5%
 APH hoppers – 5%
 E.S.P hoppers – 70%
4
Safety Valves Setting :
VALVE NO. SET PRESSURE
(kg/cm2)
RESET PRESSURE
(kg/cm2)
DRUM : B1 175.8 168.8
DRUM : B2 179.3 170.3
DRUM : B13 181.1 172.0
SH : S-32 163.3 158.4
CRH : R-9 45.5 44.1
HRH : R-19 42.7 41.4
Flue gas path
PLATEN SH REHEATER FINAL SH
1155’C 1014’C 757’C 497’C
LTSH
412’C
ECONOMISER
143’C
DRAFT (mmwcl)
 PLATEN SH Inlet -
 REHEATER Inlet -6
 ECONOMISER Inlet -25
 APH Inlet -37
FLAME
S
T
A
C
K
DRUM
ID
FAN
APH
5
 ESP Inlet -153
 ID FAN Inlet -200
BOILER AUXILLARIES
Secondary Air Path
320 mmwcl 257 mmwcl 163 mmwcl
From Atm. 313C To Furnace
(Windbox to Furnace DP =
140 mmwcl)
FD FAN
Start permissives
1. Control oil pr adequate (> 8 ksc)
2. Blade pitch minimum
3. Discharge damper close
4. Bearing temp. Normal (< 60 C)
5. Control & Lub oil temp. Normal (< 55 C)
Interlock
1. I.D Fan running
Protection
1. Electrical protection
2. Bearing temp high:
Motor – 80 C (A), 95 C (T)
Fan – 90 C (A), 105 C (T)
3. I.D fan trip.
4. Control oil pr. < 6.0 kg/cm2
5. Post purge trip from FSSS.
SCANNAR AIR FAN
Interlocks
1. Closing of discharge damper from fan trip or stop.
FD
FAN-A
APH-A
FD APH-B
FAN-B
6
2. DC scannar air fan will start from AC scannar air fan trip.
3. Emergency damper will open from both FD fans trip.
Primary Air Path
779 mmwcl 740 mmwcl 687 mmwcl
Mill-A
CAG HAG
Mill-B
646 mmwcl Mill-C
Mill-D
Mill-E
Mill-F
318C
PA FAN
Start permissives
1. IGV minimum
2. Discharge damper close
3. Bearing temp. normal (< 60 C)
4. FSSS start permit (Boiler MFR reset & all cold air dampers are < 5% open)
5. One FD Fan running.
Protection
1. Electrical protection
2. Bearing temp high :
Motor – 85 C (A), 95 C (T)
Fan – 95 C (A), 105 C (T)
3. P.A header pr. low. 475 mmwcl (A), 375 mmwcl (T)
4. Boiler trip
PA APH-B
FAN-B
PA
FAN-A
APH-A
7
SEAL AIR FAN
Interlocks
1. Closing of discharge damper from fan trip or stop.
2. Seal air discharge to cold air duct DP low.
3. Auto starting of seal air fan on PA fan starting.
MILL
Permissives
1. PA Fan running.
2. Ignition Permit.
3. Feeder remote.
4. Seal air pressure adequate (> 200 mmwcl)
5. Mill outlet temperature less than 220 F.
6. No unsuccessful start command is persisiting.
7. No pulveriser trip.
8. Tramp iron gate open.
Protections
1. EPB pressed.
2. Seal air P low (<125 mmwcl for more than 1 min.)
3. Boiler MFR trip.
4. PA header pressure lo – lo (475 mmwcl – 2/3 logic)
5. Motor electrical protection.
6. If any PA fan trips , top elevation running mills trip and rest 3 mills remain in service.
COAL FEEDER
Protection
1. Discharge Plugged
2. Belt Deviation – 1st Step (A) ; 2nd Step (T)
3. Mill trip to Feeder trip
4. Hot air gate closed
8
Flue Gas System
-153 mmwcl
-200 mmwcl
-37 mmwcl
-25 mmwcl
ID FAN
Start permissives
1. IGV minimum
2. Discharge damper close
3. Bearing temp. normal (< 60 C)
Interlock
1. Gas path through
2. Air heater running
Protection
1. Electrical protection
2. Bearing temp high :
Motor – 75 C (A), 80 C (T)
Fan – 95 C (A), 105 C (T)
3. Both APH trip
4. Post purge trip from FSSS.
ESP PASS-A
ESP PASS-B
ESP PASS-C
ESP PASS-D
ECONO
MISER
APH-A
APH-B
ID
FAN-A
ID
FAN-B
C
H
I
M
N
E
Y
9
HFO TRIP VALVE
Permissives
1. Boiler MFR is reset
2. HFO pressure is adequate ( >10 kg/cm2 )
3. HFO header temp > 95 C
Protection
1. HFO pressure low (< 3 kg/cm2 )
2. HFO temp low (< 90 C)
3. Boiler trip
BOILER PROTECTIONS:
1. Flame failure
2. Loss of all fuel
3. Loss of 220V DC to FSSS.
4. Elevation power failure.
5. Boiler load < 30% and air flow <30%.
6. Furnace pressure hi-hi (+100)
7. Furnace pressure lo-lo (-75)
8. Drum level hi-hi (+225)
9. Drum level lo-lo (-225)
10. Reheater protection
11. All BFP’s stopped.
12. Boiler both manual trip buttons pressed.
13. Turbine trip and boiler load > bypass capacity (60%)
14. Loss of ACS power.
15. Both ID fans off
16. Both FD fans off
Loss of All Fuel Protection Logic:
¾ ignitors of any elevation ‘ON’ (ARMED)
HOTV closed
All oil nozzle valves closed
Feeder OFF
OR
AND
Loss of All
Fuel
TRIP
10
Boiler Flame Failure logic :
Boiler will trip on flame failure when all elevations are ‘VOTED’ in FSSS console.
