1
SORIANO VS DOZON
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty.
Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar
Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving
moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the
conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the
Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that
he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June
11, 2004.[4] After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was
submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments.[5]
Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did
on July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her
Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had
violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved
moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by
Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota
Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife.
Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven
by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a
prominent member of the Baguio community who was
under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed
the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the]
Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his
car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To
stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door
causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver
knew that the accused had been drinking because he
smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked
elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up.
But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately
and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the
latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell
down a second time, got up again and was about to box the
taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm
around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he
could be pacified and then released him. The accused went
back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the
handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was
on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the
eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them
up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was
handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel
of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him
hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused
so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony
corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this
case, Roberto Soriano.[8]
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the
aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had
lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical
assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr.
Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part
of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001.
On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which
was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction
2
of the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party,
Roberto Soriano.[10]
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon,
who has yet to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the
civil liability to the Court of Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa
recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been
convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of
good moral character, based on the following facts:
1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his
car;
2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault
Complainant only because the latter, driving a
taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted
assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a
gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and
shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply
pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming
evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he
claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent
has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities
to Complainant.[12]
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the
IBP Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner
Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for
a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he
stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his
conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the
only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime
of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt
warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society
in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral
turpitude has been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the
basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected
the employers contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve
moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs
Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court
explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a
pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine
conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the
courts, as explained thus:
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral
turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not
shown by every known and intentional violation of statute,
but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis
supplied)
3
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve
moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-
defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better
understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as
follows:
x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI
employee] was then urinating and had his back turned
when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the
victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy
urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that
position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his
shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released
his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him
several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was
not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of
self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence
of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral
or unjust.[17]
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the
circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his
unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot
complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by
respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm
twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable
actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further
indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the
latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression
that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely
returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot
him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with
a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly
intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral
turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and
feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who
deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate
reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a
member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness,
which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the
persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy
of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his
civil liabilities.[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders
of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is
wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the
trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And
yet, it has been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities
to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill
that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his
violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning
capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon
begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore
what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to
the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral
character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings
4
is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be
justified in suspending or removing them from that office.[23]
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of
good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to
enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.[24]
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and
duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid
of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants
family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie
by making it appear that it was complainants family that had sought a
conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely
implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other
persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:
The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three
(3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support
his allegation that three people including the complainant
helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries
he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not
downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said
were bent on beating him to death could do so little
damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainants version of the incident particularly when he
said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.[28]
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of
the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good
faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public
perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which
he should be disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to
practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they
are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times
conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31]
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of
the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP
proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate
and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not
hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser
penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the
Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so
despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession.
We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable
with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a
shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege
demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition
precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice
of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending
circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness
to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness,
treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to
continue as a member of the bar.
5
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby
DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member
of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14)
years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought
to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to
the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese
citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao,
La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course
at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the
1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September
1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition
that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November
1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission
showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing
that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released
and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the
successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because
of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take
his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he
was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same
resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents
evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the
"legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the
1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An
Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an
inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon
reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two
(2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making
the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must
be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
6
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the
age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO,
supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940,
Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op.
Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over
seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his
Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance,
both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared
myself as one in my school records and other official
documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public
Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I
was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and
sworn to by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my
oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La
Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing
fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the
question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a
"reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age
of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
"(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should
not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If
the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it
7
remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the
1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order
to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof,
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time
period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made.
The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this
Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions,
the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on
the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase
"reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the
three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and
that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years
is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under
the constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when the person concerned has always considered himself
a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16,
1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15,
1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or
over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already
thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A.
No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached
the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the
privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay
in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching
erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a
refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of
which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic)
legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right
of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act
of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as
of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was
about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in
the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s].
These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. 16
8
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances
obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625.
Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not
be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare
to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a
natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina,
is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be
necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse,
29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953;
Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither
could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a
formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we
held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of Philippine
citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship
as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare
rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship.
For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came
up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be
less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for
public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
because he is a national of two countries. There is no
doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when
he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on
the part of the private respondent would not only have
been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an
absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However,
even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his
having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is
a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
9

with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching

failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years
that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M.
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of
majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship
that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be Philippine citizenship.1[1] On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm
practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M.
and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
from his grasp.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D.
cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the
Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
Rules of Court:

SO ORDERED.
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines,
at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character,
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO B.M. No. 1678 and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before
RESOLUTION the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
CORONA, J.: character, and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.
10
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that,
by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has
again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the
practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers
oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant
with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2[2] It is
so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of
the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare.3[3]
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal
profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach
by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4[4]
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and
who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of
Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a
resident of the Philippines.5[5] He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines.6[6]
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
11
qualifications;7[7] passing the bar examinations;8[8] taking the lawyers
oath9[9] and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court
of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10[10]
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good
standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means continued membership
and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11[11]
payment of the annual professional tax;12[12] compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13[13] faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being
continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14[14]
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by
law.15[15] Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words,
the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice
law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.16[16]
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired
pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].17[17] Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA
12
9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession
in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its
provisions (he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit
to engage in such practice.18[18] Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership
dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as
a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above
and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which
he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH BY ARTHUR M.
CUEVAS, JR.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar
Examinations.i[1] His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the
Courts resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the
Bar Examinations subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same,
(he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyers oath pending approval of the
Court x x x due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioners
participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS,
a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in
September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of
the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for
and was granted probation. On May 16, 1995, he was discharged from
probation and his case considered closed and terminated.
In this petition , received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that
he be allowed to take his lawyers oath at the Courts most convenient
timeii[2] attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character
issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the
Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan
of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the
IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph
Cathedral, San Jose, Antique, and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral
Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the
Court, before acting on petitioners application, resolved to require Atty.
Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I.
13
Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Courts directive,
Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows:
1 He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in
allowing him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to
take the lawyers oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such
gesture.
2 He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its
resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No.712 that the infliction of
severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental
or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of
the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-
defendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but
murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes helpless and defenseless
condition when they were beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray
dog, suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of
superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524).
3 He, however, has consented to the accused-students plea of guilty to the
lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including
the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the
accused who went together at his house in Lucena City, literally kneeling,
crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in
1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported that the
father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his sons
involvement in the case.
4 As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the
criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son
in whom he has a high hope to become a good lawyer to succeed him, he
still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget.
5 He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has
become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He
politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the
Hon. Court. iii[3]
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan
and commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty.
Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that [h]e is not, right now, in a position to say
whether petitioner since then has become morally fit x x x and submits
petitioners plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound
and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for
disallowing petitioners admission to the noble profession of law. His
deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte
which resulted to the latters untimely demise indicates absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a
privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of
intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the
entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been
admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court,
nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it
recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioners co-accused below, to
take the lawyers oath.iv[4]
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.s discharge from probation without any
infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications
attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he
has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral
character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The
Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice
of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.v[5] Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyers
oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of
flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is
exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly
according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to
paraphrase Mr. Justice Padillas comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of
Al Argosino To Take The Lawyers Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19,
1997, [t]he Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Cuevas, Jr., will continue with