Conditions for VOTED in a single elevation:
Feeder OFF
Elevation power failure
3/4 Safe Scanners intensity < 20%
Flickering Freq.< 2.5 Hz (OIL)/ 26 Hz (COAL)
2/4 nozzle valves not proven
Flame failure protection is armed when 1st feeder is taken into service.
Ignition Permit criteria for different Mills :
MILL-A
¾ nozzle valves of AB elevation are proven
Mill-B loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
MILL-B
¾ nozzle valves of AB elevation are proven
Mill-A loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
Mill-C loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
OR &
Ignition Permit
for Mill-A
OR
&
Ignition Permit
for Mill-B
&
OR
AND
VOTED
11
MILL-C
¾ nozzle valves of CD elevation are proven
Mill-B loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
¾ nozzle valves of AB elevation are proven
Mill-B loading > 50%
Mill-D loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
MILL-D
¾ nozzle valves of CD elevation are proven
Mill-C loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
Mill-E loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
MILL-E
¾ nozzle valves of EF elevation are proven
Mill-D loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
¾ nozzle valves of CD elevation are proven
Mill-D loading > 50%
Mill-F loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
OR
&
Ignition Permit
for Mill-C
&
&
OR
&
Ignition Permit
for Mill-D
&
OR
&
Ignition Permit
for Mill-E
&
&
12
MILL-F
¾ nozzle valves of EF elevation are proven
Mill-E loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
Drum Level Protection
TURBINE
IPT LPT
(20 X 2) (8 X 2)
ESV 39 ksc IV 34 ksc
334 C 535 C CONDENSER
0.1187 ksc
36 ksc 34 ksc 49 C
335 C 538 C
147 ksc
535 C
OR &
Ignition Permit
for Mill-F
REHEATER
HPT
(25 X 1)
HPBP LPBP
HW
OR
ACS(L)
HYD(R)
ACS(R)
ACS(L)
ACS(R) HYD(L)
BOILER TRIP
13
Turbine Diff. Expansions :
ALARM TRIP
HP Turbine + 4.5 + 5.5
-6
IP Turbine + 5.0 + 6.0
-5
LP Turbine + 25.2 + 30.2
-12
Cut-in / Cut-out speeds :
1. BARRING GEAR
Cuts In – 250 rpm
Cuts Out – 200 rpm
2. J.O.P
Cuts In – 540 rpm
Cuts Out – 510 rpm
TURBINE PROTECTIONS
 Main Steam temperature very low ( < 460 C )
 Condenser back pressure high ( > 220 mm Hg )
 Bearing lub oil pressure lo – lo ( < 2 kg / cm2 )
 Axial shift of turbine shaft ( + 1 mm & -1 mm )
 Over-speeding ( > 3330 rpm )
 Boiler trip to turbine trip.
 Manual trip Push Button pressed.
 Fire Protection – 1
1) Push Button pressed
2) Operates automatically when MOT level is
< - 50 mm  Alarm appears.
< - 100 mm  Protection operates.
When Fire Protection – 1 acts,
 Vacuum breaker opens.
 Turbine comes on barring gear.
 When MOT level < - 150 mm  MOT level low alarm appears if TG is on barring
gear.
 Fire Protection – 2
Does not operate automatically. It is operated manually by pressing the Push Button.
Then Fire Protection – 1 acts automatically.
When Fire Protection – 2 acts ,
 JOP – 2 and EOP starts.
 Vaccum breaker opens.
 Turbine does not come on barring gear.
14
THERMAL POWER PLANT EFFICIENCY
TURBINE THERMAL STRESS
Surface and Mid metal temperature probes in Casing :
55 % (TM)
95 % (TS)
Rotor Mid metal temperature calculation :
TM = TS [ 1 – (0.692 e –t/T1 + 0.131 e –t/T2 + 0.177 e –t/T3) ]
Where,
TS – Surface Temperature T1 – 2408.31
TM – Mid metal Temperature T2 – 457.08
t – Time in minutes T3 – 56.62
T1, T2, T3 are computed using rotor material thermo-dynamic properties and shaft dia.
Margin Calculation:
T = TS – TM
Thermal Stress  T
Margin = T permissible – T actual
PLANT = BOILER X THERMAL CYCLE X TURBINE INTERNAL X TURBINE MECHANICAL X GENERATO
(30-40%) (75-90%) (35-40%) (88-90%) (99%) (98-99%)
15
T PERMISSIBLE
T
Upper Margin
Operating point
T ACTUAL
0
TM
Lower Margin
T PERMISSIBLE
TURBINE OIL SYSTEM
Gov. Rack
Shut-Off valve
LPBP Signal Oil
Lub Oil (Brg.- 1 to 6)
MOT
Barring Gear
Jacking Oil (Brg.- 1 to 6)
M
A
I
N
H
E
A
D
E
R
MOP
CONTROL OIL HEADER
COOLER
MAIN
OIL
TANK
AOP
EOP
JOP
16
TG Oil Pumps Start Criteria :
1. Lub oil pr. < 7.0 ksc  A.O.P – 1 starts
2. Lub oil pr. < 6.5 ksc  A.O.P – 2 starts
3. Lub oil pr. < 2.2 ksc  E.O.P starts
4. Jacking oil pr. < 90 ksc  Stand-by J.O.P starts
BOILER FEED PUMP
Start permissives :
1. De-aerator level adequate ( 700 mm )
2. Bearing temperature normal ( < 60 C )
3. Lub oil pressure normal ( 2 kg / cm2 )
4. Suction valve full open.
5. Booster pump suction pressure adequate ( > 3 kg / cm2 )
6. Cooling water pressure adequate ( 2.5 kg / cm2 )
7. Re-circulation valve 100% open.
8. Scoop position is minimum.
Protections :
1. Bearing temperature high ( > 85 C for pump & > 90 C for motor )
2. De-aerator level lo – lo ( < -230 mm )
3. Lub oil pressure low ( < 1 kg / cm2 for 5 secs)
4. Discharge flow high ( > 430 T / Hr for 20 secs)
5. Working oil temp high ( > 130 C )
6. Suction pressure low ( < 9 ksc for 30 secs)
CONDENSATE EXTRACTION PUMP
Protection & Interlock:
1. Hotwell level very low.
2. Discharge pressure < 14 ksc.
3. Electrical protection.
4. Auto starting of stand-by pump from discharge header pressure < 16 ksc.
ACW PUMP
Protection & Interlock:
1. Both pumps trip from tank level lo-lo.
2. Auto starting of stand-by pump when running pump trips.
3. Auto starting of stand-by pump when discharge header pressure < 3 ksc.
17
ARCW PUMP
Protection & Interlock:
1. Auto starting of stand-by pump when running pump trips.
2. Auto starting of stand-by pump when discharge header pressure is low.
GENERATOR SPECIFICATIONS
Rated parameters :
1. Max continuous MVA rating : 247 MVA
2. Max continuous MW rating : 210 MW
3. Rated terminal voltage : 15.75 kV
4. Rated stator current : 8625 Amps
5. Rated power factor : 0.85 Lag
6. Excitation current at MCR condition : 2600 Amps
7. Slip ring voltage at MCR condition : 310 V
8. Excitation current at no load : 907 amps
9. Slip ring voltage at no load : 102 V
10. Rated speed : 3000 rpm
11. Rated frequency : 50 Hz
12. Efficiency at MCR condition : 98.47 %
13. Direction of rotation as viewed from
slip ring : Clockwise
14. Phase connection : Double star
CAPABILITY CURVE
MW
Turbine Limit
Thermal Limit
Stability Limit Rotor Current  = Load Angle
 = Phase Angle
Stator Current


MVAR
18
Excitation System
Excitation Power  0.7 – 0.8 %
 1.6 MW
BUS-I
400 KV
BUS-II
(1½ Breaker Scheme)
GT
Tie X’r Excitation X’r
SCR
15.75 kV/575V
AC
(Station DB)
Field Breaker Field Flasher
DC
(DCDB)
Arrangement of Thyristors in a single bridge :
3 AC Input Field Winding
ROTOR
DC Output
G
AVR
19
VDC = 1.35 VAC cos 
‘’ is the firing angle of thyristor. It is usually between 5 – 30 .
Four such bridges are connected in parallel. Total field current is shared by all the four
bridges. Each thyristor in every bridge is provided with the Snubber circuit which protects
the thyristor from heating.
Snubber Circuit of SCR
L Voltage surges are partially charged in the Capacitor ‘C’
thereby saving the SCR from high voltages. Also the
Inductor ‘L’ limits the surge current to some extent.
Resistor ‘R1’ restricts the charging current of Capacitor.
SCR R1 ‘R2’ is discharge resistor of Capacitor.
C R2
Hydrogen gas cooling system
1. Generator gas volume : 56 m3
2. Nominal pressure of hydrogen : ( 3.5 kg / cm2 )
3. Nominal temperature of Cold gas : 40 C
4. Purity of hydrogen : > 97 %
5. Relative humidity of hydrogen at
nominal pressure : 60 %
6. Nominal temperature of cooling
water inlet : 37 C
7. Nominal flow of cooling water : 350 m3 / hr
8. Hot gas temperature (alarm) : 75 C
Stator water cooling system
1. Nominal pressure at inlet to winding : 3.09 kg / cm2
2. Nominal temp. at inlet to winding : 40 C
3. Stator water flow : 27 m3 / hr
4. Stator water conductivity : < 5 mho / cm
5. Stator water expansion tank vaccum: 200 – 300 mm of Hg
20
STATOR WATER PUMP
Protection & Interlock:
1. Expansion Tank level low.
2. Auto starting of stand-by pump from stator water pressure < 2.8 ksc.
Seal oil system
1. Seal oil temperature after cooler : 20 – 40 C
2. Seal oil outlet temperature : 40 C
3. Differential pressure across duplex filter : 0.4 kg / cm2
4. Seal oil pressure at turbine & excitor
end : 5.9 kg / cm2
DC Seal oil pump starts when :
1. T.E seal oil pr. < 3.8 ksc
2. E.E seal oil pr. < 3.8 ksc
3. AC Seal oil pump discharge pr. < 4.5 ksc
GENERATOR PROTECTIONS
1. Generator Differential (Relay – 87G )
2. Stator Earth Fault
(i) Main Protection (Relay – 64G1)
(ii) Stand By Protection (Relay – 64G2)
3. Rotor Earth Fault
4. Stator Inter – Turn Fault (Relay – 50G1)
5. Loss of Excitation / Pole Slipping (Relay – 40G )
6. Negative Phase Sequence (Relay – 46G)
7. Low Forward Power (Relay – 32G1)
8. Reverse Power (Relay – 32G2 )
9. Over-voltage (Relay – 59G )
10. Local Breaker Back – up Protection
11. GT Over fluxing (Relay – 99GT)
12. Stator water flow low (< 13 m3 / hr)
13. Stator water conductivity high (> 20 mho / cm )
OFFSITE
CW PUMPS
Type : BHM-100 , Single Stage
Motor HP : 950 KW
Make : BHEL
21
Capacity : 16,000 cu. m/hr
Bowl Head : 16.36 mmwcl
Speed : 420 rpm (Nominal)
No. of Stage : One
Max. Working pr. : 2 ksc
Impeller Type : Mixed flow
No. of Vanes : Four
Max. Bearing Temp : 70 C
BFV UNIT – 1
BFV UNIT – 2
BFV UNIT – 3
BFV INTERCONNECTION VALVES
COMPRESSOR
Discharge Pressure : 8 ksc
Free Air Delivery : 25 . 68 cu. m/min
No. of Cylinders : 4
Speed : 670 rpm
Protection
1. Air delivery temperature after intercooler high (> 48 C).
2. Lub oil pressure low ( < 1 ksc).
CW-1
CW-2
CW-3
CW-4
CW-5
CW-6
CW-7
22
Air Drying Plant
Exhaust to Atm.
De-pressurise
Inlet
Outlet
Re-pressurise
From Atm.
Steps for ADP change-over :
1. Close exhaust valve.
2. Pressurize stand-by ADP.
3. Give ADP change-over command from panel.
4. De-pressurize.
5. Open exhaust valve.
6. Start blower.
7. Switch on the heater.
AD
1
AD
2
HEATER
BLOWER-1
BLOWER-2
23
DIESEL – GENERATOR
Manufacturer : NGEF
Excitation System : Brushless
Engine BHP : 720
Stroke : 4
Rated Speed : 1500 RPM
Cooling : Stationary water cooled
D-G auto starting is from under-voltage in EMCC.
415 V
50 Hz
EMCC Unit – 1
EMCC Unit – 2
EMCC Unit – 3
ADDITIONAL INFO ON OFFSITE EQUIPMENTS
Capacity of some pumps :
1. L.P Fly Ash Water Pump : 450 m3/hr.
2. H.P Fly Ash Water Pump : 375 m3/hr.
3. Bottom Ash L.P Water Pump : 375 m3/hr.
4. Seal Water Pump : 90 m3/hr.
5. Fly Ash Slurry Pump : 600 m3/hr.
6. Fuel Oil Pump : 100 m3/hr.
Fuel Oil Tank
DG
1
DG
2
2826 M3
24
OPERATION GUIDELINES OF MAJOR EQIPMENT
EHC related emergency situations and remedial actions
Sl
no
Emergency situation Observations Action to be taken
1 M/C is on EHC. Power
supply failure in Pressure
control rack/load control
rack / transfer circuit rack
leading to zero EHC output .
Starting device will become
off automatically due to
EHC fault.
Load zero
Machine on bar with
ESV & IV open
(Turbine not tripped)
EHC fault alarm
( Spd. contr. Active
when Load contr.
P.S.fails—spd. Ref.
Can be increased)
Confirm HP/LP bypass
opening, isolate EHC
from governing rack and
parallely reduce starting
device position from UCB
Reduce boiler firing to
restrict rise in boiler
pressure.
2 M/C is on EHC. Admission
control rack power supply
fails leading to zero EHC
output. Starting device will
become off automatically
due to EHC fault.
Load zero
Machine on bar with
ESV & IV open
(Turbine not tripped)
EHC fault alarm
Zero starting device
feedback
Zero speeder gear
feedback.
Confirm HP/LP bypass
opening, isolate EHC and
parallely reduce starting
device position from local
Reduce boiler firing to
restrict rise in boiler
pressure..
3 M/C is on EHC pressure
control mode and Throttle
pressure set point becomes
zero. EHC output will
increase.
EHC output may go
to 100%. Starting
device will track to
100%, resulting
wide opening of
HP/IP control
valves.
Tracking should be made
off manually and starting
device to be reduced
manually to adust the load
and pressure.
EHC may be isolated.
4 M/C is on EHC, Tracking on
and Strating device becomes
inoperative due to motor
failure/overload/ jamming.
During increase in
boiler firing Boiler
prassure will
increase due to load
restriction by
starting device
EHC output will go
to 100%
Switch off the electrical
module of starting device
and increase starting
device position from local
so EHC can take control.