the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will
14
now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.vi[6]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.
Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyers oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a
date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let
this resolution be attached to petitioners personal records in the Office of
the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
[B.M. No. 832.November 27, 2001]
IN RE: MATTER OF ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-
TAKING OF SUCCESFUL BAR APPLICANT TULIAO et al.
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated
NOV 27 2001.
B.M. No. 832 (In Re: The Matter of Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking
of Successful Bar Applicant Blas Antonio M. Tuliao, Blas Antonio M.
Tuliao, petitioner.)
Submitted for resolution is a petition of Blas Antonio M. Tuliao, filed on
January 7, 1998, seeking to take the lawyer's oath. Petitioner Tuliao passed
the bar examinations administered in 1996.The Court, however, deferred his
oath taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide in 1993.
On January 20, 1992, petitioner and his seven (7) other fraternity brothers
were originally charged with Homicide for the death of Raul Camaligan
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81.Petitioner and
his fraternity brothers were, at the time, students at the San Beda College of
Law and members of the Lex Taliones Fraternitas.Camaligan was among
their new recruits when he met his untimely death at the hands of his
would-be fraternity brothers during the initiation rites.Petitioner and his
seven (7) co-accused, among whom were Al C. Argosino and Arthur M.
Cuevas, Jr., later withdrew their original plea of not guilty and upon re-
arraignment pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide.On January 11, 1993, the trial court convicted all the
eight (8) accused including herein petitioner Tuliao and imposed the penalty
of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years for each of them.
Incidentally, the hazing incident, subject of said criminal case, happened
before the Anti Hazing Law (R.A. No. 8049) took effect on September 15,
1998.The plea bargaining of petitioner Tuliao and his co-accused as well as
the rendition of the judgment of the trial court in that case also happened
before the Supreme Court enacted on August 11, 1998 Circular No. 38-98
providing that the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, can only plead guilty to a lesser offense provided the lesser
offense is necessarily included in the offense charge.
Petitioner later applied for probation which was granted by the trial
court.On July 7, 1995, he was discharged from probation and the case
against him was ordered closed and terminated.
In 1996, petitioner was allowed by the Court to take the bar examinations
subject to the condition that should he pass the same, he shall not be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath until further orders by the Court.Petitioner
successfully hurdled the bar examinations given in 1996.
On January 7, 1998, petitioner filed the present petition to allow him to take
the lawyer's oath on the basis that "he is now in possession of good moral
character and that he has reformed his life after conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide."
In support of his petition, petitioner presented certifications from
individuals who are of known probity and integrity and who had known him
for a significant period of time.Among those who issued certifications and
vouched for the good moral character of petitioner were: (1) Archbishop
Diosdado A. Talamayan 1 Annex "B", Records, p. 6. (2) Rev. Msgr.
Marcelo C. Bassig 2 Annex "C", Records, p. 8. (3) Bro. Pete Calucag
15
3
Annex "D", Records, p. 9. (4) Dean Raymundo A. Briones 4Annex "E",
Records, p. 10. (5) Atty. Teofilo E. Untalan 5Annex "G", Records, p. 13. (6)
Retired Justice Oscar R. Victoriano 6Annex "H", Records, p. 14. (7) Judge
Pedro R. Santiago 7 Annex "I", Records, p. 15.And (8) Atty. Enrico G.
Gilera. 8 Annex "J", Record, p. 16.
Petitioner likewise invited the attention of this court to the fact that he and
his seven (7) co-accused and the family of the deceased Raul Camaligan
established a scholarship foundation known as the Raul Camaligan
Scholarship Foundation.
Finally, petitioner presented a certification 9 Annex "F", Records, p. 12.
from the Commission on Human rights led by chairperson Aurora P.
Navarette-Recina commending his performance in said office as "Attorney
III."The Commission noted that petitioner "has performed and continued
with zeal in his endeavor to provide excellent legal service to the
underprivileged." The Commission added has exhibited true advocacy for
human rights while showcasing the nobility of an officer of the court and
that his admission to the bar "will all the more maximize his potentials and
thus be an asset to the profession."
On February 3, 1998, We required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, the father of
the deceased Raul Camaligan, to comment within ten (10) days from notice.
Atty. Camaligan, in his comment, stated that, as a Christian, he has
forgiven the petitioner and his co-accused in the criminal case for the death
of his son.However, he stated that he was not in a position to determine
whether petitioner has become morally fit for admission to the noble
profession of the law.He submitted the matter to the sound and judicious
discretion of the Court.
On March 2, 2000, Deputy Clerk of court and Bar Confidant, Atty. Erlinda
C. Versoza, recommended that petitioner Tuliao be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath. 10 Records, pp. 25-28. She noted that petitioner had been
discharged from probation by the trial court of Quezon City as early as July
7, 1995 and that the case against him has been ordered closed and
terminated.Moreover, his two (2) co-accused, Al C. Argosino and Arthur
M. Cuevas, Jr. have been allowed to take the lawyer's oath on March 19,
1997 and January 27, 1998 respectively.
The Committee on Legal Education, which was required by this Court to
submit a report and recommendation, likewise gave a favorable
recommendation 11 Report and Recommendation of the Committee on
Legal Education, Rollo, pp. 39-40. for petitioner anchored mainly on the
ground of fairness, equal treatment and protection.The Committee opined
that since petitioner's said two (2) co-accused in the criminal case have been
allowed to take the lawyer's oath, there was no reason to accord a different
treatment to petitioner.
Petitioner's discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant
conditions therein and the various certifications attesting to his good moral
character and civic consciousness show that petitioner Tuliao has
sufficiently proven that he is now morally fit to be admitted to the Bar and
to take the lawyer's oath.In allowing petitioner Tuliao to take the lawyer's
oath, the Court recognizes that petitioner Tuliao is not inherently of bad
moral fiber.He has also taken decisive steps to atone for the unfortunate
death of Raul Camaligan.
It is significantly noted that the case of petitioner Tuliao arose out of the
same hazing incident as that of Al C. Argosino and Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.
who have been allowed by this Court to take the lawyer's oath on March 19,
1997 12 Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter
No. 712, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 26. and January 27, 1998, 13 In Re:
Petition To Take The Lawyer's Oath By Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., Bar Matter
No. 810, January 27, 1998, 285 SCRA 59. respectively.The dispensation of
justice should be even-handed and consistent.
Petitioner Tuliao is reminded that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality
for entering the noble profession of the law.He is exhorted to conduct
himself beyond reproach at all times and to live in accordance with the
lawyer's oath and to abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility.As a
16

new lawyer, he is advised to be a man for others, ready and willing to

render legal and other services to the less fortunate among our people.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves to

GRANT the petition, and to ALLOW petitioner Blas Antonio M. Tuliao to
take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of
Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.Buena, J., abroad
on official busines