5 Starting Device gets
continuous close command
due to malfunctioning of
command circuit. Hydraulic
governing will take control,
Starting device
position and Load
will come down
gradually
Boiler pressure will
Try to switch off the
electrical module
immediately before stop
valves closes. Increase
starting device from local
25
load will reduce gradually,
ultimately stop valves will
close and turbine will trip.
start increasing
resulting in opening
of HP/LP bypass.
so that EHC can take
control. Parallely reduce
boiler firing.
6 Speeder Gear gets
continuous close command
due to malfunctioning of
command circuit. Ultimately
complete unloading and
generator motoring may take
place.
Speeder gear
position and Load
will come down
gradually
Boiler pressure will
start increasing
resulting in opening
of HP/LP bypass.
Try to switch off the
electrical module
immediately before stop
valves closes. Increase
Speeder gear from local
so that EHC can take
control. Parallely reduce
boiler firing.
7 Trim device operated due to
malfunctioning/power
supply failure of solenoid
Trim device
operated alarm
IP control valves
will get throttled in
case of partial load
operation.
reduce boiler firing to
restrict rise in boiler
pressure.
8 M/C is on EHC, power
supply failure in CCA panels
only.
All indication lamps
in atrs console will
go off.
EHC output and
Load will become
zero due loss of
GCB close feedback.
All ATRS drives
will become
inoperative
Confirm HP/LP bypass
opening, isolate EHC,
Adjust starting device
from local. Reduce boiler
firing.
9 Unloading due to
malfunctioning of TSE
margin circuit.
TSE indicator will
show abnormal
margins and load
will come down
Speed controller will
be active if load
comes below
10%(block load)
10 Loss of speed signal
AOP & JOP will
take auto start
Lub oil pressure will
come down in case
of breakage of MOP
shaft
26
GENERATOR GAS PURGING AND FILLING
PURGING OUT HYDROGEN BY CARBON DI OXIDE
PREPARATION
1. Make arrangements for hot water, which will be required during CO2 charging.
2. Check for any leakages in CO2 manifold
3. Ensure sufficient number of CO2 cylinders
4. Inform fire fighting
5. Ensure availability of Flash Evaporator
6. Reduce barring gear speed or do hand barring if conditions permit.
7. Inform Chemistry Department about the program.
ACTIVITY:
1. Depressurise the generator casing by venting Hydrogen out to atmosphere slowly by following
instructions /directions given at the gas valve manifold.
2. Bring down hydrogen pressure to 0.2 ksc
3. Set the valves to CO2 charging and HYDROGEN purging position and pressurise generator
casing to 0.4 ksc by CO2.
4. Purge out the gen casing gas mixture by maintaining 0.1 ksc gas pressure.
5. Do gas analysis after charging 15 cyliders.
6. Purge LLD lines, Gas Driers by CO2 for removing any entrapped Hydrogen.
7. Repeat gas analysis after charging every 5 nos of CO2 cylindrers or at suitable intervals .
8. After attaining about 80% CO2 purity put the barring gear in service for at full barring speed for
15minutes for removing any Hydrogen pockets inside casing.
9. Continue hydrogen purge out till aCO2 purity of 98% is achieved.
PURGING OUT CARBON DI OXIDE BY AIR
PREPARATION
1. Ensure availability of dry compressed air .
2. Clean the air filter
3. Connect the air hose to the air inlet line.
ACTIVITY
1. Purge out CO2 by air.
2. Do gas analysis after at least 30 mins. of air purging.
PURGING OUT AIR BY CARBON DI OXIDE
PREPARATION
1.Make arrangements for hot water, which will be required during CO2 charging.
2.Check for any leakages in CO2 manifold
27
3.Ensure sufficient number of CO2 cylinders
4.Inform fire fighting
5Ensure availability of Flash Evaporator
6.Reduce barring gear speed or do hand barring if conditions permit.
7.Inform Chemistry Department about the program.
ACTIVITY:
1. Depressurise the generator casing by venting Air out to atmosphere slowly by following instructions
/directions given at the gas valve manifold.
2. Bring down Air pressure to 0.2 ksc
3. Set the valves to CO2 charging position and pressurise generator casing to 0.4 ksc by CO2.
4. Purge out the gen casing gas mixture by maintaining 0.1 ksc gas pressure.
5. Do gas analysis after charging 15 cyliders.
6. Purge LLD lines, Gas Driers by CO2 for removing any entrapped Air.
7. Repeat gas analysis after charging every 5 nos of CO2 cylindrers or at suitable intervals .
8. After attaining about 80% CO2 purity put the barring gear in service for at full barring speed for
15minutes for removing any Air pockets inside casing.
9. Continue Air purge out till aco2 purity of 98% is achieved.
PURGING OUT CARBON DI OXIDE BY HYDROGEN
PREPARATION
1. Ensure availability of HYDROGEN Cylinders.
2. Ensure availability of NON SPARKING TOOLS.
ACTIVITY:
1. Bring down CO2pressure to 0.2 ksc
2. Set the valves to HYDROGEN charging and CO2 purging position and pressurise generator
casing to 0.4 ksc byHYDROGEN.
3. Purge out the gen casing gas mixture by maintaining 0.2 ksc gas pressure.
4. Do gas analysis after charging 15 cyliders.
5. Purge LLD lines, Gas Driers by HYDROGEN for removing any entrapped CO2.
6. Repeat gas analysis after charging every 10 nos of HYDROGEN cylindrers or at suitable intervals
.
7. After attaining about 80% HYDROGEN purity put the barring gear in service for at full barring
speed for 15minutes for removing any CO2 pockets inside casing.
8. Continue CO2purge out till a HYDROGEN purity of 98% is achieved.
9. After conferming HYDROGEN purity pressurise Gen.casing to 3.4 Ksc.
28
COOLING PROCESS OF BOILER IN STAGE-1 & STAGE-2
After shutting down the boiler follow the steps to cool the Boiler.
1. Keep one set of ID & FD fan in service in cross path i.e. ID-A with FD-B or ID-B with FD-A.
2. In Stage-2 a) for both SAPH keep gas outlet damper closed while gas inlet & air inlet & outlet
dampers open.
b)for both PAPH keep gas inlet & outlet and air inlet & outlet dampers open.
3. Depressurize the boiler to 10 kg/cm2 by keeping HP – LP bypass system charged then close MSV
and open SH header drains.
4. Evacuate RH coils completely keeping only LP Bypass charged for a while.
5. Adjust Secondary air flow at around 30% of MCR.
6. Do not open manholes and do not break sealing of trough of boiler to prevent unaccountable air
ingress.
7. Control drum top bottom metal temperature difference within 50ºC. If the difference goes beyond
that regulate air flow and take FW to drum and drain through EBD. Keep CBD closed.
8. Open SH header vents and drum vents at 7 kg/cm2 and 2 kg/cm2 drum pressure respectively.
9. When drum metal temperature comes to <150ºC drain water wall through LPD.
10. After drum metal temperature comes to 120ºC sealing of trough may be drained and FD fan is to
be stopped. Keep ID fan running.
11. Record the parameters as given in the format.
Time
S
Afl
o
w
APH
gas
I/L
temp
FW
flow at
Eco
I/L
FW
temp at
Eco O/L
Drum Metal Temperature
Top/Bottom
Left Centre Right
29
HP HEATER CHARGING PROCEDURE OF STAGE-1 UNITS
A) CHARGING FROM WATER SIDE :
01: Open FW outlet drains and vents partially for venting and warming up.
02: Open the manual isolation valves before group bypass pneumatic valves FW 36 & 37 and
check instrument air supply
03: Open FW inlet and outlet valves of HPH 5 & 6 and close individual heater bypass valves.
04: Close all the shell side drains and vents including stand pipe drains & vents.
05: Open the isolating valves before and after emergency drip valve keeping watch on
condensor vaccum.
06: UNLOCK BOTH THE GROUP BYPASS VALVES . FW 35 FIRST THEN FW 34.
07: Open the HPH charging line valves slowly and watch water coming out of the vents and
drains
of the heaters. Close dump valve FW-73.
08: Close vents and drains after proper venting and warming up. Pressure gauge at HPH-6
outlet line
will show almost BFP discharge pressure.
09: Give INSERVICE command to group bypass valves.
10: Confirm full lift of spindle of both FW-34 & 35 from local.
11: Close HPH charging line isolating valve
12. B) CHARGING FROM STEAM SIDE:
13. 1: Ensure that heaters are charged from water side.
14. 2: Open the isolating valves of deaerator side drip and cascading drip of HPH- 6
3: Open the shell vents to condensor slowly keeping watch on condensor vacuum.
4: Ensure instrument air supply to all drip control valves.
5: Open ES-6A and 5A slowly and warm up shell side of the heater. Shell side pressure ,HP
heater
FW outlet temperature and drip temperature will start to increase..
6. After long shut down or maintenance of HPH, shell side is to be flushed. Keep Emergency
drip manual valves closed & shell drain(at minus metre) open. Keep watch on drip level and
vac. Normalise after clear water comes from shell drain.
30
7: After around 30 minutes of heating, open ES-6 and ES-5 slowly and observe drip level to
come
to normal value.
8: Observe HP heater outlet temperature to increase.
C: ISOLATION PROCEDURE OF HP HEATERS:
1. Open ES-6A and ES-5A
2. Close ES-6 and ES-5 slowly. Keep watch on drip level so that HP heaters do not get
bypassed from level protection. Observe increase of load.
3. Close ES-6A and ES-5A. Keep watch on vacuum.
4. Keep open manual isolating valve before dump valve FW-73 . Otherwise, open HP heater 6
outlet line drain valve to avoid frequent opening and closure of group by pass valve during
bypassing of HP heaters from feed water side.
5. Give BY PASS command to group by pass valve after 5 min. of closing of Extraction valves.
6. Confirm full closure of group bypass valve from local.
7. LOCK BOTH THE GROUP BYPASS VALVES.
8. Close isolating valves before and after the emergency , normal and cascading drip line.
9. Open shell side drains and vents. Keep watch on vacuum.
10. Ensure full closure of ES-5/5A,6/6A and depressurisation of shell side.
11. Open FW side drains and vents.
31
CONDENSER BACK WASHING PROCEDURE OF STAGE-I UNITS
01: Ensure supply healthiness and availability of Electrical Operator in front of module of
CW valve 2 & 5.
02: Be prepared for manual operation of valve CW 2 & 5 in case of any emergency.
03: Reduce load to less than 120MW keeping watch on vac.
04: Keep both main ejector in service for safety.
05: Close air evacuation manual valve of pass A.
06: Rotate butter fly valve CW 2 by 90 without stopping. Confirm full rotation of the valve from
arrow indicator on the valve mounting.
NOTE: Butterfly valve CW2 must not be left at intermediate position. It must be brought to final
position by manual operation if stuck up midway.
07: Open air evacuation manual valve of pass A . Confirm condenser vacuum to regain to at least to
original value.
08: Close air evacuation manual valve of pass B.
09: Rotate butter fly valve CW 5 by 90 without stopping. Confirm full rotation of the valve from
arrow indicator on the valve mounting
NOTE: Butterfly valve CW5 must not be left at intermediate position. It must be brought to final
position by manual operation if stuck up midway .
10: Open air evacuation manual valve of pass A . Confirm condenser vacuum to regain to at least to
original value.
11: Stabilise vacuum and normalize load .
32
CEP SUCTION STRAINER BACKWASHING PROCEDURE
1. Ensure the CEP is not running and SLC is Off.
2. Isolate the 6.6 KV breaker of the CEP.
3. KEEP THE DISCHARGE VALVE OPEN .
4. Close the suction valve.
5. Close the vacuum equalising valve.
6. Close the gland sealing inlet valves.
7. Open the strainer drain valve and watch whether air is sucking or water is draining.
8. If air is sucking then close the drain valve. Further tighten the suction & vacuum equalising valve
then repeat step 7.
9. After completion of draining, open the backwasing line valve very slowly and observe water
coming out gently from strainer drain. Continue backwashing for 2 to 3 minutes. DO NOT FULL
OPEN THE BACKWASING VALVE AS OVER PRESSURISATION MAY DAMAGE
SUCTION LINE FLANGE GASKET OF THE STRAINER.
CEP NORMALISATION AFTER BACKWASHING
1. Close the backwashing valve.
2. Close the strainer drain valve.
1. Open the gland sealing inlet valves.
2. Open the vacuum equalising valve wait for sometime.
3. Open the suction valve slowly to full open position.
4. Normalise the 6.6 KV breaker.
5. Check the availability and keep the discharge valve open.
6. After selecting the running pump switch ON the SLC.
33
VACUUM PULLING IN STAGE-1
1. Ensure one CEP is running through main ejectors and GSC.
2. Ensure CW is following through condenser. (CW inlet/outlet valves are about 30%opened.
condition. If valves are not in opened condition then in coordination with UCB-1 open the
valves.
3. Line up one gland steam exhauster ( suction valve open and power supply on)
4. Main ejector and GSC drips are in lined up condition.
5. Ensure Vac breaker in opened condition.
6. Isolating valve before seal steam controller in closed condition and upstream drain to
atmosphere in opened condition.
7. Atmosphere drain of ejector steam header (below main ejector) is in opened condition and
ejector steam header drain to condenser closed condition.
8. Ensure manual isolating valves(CA-1,2 near condenser: CA-3,4 near main ejector) are in
opened condition
9. Open the isolating valve of ejector steam and gland steam at dearator floor.
10. Put into service one starting ejector and open warm up drain valve(as 87) of seal steam header.
11. Open the isolating valve before seal steam controller.
12. At about condenser pressure 600 mm Hg start seals steam exhauster and charge seal steam. Put
seal steam controller on auto, observe seal steam header pressure and close vacuum breaker.
13. At about condenser pressure 500mm Hg put main ejectors in service.
14. Line up the drain from atmosphere to condenser of seal steam line & ejector steam header at
5.5 mt.
VACUUM KILLING IN STAGE-1
1. Close the MS stop valves at boiler end(MS-301/MS-302)
2. Depressurise MS line and RH line by opening HP-LP by pass.
3. Closes all the mal drains which were opened during unit shutdown and line up atmospheric
drains of MS/HRH strainer.
4. After closing HP-LP bypass watch MS pressure (digital). If it increases then manually tighten
the MS stop valves.
5. If it remains at 1 KSC then reduce vacuum by taking out ejectors. Wait for VAC dropping upto
500mm Hg.
6. When back pressure is about 500 mm Hg then close the seal steam control valve and close the
seal steam isolating valve at 5.5 mt. Keep open the VAC breaker. Open atmosphere drain of
seal steam line and ejector steam line (At 2.5 mt).
7. Open the starting ejector air valves and watch the back pressure which should be less than
760mmHg.
8. Check from local whether steam is coming out from FAC breaker or not.
9. If steam is not coming out then close ejector & gland steam root valves at deaerator floor.
34
BFP ISOLATION STAGE-1
1. Ensure that pump is not running and lead/lag selection switch is in normal position.
2. Close the discharge valve and isolate the power supply.
3. Isolate the 6.6KV breaker.
4. Close recirculation valve at deaerator floor.
5. Close the suction valve slowly and watch local suction pressure.
6. If suction pressure increases then open the suction valve and manually further close the discharge
then repeat step-4 till suction pressure remains constant.
7. Open booster discharge vent valve.
8. Open booster pump suction drain and main pump discharge drain.
9. After completion of draining issue the PFW.
BFP NORMALISATION STAGE-1
1. Close the drain valves and keep open vent valves.
2. Crack open the suction valve, watch suction pressure and vent the system.
3. After proper venting close the vent valves.
4. Open the suction valve fulluy.
5. Open the recirulation valve at deaerator floor.
6. Normalise power supply of discharge vavle.
7. Normalise 6.6 KV breaker.
8. Check availability.
9. After Opening the discharge valve keep the selector switch in lead position.
35
CEP ISOLATION STAGE –1
10. Ensure the CEP is not running and SLC is Off.
11. Isolate the 6.6 KV breaker of the CEP.
12. Close the discharge valve and isolate power supply.
13. Close the suction valve.
14. Close the vacuum equalising valve.
15. Close the gland sealing inlet valves.
16. Open the strainer drain valve and watch whether air is sucking or water is draining.
17. If air is sucking then close the drain valve. Further tighten the suction & vacuum equalising valve
then repeat step 7.
18. After completion of draining issue PFW
CEP NORMALISATION STAGE –1
7. Close the strainer drain valve.
8. Open the gland sealing inlet valves.
9. Open the vacuum equalising valve wait for sometime.
10. Open the suction valve slowly to full open position.
11. Normalise the power supply of discharge valve and open it.
12. Normalise the 6.6 KV breaker.
13. Check the availability and kept open the discharge valve.
14. After selecting the running pump switch the SLC.
VELOCITY AND PRESSURE DROP IN PIPES
VELOCITY AND PRESSURE DROP IN PIPES
Velocity
The velocity of hydraulic fluid through a conductor (pipe, tube or hose) is dependent on flow rate and
cross sectional area. Recommended fluid velocities through pipes and hoses in hydraulic systems are as
follows:
Service Velocity (ft/sec) Velocity (m/sec)
suction/intake 2 - 4 0.6 – 1.2
return 4 – 13 1.5 - 4
pressure/discharge 7 - 18 2 – 5.5
Use values at the lower end of the range for lower pressures or where operation is continuous. Refer to
the flow/velocity nomograms on pages four and five for more information, alternatively, fluid velocity
can be calculated using the following formula:
v = Q × 0.408

Where
v = velocity in feet per second (ft/sec)
Q = flow rate in US gallons per minute (USgpm)
D = inside diameter of pipe or hose in inches (in)
In metric units
v = Q × 21.22

Where
v = velocity in metres per second (m/sec)
Q = flow rate in litres per minute (L/min)
D = inside diameter of pipe or hose in millimetres (mm)
Pressure drop
Friction between the fluid flowing through a conductor and its inside wall causes losses, which are
quantified as pressure drop. Pressure drop in conductors is an important consideration for the designer
especially in systems where long pipe or hose runs are necessary. The pressure drop over a length of
pipe or hose can be calculated using the following formula, which for ease of calculation uses metric
units. Before proceeding to the pressure drop calculations, the following variables need to be known:
Flow rate in litres per minute (L/min) Q
Inside diameter of pipe or hose in millimetres (mm) D
Kinematic viscosity of fluid (at operating temperature) in centistokes (cSt) ν
Density of the fluid in kilograms per cubic metre (kg/m³) ρ
Length of the pipe, tube or hose in metres (m) L

1. Calculate fluid velocity:
v = Q × 21.22

Where
v = velocity in metres per second (m/sec)
Q = flow rate in litres per minute (L/min)
D = inside diameter of pipe or hose in millimetres (mm)
2. Calculate the Reynolds Number (Re):
Re = 1000 × v × D
ν
Where
Re = Reynolds Number
v = velocity in metres per second (m/sec)
D = inside diameter of pipe or hose in millimetres (mm)
ν = kinematic viscosity of fluid (at operating temperature) in centistokes (cSt)
3. Calculate the friction factor (f)
The formula used to calculate the friction factor is dependent on the magnitude of the Reynolds
Number.
If the Reynolds Number is less than 2300, flow is laminar and the following formula is used to
calculate the friction factor:
f = 64
Re
Where
f = friction factor
Re = Reynolds Number < 2300
If the Reynolds Number is between 2300 and 4000, flow is transition and greater than 4000 flow is
turbulent. For Reynolds Numbers greater than 2300 and less than 100,000 the following formula can be
used to calculate the friction factor:
f = 0.3164 × Re - 0.25
Where
f = friction factor
Re = Reynolds Number > 2300 and < 100,000
In instances where the Reynolds Number is greater than 100,000, friction is highly dependant on the
roughness of the conductor’s inner surface. In these cases Colebrook’s equation, which considers pipe
roughness, is used to calculate the friction factor. However, due to the relatively low fluid velocities
and high fluid viscosities present in hydraulic systems, Reynolds Numbers of this magnitude should not
be encountered.

4. Calculate the pressure drop:
Finally, pressure drop can be calculated using the following formula:
Δp = v² × f × L × ρ
2D
Where
Δp = pressure drop in Pascals (Pa)
v = velocity in metres per second (m/sec)
f = friction factor
L = length of pipe or hose in metres (m)
ρ = density of the fluid in kilograms per cubic metre (870-890 kg/m³ for hydraulic oil)
D = inside diameter of pipe or hose in metres (m)
Conversions
SUS (32 – 99) cSt = 0.2253 × SUS – (194.4 ÷ SUS)
SUS (100 – 240) cSt = 0.2193 × SUS – (134.6 ÷ SUS)
SUS (> 240) cSt = SUS ÷ 4.635
US gallon × 3.785 = litre
inch × 25.4 = millimetre
inch × 0.0254 = metre
feet × 0.3048 = metre
lb/ft³ × 16.02 = kg/m³
Pascal (Pa) ÷ 100000 = bar
Pascal (Pa) × 0.000145 = psi
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